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UAE - Israel Normalization: An Analysis
TEN TAKEAWAYS FROM THE UAE - ISRAEL ANNOUNCEMENT
By Benjamin Anthony
The normalization of ties between the UAE and Israel is an historic moment, worthy of celebration and optimism.
In no particular order, here are ten take away points to keep in mind.
1) By taking the issue of sovereignty off the table, the Israeli right has been spared from entering into the Trump peace plan as a basis for negotiations. That plan endorsed Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley, but it also supported the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea & Samaria, it’s capital in east Jerusalem and the ceding of more Israeli land, this time adjacent to the Gaza strip (see Trump peace initiative conceptual map below). If sovereignty is ever to be applied it should occur in total separation from the Trump plan. The Israeli right should breathe a sigh of relief - and demonstrate some introspection. Several settler movement leaders applauded the Trump peace plan at the White house ceremony, without reading its contents. Next time, they should study such a document in advance of rendering judgment - particularly when that document pertains to the fate of their own homes.
2) Prime Minister Netanyahu says sovereignty is not off the table. The Americans and the Emirates say otherwise. To find out who's right, wait to see the written details of the deal. Beware though. While the issue will probably be addressed contractually, if past treaties are prologue, the wording relating to sovereignty will be agreed upon but what that wording actually means will be hotly contested - possibly for generations to come – by both sides.
3) If Israel applies sovereignty in the future, it is unlikely that such a step would destroy an Israel – UAE deal. Mutual interests between the two countries will become inextricably tied by the time such a decision is taken by any future Israeli government.
4) America, whose commitment to the Middle East has been understandably questioned recently, could very well be back in the region - and that is a good thing. Russia, China and the EU are pale imitations of American leadership.
5) Benjamin Netanyahu’s massive presence astride the international stage and his myriad domestic achievements have not yielded him a seminal legacy issue. He has managed, rather than resolved, the matters he designates most in need of resolution, including the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear program.
The normalization of ties with the UAE undoubtedly gives him that legacy achievement. Whenever he departs the political stage, this deal is one to which he can always gesture. It's also quite possible that the inking of the agreement will enable him to add another notch to his legacy belt; finally tackling Iran.
6) Normalization turns the tables on the Iranians. For years, Iran has tormented Israel by stationing Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, hard along Israel's border. Now Iran must contend with the open fact that Israeli capabilities and know-how will be established in the UAE, likely in greater order than has been the case to this point, in a position as proximate as possible to the Ayatollahs. It's a tit-for-tat move by Israel and the UAE. Geography still matters.
7) Netanyahu has hinted that his potential successors include Mossad Chief, Yossi Cohen. That Cohen effectively conducted the diplomacy undergirding this deal may indicate more than the traditional Mossad role of coordinating with countries with which Israel does not enjoy diplomatic ties. Cohen's role speaks to this being an interests based agreement between the UAE and Israel, at the lead of which is Iran. But it also demonstrates Netanyahu's faith in the Mossad Chief and bolsters his credentials if ever a political 'succession' does take place.
8) Benjamin Netanyahu is the world's most strident voice against the Iranian nuclear program. The UAE wants that program ended. They are more likely to reach that goal with Netanyahu as Premier. At this moment, Benny Gantz is set to soon rotate into that position. On Iran, Gantz is a far less strident force than Netanyahu, and the UAE knows it. Israeli politics are such that anything could change. Gantz may never become PM. But if you were the UAE, why would you wait to find out?
9) The August 25th deadline for Israel’s government to pass a budget is looming and the coalition is at an impasse. A bill to defer that deadline recently passed its first preliminary reading. The bill could still be scuttled though, the deadline missed and this government dissolved, ushering in a fourth round of elections in Israel. The US presidential elections will take place on November 3rd. Netanyahu frequently stakes his election campaigns on his international gravitas and Trump is seeking a bump in the polls. Any signing ceremony will be timed to take place at a time that buoys the electoral chances of both leaders. If Netanyahu wants to form a coalition of new partners, a well timed peace summit would do wonders for his prospects - and he is absolutely canny enough to have timed the announcement of normalization for when he did, for that very reason.
10) Watch Foreign Minister Gaby Ashkenazi closely. If the coalition holds, the signing ceremony could be his moment to shine - to the detriment of Benny Gantz. Gantz is the leader of the party, but he's thus far failed to make a political impression. Ashkenazi could use this opportunity to step out from behind him, if Netanyahu allows him to do so.
Bonus Point 11) The BDS movement was just delivered an absolute hammer blow. This deal is a massive economic opportunity for both countries. Those who’ve thrown in their lot with the BDS movement should understand that they are backing a racist, bigoted, Jew-hating movement that's on the wrong side of truth, history, principle and progress. While that movement lurched between student governments seeking divestment, Israel and the UAE were identifying ways to generate massive mutual investment. Better to follow their example and join a winning team.
Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. His portfolio includes the coordination of high level briefings by senior members of the Israel defense establishment - active and retired - to elected officials; including within the US Administration, the US Senate, and the US House of Representatives, on matters relating to the state of Israel and her strategic relationship and positioning in an international context.
NORMALIZATION WITH THE UAE. DENORMALIZATION FOR ISRAEL.
By Alexander J. Apfel
The “normalization” of ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an historic step about which Israelis can rejoice. Jerusalem is forging relations with countries that not long ago vowed to never recognize the Jewish state. The benefits accompanying this “Normalization” should be celebrated by all peace-loving people. It is Israel’s hope that one by one, other Arab countries will follow this courageous, albeit overdue, path of peace.
However, in the process of pursuing Normalization with the UAE, Prime Minister Netanyahu all but formally relinquished Israel’s sovereignty to the United States. Hailing the historic breakthrough, Netanyahu assured his base in a press conference on Thursday that he remained committed to applying sovereignty, as he had repeatedly pledged during his last three election campaigns.
Many Israelis believed Netanyahu's election promise and that he had just the man in the White House to give the green light. Yet, after Jordan protested and threatened diplomatic consequences and with Netanyahu’s characteristic flip-flopping, the July 1st date for commencing the process came and went, without progress or event.
Fast Forward a month, and here we are once again, with Netanyahu bowing to the demands of the UAE and the US that we surrender our right to extend sovereignty to areas he has stated belong to the Jewish state. In a press conference immediately following the announcement of the UAE deal, Netanyahu outlined the benefits of such Normalization. These mutual benefits - particularly that Israel has now enlisted a strategic, overt ally against Iran - justify the “temporary” delay on sovereignty, he said.
But rather than accepting the demand to halt sovereignty as a precondition for signing this pact, Netanyahu should have turned the tables and insisted that Israel will sign the pact on condition that the UAE recognizes Israel’s application of sovereignty over certain territories; or, failing that, that the UAE does not openly oppose the Israeli step? Why must Israel, whose cooperation is so highly coveted by the UAE in the fight against Iran and in many other areas, repeatedly yield to demands from others, particularly as those demands pertain to Israeli land?
Such a predisposition is not tenable for a sovereign state. It plays into a decades-old fiction that Israel does not have the right to determine its own destiny unless “we, the world” say it does. This has essentially been the case since 1947 and it appears to be a symptom of the Galut (Jewish diaspora) mentality that has bled into the modern Israeli psyche.
In our pursuit of acceptance among the nations, we submit to their dictates. It's time for Israel to fully shed its Galut skin.
Netanyahu’s deference to Washington on almost all military and territorial matter of strategic, historic and biblical import, constitutes a near total abandonment of the principles upon which this country was founded - that no longer would the Jewish people be bound by the whims of any nation, that they alone would be the architects of their own destiny.
Before blindly embracing this Normalization pact with the UAE, therefore, Israel must ask itself some fundamental questions: Are we a sovereign state or are we a client state of the United States? Is our capital in Washington or Jerusalem? Do we follow the decisions of the democratically elected Knesset or do we obey those sent from Capitol Hill? Are we really an “Am Hofshi (free people)” or are we simply an “Am Americai - An American people”? And what are the implications of those questions in a rapidly changing America?
Israelis must ask themselves the very question that Netanyahu himself asked during a 2012 speech about neutralizing the Iranian threat: “The world tells Israel, ‘wait. There’s still time.’ And I say, wait for what? Wait until when?”?
As a sovereign Jewish state, we should have applied sovereignty. If doing so had resulted in the scuttling of a deal with the UAE, so be it. A country that is unable to determine its own borders without foreign consent is no country at all. It is little more than a colony.
An ever-closer relationship between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump is no reason for Israelis to feel any less of the bitter disappointment they carry as a result of Netanyahu’s repeated, broken promises. Netanyahu surely has not forgotten that the end of the Trump era is approaching and a sea of new challenges under an unknown administration awaits - whether in November, 2020 or four years hence.
Delaying the application of sovereignty has rendered us an autonomous enclave in the Middle East, rather than a sovereign power. Put simply, Normalization with arab countries must never be conditioned upon the perennial denormalization of our own identity and territorial integrity.
On sovereignty, Netanyahu has failed to seize the opportunity he was afforded by history.
He would do well to reflect on what was arguably his finest hour.
Sitting in the Oval Office, in the face of inordinate pressure from an American president, the Israeli Prime Minister invoked history. As he pushed back against the policies of Barack Obama on Judea and Samaria, Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed that if we were to misstep, “history will not give the Jewish people another chance."
On sovereignty, that same Israeli Prime Minister has misstepped. History is unlikely to bestow another chance upon the Jewish people.
Alexander J. Apfel earned a BA and MA in Modern History. He is the former managing editor of Ynetnews and served in the Armoured Corps of the IDF, where he continues to serve as a reservist.
Israel Must Seize Its Moment in Abu Dhabi
By Zachary Shapiro
Last week, the Trump administration announced that Israel and the United Arab Emirates reached a landmark diplomatic agreement to normalize relations. President Donald Trump hinted that the deal could be the first of many accords with other Arab states.
Of course, Israel should celebrate this historic achievement. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government should resist the temptation to sit back and rest on their laurels. Instead, they should seize upon this breakthrough by prioritizing non-military cooperation, choosing a fitting ambassador to Abu Dhabi, investing in public diplomacy, and moderating Israeli policy towards the West Bank. Taking these steps would help solidify the agreement while advancing Israel’s broader normalization campaign in the Middle East and beyond—a cornerstone of Israeli doctrine.
Israel has long tempted unlikely partners with access to its defense and technology sectors. According to the White House’s statement, security ties will be a pillar of this normalization deal, along with environmental, medical, and technological trade, and more. No doubt Israel’s security cooperation with its Emirati counterparts is crucial to countering Iran. However, Netanyahu and his diplomats should work tirelessly to advance relations in non-military sectors first and foremost. Ultimately, the long-term success of this treaty hinges on broad and deep economic cooperation. By focusing on non-military commerce, Israel can diversify and deepen a critical partnership for years to come.
Second, the Israeli government should choose its first envoy to Abu Dhabi carefully and strategically. And Netanyahu should vet candidates more cautiously than he has in the past. In 2016, he nominated former settler leader Dani Dayan as ambassador to Brazil. Israel suffered an embarrassing setback when Brazilian officials rejected Dayan’s credentials, citing his past in the settler community. Ultimately, Dayan became Consul General in New York, where he made impressive headway with critics of the Israeli government. On other occasions, Netanyahu has used diplomatic appointments to exile potential political foes like Danny Danon, Israel’s outgoing ambassador to the United Nations.
This time, Netanyahu should resist the urge to politicize the appointment. Instead, he should select an ambassador who can speak to the Emirati people articulately: an Arab-Israeli official. Two in particular would make strong choices. George Deek, Israel’s ambassador to Azerbaijan, has been called “Israel’s best diplomat.” Ishmael Khaldi, who in July became Israel’s ambassador to Eritrea, is Israel’s first Bedouin diplomat. He, too, would make a fine nominee.
After selecting a qualified ambassador, Netanyahu and the Foreign Ministry should invest heavily in exchange and cultural diplomacy programs in the United Arab Emirates. If handled properly, Abu Dhabi could be a steppingstone to Manama, Muscat, and beyond. Accordingly, normalization with the UAE is a golden opportunity for Israel to break down barriers and to change long-hostile Arab attitudes. A robust public diplomacy strategy could help Israeli diplomats reach Emirati audiences and lay the groundwork for long-term change. The Foreign Ministry excels at this sort of diplomacy, so it should make these programs a strategic priority as soon as the Embassy opens its doors.
Finally, Netanyahu should moderate Israeli policy toward the West Bank. Emirati leaders have already faced blowback across the Arab world. Beyond keeping its word to avoid annexing the West Bank for the foreseeable future, the Israeli government should refrain from further settlement activity for at least the near term. In the wake of the normalization deal, each new settlement is effectively a threat to Israel’s relationship with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed.
Furthermore, settlement construction, especially in more controversial areas understood to comprise a future Palestinian state, could preclude the possibility of more official relationships with other Arab countries. Much like the possibility of annexation, building in these areas could jeopardize this potential realignment—a focal point of Israeli foreign policy and its strategy to counter Iran. Though the Israeli right has condemned Netanyahu’s concession on annexation, this historic victory gives him sufficient political cover to continue pursuing other pragmatic policy objectives while pivoting towards the Israeli center—and away from wayward settlers on his right.
Overall, the Israel-UAE agreement marks a watershed moment for Israeli foreign policy and for Netanyahu. A string of accords with other Arab states may well be on the horizon, and Israel’s longtime goal of greater normalization may finally be within reach. Netanyahu should be pleased and proud, but he should also lean forward. He must capitalize on this opportunity to secure Israel’s place in the region and among the nations.
Zachary Shapiro is a foreign policy analyst and master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was previously a research associate for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
The Geopolitics of the Israel-UAE Peace Agreement
By Jeremiah Rozman
With strong U.S. backing, on August 13, 2020, Israel and the UAE agreed to normalize relations. The UAE is the third Arab country to do so since Israel’s founding.
In exchange for full normalization, Israel agreed to suspend extending sovereignty to disputed areas. As a supporter of sovereignty, especially in the strategically critical Jordan Valley, I view this agreement with tempered optimism. It supports the strategic interests of the U.S., U.S. partners in the Middle East and Israel. It does not harm Israel’s de-facto defensive position and should encourage the Palestinians to negotiate. Following an extensive election campaign, which heavily featured the promise to extend sovereignty, this deal has mixed results for Israel’s domestic politics.
Great Power Competition
The Israel-UAE peace agreement was at least as much about U.S. strategic interests as it was about Israel and the UAE. Washington’s strategic priority is great power competition. Its top adversaries are Russia and China. Its main advantage is its alliance network. By solidifying the start of a coherent alignment between itself, Israel, and regional partners, the U.S. can lead a united front against Iran while preempting Russian and Chinese encroachment on its traditional allies. Furthermore, European partners often clash with the U.S. over Israel. This agreement has been warmly welcomed by the Europeans, helping to smooth over some of these differences.
Regional Security and Prosperity
The main benefit of this agreement is not ending violence, as was the case with Egypt. Rather, it is the setting of a diplomatic precedent intended to open a new regional realignment and an era of cooperation.
Forward thinking Arab leaders realize that oil does not hold the promise for prolonged prosperity that it did fifty years ago. Their countries need access to state of the art technology and expertise in order to build economies and militaries primed for success in the information age. The U.S. and Israel can offer much needed investment, expertise, and defense support. Normalization with Israel opens the door for multilateral cooperation to modernize regional economies and enhance collective defense with an eye focused towards restraining Iran.
Presidential candidate Joe Biden’s campaign credited the Israel-UAE breakthrough as the culmination of “efforts of multiple administrations.” Perhaps this assertion alludes to President Obama’s Iran deal, which caused regional powers to seek cooperation with Israel out of fear of Iran. This agreement, as a starting point for regional cooperation, will greatly boost Israel’s ability to target Iran should the need arise.
Israel and the Gulf countries fear that if Joe Biden were to win the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, and follow through on his platform’s pledge to reenter the JCPOA, ending the maximum pressure strategy against Iran, the need to kinetically target Iran’s nuclear program could very well arise. For Israel to carry out a successful attack, it needs good relations with partners, the use of airspace, staging grounds, refueling capabilities, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support. By simply boosting the credibility of the threat to strike Iran, the peace deal enhances deterrence against Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
By forestalling sovereignty and securing increased visitation to the al Aqsa Mosque, this agreement gives the UAE a concrete policy win for the Palestinian cause. This boosts its leadership clout and contrasts the advantages of diplomacy with the Hezbollah/Lebanon confrontational model which has secured nothing for the Palestinians and brought ruin to Lebanon.
For Israel, the main strategic drawback of the agreement is postponing de jure sovereignty, which is the optimal way to ensure Israeli control over the Jordan Valley for posterity. In the near term, this changes nothing, though. Israel has maintained security control over the Jordan Valley for over five decades and can continue, now with the tacit support of Arab powers, until an adequate deal is presented. This would require concrete border commitments from the Palestinian Authority (PA). Due to their ideological opposition, this is unlikely to be obtained.
Over the coming years, the UAE will inevitably see substantial economic and defense benefits from normalization with Israel, making the treaty ever more difficult to abrogate. If the PA remains unwilling to negotiate peace, it is unlikely that the UAE will withdraw from the agreement if Israel extends sovereignty to the Jordan Valley. At that point, Israel could extend sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and other areas in the disputed territories without substantively harming relations with its Arab partners. Both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Jared Kushner have signaled that this is on the table. Whether it is implemented depends mostly upon the actions of the PA.
Israel’s Domestic Politics
For Israel’s domestic politics, the peace agreement will have mixed results. It will exacerbate trust issues between the electorate and the Likud. Netanyahu campaigned on the promise of sovereignty, which was strongly supported by his voters. Some might credit him with masterful “door in the face” negotiating, waiving the credible threat of sovereignty in order to secure a diplomatic win by then conceding on it. Others will see this as a bait and switch. Either way, it exemplifies foreign policy from on high, keeping the masses in the dark so that the “experts” can play geopolitical chess. While this may or may not be desirable, it is likely to erode faith in electoral promises.
Conclusion
The much heralded Israel-UAE peace agreement has disappointed many proponents of sovereignty. Others see normalized ties without requiring a change to the status quo as a betrayal of the Palestinians. In reality, this is a pragmatic move aimed primarily at boosting the U.S. geostrategic position with an eye towards great power competition. Secondarily, it opens the door for regional alignment between Israel and Gulf countries for economic and military cooperation. It does not harm Israel’s security in the short-term. It does not definitively end sovereignty. It does however, boost Israel’s position vis-à-vis its only existential threat, a nuclear armed Iran. For these reasons, the deal should be viewed with tentative optimism, as a win for Israel, moderate Arab regimes and the democratic global order.
Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
You Won't Get Peace Now By Weaponizing Falsehoods
By Cade Spivey
On a long drive from my native Indiana to Virginia, I listened to a podcast wherein the interview subject began with a fairly benign truism: "Words matter." The program, produced by Americans For Peace Now, began by stating that not every murder is a genocide, and that not all discrimination is apartheid. The interview then continued for another thirty minutes laying out a “legal” framework of apartheid in order to shoehorn Israel into that definition, vis-à-vis Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank.
I agree that words matter. The words we use to describe an issue directly influence the substance of a debate. I further contend that facts matter, and that merely using legal terms to describe a legal framework does not establish facts independently. Law was not meant to be argued in the abstract. The arguments made to establish Israel as an "apartheid state" were irresponsible and unwarranted and promoted key assertions which have become commonplace in the misinformed effort to establish Israel as an apartheid state.
Apartheid Defined
The UN defines apartheid as "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them." The term was derived from the system of racial segregation imposed in South Africa from the late 1940s until 1994. Separation of the races was strictly enforced in public accommodation, trade, education, marriage, and even sexual acts. The purpose was to cement the power structures which existed at the end of the British colonialization of the region. While the UN's legal framework does not establish South African-style apartheid as a benchmark for action, there have been no sanctions for acts by any government (including South Africa) since the passage of the Rome Statute by the International Criminal Court in 1997.
Regardless, the cynical invocation of the term harkens back to that brutal scheme of governance in hope of eliciting a sympathetic response to the alleged victims - in this case, the Palestinian Arabs. When the term is used to describe Israel, it is as inappropriate an analogy as a comparison apples to hand grenades.
Occupied Territory
Firstly, the speaker described the West Bank as "occupied territory" under international law. This is simply not true. The area traditionally referred to as the West Bank is not "occupied." The West Bank is “disputed" territory. While the distinction may seem purely semantic, words matter.
Occupied territories are captured in war from another sovereign; in this case, a Palestinian sovereign did not exist in 1967, prior to the Six Day War, when the alleged “occupation” began. Disputed territories, however, are lands subject to ongoing negotiations regarding conflicting claims of sovereignty. Referring to the West Bank as occupied may play well into the argument of Israeli apartheid, but doing so mischaracterizes the legal and political frameworks under which both sides of the debate are attempting to establish agreements. Furthermore, this mischaracterization does not produce a positive result - nor does it seek to do so. It seeks only to entrench and divide both sides through alienation while failing to meaningfully address the needs of either.
Racial Subjugation
The speaker told of an Israel where Arabs are second-class citizens; denied the right to vote, run for office, or attain citizenship. I would wager there are many Israeli-Arabs who would beg to differ. For example, Abdel Rahman Zuabi, Salim Joubran, or George Karra, former members of Israel's Supreme Court; the 17 Israeli-Arab members currently serving in the Knesset; or perhaps the Israeli-Arabs serving in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), would likely see things differently.
Even in the West Bank, Palestinians are afforded voting rights and even their own civil management under the Palestinian Authority (PA). While the PA certainly coordinates with Israel in some areas - such as sharing security functions with the IDF - it still has autonomy status. The Palestinian-Arabs who live under the control of the Authority are not denied a voice, it’s just that the authority to which they speak seems unwilling to listen. The people who live in the West Bank are subject to security controls and movement is, at times, limited. But the realities that lead to such policies are independent of their race. They are based on real-world safety and security concerns. The Palestinian-Arabs are not subjugated, and they are not second-class citizens. They are also not citizens of Israel.
To be clear, matters of Israeli-Palestinian sovereignty are not beyond debate. There are political, religious, and human rights issues that should be debated and considered very deliberately.
Reducing one side or the other to terms that are the very embodiment of evil through ad hominem labels or inappropriately applied legal definitions is not helpful, and does not produce meaningful outcomes for people living these truths daily.
Cade Spivey is a publishing Adjunct at The MirYam Institute. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and served three tours in the Navy as a Gunnery/Antiterrorism Officer, Damage Control Assistant, and Counter-Piracy Evaluator. He is currently a student at the Wake Forest University School of Law.
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A Conversation With Israel Hayom Correspondent, Danielle Roth-Avneri
THE BEIRUT BLAST HAS ROCKED LEBANON AND THE REGION
By Yaakov Lappin
The tragic August 4 explosion that tore through Beirut, killing over 150 people, injuring thousands, and causing massive property damage, represents the latest tragic phase in Lebanon's destabilization and transition into failed-state status.
As the fallout from the deadly explosion continues to reverberate, and the government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab resigned in the face of popular outrage, many Lebanese demonstrators have taken to the streets. In addition to their calls for an overhaul of the corrupt political system, which has left them poor, with little electricity, and a breakdown in basic services, the demonstrators have begun challenging Hezbollah's unrivaled status as the military and political hegemon in Lebanon.
A domino effect of instability could see Hezbollah's position challenged in new ways, and the Iranian-backed proxy could respond with violence to protect its status.
Yet the destabilization of the Lebanese state began long before the Beirut explosion. Lebanon has been facing a series of crises, joining a Middle Eastern club of states unable to provide basic services or an economic future for its citizens, a growing number of whom find themselves homeless, jobless, and hopeless.
Lebanon has shown an inability to find a solution for its people, for whom the economy is the most important and pressing issue. That reality has given rise to a growing current of anti-leadership protests in Lebanon, and the protests are not sectarian in nature. Like in Iraq, the Shi'ite sector in Lebanon has seen a young generation challenging its own Shi'ite leaders.
The involvement of the international community has also been sub-par. Inherent instability is thus the norm in Lebanon, and, like in other Middle Eastern states, Iran is a big part of the story.
Lebanon now faces the twin crisis of economic collapse and political paralysis.
While anger toward the government and Hezbollah was growing prior to the blast, Hezbollah still maintains a large loyalist southern Lebanese Shi'ite heartland (though some people there have joined Shi'ite voices critical of Hezbollah's actions).
Lebanese citizens, from a variety of sectarian backgrounds, have become frustrated by the obstacles that the Iranian-backed terror-army has placed in the way of outside help. Sunni Gulf states, alarmed by the political ascendency of their arch-adversary - the Iranian-Shi'ite axis in Lebanon - stopped channeling large funds into Lebanon's banking services sector. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE, which must contend with the radical Shi'ite axis in their own backyards, have any interest in rescuing a Hezbollah-dominated Lebanese government from bankruptcy.
In distress, Lebanon turned to the International Monetary Fund for a 10 billion dollar bailout loan. But the IMF would require changes to Lebanon's economic structure, including more transparency, and assurances that Hezbollah, which faces American sanctions, will not take charge of the funds. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has described the IMF conditions as terms "that would make the country explode" – a statement that reflects the degree to which Hezbollah holds the country hostage.
Hezbollah, meanwhile, still maintains thousands of combatants in Syria, where they fight alongside Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias on behalf of the genocidal Assad regime.
The blast itself raises a number of questions, so far unanswered, about Hezbollah's potential linkage. The questions were well summarized by Dr. Ely Karmon, a senior research scholar at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, who examined the official version of events describing how a Moldovan-flagged cargo ship docked at Beirut port in 2013, reportedly after suffering technical problems while sailing from Georgia to Mozambique, carrying 2750 tons of ammonium nitrate. After a series of disputes and inspections, the ship was abandoned by its owners in Beirut, and its cargo was transferred to the Port's Warehouse No. 12, where it remained for several years, despite repeated requests by port authorities to dispose or resell the explosive substance contained.
According to Karmon, questions linger over how the ship got permission to dock in Beirut in the first place, as well as why nobody contacted the company in Mozambique that allegedly ordered the explosives and paid a million dollars to the ship's owners for it. Questions over who decided to store the explosives at the port for six years, and keep it in poor conditions, have not received satisfactory answers.
In addition, it remains unclear whether Hezbollah weapons were stored near the enormous ammonium nitrate storehouse.
Whether or not Hezbollah is connected to the blast, what is beyond dispute is that Hezbollah terror cells, under orders to attack Israeli and Jewish targets around the world, were found in possession of tons of ammonium nitrate, including in London, Thailand, Cyprus, and Peru. The organization appears to have trafficked the substance to its sleeper cells. The Thai National Police chief found similar explosives in shipping crates, apparently for export to other destinations.
It must also be noted that Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsor intended to set up a missile production line inside Lebanon, an initiative that resulted from Israel’s alleged, effective, ongoing interdiction of Iranian smuggling attempts into Lebanon.
Hezbollah now wants to convert many of its rockets into precision guided missiles in order to threaten Israeli strategic sites, a development that would cause even greater regional volatility.
Whether or not Hezbollah negligence was linked to the Beirut blast, the tragic event underlines the obvious risk posed by the storage of explosives and weapons in the heart of crowded, built-up civilian areas – a modus operandi that Hezbollah has pioneered, and continues to implement.
Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S.
RIGHT OF REPLY: ISRAEL'S ECONOMY IN THE COVID-19 ERA: AN UPDATE
By Itai Ater
I listened with interest to the MirYam Institute Podcast discussion between Pinchas Landau and Allan Marks on July 31st, regarding Israel's Economy in the Covid-19 era. I want to briefly touch upon two points that were raised in the conversation, and then discuss a third point that was mentioned but perhaps did not receive enough attention.
1. Mr. Landau asserts that the current 15-20% unemployment rates are first and foremost NOT a macro-economic problem. He explains that many of the newly unemployed are young, low income and unskilled individuals and that the impact of these unemployed individuals on the Economy is not significant, therefore.
I disagree.
The underlying goals of economic policy is the well-being of all individuals in the Economy. If a non-trivial share of individuals in the economy is unemployed then the Economy is facing a huge economic problem, both at the micro and the macro level. This is true irrespective of the education, age and skills of those unemployed. If anything, having many unskilled individuals unemployed implies that the recovery period from the current crisis may be more protracted given that these individuals will find it increasingly difficult to find jobs elsewhere.
Furthermore, due to the rise in unemployment, income inequality can be expected to increase, yielding further negative ramifications on the Economy.
The unprecedented rise in unemployment is clearly, first and foremost an economic problem, therefore.
2. The conversation discussed in length the Israeli balance of payments, which for various reasons improved in recent months. Macroeconomic indicators (e.g., GDP, balance of payments, inflation) are not important in their own right. They become important when they tell us something about the performance of the Economy overall.
Unfortunately, the balance of payments indicator is probably the only macroeconomic indicator that looks somewhat positive at this time. Other indicators (such as unemployment which was discussed above) provide a different perspective. For instance, the Bank of Israel estimates that GDP in Israel will fall by 6% in 2020. Private consumption, the main driver of economic growth in Israel in recent years, has fallen dramatically (per-capita private consumption dropped by 22.2% in the first quarter of 2020). Finally, the government deficit is expected to be at 13% by the end 2021. That large deficit is driven by increased government spending and a drop in government income due to lower tax collections.
The implications of the current crisis are far-reaching. First, unemployment rates are expected to remain high for the next 4-5 years. Second, the government will need to fund its debt through higher taxes and lower government spending on education, welfare and infrastructure projects. While it’s possible that not all measures will be adopted in the immediate to near term, in the world of economics there's no such thing as a free lunch. Someone (the Israeli public) will end up footing the bill for the vast (probably warranted, given the situation) government spending.
3. Many of the adverse implications of Covid-19 are common to many countries. Yet, unfortunately, the Israeli case is further complicated by a dysfunctional government.
Reflecting this leadership crisis is the current disagreement regarding the government budget, and whether the newly formed coalition will pass a budget before August 25th.
Absent a budget by that August date, elections will be triggered automatically, announced and held this coming November. Despite contrary opinions held by nearly all economists - including the Governor of the Bank of Israel - Prime Minister Netanyahu is advocating for a short-term budget for the coming 3 months. Deputy Prime Minister Gantz is seeking a budget that takes us through 2021.
A failure to resolve the budget impasse could well result in the international credit agencies (Moody's, Fitch and S&P) lowering the credit rating of the Israeli government, leading to higher interest rates having to be paid by the Israeli government.
Perhaps even more troubling than looking at a particular macroeconomic indicator is the notion that - unlike the large economic crises that Israel faced in 1985 and 2001-2002 – in this particular scenario, the politicians running the Israeli government, and specifically the current Prime Minister, are distracted by other political considerations - considerations that prevent them from fully focusing on the very real challenge at and helping the economy exit its current state of crisis, bringing it to recovery and - hopefully - prosperity.
Itai Ater is a Professor of Business Economics and Strategy at the Coller School of Management at Tel Aviv University. Itai, born and raised in southern Israel, served as an officer in the IDF's 8200 unit.
VIDEO: WILL THE GOVERNING COALITION LAST?
A Conversation With Former MK, Nachman Shai
VIDEO: ISRAEL'S ECONOMY IN THE COVID-19 ERA: AN UPDATE
Pinchas Landau & Allan Marks Provide An Economic Update
VIDEO: IAF ANALYSIS OF SECOND LEBANON WAR
The Israel Air Force's Role In Lebanon Two
NO PANDEMIC CAN STOP OUR POLITICAL CRISIS
By Danielle Roth-Avneri
Only a coronavirus-sized global pandemic could break Israel's political paralysis - but not for long.
Just a few months after the formation of the government, political feuding and paralysis is back, yielding to nobody and nothing, including the coronavirus crisis, potentially bringing us to the cusp of national elections – once again – within a year.
One of the clearest signs of this new phase is the escalating political battle between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Alternate Prime Minister Gantz. The number of issues on which they clash only continues to grow.
Netanyahu is insisting upon an annual budget, due to rapidly changing conditions. Gantz, meanwhile, seeks a bi-annual state budget, saying it will provide greater stability.
The budget argument is also governed by the political interests of either side. Netanyahu wants short-term political arrangements, which would allow him to dismantle the government if he feels the need to do so. Gantz, on the other hand, wants to safeguard his position as future prime minister, in line with the coalition deal. The absence of a budget would serve Netanyahu’s goals and undercut those of Gantz because it would amount to a pretext for the dissolving of the coalition.
Coalition agreements have also been violated. The first of which was carried out by the Blue and White Party, which voted in favor of a law banning 'conversion therapy' for gays and lesbians, something that could push the seat of prime minister even further from Gantz's reach.
For many of Gantz's initial supporters, recent months have been a resounding disappointment. One would expect that a politician for whom an entire role was invented - that of alternative prime minister - would work day and night to prove himself, and generate new, creative ideas, in order to justify his position.
He has failed to do so. His decision making is extremely slow. Off the record, some of his associates have been increasingly critical of his drawn out demeanor. Instead of being at the forefront of responses to Israel's multiple crises, he often appears to be absent.
While many of his voters remain disgruntled by his violation of his pledge not to form a government with Netanyahu, Gantz could have redeemed himself in the eyes of those voters if his commendable step toward national unity in the face of an emergency had been followed with a demonstration of leadership.
Unfortunately for Gantz, that is not what has happened. His spokespeople often release anemic media messages expressing how difficult the situation is, but leadership, not commentary, is what is needed from him.
As a result, in a political reality divided firmly between pro and anti-Netanyahu camps, with no middle ground, Gantz’s Blue and White party has plummeted in the polls to a mere nine mandates, making it difficult to imagine how he can assume the position of prime minister next year.
Gantz has been careful not to aggravate Netanyahu or to break new political ground. The result is that he is now politically paralyzed.
Even in his role as defense minister, a position from which he could demonstrate leadership and experience, he is subsumed by Netanyahu, seemingly of his own will, leaving the Israeli people wondering why he seems so absent - even in what is a flagship role in Israel.
LEADERSHIP TO EMULATE
Yair Lapid, leader of Yesh Atid and chairman of the opposition, is filling the void of alternative leadership created by Gantz. Lapid, now polling at 16 seats – a leap forward for him, is capitalizing upon his role as opposition chief. Gantz would do well to emulate that example.
Lapid has already launched his 2021 election campaign, and is gaining the support of voters disappointed in Gantz.
This month witnessed another example of leadership, one that promoted gender equality in the political system. Three women, from three different political parties, who sit on the Coronavirus Knesset Committee, cancelled a government decision.
The Committee Chairwoman, Yifat Shasha Biton (Likud), Yulia Malinkovski (Yisrael Beitenu) and Hila Shay Vazan (Blue and White) boldly challenged the government's desire to shutter public pools and gyms and to close down beaches on weekends, citing the lack of data supporting the idea that such places are transmission hubs and that during the pandemic, allowing people to be active in such places creates an outlet for mental wellbeing.
Their ability to band together and challenge the government is an example of how to prioritize the needs of our citizens; above and beyond our coalition politics. The contrast between their conduct and the conduct of Gantz could not be more stark.
Shasha-Biton made her decision knowing that the punishment ultimately doled out to her from the Likud for her “rebellion” was in the offing, but she acted nonetheless. Ultimately, she was removed from her post as a result.
Gantz seems to be steered primarily by what best ensures the safety of his political seat.
Despite the ongoing, severe challenges posed by the pandemic, a return to political crisis is in full swing in Israel.
The possibility of yet another round of elections is back on the agenda.
Danielle Roth-Avneri is a journalist and reporter on political matters, as well as an editor for the Israel Hayom/Israel Todaynewspaper, the most widely circulated publication in Israel.
Questions for Peace Proponents Overseas
BY Benjamin Anthony
Peter Beinart is the latest non-Israeli to prescribe what Israel must do to resolve its conflict with the Palestinians. Beware this prophet. A former, impassioned advocate of the two-state solution, he now calls for the establishment of “a Jewish home that is not a Jewish state” in a single entity he calls “Israel-Palestine”; effectively, a one-state solution.
Beinart’s proposal, printed in The New York Times, is symptomatic of an U.S. political pendulum whose direction is unfavorable to the state of Israel and whose momentum is generated in significant part by strands of vocal, Diaspora Jews.
Israel must challenge him and those like him.
Below are six questions for overseas proponents of the two-state and one-state solutions to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
Is the policy you propose implementable?
When advocating for the two-state solution, could you open a map of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and demonstrate how a contiguous state for the Palestinian Arabs — incorporating Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip — could be established without breaching the contiguity of northern and southern Israel?
Is there evidence that concessions of Israeli land and security control will yield peace for Israel?
Since withdrawing from Gaza in 2005, Israelis have fallen prey to thousands of rockets launched from the territory vacated. More than two-thirds of the state of Israel is within range of rocket attacks from Gaza. Does that reality inspire confidence in further concessions of land or security control?
Are the majority of Israelis prepared to divide our capital city?
The people of Israel always yearned to return to Jerusalem. For millions of Israelis, Jerusalem is the heart of our existence. Thus, we believe that carving up that heart would destroy, not preserve, the broader Israeli organism. No Israeli prime minister has successfully negotiated the partitioning of Jerusalem since its reunification. Israelis are not in the business of partitioning the holy city.
If a given solution fails, will those who championed it be willing to live with the consequences of that failure?
Since Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, three defensive operations have been launched by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in response to acts of terror from the strip. Such operations required, among others, the repeated, mass mobilization of the IDF reservists. These citizen soldiers are our fathers and our mothers, our doctors, professors, lawyers and innovators. Some of these citizen soldiers are killed. Anyone unwilling to accept such risks for themselves has no right to ask Israelis to do so.
If a given solution fails, will those who championed it be willing to have their own children face the consequences of that failure?
Most of Israel’s defenders are ages 18 to 21. In wartime, they can see the towns they defend from the forward lines of the battlefield. The IDF’s last four major, cross-border operations resulted from the land for peace formula and the relinquishing of Israeli security control. In each case, our teenage defenders were protecting a society whose children have grown up under rocket fire. Are overseas peace proponents so confident in their suggestions that they would be willing to stake the lives of their own children on its outcome?
Why do people overseas believe Israelis require any pressure whatsoever in order to fashion a peaceful way forward for ourselves and our loved ones?
The Israeli debate as to how we ensure a life of peace is alive and intense. It is Israel’s to have. Overseas pressure is not required for us to recognize the urgency of peace-making. We have made peace with enemies before. We seek to do so again. We have not, and do not, seek to do so along parameters that would imperil our very existence.
If Beinart and others like him are unable to respond with a resounding “yes” to all these questions, they ought to move away from policies they have thus far promoted and consider alternative ideas.
A stubborn unwillingness to do so is indicative of a readiness to impose upon Israelis a standard they would never accept for themselves.
Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. His portfolio includes the coordination of high level briefings by senior members of the Israel defense establishment - active and retired - to elected officials; including within the US Administration, the US Senate, and the US House of Representatives, on matters relating to the state of Israel and her strategic relationship and positioning in an international context.
ISRAEL'S VIEW OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES: A COMPLEX PICTURE
By Yaakov Lappin & Chuck Freilich
As tensions mount on the Israeli-Lebanese border, the role of Lebanon's official military must not be overlooked. Defining an Israeli perspective of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is more complex than meets the eye. On the one hand, as can be seen from current events, Hezbollah's growing domination of Lebanon's official military is a source of deep concern. On the other, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) maintains regular open channels of communication and coordination with the LAF, which are used to help stabilize the Lebanese – Israeli border area during sensitive times.
Officers from the IDF's International Cooperation Unit (ICU) meet with counterparts from the LAF every few weeks, at the headquarters of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which hosts the encounters in the Lebanese town of Naqoura.
The meetings have been successful in their goal of avoiding unintended incidents and border friction, as Operation Northern Shield (December 2018 to January 2019), which was launched to destroy a series of cross-border Hezbollah attack tunnels, has demonstrated.
At such meetings, the military delegations display English-language presentations to one another, outlining their requirements and outstanding issues. According to former ICU head Brig. Gen. Erez Maisel, "On some days, they [the LAF] would describe us as the Enemy Defense Force. Now they just write 'Israeli Force.'"
The LAF has raised 13 "areas of contention" with the IDF that touch on the exact location of the Blue Line. At least one of those areas was resolved through military-to-military dialogue, when the IDF offered a solution accepted by the LAF.
At the same time, IDF commanders have expressed concern over the increasingly cooperative relationship between the LAF and Hezbollah. The LAF does not prevent Hezbollah from entering into any area it pleases and it has a protocol through which its units do not enter southern Lebanese villages without gaining prior Hezbollah approval, which makes sure to remove any incriminating evidence.
In some cases, Hezbollah personnel wear LAF uniforms and the two even enter villages for joint patrols, which of course allows Hezbollah to prevent any attempts to truly uncover its illegal presence and reimpose Lebanese sovereignty. The cross-border Hezbollah tunnels, which Israel discovered and destroyed last year, were dug under the nose of the LAF. Hezbollah has shown off captured US military equipment, which could only have come from US aid to the LAF.
All of this has helped Hezbollah to circumvent UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which bans it from deploying armed units and weapons into southern Lebanon. The resolution sought to ensure that the LAF would be the sole military force in the region, but Hezbollah has succeeded in subverting it to give it cover for its armed presence. In fact, most villages in southern Lebanon have become bases for Hezbollah rockets and other armed positions, in many cases almost every home.
What remains unclear is how different components within the LAF view their military's relationship with Hezbollah.
The possibility of internal divisions appears tangible. The LAF is formally dedicated to the Lebanese state, while Hezbollah is an Iranian-sponsored Shi'ite fighting force that views the Lebanese state, ultimately, as a host to be exploited. This long-standing clash of interests within Lebanon came to the fore once again during the Coronavirus crisis, which further magnified the country's catastrophic economic troubles.
Hezbollah’s presence has not been conducive to efforts by Lebanon to secure an IMF loan, with the organization's chief, Hassan Nasrallah setting conditions for receiving the loans, and warning that a failure to adhere to them could "make the country explode." Nasrallah's fear is that the IMF's conditions for granting the loan could obstruct Hezbollah's ability to exploit Lebanon's banking system.
For years the US has poured billions into the LAF, over $2 billion since 2005 alone, viewing it as the only force in Lebanon that might prove capable of countering Iranian influence. In addition, the U.S. says that the financial assistance has enabled the LAF to successfully repress ISIS on Lebanon's border with Syria.
In practice, Hezbollah has long held de facto control over the LAF, which does not make decisions of consequence without its approval. Indeed, in recent years, Hezbollah has come to dominate the government of Lebanon - in reality it is the government - and is also the primary socio economic force in the country.
The Trump administration, despite its policy of “maximum pressure” towards Iran, recently released $105 million in aid to Lebanon. In Congress, in contrast, pressure is growing to condition at least 20% of the aid to the LAF on a reduction in Hezbollah’s influence over it.
The LAF could, in theory, fill in a vacuum left in southern Lebanon in the aftermath of a new Israel – Hezbollah war, thereby enabling the IDF to quickly withdraw after a future conflict. This has already been done in the past, and was the intent behind Resolution 1701. Hezbollah’s stranglehold over the LAF and Lebanon, as a whole, however, have proven too strong, but there are few better alternatives.
For decades, Iran’s Hezbollah proxy has hollowed out the Lebanese state, including the LAF, creating a situation in which it becomes hard to apply leverage, because no one appears to really be in charge and all options are bad. Aid to the LAF has almost become a form of indirect assistance to Hezbollah itself, but to cut it off completely would only strengthen Hezbollah further.
In these circumstances, the Congressional legislation conditioning part of the aid to the LAF on a reduction in Hezbollah’s influence, appears to be a first step in the right direction. Lebanon does need a jolt. Growing pressure must also be brought on France and others to join the US and, more recently, Britain and Germany, in formally designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Growing pressure must also be applied on Hezbollah’s financial channels.
Israel, for its part, should continue its efforts to document and expose Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon and especially the deployment of its forces in the south, in violation of Resolution 1701, as well as the ongoing precision guided missile program.
For all of the criticism of Israel’s hasbara (public diplomacy), its previous efforts in this area bore fruit and can do so again.
Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S.
Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University.
IRAN'S AYATOLLAHS: DOWN, BUT FAR FROM OUT
By Yaakov Peri
Iran has now named Ershad Karimi as the perpetrator of the blast at the Natanz nuclear facility, but the ongoing series of blasts, fires and power failures taking place throughout Iran, including in Tehran, in other locations of strategic significance at the advanced centrifuge development site in Natanz, and the nature of the operations have the hallmarks of a state entity, with highly advanced attack capabilities. The responsible entity certainy has leading capabilities in the realm of cyber, and possibly, in the context of the reported explosions, is the beneficiary of personnel placement inside Iran.
While it is possible to generate explosions through cyber capabilities, when blasts are involved, operational teams on the ground are a more likely source of attack.
While the Iran's regime continues to investigate who is responsible, its relative silence is indicative of it's helplessness. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, who was expected by some to threaten Israel as a result of the blasts, made no mention of them during a recent speech. He made no mention of them and focused his message upon issues such as the 'agricultural jihad' in Lebanon, a country which is suffering from a severe economic and political crisis. Iran's and its proxies are cultivating a sphere of deniability.
Silence cannot hide the fact that the Iranian regime has failed to protect its most strategically important assets. Naturally, its suspicion will be trained on Israel, and though this could be the latest phase in Israel's shadow war with Iran, other possible operatives cannot be ruled out; including the United States and Arab adversaries of the Islamic Republic such as Saudi Arabia and, very importantly, elements of Iranian opposition must also be considered.
The continuing nature of the incidents, and the fact that they include power blackouts is significant. More extensive than a temporary power outage, the blackouts are disruptive to city infrastructure, and are potentially harmful to the Iranian nuclear program.
The entity responsible for these incidents has also timed them to ensure the maximum effect upon, and bring maximum strain to, an Iranian regime already battling a confluence of challenges. Biting U.S. sanctions and falling oil prices have worsened Iran's economic crisis. The coronavirus pandemic has taken a heavy toll on Iran, though the extent of that toll is being concealed by its government, and a crisis of confidence in their leadership is emerging among the Iranian people.
These mysterious attacks appear to have damaged Iran's ability to produce advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges and have likely caused significant setbacks to the country's nuclear capabilities.
The repeated, continuing attacks on Iran's electrical infrastructure also indicates that whoever is behind the incidents now possesses the ability to launch attacks of this type as and when they wish to.
The image of Iranian regime, having been caught off guard, has weakened at home and the attacks have buoyed the morale of the Iranian opposition that no longer feels alone and isolated.
And yet, despite all of these setbacks Iran isn't going anywhere as a Shi'ite revolutionary regime.
It will seek to expose the attackers, and it will choose how it responds from a menu of revenge options, including kinetic strikes to cyber attacks, such as those that struck the Israeli water treatment plant.
Whichever option Iran selects, its response will be calculated to fall short of the threshold of war. Iran has no interest in launching a war against Israel or the U.S. and while its nuclear program has been damaged, the regime will seek to repair that damage, learn relevant lessons and continue its long term conflict with Israel. Despite their efforts to downplay the attacks, Iran will be compelled to respond, if only to salvage the image of the regime.
As we await Iran's next move, the regime of the Ayatollah's is looking considerably more vulnerable than it would like the Iranian people to know.
Mr. Yaakov Peri concluded his distinguished career as Director of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Service). He served in that position from 1988-1995. Prior to that role he held the position of Head of the Shin Bet Northern Command and the Judea & Samaria Command. In 2013 he joined the Yesh Atid party, was elected to the Knesset and was appointed Minister of Science, Technology and Space.
THE SECOND LEBANON WAR: A RETROSPECTIVE
By Noam Tibon
Fourteen years have passed since the eruption of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Now is an appropriate time to assess the conflict.
While the Middle East has dramatically changed in the intervening years, the risk of a future Israel – Hezbollah war remains.
Looking back, it is clear Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah did not anticipate a war would result from the kidnapping raid on IDF reservists patrolling the northern border he ordered. He merely hoped to increase pressure on Israel, which was in the midst of a separate military operation inside the Gaza Strip.
The kidnapped IDF reservists, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, were on their last day of duty. They were ambushed in a vulnerable spot in the sector they patrolled and Hezbollah's attack was well prepared. A deadly, unforeseen chain reaction followed, leading to the Second Lebanon War.
At its start, neither side had planned for it. By its end, both were claiming victory.
An Iranian proxy, Hezbollah was intended to serve as a deterrent against an Israeli strike on the Iranian nuclear program. It was not intended to initiate regional conflicts. As far as the Iranians were concerned, the war was a disruption to its original plans. But Iran could console itself by its tightened control over the terror group; a result of the conflict.
The war consisted of two phases. The first prioritized IDF air and artillery power in lieu of a ground offensive. The second phase saw the deployment of ground forces into Lebanon in order to battle Hezbollah.
The first stage witnessed highly effective IDF operations.
The Israeli Air Force launched a massive bombing campaign against an extensive list of targets, stunning Hezbollah. Israel suffered few civilian casualties as a result of a well organized home front. After one week, Hezbollah was seeking a ceasefire.
That success generated vigorous debate within the IDF General Staff and the Israeli government. The first side of the debate viewed Hezbollah's northern border raid as a local incident. The two kidnapped reservists had not survived the raid. Their view was that Israel should limit the conflagration to the air power and artillery firepower already expended, reaching an end state that was to their advantage if they did so. That view did not prevail.
Israel's decision to push forward resulted in two developments, both of which impeded the IDF's momentum.
First, the air force ran out of targets, even as Hezbollah continued to fire its rockets, paralyzing the Israeli home front.
Secondly, when the ground offensive took shape, a series of operational mistakes occurred, and Israel began absorbing casualties. As those numbers mounted, the Israeli government became less and less inclined to stop the conflict while in a weakened position.
Israel's war planning thus became unbalanced. It was initially predicated upon achieving victory by way of air power, but the ground offensive continued.
Additionally, prior to the war, the IDF had spent more than five years of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank. Israeli ground forces had not been prepared for a ground maneuver of the nature required in the Lebanese arena, therefore. A ground maneuver was ordered nonetheless.
But Israeli infantry and armored units struggled to deal with Hezbollah's Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, fired in open areas and built up combat zones alike.
In the battle of Wadi Saluki, Hezbollah cells, armed with anti-tank missiles, faced off against Merkava tanks from the IDF's 162 Division, resulting in a relatively high number of IDF casualties.
Paratrooper reservists also absorbed many casualties in firefights with Hezbollah. Those events soured Israeli public opinion against the war.
Though the IDF succeeded territorially, the tone felt by many Israelis was one of failure. As that sense increased, Israel requested a ceasefire.
A key lesson from the conflict is that when flooded with enemy rockets, the ability of Israel's home front to continue to function is extremely finite.
In the months and years that followed, struggles were waged over how to assess the war.
Some Israeli political figures sought to present it as a failure, a characterization further fueled by Hezbollah's own description of their ability to merely survive an Israeli military campaign as a "divine victory."
But today, with the passage of time, we know that Hezbollah was far more damaged than was believed in 2006.
We also know that Israel achieved a significant level of deterrence, which remains in place to this day. Hezbollah's chief remains confined to a bunker.
Yet the aftermath of that war is still central to the IDF's planning in 2020.
Last year's public dispute between former IDF ombudsman, Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick, and then IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, over the readiness of the ground forces, is an example of that.
The IDF has purchased advanced new armored personnel carriers and tanks, and installed active defenses on its armored vehicles. But most of the army still relies on old equipment and would have to conduct a maneuver without such protection.
Since - and as a result of - the war, Hezbollah has tripled its projectile arsenal. It has placed strong emphasis on building up its stockpile of precision guided missiles. Israel is combating that build up, primarily on Syrian soil and in Syrian skies.
While neither Hezbollah nor Israel are interested in entering into a conflict in the near term, the central lesson of the Second Lebanon War is that such a war can occur even if no one desires it.
The IDF's mission is to ensure readiness, maintain full alert on Israel's northern border and prevent war if possible. But if it erupts, Israel is prepared to do what is needed in order to achieve a rapid and decisive victory, including raining down destruction throughout Lebanon.
Major General Tibon spent his military career specializing in counter terrorism and homeland security. His command positions include service as Commander of the 202nd Battalion of the Paratroopers Brigade, Deputy Commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, Commander of the Etzion Regional Brigade, Commander of the Judea Regional Brigade, Commander of the “Nahal” Brigade, Head of the Personnel Division of the IDF Ground Forces, Chief of the Infantry and Paratroopers Corps, Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division and Commander of the Command and Staff College, IDF. His most recent military position was Commander of the Northern Formation.
Where are the consequences for DeSean Jackson’s rant against Jews?
By Mark Goldfeder
We are living in a moment of righteous awakening that has resulted in a long-overdue movement to end systemic racism and call out those who are not on board. We fire people over old tweets that do not live up to 2020 standards, even if the writers apologize or try to contextualize them. There is zero tolerance for hate, or even for insufficient sensitivity. Unless, apparently, the group being discriminated against is Jews.
It’s hard to draw a different conclusion from the saga of Philadelphia Eagles wide receiver DeSean Jackson. In a series of Instagram posts, Jackson praised the noted anti-Semite Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam, designated by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a hate group for its hostility to Jews. He also posted a text attributed — mistakenly — to Adolf Hitler claiming that “white Jews” are exploiting black Americans and resorting to blackmail and extortion to advance “their plan for world domination.”
Jackson’s post was not vague and did not speak in generalities. The text he shared with his 1.4 million followers touted age-old conspiracy theories about Jewish manipulation and encouraged others to study Nazi ideology to confirm that Hitler was right about the Jews.
For everyone who has ever expressed outrage about a public figure suspected of covertly dog-whistling to neo-Nazis: A star athlete with a massive following overtly praised, and tried to spread the teachings of, the genocidal leader of the real Nazi Party. He asked others to learn from a monster who also persecuted and murdered black people, gay people and other minorities. Where is the outrage now?
The subdued reaction to Jackson’s comments has been alarming. Yes, the Eagles organization fined Jackson an undisclosed amount and issued a statement saying the posts were “absolutely appalling.” But it made only a vague promise to continue “to evaluate the circumstances” and “take appropriate action.” The NFL said the comments were “highly inappropriate,” yet punted the matter back to the team. Jackson himself attempted an apology, but implausibly claimed that he “really didn’t realize what [the purported Hitler] passage was saying.” In some corners of social media, Jackson has been appropriately excoriated for his actions. But other prominent athletes — former NBA player Stephen Jackson and Eagles defensive lineman Malik Jackson — have defended his comments, saying he was “speaking the truth” in one case and praising Farrakhan as “honorable” in the other.
There has been no massive backlash, no outpouring of denunciations from celebrities, and no real accountability — in the form of a suspension or, ideally, termination. As former Eagles team president Joe Banner suggested, it’s hard to imagine that the response would be as muffled if Jackson’s vile posts had targeted any other minority group.
This is how anti-Semitism works: It starts with horrific lies about Jews that legitimize hate and then grows more entrenched when no one takes a firm stand against it.
Unfortunately, anti-Semitism is a very real problem in our country. Each year since 1979, the Anti-Defamation League has published a report measuring the number of anti-Semitic acts in the U.S. In 2017, there were 1,986 reported incidents, a 57 percent increase over the previous year, and the biggest annual jump since the organization started tracking these numbers. In 2018, there was a 105 percent increase in the number of recorded physical assaults, including the deadliest attack on Jews in U.S. history at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh. In 2019, the total number of anti-Semitic incidents increased 12 percent over the previous year, with a 56 percent increase in physical assaults. There were, on average, nearly six anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S. each day.
According to the FBI, the majority of religiously motivated hate crimes in the United States are committed against Jewish people, despite the fact that they make up less than 2 percent of the population. On campuses around the country, anti-Semitism has become rampant, with recent studies showing that the number of Jewish students experiencing anti-Semitism on campuses across the United States had spiked to nearly 75 percent.
These trends are terrifying, and there is much work to be done to reverse them. It starts with calling out anti-Semitism for what it is: hate speech that, while legally protected, should never be acceptable in decent society. If DeSean Jackson avoids meaningful censure, it sends the dangerous message that the kind of hatred he espoused is tolerable — and that, in a moment when we are making impressive strides toward greater equality for people of all races and creeds, it’s somehow okay to leave the Jews behind.
Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations.
AOC should stop pretending to be an Israel expert
By Mark Goldfeder
A dozen radical lawmakers known for their anti-Israel bias, led by New York Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, have sent a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo decrying Israel’s plans to begin implementing President Trump’s Vision for Peace and calling for the United States to withhold military aid if Israel applies its law to some of the territories in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) over which Israel has lawful sovereign rights.
The letter demonstrates once again that Ocasio-Cortez and her fellow leaders of the left wing of the Democratic Party are trying to turn what has long been a staple of bipartisan agreement, support for Israel, into just another area of conflict. Constituents need to understand exactly whom they might be voting for in November: politicians who actively promote false narratives with potentially critical implications.
Ocasio-Cortez's letter is disingenuous and dangerous. Legal terms have precise definitions. For example, the West Bank is not illegally occupied. Israel’s planned extension of civil law to Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley is not an annexation.
Occupation occurs only when a country takes control of a territory owned by another legitimate sovereign. Annexation is the forcible acquisition of one state's territory by another state. There is not yet, nor has there ever been, a state of Palestine from which to take. If there were, calls for a two-state solution would be redundant.
Israel is the only country in existence with any legal claim to title and sovereignty over the territory in question. The Jewish people’s rights to the land were guaranteed by the 1920 San Remo Resolution and the 1922 Mandate, then reconfirmed by the 1945 United Nations Charter. Israel lawfully inherited title to and de jure sovereignty of the full mandatory area when Israel emerged from the mandatory system.
After Jordan (along with five Arab countries) invaded Israel in 1948, Jordan seized and illegally occupied Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley for 19 years, renaming this area "the West Bank." Although Israel lost de facto possession of this territory for that period, Israel never lost her sovereign rights, guaranteed under binding international law. Israel regained control over this territory in a defensive war in 1967.
Ocasio-Cortez's letter seems oblivious to the fact that, despite the legality of its territorial control, Israel has already given back the vast majority of the land it retook. It did so in a series of attempts to make peace. Israel gained a total of 26,178 square miles of territory in 1967. To date, it has ceded sovereignty over 23,871 square miles of that or 87% of that territory. At various times in recent history (including deals proposed in 2000, 2008, and 2014), Israel has offered up to 99.3% of the remaining disputed territory in exchange for peace. Each time, the Palestinians refused.
Ocasio-Cortez's letter simply ignores legitimate Israeli rights and security needs, or that there could be any Jewish equivalent of the endorsed Palestinian “national rights.” Likewise, the letter makes no mention of the Palestinian Authority’s intransigence and support for terrorism, including payments to terrorists to murder Jews.
Indeed, there is no mention of Palestinian wrongdoing at all. The words peace, coexistence, and negotiations appear nowhere in the document. It does, however, include the absurd claim that the Palestinians “understandably refused to participate in a process that is not grounded in a recognition of their national rights under international law.” That sentiment sounds reasonable only if you ignore both the Palestinian Authority’s history of turning down generous proposals, and their blanket refusal to engage in the very peace talks that led to this moment — talks that once again included the opportunity for a Palestinian state.
That opportunity is still very much on the table, should Palestinian leaders choose to come and sit.
Ocasio-Cortez’s letter is also dangerous because U.S. military aid to Israel, while generous, is an investment, not charity. Supporting Israel in combating Middle Eastern terrorist groups and expansionist potentates is crucial for America’s own national security. Israel is our closest ally in the Middle East and our only reliable source of intelligence and cyberdefense.
Our shared security interests include but are not limited to preventing nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, containing Iranian, Turkish, and Russian expansionism, and promoting the rule of democracy. Israeli-developed technology protects our citizens and troops at home and abroad. In addition, U.S. military aid to Israel is actually spent in the U.S., providing jobs and economic growth that benefits our own defense industry. Jeopardizing these benefits while pressuring a longtime ally to surrender both its rights and its attempt to forge a lasting peace, in a hostile region with an unwilling partner, under a plan sanctioned by our president no less, is simply not defensible.
Israel has the legal right to implement the Vision for Peace and to exercise Israeli law over land that Israel owns. American politicians have the moral responsibility to not hurl false accusations at our allies and to protect our own security interests by protecting the U.S.-Israel alliance.
Already two years ago, when Ocasio-Cortez was first campaigning, she criticized Israel and referred to Israel’s presence in the West Bank as an occupation. When pushed by PBS’s Margaret Hoover to explain why she said that, she was unable to answer, and tried to laugh it off by explaining that she is not an expert on the issue. Now that she is in Congress, she needs to stop pretending to be one.
Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations.