My View On The American Withdrawal From Afghanistan

BY Daniel Calbi

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The events of the past two weeks in Afghanistan do not completely surprise me. The speed and swiftness with which they occurred was unforeseen. Prior to the U.S. invasion in winter 2001, the Taliban provided safe harbor to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The United States’ primary mission in Afghanistan since 2001 was counterterrorism, not nation building. My thoughts on the United States withdrawal come from the perspective of counterterrorism, not nation building.

There are many questions that appear unanswered regarding the sudden and rapid downfall of the Afghan Government. In the forefront are the following questions that need to be addressed– who were the leaders in the United States telling Donald Trump in late 2019 and early 2020, and Joe Biden in 2021 that Afghanistan was stable enough to be turned over to the Afghan Government? Was stability a concern, or was a war weary nation the driving factor in the removal of U.S. troops and their support for the Afghans? What steps prior to the U.S. withdrawal were taken to ensure that the Afghan military had the ability to supply their troops with ammunition, food, ensure wages, repair their equipment (most importantly air assets), and that they would not capitulate without a fight?  

President Biden has highlighted that the Afghan military and police are unwilling to fight for themselves, a now proven fact. In countless provinces, and specifically the major cities of Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Kabul the military did not counter the Taliban advancement. The Afghan military was underequipped and minimally supported by their government, making it nearly impossible to gain the initiative and defeat an advancing enemy. I reference my list of earlier questions – did the decision makers in the United States convey to our President that these Afghans were severely depleted of supplies, had little to no air support and little conviction to the fight? Afghan President Ashraf Ghani refused to resign, a tenet of a two-week ceasefire between GIRoA and the Taliban in early August. Yet, he fled the country as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. If the leader of a country is unwilling to lead, is it fair to expect it from his military?

It has become clear over the last few days that throughout the withdrawal process the plan of the United States was an imminent departure regardless of the situation on the ground. During the week of August 16th, 2021, there were over 7,000 troops in Afghanistan, the majority of whom were surged to the country as a response, not a planned tactical withdrawal, to accommodate the rapid exit of our remaining citizens and partners. It is possible that the United States government expected the Taliban would regain control, and simply miscalculated the timing in which it would occur. One can argue the morality of that decision, but the premier issue in the execution of the United States withdrawal is that it was not completed before the country fell. The misjudgment regarding the power of the Taliban and the fragility of the Afghan Government cannot be overlooked.

The Wall Street Journal reported on August 17th, 2021, that senior military and intelligence officials warned the Biden administration that a rapid, untimely exit from Afghanistan could have dire consequences. It seems that the reality of this exit was even more serious than they anticipated. No matter the circumstance of the discussions between senior officials and the White House the U.S. military answers to the American people, and acts at their will via elected officials.  It is unnerving that military, intelligence and other governmental agency leadership were unable to conjure a plan that met the timeline provided to them by the Biden administration or that the White House disregarded the findings of their senior leaders.

During my tenure in the country, 2015-2019, the Afghans were incapable of fighting on their own and relied heavily on logistical and military support of coalition partner nations. What was done at the strategic level to alleviate this issue or ensure that the United States had the necessary time and assets for an orderly and safe exit? I’m not confident that senior leaders of the United States can  provide a clear answer. America is beyond fortunate that we suffered no casualties from the blitzkrieg-like advancement of the Taliban. What has and will continue to suffer is the Afghan people and the greater Central Asia region.

Will this new, emboldened Taliban revert to their old ways, or will they honor their pledge to not allow Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to operate within their borders? Time will tell, but what is certain is that the manner in which the United States departed from the region is a calamitous black eye that will have repercussions for years to come.


Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. Read full bio here.

U.S., Israel must prepare for Iran possibly not rejoining JCPOA

By Yochai Guiski

The realization that Iran under President Ebrahim Raisi may not wish to move forward with the nuclear negotiations and recommit itself to the nuclear deal (JCPOA) has dawned on decisions makers and analysts in Israel and the United States in recent weeks.

This should come as no surprise. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, never had any real interest in the deal in the first place. He was always very suspicious of the notion of a deal, as he feared it would bring the “corrupting” influence of the West to Iranian society. He has always favored perseverance and resistance to the West’s influence, even at great economic cost.

Although there are other approaches in Iran, such as the one championed by former president Hassan Rouhani, it is ultimately the Supreme Leader’s reservations that need to be addressed to get to a deal.

Any scholar in the field of decision making can explain that a deal is reached when three conditions are met – the deal itself is worthwhile (and there is a path to reach it), there are no better options for either participant, and the benefits of having a deal outweigh the prospects of not having one.

For example, reaching a deal to sell a car for 10,000$ requires that you have a buyer willing to pay; that you don’t have an alternative buyer willing to pay 11,000$; and that you are willing to part ways with the car (it would not leave you unable to work or move around).

When analyzing the JCPOA, one can see that a deal was reached because:

1.       Iran was promised economic benefits and sanctions relief, while keeping the core of the nuclear program intact, and being able to gradually grow it over time.

2.       There was no alternative to a deal with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1), and no real way to avoid dealing with the demands of the U.S. and the Europeans, since they controlled the world financial system, and China and Russia were unable and unwilling to oppose them.

3.       The option of not having a deal would have entailed more sanctions and economic hardship, and even a military escalation, which may have put the survival of the regime at stake.

The sum of these three conditions, and the Supreme Leader’s cautious nature, was great enough to overcome the supreme leader’s aversion and led him to “drink form the poisoned chalice” and accept the deal after being  persuaded by President Rouhani and his ministers.

The current situation is very different:

1.       The benefits of a deal have shrunk considerably. Six years into the JCPOA, Iran has learned it cannot trust the U.S. to live up to its end of the bargain; that the private sector is extremely risk averse regarding investment in Iran; and that a decarbonizing western economy would not be a good fit for an oil and gas exporting Iran.   

2.       China has emerged as a significant possible alternative to economic ties with the West. China is now Iran’s most important economic partner, it is hungry for oil and gas, has signed a strategic partnership agreement with Tehran and sees it as part of its “Belt and Road” initiative. Even if Beijing may view Iran as just a small part of its growing Middle East portfolio (which includes strong ties to the UAE and Saudi Arabia), the view from Tehran is different.

3.       The possibility of war because of a “no deal” situation is practically nonexistent (after no response to Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia and the downing of a U.S. spy plane, and the U.S. strategy of accepting the situation in North Korea and Afghanistan). Sanctions are still in place, but the Iranian leadership thinks the worst has passed, and Iran has been able to adjust to the sanctions.

Under these conditions it is no surprise that the Supreme Leader has been unwilling sign off on a return to the JCPOA, this even while Rouhani was still president (and supposedly pushing for it).

It seems that the Supreme Leader was looking for something else when he allowed Iranian diplomats to return to the negotiating table (while not allowing them to directly negotiate with their U.S. counterparts):

1.       Extract concessions and sanctions relief from the U.S. during the negotiations, without returning to the deal itself.

2.       Deny the U.S. the capability of applying pressure on Iran, for fear of being blamed for the failure of the negotiations and being seen as a warmonger by different political actors in the U.S.

3.       Provide time and space to advance the nuclear program, and other regional activities, while the U.S. is deterred (as bargaining chips and as tangible assets).

4.       Create the conditions to enhance Iran’s ties with China, as its economic and political future, while Tehran uses the negotiations to embarrass the U.S. and show its abuse of power.  

Up until now Iran’s logic has proven itself to be precise, as its actions have led to few consequences. The U.S. and Europe are not inclined to pressure Iran or lead to a crisis with Tehran, even as it enriches uranium to 60%, commences work on uranium metal, operates advanced centrifuges, and attacks various ships at sea and in port. All the while, China and Russia are still on Iran’s side and are calling on the U.S. to address Iran’s demands.

Going forward, one can expect Iran to continue the following trends:

1.       Dragging out the negotiations, possibly in the hopes of strong-arming their counterparts to accept the status of Iran’s program as “fait accompli” and not rolling it back much.  

2.       Aspiring to enhance its relations with China.

3.       Advancing the nuclear program: With a new hardline leadership and the understanding that no one will stop it, there is no telling when and if Iran would stop. Iran might even eventually decide to develop a nuclear device if it assesses that there is no credible U.S. military threat, and that the world might prefer to accept the situation and blame the Trump administration for the mess, instead of confronting Iran.

4.       The growing pressure on Iran’s government from the accelerating Covid outbreak (Iran now ranks third in the world in the number of newly infected individuals) may play a part in a change of heart and a return to the JCPOA, but that seems unlikely.

The belief that Iran is willing to rejoin the deal and the view that acceleration of its nuclear program is aimed at attaining bargaining chips for the negotiating table have allowed Iran to advance its program without real cost (even if actions attributed to Israel set the program back in a few areas). Thus, it is imperative to make sure that Secretary of State Blinken’s statement that “negotiations cannot go on indefinitely” is translated into plans and action both in the U.S. and Israel.


LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

SOME DEMOCRACIES CAN WITHDRAW. ISRAEL IS NOT ONE OF THEM.

By Benjamin Anthony

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The unilateral withdrawal from Gaza removed 8,500 Israeli citizens and soldiers from the enclave. Twenty one Jewish communities within the Gaza strip were uprooted. The final resting place of those Israelis buried within the Strip proved to be anything but final, as their bodies were exhumed for reburial inside Israel. The loss felt by those who mourned for them was renewed. Synagogues were razed and the agricultural infrastructure used by Jewish communities in the Strip to make the desert bloom and to attain self-reliance were smashed by Palestinian-Arabs hell bent on pursuing perennial reliance on the international community and wanton self-immiseration; to be weaponized against the Jewish state.

The government that oversaw Israel's withdrawal from Gaza failed to provide appropriate housing, employment or compensation to too many displaced Jews who needed to rebuild their broken lives. Unilateral withdrawal, a gambit served up by a Prime Minister of the Israeli right and feted by many on the left as one that would grant Israel greater international approval - a naive hope if ever there was one - fashioned a permanent rend within Israeli society. No international legitimacy followed. No domestic consensus was forged. Some gambit.

This commemoration of the disengagement coincides with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the scenes resulting from that policy are internalized and judgement best rendered by Americans, it is appropriate to highlight those aspects of unilateral withdrawal that are particular to the state and the citizens of Israel, contrasting as they are with the experiences of most democracies, with a view to ensuring that even as others may have the luxury of pursuing such a policy, Israel has no such option.

Typically, when democracies withdraw from a stronghold, the majority of their civilians observe the fallout from afar. The homefront is rarely impacted directly. When Israel withdraws, its conscripted military, its citizen-soldiers and its home-front feel the effects of withdrawal in their daily lives, for years and generations to come. The folly of unrequited concessions for peace reverberates in Israeli backyards and living rooms; literally and figuratively.

Israel’s unilateral withdrawal tilled the very soil that was once used by Jewish communities into a fertile launchpad for hostilities against the Jewish state. By negotiating no pact of peace with its enemy, Israel entreated all manner of aggression, particularly the rocketing of its communities. In the little more than three years between the disengagement and Operation Cast Lead (2008), the number of Israeli citizens living with steady rocket bombardement rested at one million, including residents of Beersheba, Ashkelon, Ashdod and Netivot. Today, despite three additional defensive operations by the IDF against Gazan terror, Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), Operation Protective Edge (2014) and Operation Guardians Of The Walls (2021), the reach of those rockets has dramatically increased. Added to the aforementioned population centers are areas as far north as Haifa. Jerusalem - the city so 'sacred' to Hamas that they fire rockets toward it deliberately and indiscriminately - is regularly targeted, as are the cities in the Dan bloc, including Tel-Aviv. 

Reprehensibly, it is only once those rocket barrages fall in the greater Tel-Aviv area that the IDF stirs in any meaningful way. Absent that, successive Israeli governments have decreed Israel’s citizens of the south be little more than the "Jews" of the Jewish state - a separate collective sentenced to suffer a double standard; overlooked and ignored. At the time of writing, rockets were again fired from the Gaza Strip toward Israeli civilians there. 

Over five million Israeli citizens, two-thirds of the Jewish population of the Jewish state, now face a reality wherein terrorist organizations determine the timing and intensity of when they will be terrorized. Were that dynamic superimposed onto an American map, if the U.S. began absorbing rocket fire from her eastern flank, all states up to Colorado and all citizens therein, would find themselves in the firing line.  

Also particular to Israel is that the price of wrong-headed policies is paid not by professional men or women-at-arms who elect to join the military, but by its civilians and its citizen-soldiers. 

The IDF certainly benefits from exceptional professional officers, but the bulk of its wartime manpower is made up by its reservists. These are men and women who serve as conscripts and then continue to report for annual duty as part of the social contract. They are proud to do so. If called to war, however, with all of its attendant dangers, those wars should be as swift and overwhelming to the enemy as possible, in pursuit of a clear strategic outcome.

A smudging of that social contract emerged when the term "mowing the lawn" was coined by Israeli strategists some years ago to describe policy toward Gaza. The term was applauded for its pithiness and wisdom. But neither the phrase nor the policy it describes were ever wise and the subject matter is ill-suited to cheap sloganism.

The reservists mobilized to carry out the policy are Israel's professionals and entrepreneurs. They are Israel's fathers and mothers. Only utterly detached governments could view a policy that drafts such individuals from their boardrooms to the battlefield - with a frequency more intense than that of World Cup soccer tournaments - as reasonable. 

Drafting the same individuals, to face down the same enemy, with the same lack of conclusion; who return from the battlefield escorted by the same foreboding sense that they will soon return to the same fray, within the coming few years is not a serious policy. Men and women, drafted by the tens of thousands, cannot be asked to place their lives on the line in pursuit of 'mowing the lawn,' a clear legacy of the disengagement.  

The author was drafted into two such inconclusive campaigns. He has no wife and no children and so listened carefully to the conversations of his fellow reservists as they wished their first child goodnight in 2012 and their second child the same in 2014. These men have too much at stake to be disrupted so dramatically, as do those who await their return from combat.  

Strategists often argue that the pursuit of conclusive military outcomes requires large scale campaigns that yield large scale casualties. As a result, the still only effective method of destroying terror organizations, a sustained incursion by the ground forces, is avoided at almost any cost. Witness again the sullying of the social contract. It is the task of the military to defend the citizenry, not the other way around. Since the disengagement, Israel’s citizenry has borne increasingly more of the brunt of what emanates from the Strip and they have been designated to do so in order to spare the military. The appropriate dynamic has been inverted and must be righted once more. 

All military casualties are painful, but a ground force as casualty-averse as Israel's has become, risks no longer being a ground force at all. Gradually, it will become something of a police force, best used in matters of law enforcement, not in war-fighting. The IDF has long traded on the power of deterrence. Yet where Gaza is concerned, it is clear that not only has Israel lost much of its deterrence - tragically it is Israel that has now become deterred. 

Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza provided Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad with the space and time to expand, plan and execute. Israel’s weakest enemy has evolved into a strategic threat. A game Hamas, if joined by Hezbollah or another, will stress test to the maximum Israel's ability to defend herself on two fronts simultaneously.  

Many invoke the disengagement as evidence that Jewish populations in Judea and Samaria may also be uprooted in exchange for a viable peace. Such opinions ought to be viewed askance. They ignore the lessons of the past and of the present. Far more congruent with the consequences of the Gaza withdrawal is the realization that unilateral withdrawal has not and will not work. Repeating the errors of Gaza in Judea and Samaria will simply repeat and expand the list of crises Israel faces. It’s societal rift will deepen and likely turn violent. Vacated territory will become a larger hotbed for terror. Israel's main population areas will be not at the furthest limits of its enemy’s firepower but in the near ground and when Israel defends itself, it will garner only greater international criticism, sanction and censure; and it will have to draft ever more of its citizens to fight the same conflict against a never changing enemy. 

Some speak of the demographic threat to Israel to justify further withdrawal. Even if real, such an eventuality is far from upon Israel. Israel would be wiser to avoid present kinetic threats than to pursue policies that defer to perceived threats that may never actualize. Rejecting further concessions would be a good first step.

How to resolve Gaza is unclear. But one teaching from Israel's experience that must be internalized by all is that the policy of unilateral, territorial concession is unworthy of consideration. It merely lays the ground for engagement with a bolder, better equipped and more proximate enemy; one that will harass and harm Israel for as long as the Jewish state exists. What other democracies do, Israel shall not emulate. 


Benjamin Anthony is Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, Benjamin brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. Read full bio here.

I Served in Afghanistan. This US Policy Is Disgraceful.

By Micah Jones

By the time this piece is published, the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan will be complete. In seeing the images of Taliban fighters riding in stolen American vehicles, Afghans waiting in line at government passport offices hoping to flee the country, and US Army helicopters evacuating diplomatic personnel, I have been overwhelmed with emotion over the complete and utter waste that has occurred following America’s disastrous withdrawal.  Besides the incomprehensible human suffering that will undoubtedly unfold, particularly for Afghan women and minorities, I am disgusted by the damage that America’s retreat has already done to the United States’ credibility among both its allies and enemies alike.

I served in Afghanistan from September 2014 to September 2015. I initially worked as an intelligence advisor to the Afghan Ground Forces Command, before being interviewed and selected to be the aide to the brigadier general in charge of NATO’s Rule of Law mission. In this role, I was a given a privileged view of the war effort. From weekly meetings with the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, to discussions with the Afghan Vice President, to briefings with four-star generals, I had the opportunity to be the fly on the wall in the rooms where the decisions were truly being made. Most importantly, I had the opportunity to work with dozens of dedicated and patriotic Afghans who wanted nothing more than to improve their country. I came to know Afghanistan, Kabul, and the Afghan people intimately well.

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Returning home from that year-long deployment, I came away with the understanding that America was likely not going to ever have a decisive victory against the Taliban. Nevertheless, I left Afghanistan truly believing that America, and its NATO allies, were genuinely improving the lives of the Afghan people. Most importantly, I believed that our continued presence in Afghanistan had been successful in preventing the Taliban and Al Qaeda from ever being strong enough to recreate a 9/11-level attack on American soil. Finally, I believed that American bases in Afghanistan gave us broad force projection throughout a dangerous and chaotic part of the world. With borders to China and Iran, American bases in Afghanistan gave the United States strategic leverage to push back against those nefarious actors.

I am someone who firmly believes that America is a force for good in the world. When the United States retreats, the world becomes a darker place. And when it is not American and Western values being shared in an area or projected throughout the world, it is someone else’s, who is likely reprehensible and antithetical to everything we believe in.

With thousands of American troops currently stationed throughout the word, including Japan, Germany, and Korea, I do not believe that it was a heavy lift to maintain a minimum number of troops in Afghanistan. With no combat deaths since 2020, the American mission in Afghanistan had essentially become a peace keeping mission in which the price to pay was small when compared to the dangers that could arise following an ill-timed, and unprepared exit.

Tragically, that is exactly what has happened and what we are collectively watching in real time. The Biden Administration’s complete and utter lack of preparation to facilitate a strategic withdrawal is evident as the Taliban have run roughshod over the country, taking over many provincial capitals in a matter of days. Even worse, America now looks like a paper tiger. We have lost credibility amongst both our allies and enemies.

For our allies, why would anyone risk their life, literally, to work with future American endeavors? Yes, the United States is attempting to bring many Afghan interpreters and civilians who aided the 20 year war-effort back to US soil, but many thousands more will be left behind. I do not trust for one moment that the Taliban will treat them well. Furthermore, why would America’s allies the world over trust us to back them up if they were to go to war? Why would Taiwan now think that the United States would be a credible foil to China? Why would Israel believe that America would back it against Iranian aggression? Those countries would not be wrong for having second thoughts about America’s commitment.

We have also lost all credibility with our enemies. The lesson here is that if you wait out the United States long enough, Americans will cut and run.  It also demonstrates to America’s truly strategic enemies of Russia, China, and Iran, that if America does not have the will to defend its interests in a country where it has all available assets, what stomach, if any, will it have in preventing those nations from exerting more control over their own spheres of influence? China will likely fill the vacuum that we have created, thus extending its authoritarian regime over an even greater portion of the world.

The feeling of disgust that I have in the United States withdrawal in Afghanistan will never go away. But for my generation of veterans who served, and for those of us who will eventually be in positions of power and influence, I hope that we never forget these images and this moment in history so that we do not make these same mistakes in the future. I hope that we never forget the good that we did for so many Afghan people. I hope we never forget our friends who were killed in service to protect the United States of America from future terrorist attacks. And I hope that we never forget that America is a force for good.


Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. Read full bio here.



PODCAST: The MirYam Institute Hosts Secretary Mike Pompeo

Secretary Mike Pompeo: America, Israel & Iran. Regional Threats & Opportunities: Past, Present & Future.

On July 17th, 2021, former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, sat down for a long form interview by Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder of The MirYam Institute, at a private breakfast briefing in Manhattan, NY.

During the interview, the Secretary weighed in on numerous subjects including:

The likelihood of a return to the JCPOA

The support he would have granted to Israel in the event of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities

The credibility of a military threat to Iran’s nuclear ambitions

His faith and conviction in the context of policy making

His views on the Peace to Prosperity proposal between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs.

To learn about the work of The MirYam Institute with U.S. Military Academies, U.S. Graduate Schools and the U.S. House of Representatives, visit: www.MirYamInstitute.org

Universities Must Shift Their Conception of Jewish Students

By Mark Goldfeder

As universities and colleges across the country gear up for the academic year, institutional offices of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) are working hard to schedule programs designed to celebrate difference while facilitating greater inclusion and delivering on the promise of equality in higher education. DEI offices usually focus on historically marginalized populations, including racial and ethnic groups that have traditionally experienced discrimination. So it’s strange that in the vast majority of these offices, there is one historically marginalized and oft discriminated-against group that is routinely missing altogether, if not from the mission statement, then certainly from the mission practice.

The Jewish people.

But why the gap? The reason is that universities tend to think about the “Jewish issues” facing students as a subset of “religious issues,” falling under the purview of their Offices of Religious Life, or any of the various clergy groups on campus, as opposed to a racial or ethnic problem better handled by the DEI office. But while it is true that Judaism is a religion, and that Jewish students do sometimes face issues—such as the scheduling of exams on holidays—that might best be defined as religious discrimination and handled by someone with a focus in that area, reflexively putting Jewish issues in an exclusively religious box is both limiting and wrong.

It is also true that for the vast and ever-expanding number of Jewish students encountering antisemitic hatred on campus, their experience has nothing to do with their religious practice, and everything to do with their racial, ethnic or cultural identity. And for the most part, handling this kind of discrimination falls outside the purview and expertise of even the most well-meaning chaplain. Universities need to realize this, adjust their lenses, and plan accordingly, just as they do for other minority groups that might need assistance.

In an age of intersectionality, appreciating that Jewish students can and do hold multiple identities should not be controversial. Federal law, for instance, has already come to this realization and corrected its own definitional understanding for how to properly protect Jewish students.

Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act requires schools to ensure their programs and activities are free from harassment, intimidation and discrimination on the basis of race, color and national origin. Notably, the Act does not give the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights jurisdiction to investigate religious bias, and so until 2004, OCR was making the same mistake that university DEI offices are still making today: they were declining to investigate antisemitic complaints under their regular well-established framework for dealing with discrimination against other minorities because they saw Jews as only a religious group, and not a race, ethnicity or type of national origin. Because antisemitism fell outside the bounds of the normal system, it was much easier to get away with.

In 2004, however, OCR issued a series of policy statements announcing that they would henceforth investigate antisemitism complaints, to the extent that they implicate ethnic or ancestral bias. As the policy directive explained, “[g]roups that face discrimination on the basis of shared ethnic characteristics may not be denied the protection of our civil rights laws on the ground that they also share a common faith.” This idea has been confirmed in both Title VI and Title VII cases. It is high time for schools to actually put it into practice on campus as well.

Around the country, antisemitism has become entrenched and systemic, with recent studies showing that the number of Jewish students experiencing antisemitism had spiked to nearly 75 percent, and that Jewish students need and want their schools to be doing more to help them. Under Title VI, administrators have a responsibility to protect students and faculty from acts of hate and bigotry motivated by discriminatory animus—including antisemitism—and to proactively work to create a safe environment for everyone. They must ensure that when people discriminate against Jews for being Jewish (as opposed to their religious practice) it is treated as seriously and as quickly, and with the same procedures and processes in place, as discrimination against any other member of a minority group targeted for their racial or ethnic identity.

A step in the right direction toward shifting the framework through which colleges and universities see their Jewish communities would be to have someone in the DEI office specifically attuned or at the very least paying attention to the different aspects of Jewish life on campus. Jewish students across all spectrums, like any other group, should be celebrated for the diversity they bring, and appreciated for the contributions they make to campus life. At the very least they should feel free to express their full identities without fear, and have proper recourse and a designated someone to turn to if they are in fact excluded.


Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Israel Can Carry The Torch In The Fight Against Anti-Semitism

By Nachman Shai

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Like the flaming arrow used to launch the Olympics in games past, the swastika carved into an elevator of the US State Department this week hit its mark at the center of Western democracy and diplomacy, proving that no space is beyond antisemitism’s reach.

The State of Israel is now called upon to rise to the occasion as partners in the united effort to combat antisemitism and respond to hate in all its forms within the Israeli government, in relation to Jewish communities, and on the international stage.

The severe rise in global antisemitic events following Israel’s last military conflict was a wake-up call regarding how events in Israel directly impact the Jewish world. Antisemitic actors took full advantage of Operation Guardian of the Walls to double down on their efforts by transforming Jewish communities into global targets.

Today, Jewish individuals are perceived as representatives of the Israeli government, whether or not they identify themselves as such. Antisemitism rose more than 500% in the UK over the 11-day event. In the US, antisemitic attacks rose by 69% in New York City alone, according to the NYPD. And these numbers were reflected around the world.

But the issue is ongoing. According to the latest Pew study, over half of American Jews reported experiencing antisemitism in 2020, and the Jewish Electorate Institute’s July 2021 national survey found that an astounding 90% of American Jews are concerned about antisemitism. I hear the deeply personal implications of this data when engaging with individuals from South Africa to the UK to the US who share with me their potent fears. Only recently, we believed that such experiences were reserved for the pages of our pre-1948 history books.


Israel must recognize this new reality, and take into account how our actions directly impact the safety, security and communal life of Jewish communities around the world.

As the new government moves in the coming days to pass a state budget and delegate responsibilities and priorities, it is our duty as the Jewish nation-state to put antisemitism at the heart of our agenda by increasing our investment and streamlining our emergency and long-term Jewish community-resilience strategy.

The stark rise in antisemitism, matched with a fresh mindset in this broad coalition, provide us with a unique opportunity to set the foundation for a new paradigm driving Israel’s approach to antisemitism.

THIS PARADIGM must be grounded in the Israeli government’s formal acknowledgment that the safety and viability of world Jewry is not only central to Israel’s identity as the Jewish nation-state, but crucial to our national security and foreign policy approach.

Unfortunately, in previous governments, the work of combating antisemitism was split across offices, with no driving work plan.

It’s time for Israel to organize the many bodies that deal with antisemitism into one framework in order to provide a more effective and strategic response.

The Diaspora Affairs Ministry is the natural convener to organize and lead activities inside and outside of Israel regarding antisemitism. I’ve started this work informally by reporting to the cabinet how communities are being challenged and in what ways they are looking for leadership and support from the Jewish state.

These briefings are based on my daily conversations with Jewish communal leaders who share with me their experiences and needs on the ground.

At the same time, just this week, I led an emergency forum on antisemitism in partnership with the Jewish Agency and Foreign Ministry to discuss pressing dangers facing specific Jewish communities and our government’s response. Within such a forum, the Diaspora Affairs Ministry holds a unique global perspective, with the ability to connect trends, needs and best practices in the field with the government’s developing tool kit.

Moving forward, I will advocate from the budget-negotiations table for an increase in state funding to combat antisemitism, and request the formalization of my office as the focal point for this effort.

Finally, in addition to our work within Israel and in relation to Jewish communities, the state must show up on the global stage. Ultimately, we will only succeed to combat antisemitism if it is taken on as a united and international cause.

As we saw at this year’s Tokyo Olympics that today’s games are launched not with an arrow but with a torch, which burns through the end of the games.

In the same spirit of global unity and responsibility, the State of Israel is ready to carry this torch both today and in the days to come.


Dr. Nachman Shai currently serves as Israel's Minister for Diaspora Affairs. Previously, he was a Member of Knesset, from 2009-2019 as a member of the Labor party.. Read full bio here.

The Shadow War Against Hezbollah's Missiles

By Yaakov Lappin

The ongoing attempt by Hezbollah and its patron Iran to build an arsenal of precision guided missiles (PGMs) in Lebanon and in Syria represents the most challenging conventional military threat to Israel’s security.

With an accuracy of within 10 meters, PGMs give Hezbollah the ability to strike strategically sensitive targets such as power plants, government buildings, military targets, commercial centers, and other potential targets. In essence, this firepower capability gives anyone who possesses it, including a non-state terror army like Hezbollah, its own version of an air force with precise bombing abilities.

In any future full-scale conflict with Hezbollah, Israeli multi-tier air defenses would, despite their high-end capabilities, be unable to provide complete protection. The combination of physical damage to life and property in a sensitive site and the boost this would give to future Hezbollah ‘victory’ narratives represents a top priority challenge to Israeli national security.

Iranian-Hezbollah efforts to set up a PGM arsenal go back several years. According to the Israel Defense Forces, in 2013, under the cover of the Syrian civil war, Iran attempted to smuggle fully assembled precision missiles from Iran to Syria. The missiles were intended for the use of Hezbollah. A series of airstrikes, attributed by the international media to Israel, thwarted those efforts.

This shadow campaign, dubbed the ‘campaign between wars’ by the Israeli defense establishment, continued in high gear in 2014 and 2015, as Hezbollah entrenched itself more deeply in Syria.

In 2016, after the campaign between wars apparently thwarted Iranian-Hezbollah efforts, Tehran adopted a new approach, based on the idea of producing PGMs on Lebanese soil, as well as converting unguided rockets already located in Lebanon into PGMs.

In order to achieve this goal, the Islamic Republic began transferring to Lebanon precision components from Iran, and rockets from the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (known by its French acronym, CERS), an Assad regime agency that develops weapons together with Iran and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s job was to assemble the ‘puzzle pieces’ together into PGMs, and to this end, it began setting up PGM conversion centers across Lebanon, including in Beirut.

The IDF says  the entire program is being managed by senior officers in the Iranian overseas Quds Force. The program is ‘nourished’ through three lines of trafficking, which were planned out by the late Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani: Via cargo flights from Iran, truck convoys, and ships.

Due to what the IDF described in a video as “various efforts,” Iran and Hezbollah struggled to manufacture PGMs or convert ‘dumb missiles’ into guided ones.

In 2019, Iran and Hezbollah again attempted to intensify these efforts, leading Israel to issue multiple warnings to Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah over the grave potential consequences of his actions.

While Nasrallah is theoretically able to convince the Iranians to ‘turn the volume down’ on the PGM project if he were to feel this was necessary, it still remains unclear to what extent Nasrallah has internalized these warnings. This, despite the fact that Hezbollah is extremely busy dealing with - and trying to exploit - Lebanon’s snowballing economic, political, and humanitarian crises.

The crumbling Lebanese state is incapable of stopping these efforts despite the enormous threat they pose to its own security.

Israel continued to expose PGM sites in Lebanon in 2020. In September of that year, for example, it listed several PGM conversion sites in the heart of Beirut, leading Nasrallah to deny the information. He then invited reporters on a dubious tour of the sites in question.

In July this year, the IDF’s Northern Command assessed that Hezbollah possesses between 130,000 to 150,000 rockets and missiles at various ranges. Hebrew media reports noted that Israel is more disturbed by the PGM project than the size of Hezbollah’s arsenal.

It is also worth noting that Hezbollah possesses a number of guided anti-ship cruise missiles, which should also be considered as PGMs. These same cruise missiles could be used to hit targets on the Israeli coastline, such as naval bases.

“The assessment in the defense establishment is that there is no need to conduct a preventative or early strike at this time, since Hezbollah does not pose an existential threat,” Kan reported on July 16. According to the assessments, Hezbollah is not interested in initiating a war in the near future against Israel.

But Hezbollah and Iran are interested in building up the PGM arsenal in Lebanon, and this creates ongoing dilemmas for Israel. From 2013 until now, Israel has apparently decided to respond to the challenge by relying on the campaign between wars.

A reported Israeli airstrike in the area of Al-Safira, southeast of Aleppo, Syria, as well as on civilian and military airports in the area, on July 19 of this year,  appeared to be the latest Israeli preventative move against the PGM program.

According to the Israeli Alma Research and Education Center, which maps out threats on the northern front, Al-Safria has a branch of the CERS agency. 

“We also know that under Iranian auspices, among other things, the precision missile project is involved there,” Alma observed following the reported airstrike. The center assessed that the strikes on Al-Safira were “intended to disrupt and harm attempts to advance the missile accuracy project,” marking what appears to be the latest development in the high stakes shadow war to prevent the radical Shi’ite axis from building Hezbollah’s ‘air force.’

It seems therefore that Israel is continuing to prioritize its activities against the PGM program, but limiting its activities to Syria, based on the common understanding that any Israeli preventative strike in Lebanon would lead to a rapid escalation with Hezbollah.

In addition, it is impossible to view Hezbollah’s PGM program in isolation from the Iranian nuclear program. Iran’s objective to become a nuclear-armed state, or a threshold nuclear state that is on the cusp of nuclear breakout, is designed to provide a nuclear umbrella over its proxies in the Middle East (in addition to creating immunity for the Iranian regime).

Under that scenario, Hezbollah would be able to threaten sensitive targets using PGMs, and enjoy the backing of a nuclear-armed ‘mothership’ state. This combination of threats would surely boost the confidence of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis, and could embolden it to launch future attacks and provocations against Israel as part of a gamble that Israeli decision makers would be deterred from responding with the appropriate level of force.

This scenario contains within it intolerable future costs, meaning that Israel must prevent it from materializing today.

If the campaign between the wars is sufficiently effective at prevention, then this is welcome news, but if it proves to be insufficient, taking preventative action that could incur a high cost today is preferable to sitting on the fence and watching the PGM threat overshadow Israel’s future.


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Ben & Jerry’s unjust desserts

By Mark Goldfeder

Monday, Ben & Jerry’s announced that it would terminate its business relationship with its Israeli distributor because the distributor has refused to go along with Ben and Jerry’s decision to end the sale of its ice cream in the “occupied Palestinian territory.”

The decision came after months of online campaigning by those who were indignant that Israel dared defend itself against attacks from the terrorist group Hamas in ways that regrettably cost some innocent Palestinian lives.

For an American company like Ben & Jerry’s, the decision to align with the anti-Semitic Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, a movement that has been denounced by both major U.S. political parties as well as the majority of states as just another in the long history of boycotts against Jews, is not only shameful; it is possibly illegal.

Since Israel is the world’s only Jewish state, singling it out for boycotts and other punitive economic actions involves blatant discrimination on the basis of nationality and ethnicity. If you are curious as to what this looks like, consider Ben & Jerry’s announcement that it will work to “find a different arrangement” to “stay in Israel” that cuts their long-term Israeli licensee out of sales to the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. The company refused to comment when asked if their products would still be sold in Palestinian-owned stores in those areas (and it is unclear how they intend to continue sales in Israel while boycotting Judea and Samaria, which is illegal under Israeli law), but the strong implication is that if a Palestinian licensee wanted to sell in those regions, Ben and Jerry’s would allow it.

Such discriminatory business practices are contrary to public policy. That is why there has been consistent bipartisan condemnation of the BDS movement by U.S. lawmakers. American anti-boycott regulations under the 1977 Export Administration Act, the Ribicoff Amendment to the 1976 Tax Reform Act and The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act all express opposition to such boycotts. Acquiescence to a BDS pressure campaign could therefore expose a company like Ben & Jerry’s to expensive legal challenges.

Second, boycotting Israelis in a discriminatory fashion violates the fiduciary duties of both loyalty and care that officers and directors owe a corporation and its shareholders. The duty of loyalty requires decision-makers to put the welfare and best interests of the company before their own personal interests (including the desire to virtue signal), while the duty of care requires them to reasonably consider the impact of their decisions on the company’s economic prospects. BDS is bad for business: Thirty-five states already have anti-BDS legislation in place which might block those states from doing business with companies that proudly announce they will henceforth engage in BDS. That means that in many of these states, cafeterias at government offices, universities and so forth will not be allowed to stock their ice cream — and perhaps the much larger number of products made by its parent company, consumer products giant Unilever.

Losing that much market share by politicizing ice cream, all in the service of a controversial and arguably bigoted ideological stance, cannot be justified as good corporate governance.

Finally, Unilever is a publicly owned companyAs such, they are required to file documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission and send disclosures to investors about risks that may affect the company. Presumably, after having agreed to divest based on a years-long anti-Semitic blacklist campaign, their next disclosure report will need to include a paragraph like this: “Investment may involve serious risks, because we are currently engaging in a discriminatory boycott, in violation of applicable laws, and for no discernable corporate or business objectives. We may also incur significant liability and cost in defending the company against litigation and enforcement actions responding to our violations, and will likely incur loss of business from jurisdictions that have anti-boycott provisions in place.” In fact, with reports that Ben & Jerry’s has been sitting on this decision for months, they may already be liable for their failure to disclose.

Unilever has tried to distance themselves from the decision, noting in a separate statement that Ben & Jerry’s Board made this decision entirely on their own. That does not absolve them of legal responsibility for the company they own. If Unilever has made agreements with Ben & Jerry’s that prevent them from controlling such actions, they may find themselves in a position of having to choose between selling off the damaged brand or facing regulatory and legal responsibility for its actions.


Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Israel Needs A Clear Policy On The Palestinians & Israeli Arabs

By Yair Golan

In 2021, some 20% of the Israeli Arab public – 1.9 million people – have come to view themselves as a part of Israeli society. This has found expression in the ever-growing role played by Arab parties in the Knesset, the role that Arab parties play in determining the stability of ruling coalitions, and the engagement of the Arab public by Jewish politicians in ways not seen before.

Alongside the integration process, there are deep frustrations and feelings of discrimination by Arab Israelis, along economic and social lines. But it would be wrong to ignore the fact that a section of the Arab Israeli public expresses fervent Palestinian nationalist sentiments.

In responding to this picture, successive Israeli governments have not come up with one clear policy. There are elements of cooperation and partnership with the Arab public, but there has been no systematic government policy to integrate it. One prominent example of this is the situation of Bedouin in Southern Israel – almost 300,000 people, around a third of whom live in unrecognized communities, in conditions that are not suitable for a modern state.

Meanwhile, skyrocketing violence in the Arab sector has mostly been met with indifference. There have been many complaints about illegal Arab land takeovers and construction, yet nothing tangible has been done to promote a solution to enable legal construction. The issue of building rights is complex, but the State of Israel does not want to deal with it.

According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, an Arab child gets a smaller education budget compared to his counterpart in Jewish state schools. This gap clearly does not serve the Israeli national interest in any way.

Hence, what has been happening is a failure by the state to embrace the Arab Israeli public and to create among it identification with the State of Israel. Such an affiliation could be created if the Arab minority were to feel that it has a stake in the country, enjoys equality, and can make progress. Instead, Arab youths who receive a poorer education and struggle to get into Israeli universities, often end up studying in universities in the West Bank and Jordan, run by elements hostile to the Jewish state. 

The eruption of violence in the Arab sector is inexcusable. Those who are guilty of violence need to be dealt with an iron fist, and to be imprisoned for their actions. Every single person, Arab or Jew, who uses violence must be held accountable.

But we must ask ourselves how to repair this situation. The answer lies in initiating a serous, systematic national project to integrate Arab Israelis.

The same lack of clear policy has plagued Israel’s dealings with Gaza. In 2008-9, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead against the Hamas terrorist organization in Gaza; at the time,  I served as head of the IDF Home Front Command.

The operation, which began with a surprise air raid on Hamas’s bases and a Hamas police ceremony, went on to achieve significant military gains, even as Israeli civilians were exposed to terrorist rocket fire without the Iron Dome missile defense system which was not yet operational.

And yet, Israel did not follow up on this achievement or try to leverage it for political gain. Israel could have explored the option of a long-term, stable arrangement with Hamas. The same mistake happened after the 51-day Operation Protective Edge in 2014, when Israel suffered 73 casualties. Nothing was done afterward to achieve political gains to stabilize the situation.

Former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not interested in paying the price for a long-term arrangement with Hamas.

Had he been willing to, we could by now have had the answer to the question of whether such an arrangement is possible. Had the answer turned out to be negative, Israel would have been able to know that the time may have truly arrived to dismantle Hamas’s military wing and treat it as a hostile army that needs to be smashed.

Yet Israel failed to choose either option –not an arrangement and not the destruction of Hamas’s military wing. Instead, it opted for the in-between grey zone, thus abandoning the citizens of the South to the brutal hands of Hamas.

The idea of restoring Israeli deterrence through firepower alone has been largely discredited. Hamas is prepared to pay a heavy price, and it is not really deterred for a long time. Hence, a clear decision must be made on this front too.

The same indecision has meant that Israel has not been able to deal correctly with the Palestinian Authority. There is no sense pretending that the PA is composed of Israel-lovers. The entity is obviously made up of Palestinians who are deeply hostile to Israel, yet they are able to cooperate with it at the practical level, leading to success on the ground.

For the past 12 years, the Netanyahu governments described the PA President as a terrorist supporter, and put the spotlight on his payments to the families of terrorists. But this focuses on the marginal issues, for it is clear that the PA’s competitor is Hamas, and that it is in Israel’s interest to make the PA looks more successful than Hamas.

Making the PA look like it is working well for its civilians, while Hamas is damaging them, is a core Israeli interest. Yet the opposite occurred. Instead of pointing out to Palestinians that the PA has superior economic development when compared to the Hamas regime, we have spent all of our time talking about how bad the PA is.

Despite the PA’s many and troubling problems, it is preferrable to Hamas, and in the real world, we must choose between bad and worse.

In summary, Israeli indecision has meant that developments have occurred that run contrary to our critical interests. This has enabled Arab Israelis to identify with Hamas and with West Bank Palestinians – in direct contradiction of Israel’s interests. And it has enabled Hamas to extort Israel and grow stronger on our southern border, but without any long-term stable arrangement.

The time for clear strategic decision making, which actually serves the national interest, is now – and the most prominent Israeli interest is to prevent annexation of millions of Palestinians while continuing to explore the possibility of living beside them peacefully.


Yair Golan is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute, a serving Member of Knesset and the immediate past Deputy Chief Of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. Read full bio here.

The final countdown to Abbas’s rule is gaining pace

By David Hacham

Recent events in the Palestinian Authority indicate that the countdown to the rule of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is gaining momentum. This does not mean that the PA is about to collapse as an organized institution of government, but it does raise serious questions about the viability of the Abbas administration.

The recent apparent torture and killing of Palestinian dissident Nizar Banat – now widely called the ‘Palestinian Khashoggi’ by the Palestinian public – seems to signal the approach of a new era in the PA, and it is not at all clear that Abbas and his inner loyalist circle will be able to continue to govern.

In the West Bank, the PA has responded to protests that erupted in the aftermath of Banat’s death with force and with frequent violence.

Abbas might still be able to repel the waves of criticisms and protests he is facing, safeguard the PA’s status, stabilize its rule, and continue to function as a central authority. But that scenario is being cast into doubt by senior Fatah operatives in Ramallah, who assume that Abbas is likely moving toward the final station of his long career.

Demonstrations held to protest Banat’s death saw protesters shout slogans such as “Abbas, leave!”

Added to this combustible mix is the ongoing power struggle that has been raging in recent years among possible successors to Abbas.

Many of Abbas’s critics point out that he led himself to this junction through several critical mistakes. The most prominent of these is his public, celebratory call for holding elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council [originally scheduled for May 22,] as well as elections for the PA’s Presidency and the PLO’s National Council. The elections were canceled by Abbas due to a well-founded fear of a Hamas victory. Abbas justified his reversal using the pretext of Israel’s refusal to allow elections in East Jerusalem.

These actions created a vacuum, which Hamas rushed to fill without hesitation. Hamas seized on the opportunity to present itself as Jerusalem’s defender and projected its patronage over the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

After Operation Guardian of the Walls ended, a bitter struggle raged between Fatah and Hamas over who would manage and allocate funds intended to develop civilian infrastructure in Gaza. 

The PA’s image on the Palestinian street was dealt a severe blow, and Ramallah is today widely seen by Palestinians as a corrupt authority seeking to use Palestinian funds for its narrow interests. The PA has lost control over much of the social media narrative, and Hamas has gained the upper hand.

This has allowed Hamas to present the PA as a corrupt entity that uses its security forces to cooperate with Israel and repress the Palestinian population.

This development demonstrates clearly that no power vacuum in the Palestinian street remains unfilled: When the PA weakens, Hamas grows stronger.  When waves of angry demonstrators rise up against the PA, clashes can also quickly turn against Israel in the form of violent disturbances and terrorism.

The PA’s management of the Banat affair was a poorly calculated maneuver that could turn out to be one mistake too far. Banat was able to remain an opposition figure without affiliating himself politically. He did not hesitate to use social media to blast the PA and its leaders, the Fatah movement, and the PA’s security forces. He was also extremely critical of a deal reached between the PA and Israel over the use of coronavirus vaccines that were set to expire.

Banat’s death opened a pandora’s box within the PA. Accusations have been flying between senior officials over who was responsible. Various security forces are trying to evade direct responsibility for the incident. Abbas is trying to contain the public anger, reinstate calm and stability, and thereby lengthen his political life, in the wake of the demonstrations against him.

He has sought to do this through the official announcement, publicized by Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh, on the setting up of a committee of investigation (PA security force members who were allegedly involved are in custody), and through the intention to replace key position holders in the security establishment (in the Preventative Security Force, Military Intelligence, and the Palestinian police), as well as among district governors (Ramallah and Hebron) and the diplomatic senior staff (PLO ambassadors abroad).

In this context, it now seems unlikely that Abbas’s initial intention to replace Shtayyeh will go ahead (Shtayyeh was seen as having ministerial responsibility due to his position as Minister of the Interior). This is in light of support by sections of Fatah for Shtayyeh.

At the same time, former PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s intention to return to public life, through the setting up of a new ‘compromise government,’ has been blocked  

Hussein El Sheikh, PA Minister for Civilian Affairs, and Majed Faraj, head of the General Intelligence Service, both of whom are in Abbas’s inner circle and wield major power in the PA, have also been involved in the political mix in the aftermath of the Banat affair. They have pushed aside potential rivals and worked to consolidate their position in the Palestinian leadership.

This has occurred as other senior Palestinian figures opposed to Abbas’s rule have been active to promote their agendas too, including Muhammad Dahlan, Marwan Barghouti, and Nasser Al-Qidwa.  

In this context, Azmi Bishara, a former Israel Knesset Member from the Balad party, pulled strings from afar from his Qatari exile (where he fled after being suspected of espionage and assisting Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War). Operatives close to Bishara were recently arrested by PA security forces in the West Bank.

The PA has in recent weeks taken steps to stabilize the situation and has been able to significantly reduce public rage over the incident.

Despite the decrease in protests, the PA’s investigation into the affair is unlikely to truly calm the thousands of people who took part in demonstrations across major West Bank cities, foremost among them, Ramallah, the seat of government, and in Hebron, Banat’s home city.

To further calm the situation, PA security forces have avoided direct clashes with protesters and deployed only at the entrances to cities.

The PA is keenly aware of the potential far-reaching consequences that could develop from this affair, and fears for its legitimacy and ability to function.

Ultimately, Abbas has been able to contain the crisis so far, and restore a level of calm, while maintaining a ‘business as usual approach by visiting Jordan’s King Abdullah, and President Erdogan in Turkey.

Yet a scenario of renewed rallies and calls for Abbas’s departure could certainly return.  Should that occur, the pressure, together with Abbas’s advanced age, poor health, and many would-be successors, could spell the end of his rule.

In summary, the protests against the PA and the calls that have been made in recent weeks during demonstrations for Abbas’s exit from power are not accumulating at this time into a critical mass. At the same time, the assessment that the Palestinian arena is witnessing the twilight of Abbas’s rule is growing stronger.


David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Israel, Cyber Sabotage and International Law

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By Gary Corn

In April of this year Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and move closer to producing nuclear weapons suffered a significant setback when its Natanz uranium enrichment site experienced a power failure caused, apparently, by an explosion.  Without offering much detail, Iran accused Israel of authoring the power outage in an act of “nuclear terrorism.” At the same time, reports surfaced alleging the explosion was the result of an Israeli cyber operation. Although facts substantiating this claim are sparse, in an unusual step, Israel imposed no censorship restrictions on coverage of the incident.  Further, in the face of reports by Israel’s public radio that the Mossad had been involved, the Israeli defense chief, Aviv Kochavi, said the country’s “operations in the Middle East are not hidden from the eyes of the enemy.” Some have taken this as a less-than-veiled admission.

If true, it would not be the first time that Israel has acted preemptively to impede its adversaries’ efforts to develop nuclear weapons.  Some of these operations have been open, acknowledged, and quite kinetic, such as the 1981 airstrike on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor. And if one accepts common lore, Israel has also reached into its impressive cyber toolkit on more than one occasion to covertly thwart its enemies’ nuclear ambitions. The notorious 2010 Stuxnet operation against the Natanz facility, as well as an alleged cyber operation in 2020 that led to a fire in the main hall at Natanz, being popularly (but not officially) attributed at least in part to Israel. 

Although frequently conducted in the shadows, States have long employed sabotage—intentional actions aimed at weakening another state by impeding through interference, obstruction, damaging or destroying, the development of its military or other potentially threatening capabilities—as a tool of statecraft.  These actions, often taken in a preventive framework, have ranged from overt, highly destructive operations like the Osiraq airstrike, to far more subtle, covert operations.  When conducted in advance of a perceived threat actually manifesting, sabotage raises challenging issues of international law.  If the recent Natanz explosion was indeed the product of an Israeli cyber operation, how would it square with Israel’s international legal obligations? 

Despite a long and steady drumbeat of accusations to the contrary, Israel’s overall track record is, albeit imperfect, one of respect and support for the international legal order.  It’s approach to assessing its international legal obligations is no doubt pragmatic, and at times discordant with the general views of the international community and international law experts.  But this is a reflection of the unique and challenging security posture Israel has found itself in since its founding as a State, not a manifestation of general disregard of international law as is often alleged.  It’s no surprise, therefore, that Israel is one of the few States to publicly affirm international law’s applicability to cyberspace and to expound on its views of how that law regulates its cyber operations.

In particular, at the end of last year Israeli Deputy Attorney General (International Law), Dr. Roy Schöndorf, gave an important speech at the US Naval War College detailing Israel’s views on the application of international law to cyber operations.  Not surprisingly, it reflected a thoughtful and practical approach to applying extant law to new technologies and circumstances. Relevant to any discussion about the legality of preventive or preemptive cyber sabotage, Dr. Schöndorf  made clear Israel’s view that cyber operations can amount to uses of force subject to the UN Charter’s general prohibition against the threat or use of force in international relations.  As with more traditional uses of force, Israel recognizes that any cyber use of force must be conducted pursuant to a Security Council authorization, the consent of the targeted State, or in the legitimate exercise of self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Otherwise, cyber uses of force are internationally wrongful acts, whether conducted as sabotage or otherwise.

So what of the alleged cyber operations against Natanz?  Again, assuming the reports to be true, each of the alleged operations manifested in some degree of physical harm—from the extensive damage to centrifuges in the case of Stuxnet, to the more limited explosion reported in the most recent event.  This begs the question of whether these operations amounted to a use of force, and if so, whether they were justified pursuant to the international legal right of self-defense.

Whether a particular action amounts to a use of force is a highly contextual question, and not every operation resulting in physical damage will qualify.  For example, although commentators frequently point to Stuxnet as a rare example of a cyber use of force, to date no State has made that claim.  But Israel appears to be unusually forthcoming on how it assesses what qualifies as a use of force. According to Dr. Schöndorf, cyber operations “expected to cause physical damage, injury or death, which would establish the use of force if caused by kinetic means,” fall into this category. Furthermore, Israel does not exclude the possibility that “operations not causing physical damage could also amount to a use of force.”  Therefore, if Israel in fact authored some or all of these reported acts of cyber sabotage, it is possible it did not consider them as amounting to uses of force.  But based on Dr. Schöndorf’s speech, self-defense is the more likely Israeli legal justification for engaging in such operations.  This presents its own difficulties, however. 

Absent from Dr. Schöndorf’s remarks was a discussion of Israel’s views on the law of anticipatory self-defense, a doctrine that Israel, like the United States, has long embraced.  Since at least the early 1980s, Israel has not shied away from testing, and perhaps resetting, the international legal boundaries of engaging in sabotage as a tool of national security under the umbrella of the inherent right of self-defense.  Immediately after the airstrike on the Osiraq reactor, then Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledged the attack, justifying it morally and legally as an operation intended to prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction that would present an existential threat to Israel.  Setting out what became known as the Begin Doctrine, he noted that the airstrike was an act of “anticipatory self-defense at its best” that should be understood as setting down precedent for how Israel would approach such threats going forward.

International condemnation of the Osiraq attack was swift, nearly universal, and grounded in the assertion that Israel had violated international law.  Israel’s invocation of self-defense to justify the attack was roundly rejected as a misapplication of the doctrine and the generally recognized strict imminence standard derived from the famous Caroline affair, which requires that threats must be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no moment of deliberation” to justify such anticipatory uses of force.

Notwithstanding this international condemnation, Israel again took forcible preventive action against a potential nuclear threat in 2007 when it conducted a similar raid on the al-Kibar nuclear reactor in Syria.  In contrast to the Osiraq attack, this time international reaction was far more muted.  Syria itself offered no condemnation, downplayed the strikes and sought to cover up any traces of the nuclear facility.  Neither the UN generally, nor the Security Council specifically, took up the matter or offered any rebuke.

Although these two operations were quite similar in execution and result, myriad reasons might account for the markedly different reactions to the two events.  Some have pointed to, inter alia, the al-Kibar reactor posing a greater threat, different regional and international political considerations, and the failure of either party involved to openly acknowledge the open secret of the strike. 

Others argue that the different reactions reflect an evolution in the view of states with respect to the standard of imminence required for a state to use force in anticipation of a threat manifesting, at least in the case of nuclear weapons and perhaps other weapons of mass destruction.  Owing to the destructive nature of these weapons, and the compressed decision timelines to counter them, States may be more tolerant of uses of force intended to pre-empt threats that cannot be said to meet the strict Caroline standard.

Israel does not stand alone in seeking to evolve the notion of imminence to better reflect the realities of modern weapons technology and national security threats. For example, the so-called Bush Doctrine, first articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, sought to move the needle in light of modern weapons technology, signaling a broadened aperture for assessing what qualifies as imminent within the meaning of international self-defense law, “even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” And although this shift met with criticism, especially after it was viewed at least in part as a misapplied justification for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, it retains currency to this day in the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement’s pronouncement that “[i]mminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.”  However, whether this broader view of imminence has gained currency as a matter of customary international law is far from clear.

In his speech, Dr. Schöndorf signaled an understandably cautious approach to applying existing international law to the new and distinctive domain of cyberspace.  Given its unique and precarious security situation, this should not be surprising.  Israel can ill afford to stand idly by while Iran or other regional threats seek to develop nuclear weapons.  There is little indication that Israel will shelve the Begin Doctrine any time soon, and it appears that it is deftly leveraging cyber capabilities as another, and potentially more precise and artful arrow in its sabotage quiver. But Israel is far from alone in facing emerging threats of great magnitude that produce substantial stress on the logic of strict imminence reflected in the Caroline doctrine. Other states may share an interest in a more forthcoming discourse on how the justification of individual and collective self-defense can keep pace with a rapidly evolving threat environment.   

 


Gary Corn is the Director of the Technology, Law & Security Program and Adjunct Professor of Cyber and National Security Law at American University, Washington College of Law; a Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity and Emerging Threats at the R Street Institute. Read full bio here.

Media Must Improve Conflict Coverage

By Geoffrey Corn

PROFESSOR OF LAW, SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW. US ARMY (RET.)

As the saying goes, “no good deed goes unpunished.” When considering media coverage of the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict, it may be hard to imagine the relevance of this saying, but . . . The media narratives arising out of the recent bout of hostilities between Israel and Hamas illustrate the applicability of this saying to such a context.

Let’s start with stating the obvious: war is awful. The loss of life, physical and psychological injuries, and destruction of property resulting from states or non-state armed groups resorting to the force of arms is something we should all lament. This is especially true when the victims of wartime violence are not participants in hostilities. Yes, it is unfortunate when the fighting members of opposing groups are killed or wounded; no one should celebrate such human loss. But participating in hostilities carries with it the risk, if not expectation that such may be the result of conflict. For civilians and others who don’t fall into this category – to include wounded, sick, and captured members of opposing armed groups – such suffering is as tragic as it seems inevitable.

It is for this reason international law, and more specifically the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), imposes obligations on the groups engaged in armed conflict. This law is truly as old as organized warfare itself, although obviously it has evolved substantially throughout history. At the core of the law are obligations established to mitigate the risk to civilians, other individuals not actively engaged in the conflict, and civilian property. This ‘package’ of obligations is often characterized as ‘targeting’ law, because it imposes legally binding regulation on the process of deciding who, when, where, and with what to attack an enemy.

Pursuant to this law, it is always unlawful to deliberately attack civilians or civilian property. As a result, any person employing force must constantly distinguish between enemy personnel and objectives and all other persons, places, and things. Importantly, the law does not prohibit the result of inflicting such casualties; if they are an incidental consequence of an attack on a lawful target and were not assessed as excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by the attack, they qualify as lawful consequences.

The law also imposes an obligation on both sides of the fight to take constant care to mitigate the risk to civilians and to implement all feasible precautionary measures to mitigate civilian risk arising in the conduct of hostilities. For the attacking force, this means considering a wide range of risk mitigation measures. These range from efforts to verify the true nature of a proposed target and to assess the risk to civilians and civilian property, to adjusting the timing and tactics of an attack to mitigate risk, to issuing pre-attack warnings and encouraging civilian evacuations. And this is not an exhaustive list; commanders are expected to constantly explore measures that will mitigate civilian risk without significantly compromising their military advantage.

But this obligation is not unitary; it also extends to a force that anticipates it will be attacked. To that end, the law imposes an obligation to endeavor to avoid locating military assets amongst the civilian population. Even more importantly, the law categorically prohibits using individual civilians or the presence of a civilian population in an effort to shield military objectives from enemy attack. Known as human shielding, this pernicious practice is all too common in contemporary conflict where a tactically inferior force seeks to level the equation by deliberately comingling its vital personnel and assets amongst civilians and civilian property.

Sadly, it is equally common that attacking forces encounter an enemy that ignores these obligations – that embeds military assets amongst the civilian population, uses civilian structures to house military assets, or uses civilians as human shields. In such situations the enemy violation does not release the attacking force from its obligations to mitigate civilian risk. But the effort to exploit the civilian population to gain some shielding advantage does not immunize the enemy from attack. When civilian property – such as an apartment building, or a school, or a bus or car – is used by the enemy as a military asset, the law provides a test for when that use essentially transforms the place or thing into a military objective within the scope of permissible attack authority. And when such an attack will result in incidental injury to civilians or destruction of civilian property, the law permits such attack so long as the attacking commander’s assessment is that the civilian harm will not be excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage, the so-called proportionality rule.

Unfortunately, there seems to be little interest in the true nature of this targeting legality equation when reporting on contemporary conflict that results in the almost inevitable tragedy of civilian suffering. To be fair, it is to a certain extent understandable why the media and the public gravitate instinctively towards the images of destruction and suffering; as noted above we should all be saddened and bothered by this. But the flaw in the common narrative is to instinctively conflate the results of combat action with legal responsibility for this suffering. It is, of course, easy to identify the direct cause of death, injury, and destruction in war: the party that drops the bomb or launches the attack. But assessing legal responsibility for that destruction – especially when it adversely impacts the civilian population – is more complex.

And here is the true irony reflected in the latest conflict in Gaza: the party to the conflict that appears to have endeavored in good faith to comply with the law of targeting and its civilian risk mitigation imperative is consistently condemned, while the party that consistently and blatantly violated this law is treated as the victim of illegality. Two iconic examples stand out that illustrate this distortion.

First, The New York Times cover page showing photos of children killed in Gaza during hostilities. The tragedy of this loss is undeniable, but so is the invalidity of the suggestion that the Israeli Defense Force bears responsibility for this tragedy. Instead, that responsibility almost certainly falls at the feet of Hamas because of its deliberate effort to use the presence of civilians as human shields. And even that is being forgiving, for there is good reason to believe that shielding its targets from attack is not the ultimate objective when Hamas exploits its own civilians to get between its assets and IDF attacks; that what Hamas really wants is to force the IDF into inflicting those casualties so that they may be leveraged in the international information space to delegitimize Israel. The New York Times front page is all the evidence needed to understand why Hamas would engage in such tactics.

The second is a New York Times report of its investigation into the destruction of two apartment buildings in Gaza. A video goes to great lengths to establish that it was IDF precision-guided 2,000-pound bombs that destroyed these buildings. But the video also acknowledges that the targets of those attacks may have been the underground tunnel network running beneath the street in front of these buildings. But what about the law? First, the report erroneously states that the IDF was “obligated” to issue a pre-attack warning to the civilians placed at risk. This is a clearly erroneous statement of the warning obligation, which is not required when the operational circumstances indicate it will compromise the effect of the attack. Second, the report condemns the use of the munition based on a statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross that such ‘wide area effect’ weapons should not be used in urban areas. Setting aside the invalid suggestion that the ICRC is somehow the final say on what is or is not legal in conflict (it plays an important and influential role but is not the final say), the report’s failure to consider the ‘legality impact’ of the fact that the munitions were precision guided; and the fact that the use of these munitions may have been calculated to avoid the need to conduct a 2014-type large scale ground incursion into Gaza to destroy tunnels reveals how deeply misleading the inference of illegality is.

And then there is the ultimate manifestation of distortion: at one point in the report, the narrator notes that Hamas tunnels did in fact run under the street in front of both of these buildings and that large subterranean explosions may have been the cause of the collapse. Unfortunately, the report offers no discussion of why those tunnels would have been assessed as vital military objectives; of why aerial attack to destroy them would have been assessed as a tactic creating a substantial reduction in danger to civilians than the alternative of a ground incursion; of the IDFs process of collateral damage estimation, and how that process would have informed the commander as he made the difficult assessment of proportionality; or of the dilemma the tactic of running tunnels under densely populated civilian areas creates for the attacking commander. Instead, all the report acknowledged was that, “Doing this under a civilian neighborhood likely breaches international law.”

There are countless other examples that illustrate the distorting effect of this type of ‘effects-based condemnation.’ Yes, it is true that Israeli attacks resulted in loss of civilian life and destruction of property. But why were those lives exposed to the consequences of attacks? And why is that more pernicious than the efforts of Hamas to deliberately attack Israeli civilians using inherently indiscriminate weapons, not to mention the willingness of Hamas to deliberately expose its own civilians to this tragic suffering.

The media has to do better. It may be the case that aspects of the IDF operation crossed the line of legality, but the suggestion that the IDF is the pervasive law-breaker and Hamas is somehow understandably incapable of complying with the law is corrosive. The mere fact that the IDF was able to achieve its military objectives without resorting to a full-scale ground operation – with the ultimate result of a 10-fold reduction in casualties in Gaza compared to the 2014 operation – reflect a nation and a military committed to the imperative of balancing military necessity with civilian risk mitigation. But if all that the media gravitates toward is effects, illicit groups like Hamas will have all the more incentive to violate this law and to create situations that will inevitably exacerbate instead of mitigate the risk to their own civilians. And when those casualties and that destruction are reported in the future, it will be the media itself that shares responsibility for that tragedy.


Geoffrey S. Corn is the Gary A Kuiper distinguished professor of National Security Law, at South Texas College of Law, Houston, and a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Read full bio here.

Long-Form Analysis: Conveying Israel's Victory Over Hamas

BY Grisha Yakubovich

 The recent conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and its aftermath have demonstrated that victory is very much in the eye of the beholder. In this case, Israel and the Palestinians each view themselves as the victor, and both sides use very different definitions to reach their conclusions.

This means that the ability to declare ‘victory’ in the modern age of war depends, to a great extent, on the ability of each side to build and maintain a narrative, and to influence reality in a way that lines up with that narrative.

Since taking over Gaza in a coup in 2007, Hamas has built a narrative of victory that disregards Israel’s own victory narrative: Israel, unfortunately, has yet to fully internalize how to influence Hamas’s internal narrative to its advantage.

Israel defines victory in military terms. Hamas translates victory as an ability to fire rockets from the start of a conflict to its end, and it sees its very ability to carry on the fight as victorious.

Hamas has been able to effectively market its own version of success against Israel, rallying the Gazan people to its side – despite Israel’s military achievements.

The sign of how deep the gap is between the Israeli and Hamas definitions of victory can be seen in how they describe the same conflict. Israel shared details of how it tracked down and destroyed Hamas’s ‘metro’ underground tunnel network, and killed its weapons engineers – all undoubtedly military achievements, enabled by first class intelligence. Between rounds of conflict with Hamas, Israel created an intelligence superiority that not only led to high value strikes, but also to relatively little collateral damage in Gaza.

Israel exhibited a world-leading surgical strike capability during the May conflict with Hamas. In eleven days, it fired the same quantity of explosives at enemy targets as it did in 52 days in the 2014 conflict. It was able to map out Hamas’s tunnel system in Gaza without being there on the ground, hit high level targets, and disrupt Hamas’s offensive systems.

Now, Israel’s core challenge is to translate these accomplishments into an ability to change Gaza’s own victory conception. So far, Israel has struggled to do so, for several reasons.

A missing strategic mechanism

The first is the lack of a fixed, permanent Israeli strategic body whose job is to spend every day analyzing Israel’s ability to shape consciousness in Hamas and Gaza. It is from this body that negotiations teams should emerge, able to simulate various scenarios, and analyze Israel’s geo-political environment on a daily basis.

Israel has so far relied on ad-hoc, opportunistic negotiators, who come together at the last minute and in a fairly arbitrary manner. Led by senior defense officials who are guided by defense perspectives, these negotiators have held indirect talks with Hamas via Egypt in an ad-hoc manner, and not as a permanent analytical creative agency.  

This lack of a professional agency has created numerous problems for Israel in its dealings with Hamas. Israeli negotiations teams are constantly changing over, and the Israelis who head to Egypt to conduct indirect talks with Hamas are not the same people who were there a few years ago.

The lack of a permanent mechanism means there is little strategic planning on how to convert Israeli military gains into leverages that can chip away at Hamas’s narrative.

Compare this with Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, both of whom are heavily invested in being able to strategically maneuver vis-à-vis Israel. The PA has a strategic body that knows how to dispatch high quality negotiating teams. This body advises its negotiators based on a deep analysis of the PA’s interests.

Hamas, for its part, consistently thinks about how to use all events – military and political – to further its interests. This thinking is built-in to the organization’s daily activities, meaning that its negotiating abilities are highly developed.  Hamas issues clear demands that are based on prior analysis of both its situation and Israel’s. It developed this ability because of its status as an infant entity striving to become the legitimate Palestinian ruling entity. As a result, its negotiations strategy is always forward-thinking.  

How Hamas has successfully promoted its victory definition

Following the 2014 Operation Protective Edge, after 52 days of combat, during which Israel struck Hamas hard, Hamas was internally and genuinely convinced that it had won.

This is because Hamas defines victory as the ability of a powerful non-state terror army like itself to stand up to a regional power, and activate attack systems – primarily rocket fire – until the very last minute of the conflict as a key component of its negotiations approach.   

This same ‘victory logic’ held up during the latest conflict between Hamas and Israel. Not only was Hamas able to keep firing throughout the conflict until the last moment, it also harnessed world opinion to its side, and was able to cause international opinion to view Israel as a bully. Strategically, de-legitimization of Israel is an important part of Hamas’s arsenal, and the use of media to draw attention to dead children and civilians is part of this strategy.

During the fighting, there was not a single international media image of an armed Hamas operative, and this is a major media achievement for Hamas. Instead, the only scenes broadcast were of Gazan hospitals and dead and wounded civilians. 

Meanwhile, Hamas’s popularity among Palestinians in the West Bank and in east Jerusalem increased significantly, causing major political damage to its arch-competitor for power, the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority.

Thus, while Israel’s achievements are limited to the military field, Hamas was able to shape the perception of the Palestinians, much of the region, and the international community.

Hamas was able to position itself as the leading force in the Palestinian arena, and place Jerusalem as a center stage issue on the international agenda. This has led to significant pressure building up against Israel.

Israel’s concept of victory is rooted in the clear-cut Western notion of it being something that is obvious and visible to all.

In Arab culture, victory is often a far more flexible concept. Hamas declared a ‘divine’ victory at the end of Operation Guardian of the Walls despite lacking any major practical victory.

The marketing of itself from day one as the “Defender of Jerusalem” earned it broad support from the Palestinian street.

So long as the military campaign continued, this met Hamas’s criteria of ‘defeating the enemy,’ because the definition of success has been adapted to fit the current conditions – firing rockets at Israel throughout every day of the conflict.  

Even though Hamas lost militarily, it was therefore still able to declare a victory, and to believe in this genuinely. The military reality on the ground became irrelevant.

This is a deep cultural gap that the Western world struggles to grasp. Yet Hamas has been using this flexible framing since it seized power in 2007 in Gaza, and Hamas is not the only entity in the Arab world to utilize this flexible definition of victory.

Hamas keeps coming out on top in the victory narrative struggle

In the first days of the Hamas regime, following the 2007 coup that brought it to power, the Islamist terror movement understood that it needed to create a new dynamic if it wished to remain in power. This led to the 2008-2009 conflict with Israel, which Hamas framed as a small Palestinian enclave resisting the powerful Jewish state. It was then that Hamas began to successfully anchor its narrative.

The Goldstone Report that followed the conflict and demonized Israel in the international community, together with the Israeli commando raid on the 2010 Turkish-backed Marmara flotilla to Gaza acted as boosters to Hamas’s narrative.

While Israel faced constant criticisms, no one in the international community was disturbed by Hamas’s executions of Fatah members, its fundamentalist anti-Westernism, homophobia, or systematic repression of women’s rights.

 This same pattern has played out repeatedly since 2007. The fact that Hamas proved adept at negotiations means that it has been better able to shape reality in line with its narratives after rounds of conflict with Israel. For example, after Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, which began with a successful Israeli assassination of Hamas’s deputy military wing commander, Ahmed Jabari, Hamas learned how to effectively make demands of Israel via Egyptian mediators.

It also got used to seeing those demands met. As someone who took part in some of those negotiations, I was witness to this process on multiple occasions. Hamas kept improving its ability to issue demands and extort Israel.

The 2012 post-conflict talks with Israel via Egypt were a turning point in Hamas’s ability to master the negotiations process. It used the talks to improve Gaza’s economic situation to a certain degree. At that time, Hamas was not very dependent on Israel for Gaza’s economy, as the extensive and flourishing ‘tunnel economy,’ made possible by a network of smuggling tunnels linking Sinai to Gaza, meant that Gaza’s markets lacked nothing.

 The big change came in 2013, when the Islamist Egyptian President, Mohamed Morsi, was ousted by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who then proceeded to seal off the smuggling tunnels.

It was then that Hamas found itself relying on the PA, which had been sending 45% of its budget to Gaza, and it had to begin dealing more intensively with Israel and the international community. Over the years, Abbas’s sanctions on Gaza meant that significantly fewer PA funds reached Gaza, turning up the pressure on the Hamas regime.

In response to this new challenge, Hamas developed a multi-arena strategy, in which the ability to manage high level negotiations in line with key Hamas interests was identified as a core capability.

Hamas learned how to master negotiations, and used this skill in the years that followed the 2014 Operation Protective Edge to issue new demands, impose new equations on Israel, and to be clear on where it is willing and unwilling to compromise.

Between 2014 and 2021, Hamas directed its efforts towards a clear objective: Ending Gaza’s humanitarian crisis while paying a relatively low price for this. Instead of tackling Gaza’s economic and humanitarian problems by itself, Hamas gambled on outside players doing so, and for this to happen without Hamas answering Israeli calls for the disarmament of Gaza, or Israel’s call for a freeze of Hamas’s force build up process.

Hamas understood that Israel’s demand for demilitarization would be part of any solution for Gaza’s economy that would involve Israel. To get around this obstacle, Hamas found new ways to pay a smaller price for easing restrictions on Gaza.

Hamas understood that it can always find elements  outside of Gaza to solve the Strip’s water, electricity, and sewage problems, but it had to find a way to do this without agreeing to Israel’s demands of zero attacks from Gaza and an end to its military build-up.

Hamas concluded that Israel wanted it to remain as the ruler in Gaza – strong enough to contain other armed terror factions, but weak in relation to Israel (this is based on Israel’s conclusion that there is no alternative ruler for Gaza).

Hamas’s demands included Israel enabling some 1,000 trucks carrying goods to enter Gaza daily via Kerem Shalom crossing, an improvement in water supply systems, and electricity grid upgrades. It got all of its demands.

But Hamas then thought ahead, and realized that after the next war, Israel will demand more firmly that it stops building its military force.

To get around this problem, it introduced new, low-cost bargaining chips, in the form of ‘popular resistance.’ This ingenious solution saw the introduction of incendiary and explosive balloons and kites, and the nighttime units that harasses southern Israeli communities with the sounds of explosions and border rioting.

In exchange for agreeing to end this cheap attrition against Israel, Hamas got yet more water arrangements, more approvals for Gazans to enter Israel for trade, and it ploughed ahead with its rocket construction industry, with no one stopping it. All it had to do was stop the low-cost measures at the border, stop its ‘return march’ rioting, stop the balloons and kites, and Israel’s demands evaporated.  

Now, after the latest conflict, Hamas’s main demand is for Qatar’s cash to reach Gaza, so long as this does not happen via its rival, the Palestinian Authority. Hamas is prepared to accept a third party like the UN allocating the cash – just not the PA.

This strengthens the assessment that Hamas is fighting to disengage from the PA and to be an independent entity. It is working in an organized manner to receive legitimacy as an independent actor, able to point to cooperation and talks with the UN, Qatar, Saudi Arabia – and even Israel.  All of this gives Hamas the international legitimacy it seeks. Every minor contact with an important outside actor is a further achievement for Hamas.

Based on these achievements, Hamas’s ambitions grew, as its victory narrative continued to grow in strength.

Israel is beginning to improve, but not fast enough

In its well-thought-out negotiations stance, Hamas has insisted on separating two issues during indirect talks with Israel. The first issue is the need to solve Gaza’s civilian infrastructure, and the second is finding an arrangement to release the remains of two Israeli MIA soldiers and two captive civilians. Hamas has consistently tried to separate the two issues, while Israel is constantly linking them.

Israel has not allowed Hamas to uncouple the two issues and is finally taking the right approach to talks with Hamas: Biding its time, and not rushing to solve problems. This indicates that Israel has begun to slowly learn lessons on maneuvering vis-à-vis Hamas – though the learning curve remains too slow. Furthermore, the reason for Israel’s improved negotiations steps stem from the wrong reason: Israel’s focus on the MIA and captive civilian issues, rather than Israeli realization that it can use a post-conflict period to slowly rob Hamas of its achievements.   

When PA President Mahmoud Abbas – who continues to rule despite all of Hamas’s efforts to undermine him –called off scheduled Palestinian elections earlier this year, Hamas immediately began planning out how it can gain when he finally departs the scene.

Hamas planned on entering the next struggle for the next Palestinian elections as 'defenders of Jerusalem. It planned an escalation that would last for a few days, and assessed that a major conflict was unlikely. Hamas didn’t take into account Israel’s intelligence readiness, or that Israel would view long-range rocket fire as an opportunity to act.

In Israel, the defense establishment did not appear to be taking into account how Hamas could use the cancellation of the elections to gain new achievements. Even if such an analysis did take place, there is no evidence that Israel planned to do anything to deny Hamas such achievements.

Part of this unsatisfactory performance by Israel is the lack of a skilled, permanent Israeli strategic body that includes negotiations teams, and which can simulate scenarios and challenge the assumptions that are common in Israel.

The weeks that followed Operation Guardian of the Walls have seen Israel expand Gaza’s fishing zone from six to nine miles, approve the entry of raw material to Gazan factories, and approve the transfer of fuel to Gaza’s power plant.

These developments have nourished Hamas’s claims of victory. Had Israel established a permanent, professional negotiations mechanism, it would have been able to torpedo Hamas’s claims of victory signs and avoid this trap.

For the reality is that Israel has the opportunity to deny Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar from enjoying the fruit of his ‘divine victory.’ It can maneuver in such a way so as to trap Sinwar in his own ‘victory.’

This has in fact begun to happen due to the slow ‘crawling’ pace of the negotiations.

In the initial weeks following the conflict, it looked as if Israel had finally woken up to the need to do this. It held back the Qatari money until an arrangement that cut Hamas out of the allocation process could be found. It didn’t rush to repair electricity grid infrastructure. It was not deterred by Hamas’s threats of a new escalation. It responded to incendiary balloons with air force strikes: Hamas didn’t launch a single mortar attack in response.

Driven by its MIAs and the issue of captive civilians – and not because of the realization of the benefits of slow-moving negotiations, which takes away achievements from Hamas  –  Israel had begun to change Sinwar’s equation and to shape it in its own favor.

Time is on Israel’s side. It is Hamas that is facing pressure domestically from Gazans for an improvement in their daily lives. Understanding this will help Israel to defeat Hamas’s ‘victory’ maneuvers.

It is time for Israel to not only be militarily prepared – which it excels at doing – but also to be prepared with a cognitive campaign and a skilled strategic system that specializes in strategic maneuvering and negotiations.

Such a system would weigh events in-depth, examine options, and analyze the dynamics that best benefit Israeli interests.  These are necessary functions for Israel as much as having combat battalions ready to go into battle at any time.

This readiness should also include the establishment of an ‘army of cognitive campaigners,’ meaning the supply of Israel supporters with relevant and authentic information, and to effectively act on social media networks.

Ultimately, the gap between Israel’s military capabilities and its ability to influence Hamas’s victory narrative is glaring. If Israel starts to close this gap,  it will then  be able to create victories that cannot be questioned by Hamas or by Israeli citizens. When that happens, victory will no longer be in the eyes of the beholder. It will be apparent to all.


Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.).

Soldiers must defend civilians, not the other way around

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By Shahaf Segal

Israel views IDF soldiers as the nation's collective sons and daughters. While this may be a noble worldview, it also runs the risk of creating confusion over who is supposed to defend whom. Hamas maliciously takes advantage of this sentiment to employ it against Israel. 

The Israeli public has on multiple occasions pressured the government to rescue Israeli soldiers (and civilians) from enemy captivity at the cost of releasing scores of dangerous terrorists from prison. Israel historically yielded as if there was no alternative. However, we must remember that the release of prisoners is not the final “cost:” Israel pays that with the blood of its citizens. 

As a member of the Golani Reconnaissance Unit, where I served as a medic and sharpshooter, like many other soldiers I  endangered my life to protect civilians on the home front. That is how things should work: Soldiers should protect civilians.

During Operation Cast Lead (2008 – 2009), my comrade in arms, Staff-Sergeant Dvir Emanuelof and I were shot at by Hamas terrorists emerging from a tunnel in the Gaza Strip. The terrorists sought to kidnap Dvir: I ran toward him and opened fire in an attempt to save him. In the process, I sustained a severe bullet wound to my arm.

Dvir paid the ultimate price in defense of Israel. Despite my efforts, he did not survive the gunshot wound to his head.  I embarked on a five-year journey of extensive surgery and physical therapy to regain partial use of my arm. 

Soldiers are aware of the risks. We are willing to endanger and sacrifice ourselves for Israel and its people if necessary. Israel's government and society must remember this going forward. 

Hamas has maintained a long-standing strategy of kidnapping soldiers and using them as bargaining chips to secure the release of dangerous prisoners, many of whom have blood on their hands. 

Through this extortion, Hamas was able to secure the release of 1,027 terrorists in exchange for the release of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in 2011, who was held captive for over five years. One of those released was Yahya Sinwar, who now heads Hamas  Gaza. Sinwar's release is perhaps the most salient example of the dangers of Israel's willingness to save soldiers at the expense of civilians. 

The actual price of past prisoner releases has been intolerably high. According to various sources, between 40 to 80 percent of the prisoners released by Israel returned to active terrorism within our borders, leading to civilians and soldiers paying with their lives. 

Additional examples of convicted Hamas operatives released in 2011 include Ziad Awad, who shot and killed a police officer, Chief Superintendent Baruch Mizrahi, during a 2014 West Bank shooting. Mahmoud Kawasma, who was involved in the 2014 kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank, was another of those released in the Shalit deal.  

Now, Hamas is demanding the release of 1,111 security prisoners in exchange for the remains of Israeli MIAs Lt. Hadar Goldin and Staff Sgt. Oron Shaul (killed in Operation Protective Edge in 2014) and two Israeli civilians being held after entering Gaza. 

Israel must recognize that a prisoner release of this scale is no longer a feasible solution. 

When I insisted on joining a combat unit, my goal was to protect Israeli civilians. For this reason, I signed a document alongside other soldiers and officers, declaring my refusal to be released – dead or alive –  in exchange for terrorists. 

None of this is to say that Israel does not have a duty to work for the release of soldiers kidnapped by enemy forces. However, the right way to execute this obligation is to place conditions on Gaza's reconstruction. Israel has the power to pursue this struggle with determination and good judgment.  

The motto for this policy is simple: The restoration of Gaza must be subject to the  release of the captives.

While Israel is obligated to do its part to prevent any humanitarian disaster in Gaza, that does not mean large-scale reconstruction. Israel ensures that trucks with essential goods enter the Strip while working to help keep electricity and water supplies running. The rest must be conditioned on Hamas releasing the Israelis it holds captive. 

Israel is the powerful party in its relationship with Hamas, and this means it has alternatives to caving into dangerous extortion. If Israel proceeds to give in to demands for mass prisoner releases, it will perpetuate this never-ending cycle.

After Operation Cast Lead, Gaza was in desperate need  of reconstruction. Simultaneously, Hamas held Gilad Shalit captive. Israel missed the opportunity to negotiate Shalit's release in exchange for reconstruction, and instead agreed to the empty promise of a ceasefire. Within a short time,  Hamas received the freedom of its leaders, the reconstruction of Gaza, and hundreds more operatives who were released from Israeli prisons and joined the Hamas terror factory. Israel received more bloodshed, kidnapped soldiers, and outrageous demands.

It did not work before, and it will not work now as we once again walk off the battlefield, seemingly to return later. As it is written in Ecclesiastes,  “That which has been is that which shall be.” I call upon the Israeli government and the nation to break this paradigm, to stand firm, as our soldiers do, and put a new equation on the table: the reconstruction of Gaza for the freedom of our captives. Even at the price of renewed armed conflict.

 

Shahaf Segal was a sharpshooter and a combat medic in the elite anti-terror unit - Sayeret Golani. Shahaf was wounded in operation "Cast Lead" while saving his sergeant's body from being kidnapped through a terror tunnel into Gaza.. Read full bio here.

COVID-19 disease strategies – The Israeli experience

By Dr. Daniel Suez

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The Covid-19 Pandemic caught the world unprepared. Even though world health organizations have a relatively good understanding of common pandemic viral diseases such as the influenza viral infections originating from Asia on an annual basis with new variants/mutations, the scientific world was caught unprepared for this rapidly developing viral disease. The lack of preparedness, both from a point of view of mitigation and lack of available basic therapy, the rate of viral spreading, and the severity of disease complication and mortality, led to significant confusion among the scientific community and particularly among the population at large.

 Adding to the confusion were the frequent social media misinformation and politicization of the matter due in part to a significant global financial burden caused by the pandemic. Leadership was necessary to forge a working strategy to save countless lives from this serious disease.

Early on, and as the disease progressed rapidly, it was apparent that the best approach to stop its progression – other than mitigation strategies that lead to economic devastation –  would be to put significant resources in to developing strategic vaccination approaches, using our advanced know how and current biotechnologies in doing so.

Israel is a small country of some nine million inhabitants, with an excellent social medical system.  The medical authorities along with the political leadership understood the danger of such a serious viral pandemic and the need to institute aggressive mitigation strategies. They did  not hesitate to employ, among other measures, the Shin Bet Israel Security Agency to enforce mitigation policies and minimize viral spread.

Furthermore, as soon as vaccines were available, the authorities were successful in purchasing  sufficient stocks ahead of time and launched a mass vaccination drive that was well received by the  population. The policy achieved a high rate of vaccination in an orderly fashion, to include first the most vulnerable population, i.e., the elderly and people with underlying medical conditions.  The results were quite impressive with the rate of viral spread dropping dramatically over a relatively short period of time and consequently a significant reduction in new cases, hospitalization and mortality.  Within few months the country went from full shut down status to almost complete openness and normal daily activities.

The issue of the more recent events of few focal cases of a rebound of variant forms of COVID-19 merits further discussion.

The Pfizer and Moderna vaccines used in Israel, were proven quite effective against COVID-19 variants such as the English (Variant A), the South African (Variant B), the Brazilian (Variant C) and even the new Indian Variant (Variant D).  The original vaccination studies were shown to be quite effective (>94%) for reducing dramatically the rate of serious COVID-19 disease, rate of hospitalization, and mortality.

These studies did not evaluate the rate of viral transmission by both study populations – the immunized patients versus non immunized.

As the different variant forms developed, these vaccines appeared to be protective against them. Recently with the emergence of the Delta Variant (the Indian Variant), it was noted that transmissibility of this variant is much higher compared to the original virus, yet, this variant does not appear to be more aggressive or to increase hospitalization or to be associated with higher mortality.

The main idea of the vaccination is to protect the most vulnerable population from serious complications and mortality. We know that the majority of the young population have either asymptomatic occurrence (meaning being tested positive yet with no symptoms) or having mild symptoms for a short period of time. 

Side effects post vaccination have been recorded, most of which are relatively benign.  However, more recently, a serious side effect was noted in immunized young adolescents who developed acute myocarditis, which is an inflammation of the heart muscle.  Even though there were fewer cases than 1 in 10,000 immunized adolescents who developed this serious condition post immunizations, some of these cases were fatal.

It is obvious that one need to weigh in the risk to benefit ratio.  Today, there is little doubt that immunizing the majority of the adult population is largely beneficial to the entire population by reducing the number of new cases, the development of severe disease, hospitalization and mortality, which allow us to return to normal life and daily activities. Yet, vaccination in adolescents, even though proven to be effective and with minimal side effects as reported by the pivotal vaccination studies prior to the FDA approval,  should not be mandated in my opinion. 

We should not forget that these vaccines received approval only on an emergency basis and did not yet gain full approval, something that usually requires several years of experience.  We should also keep in mind that adolescents may either have no symptoms or only develop a minor flu like disease in the majority of cases, and that the main goal is to protect the vulnerable population.  Since the quasi majority of the vulnerable population have already been vaccinated in Israel, there is a small risk that the immunized vulnerable population may suffer serious consequences. 

In addition, due to the geopolitical location of Israel among other reasons, Israelis frequently travel outside of the country for a variety of reasons – primarily for tourism.  The COVID-19 pandemic era led to the entire country being almost  shut down for most of 2020 and early 2021.  Following opening of the country, Israelis have started traveling again, while many travel destination countries have continued to have pandemic related restrictions, which result in a significant social pressure on these adolescents in Israel due to travel restrictions if they do not get immunized.

Hence, in my opinion, the risk/benefit ratio should be left to the parents to decide without a mandate, which is the case today in Israel.   My prediction is that a significant number of the adolescents will be immunized and will contribute to an overall feeling of security but I do not believe that it is a crucial element at this time and probably does not constitute a very significant factor.


Dr. Daniel Suez, MD. received his medical degree from Paris Descartes University, Paris France, in 1975. He completed his Pediatric Residency in 1981, training first at the Versailles Medical Center in Versailles, France, then subsequently at the Barzilai Medical Center in Ashkelon, Israel.. Read full bio here.