Jenin Operation Was Successful, But Israel needs a strategy.

By YAIR GOLAN

The two-day IDF raid on Jenin, which, unusually, began with the activation of UAV air strikes, was an operational and tactical success but strategically will change nothing so long as Israel’s government remains on its current course.

The decision to send a brigade-sized Israeli military force to deal with a security hot spot in the West Bank is not as new as it might seem; This was done regularly in 2005 (I led operations like this as commander of the Judea and Samaria Division), at the end of the Second Intifada.

Ahead of Operation Home and Garden, which took place July 3 and 4, the IDF and Shin Bet diligently collected the needed intelligence and decided to use UAVs to strike targets that were physically difficult to reach in the opening phase of the operation – representing good adjustment of munitions to challenges.

Operationally, the IDF successfully learned from recent past failures and improved its responses to security challenges. Previously, in Jenin and Nablus, IDF operations featuring ordinary infantry units in small numbers produced very high levels of friction with Palestinians, resulting in Palestinian noncombatant deaths and escalating the situation instead of stabilizing it.  

The IDF Central Command and the Judea and Samaria Division Headquarters concluded that there was a gap in their operational readiness and decided to instead send in the best of Israel’s special forces. As a result of the use of these highly skilled units, trained for this very challenge, there were no noncombatant deaths in the Jenin operation.

The terrorists of Jenin lost their motivation to confront the IDF when it sent its elite units in. Despite the tragic death of a soldier from the Egoz unit, F.-Sgt. David Yitzchak, in the operation, the elite IDF forces completed their mission of destroying extensive terrorist infrastructures in the city.

Strategically, however, a major gap exists between the sober and responsible approach taken by the heads of Israel’s defense establishment-- who understand that there is no silver bullet against terrorism and who seek greater involvement by the Palestinian Authority on the ground -- and the Israeli government, which lacks any strategy at best, and which contains elements that have messianic aspirations at worst.

While the IDF General Staff and Central Command understand that ‘mowing the lawn’ is necessary on occasion, the political echelon is marketing the operation as a paradigm shift – and in doing so is promoting a baseless claim.

The government in Israel today is paralyzed, and its approach to the West Bank cannot be clearly discerned. In 2020, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the Trump peace plan. The plan’s merits and faults can be debated legitimately, but it is a partition plan, which bypasses the painful issue of evacuating settlements and offers the Palestinians land compensation, including land from the Negev that would be annexed to the Gaza Strip.

Today, however, Netanyahu leads a coalition that is making every effort, including by elements like Finance Minister and Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich, to advance full Israeli annexation of the West Bank.

Smotrich adheres to a vision he laid out in 2017, according to which, Israel will exercise full control of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea; Palestinians who choose to live under Israeli rule will receive subject status, but not citizenship, those who decide to leave will be encouraged, and those who reject both options will be fought.

Who should we believe when it comes to West Bank policy? Netanyahu or Smotrich?

In all his years in power, Netanyahu has never made a strategic decision on this, the most sensitive of issues. Every day that Israel fails to decide, events on the ground decide for it, and the situation is drifting toward a one-state nightmare.

The overall silence in Israel over this state of affairs means that a minority on the far right has been able to force its view on the majority, leading to de facto annexation, fueled by a messianic ideology.

Those who believe Israel can annex millions of Palestinians are clueless about Israel’s international reality, dependence on the United States, and need for international trade.

Meanwhile, on the Palestinian side, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad extremists are leading Palestinians to disaster. The result is that in the absence of any change of strategy, the area is heading toward further bloodshed, regardless of how successful the Jenin operation was at the tactical and operative levels.

It was Carl von Clausewitz who said that war is “a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means.” Military achievements are supposed to serve as the basis of political achievements, but if this does not happen, their effects erode quickly.

The deep emotional ties held by Jews to the West Bank, known in Israel as Judea and Samaria, are completely understandable; the region is the cradle of Jewish civilization, and there can be no way to unlink Jews from sites like the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, or Shiloh, where the Bible tells us of seminal events in Jewish history. The land historically belongs to the Jewish people.

But this cannot translate into a reality in which Israel controls millions of Palestinians, a reality which, if unchanged, will eventually create international pressure that will lead to Israel’s collapse.

Hence, the operation in Jenin should be seen for what it is; the product of a highly competent military and intelligence community, capable of mapping out and dealing with security threats, but no substitute for real and needed strategy on the future of the West Bank. 

Maj.-Gen. Yair Golan (ret.) is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He is a former deputy IDF chief of staff, and is Israel’s deputy minister of economics and industry. Read full bio here.

 

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Stop The Nonsense

By JUSTIN POZMANTER

It has now been over half a year of the ongoing fight over the judiciary in Israel. At this point, it is hard to conclude which side has lost the script to a greater degree.

 Israel is a democracy, and a very imperfect and messy one at that.

One side says there is a tyranny of the justices, the other says that if reform passes Israel will become a dictatorship. Both claims are dangerous and hyperbolic nonsense.

Israel’s judiciary does not function as it should. It is too powerful and relies on murky or undefined legal structures such as “reasonableness” to justify ruling as it pleases and to get involved in matters it shouldn’t. It is desperately in need of reform.

However, with it functioning as it has, Israelis and Israel’s supporters, across the political spectrum, have proudly stated for decades that we are the only democracy in the Middle East and touted our values and freedoms to the world…and we were correct in doing so.

Despite the need for reform of the judiciary, the reform put forward by the current coalition has been done sloppily, with a heavy hand and is a gross overreach.

But even if there is an over-correction that is democratically damaging, a legislature elected in free and fair democratic elections with too much power rather than an unelected judiciary with too much power does not a dictatorship make.

When you hear either side screaming about a coup, questioning the legitimacy of democratically elected officials, or claiming everything they don’t like is equal to a dictatorship, anarchy or a lack of loyalty to the country, it says a lot more about the speaker than it does the process of selecting judges or the precise application of legal doctrine.

It isn’t a coincidence that the very same people leading the protests were those leading the anti-Netanyahu protests years before the reform was introduced, or he was indicted. Nor is it a coincidence that those who are the most uncompromising on the reform are the same people who for years have slandered anyone to their left (which is nearly the whole country) as traitorous leftists.

It usually tells you more about how these “leaders”, a term that should be used very lightly, feel about the PEOPLE they oppose than the judicial system or legislation they support. They either don’t like those who have been in power for years (secular and Ashkenazi) or they are afraid of those who may be in power for years to come (religious, traditional, Mizrachi). Opposing, or overzealously supporting, people or personalities rather than ideas or policies is almost always a recipe for disaster.

This is not to attack on those protesting. The rights to free speech and assembly and the right to protest that flows from them are as fundamental as any rights that exist in a democracy. And I believe most protestors’ hearts are in the right place – in support or opposition. But it only takes about five minutes observing either side to see there is a sharp divide on religious/secular/Ashkenazi/Mizrachi lines which should give any sincere activist pause.

The real danger is not in the current judiciary or in potential reform. It is losing the very thing that allows Israel to survive against sometimes daunting challenges – our sense of shared purpose.

I was recently in the United States having a conversation over dinner about the dangers of social media for kids. Someone made the point that sometimes social media is positive for teenagers because it can give them a sense of community and purpose, they feel they are lacking.

I responded that may be true, but that I didn’t think it applied to Israel to the same degree. Israelis – with of course many, many individual and sectoral exceptions - generally feel a part of something larger, something to which they belong and are willing to fight to protect. That shared sense of purpose has allowed Israelis to overcome nearly constant economic, diplomatic and, of course, military and strategic challenges for years.

Later that evening in my hotel room I felt an overwhelming sense of unease that maybe what I was so sure of, what makes Israel such a special and resilient place, is nothing near a sure thing, not just long-term, but even in the immediate future.

The greatest risk of the fight over the judicial reform is that it seems to be a far more intense and comprehensive proxy battle for the other serious challenges pulling at the fabric of Israeli society. Isn’t it odd that the battle lines on this issue are so clearly drawn on religious/secular, Ashkenazi/Mizrachi, center/periphery lines?

There really should be no connection between sectors on this issue. Smart people can disagree on the relationship between branches of government, but there is no reason why where you come down on judicial power should be so directly connected to your salary, neighborhood, where or if you pray, or where your grandparents were born.  

How did we get here? Maybe the country was never as cohesive as we’d like to believe. Maybe it’s a consequence of greater polarization across the western world to which Israel isn’t immune. Or maybe Israel itself has in fact changed.

Two things are clear: 1. The blame game is pointless. There are many culprits, and nobody will admit anyone on their side is one of them; and 2. Israel won’t be the Israel that any patriotic Israeli or passionate Zionist anywhere in the world wants if we don’t find our sense of common purpose. I only hope we still can.

Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

 

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Geo-political changes are challenging Israel’s strategic position

By DORON TAMIR

Israel is facing new strategic challenges as the result of international and regional geo-political developments, and events on the home front. The Israeli government should take note of these paradigm shifts and act systemically to counter them.

Globally, the Russian – Ukrainian war is increasingly a source of concern, together with challenges from China that are pulling the United States away from the Middle East, thereby negatively affecting Israel’s regional status.

With Russia escalating the war further, stability on the European continent is far from assured. The recent NATO-run multi-national air exercise is a late attempt by the West to boost deterrence against Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Disturbingly, the question of how far Putin is willing to go when pushed into a corner remains unanswered. These events have created shock waves for the global system and have also directly affected Israel’s hi-tech sector due to disruptions in supply chains.

The world’s banks and investment firms are anxiously looking at the conflict’s after-effects, coming so soon after the coronavirus pandemic.

Regionally, in the Middle East, paradigm shifts are underway: Saudi Arabia is talking to Iran, as is Egypt, and Syria’s President Bashar Assad, a mass murderer, has suddenly become a regional darling. Meanwhile, Israel is being increasingly endangered by the arsenal and actions of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon.

As the U.S. is focused on new tensions in the South China Sea and Russia, its weakness in the Middle East is the elephant in the room. The Biden administration’s successive failures in engaging with Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt plays directly into the hands of the Iranian led axis. 

In the Middle East, Israel’s traditional Arab partners – Egypt and Jordan – continue to maintain good cooperation with it, but Jordan’s ruler, King Abdullah II, is facing an increasingly difficult domestic position due to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict and sensitivities over Jerusalem.

Israel needs to be more attentive to Abdullah’s predicaments, since Jordan forms a crucial aspect of regional stability. This means ensuring the status quo remains unchallenged in the Temple Mount, for example, and avoiding irresponsible moves in this sector.

Egypt’s cooperation with Israel, despite the tragic terrorist attack launched by a rogue Egyptian border guard, remains a major strategic asset for both countries and a pillar of stability.

On the other hand, the fact that Saudi Arabia has established new ties with Iran is deeply troubling and is reflection America’s regional weakness.

Meanwhile, domestically, Israel has experienced unprecedented domestic instability and crisis over the government’s legal reform initiative. This has frightened American, European, and other investment firms.

Israel’s hi-tech sector, the main engine of the national economy, is robust, but it would be wrong to pretend that it has not suffered a major blow due to the domestic instability. Investment in Israeli hi-tech is at a five-year low.

In Europe, Israel’s situation is complex, with some countries, particularly in the center and east of the continent, supporting Israel, while others are growing increasingly critical of the Jewish state. The European Union in general is quite hostile to Israel, although Germany, the most powerful state in the EU, remains politically supportive, despite the erosion in Israel’s image there.

When taken together, a strategic deterioration is the inevitable conclusion.

To counteract these trends, the first and most important action that Israel should take is to strengthen its alliance with the United States. While ongoing cooperation in the military and intelligence spheres remain strong, political-diplomatic tensions between Washington and Jerusalem are eroding Israel’s overall strategic situation.

Bilateral defense ties can, over time, be affected by bad winds blowing from the relationship between the governments, and this is a risk that Israel should not take.

To be sure, the U.S. also gains from its military alliance with Israel, gleaning intelligence information that is supremely valuable for American security.

But the extraordinary alliance must be based not just on shared interests; it must also be based on shared values.

Be it access to world-leading F-35 jets, or to American support in the United Nations Security Council, the idea that Israel can get by without its alliance with America is simply detached from reality, despite the belief in this concept in some sections of the extreme Israeli Right.

Israel must take steps to stabilize its own political system and economy. It needs to resurrect the image of a strong, stable Israel, which knows what it wants and has clear strategic goals. To be seen again as a country with a prosperous hi-tech sector that is worthwhile allying with Israel must regain its stability. 

Moreover, Israel should pursue the goal of formalizing ties with Saudi Arabia, strengthening ties with Abraham Accord states, and decreasing tensions with Jordan.

Relations with these states are highly fragile and are subject to almost immediate changes each time significant developments occur in the Palestinian arena.

The Palestinian issue cannot, for its part, remain sidelined forever. Time is not on Israel’s side on this matter. Sooner or later, Israel will have to make strategic, fateful decisions on how it proceeds vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

The era of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is ending, and Israel must see what kind of leadership will take his place in Ramallah.

To be clear, there is no silver bullet solution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, particularly with Hamas ruling Gaza. But there are steps available to Israel and the PA that can neutralize and decrease much of the current tensions.

The Israeli government has much work at hand to reverse the current trend, and to begin improving Israel’s strategic situation.

Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

 

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How Far Will Israel Go For Normalization With Saudi Arabia?

By Tomer Barak

In recent weeks, talk of progress in the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with American mediation, has resurfaced in the media.

The discourse on the subject follows two main focal points. The first is the apparent Saudi effort to show pragmatism, signaling to both the United States and Israel that 'there is something to talk about'. The goal is to score points in Washington, and as a result, receive various benefits.

The very fact that such positive Saudi voices exist, whether they have merit or not, has an impact on preparing the Arab street for some movement toward Israel in the future.

At the same time, growing voices in Israel and the U.S. are arguing that a new window of opportunity has opened for normalization.

A second media talking point focuses on the demands and conditions placed by Saudi Arabia for progress to be made. This discussion also brings to light the hurdles that stand in the way of the desired breakthrough.

This discussion focuses on four core Saudi demands:

The first is the need to complete the rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) in the U.S., as well as bring about a change in the broader American political perception of Saudi Arabia.  Both have been tarnished in Washington in recent years following the murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the war in Yemen, and more.

Mainly within the Democratic Party, Saudi Arabia is viewed as part of the problem in the Middle East, and not as part of the solution.

President Joe Biden will have to carefully consider his steps and decide whether the political achievements inherent in an Israeli-Saudi breakthrough are worth the political price he could pay in an election year.

The second challenge concerns a Saudi armament and security wish list containing advanced U.S. military capabilities and other security guarantees. In this context, the US will have to balance the preservation of Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), in accordance with American law, and with Biden's deep commitment to this principle -- as well as with the desire to strengthen an important regional partner as part of the regional campaign against Iran and the problematic Saudi track record regarding the improper use of U.S.-made weaponry in the Yemen war.

This balancing act will require a discourse with Israel, which for its part will also need to make decisions on how far it will acquiesce to Saudi expectations and refrain from objecting to arms sales to Riyadh, and whether it is prepared to make an active effort to counter objections in Congress.

The third challenge deals with Saudi aspirations to advance the Kingdom's civilian nuclear program. These aspirations include aspects of uranium enrichment on Saudi territory.

U.S. and Israeli officials have voiced over the years similar concerns regarding the proliferation of civilian nuclear technologies that could be converted into military capabilities. That is especially true in a country that has a history of hiding military capabilities and has cooperated with China on long-range surface-to-surface missile development.

The U.S. outline for an acceptable pathway for Riyadh on civilian nuclear progress, based on a limited model (like the one taken by the UAE, which gave up on uranium enrichment on its soil), is unacceptable to the Saudis.

The danger is that it will seek to develop its nuclear program via non-Western channels (China or Russia). Even if Riyadh does not create a linkage between the normalization process and progress in its civilian nuclear program, in the current situation, where China is gaining ground in the region, it makes sense for the U.S. (in coordination with Israel) to create a compromise sphere. In this sphere, Riyadh could implement its ambitions in a broader manner, but under very strict supervision mechanisms.

The final challenge is the Palestinian arena. On the surface, the escalation in recent weeks in the West Bank and the Israeli government's moves create an insurmountable obstacle for the Saudi leadership regarding any progress in the normalization process.

In the background is King Salman's traditional position, which places the issue as a main topic, unlike his son who is largely tired of the Palestinian issue and sees it as merely disruptive. Assumably, MBS would settle for a prolonged lull that would allow him to make progress in normalization.

It should be noted that the issue of the Palestinians has and continues to come up in American discourse on normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia -- though in this case, this seems to be the result of some leveraging the normalization option to pressure the Israeli government.

Some observers believe that the Palestinian issue can be placed on a lower level of prioritization and 'bypassed' through a series of relatively limited Israeli moves -- but even then, it is not certain that all members of the current Israeli government would see the moves in that way. Prime Minister Netanyahu could, however, try to market the political profit of such a maneuver and lead to their approval by his government.

So where do things stand?

There is no doubt that normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia is an important and very lucrative goal. There is good reason that it is considered the 'holy grail' of the Middle East peace process.

The process would, in theory and practice, constitute official confirmation of Israel's acceptance in the Middle East, and mark the end of the era of hostility with the Sunni bloc.

Normalization agreements would be accompanied by economic and other agreements that will create many options when it comes to regional connectivity, business cooperation, the development of interconnected infrastructure in transport and energy, joint climate crisis adaptation, and more.

In the face of the common Iranian threat, the security dimension is also of great importance. However, dangers are inherent in Saudi security and nuclear demands.

Points of balance can be found between Israel’s security needs and Saudi ambitions, as well as the common desire to build a regional system against Iran.

But it must be clear - Even if the U.S. is willing to go the extra mile toward MBS and even if the Palestinian issue is somehow set aside, Israel cannot and must not compromise on two basic demands: the preservation of its QME, and the prevention, or very tight monitoring, of any Saudi nuclear capability that could potentially enable development of military nuclear capabilities.

Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

 

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Lessons from the Ukraine war

 

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

Many lessons are emerging from Russia’s war on Ukraine, some of which are of much interest to Israel.

One key lesson Israel can learn at this stage is that its decision to install various defenses on armored vehicles is critical and will likely enable the success of future Israeli ground maneuvers—unlike those of Russia and Ukraine.

Before continuing, it is important to issue a disclaimer: The attempt to apply lessons from the war in Ukraine to the Middle East is by nature complex. Among other things, the two regions do not share the same geography, climate, population or adversarial forces.

At the same time, as the war in Ukraine goes on, strategists worldwide are busy taking notes and looking for tactical and strategic insights that can be applied elsewhere—and the same is true in Israel.

So, what can we learn?

During the initial stage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the war was marked by the failure of the Russian armored ground offensive, which invaded from the north towards Kyiv.

With time, we gradually learned that the offensive failed mainly due to logistical issues: Fuel and ammunition ran out and hundreds of tanks, APCs and trucks were abandoned or destroyed. Only some of these vehicles were hit and destroyed by anti-tank weapons, mainly Javelin missiles, which are devastatingly effective. It seems that armored maneuvers on long roads in dense anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) environments became too costly.

Israel, in contrast, has equipped a significant part of its armored brigades with active protection systems. This means Israeli maneuverability is relatively protected.

At the same time, using man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), the Ukrainian military brought down about 200 Russian attack helicopters and close air-support craft.

Israeli close air support relies on stand-off precision strike munitions that eliminate the need to fly low and close.

In the first three weeks of the war, Ukraine used its Turkish armed UAVs—TB-2 Bayraktars. Their effectiveness was marginal and Russian air defenses downed the entire Ukrainian fleet fairly quickly. Is this scenario currently applicable to Middle Eastern arenas? For now, the likely answer is not yet.

With Russia failing to destroy all of Ukraine’s air defenses, it resorted to using huge numbers of cruise missiles—over 5,000—and hundreds of ballistic missiles to attack deep in Ukraine. This was before Iranian-made UAVs joined in the Russian attacks.

At first, Ukraine’s air defense systems struggled to intercept the cruise missiles, giving the Russians deep-strike precision stand-off capabilities for a while. But gradually, starting at the end of 2022, Western air defenses replaced the older Ukrainian Soviet-made systems, and Kyiv could shoot cruise missiles out of the sky alongside ballistic missiles and Iranian Shahed 131/136 UAVs. The U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) 3 shot down  a few of Russia’s hypersonic Kinzhal missiles.

The arrival of the Shahed Iranian-made suicide drones, first used in Sept. 2019 against Saudi Aramco facilities, gave Russia a cheap, low-flying, precise firepower capability, which, together with the cruise missiles, are emptying out expensive Ukrainian air defense ammunition.

The warning here for Israel is clear. On the bright side, however, Israel’s Iron Dome interceptors are relatively cheap—up to 50 can be purchased for the cost of a single PAC 3 interceptor.

The bigger question for Israel stemming from the Russia-Ukraine war is whether Israel is correctly balancing its spending on armaments per million dollars as opposed to platforms. For example, should Israel purchase another squadron of F-35 fighter jets or spend the money on many more joint direct ammunition (JDAM) surface-to-air bombs, Iron Dome interceptors and 155-millimeter shells?

Meanwhile, Russia has fielded its own loitering munitions. One system, the Zala KYB, proved to be not very effective. The second, the Kalashnikov Lancet 3, has met with more success against Ukrainian targets such as radar installations, tanks, APCs and various air defense assets.

Ultimately, Russia’s long-range firepower threat remains substantial and Ukraine is using up ammunition in its air defenses at an alarming rate.

Ukraine, for its part, is missing key components in its arsenal that the United States has so far failed to deliver, such as heavy ground combat main battle tanks—the first Abrams tanks are not scheduled to arrive until the end of 2023)—aerial transport planes and long-range missiles.

However, Ukraine has made good use of anti-radiation missiles, such as high-speed radiation missiles (HARMs) that target enemy air defense radars and artillery-directing radars.

Ukraine is also heavily reliant on two types of U.S.-provided surface-to-surface guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS). There are two types: The M-142 launcher—a high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMAR)—and the M-270 guided rocket launcher.

Both of those systems provide Ukraine with a high and effective strike rate. The Russians are unable to intercept these weapons, forcing them to move their positions back from the front. This includes the relocation of key military headquarters and arms storage centers.

Ukraine has also received the Storm Shadow cruise missile from Britain, with a 250-kilometer range. The effectiveness of this weapon shows how important long-range, precision stand-off munitions are in modern warfare.

The West generally lacks precise surface-to-surface armaments that can reach targets 400 kilometers away. The U.S.’s own systems reach only around 300 kilometers, and they have yet to be delivered to Ukraine.

Israel, in contrast, has a range of high-precision long-range rockets in its inventory.

While the American weapons industry is supplying Ukraine with huge amounts of equipment and the White House keeps pumping cash into the Ukrainian war effort, it must be clear to Israel that no such precedent would be followed in its case. Israel will have to stand on its own two feet in the event of a major war.

Ukraine has 45 million people, not counting the five million refugees who have left the country. Russia's population is some 150 million. This means that both countries can put large numbers of soldiers on the ground. They have both sustained huge losses, but Ukraine has proven its long-standing fighting power, unity and national resilience.

These factors are not relevant to Israel, which can neither sustain such losses nor absorb warfare for that long without a rapid endgame due to its small geographical size and population. In Israel’s case, a ground maneuver will be essential as soon as the war begins.

The international community may condemn or even try to intervene in response to significant civilian casualties in a future Middle East war. Therefore, careful Israeli planning and strategic decision-making are crucial to executing a successful offensive while minimizing collateral damage.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief: Terror Attack, Israel-Iran & The Economy

By Yaakov Lappin

Israel mourned four of its civilians on June 20 after they were murdered in a Palestinian shooting terror attack at a gas station near the settlement of Eli in Samaria. Armed with M-16s, two Palestinian gunmen affiliated with Hamas, but not official members of it, conducted the attack.

An armed Israeli bystander killed one of the terrorists at the scene, while the other escaped and two hour later was located and killed by a team of Israeli special forces and Shin Bet agents.

The attack is the latest escalation in what has been a long-standing deterioration of the security situation in the northern West Bank, prompting growing calls for a larger security operation.

The first signs of a new Israeli approach to security in the region emerged on June 21, when an Israeli unmanned aerial vehicle struck a vehicle carrying Palestinian gunmen on the way to carry out a terrorist attack, according to the IDF and Shin Bet.

Two days earlier, the Israel Defense Forces had to call in air assistance in the form of an Apache helicopter strike to assist stranded ground forces in Jenin on June 19

The use of air support reflects the worsening nature of the fighting in Samaria, where a routine security operation to arrest two terror suspects, one from Hamas and one from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, became entangled.

IDF and Border Police forces raided Jenin camp and engaged in intense exchanges of fire that resulted in the deaths of four to five Palestinian combatants. They, in turn, detonated powerful IEDs that caused a number of Israeli Panther armored vehicles to become stranded. Eight Israeli security personnel were injured in the incident.

When an IDF helicopter sent in to evacuate the wounded personnel came under fire, IDF commanders sent in air reinforcements, to enable the evacuation to proceed.

Looking at the bigger picture, it is clear that Jenin is out of control and that the likelihood of a large-scale IDF operation there is growing with time.

The Palestinian Authority in practice has no presence there, and it has become a major base of operations for terrorists, not only locally, but also from across the West Bank, who view it as a refuge. It seems that both terrorists and arms are flowing into the city.

The linkage between political instability and Israeli economic performance

After Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on June 18 that his coalition administration would go ahead with parts of its controversial judicial reform program, the shekel lost value, and Israeli shares were trading between losses and gains.

On June 19, a day after Netanyahu’s statement, the shekel fell as low as 3.61 to the dollar and was trading at 3.60 at the close of trade.

The blue-chip TA-35 index on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange was flat, while the benchmark TA-125 index fell 0.1%, the Times of Israel reported. The TA-5 Bank Index was down 0.4%, and the TA-Finance Index was down 0.6%.

The report cited Sabina Levy, head of research at Leader Capital Markets, as stating that volatility around trading in the exchange rate was mainly influenced by comments from Israeli government officials and reports around the plans for the judicial reform.

This is the latest unmistakable sign that Israel’s economy needs political stability and consensus politics if it is to continue to perform well, and that political instability threatens Israel’s economic future in a strategic manner.

The Israeli – Iranian arms race

On June 14th, Israeli defense company Rafael revealed that it is working on a new missile interceptor dubbed "Sky Sonic," which is specifically intended to counter the new threat of hypersonic missiles. The announcement came days after Iran announced that it is working on its first hypersonic missile, which it said is highly maneuverable and unpredictable.

Hypersonic missiles travel at high speeds like ballistic missiles do, but unlike ballistic missiles, employ high maneuverability to take unpredictable courses to their targets.

Ahead of the globally important Paris Air Show, Rafael released a statement calling its new interceptor a groundbreaking defensive response to the growing threat of hypersonic missiles.

A "major technological leap" with "exceptional maneuverability and high-speed capabilities," Sky Sonic "neutralizes hypersonic missiles, which travel at ten times the speed of sound, with unmatched precision and stealth," the company stated.

The interceptor operates above the 20-kilometer mark and below the 100-kilometer level, where hypersonic threats are active, and where current air defense systems are not.

According to the sources, the interceptor is programmed to intercept at an altitude and location that allows air defenders to avoid needing to know the precise onward trajectory of the threat, representing a breakthrough in air defenses.

A reliable source stated, "At that altitude, it doesn't matter where it [the threat] is going."

 When the system detects a hypersonic threat, the kill vehicle splits from the booster body and rapidly travels to a designated interception point.

Rafael sources further explained that the three-year development of Sky Sonic has been funded by the firm’s own research and development funds,  

According to the sources, the kill vehicle is equipped with its own sensors, but they would not elaborate on what those sensors are. The system will rely on a completely integrated "sky picture" provided by several radars, they added.

The system was presented to the US Missile Defense Agency.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Israel Tour For U.S. & Canadian Military Cadets, 2023

By ETGAR LEFKOVITS

Nearly 50 American and Canadian military cadets toured Israel and German death camps in Poland this month, in a trip that seeks to buttress the future officers’ awareness of the history and shared values at the core of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

The two-week Israel Strategy and Policy tour, which was initiated by the New York-based MirYam Institute in partnership with the U.S. Defense Department, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the Virginia Military Institute and the Royal Military College of Canada, presented past and present to the future officers.

The cadets’ trip began with a three-day tour of the Nazi death camps, followed by 12 days spent crisscrossing Israel, taking in the sights and meeting with IDF soldiers and commanders.

For the non-Jewish cadets on the tour, the country’s size, diversity, mix of modernity and ancient, and the inseparable integration of the people’s army that is the IDF, came as a revelation.

“I was surprised flying in how much smaller Israel is compared to the U.S. and how densely packed everything is,” said Ian M., 19, from Cincinnati, Ohio, a cadet at West Point. “I was struck by the mix of the modern infrastructure in such an historic place.”

Sohum A., 21, a future infantry officer from New Jersey, also attends the United States Military Academy at West Point.

“I was surprised by how in such a small country you have widely different people and cultures who through thousands of years of history maintained their own identity while simultaneously living in close proximity,” he said.

Macy H., 21, from Seattle, also a cadet at West Point, said, “I knew that the IDF was a conscripted army but it is amazing how the IDF is part of society and how society is the army, and how integrated and inseparable the two are.”

Melina B., 19, from North Carolina and the Virginia Military Institute, offered, “The passion that Israelis have for their country and maintaining this place where they seek refuge and are able to be free even though there are wars is striking.”

Mission-ready academies

The cadets came from a wide variety of backgrounds across the U.S., as well as a handful from Canada. They will be integrated across the military including, for the Americans, the Marines, the U.S. Army’s Armor and Infantry Branches, and the U.S. Navy during their multi-year service.

The trip sidestepped the Palestinian territories due to State Department-imposed security restrictions that did not allow them to enter the biblical heartland.

(Active duty officers on a separate tour that MirYam offers are provided with helicopter rides and briefings over Judea and Samaria, commonly known as the West Bank.)

“We seek to impact the leaders of today and tomorrow now,” MirYam CEO Benjamin Anthony said in a statement. “By exposing these officers to the broad array of policymaking considerations in Israel we assist the academies with their goal of building mission-ready academies.”

MirYam has brought hundreds of cadets and officers to Israel since its inception in 2017.

“The vast majority of the participants are not of the Jewish faith yet the connection they forge with Israel … is deeply rooted in shared values and common challenges to Israel, the U.S., Canada and the entire free world,” said Rozita Pnini, the MirYam Institute’s chief operating officer.

Willpower and resolve

“Seeing the sites of the biggest demonstration of antisemitism in world history showed us the power of having a Jewish state and better appreciate the willpower and resolve of the people of the State of Israel,” said Bethany J., 19, a future armor officer from Orlando, Florida, who attends West Point.

“My grandfather landed in Normandy during World War II and liberated some of the death camps,” said Alexander D., 20, a West Point cadet from Wisconsin. He recounted his grandfather’s harrowing description of seeing bulldozers pilling up bodies for mass graves.

During a visit to the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem, the group saw a video showing that same scene. “It made me realize why Israel is so important,” he said.

Ela F., 20, a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute from Gettysburg, Pennslyvania, said, “That feeling in my stomach standing in Auschwitz and at Yad Vashem will never go away.”

Not on the news

A recurring comment among the cadets was that Israel is not what you see on the news and is something you have to experience for yourself.

“The American people and the people of Israel share a lot of the same interests but from seeing the news headlines some people don’t realize this,” said Justin P., 21, from Washington, D.C., and the Virginia Military Institute. He called the trip an “eye-opening experience.”

Alexander D. added, “Standing on the Golan and hearing from the IDF soldiers makes you understand the significance of what the IDF is doing.”

Ela F. said, “You expect fear, but you see the day-to-day life of the clubs, parties, beaches and nightlife of Tel Aviv as people go on with their lives.”

Paul M., 20, also from Washington, D.C., and the Virginia Military Institute, said, “The ability to discuss things openly despite the proximity to danger and not get rebuked by your flag officer really struck me.”

Melina B. said, “These are things you can’t get from reading a book, watching a video or watching the news. You have to have your foot on the land.”

The cadets said that the news from Israel was one of rockets raining down on the country, Israeli attacks on Palestinians in Gaza, or a government in turmoil, a picture of a country constantly at war externally or internally.

“You are not getting the full story in the media,” Alexander D. said.

“They talk about the conflict but never tell you about the fundamental history,” Paul M. said.

“Israel has a PR crisis,” Ian M. said. “Remind people why the Jewish state has to exist. If people understand that they will have much more sympathy.”

Benjamin Anthony is Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, Benjamin brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. Read full bio here.

Israel is Soft on “Soft Power”

By Chuck Freilich

 

“Soft power” is a function of a state’s ability to achieve its national security objectives through the appeal of its culture (arts, science, economy), the moral authority of its ideals (human rights, equality, democracy), and the quality of its domestic and foreign policy, rather than by coercive means. The more universal a state’s values, the greater its soft power.

In its early decades, Israel enjoyed great soft power. The horrors of the Holocaust created international sympathy and support for the Jewish people. Israel’s heroic early years were the subject of books, movies and song. The pioneers who reclaimed the ancient land and the kibbutz, came to epitomize Zionism’s attempt to build a new and just society.  The dramatic ingathering of the exiles is the story of legend. Israeli democracy was highly regarded and Israel was hailed as a “light unto the nations”.

Jews around the world cheered, cried and rejoiced upon Israel’s rebirth and celebrated its achievements, with the warm support of many Gentiles. Israel’s military victories were a source of international admiration and a balm for the souls of Jews worldwide, who saw in them the ultimate revenge against the Nazis. Israeli development projects, especially in agriculture and water, were deeply appreciated models in many developing countries.

The seemingly never-ending occupation, however, and especially the settlements, have fundamentally transformed Israel’s image. Israel is widely regarded today as an aggressive occupying power, bent on denying Palestinian rights. Nearly six decades after the Six-Day War, Israel has utterly failed to convince the international community of its claim to the West Bank.

Israel’s image has been further tarnished by questions relating to the quality of its domestic policies and democracy, including the recent “judicial reforms”, excessive prerogatives of the ultra-orthodox, status of Israeli Arabs, and rise of the radical right.

Over the decades, as Israel’s international standing waned, and the Arab refusal to make peace, or even negotiate, left Israel with little choice, military force came to occupy an outsized portion of its national security strategy. Moreover, force seemed to work; Egypt and Jordan made peace, and even Syria and the Palestinians conducted advanced negotiations. For a variety of reasons, however, Israel is reaching the limits to the efficacy of military force. It can continue to defend itself successfully and buy time, but there is no military solution to Palestinian nationalism, the Hezbollah and Hamas threats, or Iranian nuclear program.

In the interim, Israel has downplayed its soft power, or undermined it through some of its policies. The Palestinians, who have repeatedly rejected dramatic peace proposals, never presented a peace proposal of their own and who are governed by a dictatorship in the West Bank and a theocracy in Gaza, have wielded “soft power” very effectively and are winning the war for international opinion. 

In practice, Israel still enjoys considerable soft power. The epic story of the early decades may have faded, but diaspora Jews still harbor a deep sense of affiliation and caring for Israel. Christians around the world view Israel as the Holy Land and realization of divine scripture. Many still buy Jaffa oranges, an outdated symbol of Israeli agriculture, or fly El Al, long a fully privatized company, out of a sense of identification. Today, multinational corporations and scientists from around the world flock to the “Start-Up Nation”, seeking the technological creativity they cannot find elsewhere. Israeli arts and science enjoy an international reputation. Israel’s chaotic democracy still stands out in a dark sea of Middle Eastern authoritarianism.

These sources of soft power are the indispensable basis for much of Israel’s “hard” power, especially in the US. American support for Israel derives from three primary factors: the pro-Israel lobby and Israel’s strategic importance, but stems overwhelmingly from its soft power, the shared values that are the basis for the broad identification of the American public as a whole. Without this sense of identification, American support would not have remained as high as it has, for decades. American and European leaders’ opposition to the “judicial reforms” was so strong, precisely because they feared that Israel itself was undermining the normative basis for their countries’ relationships with it.

Soft power is of limited efficacy as a direct instrument of policy. It is hard to sway other countries just out of a sense of warmth and identification. Nevertheless, no country should be more attuned to soft power than Israel, whose right to a national homeland and subsequently to an independent state was recognized by the League of Nations and United Nations respectively and whose American support stems largely from it. Furthermore, Israel has successfully concluded many deals with foreign leaders and officials over the years, because in situations in which they could have adopted different decisions, identification with Israel was the determining factor.

Israel will not be able to fundamentally alter its international standing without resolving the West Bank issue, or at least achieving significant progress. Nevertheless, there are a number of important changes that Israel can make to improve its strategic circumstances, all of which are related to its soft power.

The use of force must be subject to clear political objectives, including the war of the narratives, which is almost as important today as the action itself, in some cases more. International standing, images and delegitimization campaigns, have a significant and even decisive impact on the outcome of policy initiatives, especially those that involve military action. Too often Israel wins the battles, but loses the war of narratives.

Israel must position itself so that it is always perceived as the side actively pursuing peace and accommodation, not the obstacle. The Jewish diaspora must come to be seen as a vital national security partner and asset, which greatly expands Israel’s capabilities beyond its indigenous ones, and treated accordingly.

Israel is a world leader in some of the primary issues of international concern today, including food security and agriculture, water, the environment and global warming, migration, poverty and entrepreneurship. Israel must do more to leverage its expertise in international organizations. Israeli aid programs (“Mashav”) are a pittance and should be increased. An Israel-diaspora “Jewish Peace Corps” would expand Israeli involvement in these areas and deepen Israeli-diaspora ties, especially between the young. Israel should also continue to provide emergency assistance in times of crisis, as it has so successfully done, notably in Haiti, Turkey and Ukraine.

The Palestinians miss virtually no opportunity to present their case in every possible international forum, with a long-term cumulative effect. Together with the US and others, Israel should target a few select and less politicized international organizations, such as the IAEA, in which a sustained effort can be made.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Deciphering Hezbollah’s decision-making

By Yochai Guiski

Contrary to frequent statements made of late in both Israel and Lebanon, it is far from clear that Israel and Hezbollah are entering a period characterized by heightened risk of miscalculation.

Rather, the current period appears to be marked by a more intense exchange of warning signals between the two adversaries – particularly in Syria, where Israel has reportedly been highly active.

Hezbollah, for its part, has also initiated maneuvers, such as the March cross-border Megiddo highway terror bombing, although these have not succeeded in causing Israel to lose its balance. In April, Hamas in Lebanon fired 34 rockets at northern Israel, sparking Israeli retaliatory airstrikes.

Last year, Hezbollah threatened Israeli offshore gas rigs in the Mediterranean in the lead-up to the Lebanese – Israeli maritime border agreement and sent unmanned aerial vehicles in the direction of one of the rigs.

Together, such incidents could collectively suggest that we are in an era of heightened tensions in which any miscalculation could drag the region into conflict, much like the period leading up to the 2006 Second Lebanon War.

But another way of seeing things is that the situation is far from being on a slippery slope and that it is far from being a repeat of 2006.

It is true that Hezbollah seems to feel freer to launch tactical attacks and also more capable of doing so. And that Israel feels the need to reset the dynamics, returning to a situation in which Hezbollah was more restrained. But this does not mean that either side is likely to make a gross miscalculation any time soon.

The last decade has demonstrated that both Israel and Hezbollah can de-escalate – even when one or both of the sides sustain casualties. Both sides have learned too much from the 2006 war to blindly repeat those actions.

Is Hezbollah wrongly judging reality due to internal tensions in Israel? So far, Hezbollah has shown that it does understand the Israeli system well. However, there is a joker in the pack that could still upset the situation: Iran.

If Israel concludes that it must take action because the Iranian nuclear program is advancing too far, then it may, potentially, also feel the need to take Hezbollah out of the equation in parallel military actions. If the Iranian arena stabilizes, however, and the U.S. reaches some sort of arrangement with Tehran, that will neutralize the above scenario.

Despite all of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's bravado in his speeches, he is, in practice, very cautious and understands the fragility of his situation. 

Hezbollah’s decision-making vis-à-vis Iran

First and foremost, Hezbollah is an independent entity, both in its decision-making and in choosing how to respond to Iranian calls to action.  Of course, Iran has a very significant dialogue with Hezbollah, but in the end, Hezbollah is independent.

Does that mean Hezbollah will turn Iran down on the day of the order to go into combat with Israel? Most likely, it will not do that, but it could decide to limit the intensity of the action, and the scope of the action that it takes.

There is also the question of how other players figure into Hezbollah’s decisions. Hamas is not really an influence. Hamas leaders will not decide if Hezbollah or Iran escalate. On the flip side, however, Hamas’s leaders may decide that they will join in a future Israel – Hezbollah conflict.

Would Hezbollah be the initiator of conflict, like Egypt was in 1967? That scenario seems highly unlikely at this time. At the very least, Syria would have to stabilize first, much more than it currently is.

Would Hezbollah be willing to consider “lying on the fence” for Iran? It may choose to do that to a certain extent, and that is why Hezbollah is always preparing for war.

Hezbollah lives in dissonance between its Shi'ite Islamist messianic vision of destroying Israel and its day-to-day realpolitik considerations, which very much guide it and dominate its actual decision-making.

An Iranian nuclear umbrella is certainly an event that could change the situation, boosting Hezbollah’s tolerance for clashes. But this scenario is far down the road.

For the most part, and on a daily basis, Hezbollah’s decisions are guided by very rational calculations, much like those of its benefactor, Iran.

One often repeated question about Hezbollah’s decision-making is the role played by Israeli deterrence. But a more precise way of analyzing this aspect is to inquire about Hezbollah’s overall balance of interests.

Deterrence is too imprecise a concept to measure decisions by since it reduces all actions to binary dos or don’ts. Deterrence is by definition the power to dissuade an adversary from acting. In reality, Hezbollah is building up force and does initiate some hostile actions, but its overall balance of interests prevents it from initiating war with Israel.

Hezbollah has a concept of defense and attack, and it is keenly aware that it has a powerful enemy located to the south with many capabilities that are dangerous to it. Part of its war readiness against Israel is tied to its ideological values and affiliation with Iran. These all factor into Hezbollah’s complex balance of interests.

Lebanese domestic interests greatly affect Nasrallah’s decisions too – more than is often given credit for.

The interests of Lebanese Shiites themselves within Lebanon, the dynamics within the Lebanese government, relations with non-Shi’ite Lebanese allies, external relationships between outside players and the Lebanese state, the involvement of foreign powers in the region, all play a role, adding another layer of complexity to Hezbollah’s decision-making process.

It is a process that requires in-depth study, and one that cannot be reduced to pure ideology or to merely following Iranian directives.

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Gaza operation won’t stop next escalation

By Zvika Haimovich

The latest conflict between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Israel in early May has changed nothing when it comes to the basic strategic equation in place between Israel and the Gazan terror factions.

The fact that Hamas stayed out of this latest campaign means that the stop clock has begun to the next escalation involving Gaza’s ruling faction.

It is time for Israelis to ask themselves what the government’s strategy is for dealing with Palestinian terror factions in Gaza. They should do so immediately and not wait again passively for the next escalation to occur to raise this question.

Public comments by government representatives who claim that Israel has changed the equation in Gaza are simply false. The basic equation in Gaza remains identical to the situation that existed before Operation Shield and Arrow, just as it has before and after every previous round of fighting between Israel and Gazan terror factions over the past 15 years.

The question that should be guiding Israel’s strategy is how to delay the next break out of violence from Gaza for many years, not months. The first step in moving in that direction is to create political leverage on top of Israel’s military achievements, rather than relying on the IDF’s capabilities alone to buy a little more quiet.

One answer for shaping a new Israeli strategy should involve the recruitment of a regional coalition of powerful actors, involving Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and others, who would be significantly more involved in Gazan affairs. The goal of such a coalition would be to push for a long-term political arrangement between Hamas and Israel that would produce years of quiet.

As part of such an arrangement, Israel must also present to the world its legitimate demand that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad cease their continuous production of projectiles, whose sole intention is to terrorize, kill and injure Israeli civilians, while using Gazan civilians as human shields.

While Gaza won’t disarm tomorrow, it is important to begin delegitimizing the war crimes of Gazan terror factions on the world stage and to counter the trend of normalizing such actions, which has become all too common in recent years.

The escalation was ultimately a highly limited campaign, which must not be confused with the main combat scenario that Israel needs to prepare for.

During the five-day escalation, Israeli air defenses performed well, intercepting more than 95% of projectiles heading for built-up areas – but not providing a hermetic defense, a fact that took on a tragic form in the killings of two civilians in Rehovot and the western Negev during the fighting.

This is another reminder that no hermetic air defense solution exists, despite the advanced technology, sensors, and interceptors that take on Gazan-made projectiles. These rockets can follow unusual trajectories, presenting real challenges for air defenses.

Iron Dome has undergone continuous upgrades over the years, meaning that today’s system can cover far larger areas, deal with larger barrages and deal with more threatening projectiles. It is only the same system as the one first unveiled in 2011 in name, not in substance or capabilities; its evolution has been dramatic. No other air defense system in the world can even compare with Iron Dome’s performance.

Iron Dome forms one layer in Israel’s multi-layered air defense system, which also includes David’s Sling, the intermediate altitude system successfully employed for the first time during the May clashes, and the Arrow 2 and 3 systems against long-range ballistic missiles.

When the Iron Beam laser system becomes operational, an added layer of interception will become available to Israel’s air defenders.

If the Israeli Air Force can establish that terror rockets are repeatedly destroyed before entering Israeli air space, this could have an eventual effect on the IDF’s policy of sounding sirens for every rocket launch, enabling Israel to decrease such sirens potentially.

For this change to take place, it will be necessary to prove that the laser system – at first the ground-based interceptors, which will take around two years to be fully operational, and later, the aerial version placed on drones – can truly make some of the sirens redundant.

Israel is not yet at this stage, however, and even the laser system does not offer the guarantee of hermetic defenses.

Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind that the significant military threat facing Israel is the prospect of a multi-arena conflict involving Iran and its array of ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs, Hezbollah, with its mammoth projectile arsenal, Hamas in Gaza, and others.

Such a scenario, which would be a completely different challenge to the Israeli home front, compared to the most recent escalation, needs to be placed on the Israeli public agenda now; it is the threat that Israel needs to focus on.

The danger of public complacency based on the misunderstanding that this conflict is indicative of all of Israel’s future wars is real.

Zvika Haimovich served as Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces from 2015-2018. He was Active Defense Wing Commander during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). Read full bio here.

The state budget is Irresponsible

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

If all goes well for the government and things proceed according to plan, by the time this column is published, the state budget for 2023 - 2024 will have passed. Beyond the disputes within the coalition, the tendency of each party to pull in its direction and try and get a bigger slice of the cake, beyond the numbers and charts, beyond the headlines, the budget book tells a story, one in which numbers, unlike words, cannot lie, and the story does not have a happy ending.

To simplify the picture without having to dive into the numbers, imagine that you have a sum of money in the bank today that you would like to use for investment. After you look carefully over your bank statement, which includes your expenses and revenues, you search for the investment options that can deliver a maximum return. Your goal is to take care of your children’s future; their education, weddings, or helping them buy an apartment. At the same time, you want to make sure that your retirement is also taken care of.

It sounds simple, but if we seek to apply this same logic to the state budget presented to the Knesset, we will see that the current government has its own rules. If the train continues at high speed down the current route, we will all end up in the abyss. Or to put it differently, everyone gets wet when it rains.

The planned state budget for 2023 is NIS 484 billion and NIS 514 billion in 2024. Before we look at where the money is going, and who the state has chosen to invest in, let's recollect where the money comes from.

The bulk of the state budget comes from us, the citizens who work and carry the burden on our shoulders, with about 300 billion NIS in state revenues coming from taxes. The equation is simple -- the less economic ability Israel’s citizens have, the greater the harm to the State of Israel -- and that is without even addressing the issue of risk-averse investors, who have identified problematic trends and are pulling their money out.

The Chief Economist at the Finance Ministry, Shira Greenberg, recently released a report warning of the dire consequences for the Israeli economy resulting from the way the budget is being distributed. Among other things, she wrote that these decisions would increase the gaps in Israeli society and discourage people from joining the labor market. Greenberg referred to the fact that growth in Israel is expected to fall by 3.1% in 2023 and that state revenues are expected to be NIS 5.3 billion short of the original forecast. The loss of GDP resulting from the failure to employ the ultra-Orthodox will hit NIS 6.7 trillion over the coming decades, inflation will exceed the annual target, and the uncertainty produced by the judicial reform may also exacerbate the current situation.

Greenberg is a professional appointment, and she is looking at the numbers with great concern, while asking the government to bring the train to a stop. Yet instead of pulling the brakes, it is rushing ahead. The ultra-Orthodox party leaders who have become accustomed over the years to the patent of someone else carrying the economic burden are insatiable. Appetite comes with eating.

Where is the money going? Torah-study institutions will receive an additional seven billion shekels, about four billion will be allocated for benefits for married religious scholars, NIS 125 million will go to support ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture, NIS 600 million for family purity programs, half a billion to religious state education budgets, NIS 279 million to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, of which NIS 67 million will be used to hire more rabbis. Four million shekels will go to paying for religious legal rulings for overseas communities (yes, you read that correctly). Religious institutions that are exempt from teaching the core curriculum will also receive millions of shekels in additional budgets.

What about the middle class, you may ask? Where has the promise of free education from the age of 0-3 gone, what about the cost of living, investment in the geographic and economic periphery, strengthening the Negev and Galilee regions, reinforcing border communities against rocket threats, domestic security, providing for the elderly, students, directing resources to economic growth engines such as high tech and artificial intelligence? The answer will surely be that Israel is a Jewish state and that without its wise religious scholars, we have no right to exist.

Those who provide that answer, however, will forget to mention that an economy that lacks bread will also have no Torah.

Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Israel lacks a coordinated public diplomacy system.

By Arthur Koll

The five-day escalation between Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and Israel in early May produced a mixed diplomatic result for Israel, and, above all, underlined the lack of a long-term Israeli strategy regarding the Hamas-controlled enclave as well as an ineffective Israeli public diplomacy system.

On the positive side, the escalation demonstrated that despite President Joe Biden’s negative perception of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu following the latter’s attempt to reform Israel’s judicial system, the American commitment to Israel remains strong.  This vital commitment continues to extend into international organizations, as demonstrated by Washington’s blockage of an attempt to pass an anti-Israel decision at the United Nations Security Council.

During this last escalation, the international media and the international community’s criticism of Israel’s actions was not extraordinarily voluminous. This resulted from the fact that the escalation was short-lived with a relatively low number of casualties and limited destruction in Gaza, when compared to previous rounds of fighting against Hamas.

At the tactical-military level, Israel achieved its goal in the first few seconds of Operation Shield and Arrow, when it simultaneously hit three senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad )PIJ( commanders in Gaza, in three different locations. At this point, after regaining at least some of its lost deterrence power vis-à-vis the terror organizations, Israel would have preferred a swift end of hostilities.

However, the operation dragged on for five more days, due to the absence of an effective completion mechanism to bring it to a halt. Iran, which finances and trains the PIJ, encouraged its proxy to continue firing on Israel.

In addition, the operation exposed a gaping hole in Israel’s ability to coordinate a unified public messaging campaign that involves various components, such as the Prime Minister’s office, the Foreign Ministry, the IDF Spokesperson Unit, and others.

To this day, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has failed to appoint a head of the public diplomacy division, which is stationed in his own office and is answerable to him directly. Nor has he yet appointed a spokesperson to the international media. Luckily, this last Gaza operation ended before international pressure started to mount.  Israel cannot however afford the luxury of lacking a functioning professional public diplomacy apparatus.

To make things worse, The Israeli Minister for Public Diplomacy, Galit Distel Atbaryan, lacks any experience in this line of activity. She appeared to be caught off guard by the military operation and released amateur and ineffective video messages during the escalation, which appeared to be a diversion from her focus of acting as a divisive internal Israeli voice that attacks protesters against the judicial reform.

Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has always given great attention to public diplomacy should urgently pay attention to this matter and repair what is now clearly a dysfunctional structure -- before a much more serious regional or international challenge erupts.

During this minor escalation with the relatively marginal PIJ terror organization, Israel did not pay a heavy price for this governmental chaos. But future, larger conflicts, will surely extract heavier prices from Israel on the international stage.

This latest round, therefore, is a clear warning that the prime minister must take significant steps to put his house in order.

Israel’s diplomatic standing is also harmed by the fact that Jerusalem lacks a strategy for Gaza, and the Palestinian issue in general. This lack of strategy has a knock-on effect on all other aspects of the state’s performance in this context, including public diplomacy. Rather than looking for an arrangement, or at least some sort of long-term agreement, it seems that Israel is dragged into endless bursts of violent eruptions against Hamas, PIJ, or both. And it seems that the intervals between these rounds are getting shorter.

The lack of any new strategic concept that can fundamentally chip away at the old Gaza equation is taking a toll, internally, regionally, and in the wider international arena. Thus, it is clear that the next round is around the corner.

The world is preoccupied with burning global issues, like Russia’s assault on Ukraine and economic challenges, and is getting tired of repetitious clashes between Gazan terror factions and Israel.

This is not welcome news for Israel, which needs active international attention directed to Iran's nuclear advances and its network of terror.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a small part of the Iranian web of client terror organizations that constantly threaten to destabilize the region. Much more significant members of this network are Hamas and, of course, Hezbollah. The likelihood of simultaneous attacks on Israel by Iranian proxies on more than one front is growing.

The IDF is preparing for such developments. It is essential that Prime Minister Netanyahu also uses this time to put his public diplomacy structure in order. It may be needed sooner rather than later. 

Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.