Governments: Denounce Terror, Support Human Rights

By Mark Goldfeder

Last week the Israeli Ministry of Defense designated six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations. The internet immediately exploded with articles and tweets accusing Israel of trying to criminalize Palestinian civil society, while antisemitic activists like Rep. Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib called for “immediate consequences” for the Jewish State.

Even the State Department jumped on the empty virtue signaling bandwagon, with spokesperson Ned Price claiming, “We believe respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a strong civil society are critically important for responsible and responsive governance,” before adding that the U.S. will “be engaging our Israeli partners for more information regarding the basis for these designations.” For the record, Israel also believes in respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which is why they made these designations in the first place.

The six NGOs were included on the list because of their strong ties to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a U.S., EU, Canada and Israel designated terrorist organization. Among the problematic ties, these organizations have employed PFLP terrorists, diverted humanitarian funds from European donors to the PFLP, recruited members to the terrorist group, and hosted meetings for senior leadership including actual convicted terrorists. Far from being hidden or classified, much of the evidence is readily available, compiled over years by organizations like NGO Monitor, and it is important to note that the PFLP has not even bothered denying these connections.

Here is a small sample of that evidence: On August 23, 2019, PFLP terrorists detonated a roadside bomb and murdered innocent 17-year-old Rina Shnerb while she was hiking with her father and brother, who were also injured. Shortly thereafter, three PFLP members were arrested; all three were employed in senior financial roles at the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, one of the newly designated NGOs. In an official statement, the PFLP referred to one of those terrorists, who had led the operation, as a “commander, comrade, and hero.” The Bisan Center, another of the newly-designated NGOs, was headed by another one of the operatives on that very attack. As to the other organizations: Three Addameer employees appeared on the PFLP’s 2021 election slate; Defense for Children-Palestine is headed by two senior PFLP members; Al-Haq by a third (and a convicted terrorist to boot); and the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees Vice President openly refers to it as the PFLP’s “feminist framework.”

Israeli law allows the Minister of Defense to declare an association a “terrorist organization” if it is: perpetrating or intentionally promoting the perpetration of terrorist acts; conducting training or providing guidance for executing terrorist acts; engaging in a transaction involving a weapon with the goal of perpetrating terrorist acts; or assisting or acting with the goal of advancing the activities of such a group.

It is hard to imagine that anyone is truly baffled by the idea that a humanitarian NGO—which may legitimately do some very good things­—could also be engaged in providing some material support for terrorists on the side. It is especially surprising for the State Department to express confusion about such a determination, given the nature of their own obligations under U.S. counterterrorism law. Moreover, 8 U.S.C. §1189 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate foreign terrorist organizations as such if they engage in terrorist activities. The statutory definition of “engage in terrorist activity” includes affording material support to a terrorist or terrorist organization even if such support is confined to non-terrorist activities. In addition, under 18 U.S.C. §2339, it is a federal crime to “knowingly provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization”—even if you happen to be a human rights organization that also does some good. Sadly, that happens not infrequently, and in 2014 the Financial Action Task Force, an inter-governmental money laundering and terror financing watchdog, issued a report specifically warning against the special risks proposed by non-profit organizations in this context. In fact, the leading U.S. case in this area, Holder v. Humanitarian Law, is literally and explicitly about human rights groups providing material support to terrorist orgs.

Price also claimed that Israel did not give the U.S. advance warning of the changes, but Israeli officials dispute this, saying they did give the Biden administration notice and proof, and are happy to do so again, with Israeli officials preparing to fly to Washington with evidence including “footage and receipts.”

To recap: The evidence that these six NGOs (at the very least) provided material support for terrorism is readily available and yet to be refuted; tellingly, none of the statements released by the various NGOs and activists condemning Israel bothered to actually address the underlying issue. Despite how it is being painted by reflexively anti-Israel groups and activists, including some members of Congress, the legal process Israel followed is not in any way unique. In fact, it is very similar to our own well-established practice. And if any of these organizations really do believe that a mistake has been made, there is an appellate procedure available, with claims to be submitted to the Advisory Committee regarding designations on Terror Organizations. Not surprisingly, none of the groups has yet appealed.

In the meantime, if all of those wringing their hands at the thought of these poor NGOs getting in trouble are really that concerned about their welfare, or even about human rights generally, there is one ready solution. The quickest way to solve this problem would be to stop focusing on how these groups ended up getting caught, and start pressuring them to actually stop supporting terror.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

The Kabul Debacle: A Catalyst for India-Israel Strategic Alliance

By Amit Kumar

With Afghanistan now anarchic and a breeding ground for Islamic extremists, the Taliban's presence in Afghanistan promotes ultra-orthodox Islamic culture, highlighting the retreat of the United States from liberal international ideals. The complex web of jihadi organisational networks (figure 1) clouding over from the East Mediterranean via India to Indonesia poses a national security threat to both India and Israel, among other nations. In theory, the Taliban is the epicenter from which all jihadist organisations radiate and receive spiritual and material support during a crisis. Taliban vying for legitimacy from China, Pakistan, and cross fertilisation with major terror groups - Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and Haqqani - is a lethal concoction for the peaceful and secular world.

The Taliban's takeover has sent a clear message to other terrorist organizations that a glorious victory is achievable in the end. While these Islamic extremists' actions and interests differ, their ideology and terror motivation make them a security hazard. In the absence of America's security cover, secular democracies - Israel and India - are under grave threat and require reengineering of their strategic bilateral partnership against the developing intricate network of terror hovering over a large region.

Figure 1: Disturbing Web of Terror Organizations hovering over Eastern Mediterranean via India to Indonesia (Built upon Philip B. K. Potter’s diagram)

Converging Security threat for India & Israel

The Taliban's integrated jihadist network has strong roots in Pakistan - Haqqani, Al Qaeda and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM); the changed geopolitical dynamics offer Pakistan an advantage in nurturing, training, and sponsoring terrorism, which would fuel its goal of making India bleed through a thousand cuts by intensifying terrorist operations in Kashmir. Furthermore, China's financial and low-cost defense technology assistance to Pakistan and Afghanistan will worsen India's counter-terrorism efforts. The escalation of tensions between China and India, guerrilla organisations in Myanmar trained by the Chinese Communist Party, and an increase in insurgents from the Pakistan and Bangladesh borders will result in a security nightmare. 

Iran's cultivation of the Shiite Crescent, explicit backing for Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, and its nuclear ambitions, constitute a significant threat to Israel's security in the Gulf area. The changing dynamics between Iran and the Taliban will support the radical objectives of Iran's proxies - Hamas, Palestinian Islamist Jihad, and Hezbollah - in exchange for legitimacy and support against ISIS. This would contribute to what Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander General Hossein Salami refers to as Iran's "strategic objective of eliminating Israel off the world political map."

With the United States withdrawal, the overarching security cover is blown, further fracturing the power equilibrium and creating a hegemonic void. Furthermore, the emergence of the Taliban at the crossroads of West and South Asia exacerbates the already fragile security environment. The disposal of modernised armament left behind by the Americans is what makes the Taliban and its offshoot jihadi network formidable. Additionally, China, in its self-interest of preserving its western border, Uyghur nationalism from radicalization, and Belt and Road investment, was keen to recognise the Taliban as a legitimate authority. China has a long history of assisting authoritarian governments through financing and high-tech low-cost weapons, such as Iran in the Gulf War, while maintaining plausible deniability. Its symbiotic relationship with the Taliban will dramatically increase the latter’s firepower, leading to proliferation to other terror organisations.

The emerging geopolitics have driven unrestrained Islamic extremism to unprecedented heights. This necessitates a reorientation of security policies of both India and Israel. Since they share a fundamental apprehension of existential threats and a common interest in defending borders and upholding democratic ideals, both need to deepen their strategic ties and develop a well-coordinated system of efforts for their converging interest to contain and thwart threats emanating from Islamic radicalization.

Deepening of India-Israel Strategic Cooperation

India and Israel must broaden and deepen their collaboration to strengthen security against the region's developing terror network. Joint defense manufacturing and weapons production, including missiles, AWACS, radars, 3D printed weapons, and drone technology. More R&D is urgently needed in electronic warfare, space warfare, cybersecurity, sensors, artificial intelligence, and defence subsystems. Technology has emerged as an engine of security, which Israel's brilliance and India's size can fully utilise. The battle-hardened Israel and India should annually hold Blue Flag drills to boost special forces capabilities, including cross-border counter-terrorist operations. This will provide their armed forces a qualitative military edge, boost interoperability, and present a united front against Islamist extremists. The high degree of mutual trust should unleash full exchange of military and intelligence sharing between R&AW and Mossad.

India should flex soft power muscles and Israel's Abraham Accords to acquire the trust of Arab countries in order to safeguard the region from extremism. In the absence of America, Israel's comparative advantage in the armaments industry, the Abraham pact, and India's links with the GCC nations should garner support to fill the security void. Because of the altered geostrategic environment, the two nations must develop a situation-based strategic collaboration to combat terrorism.

Conclusion 

The Taliban's incapacity to rule and secure Afghanistan will feed regional terrorism. China's economic incentives for the Taliban, along with the United States' retreat, have increased the morale of Islamic extremism, resulting in national security implications for India and Israel. The failure of the world's major powers to intervene in Afghanistan against Islamist extremists has ripped a vacuum in security leadership that must be filled by the combined efforts of Israel and India. India's military and security supremacy in South Asia, combined with Israel's offensive and defensive technical marvels and unfettered access to American high-grade weapons, can defend the region against a complex web of radicals. The Taliban’s takeover provides Israel and India with the opportunity to take their strategic partnership to greater heights, with the potential to become an alliance against Islamist radicals and to resist China's expansion.

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Amit Kumar is a doctoral student at BITS PILANI in India. His primary study focus is China's relationship with Islam. Amit has worked as a Political Researcher for the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, India's National Political Party's youth wing. Read full bio here.

To Address crime in Arab sector, Israel Must re-establish sovereignty

By Gershon Hacohen

The Israeli government recently approved a new plan for fighting rampant crime in the Arab-Israeli sector, but this plan is just the latest example of a refusal by the state to recognize the deep structural issues behind the problem.

At a superficial level, the problem is violent crime, and the requisite solution would be to battle inequality, as well as treating the phenomenon as a crime problem only.

In reality, the criminal patterns on display are deeply intertwined with nationalistic sentiments that reject the sovereignty of Israel as a Jewish state.

Between the lines, it is this sentiment that guided several Arab-Israeli Knesset Members to reject an initiative to send in the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) into the Arab sector to take on crime.

But if the police alone face the problem, it is doomed to fail, as police lack the critical mass of personnel required to focus on crime hotspots.

Sufficiently massing forces, and persistence, are the twin tools needed to truly begin lowering crime levels in the Arab-Israeli sector. A lack of either will guarantee mission failure.

Part of the blindness to the problem stems from the idea that all problems in human societies are universal and all people are the same. But such wishful philosophies should be replaced with more accurate theories, such as the one proposed by the American Jewish thinker Daniel Goldhagen, who clearly grasps that particular issues affect particular people, and that not all afflictions are universal. Societies also have differing wishes and expectations.

When dealing with human action, it is essential to always ask what the overall rationale is, unlike the analysis of natural phenomenon, which can be explained purely through a break-down of unintentional processes.

Those who cling to universalist explanations will not be able to drill down to the real motivations behind crises faced by different societies.

While the idea of improving socio-economic conditions in parts of the Arab Israeli sector is a legitimate goal, it is not an adequate explanation for the spiraling levels of violence. Nor can merely ‘bringing in professionals’ to diagnose socio-economic ills and prescribe remedies seriously change the situation.

Rather, Israel must do as the French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, recommends, and to ‘love others as they are different.’

This means recognizing the ‘otherness’ and responding to it in policies designed to deal with cultural uniqueness, rather than universalism.

In light of the above, throwing more money at the problem of violent crime is ignoring the rationale being manifested through widespread lawless behavior.

That rationale is a religious-nationalist undercurrent that rejects the very sovereignty of the Israeli state.

Failing to recognize and respond to this emerging phenomenon will result in a further loss of control.

In 1976, after the first Land Day, in which Arab Israelis held demonstrations and disturbances, and clashed with security forces, resulting in six people killed, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin set up a committee of inquiry.

He later accepted that inquiry’s recommendations to improve Arab civil rights – a worthy goal in and of itself - but he also stressed that what the state is offering is a fostering of religious-cultural existence – not a separate ethnic-national Palestinian entity within the Jewish state.

Rabin’s clarity on that matter must guide Israel today as it deals with raging violent crime in the Arab sector.

While the vast majority of victims of Arab crime are themselves Arab-Israelis, the drug dealer who feels he can open fire in a drive-by shooting acts with immunity because he has the backing of his family and clan. Even if the gunman’s family goes on to fear him, they initially enabled him to act because his crimes were perceived as a chipping away of sovereignty.

The power projection and ‘respect’ placed on violent criminals goes hand in hand with a perception that the Jewish state should not be applying its sovereignty.

As a result, we have today reached a situation in which special police units have to accompany the Tax Authority when it collects taxes. Once sovereignty fails to be applied, the meaning is clear: Sovereignty has been lost.

This is visible in the Negev and the Galilee in the most explicit manner. It is also why criminal guns were turned against Jews during the May escalation with Hamas in Gaza.

This then is the underlying structure fueling the violence within Israel.

There is no doubt that many Arab Israeli citizens are actively asking the state for help, and many are suffering greatly from the crime raging in their communities.

But helping them – and the state – means recognizing that the criminals are operating with substantial nationalistic-religious baggage as well.

Understanding this will enable the state to win the campaign. Israel has no option but to activate force – in a moderate and selective manner – by focusing large-scale deployments on violent hotspots. 

In recent days, the government announced that it would send two Border Police battalions – around 1,000 personnel – to the Negev to deal with Bedouin crime issues. When I was commander of the Gaza disengagement, I focused 20,000 security forces on the Nave Dekalim Jewish community which was being evacuated, an area the size of one neighborhood in Beersheba, and the entire disengagement ended within five days without a single casualty.

This is the advantage created by injecting a critical mass of forces. When dealing with national events, sending in inadequate forces can create dangerous situations that actually increase the chance that deadly force would be required.

Large forces, on the other hand, accomplish just the opposite, enabling greater control.  

Persistence and the deployment of large-scale forces are therefore the basic conditions needed to restore Israeli sovereignty and to really bring down violent crime that is plaguing the Arab-Israeli sector today.  

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Major General Gershon Hacohen served as Commander of the Northern Corps of the IDF. He previously held various positions, including Commander of the IDF Colleges, Head of Training & Doctrine Division in the General Staff, Reserve Division Commander of the Northern Command and Commander of the 7th Brigade of the IDF Armor Division. Read full bio here.

Hospital cyber ransom attack is not ‘more of the same’

By Doron Tamir

The recent cyber ransom attack on the Hillel Yaffe Medical Center in Hadera should not be mistaken as just another cyber incident.

The group behind the attack, Deep Blue Magic, is a top-level cyber-offensive outfit that is well versed in bits and bytes and has caused havoc around the world.

While previous high-profile cyber-strikes on Israeli targets, such as the November, 2020 ransom attack on the Shirbit insurance company, were widely believed to be Iranian proxy attacks on Israel disguised as criminal incidents, in the case of Hillel Yaffe, the ransom attack appears to be authentic – and likely a game changer.

Hillel Yaffe is a government-owned hospital, meaning that it is the government – in this case the Health Ministry backed by the Israel National Cyber Directorate –  that is responsible for responding. The attackers likely were not aware that a government-owned hospital would  opt to not pay the ransom, unlike some privately-owned hospitals that might be tempted to choose a faster solution.  

The hospital remains under attack, and it appears as if not all of the details about this incident have come to light.

Until now, most ransom attacks in Israel have either been tests of capabilities, or decoys to distract attention from larger cyber operations. There have been few instances of actual ransom attacks, in which attackers usually ask for small amounts of money to return critical servers and files to the victim. Usually, in such cases, the attackers ask for a few thousand dollars – and they do this from many victims, rather than seeking millions from a single target.

Within hospitals, there are two types of computing systems. The first system is a logistical system, which handles functions such as registrations, the monitoring of drug distribution, and other activities. These activities represent around half of all patient care. The networks also contain the private medical details of patients.

The second type of system – the more ‘frightening’ kind of target – is operative, and is used to keep surgery theaters, life support,  dialysis, and medical robotic machines running. Some hospitals disconnect such systems from one another, creating independent computing systems – but this is far more difficult to defend against cyber events. Other systems run on a single, holistic cloud server, and here, defense is easier.

Yet neither of these models are immune to cyber-attacks in any way. Over the past five years, health systems have been the number one  target of cyber-attacks in the United States.  Those attacks have mostly seen data privacy breaches, but there have also been more severe types of incidents.

The Hillel Yaffe hospital attack falls under the category of a severe attack.

The importance of awareness

In the immediate timeframe after the incident, a hospital can switch to manual care for patients, and this is likely what Hillel Yaffe chose as its initial response. Surgeons can still operate and doctors can still prescribe medicines without computers. But in the modern world, this set up cannot continue for more than a day or two.

The hospital’s back-up computer system also appears to have been taken out, meaning that this option for returning to normal is not available.

As a result, the Hillel Yaffe incident is a serious source of concern, and does not represent ‘more of the same’ in cyber security incidents. The level of disruption is extensive, and not easily neutralized.

Many of the medical computing systems are used by personnel who are simply not aware of the security world. This lack of awareness constitutes a serious problem. Nurses who hit ‘enter’ after distributing blood pressure pills need training on how to keep the system secure.  

Financial organizations like banks have already grasped the importance of awareness, and know that without it, they lose money. Hospitals can lose patients without sufficient awareness.

It seems reasonable to assume that cyber authorities in Israel are now gathering forensic information in an effort to track down the attackers.

Yet days after the incident began, it has not ended, and this is a reflection of how extraordinarily disruptive the attack has been.

Incident management is a key area in the cybersecurity world, and it is an area organizations must be prepared for in the event that prevention efforts fail.

An Israeli company called Demisto enables automated responses to cyber-attacks, and is an example of where cutting-edge technology is headed in this regard. Demisto’s system, once activated, scans the attacked computer system, identifies weaknesses and locates the presence of malicious programs, thwarting them – all without human intervention.

The fact that the Health Ministry, which is responsible for hospital cybersecurity, did establish a solid protection system, backed by the Israel National Cyber Directorate, and that the attack still occurred is evidence of the severity of this event.

In addition, the fact that the attack has yet to be resolved also testifies to the seriousness of the event.

As the forensic investigation into the attackers makes progress, Israel and other countries around the world will have to be on even higher alert for such incidents.

The Hillel Yaffe incident has generated significant public relations for ransomware attackers, and could serve as encouragement for more.

We have reached an important junction. A powerful hacking group created chaos in a government-owned hospital, and even when Hillel Yaffe returns to normal, the cyber war will not end. The next incident is just a matter of time.

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Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

Dealing with an intransigent Iran

By Yochai Guiski

This article is the third in a series dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. The previous installments dealt with Iran’s unwillingness to return to the JCPOA and China’s increasing importance to the Iran nuclear file.

The concrete possibility that Iran is not interested in returning to the JCPOA and merely wishes to attain sanctions relief through negotiations (“result oriented negotiations” as the Iranians put it) is now clear to decision makers in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.

Furthermore, they now also understand that the current situation is untenable as Iran is no longer checking its nuclear program, and is willing to be bolder in its use of force, including harassing, attacking and hijacking ships.

As Europe (and the IAEA) are still heavily invested in the negotiations track it must fall to other players to deal with the implications. This means the US and Israel should swiftly plan and develop a strategy that should address three distinct issues:

·     Crisis planning and management, as part of moving Iran from its sweet spot of never-ending negotiations, and the application of pressure to get the situation under control both in the nuclear realm and regional security one.

·     China’s role vis-à-vis Iran, as its influence could be paramount if it chooses to engage on the matter. Russia has also an important role to play, as it is still shielding Iran from scrutiny by the IAEA.

·     Creating a better situation to deal with a “no deal” reality.

To that end, Israel and the U.S. should first agree on a set of priorities and acceptable outcomes. Even if Israel is not thrilled with the prospect of a U.S. return to the JCPOA, and the U.S. is wary of using non-diplomatic means to prod Iran form its current trajectory, there should be room for understanding and executing a shared strategy.

In order to have the best chance of success, additional Arab partners should be approached, consulted, and integrated into the strategy as they are major stakeholders in the Iran issue and possess additional tools and capabilities vis-à-vis China and Russia (oil and gas), as well as against Iran.

A major part of the strategy should be addressing China’s role and engaging it diplomatically to use its influence on Tehran. China’s involvement may come at a certain cost, but ultimately it is also in its best interest to keep the region from escalation. Gulf nations should play a major role in engaging China since they represent another vital interest for the middle kingdom.

As the U.S. is disinclined to wade into the non-diplomatic realms it should nonetheless aid Israel in applying pressure on Iran and preventing it from further expanding its destabilizing role in the region. A U.S.-Israeli agreement on these issues could lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive strategy involving additional U.S. partners in the region.

Such an arrangement would allow both sides to act while not surprising each other and could be the cornerstone for a new U.S. security architecture in the Middle East, as it plans to turn its attention to the Indo-Pacific. Dealing with Iran that way may also give the U.S. insights and experience in “grey zone” operations that are necessary for strategic competition elsewhere.

At the very least, the planning and strategizing process could put both countries on better footing in order to address a possible aggressive Iran under its new hardline leadership. After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the drawdown of combat operations in Iraq, Iran may see an opening to cement its grip on the region and further escalate the pressure on U.S. partners in Iraq, Yemen the Gulf, and possibly even against Israel.  

Israel should also focus on diplomacy with the two other world powers and describe, in no uncertain terms, the dangers posed by a nuclear Iran:

·      The countries of the region would see Russia and China as culpable for their economic and strategic support for Iran if the regime emerges from the current situation as a nuclear actor. Iran is already viewed as an existential threat to many countries in the region and they would not easily forget that.

·      As Iran grows in confidence, the leverage of Russia and China on Tehran would decline. Iran would emerge as a competitor to Russia’s oil and has already tried to get involved in the Caucasus (threating Azerbaijan). Regional instability would also undermine Chinese interests in the region including much needed energy supplies and strategic projects that are part of the “Belt and Road” initiative.

·      Israel should press Russia to back the IAEA demands to verify and investigate probable violations of the NPT safeguards. As long as Russia prevents any action vis-à-vis Iran by the nuclear watchdog, brazen Iranian activities will increase and Russia may find it very difficult to get Iran to adhere to the NPT (not to mention the JCPOA) if it is left unchecked.

Iran has shown it is willing to go to great lengths and endure economic and humanitarian hardships (sanctions and rampant Covid-19 surging through the country), in order to avoid making concessions in the nuclear realm. Iran has also doubled down on its regional activities targeting various countries with missiles, drones, and cyber-attacks, while providing its militia proxies with advanced weapons and financial aid.

All of the above shows that Iran would remain a regional threat, and it would pose an enduring challenge to the security of the region and to the interests of the U.S, and Israel, and their partners.

But Iran is not invincible, and its rise is not preordained – its resiliency is suspect, it is an oil and gas producer in a decarbonating world, and the climate crisis is likely to hit it hard. Showing Iran an unyielding and united front that is willing to act against aggression, while offering it a diplomatic solution (backed by China and Russia) to truly address its nuclear program and make sure it never gets a nuclear weapon is still the best option.  

The U.S. and Israel should not shy away from developing both lines of effort.

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

North Korea’s arms set to influence the Middle East

By Yair Ramati

The weapons industry worldwide is flourishing. But while sales of classic military platforms – tanks, planes, and ships – have not stopped, it is UAVs, projectiles, and munitions, both offensive and defensive, that are driving the industry forward.

While in the past, the great powers – the United States., Russia, and China – had a monopoly over advanced armaments, today medium-sized and even small countries are producing them as well. North Korea, South Korea, Iran, and Turkey all manufacture advanced military equipment. Israel, of course, does too.

Against this global backdrop, it appears as if the flow of weapons from the Democratic Republic of North Korea to Iran is set to once again influence the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

Some waves of North Korean force build-up have in the past reached Iran and its proxies – either through direct technological transfers from Pyongyang to Tehran, such as missiles, or through ‘twists’ that the Iranian weapons producers conducted on North Korean technology.

North Korea is rapidly accelerating its force build-up, and this is likely to result in new weapons ending up in the hands of Iran.  Among these new weapons are  a combination of high-level technologies and products, such as submarine-launched cruise missiles and air defense systems.

This time, the direction of ‘traffic’ could be two-way, with Iranian drone technology possibly heading in the opposite direction from Iran to North Korea. 

Pyongyang has an economic interest in selling its arms to the Middle East, and its technology has significantly influenced Iran’s missile program. Mutual visits between Iranian and North Korean defense and weapons industry officials are routine.

As global tensions rise, including in southeast Asia, North Korea is ratcheting up its arms development. The past has demonstrated that this affects the Middle East, fueling Iranian capabilities and ambitions.

Just as Iran has in the past taken Russian missiles, such as the Kh-55 air-to-surface cruise missile, turning it into three different Iranian missiles, it will likely do the same when it receives North Korea’s domestically produced cruise missile.

These types of technological transfers fuel Iran’s weapons industries, which are decentralized and run along parallel lines to encourage competition and creativity.

In Iran today, multiple weapons production centers are active, with tension between them, in a way that is reminiscent of Israel’s defense industries in the 1970s and 80s. Even today, Israeli defense companies compete in producing missile defense systems, for example.

The South Korean connection

Meanwhile, as its arch-enemy North Korea develops new arms, South Korea is stepping up its own domestic arms industry production – and this trend will result in new competition in export markets for Israeli defense companies.

Israel already competes with Turkey’s weapons industries, which have deployed a modern armed drone, the Bayraktar TB2, used effectively by Azerbaijan in the recent Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and which has been acquired by Poland.

Thus, the U.S., Russia, and China are no longer the only major armed UAV exporters.

These developments also mean that traditional arms proliferation treaties are gradually losing their relevance.

The U.S. could no longer limit South Korea’s initiative to build missiles beyond the 300-kilometer range, enabling Seoul to develop missiles that cover the whole of North Korea –600 miles. South Korea also has missiles that have ranges of beyond 700 miles. This represents another step in the erosion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The latest example of this is the U.S. decision to sell submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles to Australia, as part of its nuclear-propelled submarine deal. Until now, only Britain has been allowed to purchase Tomahawk missiles. Thus, another erosion takes place.

In summary, the world of armament industries is flourishing in an unprecedented manner, as medium-sized and smaller countries become significant players in the market. North Korea is producing a whole spectrum of armaments, and these will, in one form or another, find their way to Iran, influencing the Iranian threat profile faced by Israel.

Meanwhile, Israeli defense industries must prepare themselves to compete with South Korean for exports.

And worldwide, arms treaties are beginning to recede as they lose their gravitas.

With precision weapons becoming ubiquitous, Iran and its proxies are able to proliferate this technology, and Israel and Saudi Arabia have been the chief countries to suffer from this in the Middle East.

Air bases, a major tool for power projection, are under increasing threat from precision firepower, and Israel as well as regional pragmatic states need to think of new ways to counter the threat, including the formation of their own active missile units for returning fire in ways not dependent on fighter jets. 

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

A solution to antisemitism in the media

By Mark Goldfeder

Axel Springer, the publishing giant that just bought Politico, made waves last week when its CEO said in an interview that he wants all staffers to adhere to companywide guiding principles, including support for “Israel’s right to exist.” As Mathias Dopfner explained , this is simply part and parcel of his newsroom expectations for unbiased nonpartisan journalism.

Dofpner’s statement drew immediate criticism from those who see recognition of Israel’s right to exist, and a newspaper's requirement that those who report the facts not openly deny them, as a company enforcing “propaganda.” Articles twisted Dopfner’s words to make it seem as if he required everyone who works for him to actively support the Jewish state. To be clear, Dopfner never said that anyone could not or should not criticize the state of Israel or vociferously disagree with any or all aspects of its policies or leadership. All he said was that he did not want to print lies pretending that Israel does not have a right to exist — a right that even Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, has openly affirmed .

If you cannot tell the difference between acknowledging Israel as a legitimate country and “partisan propaganda,” you might want to ask yourself whether you might be harboring some antisemitism. Here is a simple test: Are there any other countries in the world that you dislike and think should not exist? If the answer to the second question is no, then the answer to the first one is yes.

The pushback in this particular episode is surprising only because Israel’s right to exist should have been a fairly easy line to draw in the sand. Usually, the antisemitism in legacy media newsrooms is a little bit more nuanced. Still, there are times when it positively screams out.

In July of 2020, for example, former New York Times opinion editor Bari Weiss resigned, citing, among other things, alleged instances of unlawful discrimination and harassment. This included being called a Nazi by her colleagues and hearing disparaging comments about how often she would write about “the Jews.” In describing the editorial policies of the New York Times that she could no longer abide by, she called out a comparative willingness to amplify antisemitic voices without caveat as opposed to other problematic or controversial statements that received disclaimers. Casual antisemitism in the media is not really surprising and has not gone away — it’s just not every day that an editor confirms it.

The truth is there have been entire books written on the New York Times and its biased coverage of both Jews and the Jewish state. Sometimes it gets caught , and when the bias is egregious enough and there is overwhelming pressure, it apologizes . But more often, this bias goes unchecked because it is so routine that it has just become part of the background.

To be fair, the New York Times is not alone in its not-so-subtle antisemitic slanting. Study after study, report after report, and book after book after book have documented the persistent media stereotypes and misrepresentations that are contributing to a rise in antisemitism around the country and around the world — a fact made even more incredible given that research shows many people actually believe the antisemitic claim that Jews control the media.

The normalization of antisemitism in public media forums — from the lowbrow rants of John Oliver and Trevor Noah to the interview with proud antisemite Alice Walker that Weiss mentioned in her letter — allows hateful rhetoric, including classic and surprisingly unoriginal antisemitic motifs , to seep into public consciousness. What then should be done?

Over the last couple of years , there has been a very public pushback on cancel culture, with an accompanying desire to hear more about fixing than firing, to use identified problems as teachable moments that can perhaps effect real change. There is incredibly important work being done now on racial equality and gay rights, yet at the same time, there is another slow-boiling problem that needs to be addressed. In that spirit, what can we do about persistent media bias so insidious and deep that editors often seem unable to detect it, even when it is literally highlighted ?

Here is one solution, or at the very least a concrete first step toward eliminating conscious and unconscious antisemitism in the media: Journalists should adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism and refrain from publishing anything that violates its terms.

This idea is hardly radical, and I am not the first to propose it. Indeed, several other people and groups are working on similar initiatives, including Jeff Ballabon, formerly a senior executive at CBS News. But recent events, and particularly Axel Springer’s announcement, make the timing right for this to finally happen.

There must be some objective standard for what is and is not acceptable, and the IHRA definition is as close to a consensus as it is possible to get. It is already used by the federal government, the 31 member countries of IHRA, almost all 50 countries that comprise the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Commission, the European Parliament, Australia, Serbia, Bahrain, and Albania. It has been endorsed by a growing number of world leaders, including U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and adopted by a growing number of universities. It is used by a variety of intergovernmental agencies, including the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and nongovernmental agencies, including the Iraq-based Global Imams Council. While it is not an exhaustive definition, its use as a standard in media will increase the awareness and understanding of the parameters of contemporary anti-Jewish discrimination.

The IHRA definition is particularly helpful precisely because it includes useful examples of discriminatory anti-Israel statements that cross the line into antisemitism. Legitimate criticism of Israel is explicitly fine under IHRA, and if you are merely criticizing Israel, even harshly and regularly, then signing on to such a statement should not affect your writing or publishing one iota. If you are actually demonizing and delegitimizing the Jewish state or applying a double standard by requiring of it behaviors not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation, then maybe your paper should stop and think twice about the impression you are giving with your coverage.

It might be challenging at first to swim against the current, but when the world is finally recognizing that the current is antisemitic, it is time to take the plunge.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Gaza: An unofficial calm takes hold

By David Hacham

The current situation in Gaza can best be described as de facto, but not de jure calm.

It is a calm that has been led by Egypt's effort to promote a longer-term arrangement in Gaza, as part of its interest in re-establishing itself as a leading player in the Arab arena, by fulfilling an active central role in Palestinian affairs.  

In addition, Cairo wants Egyptian companies to take part in projects aimed at rebuilding Gaza and to take advantage of budgets allocated for that purpose.

Hamas, for its part, is motivated to maintain the calm in order to reap maximum benefits from it. Meanwhile, Hamas is diverting the conflict with Israel toward the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and it hopes to also get Arab-Israelis involved.  

The ongoing calm in Gaza has been bolstered by the authorization of 6,000 work permits for Gazan workers and traders to work in Israel on a daily basis. Tens of thousands of Gazans signed up at trade bureaus in Gaza to work in Israel, signaling the importance of working in Israel for them in light of Gaza’s severe economic crisis.

There is a continuous flow of goods entering Gaza from Israel via the Kerem Shalom crossing, including products and material such as wood and steel. Humanitarian assistance enters the Strip on a daily basis.

Reconstruction of civilian infrastructure, following the May security escalation between Hamas and Israel, is occurring under the leadership and auspices of Egypt.

There has been no significant progress on negotiations between Hamas and Israel to secure the release of the remains of two IDF personnel killed in the 2014 conflict in Gaza as well as two civilians being held captive in the Strip. There has been plenty of psychological warfare and disinformation by Hamas on the issue, giving false impressions of progress, when in fact no such progress has been made.

Although Israel has conditioned significant Gazan recovery efforts on progress on the MIA issue, it has not objected to Egyptian efforts to lead Gazan recovery programs from its side, via the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Sinai.

Egypt has been moving construction equipment, workers, engineers, and infrastructure and road-building materials into Gaza, with the backing of the U.S., and in coordination with Israel.

This role serves Egypt’s interest of playing an active role in Gaza following the May military escalation, and as part of Cairo’s campaign to display its centrality to regional stability to the Biden administration, which recently reduced its annual military aid to Egypt in protest over human rights issues.

Meanwhile, Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel is leading the mediation efforts between Israel and Hamas over the MIA issue, with Germany also taking a part. However, those efforts are largely redundant in light of the fact that Egypt has become the outlet for Gaza’s construction – and large-scale Gazan construction efforts have been a key Hamas condition for undeclared calm.

Ultimately, Egypt’s interest is also to keep Gaza contained and to prevent a new escalation, as such an escalation can also spill over into the Sinai, where ISIS remains active. The U.S., recently sent its Deputy Assistant Secretary for Israeli and Palestinian affairs, Hady Amr, to the region to promote Egypt’s efforts.

The above factors contribute to an overall assessment that Gaza is headed for a quiet period, albeit temporary. Israel is certainly a part of these efforts, easing certain security restrictions, and allowing materials that it previously barred to enter from its territory into Gaza.

In October,  Hamas sent a delegation for talks in Cairo, after an Israeli delegation visited the Egyptian capital.

Hamas sent its upper leadership to Egypt. The delegation discussed the MIA issue, assistance to Gaza from Israel, and possibilities leading to a fuller arrangement with Israel.

The Hamas delegation was headed by the organization’s political bureau chief  Ismael Haniyeh and included the head of Hamas in the West Bank, Lebanon-based Salah Al-Arouri, who is responsible for terror activity in that sector, as well as the head of Hamas’s overseas bureau, Khaled Mashaal, and the head of Hamas’s Gazan political bureau, Yahya Sinwar.

The delegation held prolonged talks with Kamal, and with members of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate.  It was the first time in a lengthy period in which the most senior Hamas operatives from leadership ranks – from both the territories and abroad – visited Egypt.

Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate holds the Israeli-Palestinian portfolio, and it is in charge of coordinating contacts with the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. The Directorate’s chief mission is to deepen the calm in Gaza.  

The visit displays a willingness by Hamas to acknowledge Egypt’s leadership role, and to hold a dialogue with Cairo over ways to promote a longer-term arrangement with Israel.

As behind-the-scenes diplomacy continues, Gaza is entering a time of several weeks of quiet, with Hamas seeing some of its core demands accepted and met – albeit unofficially.  

Qatari cash has also been flowing in for needy Gazan families, and recent Hamas demands for more Qatari money to enter are fairly standard. Qatar’s envoy to Gaza, Mohammad al-Emadi, visited the Strip in recent days, signifying that the Qatari involvement and cash assistance remains active and in motion. Hamas is intent on setting up a fixed mechanism for allowing the third part of the Qatari grant money to arrive, and assist some 30,000 Hamas government employees receive their salaries.

Hamas shares an interest in promoting calm, to serve its current goal of improving the socio-economic situation of Gazans – a goal it has pursued through violent extortion. It is therefore allowing a rise in the number of traders and workers who can work in Israel (and the West Bank).

As Hamas focuses on promoting an unofficial calm in Gaza, it has recently escalated its terrorist activities in the West Bank. A large-scale IDF counter-terrorist operation, based on Shin Bet intelligence alerts, earlier this month to disband an imminent Hamas plot to attack the Jerusalem area is evidence of these efforts.

Hamas’s demands of Israel to release large numbers of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for releasing Israeli MIAs and civilians are impossible for Israel to meet. While in the past it appeared as if this was a major stumbling block to stabilizing Gaza, it now seems that Hamas, Egypt, and Israel, backed by the U.S. and with Qatari cash, have found unofficial ways to enter into a period of calm – although no one knows how long it will last.

Despite Hamas’s maximalist demands on the MIA issue, Gaza has cooled off – for now. Hamas’s long-term objectives remain unchanged: Non-recognition of Israel’s existence, together with war against it and the establishment of an Islamic state on Israel’s ruins. 

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Three Things US Can Learn From EU'S New Strategic Plan

By Mark Goldfeder

Last week the European Commission, the Executive Branch of the  European Union, unveiled a new comprehensive EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life to address a significant increase in incidents around the 27-country bloc. While the United States has seen a similar trajectory, our federal government has yet to develop an encompassing governmental response to the problem. Perhaps the EU will inspire the U.S.

On a practical level, the EU proposal contains a number of concrete suggestions—including annual stakeholder forums designed to maximize the effect of joint actions and funding, and additional resources dedicated to better understanding and tracking the spread of online hate—that could aid in the fight against domestic antisemitism. More broadly, it addresses three crucial areas in which U.S. federal and state policy have been lacking: defining, monitoring and preventing antisemitism.

First, the Commission actively encourages all member states to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, an essential tool used to determine its contemporary manifestations. The federal government does use the definition, but some politicians have been hesitant to embrace it because among its illustrations of things that could contextually be antisemitic are examples of problematic anti-Zionism, and these officials are ostensibly concerned that embracing IHRA would somehow stifle speech. That argument, however, is a legal red herring and the EU did not take the bait.

Aside from the fact that IHRA itself distinguishes between criticizing Israel and antisemitism, the use of a definition alone simply does not silence any speech—it just allows people to label it correctly. You cannot fight what you can’t define, and what the EU got right is that the IHRA definition is helpful precisely because it includes those useful examples of discriminatory anti-Israel acts that can cross the line into antisemitism—for example, “holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.” No one who labels sexist speech sexist, or racist speech racist is accused of stifling speech. In fact, officials are often praised for using their own speech to condemn these types of (legal) expression, without crossing the line into censorship. Our government should, consistent with the First Amendment, follow the EU’s lead and actively promote the implementation of IHRA in anti-discrimination policies at all levels. If necessary, they can even issue a handbook (like the EU did) for IHRA’s practical use. Meanwhile, passing the bi-partisan bi-cameral Anti-Semitism Awareness Act, which reaffirms the use of IHRA on campus, would be a great step in this direction.

Next the EU recognized that under current reporting standards it is challenging to obtain reliable and comparable data on antisemitic incidents. The new plan commits resources to help Member States improve and align their methodologies for consistently recording, collecting and assessing information on hate crimes, including antisemitism. But those in the EU are not the only ones experiencing this problem.

In the U.S., under the Hate Crime Statistics Act (modified by The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act), the Attorney General, through the FBI, is tasked with monitoring crimes in which there was “manifest evidence of prejudice” against the victim’s race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or ethnicity. The FBI  relies on local law enforcement agencies to submit data, but thousands opt out of the reporting, and, according to one report, even “among the 15,000 that do, some 88 percent reported they had no hate crimes.”

One issue is the lack of definitions: That same report found that “investigators frequently did not mark down incidents as motivated by bias, even if there was evidence suggesting this was so—a spray-painted swastika, for example, might be classified simply as vandalism and not also as a hate crime.” In 2019 (i.e. just before COVID), the number of agencies participating further declined, but the number of reported hate crimes actually rose by 113 percent, including a 14 percent increase in anti-Jewish hate crimes. All across the country 63 percent of the total reported religion-based crimes were directed against Jewish people and institutions, and one can only imagine the real number. Standardized and aligning methodologies for federal reporting of bias incidents—including but not limited to the use of IHRA—would be helpful in making sure that the statistics about antisemitism more accurately reflect reality. 

Finally, the EU plan contains several affirmative steps to attempt to prevent antisemitic sentiments from flourishing. Acknowledging that ignorance and indifference are key culprits, it lays out a number of educational initiatives focused on celebrating Jewish life, culture and societal contributions, while raising awareness about antisemitism and the Holocaust. It also calls for the Commission to ascertain that there is no antisemitism in EU textbooks or classrooms, and to ensure that EU funds are not allocated to antisemitic activities. 

If only the U.S. would do the same.

In stark contrast, the same week the EU established these programs, Governor Gavin Newsom signed California’s Assembly Bill 101 into law, making ethnic studies a high school graduation requirement. While there is nothing inherently wrong about the idea, the first draft of the bill’s model curriculum was so stunningly, openly antisemitic that Newsom himself apologized on behalf of the State, called it “offensive in so many ways, particularly to the Jewish community,” and vowed the draft “would never see the light of day.” Legislators redid the course to make it less objectionable, and appended seven amendments to confirm against anti-Jewish hate being taught. As Tammi Rossman-Benjamin has noted, “the fact that no less than seven “guardrails” were deemed necessary for preventing AB 101 from facilitating the widespread promotion of antisemitism is itself a stunning indictment of the bill and the dangers it poses for Jewish students and the Jewish community.”  But aside from that, as the LA Times warned, these measures will actually do absolutely nothing. The bill still allows schools to use their own curricula, and multiple districts and teachers’ unions have already signed statements promising to use the original, highly antisemitic, version of the course.

It did not have to be this way. For example, the bill could have just required schools to use the new model, or to submit their own curriculums for review. But apparently, as the AMCHA Initiative (an organization which fought against the bill) explained,  the concerns of hundreds of Holocaust survivors and their descendants, dozens of religious, civil rights and education organizations, thousands of Californians, and hundreds of students and parents begging the government to protect them and their families from state-sponsored antisemitism simply did not matter enough. The onus now shifts to Jewish parents and children in each of California’s 13,000 school districts to fend for themselves against the harmful and long-lasting effects of antisemitic material being taught to their children in a state-mandated class. 

Unless, of course, the federal government, like the EU, steps in where they can and should.  

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs, and federal education funding is distributed to states and school districts through a variety of grants. A school district announcing its plans to teach discriminatory material is exposing itself to liability, and the Department of Education should proactively cut off funding from those who flaunt its rules. It should never have come to this, but the federal government must put these schools on notice that under Title VI they have an affirmative legal obligation to protect their Jewish students—even from their own teachers and unions if need be.  

The U.S. must do better, and do our part, in the global fight against antisemitism. That includes adopting and enforcing standards for defining, monitoring and preventing antisemitism. The tools are there, the time is now, and the EU has shown the way. 

If they can do it, so can we. 

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

UNC failing to properly confront anti-semitism

By Mark Goldfeder

There is an antisemitism problem at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and it is high time for the school to actually, actively, address it. The fact that UNC continues to allow a graduate student-professor who has expressed vile antisemitic views to teach a course about "The Conflict Over Israel/Palestine" – despite the fact that she has said she is not capable of teaching this particular course fairly, denies Israel's right to exist, and calls those with different viewpoints on the subject matter "dirtbags"– is just the most recent manifestation of a sickening tolerance for this particular form of hate.

Last week, UNC all but admitted that antisemitism remains a serious issue on their campus. In a statement from the Chancellor, the school acknowledged all the Jewish students and alumni who have been vocal about feeling marginalized and unwelcome and noted the concern from the broader community that the University has not done enough to recognize and combat antisemitism. UNC pledged to work harder at confronting antisemitism, but while actions speak louder than words even their words are unconvincing.

The statement came only after weeks and weeks of public backlash; not one but two separate federal Title VI antisemitism complaints that were filed with the Department of Education; and at least two concerned members of Congress, a Republican, and a Democrat, expressing their concerns to the school. The administrations' semi-contrition is even more suspect because this entire incident comes a mere two years after their last public antisemitism fiasco, when the University co-hosted an antisemitic conference and was forced to settle the ensuing Title VI complaint with the Department of Education. In their resolution agreement, the school agreed to "take all steps reasonably designed to ensure that students enrolled in the University are not subjected to a hostile environment." As the Chancellor now admits, they have clearly failed to do so.

Perhaps most telling, the University is still allowing that graduate student, Kylie Broderick, to teach her one-sided course, which is the equivalent of allowing a person with an openly racist agenda to teach a course about racism. The University's half-baked statement on antisemitism has only emboldened Broderick and her supporters, who have essentially now been given an affirmative pass, and they have started a new campaign to blame the victims and pretend that she is somehow the one being unfairly targeted for her views.

That position is ridiculous on its face: Broderick published and stands by her positions, and no one is calling for her to retract them. All they are asking is that she not be given a uniquely perfect opportunity to spread her discriminatory hatred and demonstrable lies at the expense of innocent students who are paying for an actual education and deserve to be given all the facts.

It is bad enough when radical left-wing publications allow nonsensical arguments about "academic freedom" to pollute their pages, but the problem is compounded when public figures lazily retweet these silly stories without bothering to do any background research.

Here then, is a response to the most recent Broderick offensive: Broderick and her supporters are apparently shocked that numerous concerned parties are opposed to her indoctrinating students with antisemitic blood libels. They claim that people exercising their right to criticize her stated views, and to criticize the University for giving her a platform to spread slander, somehow vaguely infringes on her academic freedom.

Broderick has a record of conflating issues and being imprecise (see her discussions of Israeli history, Sheikh Jarrah, BDS laws, etc.), but to put a fine point on the matter, academic freedom does not include the right to indoctrinate students with falsehoods by asserting propositions in ways that prevent students from expressing disagreement. It is quite understandable that a student would not feel comfortable challenging their professor's anti-Zionist perspectives, or even standing up for Israeli rights, when that professor has recently referred to Zionists as "dirtbags," or moderated an event that tried to legitimize violence against Israelis.

That is why some Jewish students decided not to register for this class, and that is why Broderick should not be allowed to teach this particular course. In fact, the only threat to academic freedom at play here at all is Broderick's violation of the students' academic freedom to be educated properly. Allowing professors to shut down the exploration of alternative viewpoints by effectively excluding those who disagree is to violate entirely everything UNC purports to hold sacred.

We cannot expect more from people like Broderick, who are willing to spread dangerous lies. But we can and should expect a school like UNC to do more than pay lip service to fighting antisemitism. The best way to fight antisemitism is to call it by its name and stop giving those who spread its dangerous falsehoods legitimization and cover.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

America’s Afghan withdrawal validates the Abraham Accords

By Daphne Richemond Barak

For the Sunni Arab states that joined the Abraham Accords and established formal ties with Israel last year, the United States’ recent exit from Afghanistan has validated their choice to partner with Israel. The Abraham Accords countries understood that the U.S. would come to play a lesser role in the region, and anticipated the need to engage with a broader set of like-minded states.

Successive American administrations, beginning with the Obama administration and continuing on to Biden, have made it clear that the U.S. no longer intends to serve as the guardian of world peace. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, diversifying relationships and alliances to ensure stability in the region has become a necessity.

The Afghanistan debacle confirms, in hindsight, that relying exclusively on a single superpower ally may not be the way of the future. Instead, the formation of new, multiple alliances based on common interests, and diversifying partnerships, must become a priority.  

The Abraham Accords enabled the Sunni states to hedge their bets, minimizing the risk of ending up with nothing due to geo-strategic changes.

As a result, when the signatory states of the Abraham Accords look at what is taking place in Afghanistan , they find confirmation that looking beyond their alliance with the U.S. was a smart strategic move.

Israel is a state with significant military power – and it is willing to use it actively against the Iranian axis, more so than any other regional state. That Israel also maintains a close alliance with Washington, and a working relationship with Russia and China, also contributed to the calibrated decision by the Arab states to sign the Accords.

The U.S., Russia, and China are important to the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, and Israel can help them transition into a new multipolar era, in which the U.S. is no longer the sole superpower actor active in the Middle East.

None of this means that the U.S. is about to vanish from the Middle East. It is likely to become a piece of the regional puzzle, rather than its central moving force, as it shifts priorities to its competition with China and its urgent domestic challenges, which have kept the Biden administration extremely busy.

The truth of the matter is that the Trump administration was not the first to pursue the policy of placing America first and foreign policy second.

The lack of an American military response to the use of chemical weapons by Syria in 2013, the lack of a military reply to the Iranian-orchestrated drone strikes on Saudi Arabian oil facilities in 2019, and the muted Biden response to Iranian strikes on commercial oil tankers in recent months, all indicate that the U.S. is consistently avoiding conflict in the region.

The Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations are more in line on this foreign policy aspect than meets the eye. Ultimately, this is what the American people want. Most American voters do not want their country to be as militarily engaged in the region as it has been, and America’s friends and allies are all recognizing and adapting to this shift.

The Afghanistan exit was not the first manifestation of this change, but it is a clear signal and a turning point.

The Qatari riddle

Another turning point, and arguably unintended consequence of the Afghanistan withdrawal, could emerge in the coming weeks, as reports of a possible Qatari decision to join the Abraham Accords have surfaced. The sophisticated – and problematic - maneuvering of Doha raises questions on how the current members of the Accords would respond to such a development.

Qatar has always posed a regional riddle, as a state that has become a specialist in hedging its bets, and supporting opposite sides simultaneously. Qatar sponsors terrorism, but also sends millions of dollars to U.N. programs for countering terrorism. This pattern, of taking one action and then its opposite, has earned it considerable clout on the international multi-lateral arena.

Qatar’s role in Afghanistan is just as paradoxical. It has smartly and carefully positioned itself as the indispensable mediator between the West and the Taliban, by establishing early ties with the Taliban, and then cultivating those links.

By 2014, the Taliban had an office in Doha, and in recent years, Qatar hosted ‘peace talks’ between the U.S. and Afghanistan current Islamist rulers. More recently, Qatar assisted in the mass U.S. evacuation from Afghanistan.

When the U.S. wants to send messages to the Taliban about the need to prevent Afghanistan from serving as a platform to attack the homeland, Doha will appear as the obvious middleman.

Ironically, the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan might therefore be the one that opens the next chapter in the history of the Abraham Accords.

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Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Opposing Iron Dome Funding is Not a Peaceful Proposition

By Cade Spivey

On September 23, a group of progressive Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives stood firm against House Resolution 5323, a funding bill to support Israel's Iron Dome weapon system. The vote was all but preordained to pass with overwhelming support, and it did just that – passing by a margin of 420–9, with two abstentions. The holdouts: Republican Thomas Massie, citing dubious fiscal concerns; several Democrats citing various procedural issues; and the collective anchor of the left-wing of the Democratic party known as "the squad."

From the outset of their respective elections, these Democrats have objected to U.S. funding for Israel through a campaign known as "BDS" (or boycott, divestment, and sanctions). For the uninitiated, the aim of BDS is both amorphous and straightforward: reduce Israel's war-fighting capability and draw on her economic relationship with the U.S. to force her to the bargaining table on the issue of establishing or recognizing a Palestinian state. Unfortunately, where that bargaining table is, the relative positions of the parties, and even the identities of the parties remain perennially unanswered questions. With no clear or unified end-state, BDS has become more of a war cry than an articulable political strategy.

Instead, BDS has become a cliché partisan tactic that resurfaces about once every congressional election cycle. It gains just enough steam for the American public to remember what it stands for, only to fade away as the university quad trend-activists break for the summer, replacing their Palestine flag-backed profile photos with shots from their beach vacation. This past summer, protest season extended into mid-May and June as Israel defended itself from waves of Hamas and Islamic Jihad rocket attacks from Gaza. Those voices were amplified as Israel counter-attacked rocket sites often located within the crowded city center.

The BDS movement certainly has its adherents in the squad, though. Regardless of affiliation, one must admit that they generally stick to their principles more than the typical American political partisan. But a commitment to a set of faulty tenets is hardly a reason for celebrating the cause itself.

In the September 23 vote, America witnessed the BDS movement run headlong, with the squad leading the charge, into the steel-reinforced brick wall that is 70+ years of American-Israeli defensive partnership. Israel's Iron Dome is a purely defensive weapon system responsible for saving the lives of potentially thousands of Israelis and Palestinians alike. The system is the sole reason the death toll of the May crises did not exceed quadruple digits and likely prevented an otherwise necessary escalation of force by the IDF.

Cutting funding to Iron Dome would not have made a single Palestinian safer. It would not have made the IDF weaker as a fighting force. On the contrary, it would have only created an imperative for Israel to focus its defensive energy on attacking more rocket sites, whether from the air or via a ground-based assault. It would have endangered the lives of Israelis seeking to live in peace and those Palestinians who could not escape proximity to conflict.

No matter where one's heart lies, defunding Iron Dome is not a pro-Palestinian position; it is solely an anti-Israel position. The throw-away contrarian votes of the squad were nothing more than a political statement. It is the kind of statement they have made before and will likely make again when they have the microphone. But when symbolic gestures threaten the safety and security of Israelis with no benefit to Palestinians, it leaves one to question if the squad merely misunderstand their own rhetoric or whether they are saying the quiet part out loud.

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Cade Spivey is a publishing Adjunct at The MirYam Institute. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and served three tours in the Navy as a Gunnery/Antiterrorism Officer, Damage Control Assistant, and Counter-Piracy Evaluator. He is also a graduate of the Wake Forest University School of Law and a practicing attorney in Jacksonville, Florida, focusing on military and national security law. Read full bio here.

Kamala Harris should apologize for NOT REFUTING SLANDER ABOUT ISRAEL

By Mark Goldfeder

On Tuesday, Vice President Kamala Harris gave a talk about voting rights to students at George Mason University. During the question-and-answer session that followed, a student complained that “just a few days ago there were funds allocated to continue backing Israel, which hurts my heart because it’s an ethnic genocide and a displacement of people — the same that happened in America — and I’m sure you’re aware of this.”

Instead of taking the opportunity to actually educate the people in the room about the relationship between the United States and Israel, or even, at the very least, to correct the record by factually responding to the false and discriminatory allegations made against the Jewish State, the vice president instead thanked the woman for her contribution to the discussion and told her that “your truth should not be suppressed and it must be heard, right?”

Harris’ response was irresponsible and dangerous. She should immediately apologize, because facts matter and truth is not subjective.

Here are the facts: Last week, an overwhelming bipartisan majority of Congress approved (by a vote of 420-9) $1 billion in funding for Israel’s Iron Dome, a missile defense system that protects innocent Israeli and Palestinian men, women and children alike from the indiscriminate rockets attacks of terrorist groups like Hamas. Iron Dome uses radar to detect incoming missiles and shoot them down before they kill innocent people. It poses absolutely zero offensive threat to anyone, anywhere. All it does is reduce the death toll in Israel, and minimize the need for preemptive strikes and ground maneuvers.

Iron Dome’s store of interceptors was somewhat depleted last May after Hamas, a U.S. designated terror organization, fired over 4,300 rockets at Israeli population centers. It is beyond shameful that even nine U.S. lawmakers would vote against funding a defensive system that saves innocent lives. A vote against Iron Dome is nothing short of a vote for more effective terrorism, and for more dead civilians.

The vice president could have easily explained all this. She could have also clarified American military aid to Israel is generous to be sure, but it is an investment and not a charity. Supporting Israel in combatting Middle East terrorist groups and expansionist potentates is crucial for America’s own national security. Israel is our closest ally in the Middle East and our only reliable source of intelligence and cyber-defense in that region. As President Biden once said at an Israeli Day Celebration, “…Were there no Israel, America would have to invent one. We’d have to invent one because…you protect our interests like we protect yours.” Our shared security interests include but are not limited to preventing nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, containing Iranian, Turkish and Russian expansionism, and promoting the rule of democracy. In addition, American military aid to Israel is actually spent in the United States, providing jobs and economic growth that benefit our own economy and defense industry.

The vice president could have, and should have, explained all that as well. But at the very least she had a responsibility to call out the harmful slander of Israel as a genocidal state, and to debunk the false narrative of Israel as an occupying power.

The idea that Israel is committing ethnic genocide against the Palestinians is just an uninspired update on a classic anti-Semitic trope: the blood libel. Thankfully it is also quite easy to refute — at least for someone who is interested in doing so. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide says that genocidal acts are “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” The problem with the claim that Israel is committing genocide (aside from the complete lack of evidence for such a charge) is that the irrefutable math here tells a very different story. Since 1967, the Palestinian Arab population has actually increased by 387%.

The vice president, however, said none of that. Nor did she push back on the fundamentally false narrative of displacement which denies the demonstrable historical and legal Jewish claims to the land and places the blame for the current situation entirely on Israel.

Maybe the student asking the question really did not know that the Jews are the indigenous people living in their own ancestral homeland. Maybe the others in that classroom weren’t aware that Israel has repeatedly (over 30 times) offered plans for peace and division of the land, and that some of those plans were even supported by much of the Arab world.

But the vice president knew, and she didn’t tell them.

Our government has a responsibility to protect its citizens from acts of hate and bigotry that are motivated by discriminatory animus- including antisemitism. Study after study has shown that the kind of inflammatory discriminatory rhetoric that the vice president heard and appeared to affirm eventually leads to violent anti-Semitic action, and to innocent Jewish people around the world getting hurt. The vice president had an opportunity to distance herself and her party from these demonizing and delegitimizing lies. Instead, she gave them validation.

No one is saying that this student should have had her question or her voice suppressed. Free speech, even wrong and offensive speech, is part of what makes our democracy great. But as Harris herself once said, “Anyone who claims to be a leader must speak like a leader. That means speaking with integrity and truth.”

An apology, and a correction, are the necessary next steps.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Netanyahu’s shadow is keeping the coalition together

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

Israel’s governing coalition has reached the significant milestone of 100 days in power. The fact that it has remained intact is very much thanks to the shadow cast by Benjamin Netanyahu, the former prime minister, and now leader of the opposition, whose presence acts as the number one stabilizing force keeping the coalition together. The fear that Netanyahu could return and take power is enough to keep the disparate coalition from falling apart.

The effects of Netanyahu’s potential return were also apparent during Bennett’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly on October 27, when Israelis  watching the speech had one key question in mind: How did it compare to Netanyahu’s speeches in the same forum?

Bennett struggled to live up to Netanyahu’s standard, and his political rivals and Netanyahu’s circle in the Likud fanned the flames by playing up images of an empty UN building during the prime minister’s speech, along with statements mocking Bennett for being premier despite heading a party with only six Knesset seats – a critical mantra that has yet to vanish after more than 100 days in office. In the meantime, Bennett placed himself in direct conflict with the Health Ministry, by arguing that national leaders take the full picture into consideration beyond those raised by health officials.

It is customary to give a new government a 100-day honeymoon period and that is exactly what this coalition got. With a largely friendly media in place, the sense is that most criticism levelled at the government has been gentle.  

This phenomenon has had two important side effects. The first is that decisions on how to manage the fourth wave of the coronavirus pandemic have been less than optimal. The second is that government decisions that would otherwise have attracted firestorms of controversy from within the coalition have seen the factions quietly work together instead.

There is no sign of the loud media feuding over government decisions – a sight that was so common in the last coalition.

The ‘radio silence’ can mostly be attributed to the fear of a Netanyahu comeback.

As a political affairs journalist, it is rare to hear so few MKs briefing the media against one another.

Another factor behind this cooperative spirit is the fact that several ministers and deputy ministers – politicians who have never before had portfolios in the past – are now realizing their dreams.

Meanwhile, the coalition’s member factions continue to either ignore or disregard multiple election promises they made throughout the four recent election campaigns. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett promised not to sit with Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, or with the United Arab List party – both key members of the current coalition.

Bennett’s critics in the Israeli public, on the other hand, have not forgotten these promises, and are far from reaching the stage where they have put their outrage behind them.

For Lapid, disappearing ‘behind the scenes’ into the work of the Foreign Ministry has been a convenient maneuver, as the country grapples with the Delta wave of the coronavirus, and the number of deaths remains high.   

Lapid has additional reasons to keep a low profile. As chairman of the Yesh Atid party, while in opposition he pledged to form a government no larger than 18 members. That was before he became  Foreign Minister in a government that has 28 ministers, and a number of deputy ministers.

This government has also not been shy about activating the Norwegian Law, which allows MKs to resign, become ministers, and automatically enlarge the government by bringing the next MKs on the party list into the coalition in their place. These moves, combined with the appearance of deputy ministers, cost the taxpayer  tens of millions of shekels.

Yet criticism of all of this has been muted, with the exception of some rumblings in the opposition ranks.

Thus, the coalition has reached absurd situations, such as the appointment of Yisrael Beitenu’s Eli Avidar as Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office – a role that no one seems to know much about.

Meanwhile, right-wing coalition members are embarrassed by the government’s agenda, but are keeping quiet about it. The long called for demolition of the Khan al-Ahmar Beduin settlement –  between Jerusalem and the Dead Sea  –  is off the agenda, and Defense Minister Benny Gantz is warming relations with the Palestinian Authority. These moves are being ‘contained’ by the government’s right-wing ministers.

The left-wingers in the government are also unhappy about the government’s approval of outposts in Judea and Samaria and settlement construction, but they too have learned to censor themselves.

The United Arab List has learned how to vanish during security escalations.

And yet, the government deserves credit for delivering on one of its core promises: Quiet for the Israeli people. This goal has been achieved.

Should the government succeed in passing the bi-annual state budget, this would likely guarantee stability for two years. After passing that milestone, a breaking apart of the coalition becomes highly unlikely.

Prior to the second and third budget votes, we are likely to witness ultimatums, as various coalition elements try to pull budgetary resources in their direction. But in all likelihood, the arguments will be resolved in the last minute through compromise.

Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman promised a raise in the wages of conscripted soldiers prior to the elections. He found a way to throw this pledge aside, after available funds all went to other causes.

Liberman did not cheerlead Benny Gantz’s move to pass an increase in the pension for career IDF officers, who often retire at the age of 45. But he nevertheless went along with it. This is a sign of the ‘spirit of compromise’ that can allow a budget to be passed by this coalition.

When Netanyahu was on an extended holiday in Hawaii, one of the jokes circulating among government officials expressed the hope that he’d fall in love with the place and stay there.

In reality, of course, Netanyahu came back, and his Likud party is preparing to continue disrupting Knesset discussions with protest shouts.

That won’t be enough to bring down this coalition. Only two things can do that: Failure to pass the budget, or Netanyahu leaving politics.

If Netanyahu stops leading the Likud, the main roadblock for Likud joining the government would be lifted. The Centrist parties could find new motivation to join the Likud – motivation that will never appear in any way so long as Netanyahu heads that party.

It is this personal boycott of Netanyahu that led the current government into existence, and so long as Netanyahu remains leader of the opposition, the fear that he may return will keep the coalition together.

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a journalist and reporter on political matters, as well as an editor for the Israel Hayom/Israel Todaynewspaper, the most widely circulated publication in Israel. Read full bio here.

China now holds the keys to an Iran nuclear deal

By Yochai Guiski

Iran has come to the conclusion that a deal with the United States and Europe over its nuclear capabilities (JCPOA) no longer meets its cost-benefit analysis. The decarbonizing West may no longer serve as a destination for Iran’s oil and gas,  and, in Tehran’s view, cannot be trusted to adhere to a deal (even though the same clearly goes for Iran), while the Western economy and political system are no longer viewed favorably in the wake of the Covid-19 economic crisis.

China on the other hand has emerged as a favorable alternative for Iran:

1.      China has shown its appetite for Iran’s oil and gas over the years, and its growing economy will maintain demand for decades. China has maintained its thirst for Iranian oil even under sanctions, and even assisted Tehran in skirting them.

2.    China has a centralized political system more in line with Iran’s and would not pressure Tehran to change its regime or internal policies   – and may even provide it with better tools to control and monitor the Iranian population.

3.     China seems to view Iran favorably and is willing to invest in the country as part of the “Belt and Road” initiative (B&R). Beijing has signed a comprehensive strategic cooperation deal with Tehran, and has broadened its military ties with it (conducting joint military exercises).

4.   Both countries view the U.S. as their chief strategic rival/threat. They are both pursuing policies to weaken Washington’s power, standing and influence in their respective regions, and develop military capabilities to deny and disrupt the U.S. armed force’s ability to project power into these regions.

Despite the rosy outlook from Tehran, China seems to take a more nuanced approach toward Iran:

1.     China still views Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as strong partners in the Middle East and does not want to sour the relations with them by embracing Iran.  

2.     The amount of Chinese investment in Iran is still limited even though Iran is part of the B&R.

3.     China is still careful not to anger the U.S. by overtly and comprehensively defying sanctions.

4.      It seems that China is content to let the JCPOA negotiations drag out and has been leveraging it to criticize the U.S. and point out Washington’s failures in the Middle East.

5.      As the U.S. intends to drawdown from the Middle East in order to focus on the “Indo-Pacific” China might find Iran useful in disrupting Washington’s plans.

Whether China likes it or not, it now seems to own the Iran issue:

1.      China’s singular importance to Iran’s current and future economy lends it significant influence over Tehran to limit its nuclear actions and regional behavior.

2.     The Iranian strategic bet on China plays a major part in the failure to return the JCPOA, their ability to sustain their economy under sanctions, and in Iran’s pursuit of a “resistance economy”.

3.     Should China continue with its current policy regarding the nuclear negotiations, Iran may use the space and time to advance its nuclear plans and may even view it as a tacit approval to develop a nuclear weapon, much like North Korea did. If this scenario comes to pass it would impact China’s image as a willing backer of such regimes, and an ally to an emboldened enemy of many in the Middle East.

It is therefore important that:

1.      China recognizes its unique position and plays a responsible and prominent role in addressing Iran’s behavior and preventing it from further destabilizing the region.

2.     China understands that if Iran is left unchecked, even before it reaches a nuclear weapon, it would destabilize a region which is critical to China’s energy needs, and might foment ill will toward Beijing in an area that is a willing economic partner.  

3.      Middle Eastern nations wary of Iran’s regional and nuclear aspirations seek to influence Beijing’s policies towards Iran. They should try and encourage China to view the situation not as a “zero sum game” with the U.S., seek initiatives that help stabilize the region, and show that both great powers can work together, even in competition.

4.      The U.S. and Israel (separately and jointly) should devise a China-Iran policy that:

a.     Engages China on Iran and shared interests in maintaining stability in the Middle East  – especially the Persian Gulf  –  and even develop a joint understanding on the goals, ways and means, to do so.

b.     Seeks to enhance Beijing’s role in the nuclear negotiations, as it holds the relevant leverages to prod and cajole Tehran to return to a nuclear deal and to possibly commit to a more comprehensive deal down the line.

c.     Seeks to reduce the viability of Iran’s strategy of dependence on China, and impose increasing costs on such policies if engaging China fails.  

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

The Israel Prison Service’s resilience is put to the test

By Alon Levavi

The recapture of last two escaped Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists in a pre-dawn raid by Israeli security forces in Jenin on September 19 will go some way to restoring deterrence after they and four others dug their way out of the high-security Gilboa Prison almost two weeks earlier. But their capture does not cancel out the massive failure that enabled their escape in the first place.

The fact that Israel’s most secure prison, built after the Second Intifada, was the scene of a tunnel breakout, without any prior intelligence obtained by prison authorities and without any attempt made to stop the prisoners’ flight, represents an unprecedented and even surreal failure in the recent history of the Israel Prisons Service.

On the other hand, the rapid and silent  Jenin arrest operation that ended successfully without a single soldier – or escaped terrorist – suffering a scratch, is testament to the determination and skill of all of the security forces involved.

The Jenin operation came after the center of gravity of the pursuit shifted toward the intelligence sphere. Initially, the operation focused on the deployment of thousands of police officers and soldiers, but at a certain stage, spreading out such large forces on the ground was no longer useful. This is when the lead role went to the Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency, which activated its varied intelligence sources and technology to home in on the dangerous fugitives.

From the moment that the intelligence indication came in, security forces - the Shin Bet and its operational arm, the Israel Police’s elite Counter-Terrorism Unit, together with the IDF, and the Israel Police began planning a sophisticated operation.

It is safe to assume that from that point onward, the messaging  the authorities were putting out were not always a full reflection of what was taking place on the ground  – this in order to avoid giving away sensitive information and harming the operation.

The escaped terrorists and their collaborators were monitoring Israeli media. Security forces planned a deceptive decoy maneuver. It seems safe to assume that large forces were sent to one section of Jenin – a city that contains neighborhoods that are filled with gunmen – and conducted a ‘loud operation’ to attract attention, while a separate force went to the location where the Shin Bet knew the two escaped prisoners were hiding to carry out the   real, and quiet, escape operation.

The Israel Police’s Counter-Terrorism Unit is the go-to address for the most extreme security missions. Police have invested much in this elite unit, in terms of training, developing its fighters, investing in their facilities, and providing them operational technologies.

How the pursuit was managed

Prior to the recapture of the escaped terrorists, the various security branches joined forces in a unique manner to manage the largest-scale pursuit Israel has seen in years.

The Israel Police’s Northern District, which is still recovering from its own trauma dating back to the deadly Mount Meron stampede in April, took center stage in this pursuit. The first objective was to prevent the terrorists from escaping to nearby Jordan or  crossing the Green Line into the Jenin area of the northern West Bank.

All of the security organizations joined up with the Israel Police, bringing their capabilities to the pursuit. The Israel Prisons Service’s area of responsibility stops at prison walls, and anything beyond that in Israeli territory falls under police jurisdiction. The IDF led the search in Judea and Samaria with its forces, while the Shin Bet was injecting intelligence into all of the organizations’ efforts, and receiving intelligence from them.

The police force threw everything it had into the pursuit – helicopters, drones, night-vision, scouts, officers on horseback, canine units, the bomb squad, and its Counter-Terror Unit.

The Northern District’s personnel is simply not big enough to cover such a large area, and it had to receive back up from other police entities, such as Traffic Police, Border Police, and other districts.

The initial objective: To flood the ground with as many flashing blue lights and forces as possible, to make the terrorists hunker down in their location and stop them from crossing any borders. This made the terrorists aware that large forces were nearby looking for them at all times, and would stop most of them from advancing far. 

Since the escaped prisoners had no phones, it was not possible to track them technologically, making the mission far more challenging.

In the end though, most of the terrorists were caught alone, unarmed, unharmed, hungry and thirsty. The photos of their captures are of major significance for public perception in Israel and among the Palestinians. The fact that law-abiding Arab Israeli citizens called the police to report suspicious movements also had significant effect on the narratives surrounding the escape. 

Ultimately, despite their daring and sophistication in the early stages of the escape plan, the fact that the terrorists were found in poor condition was a twist in the plot, demonstrating no planning for the second stage of their flight , and harming the Palestinian euphoria that accompanied the escape.

The Israel Prisons Service: A time for review and rebuilding  

The Israel Prisons Service is currently facing one of the most significant leadership tests in its in history. The organization’s resilience is now being put to the test. It did not have the time to review the series of failures that allowed the escapes, and fix the problems – as it was busy dealing with prison riots, and the after-effects of its initiative to end the organizational separation of Palestinian Islamic Jihad prisoners in their own cells. It has been in ongoing crisis management mode.

To its credit, the Israel Prisons Service has not blinked as it pushes ahead with the break-up of terror factions inside prison wards, despite protests by the terror factions and threats of hunger strikes.

As it does this, the service is at the center of a government commission of inquiry, and a criminal investigation being run by the Israel Police into the escape. The police is investigating the Israel Prisons Service even as the two organizations worked shoulder to shoulder to recapture the prisoners – an extraordinary dissonance that the two organizations have had to learn to live with.

The Israel Prisons Service has absorbed an obvious shock following the escape. As an organization that is usually in the shadow of larger security organizations – ones that do not deal with the volcanos known as prisons, the current challenge forms an enormous test.

Yet it is also an opportunity for the service to seize on the situation and to begin to prioritize issues that it struggled to focus on until now, such as new security technologies, personnel development, and building better infrastructure. Many of Israel’s prisons date back to the British mandate of the 1920s and 1930s, and the escape crisis is a real opportunity to reexamine prison facilities and to start properly addressing the weak links within them.

Organizations are measured by their ability to cope with crises. In order to do that, they must build organizational resilience ahead of time. It is up to the organization’s leaders to build this resilience, which will be tested by its ability to rapidly exit this crisis, and to do so in a manner that leaves the service stronger.

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Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Palestinian and regional players prepare for life after Abbas

By David Hacham

The Palestinian Authority’s rule in the West Bank is facing a series of challenges, ranging from regular clashes between Palestinians and the IDF and settlers to Hamas’s strategic program to consolidate its foothold in the territory.

Nevertheless, the PA has been able to maintain overall security control, even as the era of President Mahmoud Abbas appears to be in its last lap.

The question of whether the PA will be able to maintain its grip, in light of its significant political weakness, is however becoming acute as fears grow over the scenario of a post-Abbas era marked by instability and violent clashes.

Abbas himself has done little to ease concerns, since he, like Arafat before him, has avoided fostering a clear successor to replace him.

Sources in Fatah remain optimistic that even if a post-Abbas succession power struggle creates tensions, it will not deteriorate into all-out chaos and conflict. According to this assumption, the relevant external power players involved in the Palestinian arena – Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the international community – mainly the United States and the European Union –  will activate their influence to prevent this scenario from coming to pass.

Jordan has already tried to introduce stability by suggesting to Abbas that he appoints three deputies – one in charge of political affairs, the second to supervise security, and the third to run economic affairs – so as to safeguard Abbas’s position and ensure a continuous, functional PA government in the post-Abbas era.

It appears as if Abbas has yet to answer this proposal. This has led observers in Ramallah to the conclusion that following Abbas’s departure a temporary transition council made up of senior Fatah members will take over –  with three separate figures for the PA, the PLO, and Fatah –  until conditions ripen for an approved leader to take over the Palestinian leadership.

Meanwhile, conditions on the ground are marked by tensions and security incidents, as demonstrated by Israel’s recent arrest of two escaped Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists in Jenin. Israel is now making a concerted effort to avoid Palestinian casualties in its operations, including during the Jenin operation, out of an awareness that significant casualties could undermine the PA’s stability. The PA is encouraged by Israel’s restraint.

The IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, asked Central Command to reduce incidents of deadly clashes after a recent period in which over 40 Palestinians were killed in clashes with the IDF in regular hot spots.

Despite these incidents, the scenario of a broad popular uprising does not look near, or realistic.

Still, should new incidents lead to new casualties, a broader security deterioration could very much be back on the agenda.

Over the past months, known friction zones have stood out as sources of a potential escalation. These include Kfar Beta, south of Nablus, located near the Israeli outpost of Evyatar, where settlers have been evicted by the IDF, but soldiers remain. Palestinians have employed the tactics of Hamas ‘nighttime harassment operatives’ on the Gaza border at this West Bank site, and engaged in nocturnal incidents.

Other hotpots have included Silwad, Abu Dis, and elsewhere.

In Palestinian refugee camps in Jenin and in Balata near Nablus, the sight of gunmen marching in the streets has recently become more common. Firefights between armed terrorists and Israeli security forces have increased in recent months in these camps.

The battle for succession is growing more intense

Meanwhile, within Fatah and the PA, the succession battle over who will replace Abbas is growing more intense. Would-be successors include the current Palestinian Prime Minister, Mohammad Shtayyeh; Fatah Deputy Chairman Fatah, Mahmoud Aloul; Fatah Central Committee Secretary General, Jibril Rajoub; Minister for Civilian Affairs, Hussein al-Sheikh; General Intelligence Services chief, Majed Faraj; and imprisoned Fatah terrorist Marwan Barghouti. Additional candidates include former Fatah senior member Mohammed Dahlan who Abbas expelled from Fatah a decade ago due to an intense personal rivalry.

All of the aforementioned  are in a state of heightened expectation and are closely following developments as they prepare for ‘D-Day’ – the day that Abbas departs the arena.

Other senior figures are fearful that once D-Day comes, their careers will end, and that perhaps their personal safety will be at risk. These include Intisar Abu Amara, the influential head of Abbas’s bureau; PA Police Chief, Hazem Atallah, and PA Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki. 

These figures are examining options and preparing possible escape routes, lest it become too late for them to move.

Meanwhile within the PA, al-Sheikh and Faraj are both growing stronger and they are closest to Abbas due to their position as members of his inner most circle. They take part in Abbas’s meetings in Ramallah and accompany him on official international visits.

Abbas is gradually losing his power and within Fatah itself there are those who see him becoming a lame duck leader. As a result of the above conditions, the PA can be described as being strong security wise and in possession of security forces with proven capabilities that continue to wield deterrence – but weak politically.

The first visit from an Israeli minister

On August 30, Defense Minister Benny Gantz visited Abbas in Ramallah, becoming the first senior Israeli minister to do so in over a decade. Abbas reported to the PLO’s Executive Committee after the meeting that Gantz stressed Israel’s commitment to the two-state solution as a basis for a future arrangement, but that he also recognized that the political reality in Israel meant that the Israeli government in its current make-up could not take steps toward a political process.

The meeting nevertheless produced a series of practical steps with the most noteworthy of them being an Israeli loan of 500 million shekels to Ramallah in order to strengthen the PA. According to Fatah sources, this loan, which comes from cleared tax funds that Israel collects on behalf of the PA,  but that are withheld due to the PA’s payment to terrorists and their families, is likely to turn into a grant.

Abbas also sought Israel’s approval for  PA police to act against criminals in Area C – the area of the West Bank under Israeli security and civilian control  – and for Israel to decrease its counter-terror activities in Area A, which is under PA security and civilian control.

Both sides share an interest in blocking Hamas’s goal of building a foothold in the West Bank and preventing it from expanding out of its Gazan home base.

Meanwhile, Hamas continues to pose a problematic threat for the PA’s rule in the West Bank due to its strategic objective of taking over the Palestinian government there.  

Hamas is working to improve its influence via social-welfare organizations, as well as in professional unions, student organizations, and other civilian society institutions.  

Hamas is not waiting for Abbas to depart, and is already working on the ground to consolidate its position as a lead force challenging the present Palestinian leadership.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

The Next Accord of the Abraham Accords

By Efraim Chalamish

The Abraham Accords, signed in September a year ago, have changed the Middle East forever. From hundreds of thousands of Israeli visitors to the UAE, to headlines about major potential cross-border transactions, to other Gulf countries that would like to join the new Middle East – new Arabian winds are blowing and are here to stay.

Yet, this moment of reflection is also a unique opportunity to look more carefully at how local, regional and global markets reacted and what needs to be done to remove the barriers that make progress more challenging on the ground.

The disproportionately high number of Israeli visitors to the UAE this past year, and the urge to capitalize quickly on the agreement, jeopardized the level of knowledge parties have. The cancelation of the potential investment by a UAE royal in Jerusalem’s leading soccer team due to his questionable finances and other similar cases have highlighted the trust deficit and the limited intelligence available to the respective entities. Better background checks, more structured and longer processes, and humble expectations will be needed to prevent similar fiascos.

The presence of international players can help to solve this issue by providing both Israelis and Gulf-based entities the necessary linkage and legitimacy. It has been reported that Japanese companies are interested in transactions that would create an energy corridor from Israel to the Gulf, and similar strategic moves are needed.  The Abraham Fund, an international financial commitment to support cross-border infrastructure and energy security projects, should be saved despite recent calls to suspend it.

Gulf-based investors are often looking for the strategic value in every project. While financial returns are important, there is a need for a strategic alignment. The Delek-Mubadala deal in which Abu Dhabi-based Mubadala Petroleum purchased a $1 billion stake in the Tamar natural gas field is a case in point. The parties will be better off focusing on similar transactions in the next few years. 

Cultural differences have also been identified. While Israelis have been looking for ‘quick wins’, such as venture investing with a short timeframe, Emirati and Bahraini individuals and companies have different time horizons, expecting relationships to develop and mature over time until they can generate the expected results. This gap has created significant frustrations on both sides and should be considered as part of the learning curve of the Abraham Accords and their consequences. While cultures cannot change overnight, governments on both sides should not create false expectations and should better prepare the parties for a more constructive dialogue.

In addition, we should not forget the framework of the Abraham Accords and the original text of the declaration. The accords are named after Abraham, the common patriarch of the three monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The spiritual aspect was an important component of the journey to the accords and their current framework. Leaders from all relevant religions have met over the years as part of the track-II diplomacy efforts to bring the countries together. They all emphasized what values and practices those religions have in common.

Unfortunately, the rush to advance commercial transactions left the spiritual component behind. While certain projects and deals are short-lived, the religious aspect can give the long-term oxygen, legitimacy, and much-needed resilience to the agreements. Despite the ongoing political sensitivities in the region, religious leaders and programs should be accelerated.

The need to re-emphasize the religious component should be part of broader efforts to add bottom-up stories following the leaders’ framework. A recent report by the Atlantic Council and INSS think tanks and policy groups highlights the areas where civic engagement can be improved and developed. Religious dialogue, sports activities, and academic research programs are some of the key elements. 

As the report shows, the progress in this area has been limited, and a lot can be done with local and international support. The incentives are concrete and beyond relationships maintenance. For instance, religious leaders from both sides can de-legitimize extremist groups in the region. The decline in enrollment in Israeli academic institutions in recent years can be addressed by a rise in participation of Gulf students. Israel’s leading athletes, such as chess players, can help the Emiratis improve their performance via joint camps, training programs, and yearly competitions. The United States can and should play an important role in this civic engagement by providing the necessary umbrella for the various projects.

As we are all eager to see the next chapter of the Abraham Accords and Jewish-Muslim relations in the Middle East more generally, only a nuanced and transparent approach can lead to the desired progress and regional growth.

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Dr. Efraim Chalamish is an international economic law professor, advisor, and media commentator. He has been involved in international legal practice in New York, Paris and Israel, along with research in, and analysis of, cutting edge areas in public and private international economic law. Dr. Chalamish teaches at NYU Law School. Read full bio here.

Diplomacy, not sabotage, top option for Iran nuclear PROGRAM

By Eitan Barak

A recent report that Israel gave the United States less than two-hours’ notice prior to its alleged April 11 sabotage attack on the underground Natanz uranium enrichment site , thereby leaving U.S. intelligence agencies with insufficient time to respond, has drawn attention to the relationship between then Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the newly elected Biden administration. Yet its greater importance lies in the fact that Israel, in the view of the administration, was required by “longstanding, unwritten agreement to at least advise the United States of covert operations, giving Washington a chance to object”.

Irrespective of the embarrassment, the affair should cheer Israeli readers.

Such a tacit agreement means that the U.S. condoned, if not cooperated in, previous alleged Israeli sabotage actions targeting Iran’s nuclear program, at least since May 2018. In other words, both sides’ cost-benefit calculations suggest that this is the “right thing to do” given the absence of a diplomatic solution (i.e., a viable, effective agreement), the immense difficulties for Israel in executing a military solution, and the U.S. reluctance to push for such a solution.

Indeed, from the Israeli perspective, even tactical actions are preferable to doing nothing in the face of Iran’s increasing efforts in the nuclear realm. Furthermore, due to many factors, including the parties’ avoidance of declaring responsibility, this policy has so far not triggered a full-scale war between the two sides.

In conclusion, it is hard to challenge Israel’s adoption of this tactic as long as Iran refrains from abiding by any international agreement (e.g., the JCPOA) aiming to curb its nuclear program.

After all, Israel’s resort to sabotage attacks is a long-standing practice. In the early 1960s, for instance, Israel launched “Operation Damocles”, in which sabotage attacks, including targeted killings, were directed at the German scientists and technicians developing rockets for Egypt up to the end of 1963.

Although used against most of Israel’s enemies, this practice represents an important stage in implementing the so-called “Sharon/Begin Doctrine”, specifically, in Sharon’s words, that “Israel cannot permit the introduction of nuclear weapons [to the Middle East-E.B.]. For us, this is not a question of the balance of terror but our continued existence. So, it will be our duty to nip this danger in the bud”.

Under this doctrine’s umbrella, Israel carried out “Operation Opera” in Iraq (June 1981) and “Operation Outside the Box” in Syria (September 2007). In both cases, the aerial strikes were considered a “last resort”, after exhaustion of all other tools (i.e., diplomatic pressuring of supplier states, sabotage actions and, finally, an implicit appeal to the US to execute the military strike that, although rejected as expected, was considered as providing a “green light” for Israeli actions). 

To illustrate, only three months ago, in June 2021, a sort of formal confirmation was received that two years prior to the 1981 attack on the Iraqi reactor, Israel had sabotaged, on French soil, a shipment of materials destined for the Iraqi facility. As in the 1960s, the action followed multiple phone calls to French and Italian workers in the involved companies at the sites “advising” them to avoid any connection with Iraq and the reactor’s construction. Research has since suggested, however,  that this military strike was somewhat counterproductive as, inter alia, it triggered a new covert program that, despite gross inefficiencies, placed Iraq at the threshold of nuclear weapons capability a decade later.

In the present case, given the prevailing estimates that Iran had reached self-reliance in its nuclear program after 2010, no third parties are available as targets for diplomatic pressures and sabotage actions. Furthermore, giving the immense difficulties involved in executing a successful military strike against Iranian nuclear installations, in the absence of a diplomatic solution Israel sees few options available beyond continuing sabotage attacks that can – at best – delay the program while gaining time to reach a diplomatic solution.

Unfortunately, all the historical lessons suggest that sabotage attacks can do little other than slowing the pace of state-initiated military nuclear programs. This view seems to be shared by Israel’s defense establishment, to the point where it ascribes the Iranian slowdown in its nuclear race during the last three months solely to renewal of the Vienna talks.

After numerous sabotage attacks, it seems clear that diplomacy is the best if not the only solution to Israel’s predicament vis-a-vis Iran’s nuclear program.

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Dr. Eitan Barak is a senior researcher at the International Relations Department, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Prior to joining the Department, Dr. Barak was a Fulbright postdoctoral grantee in the International Security Program at Harvard. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Could Gilboa Prison Escape Spark An Intifada?

By Yaakov Lappin

The dramatic escape of six Palestinian terrorists from Gilboa Prison in northern Israel on Monday carries the potential of a broader security escalation, a former defense official has cautioned.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, a former Arab-affairs adviser to seven Israeli defense ministers and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, told JNS that the breakout could lead to a chain of incidents and an escalation dynamic, although this is not a certainty.

He recalled a highly relevant precedent from the 1980s. In May 1987, six senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) security prisoners escaped from an Israeli prison in the Gaza Strip. In October of that year, a gun battle between Israeli security forces and five of the escaped prisoners erupted in Gaza’s Shejaiya neighborhood district. The cell’s members were killed, and an Israeli Shin Bet member, Victor Arajwan, was also killed in the firefight.

The PIJ to this day considers the incident to be a catalyst for the start of the First Intifada, said Hacham.

In Monday’s escape, five out of the six prisoners are PIJ terrorists convicted of taking part in deadly attacks on Israelis, while the sixth is the former commander of the Fatah-aligned Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Jenin, Zakaria Zubeidi.

All six are from the West Bank city of Jenin, which lies just across the Green Line from Gilboa Prison.

“The 1987 escape was a catalyst event ahead of the First Intifada, and today, this event also has the potential to be that type of event,” said Hacham. “Should the prisoners be killed in a firefight, this could boost the already high levels of motivation among PIJ, Hamas and Fatah-affiliated organizations in Judea and Samaria,” said Hacham, noting that this does not include the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, which maintain daily coordination with the Israel Defense Forces.

Hacham assessed that it was unlikely that the P.A. would play a role in helping Israel capture the escaped prisoners, due to the fact that security prisoners are considered to be a consensus issue of paramount importance in Palestinian society.

“The word ‘intifada’ is in the air,” said Hacham. “The escape is being perceived by Palestinians as a humiliation to Israel, just as it was in May 1987. As an event that underlines Israeli vulnerability. The event joins the incident in which 21-year-old Border Police Sgt. Bar-El Hadaria Shmueli was shot dead on the Gaza border.”

The escape also strengthens the status of PIJ as an armed faction that is at the forefront of conflict with Israel. “In Gaza, Hamas runs the Strip, but PIJ is even more virulent and ideological than Hamas is. It has no real political component. It is exclusively a terrorist-military force,” explained Hacham.

The scenario of a violent apprehension of the escaped terrorists might not only trigger violence in the West Bank, but is likely to do so in Gaza, said Hacham, leading to new arson balloon attacks on Israeli communities and possibly rocket attacks as well.

Such a sequence of events could cause “regional escalation,” he added.

While Hamas and PIJ share a command center in Gaza, “sometimes PIJ acts independently without coordinating with Hamas,” said Hacham.

‘One of many prominent failures’

“When I heard of the escape, it immediately took me more than 30 years back to 1987, in the months before the First Intifada,” said Hacham.

The only escaped security prisoner not killed in the October 1987 firefight was a terrorist named Imad Saftawi, the son of a senior Fatah member (himself later slain in 1993 in an internal Fatah power dispute). Saftawi, who was convicted of killing an Israeli Military Police officer, escaped to Egypt and from there made his way to Yasser Arafat’s PLO headquarters in Tunis.

At that time, prisoners were able to dislodge bars on their cell, climb over the barbed wires and perimeter wall, and escape the facility under the cover of darkness. The Shin Bet intelligence agency led the manhunt. Its intelligence enabled the IDF to plant an ambush for the cell in Gaza’s Shejaiya neighborhood.

One central difference between the 1987 escape and Monday’s incident is the fact that in 1987, the cell escaped into Gaza immediately, which was a “familiar, supporting environment, into which they could vanish instantly,” noted Hacham.

Hacham is in little doubt that the six escaped terrorists from Gilboa Prison received outside assistance, and that they likely walked a few kilometers before a getaway vehicle awaited them.

“I assume some of them are still in the area,” he said, assessing that some could try to cross the Green Line into the West Bank or the international border towards Jordan. Some reports speculated that they would seek to reach Lebanon.

“It will be hard for them to get into Gaza. For now, they will probably look for a hideout and seek to vanish from the radar, to evade the Shin Bet,” said Hacham, who also advised commanders of the IDF’s Southern Command.

The terrorists could potentially be hiding in Jenin’s refugee camp, which in recent days has seen PIJ gunmen hold marches and displaying their firearms in a warning to Israel against conducting raids in the area.

Hacham noted with concern the “massive outpouring of euphoria in the territories.”

He noted that the failure by the Israel Prisons Service to block cell-phone signals in the prison compound is “one of many prominent failures.” That failure likely allowed the plotters to coordinate their plans without outside helpers.

‘A morale boost for Palestinian ‘resistance’ organizations’

“This is a serious failure on the part of the IPS. But it projects onto the full Israeli defense establishment,” said Hacham.

“This is the reoccurring theme in how Palestinians are describing the event,” he continued. “People I speak into Ramallah are calling it a ‘heroic Palestinian operation,’ which has exposed Israeli security forces. Three of the terrorists were designated high-risk escape candidates. Zubeidi was a central figure from the Second Intifada. The group includes two PIJ members who are brothers. All of these were in a single cell. This looks problematic.”

The escape operation likely involved “many months of detailed planning and preparation,” said Hacham, including the tunnel digging and preparing the escape opening beyond the prison wall. Someone had to wait for them on the outside and help them find a hiding place.”

The multiple failures by the IPS in gaining intelligence about the tunnel and in adequately monitoring the activities of high-risk security prisoners were joined by negligent search activities, likely due to prison guards who did not wish to “stir the pot” and risk too much violence, he said.

The decision to incarcerate the terrorists so close to their home city of Jenin also needs to be scrutinized, he added.

“This is seen as an operational achievement and a morale boost for Palestinian ‘resistance’ organizations. They don’t only view it through the narrow lens of an escape from prison,” stated Hacham. “For Palestinians, it is a source of pride. There is now a sense of victory over the ‘Israeli war machine,” and all Palestinian factions are issuing their congratulations, not only the Islamists.”

According to Hacham, the Israeli pursuit will take two main forms. The first is at the field level, involving significant numbers of police, Border Police and IDF personnel scanning the ground and searching for escape routes, as well as clues to their location.

“The second part is the intelligence front,” he said. “The Shin Bet will focus this effort, which will be aimed at locating, surveillance and utilizing all means to get hold of reliable, precise intelligence on the circumstances of the escape and hideout locations where they could have ended up.”

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.