What would be the security & strategic dimensions of an Israel-Saudi deal?

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

As the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia gets ever-closer, it is reasonable to assume that Israel’s defense establishment is conducting a thorough analysis of the potential security ramifications of such a maneuver.

Normalization would be a part of a trilateral agreement between Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel, and has the potential to redefine regional alignments.

In due time, the Israeli government will be equipped with recommendations from the defense establishment to help it navigate this strategic junction. The proposed normalization of relations is predicated on Saudi Arabia's requests to purchase American F-35 fighter jets, cutting-edge air defense systems, and a civilian nuclear reactor that is outfitted with a uranium enrichment fuel cycle.

Saudi Arabia wishes to receive American security commitments and to build long-term stability to enable it to become an economic powerhouse. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s vision is to turn the desert kingdom into a regional powerhouse that attracts business and investment and is not reliant on oil for its economic prosperity.

In assessing these requests from an Israeli perspective, it is impossible to examine them in isolation. Beyond the undeniable fact that they would improve Riyadh's capacity to defend itself against Iranian aggression, the Saudi ‘asks’ should also be seen in the wider context of the ongoing arms race between Israel and Iran. In recent years, Iran has disturbingly closed the gap on Israel’s military edge over it and its axis of proxies. Equipping Saudi Arabia with new capabilities that would be pointed at Tehran would, therefore, boost Israel’s strategic interests, while also carrying implicit risks.

But first, an examination of recent developments in Iran’s capability force build-up is in order.

The ban on Iran possessing ballistic missiles imposed by the United Nations will be lifted in October, and this could be a significant event for the world and the region, due to the blossoming cooperation between Iran and Russia.

Europe may soon see Iranian ballistic missiles fired by Russia at Ukraine. Given the robust nature of Iran's military industry, which is capable of the mass production of missiles, drones, and a wide variety of other types of weaponry, Russia has become dependent on Iranian firepower.

 As a result of Iran's assistance to Russia in its conflict with Ukraine, Moscow owes Iran a debt; as repayment, Iran may receive Russian Sukhoi jets. Russia could also help Iran with spy satellites and with the development of a more sophisticated missile arsenal.

Even if Iran occasionally cuts corners in terms of quality, the rapidity with which it manufactures its arms and then distributes them to regional proxies via air, land, and sea channels is cause for concern. Iran is expanding its influence all over the region, including Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, in addition to Yemen and the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel's goals in the region are clear: it wants to build an anti-Iran bloc of states that includes itself and other pragmatic Arab Sunni nations. In this context, the Abraham Accords, signed with the UAE and Bahrain in the year 2020, were a groundbreaking initiative. The normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the Arab world, however, holds the promise of being the real game-changer.

A shift of this magnitude is monumental, and it gives rise to optimism for a more positive and stable future. Amid these seismic shifts, Israel's overarching goal continues to be to maximize strategic gains while managing the risks associated with these gains.

To craft a new Middle East, certain gambles are required; as a result, the potential arming of Saudi Arabia needs to be viewed within the context of this grand strategy.

Iran continues to arm and fund its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, creating a clear joint Saudi-Israeli interest to contain these threats.

Israel's expanding influence in the region, on the other hand, has caused trepidation in Tehran. This may have been the trigger for the Iranian government to launch a charm offensive and to normalize ties with Saudi Arabia in March.

The Abraham Accords and their expansion should therefore be seen as Israel’s response to Iran’s strategy of encircling it with missile bases and well-armed enemies.

Throughout history, the attitude of many Arab nations toward normalization with Israel was cautious and their strategy was to wait for the Palestinian conflict to be resolved. This all began to change from 2020 onwards, when the acknowledgment of Israel's growing economic and military power, and its close ties with the United States—reshaped diplomatic priorities for Arab Sunni states.

These states identify Iran as the primary security threat to them.

All these processes have enabled Israel's integration into the Middle Eastern map in an unprecedented manner.

This shift is exemplified by the growing ties between the IDF and not only long-standing partners such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt, but also rumored military-strategic relations that are kept secret for the time being.

In addition, the transfer of the IDF from the US European Command to the Central Command, which is responsible for the Middle East, following the signing of the Abraham Accords, has greatly enhanced Israel’s integration in the region.

Even though it does not signify the formation of a Middle Eastern NATO, it does encourage information sharing, deterrence, and defense cooperation among nations. These kinds of collaborations have the potential to be formidable obstacles in the way of Iran's goals.

As such, normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is not merely another diplomatic effort. It is a possible harbinger of a new order in the Middle East, one in which Israel and Saudi Arabia, two Middle Eastern powerhouses, can combine their military, economic, and political power to push back against Iran in new ways.

These are the larger considerations that should guide the discussion on Saudi Arabia’s requests from the U.S. in exchange for normalization. 

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

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Cyber is the new oil in Middle East diplomacy

By RENE-PIERRE AZRIA

Fifty years ago, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia dared confront the then-most powerful man on earth, US President Richard Nixon. The king wielded an unexpected but fearsome weapon: oil embargoes.

King Faisal, angry at Nixon’s massive rescue of Israel during the Yom Kippur War, overnight cut all deliveries of oil to the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and several other European countries, plunging the West into an unprecedented panic.

The vengeful king also ordered a massive increase in the price of oil, which jumped from about $3 a barrel in early October 1973 to about $12 a barrel in April 1974. Within months, the US, Japan, and Europe were suffering from runaway inflation and a series of deep recessions.

By 1979, prompted by the revolution in Iran, the oil price had tripled again, to about $36 a barrel. US inflation followed, and the fed funds rate moved over 20% in 1980, crushing the Jimmy Carter administration and ushering in the Ronald Reagan era.

Revenues of oil producers, particularly those in the Middle East, skyrocketed, creating unprecedented financial power for Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and the UAE. The most influential man in the world briefly became Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, then oil minister of Saudi Arabia, who had inspired the creation of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and negotiated the takeover, by the Kingdom, of Aramco, the old Arabian American Oil Company.

For decades after the 1973 “oil shock,” the price of oil and the production quotas decided by OPEC and OAPEC conditioned the foreign policies of the West vs. the Arab world, thus vs Israel. It was openly admitted that applying pressure on Israel to compromise with its Arab foes was the required path to appease Arab oil producers.

Two views dominated the oil-producing cartel: that oil should be viewed in the economic context of supply and demand, and that oil should be viewed and used essentially as a political pressure tool. Sheikh Yamani was on the side of moderation, warning his colleagues that raising oil too high, too fast would prompt a market reaction. Oil, however, was being used by Middle East powers as a weapon, but as such it turned out to have unpredictable impacts. During the Iraq-Iran war, Saudi Arabia kept lowering the price of oil to deprive Iran of money, a strategy which indeed hurt Iran but equally weakened all the oil producers and profoundly divided OPEC.

Sheikh Yamani was essentially correct. The high price of oil made exploration and invention worthwhile. The West found numerous new oil fields (North Sea, West Africa, Russia, and more recently North American shale oil), developed massive new energies (nuclear, LPG, and more recently renewables), and started conserving energy. The US today is self-sufficient, and Israel has become a gas exporter. Oil may still sustain the finances of large oil producers, but it does not rule Middle East politics any longer.

An alternative to oil

If not the oil, what then gave Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, one of King Faisal’s grandsons, the power to ignore and confront US President Joe Biden in 2023? 

Cyber power.

Cyber power is this writer’s shortcut for the revolutions of the last 20 years: the Internet, mobile phones, smartphones, social media, artificial intelligence (AI), and the global propaganda techniques derived from this new toolbox. The battlefield has moved from Western chanceries to billions of little screens, and world public opinion gets manipulated by the Arab world, quite cheaply, through deafening propaganda and targeted character assassination.

This is not to say that the Middle East is now devoid of oil plots and old-world battling. At no time since the Yom Kippur War has terrorism abated, nor has guerrilla warfare, intelligence work, lawfare, or cyber attacks on civilian infrastructures. 

The world public opinion, however, pays little attention to the feuds between Iran and Sunni powers, to the civil war in Syria, to the division of Libya, to Turkey’s ambitions in Iraq, to the Kurdish drama. The Arab world has successfully managed to protect these gruesome Muslim-to-Muslim conflicts from international interference, while constantly keeping Israel in the international penalty box.

The convicted murderer and politician, Marwan Barghouti, once announced in a Financial Times editorial the launch of the “Boycott, Divest, Sanction” movement against Israel. He specified that the movement would first target the BBC and the Financial Times, because they dominated English language media, and had the farthest reach into opinion leaders across the world. Since then, anti-Israel crusades have left the realm of the print and been amplified billions of times by social media and the internet in general. Hammering works.

Israel discovered a fantastic antidote against this electronic poison: the concept of the Start-up Nation. The Start-up Nation is the 21st-century equivalent of the kibbutz dream: a brilliant shortcut for success, scientific progress, peace, and universal contribution. Young Westerners identify with its message of hope and sharing, and so do youths in emerging countries.

The Start-up Nation opened the way for the Abraham Accords, for the opening of diplomatic relations in Africa, and for the investment flows from India, China, Japan, and Korea. The Start-up Nation reversed decades of negative tropes on Israel.

Yet, news from Israel today seems to revolve exclusively around a potential constitutional crisis perpetrated by the incendiary policies of a handful of far-right ministers. Will the damage to Israel’s standing among nations be so deep and so lengthy as to wipe out the goodwill created by the start-up nation concept?

Israel used to win skeptics’ hearts by bringing opinion leaders to Israel, showing them its geopolitical realities, and letting them judge by themselves. Four billion people today are less than 30 years old; they are tomorrow’s leaders. What can they know of Israel’s history, of the Jewish people’s struggles? What will shape their view of whether Israel may survive? The Internet.

Isn’t it time for Israel to go back to inventing, creating, and getting Nobel prizes? The power is in the Web. Harness it.

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Rene-Pierre Azria, is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute. He began his career in service of the French Treasury, and is a recipient of the French Legion of Honor for his services to philanthropy and international finance. Read full bio here.

MirYam Exclusive: Yoav Gallant's Delicate Balancing Act.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has been in a very difficult position for several months, faced with the need to navigate between Israel's domestic judicial reform crisis and the interlinked crisis of unprecedented cracks in the cohesion of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Time and again, Gallant finds himself at a crossroads. Israel's national security and the cohesiveness of its defense establishment are in jeopardy as a result of the toxic interaction between politics, military preparedness, and the conflict between the government and the judicial branch.

For the time being, the IDF is equipped with the capabilities necessary to successfully carry out its activities. On the other hand, the ongoing pattern (at the time of this writing) of reservists not turning up for their scheduled active service, especially in essential units within the air force and intelligence, might have disastrous consequences if left unchecked.

If this pattern persists and becomes more widespread, it may compromise Israel's capacity to react to broader security challenges. There is no specific estimate of when this may happen, but the military establishment is on high alert in an effort to assuage the worries of the reserves and make the political echelons aware of the seriousness of the issue.

The fact that the IDF is now facing its greatest difficulty in maintaining unity since its founding in 1948 highlights the urgency of the problem, and this issue is eating up Gallant’s time, preventing him and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and the General Staff from spending the time they’d like to pour over readiness for war scenarios and Iran.

In order to prevent a schism from developing among the ranks of the armed forces, Gallant has been trying to apply his influence in government to bring the domestic upheaval under control and free the military from its current political impasse. In Gallant's view, the way to achieve this is to achieve a broad consensus over judicial reform and to move on as a nation as quickly as possible to a set of priorities that will serve rather than wreck Israeli interests.

His messages to the public and the ruling coalition, of which he is a part, have reflected this.

"The citizens of Israel and the IDF need unity. Now is the time to put aside our differences and to find what we have in common and what unites us," Gallant urged on September 5.

"I call on my friends in the Knesset to reach consensus and to do so quickly—for the sake of our country and the security of the State of Israel," he added.

Five days later, on September 10, during an address to the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Gallant issued one of his most detailed calls for the political system and civil society to rearrange their national priorities, following a description of Israel’s severe plethora of security threats.

"In the face of all these stands the State of Israel. Our military, intelligence, economic, and technological power allow our existence," he stated. In a hostile environment saturated with challenges, Israel has been able to defend itself due to the high-quality commanders and soldiers that it has, advanced weapons, breakthrough technology, and a deep understanding of enemy goals and modus operandi.

And yet, he warned, protecting the State of Israel is conditioned on the Israeli people being able to act in union and close rank.

This ability has been challenged disturbingly by a growing fissure in Israeli society over the feud regarding the balance of power between state authorities, he said.

"The price may be heavy—too heavy in national security contexts —and so major changes are made by broad consensus," he stressed.

"As the head of the security system, I declare here: The continuation of the internal struggle among different currents within the State of Israel seeps into the IDF and other security organizations and exacts a price that the IDF and the security system cannot bear," said Gallant in one of his sternest warnings to date.

"I'm not dealing with the question of who started or who is right. I say: The continuation of the internal struggle endangers national resilience, the Israel Defense Forces, and our ability to ensure security for the State of Israel and protect its citizens."

"How far are we willing to deepen the rift? When do we decide that it is our duty to return to the priorities suitable for the State of Israel?" he asked.

During his speech, Gallant laid out what he said was the correct national priority list, and it began with forming a broad national consensus on the major issues of the day.

"This is a prerequisite for ensuring the national security and continued prosperity of the State of Israel," he stressed.

He then listed the other priorities as preserving Israel's ability to defend itself against its enemies, chiefly against the Iranian nuclear threat and the terror arms sent towards Israel from its borders, followed by normalization with Saudi Arabia and through it with most of the Arab and Muslim world — an objective Gallant said could be missed by Israel if the internal rift continues.

In addition, he said, Israel’s security and political power are based on its economic capability and continued economic growth, which are themselves predicated on innovation and technology.

"It's important to remember that the condition for continued foreign investment, manufacturing, and innovation is stability. Social division and ongoing disputes also harm the vital economic effort for our future and existence," he stated.

Finally, he listed law and order and stopping serious crime in Israel's cities in general and in the Arab sector in particular as the final priorities to defend the social fabric of the country and Israel’s ability to function.

"Given the great challenges ahead, especially the security threats, which might become existential threats, we have to clearly tell ourselves—we have a duty to get back to the main issues. Security, normalization with our neighbors, a thriving economy, and the rule of law and order — all of these precede any other national effort and are more important than it," said Gallant.

"This is the priority; this is the precedence, and everything else can wait for the appropriate time and manner."

In July, indicators of the fissure in the military began to appear as 1,142 reservists, including many from the Israeli Air Force, conveyed an alarming message. They announced their intention to withdraw their participation in active service if an amendment to the Basic Law: The Judiciary, annulling the Reasonability Standard, which limits the Supreme Court's ability to oversee decisions made by the government, was approved. The amendment passed and Gallant has been dealing with the fallout ever since.

In fact, Gallant has been in crisis mode over this issue since at least March. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to fire Gallant on March 26, 2018, due to his issuing a public warning over the threat posed by the judicial reform issue to unity in the ranks.

There was an outpouring of public outrage that enveloped the whole country in response to the decision, which Netanyahu later overturned.

Ultimately, the unique composition of the IDF, which is comprised of both conscripts and reserve forces, means that no military technology or equipment can substitute a basic level of cohesion for the military to function properly, and this is what Gallant has been seeking to rescue from the fire of Israel’s domestic crisis.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

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monthly brief: Three Key Strategic Events That Shaped Israel.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

The month of September brings with it three key anniversaries of pivotal strategic events that have indelibly shaped Israel and the region.

The Gaza Disengagement

On September 22, 2005, Israel completed its unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and North Samaria. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from Gaza, and Israel evacuated every civilian and community from the Strip, uprooting over 9,000 Israeli settlers from 25 settlements.

Proposed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, this maneuver aimed to bolster Israel’s security, initiate a separation from the Palestinians, and boost the country’s international stature.

Yet, just two years later, in 2007, Hamas ousted Fatah in Gaza, transforming the Strip into an Iranian-backed rocket launchpad.

Since then, Israel has grappled with four major armed conflicts with Gazan terror factions and several smaller rounds of hostilities, involving Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The skies over Israeli cities routinely blaze with rockets from Gazan terror factions.

Israel's pioneering Iron Dome air defense system, operational since 2011, has played a pivotal role in shielding its citizens and enabling the Israeli Air Force to lead campaigns against the terror groups by reducing pressure on Israeli governments to launch ground offensives. Meanwhile, Hamas’s ambitions extend beyond Gaza, as it eyes the West Bank with intent.

The Oslo Accords: Legacy of a Stalemate

Rewind to September 13, 1993. On the  White House lawn, President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and PLO chief Yasser Arafat inscribed their signatures on the Oslo Accords. Three decades later, hopes of a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace appear to be buried. Yet, the Accords still profoundly influence the matrix of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the West Bank.

Today, the Palestinian Authority (PA) governs Area A of the West Bank and, despite numerous challenges, persists in its security collaboration with Israel. Notably, no Israeli government has abolished the Oslo agreements or disbanded Palestinian autonomy in major West Bank cities. The accords may have reached an impasse long ago, but the underlying arrangements continue to serve the mutual interests of both parties.

Echoes from 1973

This month, the Israel State Archive unveiled its most extensive dossier on the 1973 Yom Kippur War, shedding fresh light on the catastrophic intelligence lapses preceding Egypt and Syria's coordinated assault on Israel. The scars of the war, marked by Israel's unpreparedness and consequent heavy casualties, remain etched deep into its national consciousness.

Yet, the saga of the IDF rebounding from initial setbacks, summoning reserves, and launching counteroffensives that neared Cairo and Damascus is an enduring testament to Israeli resilience.

Today, the threats encircling Israel have metamorphosed. The specter of enemy infantry and tank brigades storming its borders has receded. In their place, terror armies, equipped with rocket and missile arsenals, lurk. Iran-backed terror armies such as Hezbollah, armed with an estimated 200,000 warheads and embedded within civilian enclaves, epitomize this threat.

While discerning enemy motives remains intricate in 2023, Israel’s extensive, technologically advanced intelligence infrastructure renders it far less vulnerable to strategic surprises than on the eve of the 1973 war.

Drawing lessons from the Yom Kippur debacle, Israel has spearheaded an intelligence renaissance. Today's IDF is backed by a cutting-edge sensor grid stretching across land, sea, air, and space, and fueled by artificial intelligence that processes vast quantities of intelligence.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

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A battle for Israel’s future

By SHARON ROFFE OFIR

There are times in the life of a nation that we will forever remember as turning points. One of these was the 1973 Yom Kippur War; this September as we mark 50 years since that war, we will find ourselves facing a perhaps equally critical turning point. This battle will be waged not in the deserts of the Sinai Peninsula or on the volcanic terrain of the Golan Heights, but in the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice.

Just a month before she retires, Supreme Court President Esther Hayut will conduct the battle of her life, and the decision she presides over will shape the life of the entire nation.

The announcement of the government's narrowing of the Reasonableness Standard – which restricts the court’s ability to strike down laws on the grounds that they are unreasonable – was received by Hayut in Germany, where she was visiting along with a group of Supreme Court justices. They cut short the visit and returned to Israel.

The judges understood that as important as the visit to Germany may be, they could not remain abroad while Israel is on fire. Petitions to repeal the amendment that annulled the Reasonableness Standard – a law passed by a large majority in the Knesset – were quickly stacking up

A week later, the decision was made. Hayut announced that the petitions would be heard on September 12 – for the first time by an extended lineup of 15 judges. The Reasonableness Standard is not the only issue facing the Supreme Court – the court’s judges face a heavy workload. They will also address petitions filed against the government's failure to convene the Judicial Selection Committee, and appeals against an amendment to Basic Law: The Government that limits the ability of the Knesset to declare a prime minister “incapacitated”  and which the petitioners claim was designed to personally serve Prime Minister Netanyahu – the amendment prevents Netanyahu,  who is on criminal trial for three separate cases, from being declared incapacitated if he is found to have breached a conflict of interest agreement by engaging with the judicial reform program.

In other words, the difficult crisis facing the State of Israel is coming to the Supreme Court, and the decisions that will be made may decide the fate of Israeli democracy. It is difficult to bet on how the court will rule; Until now, the Supreme Court has never stricken off a Knesset Basic Law. However, previous Supreme Court rulings that dealt with the constitutional status of the Basic Laws (such as the Supreme Court discussion in the context of the Nation-State Law), and discussions on whether such laws are immune to judicial review, give some indications.

These suggest the decision will be made in line with the degree of constitutional legality that the judges will assign to the amendment that annulled the Reasonableness Standard. Other factors include the judges' views of the extent of the alleged misuse of the Knesset's authority and purpose and their assessment of the degree of harm caused by the amendment. The Supreme Court will also assess its authority to disqualify the amendment.

These major questions surface against the background of signals by coalition members, the prime minister and his ministers regarding the possibility that they will not respect the Supreme Court's ruling. Such calls make it clear to the panel of judges, liberals and conservatives alike, that their decision will be a turning point in the life of the State of Israel. The situation post-September will be very different from what came before. This forms a decisive test for the question of checks and balances, and the identity of the driver holding the steering wheel.

Hints of the worldview of Chief Justice Hayut can be found in the dramatic speech she made after Justice Minister Yariv Levine introduced his comprehensive judicial reform. Addressing the Reasonableness Standard, she stated, among other things: "If there is no room for a judge's value decision regarding the reasonableness of a government decision, the next step – according to the same logic – may be that the judge also has no professional advantage in determining what forms reasonable doubt for the acquittal of a criminal defendant.” In other words, if a judge cannot exercise judicial review of government, administrative and constitutional decisions, we can shut down the court entirely.

"From here, the road is short to the deletion of extensive chapters in the various Israeli legal sectors, all of which are subject to value standards that the judge must examine and decide upon," Hayut warned.

Those who support annulment of the Reasonableness Standard and denying the Supreme Court authority to review the laws laid down by the Knesset, and those who demand that Justice Hayut does not sit on the panel, are in fact expressing what opponents of the judicial overhaul fear – a state that will not allow substantive judicial review is a state on the threshold of dictatorship.

 Appointing judges on behalf of the delusional reform laws (225 laws in total – for those interested) will turn us into a fully-fledged dictatorship.

How will Israeli society emerge post-September? This is a question that should concern every one of us. Unlike September 1973, the battle to hold the line this time will be waged by the Supreme Court and the many citizens who come out week after week to protest for the future of the country.

Any government that wants to act on behalf of its citizens should not fear a Reasonableness Standard, and that which may seem reasonable today could develop into something deeply unreasonable tomorrow. When that happens, there might not be anyone around to stop it.

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Israel-Saudi normalization is Biden's diplomatic 'Hail Mary'

By Chuck Freilich

The Biden administration appears to be pursuing two separate but complementary tracks in the Middle East: continued efforts to reach a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear standoff with Iran and Saudi-Israeli normalization. Both tracks are designed to stabilize the region and potentially even lead to a strategic transformation. 

With the hopes for a new nuclear deal stymied by Iran, the administration is now attempting to reach “informal understandings.” Iran would halt uranium enrichment at the 60% level – dangerous, but not yet sufficient for a bomb – and refrain from attacking US targets in the Gulf. The United States, in exchange, would unfreeze $6 billion in Iranian assets, to be used for purchases of food and medical products; and allow Iraq $4 billion to pay for the electric power it buys from Iran.

The Saudi-Israel track is the one with the potential for far-reaching regional change. In reality, it is a multilateral package that would impose major demands on all sides but also provide major benefits. It is the diplomatic version of football’s “Hail Mary” play. 

What do the Saudis want in order to normalize ties with Israel?

The Saudis, in exchange for normalization, are demanding that Israel make significant, although as yet unspecified, concessions on the Palestinian issue. 

Saudi demands of the US are more specific: a defense treaty; access to essentially unlimited American weapons; and US approval of a civilian Saudi nuclear program. 

Given King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s hard-line positions on the Palestinian issue, the Saudis may be considering only partial normalization at this point, pending Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s ascent to the throne. If true, this would undoubtedly limit American and Israeli willingness to accede to the Saudis’ far-reaching demands. 

Israel’s concessions to the Palestinians would be significant and encompass the avoidance of measures that would jeopardize a two-state solution. Israel would have to indefinitely postpone West Bank annexation, as well as the establishment of new settlements and the legalization of illegal outposts. It would also transfer some of the territory from Area C in the West Bank now under Israeli control to the Palestinians. 

The Biden administration would seek Israel’s acceptance of the Saudi demands, especially on the nuclear issue, and even Israel and AIPAC’s active lobbying in Congress, as a means of gaining approval for what will be a difficult sell.

The Palestinians were expected, at least in the initial American thinking, to once again remain on the sidelines, as they did during the negotiations leading to the Abraham Accords. In exchange for refraining from active interference – their usual modus operandi – the Palestinians were to gain extensive Saudi aid and benefit from the Israeli concessions. To the administration’s surprise, however, the Palestinians may be adopting a different approach this time, seeking to be involved in the process. 

The US wishes to put the Iranian nuclear issue to bed, at least until after the 2024 elections, and thereby minimize the dangers that a crisis with Iran would deflect international attention from the war in Ukraine and global competition with China. In addition to full normalization with Israel, the US will likely seek a Saudi commitment to end to the war in Yemen, provide the Palestinians with truly generous aid, and impose significant constraints on the kingdom’s rapidly expanding ties with Beijing. 

President Joe Biden is a true friend of Israel – the only president to define himself as a Zionist and to take his children to visit the concentration camps. 

Critical American strategic interests notwithstanding, the primary impetus for the recent momentum appears to be Biden’s growing concern that Israel is incapable of extracting itself from two imminent inflection points. These are the demise of the two-state solution with the consequent ramifications for its Jewish and democratic character and the judicial overhaul process, begun by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ultra-right-wing government which threatens Israel’s democratic character. 

The practicability of the above package has justifiably met with considerable skepticism. All sides would have to make major concessions and even a watered-down version would likely lead to the collapse of Israel’s coalition and either to the formation of a new and more moderate one or to early elections that would constitute a de facto referendum on the package.

Either outcome would be welcome for an administration that seeks to confront the sides, especially Israel, with the need to make historic decisions. It is unclear, however, how a breakthrough would help Netanyahu achieve his one overriding objective – of forcing an end to the corruption trial that may land him in jail – or whether he has any residual ability to place the needs of the state above his own.

The US, for its part, has not signed a defense treaty with any country since Japan in 1960. To do so with Saudi Arabia, a country that is reviled today by much of the Democratic Party, is a very tall order. 

The administration must also take into account that acceding to the Saudi demand will likely lead to demands for similar treaties by Israel and a number of Arab allies, as well as other states around the world. On the upside, a series of bilateral treaties with countries in the Middle East could constitute the basis for the regional security architecture that the US has long sought to establish. 

A second critical decision is whether to acquiesce to the demand that Saudi Arabia be allowed a domestic uranium enrichment capability – a critical component of a potential military program in the future. Acquiescing would raise the awkward question of why Iran should be barred from such an enrichment capability if Saudi Arabia is not, and set a dangerous precedent for future proliferators. 

Conceivably, a compromise might be found whereby US willingness to grant the Saudis a defense treaty would be contingent on their willingness to forgo enrichment. Should a trade-off such as this prove elusive and the overall package ultimately depends on it, a sufficiently intrusive inspections regime would provide a reasonable compromise that Israel, too, could live with. 

Thirdly, US willingness to grant the Saudis access to the most advanced American weapons – such as F-35 aircraft – would make it very difficult to live up to the congressionally-mandated commitment to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). However, based on past experience, a solution could probably be found by selling the Saudis weapons that are one generation behind those provided to Israel, missing some specific capability, or whose geographic deployment in Saudi Arabia is limited.  

Faced with a reinvigorated American-led military alignment, Iran would be the big loser in this scenario. While it is most likely to respond to this strategic setback by exercising greater restraint, a manufactured crisis designed to reset the table by increasing enrichment to the 90% level, cannot be ruled out. 

Normalization with Saudi Arabia would constitute a historic transformation in Israel’s strategic circumstances, essentially ending the conflict with the Arab states and at least somewhat containing the remaining belligerents – Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. It would also open up much of the Muslim world to Israel, possibly enabling normalization with Indonesia, Malaysia, and even Pakistan. 

An opening with the Palestinians, even if limited, is better than the current stasis, which is leading inexorably to a one-state binational solution. Anything that forces an end to the judicial overhaul (read “wrecking ball”), is more than welcome. The “informal understandings” with Iran on enrichment are far from ideal, but the best of the bad alternatives, and assuming an effective inspection regime can be found for Saudi enrichment, the benefits for Israel could not be clearer.

At this point, all of the above is still very tentative and it is unclear whether Biden is willing to put his full weight and authority behind it. However, senior American officials who recently met with their Saudi counterparts apparently came away sufficiently encouraged to proceed to the next step, an upcoming meeting with Netanyahu’s Strategic Affairs Minister and close confidant, Ron Dermer. 

It is still decidedly a long shot, but as David Ben-Gurion famously stated, “Anyone in Israel who doesn’t believe in miracles is not a realist.” 

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

monthly brief: Constitutional Crisis Brewing? Israel Saudi Normalization & Israel-German Defense.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

Israel's key institutions are finding themselves having to answer the question of how they would act in the event of a constitutional crisis.

Such a crisis could arise in a scenario in which the Israeli government refuses to adhere to a potential Supreme Court ruling striking down the government's amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary that narrows the 'Reasonableness Standard ' and thus takes away the court's ability to cancel government decisions or legislation on the grounds of their lack of reasonability. 

The head of Israel's national trade union, the Histadrut Labor Federation, Arnon Bar David, warned on August 16 that if the government precipitated such a crisis, his organization would act to shut down the Israeli economy with mass strikes. 

"A refusal to adhere to Supreme Court decisions would be a violation of the status quo. We will not allow it to happen," he warned. 

It is believed that the IDF, the Israel Police, the intelligence community, the diplomatic corps, and the civil service would side with the court in such a scenario. However, on Thursday, August 17, the candidate favored by National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir to become the next Israel Police Commissioner, Cmdr. Yoram Sofer, refused to answer a media question on the issue, calling the question "irrelevant."

Government ministers and Members of Knesset have recently refused to answer questions on how they would act in the event of a Supreme Court ruling to strike down the reasonableness standard. 

Saudi Arabia covers its 'Palestinian bases' ahead of possible normalization with Israel

On August 14, Saudi Arabia announced that it had appointed its ambassador to Jordan, Nayef bin Bandar Al-Sudairi, as “non-resident ambassador to the State of Palestine and Consul General in Jerusalem.”

The Saudi move seeks to protect the Kingdom’s legitimacy both domestically and in the Arab world. It sends a message that it has not forgotten about the Palestinian issue as it moves forward with a process aimed at normalizing ties with Israel and gaining security guarantees, advanced weapons, and a civil nuclear program from the United States. 

The Saudi appointment can be seen as a signal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, telling him that any normalization agreement will require significant concessions from Israel regarding the Palestinians, such as a commitment not to annex Area C of the West Bank, a halt to the construction of settlements deep within Area C, and possibly transferring parts of Area C to Palestinian Authority, as well as other steps designed to stabilize the PA's rule. 

It is unclear what kind of impact such steps would have on the stability of Israel's ruling coalition, which includes nationalist-religious elements ideologically opposed to the division of the Land of Israel. 

The Palestinian Authority welcomed the Saudi appointment, saying that the “timing of the decision reflects the interest of the brotherly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Palestinian cause,” the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates said in a statement Sunday.

Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen told Tel Aviv’s 103 FM radio station Sunday that Israel was aware of Saudi Arabia’s planned appointment, but that the kingdom did not coordinate with Israel on the matter.

US authorizes sale of Israel’s Arrow 3 air defense system to Germany

The Israeli Ministry of Defense, German Federal Ministry of Defense, and Israel Aerospace Industries confirmed on August 17 that they will sign a record-breaking $3.5 billion defense agreement – Israel’s largest-ever defense deal – for the supply of the Arrow 3 Israeli air-defense system to Germany.

The system will achieve initial operational capacity by 2025 and full capacity by 2030.

Germany’s investment in the Arrow 3 system, which intercepts ballistic missiles in space at exceptionally long ranges and high altitudes, comes against the backdrop of the threat posed by Russia and its missile arsenal.

IAI CEO Boaz Levy, whose mother was a Holocaust survivor, noted the powerful historical significance of the Jewish state providing a defense system for the German people 78 years after the Second World War.

Arrow 3 is the leading missile defense system of its kind for the interception of exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles, according to the Israeli Defense Ministry.

After receiving approval from the U.S. government, senior officials from the Israeli and German Ministries of Defense will partake in a ceremony to sign a Letter of Commitment (LOC), that marks the commencement of the agreement. The allocated commitment of $600 million will facilitate the immediate initiation of work on the project, said the Ministry.

As part of the deal, IAI and the Israeli Air Force will provide training to the German Air Force.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

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MirYam In The Media: Israel ‘one of the world’s top cyber powers’

Yaakov Lappin IN CONVERSATION WITH: PROF. CHUCK FREILICH

Israel’s position as a cyber superpower places it in an exclusive club of world powers, despite having a population a little larger than New York City, according to former Israeli defense official Chuck Freilich.

Freilich, a senior research fellow at the MirYam Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies and a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, recently published a book on the subject, titled, “Israel and Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became a Global Cyber Power.”

A former senior fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School who teaches at Columbia and at Tel Aviv University, Freilich said Israel’s cyber capabilities are prominent at both the civilian and military levels. The number of cyber start-ups in Israel equals the total number of cyber start-ups in the world, excluding the United States, he noted.

“This is a stunning statistic. It’s the result of a really unique contribution to the Israeli hi-tech scene in general, and the cyber realm especially, by the defense establishment and intelligence agencies,” said Freilich.

Graduates of the Israel Defense Forces cyber units, mainly Unit 8200 and Unit 81, as well as intelligence agencies, enter the private sector and become a primary source of commercial start-ups, he explained.

This in turn acts as a driving force behind cyber innovation. The fact that the Israeli defense establishment funds incubators and technological innovation programs also contributes to this prosperity of the local cyber scene, according to Freilich.

The military units “find and train Israel’s cyber personnel, and most importantly, the really top-level personnel. In the cyber world, a few geniuses make all the difference,” he added.

Between 2011 and 2020, some 100 veterans of Unit 81, who served in the years between 2003 and 2010, went on to found 50 start-ups, with an accumulated evaluation of over $10 billion, Freilich noted. “That’s 100 veterans alone,” he said.

“Another mind blowing statistic is that the NSA [the U.S. National Security Agency] has about 40,000 personnel, while Unit 8200 [its Israeli equivalent] reportedly has a quarter of that, 10,000 people. Most of what Unit 8200 does is cyber based. Here you have little Israel on the scale of a global superpower. Each year, between a few hundred and a thousand cyber personnel are discharged in Israel. China’s 2022 graduating cyber school count was 1,300. So we have a cyber force on the scale of global superpowers,” he stated.

Pointing to compulsory military service as the core secret sauce behind this success, Freilich argues that this enables the IDF to track down the best and the brightest, with the military scouting high school databases and beginning to locate suitable youths by the 10th grade.

“One percent of the best high school graduates go to Atuda [a program that enables them to study and delay military service] and Talpiyot [a program that sends students to complete BAs in mathematics and natural sciences as part of their service]. Talpiyot looks at the top 2%, and then begins an intensive testing process. Only 10% of that 2% pass and are then further winnowed down through a grueling aptitude testing process,” said Freilich, describing the rigorous screening process.

With regard to Unit 81, while 10,000 candidates passed initial annual screening, only a few hundred went on to be selected.

“All told, the IDF trains 10,000 people a year in cyber programs. This is a huge training program, not only giving people computer skills, but also reaching the real geniuses,” he said.

Freilich added that a third of graduates of a Unit 8200 high school program that teaches university-level cyber come from peripheral areas.

He also drew attention to Israel’s national style, which he described in his book as “hutzpah gone viral.”

“Israeli society has a never-ending propensity to challenge authority and reject accepted norms, refusing to take no for an answer, and thirsting for new ways of achieving things,” said Freilich.

“Our strategic circumstances means we have a greater willingness to take risks, and we are non-hierarchical and informal,” he added. “That’s the same culture you find in R&D firms around the world. So cyber fits Israel like a glove.”

On Aug. 8, the Mayanei HaYeshua Medical Center in Bnei Brak announced that it had been struck by a cyber-attack, forcing personnel to switch to pen and paper before recovering computer networks.

Despite Israel’s cyber achievements, problems still exist in protecting the civil sector, Freilich admitted.

“There is reason to be concerned about that and critical national infrastructure, like water and communications—the type of sites that the Israel National Cyber Directorate defends the most. They get specially tailored defense packages, but there is still reason for concern,” said Freilich.

Iran, for its part, woke up to the cyber realm after sustaining the devastating 2009 Stuxnet attack, which international media reports attributed to Israel and the United States.

“Be wary of the law of unintended consequences,” said Freilich. “Until 2010, Iran wasn’t doing much in this area. By 2012, it was launching offensive attacks around the world.”

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

A U.S.-Saudi deal could bring down Israel’s government

By eitan dangot

A possible agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia that would involve Saudi- Israeli normalization, is above all a maneuver that is designed to strengthen Washington’s global strategic policy. Israel plays a minor consideration in this potential arrangement, but its results could nevertheless challenge the current Israeli government to the point of bringing about its dissolution.

The U.S.’s primary considerations are the Chinese and Russian challenges to its already degraded status in the Middle East. In this context and on the eve of an American election year, the Biden administration understands that it needs a regional agreement with the Saudis to stabilize the Middle East and give Biden a boost ahead of his bid to retain the presidency.

Moreover, Washington, as it observes the Chinese infiltration of its alliance with Saudi Arabia, does not want to be drawn into instability in the region.

Under the proposed agreement, Saudi Arabia will be formally recognized as a new and primary member of the Abraham Accords bloc, which is designed to create a check against Iran. An agreement would also create a status quo against Russian penetration, which often goes hand in hand with Chinese infiltration. As far as the U.S. is concerned, this is the ultimate goal of the agreement, and hence Israel itself is not the most important element. But as part of a deal, normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia can also boost American policy in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Israel is in the second circle of Washington’s considerations.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is looking on with obvious displeasure at the deterioration of relations between the Israeli leadership and Washington that is taking place against the background of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions, as head of the ‘all right-wing’ government.

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement is designed to boost its regional and global status. This follows a Saudi policy of continued dependence on the United States, while at the same time opening channels in the opposite direction, reflecting the lack of Saudi confidence in the U.S.

Riyadh wants a deal to affirm its place as a prestigious and valuable U.S. ally, in a reversal of the current American attitude to it. The Saudis also want a deal to include a U.S. commitment to a strategic defense alliance, similar to the U.S. commitment to NATO.

As Saudi Arabia looks a decade or two ahead at a changing world, against the backdrop of Iran's provocations, it also sees in the deal an opportunity to gain early nuclear technological know-how. And this signifies a challenge for the future Middle East.

Saudi Arabia would also receive advanced military technology platforms and capabilities that put it in the first class of powers, and through sales of F-35 and air defense systems, give it capabilities against the Iranian axis. This will also give the Saudis confidence in facing the Houthis in Yemen.

Israel will have to deal with the risk of losing regional aerial superiority due to Saudi Arabia acquiring F-35s, and Riyadh’s planned nuclear program, will also see a major erosion of Israel’s qualitative military qualitative edge.

Perhaps, as a compromise solution, the U.S. will agree to the first civilian nuclear steps over a longer timeline, with other steps put on hold. We cannot ignore the risk of an unconventional arms race developing, with additional countries following the Saudis, like Egypt and Turkey. And this dilemma is something the US and Israel will have to seriously discuss.

Yet for Riyadh, all of this will give the Kingdom the security to continue with its economic plans to become a global superpower with the confidence to navigate threats.

Israel, therefore, does not form the premise of the three-way Saudi – American – Israeli deal. It is more like a distinguished passenger who is invited to the business train car and is able to take advantage of what is on offer.

Israel’s involvement will make it easier for Biden to get the deal approved in Congress, where both Democrats and Republicans have raised objections to Saudi Arabia over human rights and extremism, issues that have prevented better U.S. ties with Riyadh.

Regionally speaking, Saudi-Israeli normalization will create a high wall and underground barrier to fortify the Abraham Accords in the coming years, creating a new bloc in the Middle East in the face of the Iranian threat.

Implications for Israeli politics

Neither Saudi Arabia nor the U.S. are happy about the political situation in Israel or about the risk of policies that could lead to a multi-arena escalation event. The common interest of the US and Saudi Arabia is regional quiet.

Saudi Arabia will demand significant changes from Israel. As the leading Muslim state, it will not be able to afford to give up the Palestinian issue. Normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia will not be served without Israeli concessions, including an Israeli commitment to a concept that falls within the space of the two-state idea.

In practice, Israel will be required to take steps such as the cessation of annexation of territories for several years in the West Bank, to make land available to the Palestinian Authority in Area C and to promote Palestinian economic projects. Saudi Arabia may demand a renewed and approved mechanism to keep the Al Aqsa Mosque quiet as well.

Israel will be required to transfer funds to the Palestinian Authority. It may also be time for Israel to request Saudi financial involvement in the development of infrastructure in the West Bank.

The Saudis can also provide jobs outside of the West Bank to Palestinian tech personnel and academics, some of whom were employed in the Gulf in the past but have returned to unemployment in the West Bank.

Therefore, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have to take critical decisions ahead of his meeting with President Biden in September. Does he want to return to being a legitimate leader on the international stage? If he accepts the terms of normalization, this could speed up the departure of the Ben Gvir-Smotrich alliance from his coalition and the demise of the full right-wing government, leading to the formation of a new government that could deal with these issues in a matter-of-fact manner.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

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Hamas and Israel’s domestic crisis

By grisha yakubovich

When it comes to the domestic political crisis raging within Israel's borders, Hamas is currently on the fence about how to react. Hamas’s leadership in Gaza has not been taken in by the Iranian-Shi’ite axises confident pronouncements that Israel is weak and that its end is nigh. Unlike Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (which are completely dependent on Iran both ideologically and economically), Hamas is aware that democracy is one of Israel's primary strengths.

We know that Hamas recognizes this strength because, in over 30 weeks of mass political demonstrations held in Israel, Hamas has not launched a single terror attack targeting these rallies. That appears to be a deliberate choice. It is based on the calculation that assaulting the protesters will backfire, and that this would be a foolish move for Hamas. This conclusion was likely reached after Hamas completed a strategic and operational examination of its options. The review concluded with a decision, for now at least, to stay on the sidelines and “let the Jews tear themselves apart.”

 At the same time, Hamas takes advantage of the Israeli divide to advance its goal of making its narrative the dominant narrative in the Palestinian arena. Confident that the actions of the Israeli Right, which are creating increased friction with the Palestinians, will assist its efforts to position itself as the leading faction in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), Hamas has doubled down on its efforts to carry out and support terrorism in the territories. The August 4 incident in Burqa, in the West Bank, in which a Palestinian man was shot dead by an Israeli settler during clashes, is just the kind of incident that Hamas is banking on to boost its status.

As the lead Palestinian organization behind terrorist attacks, Hamas can present its rival, the Palestinian Authority/Fatah, as a collaborator of Israel, and depict the PA’s security operations in Jenin, following the IDF’s operation there, as part of that collaboration.

Hamas very much hopes that far-right Israeli figures, such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, will continue to stir up trouble in the West Bank.

Meanwhile, Hamas is also pressing Israel, Egypt, and others to increase the quantity of money entering Gaza, as a form of extortion racket, and this pressure likely led to Israel’s agreement to increase Qatari funding of Gaza’s power station by an additional three million dollars a month.

Hamas-backed launches of primitive rockets in Jenin, meanwhile, are another signal to Israel that the multi-arena threat that Hamas is building – the ability to fire rockets at Israel from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria – is now being joined by the West Bank.

Hamas has a firm understanding of the Israeli psyche, with its top leaders, like Yahya Sinwar, having spent many years in Israeli prisons. That’s why in early August, Hamas released an image of the firearm it seized from IDF soldier Hadar Goldin, who was killed in action and whose body is held by the organization as a bargaining chip for a future prisoner swap.

Hamas sees that Israel is refraining from a forceful response against Hezbollah’s stepped-up provocations from Lebanon and is responding with a campaign of threats of its own.

Looking ahead, all of this places Hamas in a better position ahead of the departure of PA President Mahmoud Abbas from the scene. While Hamas is aware that Israel would not permit it to establish a regime in the West Bank as it has in Gaza, it is planning a different kind of maneuver, based on replicating the democratic claim to legitimacy that it sees in Israel.

Hamas will claim, not without justification, that most West Bank Palestinian voters want it in power. It is therefore likely to hold mass rallies and attempted takeovers of PA power centers, based on the democratic claim.

It is still unclear whether Hamas plans to plant one of its people as future president of the PA, or as a future secretary-general of the PLO, but what is highly likely is that it will choose a legal–democratic channel to try and seize power. Hamas may also try to re-establish a majority in the Palestinian parliament, much like Hezbollah has done in Lebanon. This is Hamas’s next significant objective – and it is searching for ways to exploit Israel’s moment of crisis to help advance it.

Should it succeed, the Oslo Accords would likely be scrapped, and Israel would probably go back to a military-combat posture regarding the West Bank.

As such, when Hamas views the mass protests in Israel and claims by both sides within the Israeli divide of representing a democratic majority, it sees the blueprints for its takeover plan of the West Bank. This scenario, if it plays out, places Israel in a more precarious position than an attempted Hamas armed coup would in the West Bank. It reduces Israel’s room for political maneuvering.

Ultimately, Israel’s working assumption when preparing for Hamas’s next steps should be that Hamas’s leadership knows Israelis better than we know ourselves.

When Hamas looks around the region and views the rise in power of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis and the perceived weakening of the U.S. alliance system, it draws encouragement. When it sees Israel fighting itself, it draws even greater encouragement, and this will guide Hamas as it enters the post-Abbas succession battle. 

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Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

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Israel's Defense Must Not Be Held Hostage

By jeremiah rozman

Over the past few months, hundreds of thousands of Israelis have turned out to protest judicial reform. The discourse on this issue is fraught with doomsday hyperbole. As a result, there is the potential for serious economic damage and a rift with the United States.

However, this pales in comparison to the danger represented by a movement—championed by some prominent leaders and politicians—that calls on reservists to refuse their obligation to serve: In essence, a call for mutiny.

This is not within the realm of legal protest. It cynically seeks to hold Israel’s security hostage if unelected elements do not get their way, and does so in the name of defending democracy.

Contrary to hyperbole about judicial reform being the “end of democracy,” it would, in fact, make Israel’s Supreme Court more accountable to the Knesset, Israel’s elected branch of government. Clearly, this is not the end of democracy.

The dispute over reforms is a policy dispute. In fact, it is a rather mundane one, considering that, absurdly, it remains possible for Israel’s judiciary to rule against the reforms.

Gullible people might believe that judicial reform poses an existential threat to Israel’s democracy. The cynical people driving the movement know this is false. They claim it is such a threat because only extreme danger can justify extreme actions such as soliciting mutiny.

This attempt to coerce political change by threatening to degrade Israel’s security is akin to a toxic partner threatening self-harm if they do not get their way. Supporters of the refusal movement explicitly say so.

For example, a member of the Brothers in Arms organization stated outright, “If the overhaul bills are passed, we and tens of thousands more who are with us will stop volunteering for reserve duty. … The army is disintegrating before your eyes.” Addressing Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, he stated, “We expect you to stand up and say that you will not vote for the laws.”

In a democracy, policy differences are addressed through voting. There is nothing wrong with opposing judicial reform. Peaceful protest is protected. But mutiny is criminal.

As IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi said, “Hezbollah and Hamas have one goal, and that is to destroy Israel; they do not care what kind of judiciary it has.”

Some 10,000 IDF reservists, including 1,000 Air Force reservists, have stated their refusal to serve in protest of judicial reform. Israel has a small active military. Mandatory reserves allow Israel to field a military capable of deterring and, if need be, defeating regional threats despite its small population.

Many reservists fill critical roles, especially pilots and elite soldiers like the Yahalom unit’s combat engineers. 160 such reservists recently refused to serve. These soldiers are expensive to train, meet difficult standards and conduct critical missions.

The refusal movement also threatens the active service. Defense analyst Amos Harel noted, “In brigades, they’re talking about ‘our’ units and ‘their’ units as solidarity erodes during the judicial overhaul.”

Ministers Miki Zohar and Itamar Ben Gvir stressed this point, sharing a staged video showing ground forces asking for aerial support and pilots asking them their position on judicial reform. A dying soldier then says, “My brothers, from right and left, don’t put politics in the army.” This political theater makes a valid point.

Israel won its independence because numerous identity groups worked together. There was a religious-secular divide, a socialist-capitalist divide, a Sephardi-Ashkenazi divide, a Western European-Eastern European divide and so on. But all these factions shared the goal of a secure Jewish homeland.

They almost failed to achieve it. When independence was declared, Israel had to decide whether to permit the existence of a separate military structure loyal to a separate political faction. But despite a bitter rivalry, the Etzel and the Haganah collaborated during the 1948 War of Independence.

Towards the end of the war, however, Diaspora supporters sent the Etzel a shipment of critical arms on a ship called the Altalena. The Haganah was ordered to fire on the ship if it refused to hand over those arms to the new Israel Defense Forces. It did so.

As difficult as this decision was, it is unlikely that Israel would have survived without a unified military that obeyed the lawful orders of the democratically elected government.

Imagine the precedent set by legitimizing refusal to serve on political grounds. Will soldiers serve only under governments they support?

The optimal solution to this crisis is top-down and bottom-up persuasion through an appeal to common sense and unity. 80,000 reservists have signed a petition against refusal and elite units have condemned refusal as well.

Those inclined to refuse must listen to those on their side of the political divide. Protest leaders and politicians should stress the need to protest through means that do not harm security or democracy. National Unity Party head and former IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz has done so, despite opposing Netanyahu and judicial reform.

Finally, only persuasion can retain the high-quality volunteers who serve in the reserves. A suboptimal solution is punishment, including dismissal, fines and the requirement to pay back benefits.

When soldiers refused to serve during the disengagement from Gaza, they faced military justice. Although punishment should be the last resort, it is preferable to capitulation, which legitimizes mutiny as a way to coerce policy changes. It is also better than ignoring the problem, which degrades readiness and divides the military.

In the lead-up to the destruction of the Second Temple, zealots failed to convince the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem to attack the Romans instead of waiting out the siege. They burned Jerusalem’s food and supplies stores to render that option impossible.

The resulting calamity is a warning against drastic unilateral action that harms Israel’s security. It is fine to have policy preferences and to use legal means to promote them. But Israel was established to defend the Jewish people. This defense must not be held hostage.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

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It’s time to put out Israel’s political fires

By DANIELLE ROTH-AVNERI

At a conservative estimate, around two-and-a-half months should suffice to douse the political flames engulfing Israel, which have left not a single person in Israeli society unaffected, be they on the Right or Left.    

What we have witnessed over the past few months is a quiet civil war, one that is being fought not with arrows or physical blows, but rather on social media networks and within groups of friends and families.

Meanwhile, the Knesset has just begun a two-and-a-half-month-long recess, during which time, anything can happen in Israel’s political reality. August is a time for families to go on vacation, with kids off school. In September, the High Holy Days continue the vacation mode, with an added spiritual, national, and cognitive effect created by the powerful holiday of Yom Kippur.

The Knesset will reconvene in mid-October, and by then we will know whether the recess allowed enough time for heads to cool in the aftermath of the passing of the coalition's amendment to the Basic Law: The Judiciary, also known as the reasonableness standard bill, restricting the power of the Supreme Court to use the reasonableness doctrine to review government decisions.  

Currently, the country is still at boiling point, and the gulf that separates the two sides is vast. One side believes that a very minor law was passed and that it had to be passed to demonstrate to conservative voters that the Right has not capitulated on issues pertaining to judicial reform and that the Left does not run the government.

On the other hand, for this law to pass, there needed to be a complete consensus among all members of the government because of the opposition to it within the military. The uprising within the ranks, which included threats by reservist pilots and elite reserve combat unit members not to show up for service, ended up being the driving force behind the passage of this law.

This is something the government could not have given in to: The refusal card puts the safety of the State of Israel in jeopardy. When it comes to military no-shows, the government correctly felt that if it gave in, the no-show card would be pulled out of the deck in other scenarios in the future.

Two camps have formed within the coalition. One faction within the Likud and other coalition parties believes the legislative process should be carried out in its entirety right now. This group is led by Justice Minister Yariv Levin and his confidants. After getting the law passed, some members of this hawkish and ultra-rightist group took a selfie in the Knesset that was highly insensitive; there was no need for them to rub salt in the opposition’s wound. After winning, they ought to have shown some modesty.

A second group within the Likud believes that now is the time to calm the situation before making any further moves. This group believes that it is necessary to arrive at a broad consensus on the future of judicial reform, most critically on the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee. Deciding the future of this committee, which appoints justices to the Supreme Court, is the next major milestone of the judicial reform drama. It is already clear that at this stage in the proceedings whatever happens on this count, the proposal will fall short of the coalition’s original plans.

Meanwhile, the demonstrations on Israeli streets warning of dictatorship spread all manner of libel against Israel. The claims of a dictatorship are simply baseless. Former senior politicians promoted this narrative within the protest movement, but anyone familiar with politics, strategy, and political campaigns is aware that the objective of the protest movement is to remove Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from office.

The protest campaigns began a long time before judicial reform did. Notably, politicians from the opposition are being completely excluded from the movement. This means that the movement itself is a political development in the making, which could result in the formation of a new party.

All in all, the heads of the protest movement are exploiting circumstances to promote their agenda, and many of them have fallen in love with protests for protest’s sake.

Despite their rhetoric, Israel will not transition into a dictatorship. The amendment to the reasonableness standard does not spell the end of democracy.

The State of Israel is not a perfect country, and many things need to be fixed. It is not sustainable to have a situation in which the government will conclude that it is powerless to make changes. On the other hand, with all due respect to Justice Minister Levin, the government needs to realize that there are more pressing things for it to deal with right now.  

We have an education system that is slowly disintegrating, a health system that requires an emergency transfusion, and security challenges on all fronts.

It is time to end the control over the political situation by extreme elements on the Right as well as the Left. This means moderating future government steps and ending anarchy on the streets, where, during a protest, a mother was attacked in her vehicle while children were inside, or where a driver drove into protesters.

How did we stoop to this new low? Many of Israel’s adversaries are clasping their hands with excitement at these scenes.

Regardless, in the end, it is Netanyahu who will decide what the next move is. He is watching the polls carefully and sees that his situation has deteriorated very significantly since the judicial reform began. Given the damage done so far, it is fair to assume that his motivation to continue with judicial reform is extremely low.  

Netanyahu will continue his wait-and-see approach before deciding what to do vis-à-vis the Judicial Selection Committee. He will wait to see what new developments surface before taking his next step.

In late July, Netanyahu was taken to hospital by ambulance. He claimed to be suffering from dehydration. When the most qualified cardiologists in the State of Israel were rushed to his side, everybody understood that there had been some kind of cardiac event, and he later received a pacemaker. The flames burning in Israel affect the entire country, including the heart of the prime minister.

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

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The fight for Israel’s democracy

By SHARON ROFFE OFIR

Last Saturday night, during the weekly protest against the government's judicial reform program, I met Yaron Ram. He was standing with a sign that showed a photograph of his brother, along with the text: "The late Sgt. Maj Elad Ram, may his memory be a blessing, the Second Lebanon War. Was it in vain?”

I approached Yaron and told him that I knew of his brother's story from my time working as a journalist. Elad fell at noon on the last day of combat. He was posthumously awarded with a citation of excellence from IDF Northern Command's Commanding Officer for his heroic conduct under fire.

“What frightens you?” I asked Yaron. "Everyone is sad lately, but as a bereaved brother, I am twice as sad. Elad was my younger brother, and he fought for a Jewish and democratic state. I pray that his death was not in vain.”

Yaron is not alone. The values upon which we have raised and educated our children to serve in the IDF are contradictory to the desire of every parent to protect their child. We have done so to protect the state.

The best of our sons and daughters has for years agreed to put themselves at risk and sacrifice their lives for the present and future of this country. They did so for this country and they were the silver platter on which we were given the Jewish homeland. Yet in the chaotic reality that has emerged, many are concluding -- for the first time in Israel's history -- that they can no longer serve the ‘king.’

The government rejected all compromise efforts ahead of the vote on its amendment to the Basic Law: Judiciary to narrow the reasonableness standard. The amendment (which passed July 24) can only change the rules of the political system.

This will certainly not, as MK Simcha Rotman argued, bring back the principle of separation of powers and boost democracy in the State of Israel. Nor can the amendment be described as "non-dramatic" as coalition officials claimed just before the vote.

To grasp the significance of the step, we need to go back ten months to the days when, for most of us at least, legal terms were not part and parcel of our daily lives.

Last October, as Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu fought to regain the premiership and made promises that were mainly about dealing with the cost-of-living crisis, no mention was made of a judicial override clause that would give the government the ability to restore laws that the Supreme Court had struck off, and neither was any mention made of narrowing the scope of the reasonableness standard or making changes to the judicial appointments committee, etc. These issues were simply not part of his election campaign.

We first learned about the legal coup from Justice Minister Yariv Levin's now-infamous press conference. The reaction arrived fast enough, and from there, the road was short to long weeks of protest that Netanyahu did not foresee.

Some may ask what is so dramatic about eliminating the reasonableness basis for the Supreme Court’s dismissal of government decisions. In layman's terms, I would answer that without the reasonableness standard there will be no checks and balances on government decisions, or those of the prime minister, and no one will prevent corrupt appointments.

You might say that this is fine and that the Supreme Court should not be the one to determine this or conduct policy since we are after all in a democracy, and no one elected the Supreme Court judges.

This narrative leads to the view that the elected government has a mandate to lead its policies without judicial oversight.

When it comes to policy, there is some justification to the claim that the government has a right to exercise its judgment -- which is precisely why the court has scarcely ever canceled policy decisions, except when they are extremely unreasonable, such as the failure to fortify classrooms in rocket-stricken Sderot.

But what will citizens say when the government seeks to return a convicted criminal to power -- for example, Aryeh Deri, violate the freedom of the press, subordinate the Police Investigations Department to a minister, or appoint an attorney general who has no background suitable for the position?

What will the people say when the government decides that the date of the Knesset elections is unsuitable, as happened when the elections for the chief rabbis were postponed?

Will that be reasonable? In other words, who will preserve democracy?

In states that have checks and balances, there is usually a constitution and a constitutional court. Some Western states have two houses of parliament. Israeli democracy is built on the principle of separation of powers, but the legal revolution led an entire public to wake up and realize its fragility.

In practice, there is no real separation of powers in Israel; the government controls the Knesset, and only the judiciary can check the government.

Israel is a model of semi-democracy that has led to inherent chaos over the years. Eliminating the reasonableness standard blocks the judiciary, and leaves a single power: This is known as dictatorship.

As we prepare to commemorate the destruction of the Second Temple some 2,000 years ago, history has its ways of making us open our eyes. When in the background, members of the government are engaged in making painful remarks, condemning pilots and IDF combat soldiers who decline to show up for reserve service, or when the Minister for Information Galit Distel Atbaryan writes that "a thousand pilots won't be able to extinguish me," we should cast our gaze at the moving images of the masses of Israel who in extreme heat have marched to Jerusalem. Those behind the so-called reform should internalize that just as we are ready to fight for our country, so too will we fight for our democracy.

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Israel must restore its deterrence against Hezbollah

By Shmuel Tzuker

Hezbollah’s disturbing escalation on the Lebanese-Israeli border in recent weeks and months reflects a simple truth: Israel has allowed itself to be deterred by its northern adversary.

To disguise this sobering fact, laundered words like “containment” are thrown around to justify Israel’s lack of response to these provocations.

Years ago, Israel’s defense establishment spoke of decisive victory as the goal when dealing with enemies. This was eventually phased out in favor of “deterrence.” Now the talk is of containment.

There is no doubt that Israel does not want to be dragged into a war with Hezbollah.  The terror group knows that this is Israel’s position, and calculates the risks it is willing to take accordingly.

While Israel is proactive in defending its security interests in Syria and even in Iran, as well as at sea, Israel simply does not dare to attack Lebanon. Even when earlier this year a Hezbollah terrorist infiltrated Israel and made it to Megiddo Junction in Israel’s north, where he planted an IED on a highway, Israel did not respond.

That terrorist could have reached Tel Aviv. No one knew of his existence until his bomb detonated, seriously injuring an Arab-Israeli driver. The driver’s injuries were tragic, but the attack could have ended in dozens of casualties.

Then, on Passover eve in April, a barrage of rockets was fired into Israel. The dominant narrative was that it was Palestinians who fired them, not Hezbollah. We convinced ourselves that this was the case and returned fire on an open field.

Now Israel is dealing with a Hezbollah tent planted on Israeli territory that houses armed operatives. This has become a strategic matter. In recent days, a Lebanese parliament member and eight others infiltrated Israel from Lebanon.

Nevertheless, Israel is in containment mode. This means that it doesn’t want to do anything.

If the recent comments made by opposition figure and Yisrael Beiteinu Party leader Avigdor Liberman are to be believed, the IDF has told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel’s failure to respond properly to these events is eroding its deterrence—if it even existed in the first place.

Containment is merely a tactical matter and a bigger issue is at play. Israel does not feel it can respond forcefully against Hezbollah due to the risks posed by war with it—namely thousands of rockets a day fired at the Israeli home front. Hezbollah’s arsenal includes 500 precise projectiles capable of striking every location in Israel.

Northern Israel, meanwhile, faces the scenario of evacuating tens of thousands of civilians who have nowhere to go. There is no organizational plan in place for this.

As a result, the concern is that in the event of a Third Lebanon War, the Israeli government will not be able to implement its military and civilian directives. This includes infrastructure. In particular, Israel’s offshore gas rigs may have to be shut down.

Meanwhile, factions in the Israeli-Arab sector could direct large numbers of firearms at fellow citizens. The unrest that took place during the May 2021 Operation Guardian of the Walls could be a sneak peek at what a future war might look like.

Hence, Israel seeks to avoid war. Needless to say, there is an Israeli military in this equation that is far more powerful than it was during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. But when we compare the ability of Israel to absorb losses and damage to that of Hezbollah, the conclusion that emerges is problematic: Israel, it seems, is more deterred than the terror group.

All of this raises the question of the feasibility of a preemptive Israeli strike on Hezbollah.

Due to the risks posed to the Israeli home front, which could sustain thousands of casualties (including injured) and tens of thousands of homes hit by projectiles, with dysfunctional emergency service responses and civilian services severely affected, the option of a preemptive strike must be examined.

Such a strike could significantly decrease the damage sustained by Israel in a future war with Hezbollah. Furthermore, if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear program, it is clear that Hezbollah would retaliate, leaving Israel in conflict on at least two fronts.

Fighter jets would have to deal with Iran and Lebanon, and this raises the question of whether it might not be better to first decrease Hezbollah’s capabilities, allowing Israel to focus on Iran.

Should we wait for Hezbollah to take the initiative or do we take the first step after we define what an Israeli red line looks like?

Either way, it is only a matter of time before the next escalation occurs. Hezbollah won’t be able to keep stepping on Israel’s toes as it has been doing since the summer of 2022 when it threatened Israeli offshore gas rigs. Nor can it do so now when it issues new border demands and fires an anti-tank missile at an IDF patrol.

Israel can’t keep hiding under the apron of inaction.

The question is whether the IDF should wait for Hezbollah to escalate or seize on a future Hezbollah provocation at a time when Israel is prepared to attack and deal with the consequences.

In answering this question, one can’t ignore Israel’s current unprecedented domestic crisis.

Improved social cohesion will be a necessary condition for choosing the timing of a potential preemptive strike on Hezbollah. If Israel chooses this path, it must launch a strong response to any future Hezbollah attack. If Hezbollah escalates further, Israel will have no choice but to go to war.

But this time, Israel would act from an improved position due to the preemptive strike, better preparations on the home front and no domestic political crisis threatening the ability of Israeli Air Force reservists to serve.

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Brigadier General Shmuel Tzuker is the former Deputy Director General of the Directorate of Production and Procurement in the Ministry of Defense, Israel. Read full bio here.

Israel-India defense relations should be taken to the next level

By MANGESH SAWANT

Israel and India are progressive islands of democracies situated in a sea of autocracies interspersed with nuclear unstable nations. Israel and India face similar asymmetric and symmetric threats such as terrorism and wars. Terrorism and wars are the policy instruments of hostile neighboring nations. Israel is threatened by terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran supports terrorist groups, ratchets up geopolitical tensions and is working on developing a nuclear bomb. Pakistan which is the epicenter of terrorism has been attacking targets in India through radical Islamic groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-I-Mohammad. China has fought a war with India and intermittently attacks Indian army soldiers guarding the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Israel has played a pivotal role as a trustworthy partner of the Indian military and the defense industry. The two nations have strategically fostered productive relations in the defense sector for more than three decades. Israel is the second largest supplier of weapon systems to India. In 2021 both nations signed an agreement to set up a 10-year roadmap in the arena of defense cooperation that will make India the largest importer of Israeli defense equipment. Military technology transfers, joint defense research programs and Israel's advanced weapons systems such as UAVs, missiles, and missile defense systems have enhanced India's offensive and defensive capabilities since the Kargil conflict.

The Indian army has deployed Israeli thermal imaging and night vision imaging equipment on the Line of Control and in counter-terrorism operations in Kashmir. The Indian Army has also deployed Heron drones on the LAC since the 2017 Doklam crisis. The SPICE bomb was used by the Indian Air Force to strike terrorist training camps in Pakistan. The Indian Navy’s MARCOS are equipped with the TAR-21 assault rifles and Galil sniper rifles. The Indian Navy has installed the EL/M 2248 MF-STAR and EL/M-2221 STGR radars on its frontline destroyers. Israeli defense companies such as IAI, Elbit Systems and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems have set up joint ventures with Bharat Forge, Adani Group and Tata Advanced Systems.

Though arms sales have been the primary focus of the bilateral relationship, the expansion of strategic partnership and cooperation on the military operational framework is missing. The following are the areas where India and Israel could cooperate tactically:

● A center for the study of warfare could be established at the upcoming National Defense University in New Delhi. Both nations have deep experience in fighting wars, insurgencies and terrorism. The center could facilitate interaction between the two militaries, prepare case studies and lessons learned and conduct workshops, seminars and simulations. 

● Israeli special forces could conduct asymmetric warfare courses in Indian military staff and command colleges.

● Israeli special forces units specializing in urban warfare can impart training to the Indian Army’s 4 Para (SF) and 9 Para (SF) who specialize in counter-terrorism operations in Kashmir.

● Israeli special forces training and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) could be incorporated by the Indian Army Para (SF) regiments.

● The Indian Army and Israeli Army Special Forces units operating in deserts can train together in desert warfare and exchange lessons learned.

● Close coordination between Indian and Israeli intelligence agencies at the TTP, collection and technical levels could be fostered for common threats in the Middle East and South Asia.

● Rashtriya Rifles operating in Kashmir could gain valuable insights from Israeli counter-terrorism units.

● Israeli military advisors could be embedded during the Indian special forces planning process and at the operational levels for strategic advice and tactical guidance.

● Indian intelligence agencies could gain from the technological advances made in Israeli SIGINT and IMINT collection and dissemination framework.

● Both nations could expand air, naval and army training and military exercises.

●Israeli counter-terrorism units could collaborate with the National Security Guards in the areas of TTPs, reconnaissance, training in Krav Maga and close-quarters combat (CQB) in urban areas

●Intelligence communities of both nations could actively cooperate in the areas of counter-terrorism and tactical operations against terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.

● The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and Israeli defense industries could initiate space cooperation in the areas of IMINT and SIGINT which can be used for C4ISR and border security in South Asia.

The spectrum of India-Israel relations continues to expand. Cooperation in the operational dimension will align their objectives and capabilities to deal with the common asymmetric and symmetric threats in the Middle East and South Asia. Regular exchanges between the militaries and intelligence agencies of both nations will further strengthen existing defense cooperation. The relationship should advance beyond buying weapons and setting up joint enterprises, to collaboration on military operations.

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Mangesh Sawant is the CEO and Managing Partner at an international security and geopolitical risk consulting firm. He has a Masters in International Affairs Degree from Columbia University, New York where he concentrated in international security policy.. Read full bio here.

The Future Of Judicial Reform.

By DANIELLE ROTH-AVNERI

Once again, Israel’s political system is at a moment of high drama.

Coalition and opposition are locked in conflict over the government’s plan to pass a bill that restricts the reasonableness standard; the coalition bill aims to reduce the Israeli Supreme Court’s ability to overrule government decisions based on the court’s assessment of their reasonableness (or lack thereof).

Ironically, the need to restrict the reasonableness standard has previously been an area of agreement between the coalition and opposition in Israel, and was, until recently, the least controversial aspect of the government’s judicial reform program.

The government is expected to pass its bill on Sunday, July 23, after having frozen a much broader judicial reform program in March. The reform was frozen because of threats by military and Air Force reservists to cease volunteering for service, as well as warnings by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant about the consequences of continuing with the reform.

Since then, the anti-government protest camp in Israel has engaged in a campaign of intimidation and unfounded warnings alleging that the State of Israel will become a dictatorship if the judicial reform passes. 

Large-scale protests have been held every Saturday under the banner that Israeli democracy is at mortal risk. Those viewing these images from abroad could become extremely alarmed, but those who are familiar with the Israeli political system and the forces at play are aware that this is merely an intimidation tactic.

Nevertheless, a significant number of citizens have been persuaded by the intimidation campaign, and signs are now up everywhere, including major roads and highways, warning of dictatorship. The signs state that it is necessary for citizens to resist the fall into dictatorship.

The result has been the emergence of a large anti-government camp, much of which was not previously concerned with politics. This camp has been mobilized and is backed by millions of shekels spent by advertising agencies and other elements with vested interests in the protest movement that is opposed to the Netanyahu government.

On the other side of the divide is an Israeli government that was democratically elected. Those who support it believe that the left-wing controls the country in a de facto manner, regardless of who wins the elections.

As a result, the situation in Israel is reaching boiling point. Days of rage and protests are intensifying, protesters are taking to the streets, and some are breaking the law by blocking traffic or entrances to buildings.

It is becoming impossible on these protest days for people to get to work. Meanwhile, a number of companies, particularly in the hi-tech sector, encourage their staff to go out and protest, and those employees who refrain from doing so face pressure and negative perceptions.

For its part, the government wants to push forward and pass the bill into law. Coalition leaders fear being perceived as fools by their right-wing voter base, and to avoid accusations that the government is controlled by unelected left-wing officials and activists.

The government has decided that this time around, unlike in March, it cannot give in. Doing so would send the message that the government is unable to rule because of protests and refusal to serve by reserve Air Force pilots and reservists from elite units.

Hence, the government can be expected to push forward, and, by providing a tangible achievement for its right-wing voters, put out the message that it is not capitulating. 

The idea that the bill will turn Israel into a dictatorship is laughable, but that doesn’t mean the situation isn’t dangerous.

It’s impossible to predict whether the pilots are merely issuing threats, or will make good on them, or whether we will see additional protests and broader strikes.

The government has already made its choice, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be looking at how things unfold going forward.

The Knesset will, at the end of July, head out for a long summer recess. In August, many Israelis will head for vacation with their families, and the Knesset will not return from recess until mid-October.

Two and a half months is a near eternity in the Israeli timeframe, and many transformative events could occur in that time.

Netanyahu will have until October, at the end of the Jewish High Holidays, to decide whether he will continue with the judicial reform legislation by changing the composition of the judicial selection committee, as he has said he will, or whether to ditch the entire reform program. We will have to wait until October for his decision to become clear.

After a pandemic, multiple elections, armed conflicts, and the forming and breaking of political alliances – not to mention a recent visit by Netanyahu to hospital, sparking questions about his health – it is clear that anything can happen in this country between now and October.

We might not even remember the judicial reform by then, and could instead be busy with brand new and burning issues to argue about. 

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

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Israel is Not a Racist State, in Theory or Practice

By MARK GOLDFEDER & GABRIEL GROISMAN

On Saturday, July 15 Representative Pramilla Jayapal, Chair of the 103-member Progressive Caucus publicly announced that she has been fighting hard “to make clear that Israel is a racist state.” Thankfully, the leaders of the Democratic Party responded with a strong rejection of her remarks. But because she and so many others like to make this and similar fallacious arguments, it is worth responding to and debunking it in a fuller fashion.

The assertion that the State of Israel is itself a racist endeavor is antisemitic on its face, as no one seems to have a problem with the existence of over 50 Muslim nations and over 100 Christian countries. Calling it “racist” also serves to justify and promote the delegitimization and destruction of the lone Jewish state. Of course, it is important to note that there is a difference between calling the entire existence of the State of Israel itself a “racist endeavor” and criticizing any particular Israeli government policies or practices as “racist.” One is flatly antisemitic, while the other is a criticism of Israel like that of any other country. Jayapal’s retraction openly disavowed the first, but she did not back away from the separate claim that Israel is a racist state in practice, which remains the kind of massively pernicious charge that needs to be backed up with evidence, of which she has none. The attempt to impose an American lens of race on a conflict she does not seem to understand is inexcusable in the context of an elected leader publicly maligning an entire country—and a close American ally.

The reason that she cannot present any evidence to support her position is because there is none, and calling Israel a racist state is counterfactual and ridiculous. The term “Palestinians” as it is used today includes Arabs who are Israeli citizens; Arabs residing in the Gaza Strip and the disputed territories; and Arabs who were displaced as a result of the conflicts in 1948 and 1967. Israel treats all of its citizens, including its Arab citizens, equally under the law. Israeli Arabs enjoy positions in the highest levels of every branch of government, including the legislative branch (the Knesset), the executive branch (the Israeli cabinet) and the judicial branch (the Supreme Court). In fact, in some cases, Arab citizens of Israel have more rights than Jewish citizens of Israel, including the fact that Arab citizens of Israel are not required to serve in the military.

The differential treatment of some members of these groups is demonstrably not based on their race; they all share the same ethnic and racial identity. It is, however, based on their legal status as either Israeli citizens, residents of territories under military administration, or non-citizen foreigners.  All countries in the world “discriminate” between their own citizens and non-citizens; if doing so constitutes racism, then all states are guilty of racism. But they aren’t, of course, and neither is Israel. The entire basis of Jayapal’s argument, which elides these important distinctions, is utterly wrong, and the application of a “racial” standard to questions of citizenship in one and only one instance worldwide is the kind of double standard that is dangerously problematic. If in fact you were looking for systemic racism in the area, you might ask how many Jews are living in (or even allowed to visit) Gaza or Ramallah, as compared to the 20 percent of Israeli citizens that are Arab.

Part of the problem seems to be Jayapal’s (and her friends’) complete unfamiliarity with the history of the conflict and the players involved. Forget the fact that the “progressive” caucus refuses to support the only democracy in the Middle East, and the only country in the region with full equality for women, the LGBT community, and freedom for all religions. This entire episode comes in the laughable context of her and several other progressives skipping an address by Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Congress, in an attempt to protest the policies of Prime Minister Netanyahu. None of them seem to be aware that before he was elected to his mostly ceremonial role Herzog served as the left-wing opposition leader against Netanyahu.

Her willful lack of knowledge is also clearly evident in what Jayapal’s “apology” does not say.

First, in her telling of the failures of the two-state solution there is only one party at fault: Israel. There is no mention of or accounting for the dismal leadership of the PA, which has consistently turned down numerous offers for an independent Palestinian state. For the record, Israel has repeatedly, more than 30 times, offered plans for peace and division of the land. Some of those deals, including the Clinton Peace Parameters, were even supported by Jayapal’s own party—along with much of the Arab world. Again, for the Squad’s edification, Israel (legitimately) gained a total of 26,178 square miles of territory in the defensive war of 1967. To date, it has ceded sovereignty over approximately 23,871 square miles or 87% of that territory. At various times in recent history (including deals proposed in 2000, 2008 and 2014), Israel has offered up to 99.3% of the remaining disputed territory in exchange for peace. Each time the Palestinians refused.

Second, while Jayapal’s statement contains vilification of Israel as a whole and its leaders in particular, there is no mention of the PA or its President, Mahmoud Abbas, who have repeatedly confirmed that the PA will use their very last penny if necessary to pay salaries and stipends to incentivize terrorists who kill innocent Americans and Israelis. There’s no mention of the fact that while Israeli schoolchildren are uniformly taught to yearn for peace, Arab schoolchildren in Israel, Gaza and PA controlled cities are taught to glorify war and terrorism, and that under official PA policy they stand to make more money for their families if they grow up to be killers and martyrs rather than doctors or lawyers.

Third, as she made clear in her statement, Jayapal does not understand—and seemingly does not seek to understand—the Israeli point of view on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Contrasting the Jewish people’s historical trauma from pogroms, persecution and the Holocaust with the Palestinians’ feelings of hopelessness about peace, as her statement does, creates a false framework that depicts the debate incorrectly. The suffering of the Jewish people historically has nothing to do with their legitimate claim to the land of Israel, and implying that this generational suffering is all that they bring to their “side” of the “debate”—as opposed to the Palestinians who just want the same rights as their neighbors (which, again, they have)—completely denies the Jewish people’s religious, historic and indigenous ties to the land. The Jewish people’s rightful ownership long predates the United Nations and well precedes the horrors of the Holocaust. No one ever gave Israel to the Jews—certainly not the Palestinians—and no one can ever take her away. Any two-state solution needs to begin with this fundamental understanding that somehow eludes Jayapal: The Jews are in Israel, and always have been, and will continue to be there, by right and not on sufferance.

Jayapal’s non apology concludes by turning to her own background, and she lets us know that as an immigrant woman of color, she should be excused for her own antisemitic racism because obviously she is sensitive when a people’s very existence is called into question. Except that, as a practical matter, and despite her race and gender, she continues to dehumanize and implicitly justify terror against Israelis whom she apparently feels deserve just what they get for being so darn difficult and wanting to exist in their homeland.

At bottom, Israel is not a racist state, and does not implement racist policies. Despite Japayal and her friends’ best efforts, nothing will change these truths. But it is high time that propagandists like her be relegated to the dustbin of political history, rather than voted to lead a caucus of over 100 members of Congress.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Gabriel Groisman is a partner at LSN Law in Miami, FL, a Jewish rights leader and the former Mayor of Bal Harbour, Florida.

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monthly brief: Israel On Edge As Reasonability Clause Moves Ahead.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

The State of Israel is at a boiling point as the coalition and its opponents face off over the government’s bill to erase the judicial reasonableness standard as part of its controversial judicial reform program.

Members of the Israeli protest movement have been planning further "days of resistance" to express opposition to the reforms, which they say endanger Israeli democracy. The protests include disruption of train services, marches in cities, and mass rallies on Tel Aviv’s Kaplan Street, the epicenter of weekly nation-wide demonstrations.

The coalition plans to convene the Knesset plenum on July 23 to pass the so-called "reasonableness" bill, which seeks to prevent Israeli courts from using the reasonableness standard in evaluating government decisions.

Opposition members have requested more time to submit objections to the bill.

The bill will be sent to the Knesset plenum for its final second and third readings after all committee work on it was completed in recent days, according to Knesset Member Simcha Rothman (Religious Zionist party), Chairman of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee.

Rothman’s handling of the procedure has drawn criticism from opposition legislators, who assert that the entire legislative process is flawed and being run by "messianic fanatics who shut their ears to the truth."

According to a poll published earlier this month by Israel’s public broadcaster, Kan, 43% of Israelis oppose the reasonableness bill.

Thirty one percent of respondents said they support the bill, while 25% stated they were unsure of their position. Furthermore, the poll found that 36% of Israelis believe police should act in a harsher manner against protesters blocking roads, while 24% believe police are already acting too harshly. A further 24% believe police are acting appropriately. 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking at the July 17 weekly cabinet meeting, addressed calls by a number of IDF reservists to stop volunteering for service if the bill is passed, stating, “To all those who wave the flag of democracy, I would like to say a few words about democracy: In a democracy, the military is subordinate to the elected government and not the opposite, whereas in a military regime, the government is subordinate to the military, or to be more precise, to a group within the military. This is the fundamental difference between a democracy and a military regime. Incitement to refusal to serve, and refusal to serve itself, are contrary to democracy and contrary to law. This is true in every democracy but in ours, incitement to refusal to serve, and refusal to serve, directly endanger the security of all citizens of Israel. They gnaw away at our deterrence of our enemies, and this could easily develop into aggression against us. Moreover, they undermine discipline within the military, and discipline is the foundation of the military's existence in the first place.”

The Palestinian Authority returns to Jenin

Israel watched closely as PA security forces returned to Jenin on July 10, after a two-day intensive security operation held in the northern West Bank city by the IDF on July 3 and 4. 

The operation saw a brigade-sized force of elite units enter Jenin after dozens of shooting attacks, as well as rocket and IED attacks, were carried out by terrorists from the city. The operation was aimed at making sure Jenin no longer served as a terrorist safe haven.

The IDF said it seized over a thousand terrorist weapons, including bombs, ammunition, and guns, and questioned over 300 suspects. Over 120 were detained, and the IDF destroyed command posts, hideouts, and bomb-making facilities.

Twelve Palestinian combatants and an IDF soldier were killed in the operation. Hundreds of terrorist gunmen fled Jenin, paving the path for the PA’s attempted return.

The IDF sent in elite units, including Maglan, Duvdevan, the Paratrooper Brigade Reconnaissance Unit, Nahal Reconnaissance Unit, and Egoz. The operational model employed by the IDF in Jenin may, if necessary, be applied to future raids in areas of the West Bank that experience a collapse of PA rule.

Nasrallah gambles, and wins (so far)

Israel's lack of response to a series of recent provocations by Hezbollah is a mistake and the effort to bring about a diplomatic resolution is a bad joke, said Prof. Eyal Zisser, a senior Middle East scholar at Tel Aviv University, in criticism of how Israel has handled an escalation by the Iran-backed terrorist army in Lebanon.

The 17th anniversary of the 2006 Second Lebanon War sees the prospect of another conflagration that could become the Third Lebanon War, Zisser warned. Hezbollah resolved to escalate the situation in March, sending a terrorist across the border to stage an IED attack on an Israeli highway. Israel chose not to respond and Hezbollah saw this as weakness, Zisser argued.

An April rocket attack from Lebanon, conveniently attributed to Hamas, gave Nasrallah plausible deniability. Now, Israel has to decide how to deal with a tent pitched by Hezbollah on Israeli territory and which houses armed operatives; Nasrallah has already threatened to launch kill squads into the Galilee region of Israel.

Nasrallah — who has a reputation as a gambler — is convinced that Israel is bogged down with internal strife and will not retaliate against his provocations. Zisser added that Nasrallah had upped his wager by firing an anti-tank missile at Israeli forces in early July, as well as through repeated attempts by Hezbollah operatives to sabotage the border fence with Israel.

UK MoD invests millions in Israeli active protection system

The Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom announced July 13 that it had awarded a £20 million contract to secure the hardware for the next phase of tests on a cutting-edge new rocket and missile protection system for Britain’s Challenger 3 tanks.

The system in question is the Trophy Active Protection System (APS), produced by Israel’s Rafael defense company. Trophy will be tested and integrated with Challenger 3 to provide enhanced protection against rocket and missile threats, while simultaneously finding the origin of the hostile fire for immediate response, the statement said. “The system can locate an incoming rocket or missile in less than a second, destroying it by firing back its own ammunition,” the statement added.

In 2021, Rafael completed the supply of 400 Trophy systems for four US Army Abram tank brigades.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

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The Israel Police is facing its worst-ever crisis

By Alon Levavi

The Israel Police is currently facing the most severe crisis in its history, as multiple causes converge to create a perfect storm.

The first cause is long-standing: Over the years, the issue of public security has not received the place it deserves on the national agenda. Crises are mounting – climate change, cyber-crime, pandemics, terrorism, violent crime – and it is becoming increasingly clear how vital it is in a democratic state to have a strong, effective, service-oriented police force.

Israel’s founding prime minister David Ben-Gurion once said that the military is responsible for state security, and the police for its honor. He understood deeply the role that the police play in a democratic state.

And yet, due to the ongoing Israeli security situation and years of wars against external enemies, the center of gravity has traditionally been on security and defense. This found expression in national resource investment, the police’s image, its low place in decision-making, and more.

In reality, the police have always been involved in all aspects of life, and acted as the national emergency room, investigating public officials, tackling corruption, fighting crime, and combating terrorism. Yet the police in Israel are an eternal punching bag for the public. There will always be those unhappy to get a fine, to be arrested, or face indictment. Police are easily and quickly slandered here – and this damages the organization.  

Ultimately, the ability of the police to function is based on public faith. When this faith is eroded, the public stops cooperating with it. On the flip side of the equation, criminals stop being deterred and become ever bolder about committing crimes. This sends the country into a sharp, downward slippery slope.

On top of this, the way the police force is seen from the outside seeps into the organization. Police officers want to feel motivated, but the more the media attacks the police, the harder it is for officers to find the will to stay. Growing numbers are finding reasons to leave. The fact that their salaries are ridiculously low, that they work 24-7, endanger their lives, have no extra paid hours, no union rights, and have poor employment conditions only adds to the desire of some officers to quit.

Despite public perceptions, not anyone can become a police officer. It’s a profession that requires over a year of training, followed by further on-the-job qualifications. When an officer leaves that means that major resources get thrown away.

Personnel shortages mean that qualification processes have been shortened, leading to police officers with lower professional capabilities – and creating another vicious cycle.  

Today, in the post-pandemic era, when a new generation has no hesitation about moving jobs, when police officers no longer receive budgetary pensions, but rather, cumulative ones, and when there are many tempting job opportunities in the civilian market, including comfortable work-from-home jobs, many are leaving the force, unwilling to risk their lives for low salaries and widespread contempt.

Meanwhile, public security ministers avoided appointing commissioners for years, choosing to work with acting commissioners instead, meaning that long-term planning and force build-up programs were impossible. The ministers’ refusal to appoint commissioners was also a statement on how they viewed the importance of the police. Apparently, an organization that doesn’t ‘need’ a commissioner isn’t very important.

It is against this backdrop that National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir took office.  Ben Gvir has been convicted of several offenses and has a highly aggressive policy regarding his ministerial mandate and approach to the police chief.

If someone convicted of criminal offenses becomes head of police, what does this mean? Could something similar happen to the Shin Bet or IDF? This development further suggests that the government doesn’t think the police is very important.

The coalition agreements that stipulate the National Security Minister’s right to directly activate the police, and Ben Gvir’s call to set up a national guard under his direct authority rather than that of the police, all send the same message about the force’s low standing. Worse still, they threaten to infect the police with politics, something that must never happen in a country that wants to remain democratic. Only the police commissioner should activate the police, while the minister should focus on policies.

Today, after the coronavirus pandemic, the Mount Meron stampede in 2021, Operation Guardian of the Walls in the same year that saw widespread rioting in Arab-Israeli areas, and the current political deadlock with 30 weeks of mass protests, skyrocketing Arab sector crime, and an almost full neutralization of the police’s ability to employ technology like cyber and signals intelligence, the police has hit rock bottom.

It has very few tools and abilities to deal with the challenge sit faces. It is being told to fight crime blindfolded.

Looking ahead at the next decade, bold decisions are in order. First, the police must be defined as a critical pillar in national resilience. Next, governments must allocate to police suitable financial and personnel resources -- billions of additional shekels and thousands of extra personnel.

The billions that were promised to the police currently do not appear to be materializing.

Police must also be allowed, under supervision, to employ technological means, or there will be no meaningful war against 21st-century crime. State leaders need to begin publicly backing the force, and that also means not ignoring police during the annual torch-lighting ceremony on Independence Day, for example, and promoting a new national narrative that isn’t exclusively focused on the military.

When the public receives good service from a police force that receives proper investment, when calls to the emergency hotline are answered effectively, when community police officers check in, and investigations don’t end abruptly, when patrol cars arrive within 20 minutes and not an hour, the public will naturally warm to the police.

Finally, the new Israeli national guard must operate under police command, not under a civilian ministry headed by a minister.

If Israel’s ‘ER Room’ is to start working properly again, these are the minimal steps necessary, and there isn’t much time to waste.

The commanders, officers, fighters, and volunteers in the Israel Police are dedicated and professional. At one moment, they foil terrorism, at another, they foil homicides, prevent accidents, and fight drugs. The second largest organization in Israel must receive a higher spot on the national priority list, and it must also get practical recognition as a critical pillar in national security and resilience.

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Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.