Israel's political merry go round must stop

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

In Israel, elections have become a new Olympic sport. One round of elections after another has cost the country roughly NIS 12 billion over the past five years, not to mention the economic losses caused by the absence of a national budget for government ministries, the direct damage to our personal finances, and the persistent turmoil that has damaged every national institution.

The political merry-go-round makes it harder to govern and run the state effectively. In the absence of a clear planning agenda, combating the rising cost of living, addressing the housing supply shortage, building a stable national health system, combating crime, reducing road deaths, and implementing comprehensive infrastructure plans become a challenge, to say the least.

What could have been accomplished with NIS 2.4 billion (the cost of each round of elections)? Numerous institutions in Israel would benefit substantially from a fraction of that sum.

Political instability in Israel is nothing new: Calls for a change in Israel’s electoral and governing systems have been around since the days of Mapai. Few Israeli governments have completed their full term, but the past four years have seen Israel’s political instability hit new lows.

Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu has mastered the game of rewriting the rules of the political system. From his perspective, securing his future, evading justice, and paving the path for his return to the Prime Minister’s Office are the most crucial objectives to pursue.

As far as Netanyahu is concerned, governmental stability should only occur after he accomplishes these objectives. In the meantime, Netanyahu has violated unwritten political norms, among them his refusal to resign after being indicted on corruption charges – a far cry from his insistence that former prime minister Ehud Olmert step down when he was indicted.

The current state of affairs endangers the State of Israel and generates a crisis of confidence between the people and their elected officials that worsens with each election cycle.

Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman recently noted that politicians are dragging the Israeli people through a fifth round of elections, and that, looking ahead, it is therefore essential to secure governmental stability in the simplest and most straightforward way possible.

Liberman proposed passing new legislation to boost governmental stability. According to his proposal, the new legislation would adopt the model of the existing Knesset Chairperson Law. According to Liberman’s proposal, instead of the current setup, in which 61 votes are needed to both swear in a Knesset and disperse it, 90 votes would be required to disperse a future Knesset, after the Knesset passes a two-year budget. This legislation would adopt an existing formula and apply it in the Knesset to boost governmental stability. By linking the legislation to the passing of a two-year budget, this maneuver would introduce at least two years of government stability.

This is now the story of these elections. The time has come to stop the merry-go-round.

Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

17 Years Later: Did Israel’s Gaza Withdrawal Aid Peace?

By Chuck Freilich

 

Seventeen years ago this week, Israel withdrew from Gaza and dismantled the seventeen settlements that existed there. To demonstrate that it was prepared to go ahead on the West Bank as well, Israel dismantled four settlements there, too. Israel’s preconditions for further progress were straightforward: a demonstration of the Palestinians’ ability to govern responsibly and end terrorism.

The Palestinian response was similarly straightforward. Hamas seized control in Gaza from the Palestinian Authority (PA), established a radical theocracy, and together with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), fired tens of thousands of rockets at Israel’s civilian population, over 1,100 in the recent round alone. The PA, in the West Bank, became a corrupt, if feckless, dictatorship.

No criticism of Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians can excuse, or explain away, the intentional and indiscriminate targeting of civilians: that is terrorism and murder. The fact that some Palestinian civilians are unavoidably killed when Israel responds is heartbreaking, but there is no moral equivalence. Israel’s right to defend its citizens is inviolate.

There is no purely military solution to the problem that Gaza proposes. Tragically, there may not be a political one either.

Despite decades of efforts, Israel’s ability to prevent and suppress rocket fire is still limited. Fortunately, Israel’s Iron Dome defensive system has proven extraordinarily effective and its casualties, since the system was first deployed in 2012, have been comparatively small. Had it not been for Iron Dome, Israel’s casualties would have been severe, and it would have been forced to launch a major ground operation. As it is, disruption to the economy and national life is significant.

The only way to truly cut Hamas and PIJ’s large rocket arsenals down to size, and Hezbollah’s mammoth one, is through a ground operation. Israel would have to occupy all of Gaza, or Lebanon, and go house-to-house for months in a bloody battle to root out the rockets. Once Israel withdrew, however, Iran would rapidly replenish the arsenal and the period of calm gained—at the price of hundreds of Israeli casualties (and far more Gazans or Lebanese)—would likely be short-lived. Some suggest that Israel topple Hamas or Hezbollah, but they would probably just rapidly reconstitute or be replaced by something even worse, e.g., ISIS.

For these reasons, every Israeli government in recent decades, regardless of political complexion, has refrained from doing so. Israel may ultimately have no choice, but at least for now, the remedy exceeds the threat.

Unsurprisingly, the repeated rounds of conflict in Gaza, following the withdrawl, have convinced many in Israel that it is a proven failure. If so judged, this would certainly cast a pall over recommendations that Israel undertake a far riskier withdrawal from the West Bank; indeed, over the entire concept of a two-state solution. The West Bank literally abuts central Israel, where it is just 8.7 miles wide, and is in easy rocket and artillery range from Tel Aviv and Beersheba, even small-arms range from Jerusalem.

On the one hand, Israel was unable to prevent Hamas from firing thousands of rockets even before the withdrawal, when it was in complete control of Gaza. In that sense, the withdrawal has not fundamentally changed the situation, even if the repeated rounds have exacerbated it. On a more positive note, Israel no longer occupies 2 million people. Moreover, had Israel not withdrawn, more than half of the population under its control today would not have been Jewish. As such, the withdrawal was a critical step towards full separation from the Palestinians and a future two-state solution.

Conversely, detractors correctly assert that Israel’s post-withdrawal experience has greatly dampened prospects for this. Israel simply cannot allow the West Bank to become another rocket launching pad, and widespread public recognition of this has greatly undermined support for further progress with the Palestinians. Whether truly effective security arrangements can be devised is debatable—and without them, no one in Israel, Left or Right, will withdraw.

If Israel cannot ignore withdrawal’s disappointing consequences, it also cannot allow them to dictate future policy. For all of the greater near-term certainty in the current situation, it, too, poses grave risks. The absence of a political horizon feeds into Palestinian despair, increases the likelihood of a further armed uprising in the West Bank—or at least a surge in terrorism—and ultimately endangers Israel’s national character.

For decades, various overly optimistic analysts have predicted Hamas’s eventual moderation and pursuit of a more diplomatic course, as some terrorist organizations have done in the past. In practice, Hamas’ fundamental enmity toward Israel remains unchanged. However, this fact does not preclude Israeli from pursuing peace negotiations with the PA or taking measures to improve the quality of life in Gaza. Hamas, however, has proven to be an only partial partner even for such limited measures, repeatedly launching rockets at Israel just as it was opening the border. This seemingly self-defeating behavior only appears inexplicable if one refuses to accept Hamas for what it is, a jihadi organization bent on Israel’s destruction.

The situation in Gaza deteriorated so severely in recent years, however, that even Hamas was forced to support some economic reconstruction and growth measures. As the de facto government, Hamas seeks to ensure that the public does not become so disaffected that it rises up against it, but also not so satisfied with the new status quo that it ceases to support ongoing operations against Israel. In practice, the periods of calm between the rounds have grown shorter, not longer, despite Israel’s repeated attempts to promote economic growth.

Palestinian rejectionism has, unfortunately, not been limited to Hamas. PA presidents, Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, both rejected dramatic proposals for peace, which would have given the Palestinians a state on essentially 100 percent of the territory, a capital in East Jerusalem, and a limited return of refugees, years ago. One cannot ignore the truly wrenching question, whether the Palestinians are prepared to accept any deal that requires that they live in peace alongside Israel.

Israel heads to the polls again in November and a new centrist government is not unimaginable. The battle to succeed Abbas is also underway and, though less likely, a more moderate Palestinian leadership, too, may emerge. Such are the faint glimmers of hope in the Mideast.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Israel must beware of dangerous delusions after Gaza conflict

By Yaakov Lappin

The ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad appears to be holding stable, creating an opportunity to review the key takeaways from the three-day round of fighting from August 5 to August 7.

The Israeli defense establishment conducted a highly successful and effective short, sharp shock to the Iranian-backed PIJ terror faction. Yet it is the weakest of Israel’s adversaries, and the Israeli public needs to manage its expectations accordingly.

Acting on intelligence of an imminent guided missile attack from Gaza on Israeli targets, the Israeli Air Force, the Shin Bet, the Military Intelligence Directorate, Southern Command, and the IDF Armored Corps integrated their firepower efforts in a coordinated opening strike, which eliminated PIJ’s senior military leadership in northern Gaza, PIJ field attack squads, and PIJ observation towers used to coordinate enemy activity -- all at the same time.

The Israeli operational momentum continued throughout the operation, with precision strikes displaying a marriage of accurate firepower and real-time intelligence superiority.

Meanwhile, on the defensive side, Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system broke its previous records and achieved a 97% successful interception rate of rockets heading for built-up areas. Standing guard over Israeli cities, towns, and villages, the Iron Dome intercepted 380 projectiles.

The conflict was fought entirely as an exchange of standoff firepower, with both sides sending firepower strikes at one another. PIJ directed 1,100 rockets indiscriminately at Israeli targets, while the IAF took the utmost care to reduce harm to noncombatants to the extent possible, including aborting strikes when civilians were spotted in the designated strike zone.

According to IDF figures, 15 Palestinians were killed by failed PIJ rockets, meaning that more Palestinian civilians were killed by PIJ than by Israel in this conflict.

The IDF attacked a total of 170 PIJ targets during the three days of fighting, also going on to eliminate the organization’s southern commander.

It is easy to become deluded by the effective defense of the Israeli home front during this conflict, and easy to forget that should Hamas get involved, with its significantly larger arsenal of rockets, or Hezbollah, which has a monstrous arsenal of 150,000 projectiles – larger than that of most NATO armies --  air defenses will be flooded and will only be partially effective in preventing impacts in Israel.

More importantly, it is important to view Gaza as Iran sees it: One more arena in a multi-arena choke hold that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is trying to wrap around Israel’s neck.

By financing and providing knowhow to Gaza’s terror factions to build rocket arsenals and adding their firepower to that of Hezbollah, together with its entrenchment in Syria where it has ballistic and cruise missile bases, as well as its deployment of missiles and UAVs to Iraq and missile launch sites in Iran itself, the Islamic Republic is building a region-wide multi-front firepower assault staging ground against Israel.

This is the true context in which Gaza should be viewed. The three-day clash with the second largest Gazan terror faction is therefore no indication of the real security challenges faced by Israel.

It is precisely because of this force build-up by the Iranian-led axis, and the alarming progress of Iran’s nuclear program, that Israel’s defense establishment views Gaza as a third-tier priority, and one which must not act as a distraction or drain on Israeli military resources through a large-scale conflict.

Ultimately, however, although it is a mistake to view Gaza in isolation from the wider strategic picture, Israel is still overdue for a more in-depth discussion on its available options regarding the Gaza Strip conundrum.

Israel has two main strategic options when it comes to the Hamas-ruled Islamist enclave: Rounds of fighting designed to create periods of calm and quiet, or re-occupation of the Gaza Strip and a years-long military operation to root out the terrorists that would result in large numbers of casualties and a military regime imposed on 2.2 million Palestinians.

There are no other visible options at this time, and the Israeli defense establishment has repeatedly concluded that limited campaigns to top up Israeli deterrence are the lesser of the two evils.

This is a legitimate and critical debate for Israelis to engage in and those who advocate for toppling the Hamas regime must answer the question of who they think can replace it.

The idea of getting the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority to ‘ride into Gaza on Israeli tanks’ appears to be lacking in credibility, both because of the legitimacy crash that this would cause Fatah, and because of the severe doubts that exist over Fatah’s ability to hold Gaza, after losing the enclave to Hamas in a violent coup in 2007.

If Israel does continue to choose to allow Hamas to rule the Strip, meaning an acceptance of a cycle of enemy force build-up and habitual rounds of fighting, it must also think about ways of strengthening the status of the shaky Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, to avoid giving Palestinians the impression that Hamas’s way of armed conflict and radical Islamism will promote Palestinian interests and national prestige more than the PA’s modus operandi.

The PA’s ‘hybrid’ model of pursuing quiet security coordination with Israel against the common foe of Hamas and PIJ, together with diplomatic assaults on Israel and nods to martyrdom culture and incitement, will be insufficient to compete with Hamas if the PA does not soon begin delivering some political achievements for the Palestinians living under its rule. Those achievements can then act as a lever for Israeli demands for the PA to tone down its incitement.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

ISRAEL'S TECH INVESTMENTS ARE GOOD FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

By Doron Tamir

As technological developments race ahead across the board, governments must take the initiative and create incentives for the private sector to develop those that serve the national interest -- or face being left behind.

The State of Israel’s initiatives to promote eco-systems of development in the cyber sphere are an example of what government-guided development can do for both national security and the national economy.

Societies that are not interested in leaving their wellbeing up to market forces alone need governments that clearly define national technological requirements, and chart ways to reach those objectives.

While governments cannot force companies to research and develop anything, they can certainly encourage them to do so through tax breaks and investments, as Israel’s Office of the Chief Scientist has been doing for over a decade.

Often, technological development comes in recognition of a requirement, and many of these requirements have their origins in wars. For example, mass train transport took on a new dimension after trains became key to moving troops in World War One.

During the Cold War, many defense-related technological developments, like satellite communications and global positioning systems, later revolutionized the civilian world as spinoff technologies emerged.

The emergence in the 20th century of nuclear power from the science behind the atomic bomb solved severe energy issues for many advanced countries, particularly among states lacking oil.

It took around forty years to develop advanced unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver battlefield intelligence in real-time, a process in which Israel played a pioneering role. Today, however, quadcopters deliver packages and monitor traffic.

Yet, despite the plethora of development, many countries are also seeing the appearance of technologies that have no obvious good use.

This deluge of technology without any guiding hand means that governments face dilemmas when they plan for times of crisis – times where falling back on national technological development can make the difference between getting through a crisis successfully or not.

This was the thinking that guided Israel’s establishment of its National Cyber Directorate in 2012 after the government completed a process of defining just what kind of technological objectives it wished to achieve.

Unfortunately, this is not a frequent or common pattern in state-level decision-making, particularly in the West. While states excel in forming institutions and academic infrastructure, they have not fared as well in providing a deliberate guiding hand to technological development.

Israel, a relatively new country, which was barely functional 70 years ago, is a technological hub that competes with major powers, specifically because it has encouraged industries like cyber-security.

The same is true of Israel’s domestic defense industries, which truly began to flourish after the French arms embargo against Israel in 1968; until that time Israel had relied on French weapons systems.

Israel’s lead in agricultural technological development is another case in point – and with the prospect of food insecurity being a larger threat globally than war, countries must urgently begin developing such technologies.

Impending climate change and disruption to food supplies created by events like Russia’s war on Ukraine risk the death of millions of people. Famine is not the only threat faced by vulnerable countries-- droughts are another peril, which is why developing national desalination infrastructure provides states with a shield (albeit an expensive one) against such dangers, as Israel has learned through its pioneering desalination technology.

These maneuvers require governments to take a strategic view of present and future requirements, and to position themselves in ways that enable technological developments to serve as a defense against major threats, be they the result of natural phenomena or be they manmade.

Such a guiding government hand also yields significant economic dividends. When Israel established the National Cyber Directorate a decade ago, at the time it exported just hundreds of millions of dollars worth of cyber security solutions. Today, those exports surpass ten billion dollars a year – not including billions in investment by international companies in the local cyber industry. Today, that pace of growth is slowing down, but its economic and national achievements remain prominent.

Looking ahead, artificial intelligence will be a major sector for deliberate government-fueled development, for any country that wishes to be influential and relevant in the 21st century.  A failure to set such objectives will result in huge resources being poured into the research and development of projects that may yield negligible tangible results on the national level.

Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

IRAN'S PROXY PIJ, BEHIND ESCALATION HAMAS STAYING OUT, FOR NOW

By David Hacham

Iran’s puppet in the Palestinian arena, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), is a purely military-terrorist organization with a clear pro-Iranian orientation.

With some 10,000 armed members, it is the second largest armed faction in Gaza behind the ruling faction, Hamas, which, while expressing support for PIJ so far, has not rushed to join in the combat – and for good reason, though this could change.

Designated as a terror organization by the United States, Britain, the European Union, Canada, Australia, and Japan, the PIJ was founded by Gazan radical Islamists, who fused fanatical Islamic ideology with nationalism as a tool to promote the goal of destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamic state. PIJ was the first organization to position itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah party.  

The Sunni PIJ is hugely dependent on external supporters, first and foremost, the Shi’ite Islamic Republic of Iran. It is no coincidence that PIJ’s leader, Ziyad Al-Nakhalah, has spent recent days in Tehran with his backers, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

PIJ is also dependent on support from the Assad regime in Syria, which permits Nakhalah to run a PIJ headquarters from Damascus, as well as from Beirut.

While the PIJ makes local operational decisions, they are in tune with the overall expectations and instructions that Iran transmits to its Palestinian proxy. Iran is actively behind the current escalation and is far from being a passive onlooker.  

Tehran finances almost the whole of the PIJ’s annual budget, and while it directly armed PIJ in past years, today PIJ produces rockets in Gazan factories, based on Iranian know-how.

The central question at the time of this writing is whether Hamas will join the fighting. At this stage, the impression is that Hamas is in no rush to get involved, and this is due to the fact that Hamas absorbed a painful blow from Israel during its own May 2021 conflict with Israel. Since then, Hamas has been licking its wounds, recovering militarily, rebuilding its rocket stockpiles, and encouraging civilian-economic-humanitarian rehabilitation efforts in Gaza as well.

Hamas thus has no immediate and real interest to join the fighting against Israel. It fears that doing so would set it back considerably in terms of military, civilian, and economic damages.

It is fair to assume that Israel’s combat objectives are designed to avoid encouraging Hamas from jumping into the fray. Israel has been focusing its military activity on pinpoint strikes on targets designed to avoid drawing Hamas into the fight.

Still, none of this guarantees that Hamas will remain uninvolved. In the event of an IDF operation resulting in the unintentional killing of large numbers of Palestinian civilians, not only would large-scale international pressure come down on Israel to end its campaign, but also, Hamas would be far more likely to join hostilities. As long as the operation continues, the risk of operational errors grows.

Precisely for this reason, Israel has an interest in limiting the extent of fighting to the extent that it can. On the other hand, PIJ has an opposite interest – in dragging out hostilities in the hope that the IDF makes a mistake, resulting in Hamas joining forces with PIJ on the battlefield.

Either way, even if a ceasefire is implemented in Gaza, observers should have no illusions. An escalation could erupt anew at any time. The conflict between Israel and Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a story that has no end.

Still, Israel does not want to get dragged into the Gazan mud in the form of a large-scale ground operation, which would result in Israeli casualties and damage national morale.

In addition, Israel has a clear set of priorities in terms of its security challenges, and Gaza is not at the top of the list. Iran and its nuclear program are very much at the top of the priority list, followed by Iranian entrenchment efforts in Syria, and Tehran’s military assistance to Hezbollah.

Hence, Israel cannot invest all of its energy in Gaza, when it has other threats to prioritize.

Israel took the initiative, launching Operation Breaking Dawn on August 5 and assassinating PIJ northern commander Taysar Jabari in a surprise aerial strike, along with additional strikes on PIJ attack cells approaching the Israeli border.

This was a similar opening to move to that employed in Operation Black Belt in November 2019, which began with the assassination of Baha Abu al-Atta, Jabari’s predecessor. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi presided over both targeted killing operations.

In both 2019 and now, the IDF worked to attack PIJ targets exclusively and tried to avoid an escalation with Hamas.

Jabari, 50, had previously served as deputy to his late predecessor, Abu al-Atta, as head of PIJ operations, and as a coordinator of PIJ activities with Hamas. Jabari coordinated hundreds of rocket launches at Israel during the May 2021 conflict. After surviving past assassination attempts, he met his end on Friday.

During the current operation, the head of PIJ’s southern division, Khaled Mansour, who was involved in rocket fire against Israel during the May 2021 conflict, was also killed by the IDF in a targeted strike.

After the May 2021 conflict, southern Israel experienced almost total quiet, something not seen in Gaza for years. Hamas and PIJ exploited this to rebuild their military capabilities, including replenishing their rocket stockpiles.  

Hamas reaped the benefits of international efforts aimed at rebuilding Gaza’s civilian infrastructure, led by Egypt, and ongoing Qatari financial support for needy Gazan families, as well as fuel for Gaza’s power plant. Israel also encouraged this process by providing permits for 15,000 Gazan workers to enter Israel for employment.  

This escalation could torpedo the process of Israeli civilian gestures toward the Gazan population.  

In the end, civilians on both sides are, once again, paying the cost for the uncompromising radical ideology of Gaza’s terror organizations, which are willing to sacrifice the lives of Palestinians for their own extremist goals. This operation is one more station in what Gaza’s Islamic terrorist groups see as a never-ending journey of conflict.  

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

The PIJ – Israel conflict places Hamas in a trap

BY Grisha Yakubovich

The latest round of conflict between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Israel has produced a key conclusion: Hamas is the only ‘resistance’ element in the Palestinian arena that can impose an equation of its making on Israel.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad has been seeking to copy Hamas: It tried to mimic Hamas’s strategy of linking the West Bank to the Gazan arena and responding to events in the former by threatening and activating force from the latter.

PIJ has failed in this task. On the one hand, this failure strengthens Hamas, because it provides proof that the ruling faction in Gaza and it alone has the ability to challenge Israel through its terrorist army in the Strip.

There is, however, a flip side to this coin. Hamas is under pressure to join the fighting and prove its credentials as a ‘resistance’ movement. Hamas is in a bind.

Operationally, there is no doubt that the Israeli action against PIJ in Gaza has been beneficial for Hamas. Israel has been targeting PIJ, a competitor to Hamas that is seeking to position itself as the ‘resistance’ entity and steal some of Hamas’s prestige.

PIJ has been able to take a lead position in the northern West Bank, particularly in Jenin, and it is seeking to bolster its position in Gaza too. This troubles Hamas.

Hamas, though it will never admit it publicly, could not ask for a better result than the battering PIJ has received from Israel. The end result, Hamas can hope, will be a message to the Palestinian arena: All smaller armed groups should follow its lead. If they try to wage war on Israel by themselves they are doomed to failure.

This strengthens Hamas significantly. But PIJ has been trying to obtain a different result by prolonging the conflict (although at the time of writing reports of ceasefire negotiations are surfacing) in the hope that Hamas will be entrapped into joining the hostilities.

Israel has understood this sensitive situation very well, and this understanding has been reflected in its precise, cautious targeting of PIJ targets in the Gaza Strip.

It wouldn’t have taken much for Hamas’s calculation to change, and to alter its position to remain out of the fighting.

Still, Hamas is keenly aware that such a result runs contrary to its core interests. At its core, Hamas represents an ideological concept based on the idea of rejecting diplomacy with Israel, rejecting the path of the Palestinian Authority, and continuing with armed conflict.

Both Hamas and PIJ represent the thinking of Palestinian Muslims who reject the path chosen by their secular brethren, who have opted for understanding that they have to live with Israel.

Now, with PIJ weakened by Israel, Hamas can not only rest assured that it has an exclusive lead position in Gaza, it can also begin to fill a void in the northern West Bank, where Israel has arrested large numbers of PIJ operatives.

All of this can significantly help Hamas position itself in the race for the Palestinian leadership when the 87-year-old Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas finally steps down. Hamas becomes the most relevant movement, outshining Fatah, and certainly outshining PIJ, as the only one that can force Israel to change its policies towards Gaza.

Still, these interests do not guarantee that Hamas would not get involved, if not in this round of fighting, then potentially in a future one under similar circumstances. If Hamas did feel compelled to act, it can be expected to do so with massive action, in a surprising manner, hitting Israel as hard as it can with rockets, armed drones, sea attacks, and cyber-attacks.

If that does not happen, however, in the near term future, then PIJ will be on record as failing to replicate Hamas’s impressive achievements at the cognitive-national level. 

The May 2021 conflict that Hamas fought with Israel stands as proof, as far as Hamas is concerned, that it is on the right path, leading as it did to increasing international and Israeli investment in Gaza’s economy, and a boost to Hamas’s status as ‘guardian of Jerusalem,’ the banner under which it sparked that confrontation last year.

PIJ’s pale imitation of this achievement saw the group fire rockets at Jerusalem on Sunday, at a time when Jews mounted the Temple Mount in the Old City to mark the holy Jewish day of Tisha B’Av. But unlike Hamas, that attack, like the remainder of PIJ’s attacks, are a shadow of Hamas’s capabilities.

Ultimately, PIJ’s attempt to be ‘the next Hamas’ failed, and the results of that failure will continue to be felt by Hamas, the PA, and Israel long after the next truce comes into effect.

At the same time, reality on the ground has demonstrated more than once that failure can form the basis for future success. Time will reveal if this will be the case.

Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

Russia-Ukraine war: A driver for Israeli defense exports to Europe?

 

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

As European states reassess their security situation amid the fallout of Russia’s war against Ukraine, signs are growing that acquisitions of Israeli defense products by European clients – and not only European clients – could substantially increase.

In 2021, according to Defense Ministry figures, Europe was the highest importer of Israeli defense technology. Overall exports hit a new record of $11.3 billion that year, with Europe accounting for 41% of that figure.

However, for this to increase further, European defense budgets will need to rise too, and the extent to which this will happen depends greatly on whether European states develop comprehensive defense strategies.

Such strategies go much further than decisions on defense budget increases.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was one of the biggest opponents of former US President Donald Trump’s insistence that NATO states allocate 2% of their GDP to defense. Now, Scholz how pledged to create a 100 billion Euro defense fund, and exceed the 2% threshold. But will this commitment last into the long-term? It is too soon to answer that question and meanwhile, the annual defense budget that Scholz is proposing is based on a gradual increase, not an immediate jump.

The second key question pertaining to Israeli defense exports to Europe relates to Israeli portfolio adaptability. Are the lessons now emerging from the Russian – Ukraine war relevant to Israeli defense company specialty areas, in a manner that favors distinct products from Israel?

The answer to this is more complex than meets the eye. The United States, for example, can easily supply Ukraine with anti-tank Javelin missiles, or Stinger man-portable air defense systems, by taking them out of US Military storage sites, or from storage facilities allocated for allies. Israel is not in the same situation.

While Rafael has been able to mass produce spike missiles for European clients (Euro Spike), Israeli UAV makers must produce systems from scratch, as is the case with most Israeli defense exports.

The repertoire of Israeli defense companies is generally strongest when it comes to suites for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance requirements, but not the platforms themselves.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance elements such as radars, on the other hand, are easier for Israeli companies to supply in significant numbers.

Additionally, some of the battlefield lessons emerging from Ukraine have changed since Russia launched its offensive in February. At the start of the war, songs of praise were written for Turkey’s Bayraktar TB-2 armed UAVs from the medium altitude long endurance category. Yet limited release of video footage of Bayraktar strikes is testimony of the limited and sporadic use made of this system (unlike the Azeri use of the Bayraktar against Armenian forces in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war).

In the skies, Russia effectively controls the medium to high altitudes, while neutralizing the armed UAVs. It is reasonable to assume that Israeli-made lightweight UAVs or loitering munitions will perform in this environment.

Both Russia and Ukraine have abandoned the low-altitude arena. For Russia, this means precision strike and ground support fire capabilities were largely lost, and Russia reverted to artillery strikes and high-altitude air strikes, conducted by powerful assault helicopters and fighter jets.

These trends reveal three things to Israel’s defense industry. The first is the growing need for standoff weapons, enabling warfighters to avoid getting too close to the ranges of enemy firepower.

Additionally, there is a growing need for advanced soft and hard kill active defense suites for various platforms such as tanks, helicopters, etc.  

Thirdly, air defense requirements are diverse. The Ukrainians are armed with a multitude of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, and not all warfighters are covered under medium-long range air defense umbrella.

Thus, it is unsurprising that Germany and others are showing interest in Israeli missile defense systems, like the Arrow program, and airborne balloon-carrying radar systems, which can detect cruise missiles and UAVs better than ground-based radars.

Meanwhile, the role of precision surface-to-surface rockets is increasing in the war, as the US and UK supply the Ukrainians with such systems, for example, GMLRS. Even though their numbers are small so far, their influence is highly significant.

In the cyber sphere, Russia failed to achieve its objectives, causing limited damage to Ukraine. Still, Ukraine’s communications networks, water, and electricity, transportation, keep working – and this underlines the central importance of cyber defense systems.

Electronic warfare is undoubtedly growing more influential as the war progresses.

These are the essential lessons that Israel’s defense industry can take away thus far from the war raging in Europe.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.

Israel elections: Israel is in for a wild campaign season

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

After the upcoming Jewish holidays, Israelis will go to the polls on November 1. That means Israelis are in for a four-month-long election season instead of the usual three and thus face one of the longest campaign seasons in the country’s history.

Four months of spin, promises and manipulations are in store for Israelis as political parties work to try and conquer the hearts and minds of voters – voters who are already saturated by the unfulfilled promises of four elections in the past five years.

Instead of a prime minister leading a small six-member party, Israel now has a caretaker prime minister, which is just another way of saying a temporary prime minister in office for four months.

Lapid and Yesh Atid

Many things can be said about Yesh Atid, chairman and caretaker Prime Minister Yair Lapid, but one thing cannot be taken away from him: He managed to realize his dream of becoming premier. That’s not something many in politics can say.

But that achievement is a mere step in Lapid’s grand strategy of being voted in as prime minister, which he is pursuing with a lot more planning and political calculation than meets the eye. For example, Lapid’s decision to let former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett be first in the rotation between the two was not, as is often presented, a gentleman-like act, but rather, the result of a consideration that whoever enters elections as serving prime minister has an advantage.

There’s an Israeli saying that says that nothing is more permanent than the temporary and Lapid understands the political aspects of this very well. His temporary step up is part of a bigger goal to lead a real government.

The catch is, however, that Lapid’s ability to assemble a government will depend not only on his maneuvers but also on those of his fellow members in the center-left bloc.

Gantz and Sa'ar

Unlike in the last, exhausting four rounds of elections, this time around, the Israeli political map appears to be changing somewhat. Recently, Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Chairman of the Blue and White party, who was a political partner of Lapid, decided to challenge Lapid’s bid to become prime minister by forming a joint list together with Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar, head of the rightist New Hope Party.

This pushes Lapid more to the left of the political map. For Sa’ar the maneuver makes good political sense since polls show him barely scraping across the threshold in the next elections if he runs alone. Gantz, for his part, becomes a real candidate for prime minister in the face-off against the opposition led by Benjamin Netanyahu and Gantz’s new joint list could lure some center-right voters who are fed up with the Netanyahu-led bloc.

These advantages, however, could all be undermined by the fact that Gantz’s messaging is too confused to clearly position himself politically.

Gantz attempts to satisfy everyone – the Left, the Right, the middle class, the Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox. In both politics and life, one can’t satisfy everyone. At this time, it seems that it is Sa’ar who closed an excellent deal for himself and is riding on Gantz’s shoulders, saving himself from erasure from the political map.

Ayelet Shaked

Meanwhile, Within the rightist bloc the Likud party grows stronger, according to the polls, despite the multiple trials that Netanyahu is facing. His base of voters remains loyal and seems to be getting stronger. Still, Netanyahu’s bloc would have to reach 61 Knesset seats to gain power and it may turn out that the only way he could do this is with the help of Interior Minister and Yamina party chairwoman, Ayelet Shaked, known to some as the princess of the right.

Shaked is still recovering from finding out very late, while on a state visit to Morocco, that the government she was a part of had fallen apart. She was practically the last person to know about the fall of the government despite her full loyalty to Bennett, her former Yamina colleague.

The shock and sense of treachery she felt in the face of Bennett’s failure to update her was clearly visible. Shaked’s party has been deeply scarred by the departure of members from the party itself and from the previous government, and her situation in the polls isn’t great. But if she joins forces with Netanyahu, this could be the push that the bloc needs to get into government.

Shaked has four months to reinvent herself, and she has a big advantage going into the elections since she is able to market herself as a right-wing force operating for the benefit of all.

As a result, it is worth closely tracking Shaked’s progress over the next four months. She could well be the decisive factor regarding what kind of government Israel has after the elections.

Labor and Meretz

Meanwhile, on the Left, Labor and Meretz find themselves under Lapid’s leadership. Meretz has more than its fair share of trouble. Health Minister and Party Chairman Nitzan Horowitz announced that he will not compete in the upcoming primaries for the party leadership, and the party’s number two, Environmental Protection Minister Tamar Zandberg, announced that she is taking a pause from political life.

Both of them understand that the ship is sinking and that they must jump off it. Meretz is scratching the electoral threshold in polls, and its sister party, Labor, refuses to merge with it. This week, former Meretz chairwoman Zehava Galon declared that she will return to politics to run for the party leadership. This move is designed to revive the party and could certainly prove effective since Galon is considered a skilled and highly esteemed political operative.

United Arab List

The Arab sector, for its part, will soon answer an important question as well: How many votes will the United Arab List party of Mansour Abbas gain after making history and becoming the first Arab party to serve in the ruling coalition government?

Will the Arab Israeli population reward Abbas for his actions or will they erase him from the political map?

Former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, who declared his intention to enter politics, is currently shopping for parties and could run with either Lapid or Gantz-Sa’ar. It’s important to remember, however, that the Israeli population is no longer automatically enthralled with generals and former chiefs of staff, and demands someone who puts their quality of life at the top of their list of priorities.

In Israel, every day is dramatic and this is true all the more so in politics. The situation is highly fluid and the political arena is filled with capricious actors pursuing their dreams and ambitions, alongside “mere ideology.”

What remains certain, however, is that this campaign will be primal and highly charged.

Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

Founding a Middle Eastern NATO

By Henrique Cymerman

The Middle East is experiencing a geostrategic earthquake, and its epicenter is in Saudi Arabia. This seismic shift is leading to the creation of a military alliance between countries that, at least technically, are still enemies.

The political and commercial contacts between Israel and the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, led by Saudi Arabia, stopped being a secret in August 2020 when the dramatic signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain took place. Later, Morocco and Sudan joined the framework.  

Now, however, the new alliance is on the cusp of evolving into a regional NATO-type system, with states cooperating under an all-for-one and one-for-all logic. There have been a series of recent reports regarding regular meetings between military chiefs from Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, as well as ongoing discussions about joint defense agreements against missile and drone attacks from Iran, or its proxies.

The publicizing of joint Israeli–Emirati air force drills employing F-15 and F-16 fighter jet pilots flying side by side would have been the stuff of science fiction just a few years ago. Today, it is a concrete reality.  

During recent trips to the Gulf cities of Jeddah, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, I received explanations that cast light on these developments. The Iranian threat – both nuclear and conventional – is the glue that binds together this unique coalition.

According to senior military officials say, as early as 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, the Arab powers already understood that there is no military option against Israel. A former Saudi intelligence chief explained this reasoning to me in detail, saying, “We surprised you on your Day of Atonement. You started the war on your knees, but in the end, you won it. And now Israel is much stronger, it is the greatest power between Indonesia and Gibraltar."

The rulers of Abu Dhabi, the capital city-state of the UAE, do not hide their dream of turning the Israeli "startup nation" into a "startup region.”

"What we are looking for is not to buy and sell like in a bazaar, but to do joint ventures," a prominent Emirati businessman told me. According to him, for the UAE, peace with Israel is a strategic bet on the future.

Many secret and private flights have occurred in recent years between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and heads of the Mossad have reportedly made such journeys.

Even a few weeks ago, a private jet with prominent Israeli businessmen and women was reported to have made this journey. All of them first landed in Jordan just for a few minutes so that they could not be tracked by any app and so that no questions were raised, and then they continued to Saudi Arabia.

In his first tour as American president in the Middle East, Joe Biden, who ultimately understood the extraordinary potential of the Abraham Accords achieved by the previous Republican administration, decided that Air Force One would be the first plane to fly directly from Tel Aviv, Israel to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where a summit was scheduled to take place under the leadership of the Saudi kingdom.

Some say that Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), Crown Prince and strong man of the kingdom, is carrying out a revolution and that if his grandfather and some of his uncles saw it, they would roll over in their graves.

Many of the internal Saudi dynamics that enable this change are tied to a demographic factor that is so noticeable on the streets of Jeddah, Riyadh, and the rest of the Gulf’s capitals: 70% of the population is aged under 30. And for most of them, the 20th-century wars between Israel and the Arabs are as ancient and irrelevant as the wars of the Romans.

The Saudis have removed all antisemitic references from their school curriculum textbooks, and even the Secretary General of the Muslim World League, Mohammed al-Issa made it a point to visit Auschwitz and maintain close relations with rabbis from Israel and from around the world. His critics call him "the Zionist Imam". Last week, he was chosen by the Saudi authorities to deliver the main sermon for the festivity of Eid Al-Adha.

MBS, together with his Abu Dhabi mentor and the new Emirati President, Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ), Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, are now betting on Biden's help to push the Abraham Accords into a new phase.

The American president is seeking to reach an agreement that will be a win-win for the four countries.

According to this arrangement, Saudi Arabia will grant Israel complete freedom of flights over its airspace for all Israeli and foreign airlines operating out of Israel, effectively shortening all flights from Tel Aviv to many Asian capitals.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia will receive approval from Israel for the transfer of two strategic Egyptian-controlled islands in the Red Sea, Sanafir and Tiran, off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula, to Saudi hands (Israel’s approval for this is stipulated by the 1979 Egypt – Israel Peace Treaty).

Cairo will be financially rewarded significantly by Riyadh, and this will pump plenty of financial oxygen into the very poor and fragile Egyptian economy.

Finally, the US will achieve an increase in oil production from Saudi Arabia, which is necessary to replace the black gold lost by the West as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Biden, who throughout his political career was one of the champions of the 80-year-old strategic alliance between the United States and Israel, also visited East Jerusalem and Bethlehem, to remind the region that the Palestinian issue remains pending. The Palestinians do not hide their concern that they have been relegated to the sidelines in world politics by the new cold war, the global energy crisis, and the ongoing normalization process between Israel and a growing number of Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries.

It is said that what happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas. The events of recent times prove once again that what happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. And that, although American presidents want to leave the region, the Middle East will pursue them wherever they go.

Henrique Cymerman is a journalist of global renown whose writings regularly appear in media publications in Europe, the USA, Latin America and Israel. He lectures in five languages. Henrique has covered current affairs in the Middle East for over 30 years and has been nominated "Comendador," a title of nobility, by the King of Spain and the President of Portugal. Read full bio here.

Israel is politically gridlocked

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

As all Israelis are painfully aware, the country is quite literally stuck in a traffic jam. But Israel is also stuck in a figurative gridlock. Over the past few years, the lives of Israeli citizens have been disrupted by one man, who is fleeing his trials and is attempting, in every way, to obstruct the state’s systems.

Citizens who are upset about the spending of NIS 2.4 billion on the upcoming November 1 elections should not be deceived into thinking that the opposition is working earnestly for the public good: It is working in the interests of Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of the opposition.

Let us look, for example, at the Metro Bill. The traffic jams that afflict greater Tel Aviv have become one of Israel’s most acute problems. To address the causes of this chronic congestion, the government decided to turn words into policy, and after years of promises made by its predecessors, launched the largest infrastructure project in the country’s history of Israel, at a cost of NIS 200 billion.

While many European cities have operated metro railways since the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Israel’s metropolises still lack underground mass transit systems. The project is no less than historic.

The planned metro project stretches out across the whole of the Dan Region, from Rehovot in the south to Hod Hasharon in the north, and it is designed to offer a real solution to the chronic problem of traffic, as well as to housing and employment issues. The projected benefits from this national project are estimated to surpass NIS 420 billion, and some NIS 25 billion per year.

The Metro Bill was a flagship initiative for Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman. It successfully passed its first reading in the Knesset and was put up for debate before the Knesset’s Special National Infrastructure Projects Committee.

But then the opposition stepped in. Those who believed there could be no reason to sabotage such an important bill, one that serves the citizens of Israel, irrespective of what side of the political spectrum they are on, were proved to be mistaken. At the National Infrastructure Projects Committee, the opposition caused a gridlock by submitting endless reservations leaving it stuck in committee, waiting for approval.

Liberman, who understood that soon the bill would be lost, together with an investment of billions of shekels, fought to save the bill, turning to every faction, including coalition factions that were showing signs of giving up and pleaded with them to put politics aside.

Trying to pass the bill

After the bill finally made it through the National Infrastructure Committee, Liberman made a desperate attempt to push the bill through second and third readings in the Knesset on the eve of parliament’s dissolution, pleading with opposition factions to put politics aside and telling them that a vote against the bill was a vote against the citizens of Israel.

“This is not about opposition and coalition, or religious or secular, or Left and Right. This is the most important infrastructure project in the history of the State of Israel, and it is being sacrificed on the altar of political interests,” Liberman said.

Even now, as Israel heads to elections, Liberman is asking the Knesset to convene to approve the bill, yet without the opposition’s cooperation, it seems this will not happen.

At first, it seemed as if the opposition, having achieved its goal of toppling the government, had decided to support the bill. But then it changed course again, making new, bizarre demands that had nothing to do with the interests of Israel’s citizens.

Just a few examples to illustrate the point. The opposition said it would consider voting for the Metro Bill if Yamina, headed by former prime minister Naftali Bennett, would revoke Chikli’s rebel status – a move that would have enabled him to run with the Likud party in the next elections.

Or, consider a demand to increase election funding to NIS 1.66 million shekels per MK.

MK Yoav Kisch (Likud) went a step further. He said he would be prepared to pass the Metro bill only if the coalition would be willing to bring forward elections by a week, as this would boost the Likud-led bloc’s chance of winning more votes because yeshiva students will be home on holiday that week.

Could the opposition’s demands be any more effective in highlighting its priorities, which clearly put the national interest second to its political interests?

And now, Israel is, once again, heading to elections for the fifth time in three-and-a-half years, and it’s not only its roads that are at a standstill: Israelis can no longer bear the endless gridlock in the political system. They deserve a sane and functioning country, and leaders who place the public interests before their personal and political interests.

When Israelis ask themselves “Are these elections necessary?” and “What could have been done with the NIS 2.4 billion shekels that they will cost?” they would do well to remember the story of the Metro bill. 

Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

Making Technology Work for Humanitarian Purposes in War

 

By Daphne Richemond Barak & Laurie Blank

Although targeting technology continues to make significant progress, it is important for governments and militaries, including Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), to consider how technology can assist civilians stuck in battle zones, facilitate communication between adversaries, and rebuild communities post-conflict.

We see already the use of apps, databases, and social media to gather and share evidence of war crimes in Ukraine, providing real-time documentation of atrocities even as the war is still ongoing. These efforts will contribute to bringing justice to the victims in international and domestic courts.

But new and emerging technologies can do so much more. Modern technology can provide a real boost to family reunification through facial recognition software and other biometric tools, enhance identification of areas that require humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance using satellite imagery, and help ensure that various fighting factions are aware, in real-time, of when and where ceasefires go into effect.

During war, any and all tools to reduce vulnerability are essential. Civilians are vulnerable to attack and starvation, internment, disease, adverse weather, and many other hardships. Combatants captured by the adversary are also vulnerable—to mistreatment, loss of rights and privileges, disappearance, and other harms.

Any tools that can minimize such vulnerabilities must be harnessed, such as the real-time databases and background checks to screen for traffickers taking advantage of displaced persons and refugees launched at the Ukraine-Poland border, or biometric identification of captured soldiers and war dead, through to proper treatment and return of personnel.

And as conflict comes to an end, uncertainty can be a substantial obstacle to progress towards peace. Imagine technological tools that could enable warring parties to verify and trust information about the position of forces, the adherence to ceasefires, or the demobilization of forces, such as blockchain and other means of securing information flows. Mitigating uncertainty can help smooth the path to peace by removing common obstacles and sources of re-escalation.

In recent months, we have worked to bring relevant stakeholders around the table to explore how technology may be channeled for humanitarian purposes as wars wind down. Policymakers, militaries, humanitarian organizations, and technology experts are all essential participants in moving beyond the limited conception of technology as a warfighting tool and beginning to harness new and emerging technologies to ameliorate the consequences of war.

Although such technologies may not appear to fit into traditional military perspectives or mission definitions at first glance, a policy shift would be easier than some may think. Israel serves as a good case study for this potential. The IDF, for example, will have to address the needs and safety of millions of civilians in the event of war breaking out in Gaza or Lebanon, and as such, this discussion is extremely relevant to it.

A number of military technologies, particularly air defense systems like Iron Dome, are already defined as defensive systems that protect and have an ultimately humanitarian mission, as are the red alert (tzeva adom) warning systems designed to notify civilians of impending rocket attacks. Well beyond the narrower mission of targeting and boosting lethality, these existing technologies open the door to inserting other humanitarian applications into the mix.

Until now, the lack of any substantive discussion about the use of technology to enhance the protection of civilian populations caught up in conflicts and facilitate the end of war has been striking. Although the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross are already using new technological capabilities for several of these purposes, and NATO has held simulations on using artificial intelligence in disasters, the conversation too often focuses on the downside of technology rather than its potential upside.

Ultimately, there are countless ways in which technology can be used to bolster protections for civilians, facilitate the end of conflict, and better inform reunification and reconstruction after the war. The ever-increasing use of technology to cope with humanitarian disasters not linked to war, such as earthquakes, major flooding, and storms, highlights the breadth of this potential.

Breaking the stigma that views technology in war as solely about attacks and lethality can enable international organizations, humanitarians, militaries, tech companies, and scholars to work together to shape this new and promising humanitarian role.

Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Prof. Laurie Blank is Clinical Professor of Law at Emory Law School. Together they co-founded the End of War Project under the auspices of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism and Emory’s Center for International and Comparative Law.