IN THE COMING ELECTIONS, IT'S TIME FOR GENDER EQUALITY TO TAKE CENTER STAGE

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

The coming elections for Israel’s 24th Knesset represent a vital opportunity to place the values of gender equality – and with them, those of liberal Zionism - at the forefront of Israeli national development. 

The good news is that the issue of gender equality is already at the heart of public dialogue. All political parties have recognized the centrality of the issue, and are highlighting the women in their ranks. Almost every party has its own women’s committee, even the ultra-Orthodox Shas party. 

But ultimately, such steps are at the level of ‘nice to have.’ After all, it is one thing to raise the banner of gender equality across all parts of society, it is another to take these calls forward and translate them into tangible action. 

Unfortunately, the ultra-Orthodox parties, including Shas, have no women at all among their elected officials – yet they still receive state funding for election campaigns. As long as this remains the case, full gender equality will be out of reach. 

Any coalition that involves the two ultra-Orthodox parties will be incapable of promoting gender equality. This is not to say that there are not voices within ultra-Orthodox society seeking to create important change. There are indeed Ultra-Orthodox women activists who are fighting back. 

Knesset legislation must be introduced conditioning state funding on parties having at least 30% representation by women. 

 According to a report by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Israel is ranked 83rd out of 189 countries when it comes to global parliamentary gender equality, and is ranked 27th out of 35 OECD countries. These figures are highly unflattering. 

Measured in the absence of Shas and UTJ, most Knesset parties have female  representation ranging from 26 to 45% – not a trivial percentage, and in line with the Western average. 

Greater commitment to gender equality education is required, from kindergarten to twelfth grade. This is currently not compulsory in Israel, and making such gender education part of the curriculum would be a revolutionary act that could happen in the 24th Knesset. 

Similarly, it is time to open IDF roles to men and women, and while the military has made progress in this direction, ensuring that only suitable candidates reach such positions irrespective of gender should be enshrined in legislation. 

 For any of these things to happen, the ultra-Orthodox parties must be forced into opposition. The choice is clear: Israel can have either ultra-Orthodox parties in the ruling coalition, or it can promote women’s rights. It cannot have both. 

If an enabling coalition is formed, a broad range of issues can be tackled. 

Reform is also overdue in the private sector. Among publicly traded companies on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, only three have women as CEOs. To help address this issue, a ‘traffic light index’ was introduced in the last knesset by MK Oded Forer, who chaired the Status of Women committee at that time, to measure the integration of women in the workforce and in senior management in companies on the Tel Aviv 125 Index.

This was based on research conducted abroad, where gender equality indexes are published for investors, since companies with a higher percentage of women have been found to be more profitable, creating investor pressure for the publication of the indexes. 

Israel is still trailing many other countries on this front. The new index will publish figures twice a year, and highlight green companies, which have over 40% women in senior management, yellow companies, with 20 to 40%, and red companies, which have under 20%.

 The coronavirus pandemic has been especially harmful to women, with some 70% of unemployed in this current, third closure being women. There has been a sharp rise of hundreds of percent in the numbers of women falling prey to domestic abuse. And yet, just seven out of 37 people on the government’s committee of experts to exit the crisis are women. 

 Out of the expert guests who appear on the media to discuss these issues, a mere 15% are women. 

Only one woman has served as a Knesset chairperson since the parliament’s founding, and important Knesset committees such as Finance, Defense and Foreign Affairs, and Law and Justice have never been chaired by a woman. ,. 

Meanwhile, twenty-five women were murdered in domestic violence attacks in the past year.

Despite the challenges that remain, today’s young generation is demanding gender equality, and such values are familiar territory for it. Yet it is vital to take the next necessary steps — for gender equality will make it more likely that that we all live in a stable, prosperous society, and in a liberal-Zionist country

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Sharon Roffe Ofir is deputy Mayor of Kiriyat Tivon, in the Haifa region. She is in charge of government relations and gender equality and is a member of WCCS (Women's Council for Civil Security) strategy group. Sharon is the Chairperson of the Women's Rights Committee in the Yisrael-Beiteinu party. Read full bio here.

HEBREW PODCAST: השגריר בדימוס ארתור קול , ישראל: עבר,הווה ועתיד

השגריר בדימוס ארתור קול, חיי והשירות שלי למען המדינה

HEZBOLLAH STILL EYES REVENGE

BY Noam Tibon

In recent months, Hezbollah has made repeated attempts to avenge the death of one of its operatives in a reported Israeli air strike in Syria in July. While the Lebanese terror organization hasn't given up on its stated goal of killing an Israeli soldier in response, the organization currently faces multiple challenges that are significantly more pressing. 

The restraining factors acting against Hezbollah at this time are likely dissuading it from taking action that could lead to war with Israel, though the risk of an unintended conflict certainly remains. 

The Lebanese state, which hosts Hezbollah, faces several crises, each of which has an impact on the organization: The coronavirus pandemic, and a severe economic meltdown are two of the most impactful of the current challenges. 

In addition, the massive blast in the Beirut port in August killed more than 200 people in 2020 and left widespread devastation in the Lebanese capital. 

Iran, Hezbollah's state sponsor, faces its own grave economic crisis, and the spiraling coronavirus outbreak in the Islamic Republic is fomenting widespread anger against the Ayatollahs.

Meanwhile, for the first time in years, extraordinary negotiations took place between the Israeli and Lebanese governments over maritime borders. These talks, though stalled, occurred in spite of Hezbollah, and have been driven by Lebanon's dire economic straits, which led Beirut to seek natural gas revenue in the Mediterranean. Lebanon's willingness to negotiate represents a change to the status quo. 

Iran, meanwhile, remains on high alert as the Biden administration settles into Washington DC. Though free from the concern that President Trump might have taken drastic action against it before he left office, the Biden Administration's policy toward Iran remains unclear. It is as yet unknown when the new president will return to the nuclear agreement, and under which conditions. As a result of these uncertainties, Iran must avoid any unforced errors, and the same holds true for its proxy, Hezbollah. 

Nevertheless, it is important to recall that Hezbollah is continuing with many of its dangerous activities. First among these is its accumulation of firepower. Israel is engaged in a daily battle with Hezbollah, which seeks to turn a significant portion of its massive arsenal of rockets and missiles into accurate projectiles that pose a far greater threat.

Israel's campaign of attacks in Syria is designed to prevent precision guided missiles from reaching Hezbollah. It is also designed to prevent Iranian-backed militias from entrenching themselves in Syria, and building a second front against Israel in the Syrian Golan Heights. 

Last November’s IDF discovery of explosive devices placed on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights border was clear evidence of the same effort by the Iranian axis to create a second anti-Israel northern front in Syria. Hezbollah is certainly involved in that attempt, even if its involvement takes a low profile. 

With so many factors at play, Hezbollah's "revenge" against Israel in response to the July incident appears likely to be very minor, and pursuit of this objective is not at the top of the organization's priority list. 

There have been three attempts since the summer to exact a price from Israel - at Mount Dov, on the Golan Heights, and on the Lebanese border. All three have failed, but Hezbollah continues to search for an IDF weak point, albeit as a low priority. 

The targeted killing of the Iranian Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in a U.S. drone strike dealt a further blow to Hezbollah's effectiveness. 

Despite all of the above, it is also important not to underplay the risk of unintended war. In 2006, when it launched a cross-border kidnapping raid, Hezbollah did not intend to launch the Second Lebanon War, and the organization's secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah would later state as much. 

The high tension level on the Israeli - Lebanese border means that localized incidents have the potential to rapidly snowball into major events. 

Israel therefore must remain on high alert, and closely monitor developments on the ground. While Hezbollah remains under multiple restraints, it could still seek to act, and it may choose a location that is far from local in order to do so, as it has done in the past. 

The 2012 Burgas bus bombing, which killed five Israeli tourists and their Bulgarian driver, is one such example. 

The Israeli defense establishment will be closely monitoring the situation, and can be expected to continue to gather intelligence while remaining on the highest alert. A full blown conflict would be costly to Hezbollah and very costly to Lebanon. 

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Major General Noam Tibon spent his military career specializing in counter terrorism and homeland security. His command positions include service as Commander of the 202nd Battalion of the Paratroopers Brigade, Deputy Commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, Commander of the Etzion Regional Brigade, Commander of the Judea Regional Brigade, Commander of the “Nahal” Brigade, Head of the Personnel Division of the IDF Ground Forces, Chief of the Infantry and Paratroopers Corps, Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division and Commander of the Command and Staff College, IDF.

MIRYAM'S SUMMARY: DR. MICHAEL OREN ON THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

By Peter Fishkind

On Tuesday, January 12th the MirYam Institute hosted Israel’s former Ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, for a discussion, available on MirYam’s podcast channel focused on what Joe Biden’s election will mean for Israel. The first half of the program was a Q & A with Benjamin Anthony and the remainder was filled with questions from members of the MirYam Institute community of adjuncts. The conversation with the Ambassador also focused on recent news events including the riot at the U.S. Capitol.

In discussing Joe Biden, Ambassador Oren described him as a friend of Israel, spoke fondly of his character, and noted that he took specific stances during the Democratic Presidential Primary on issues like U.S. financial aid to Israel to positively distinguish himself from certain other competitors in the race. However, he expressed concern over the administration’s expected Iran policy. In particular, despite speaking highly of the capacity of a number of Biden’s announced foreign policy team and their support of Israel, he noted that the bulk of them played significant roles in crafting the JCPOA. Despite those concerns, the Ambassador stated his hope that the administration will be guided by facts and analysis rather than preconceived ideological goals, that the administration will seek to utilize leverage afforded to it by the sanctions currently in place, and that the administration will avoid showing daylight with Israel whenever possible. 

Certain recent developments, including the testimony of Joe Biden’s nominee for Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, have reinforced the conclusions of the Ambassador. Blinken was generally received warmly by the Committee, testifying that the U.S. Embassy would remain in Jerusalem, complementing the successes of the Trump Administration in facilitating the development of Israeli-Arab relations via the Abraham Accords while pledging to work to increase such efforts. However, as expected, Blinken stated that it would be the Biden administration’s intention to re-enter the JCPOA if Iran was to come into compliance with its terms. As the Ambassador noted, and I agree, the Agreement contains fatal flaws such that a re-entry will cause significant friction in the U.S.-Israel relationship. However, Blinken noted that any such step is a “long way” off and also addressed a critical concern of Oren’s, promising that Israel and other regional allies as well as Congress would be consulted before any U.S. action. If such steps are taken and sound advice is heeded, it will only improve the odds that a policy is best designed to achieve the joint aim of the U.S. and Israel, to prevent Iran from developing the capacity to build a deliverable nuclear weapon. 

Additionally, the Ambassador stated that he does not expect Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to be a particular priority of the Biden administration. Such a stance accords with the U.S. interest, where U.S. meddling has often backfired in its aim of improving Israeli-Palestinian relations. Rather, the Ambassador predicted that a greater focus will be placed on building on the successes of the Abraham Accords, noting Biden’s praise of the agreements during the campaign. As noted, this was reiterated as an intention of Biden’s in the Blinken testimony. 

In discussing the riot at the Capitol, the Ambassador contextualized the events specific to that day within a longer framework of America’s withdrawal from the world. The Ambassador noted that dating back to his time of service as Israel’s Ambassador during President Obama’s tenure through President Trump’s term in office that political leaders in both parties as well as American voters were far more focused on domestic concerns than ones abroad. In the Ambassador's view, the riot was indicative of these troubles and would demand that the U.S. continue its focus on policing itself and strengthening its own democracy rather than foreign affairs. In no uncertain terms, the Ambassador stated that this development will be bad for Israel and the free world, as an American withdrawal will create vacuums to be filled with bad actors. 

This analysis is likely correct as both America’s political divisions and the massive costs imposed by the pandemic will require the Biden administration to focus on domestic issues. However, there is certainly a contrarian view to take here. One could suggest that Americans may respond to the pandemic with an increased focus on global affairs. In fact, its need is apparent, as the virus was birthed in China and spread, in part, because no external actor was on the ground to assess the threat posed by the virus. Similarly, there may be an opportunity to build a political consensus on how the U.S. can most effectively compete with China’s growing economic power and influence abroad.

Unfortunately, while the factors to make such a reinvigoration of America’s broader strategy of engagement with the world are present, it is most likely that other domestic challenges will require too great a focus for any administration to meet them fully in the near term. As a consequence, as the Ambassador noted, Israel will need to continue to diversify its relationships rather than rely on its alliance with the U.S. alone.

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Peter Fishkind is currently an associate in the Litigation Department at Proskauer Rose LLP in New York. He lives in Great Neck, New York and is a Member of the Nassau County Democratic Party Committee.

PALESTINIAN ELECTION TRAIN ROLLS OUT, BUT WILL ABBAS LET IT REACH ITS DESTINATION?

By David Hacham

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has fired the opening shot marking the start of the race to Palestinian elections, some 15 years after the last time a ballot was held,  but multiple obstacles remain, as well as considerable risks for Fatah.

In mid-January, Abbas signed a presidential decree announcing elections in three stages to the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Palestinian presidency, and the PLO parliament.

The last time elections were held, Hamas won a majority of 76 of the Legislative Council’s 132 seats (Abbas won the presidential elections the year before).

There are many good reasons to remain doubtful that the current elections train will reach its final destination.

Hamas rushed to embrace Abbas's decree, claiming that it would prepare the ground for free and fair elections to reflect the genuine will of the voters, though it remains far from clear whether this indeed would be the case in Gaza.

Major gaps remain between the two groups, driven by their opposing strategic objectives, and these differences could still thwart elections entirely.

A sign of Fatah's true feelings about elections could be found in Abbas's insistence that they be held in stages, in contrast to Hamas's desire to hold all three elections (legislative, presidential, and the PLO) in one swoop.  

For Fatah, each stage represents a possible exit ramp, which could abort the process in the event of a Hamas victory. Yet Hamas agreed to Fatah's conditions, due to its ongoing distress in Gaza, where the regime is facing deep economic and health crises, accompanied by regional isolation that is only growing following normalization agreements between Sunni countries and Israel. 

Hamas is seeking rapid economic relief for Gaza, and acknowledgement from the international community that it is a legitimate actor. It views elections as a path to those goals, as well as a stepping stone to expanding its power in the West Bank and taking over Palestinian government institutions.

For Israel, merely allowing Hamas - a hostile enemy entity, it designates as a terror organization - to take part in elections in East Jerusalem presents enormous problems .

Yet it is not just Israel that faces serious dilemmas.

Fatah itself senses some level of discomfort. Within the organization, Abbas's real intentions in moving forward on the elections are unclear, and the question of whether he is prepared to pay the price of a Hamas victory remains open.  

Behind closed doors, claims have emerged that Abbas received a promise from Hamas that it will not run a candidate for the presidential elections, and may even support him, or at least not interfere. If true, this could help explain Abbas's consent for holding elections. Under such a deal, Abbas would give Hamas a chance to be present in the PA's parliament, and Hamas would enable him to continue as PA president.

A far more popular candidate is the imprisoned senior Fatah member Marwan Bargouthi, who is serving five life sentences plus 40 years for a string of deadly terror attacks on Israelis. Bargouthi has hinted at his intention to run in the elections. An additional dilemma facing Abbas is whether to allow rival Mohammed Dahlan to run. Dahlan was ejected from Fatah’s ranks in 2011 due to his rivalry with Abbas, and currently enjoys the support of refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as of the UAE and Egypt.

Abbas's renewed interests in elections are primarily timed to coincide with the arrival of the Biden administration in Washington.

He is clearly seeking to signal the PA's democratic credentials, and to consolidate it as a legal, legitimate, and elected entity, after years without elections.

Abbas is undoubtedly aware of the risks he is taking enabling Hamas to participate in the democratic game. Hamas could take over the PA and the PLO from the inside. This would be tantamount to allowing a wolf into a sheep's pen, and hoping that things pass peacefully.

In light of the above, the multiple exit ramps that Abbas has built into the process are critical, and it should surprise no one if in the near future, divisions arise between Fatah and Hamas that derail the elections.

 One possibility is that talks between the factions in Cairo will end with failure, while an escalation of the coronavirus outbreak could also lead to cancellation of the process.  On the other hand, the possibility of the elections dynamic gaining its own momentum also exists, and both sides could find themselves unable to pull the brakes on the process. 

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.

PODCAST: SPACE: A Paradigm Shift in Modern Warfare

PODCAST: U.S. Army Base, Fort Gordon, Hosts MirYam's Webinar on Modern Warfare

HEBREW PODCAST: תת ניצב בדימוס שאול גורדון, השתקפות על חיי בשירותי בצה״ל ובמשטרת ישראל, למען מדינת ישראל

דיאלוג על חשיבות החוק למען אזרחי מדינת ישראל

PODCAST: Ambassador Michael Oren On What A Biden Administration Means For Israel

RAMALLAH PLACES ITS HOPES IN BIDEN

By David Hacham

The incoming Biden Administration has relegated all talk of 'reconciliation' between Fatah and Hamas to the realm of fantasy. 

Now, the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority (PA), must remove itself from that process - which was little more than an attempted provocation of Israel and the Arab states in response to normalization, and the Trump peace plan - and aggressively steer itself toward the goal of seizing on Biden's victory in order to make diplomatic progress vis-à-vis Israel. 

Biden's election victory has been greeted with a sigh of relief within the PA, after what for it were four nightmarish years of President Trump, whose policies categorically sided with Israel. 

Yet the PA does not suffer from delusions when it comes to what it can expect to achieve under the new administration. 

The PA does not expect the Biden administration to immediately steer toward a position that would favor the Palestinians. In the PA’s sober assessment, building overly grand expectations would be a serious mistake, at least in the short-term. 

The new American administration will likely repudiate Trump's Deal of the Century and reject all steps that challenge the traditional two-state formula as it seeks to realign with the international community and with positions that receive legitimacy from that community – a source of encouragement as far as the PA is concerned. 

Yet it will likely be many months, perhaps more than a year, before Washington even turns its attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It will be busy dealing with the coronavirus crisis and with taking steps to put the severely damaged U.S. economy back on track to growth. 

Still, the arrival of Biden has provided the PA with an opportunity to climb down from the ladder it ascended when it decided to cancel security and civilian coordination with Israel as a protest against Israel's earlier intention to apply sovereignty in parts of Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley. 

In President Biden, the PA has found the justification it needed to immediately and unconditionally resume coordination with Israel, in a manner that was smoothly accepted by the Palestinian street. 

In terms of what the PA can realistically expect from Washington, steps such as withdrawing the American embassy from Jerusalem back to Tel Aviv, or cancelling American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, are nonstarters. Ramallah understands that reality. 

But the PA can reasonably expect the Biden administration to renew its funding of the PA and of UNRWA, reopen the PLO's embassy in Washington, and reopen the US consulate in East Jerusalem, while expressing a renewed commitment to restarting the diplomatic process. 

Despite the likelihood that any renewed negotiations will take time to translate into policy, the PA does expect Washington to abandon Trump's Deal of the Century as a basis for future talks. It will also seek to gain diplomatic leverage to freeze Israeli settlement construction, remove annexation from the table as a viable option for Israel, and stymie Israeli aspirations in Judea and Samaria. 

The PA is also seeking increased coordination with Egypt and Jordan ahead of the arrival of the new administration, as recent visits by PA President Mahmoud Abbas to both countries demonstrate. Abbas is keen to present the image of a PA that enjoys the support and backing of moderate Arab states.   

Yet even the successful cultivation of that image cannot mask the fact that the PA has lost its veto power over other Arab states and that the PA can no longer torpedo the desire of those states to promote normalization with Israel. 

The latest agreements between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco under U.S. sponsorship make it abundantly clear that the Palestinian agenda, which holds that Arab normalization with Israel is wholly contingent upon major progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, has been discarded by much of the Arab world. 

The Sunni Arab states are preoccupied with a new strategic concern. They fear Iran's nuclear-military program, and are also concerned about Iran's ongoing attempts to entrench itself throughout the Middle East, and its support for radical Islamist elements including Hezbollah in Lebanon; an ever increasing presence. 

Ramallah has little choice but to adapt and to reestablish itself as a major concern despite those shifting priorities, while cautiously raising its hopes that a new American administration can undo some of the setbacks it experienced under the Trump years.  

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.

THE CAPITOL INSURECTION WILL DAMAGE AMERICAN SOFT POWER AND HARM THE US-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP

By Micah Jones

During my year-long tour in Kabul, Afghanistan, I served as the military aide to the U.S. Army Brigadier General in charge of NATO’s Rule of Law Mission. I joined the general in every high-level meeting with Afghan, U.S., and International VIPs as we tried to establish a viable rule of law system in a country that had none. Although we failed in our overall mission, we did make incremental progress, much of which was due to our ability to cite our own democratic institutions and the consistent, peaceful, transfers of power following our elections.

Deployed to a country that, for centuries, had relied on tribal affiliations and warlords, the ability to contrast the Afghan system with the American one gave our mission clout.

In watching the riotous mob of Trump-supporters and far-right extremists storm the United States Capitol on Wednesday, January 6, 2021, I thought of how impossible that same Rule of Law mission now seemed. Yes, we could cite how the House and Senate reconvened to certify the electoral votes, or how order was restored within a matter of hours, but the glaring stain on American democratic institutions and values would be hard to conceal.

The moral authority that U.S. foreign policy could leverage in a place like Afghanistan had become far more difficult now that warlords and tyrants the world over could point to the Banana Republic-like images of the U.S. Capitol being overrun. 

Beyond the irrevocable damage to American soft power, the mob’s actions may also harm the relationship between the United States and Israel. In the wake of the Capitol Insurrection, there will be significant momentum to overturn everything affiliated with the Trump Administration. Anything that might bolster President Trump’s legacy will face a reckoning. And this retribution will likely be done with a sledgehammer rather than a scalpel. Unfortunately, this purge may do away with some of the historic achievements that the Trump Administration facilitated in the Middle East.

From recognizing the Golan Heights to defending Israeli settlements to presiding over the Abraham Accords, President Trump was incredibly pro-Israel. Trump’s support for Israel, however, may prove to be a curse as the US-Israel relationship may be viewed as a relic from a time that the new Biden-Harris administration must reconstruct. 

Because the vast majority of American Jews are members of the Democratic party, and Israel still has majority bi-partnership support in Congress, this damage to the US-Israel relationship may not be immediate. That said, support for Israel in the US is rapidly becoming a divisive and partisan issue. Israel is anathema to the values of the progressive Left, made amply clear by the most vocal members of the Democratic party who have not been censured despite spouting anti-Semitic and anti-Israel tropes. Coupled with the rise of Critical Social Justice ideologies within academic and governmental institutions, the false notion that Israel is a racist, oppressive, settler-colonial State is only gaining more transaction amongst younger Americans and American Jews.

Following the Capitol Insurrection, my fear is that the mainstream media’s unfair, but likely, equating of all conservatives and Trump supporters as equivalent to the thugs who ransacked the Capitol will lead to less bi-partisan support for Israel. Based on the mob’s actions, many Americans who did not have an opinion about the U.S.-Israel relationship may now view support for Israel as affiliation with a “toxic” Trump Administration. 

With full control of the Executive and Legislative branches and significant momentum to purge the Trump Administration’s policies and executive orders, robust U.S. support for Israel may dwindle. The Biden Administration has already signaled interest to rejoin the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” colloquially known as the “Iran Deal.” Furthermore, with the progressive Left emboldened and ascendant, and the Republican party in disarray, there will be no check on the most radical voices of the Democratic party when it comes to challenging continued US support for Israel. Withholding of foreign aid, sanctions on Israeli-settlements, and the lack of support in international bodies like the UN may become the prelude to the new American-Israeli relationship. 

The fall-out from the Capitol Insurrection will not be fully known in the immediate future. But what transpired on January 6, 2021 will have ramifications for years, if not decades to come for American soft power and the U.S.-Israel relationship.

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Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division.

BRIEFING BY FORMER HEAD OF MOSSAD: MIRYAM ADJUNCT REFLECTIONS

BY David Benger

On Monday, December 21st, the former Director of Mossad, Tamir Pardo, became the inaugural speaker of The MirYam Institute “Exclusive Speaker Series.” Pardo spoke eloquently, thoughtfully, and candidly about many leading issues of the day, and chiefly on three major topics. First, he discussed the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – commonly known as the Iran Deal). Next, he offered some thoughts on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And lastly, in response to questions from the audience, Director Pardo spoke about the challenges and opportunities the rise of China poses to Israel.

Before delving into these three key issues, however, Director Pardo began with an even more pressing question: What does Israel need to do to regain bipartisan support in the United States? It was a stellar question that I wish Director Pardo had tried to answer. He did not really address this issue in any depth. He noted that Israel is a sovereign nation, and it should not intervene in domestic politics. Moreover, he said, Israel must not be beholden to American interests or overly deferential to American requests.

When it came to the Iran challenge, Pardo’s expertise was in full gear. He presented three theoretical options for dealing with the approaching deadline for a nuclear-armed Iran.

Option one, he said, was a full ground invasion and destruction of weapons-making facilities, akin to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Pardo immediately dismissed Option 1 as absurd, but ever the intelligence professional, he felt it needed to be voiced nonetheless.

Option 2 is to sit back and wait for the growth of pro-democratic revolutionary forces in Iran, and to support that revolution when it inevitably comes. Pardo was clear that he was speaking only of providing material assistance to a homegrown revolution in full stride, and never of fomenting revolution from the outside. History has shown that outside forces artificially stoking the flames of rebellion (especially in the Middle East) inevitably ends in catastrophe. But offering support to an ongoing revolution might just be ok. The problem with Option 2 is that you are at the mercy of Iranian domestic groups, and if Iranian nuclear scientists complete their work before grassroots activists’ revolt, Israel will have compromised the security of millions of her residents.

That leaves us with Option 3, which, according to Pardo is to negotiate with Iran, to dialogue with the Iranian leadership, and to convince them to change their opinion toward Israel, and reconsider their genocidal intent. Option 3, according to Pardo, is “the only option.”

Pardo claimed the greatest mistake made by President Obama’s negotiating team was to not open the agreement with full diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States. Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of the agreement, said Pardo, should have been a hearty declaration of mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations, followed by immediate openings of reciprocal embassies in Tehran and Washington as well as multiple consulates in both countries.

The conversation retreated from the horizon problem of Iran to the existential problems Israel faces with regard to daily rocket fire from Hamas in Gaza, and various other terror cells in the West Bank, as well as the looming threat from Hezbollah on Israel’s northern tip in Lebanon. Here, Pardo made it clear that though the Abraham Accords are a positive development, they have nearly no impact on the Israeli-Palestinian status quo. Annexation of neighborhoods in Judea and Samaria was never a serious consideration by Prime Minister Netanyahu, according to Pardo. It was merely a feint meant to inspire negotiating partners in the UAE, Bahrain, and other nations to come to the table. And so, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no closer to being solved. Pardo was adamant that a one-state solution was untenable. Demographic trends alone would mean that in only a few decades, one state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea would be a majority Muslim Palestinian state.

At this point, moderator Benjamin Anthony opened the floor to audience questions. Pardo was asked, in particular, to characterize the growth of China from Israel’s perspective: Is China foremost a prospective trading partner? A military rival? Is China’s growth an opportunity or a threat from Israel’s perspective? Pardo answered succinctly, but clearly: “From my perspective, Israel’s priority is the United States. Israel should be careful not to cross the rules that the United States has set, because Israel could end up losing more than it gains.” Pardo indicated that Israel should be taking its lead from the Americans with regard to China, because the special relationship with the U.S. is Israel’s most important strategic asset.

It was not only a special treat to hear from a man of Tamir Pardo’s stature, but indeed a singular honor. The man has done far more than most to ensure that Jewish blood is no longer cheap. Pardo, in my esteem, was thoughtful, self effacing, analytical, and clever in his calculations of the geopolitical costs and benefits.

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David Benger is a research fellow at Harvard University. He is a recent graduate of Harvard Law School, where he served as the chapter president of Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under the Law, and the Events Chair of the HLS Alliance for Israel, as well as an editor on the Journal of Law and Public Policy and the HLS National Security Journal.

PODCAST: Jonny Gould's Jewish State - Brendan O'Neill: Brexit, the nation state, self-determination, Israel and the hard-left

Jonny Gould's Jewish State · 51: Brendan O'Neill: Brexit, the nation state, self-determination, Israel and the hard-left

SUCCESSORS TO ABBAS ARE MARSHALING THEIR FORCES

By David Hacham

An increasingly intense struggle to succeed the aging and ailing Palestinian Authority (PA) President, Mahmoud Abbas, is underway.   

The use of armed militias may be key to a contender's success. Armed support will be needed if the power struggle turns violent. 

Such militias could be ordered to take control of symbolic government sites, like the headquarters of the PA Presidency in Ramallah, or TV and radio stations. While the PA has not clashed with such militias until now, their presence is a looming one.

Abbas, 84, is not in good health, and has been hospitalized repeatedly in recent years. His political exit could be sudden and without warning. 

The succession of power could take a variety of forms, from smooth transition to violent face-offs among the contenders.

CONTENDERS FOR SUCCESSION

Mahmoud Al-Aloul is a 70-year-old Fatah Central Committee Vice Chairman with his own militia. Originally from Nablus, Israel deported him to Jordan in 1971 due to his terrorist activities. His current position provides Al-Aloul with an advantage in the leadership struggle. His son, Jihad, was killed by Israeli forces during the Second Intifada. He enjoys a clean, uncorrupted image as a leader. 

Majed Faraj, 56, a member of a family of refugees from Dehehishe refugee camp near Bethlehem, is known to be close to Abbas, is the head of the PA's General Intelligence Service (GIS), and is a prominent candidate. He is close to Abbas, and is seen as a figure who attracts international support. Faraj has recently been the target of an assassination plot in the West Bank, which seems to signal an escalation in the succession struggle. Faraj served six years in an Israeli prison during the First Intifada. He was appointed commander of the GIS in 2009. 

Dr. Mohammed Shtayah, 62, has been the subject of increased rumors lately regarding his growing chances of succeeding Abbas. An economist by training, Shtayah has not been involved in the power struggles taking place in the Palestinian arena but he benefits from cooperation with Al-Aloul. His appointment as prime minister was interpreted by some as an attempt by Abbas to promote him as a successor. 

Dr. Saeb Erekat, 64, the chief negotiator and secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, is a well known figure but he lacks sufficient popular support and has no military backing. He also suffers from poor health, and his chances of being a viable candidate appear low. 

Dr. Nasser Al-Qudwa, 67, was the PLO's representative to the UN, and a nephew of Arafat. Qudwa enjoys the support of Fatah Central Committee Member Tawfik Tirawi, who has popular support. Al-Qudwa has served as the prime minister of the PA. 

Jibril Rajoub, 66, is the Palestinian Football Association Chairman and the Chairman of the Olympic Committee. Rajoub, a veteran political leader, has support from an armed militia. He hails from the Rajoub clan of the Mount Hebron area and has the backing of the Palestinian Preventative Security (PPS), which he once commanded. 

Marwan Barghouti, 60, is serving five life sentences for the murder of Israelis in terrorist attacks, is an outlying candidate. Barghouti enjoys popularity among young Fatah members due to his incarceration in an Israeli prison, and some believe that his path out of jail involves succeeding Abbas. He is also popular in the Gaza Strip, due his history of armed struggle. 

Muhammad Dahlan, 58, originally from the Khan Younis refugee camp in Gaza, was ejected from Fatah's ranks by Abbas in 2011. Currently exiled in the UAE, he is relatively weak in the West Bank, but maintains a strong influence over Fatah loyalists in Gaza. His standing in the Palestinian arena has strengthened in recent years, and he has formed alliances with elements in Fatah and the PA. His record of being able to secure financial support for Gaza and the West Bank via Gulf states and on behalf of NGOs has boosted Dahlan's standing. Dahlan also receives support from Egypt and maintains close ties with the Al-Sisi government, which views him as a suitable potential successor to Abbas. 

When he departs, Abbas will leave behind a mixed legacy and we will swiftly learn how the transfer of power will occur; orderly transition or violence.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.

THE UNIQUE BENEFITS OF ISRAELI-MOROCCAN NORMALIZATION

By Joshua Shushan

Yet another Muslim country has formalized peace with Israel. Morocco is the latest Arab state to establish relations, the news breaking as Jews around the world celebrated the second night of Hanukkah. The move has been applauded internationally, with Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman and other Arab nations calling King Mohammed VI of Morocco to congratulate him on this courageous leap forward into a new Middle East. With the assistance of the Trump administration, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and now Morocco have all normalized ties with Israel in recent months. Yet of all these tremendous achievements, it is perhaps Morocco that holds the greatest emotional significance among Israelis.

In the years following Israel's independence, life became untenable for the Jews of Arab lands (Mizrahim). Facing increased hostility and violence, over 850,000 Jews fled their homes, many emigrating to the nascent state of Israel. This is often forgotten among pundits of the Israeli-Arab conflict, who focus solely on the Palestinian refugee issue. The difference between these two refugee groups is that Israel embraced the Jews of Arab lands, while Arab countries largely refused to integrate Palestinian refugees. 

As many as 300,000 Jews left Morocco; while many emigrated to Canada or France, the majority arrived in Israel. These new citizens experienced considerable prejudice. The suppression of Mizrahi heritage, which was considered inferior and equated with the culture of Israel’s Arab “enemies,” led, in the early 1970s, to the formation of Israel's own ‘Black Panther’ movement, which aimed to bring the challenges of Mizrahi populations into the public sphere. Sadly, discrimination was commonplace, but Israel is slowly trying to rectify this poor legacy.

Despite these challenges, Moroccan Jews have carved their place in modern Israeli history, contributing leaders in the military, politics, science and the arts. It is estimated that about one million Israelis have at least partial Moroccan heritage. Moroccan music and cuisine have permeated Ashkenazi-dominant Israeli culture. The Moroccan custom of Mimouna, the eating of leavened bread after its prohibition during the week of Passover, has become a widely celebrated holiday in Israel. Many scholars attribute this to the ascension of the Likud party which deposed the Labor government whose policies had suppressed the Mizrahi emigres. Others point to President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem as the beginning of a thaw in monocultural dominance. The excitement over the Arab leader’s visit caused a newfound interest in the culture and heritage of the wider Middle East, and by default, Morocco. 

As with Sadat’s famous visit, normalization with Morocco signals the crumbling of walls shunning and isolating Israel from the rest of the Middle East. Nationally, it is an opportunity to celebrate Moroccan Jewry’s rich heritage, but it is much more than just that. It has often been hoped that Jews from Arab lands would be the natural bridge builders to the wider Arab world. This is the moment in history to elevate Moroccan Israelis to embrace this role. 

Furthermore, the national euphoria over normalization must be the catalyst to finally address the social injustices experienced by Mizrahi Jews. With the establishment of direct flights, Israelis with Moroccan backgrounds will be able to freely visit the cities and towns of their grandparents, and the gravesites of great rabbis and family members. We should expect to see a renaissance of Moroccan Jewish culture as educational and family trips become commonplace. The rediscovery of historical roots will result in an empowerment of those who have often felt marginalized, and lead to a psychological and emotional healing, the importance of which cannot be overstated.

The normalization of relations with Morocco has tremendous significance not only for Moroccan Israelis but also for the wider population. It can be anticipated that visits to Morocco will lead to an interest and appreciation of Maghrebi culture not only while touring Rabat, Casablanca and Fez, but also when travelers return home to Jerusalem, Tiberias and Hadera. 

While there are obvious trade, defense and intelligence sharing benefits, a fundamental yet under-appreciated factor is that Israelis with Moroccan ancestry can now proudly explore their heritage and freely visit Morocco as welcomed and respected guests. This will bolster and fortify their cultural identity, which in turn will strengthen Israeli society as a whole. 

Successful peace agreements require more than the opening of embassies and direct flights. They can only take root if and when the respective populations take an active interest in each other. We are already seeing signs of this and welcome further initiatives to bring Israel and the wider region closer to a lasting peace.

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Joshua Shushan was born in Freiburg, Germany. Joshua moved to Israel in 2013 and enlisted in the IDF where he served in the Golani Infantry Brigade. Joshua served at the Northern border, Judea and Samaria and during operation Protective Edge (2014) at the Gaza Front. He was selected for and completed the commanders course, leaving the active Army with the rank of Sergeant. He continues to serve in the IDF Army Reserves. Joshua holds a Bachelors of Arts in Government with a focus on International Relations and Middle East Studies from IDC Herzliya. He is currently pursuing a Masters of Arts in Security and Diplomacy at Tel Aviv University.

MILITARY LESSONS: ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT

By Yair Ramati

The recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which began on September 27 and ended on November 10, lasted six weeks. It offers valuable lessons for militaries worldwide.

The clash was the latest in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, but ended this time with an overwhelming Azerbaijani victory, an outcome that is a far cry from the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994), which ended in a stinging Azeri defeat. 

The history of the conflict goes all the way back to the period following World War One. During the Soviet era, Nagorno-Karabakh, despite having an ethnic Armenian majority, was governed as an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The disintegration of the Soviet Union opened the door for severe fighting that ended in 1994 through international mediation. 

The initial Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resulted in 30,000 deaths, the displacement of approximately 725,000 Azerbaijanis and between 300,000–500,000 Armenians from both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The terms of the end of that war reflected Armenia’s victory. 

Azerbaijan covers a geographical area more than two-and-a-half times greater than Armenia, and its population is more than three times the size of Armenia’s. Azerbaijan has the larger standing army and the larger number of reserves. Both sides rely mainly on Russian equipment. The armored forces of the two countries are nearly even in terms of main battle tanks. In the areas of artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sensors, precision-guided missiles, and air defense - the Azeri side enjoys superiority.

It now appears safe to conclude that Azerbaijan’s preparations for the 2020 conflict succeeded in giving it a significant qualitative edge. Baku achieved this by diversifying its military procurement. In recent years, Azerbaijan has sought multiple partners rather than rely on Russia as a sole supplier for technological arms purchases. It has reached out to Europe, Turkey, China, Israel, and others. 

Baku's focus was on purchasing high-tech weaponry required for battlefield superiority. Its superior resources and strategic insights gave it a significant qualitative technological edge over Armenia. 

The latest conflict can be divided into four consecutive phases. In the first phase, both sides inflicted mutual blows in a relatively balanced fight. The Armenian forces destroyed dozens of Azerbaijani tanks and APCs while their air defenses downed aircraft, UAV, and commando helicopters. The Azeris, on the other hand, used armed UAVs and loitering munitions to fight back, but made little, if any, progress on the ground.

In the second phase, which followed a successful Azerbaijani suppression of Armenian front-line air defense assets, the dominant battle pattern emerged. Armed Azerbaijani UAVs, loitering munitions, and attack helicopters were able to implement their close-air support plan and effectively target Armenian ground forces, while Azerbaijani ground forces made some advances. 

In the third phase, Armenia began launching a barrage of inaccurate ballistic missiles toward major cities in Azerbaijan out of frustration, as the Azerbaijanis used their armed UAV and loitering munitions for the systematic attrition of Armenian forces while their ground forces continued to make initial gains. 

In the fourth and final phase, high intensity fire was used by both sides. The Armenians fired rockets and missiles at Azerbaijani cities, while the Azerbaijani army continued with its advances from the north (minimal) and the deep penetration in the south of Nagorno-Karabakh, along the border with Iran. 

Precision-guided weapons played a key role in the battlefield, including short and long-range anti-tank guided missiles, loitering munitions, guided rockets ,and tactical missiles. 

The fighting also demonstrated that drone (UAV) warfare is an essential element in the art of modern warfare. It was Azerbaijan that deployed most of the drones in the war, with its military reportedly operating drones purchased from Turkey, and Israeli Harop suicide drones (loitering munitions). Armenian armed forces could only defend against these using their limited number of modern surface-to-air missiles. 

While Armenia was able to shoot down 25 Azerbaijani drones, the attrition rate was in favor of Azerbaijan, due to its combined use of drones and loitering munitions. 

Both sides used heavy artillery rockets as well as tactical missiles. Armenia's arsenal included Russian-made SCUD-B, SS-21 and Iskander tactical missiles, while the Azerbaijanis, according to reports, used Soviet-made Smerch 300 mm rockets and precision guided projectiles, including Israeli EXTRA long-range rockets and LORA high precision missiles.

Most of the Armenian long-range strikes targeted civilian centers while the Azerbaijanis used their precision arsenal for deep strikes against military infrastructure targets, such as S-300 air defense batteries. Azerbaijan did not have any alert system in place for its civilian population prior to hostile projectile impact, nor did it possess any intercept capabilities.

During the second, third and fourth phase of the fighting, the Armenians used (either directly or via Russian proxies) modern electronic countermeasure equipment. 

In addition, the entire battlefield in Nagorno-Karabakh experienced severe satellite GPS/GLONASS signal denial. This combination had an adverse impact on various precision-guided weapon systems that rely on continuous GPS signals and data-links. This may have contributed to the relatively high number of lost UAVs and loitering munitions.  

Hackers from Armenia, Azerbaijan and their respective allies actively participated in the cyber arena, targeting official sites, posting misinformation, or even trying to attack defense sites. 

Azerbaijan was able to suppress the mobile Armenian air defense force, but this took at least four days and came at the cost of significant losses. Once this was achieved, the picture on the battlefield changed dramatically, presenting a clear Azerbaijani advantage. 

In summary, small-scale conflicts such as the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war can tell other militaries a lot about preparations and operational implementation. 

A robust procurement strategy, along with state-of-the-art technology, the approach adopted by Azerbaijan, pays off. 

The conflict also demonstrated how new media and extensive propaganda campaigns are an integral aspect of 21st century armed conflicts. 

Finally,  the conflict exposed the fact that without effective and modern 360-degree air defense, all ground forces are subject to a high rate of attrition. Countries that wish to secure their ground forces must procure modern air defenses capable of handling the precision threats of the new battlefield.

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel.

Europe’s ruling on ritual slaughter is factually wrong and legally problematic

By Mark Goldfeder

Last week the European Court of Justice ruled that authorities in European countries may ban the practice of ritual slaughter to promote animal welfare.

The ruling was factually wrong, legally problematic, discriminatorily hypocritical and systemically dangerous.

The case arose in Belgium, where it is now illegal to slaughter livestock that have not first been stunned into unconsciousness, despite the fact that both Muslim Halal and Jewish kosher rituals require the animal to be uninjured when it is slaughtered, and the common methods of stunning are nothing if not injurious.

To be clear, the word ‘stun’ is something of a euphemism in this context. The most common pre-slaughter stunning methods include the use of captive bolt guns, which shoot a steel bolt into the animal’s brain, electrical stunning, which involves sending a high voltage electric current through the animal’s brain and/or heart, and CO2 stunning, in which the animals are gassed and eventually either fall unconscious or die through hypoxia or asphyxia – but not instantaneously. On the flipside, kosher ritual slaughter (shechita) requires the use of a special razor-sharp elongated blade that severs the trachea and esophagus of the animal in one fluid motion, causing instantaneous loss of blood pressure, so that the animal feels nothing.

Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union guarantees religious liberty and freedom. Article 52, entitled ‘Scope and interpretation of rights and principles’ requires that “Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”

No one is arguing that animal welfare is not an important topic. Jewish law, for example, forbids unnecessary cruelty to animals, and sees this as a Biblical mandate. As such, there are incredibly strict requirements that kosher slaughter be humane, and the same is true for Halal.

That is why the ruling was factually wrong. The Court’s starting premise was that “a scientific consensus has emerged that prior stunning is the optimal means of reducing the animal’s suffering at the time of killing.” There is no such scientific consensus. Research done by Dr. Temple Grandin, perhaps the world’s leading expert on the humane treatment of animals for slaughter, found that when shechita is done properly the animals show little or no stress reaction to the ritual cut before losing consciousness. In her words, “It appears that the animal is not aware that its throat has been cut.” There is no evidence that kosher slaughter is in any way ‘crueler’ than stunning.

The ruling was also deeply problematic from a legal perspective. As to whether such a ban would be “necessary” the Court decided to treat that word so broadly as to render it meaningless. Having acknowledged that “where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued,” and that “other measures, less drastic than a ban on slaughtering without prior stunning, could somewhat limit the negative impact of that method of slaughter on animal welfare,” the Court then did what no secular Justice should ever attempt to do.

In a truly incredible act of uninformed hubris, the Court told the learned members of the Jewish and Islamic faiths that under the Court’s own reading of the religious rites, they should all be fine with a stunning requirement, and that the ban depriving Belgium’s 500,000 Muslims and 30,000 Jews the right to engage in their religious requirements does not, therefore, constitute a disproportionate interference with their freedom of religion.

The ruling was also deeply hypocritical in the way it disposed of the applicants’ discrimination challenge. The Court acknowledged that there is no similar provision requiring prior-stunning before killing animals in the context of hunting and recreational fishing activities or during cultural or sporting events, but dismissed that disparity because those are not food production activities, a distinction with no practical difference.

The Court reasoned that “if the concepts of ‘hunting’ and ‘recreational fishing’ are not to be rendered meaningless, it cannot be argued that those activities are capable of being carried out in respect of animals which have been stunned beforehand.” Incredibly, mere paragraphs after self-assuredly redefining religious slaughter to the faithful, the Court could not conceive of saying the same thing to recreational fishermen about their favorite pastime.

That is why the ruling sets such a dangerous precedent for religious groups in European countries. It demonstrates an utter lack of respect for religious tradition and a willingness to dispose of religious rights in the name of fealty to dubious scientific claims and shifting cultural whims. The message such a ruling sends is that religious minorities are not welcome in the EU. One can only hope that the European Court of Human Rights, where the applicants now turn, issues its own corrective, and the European Court of Justice reconsiders its overreach.

Otherwise, it may be open hunting (which apparently can’t be limited,) on European religious rights.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations.

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