Israel Supports a Good Deal

By Justin Pozmanter

Now that the Biden administration has opened negotiations with Iran, we can expect familiar voices to claim that Israel, and the American pro-Israel community, oppose diplomacy and any agreement related to the Iranian nuclear program. To quote President Biden, that is a bunch of malarkey.

Israel is generally target number one for Iranian aggression. That being the case, who would benefit more from an agreement that actually prevented Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability? It would be foolish, if not downright suicidal, for Israel to oppose such a deal.

This is also not a case of the perfect being the enemy of the good. As a near total capitulation to Iranian ambitions, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is only a good deal if the target audience is Iran, Hezbollah and Bashar Assad.

When the JCPOA was finalized, there were those who claimed opposition was for partisan political reasons or because of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s poor relationship with President Obama. While it is true that Netanyahu and Obama had a famously rocky relationship, it is not the reason Israel opposed the JCPOA.

Israel opposed the JCPOA because it was at odds with Israeli interests and put Israeli lives in mortal peril now and in the future. While another Prime Minister may have handled their opposition differently, anyone who could plausibly be elected Prime Minister of Israel would have actively opposed the JCPOA, no matter who was serving as President of the United States.

A good deal that would justify removing sanctions on Iran would contain, at minimum, the following elements:

1.      It would verifiably remove every pathway to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. It must include anytime, anywhere snap inspections. The Iranian regime has not earned the slightest benefit of the doubt. They have repeatedly lied and hidden nuclear materials, information and even entire uranium enrichment sites. If any place in Iran is off limit to inspectors, the inspections regime is insufficient, and the deal is not verifiable.

2.      It would address Iran’s development of ballistic missiles. Iran has the right to defensive capabilities, and even reasonable offensive capabilities, but if they are not seeking a nuclear weapon, they have no use for large long range missiles and certainly no need for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). These types of weapons are only meant to carry a nuclear (or potentially other nonconventional) warhead.

3.      Iran’s malign behavior in the region must be addressed. It is illogical to again provide sanctions relief when we know it will be used to fund and arm terror proxies and destabilize multiple countries across the region. Iran funds and arms Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, countless militias in Iraq and helped Bashar Assad slaughter half a million people. After the JCPOA, it was promised that being “welcomed back into the family of nations” would moderate Iranian behavior and they would focus on improving the lives of their own citizens. The opposite occurred. Iran, committed as ever to its revolutionary ideology, used the increased revenues to boost payments to regional proxies and has repeatedly and violently crushed attempts by its people to gain greater freedom.

4.      The restrictions must be permanent, or at the very least only eased based on improved Iranian behavior rather than an automatic sunset date. By ending restrictions automatically, the JCPOA allows Iran to reap the financial benefits of the deal permanently, while being patient and continuing nuclear research, before moving forward with their previous nuclear weapons designs from a much stronger and more advanced position. A good deal would not prevent Iran from developing one rudimentary bomb today, only to make it easier for them to build dozens of advanced nuclear weapons in a few years. A good deal would prevent them from ever becoming a nuclear weapons state.

Recent comments by the United States Special Envoy to Iran, Robert Malley, do not provide much room for optimism that the United States plans a tougher stand designed to reach a good deal with Iran.

If the JCPOA is revived, or another weak deal is reached that again enriches Iran while doing nothing to prevent it from using its greater financial strength to continue its most malign behaviors, Israel, as well as most of the rest of the region, will be opposed. If nothing else, when those most endangered by Iran vehemently oppose a deal as a fundamental threat to their national security, the rest of the world should listen.

However, if the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council + Germany) come to a deal that truly and verifiably prevents a nuclear Iran, prohibits Iran from developing the means to deliver nuclear weapons and reigns in Tehran’s support for terror support, they would find Israel, and pro-Israel Americans, the most enthusiastic supporters in the world.

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Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

Mr. Biden, Please Appoint an Antisemitism Ambassador Now

BY David Benger

Today is Yom Hashoah, Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel. On this day, we are taught not only to mourn the millions senselessly slaughtered in Nazi death camps, but also to honor their memory by vowing: “Never again.” Never again will Jewish innocents be targeted for mass extermination with impunity.

For that vow to be fulfilled, we must pair those words with action. For President Biden, on this Holocaust Memorial Day, the clearest signal he can send that he cares for the global Jewish community is to prioritize the nomination of the first ever Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism.

The new Ambassador position was created by Congress early this year to elevate the importance of the position formerly known as Special Envoy to Combat and Monitor Antisemitism, a position created by the Bush administration in 2004.

It is incumbent upon President Biden to appoint a dynamic, energetic, worldly person with charisma and courage to the role. Antisemitism is on the rise across the world, and the new Ambassador’s role will be cut out for them from Day One.

The Ambassador will have to cast away arcane labels of “left wing” and “right wing” antisemitism and address all actions that harm to Jews with equal gusto. Graffiti on a synagogue wall frightens Jewish congregants, whether the words say 'heil hitler' or 'free Palestine. Both acts of vandalism strike fear into Jewish hearts. In that spirit, the Ambassador will have three priorities topping their agenda.

First, the growing power of the BDS movement and its insidious stranglehold on debate regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be made a priority. BDS stands for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, and its goal is to use economic isolation destroy the Jewish and democratic character of the State of Israel. It operates behind the façade of advocating for Palestinian rights. In reality, the movement does nothing for the rights of Palestinians (other than occasionally costing Palestinians their jobs) and instead makes Jews feel unsafe across the globe.

Recognizing BDS for the hateful movement that it is and marshalling resources to combat it will need to be top of the agenda for the new Ambassador.

Second, the Ambassador should pick up right where former Special Envoy Elan Carr left off in advocating for the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism to be adopted as widely as possible. This will mean lobbying foreign governments as well as private companies, and international organizations.

The IHRA definition is a multi-page document with a chapeaux section that explains its goals followed by many examples of antisemitism in action. The full definition (examples included) are a fantastic guideline for helping decisionmakers correctly to label antisemitic acts of hate.

Third, the Ambassador must build relationships with social media platforms to pressure them to protect at risk Jews in online fora. Consistent with the respective free speech and hate speech in a given complainant’s source country, the Ambassador’s office must help individual Jews all over the world pressure tech companies to take down content that makes Jews unsafe.

To be effective in the role, the Ambassador will have to put in extraordinary effort to build relationships from the very beginning of his or her tenure. The Ambassador should ask every State Department outpost across the world (embassies and consulates) to assign an antisemitism portfolio to one of their staffers, so that there is always a point person on the issue.

Next, the Ambassador will have to build deep relationships with the two organizations that are most plugged in to Jewish communities across the globe: Chabad and Moishe House. Though both organizations exist in central Jewish hubs such as Tel Aviv or London, they also service small peripheral Jewish communities, such as Phnom Penh and Almaty. As such, the intel provided by emissaries of Chabad and residents of Moishe Houses will be crucial in guiding the Ambassador to a clearer understanding of the pressing challenges on the ground.

There have already been rumblings about prospective nominees to the position, but nobody has come out as a clear winner yet.

Most recently, news coverage has converged on Nancy Kaufman as an option. Nominating Kaufman would be a grave mistake. Not only has she has garnered support from antisemitic organization “If Not Now” for her refusal to denounce the BDS movement, but her entire professional career has been oriented toward the domestic challenges of American Jewry, the only Jewish community on the planet that does not fall within the Ambassador’s purview.

Other names in the mix include holocaust historian Deborah Lipstadt, lawyer and Civil Rights activist Abe Foxman, philanthropy professional Karen Adler, and former Special Envoy Ira Forman. These four have many years of valuable experience, but it may be worthwhile for the Biden administration to look outside the box for a person with the creativity, energy, and fresh perspective to proudly represent the State Department in every corner of the planet where Jews are at risk.

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David Benger is a research fellow at Harvard University. He is a recent graduate of Harvard Law School, where he served as the chapter president of Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under the Law, and the Events Chair of the HLS Alliance for Israel, as well as an editor on the Journal of Law and Public Policy and the HLS National Security Journal. Read full bio here.

It Ain’t (Totally) Broke, But We Can Still Fix It

By Justin Pozmanter

Before last month’s national elections, I wrote about the nature of the race and how it had been stripped of all ideology and meaning. With all the votes counted and coalition negotiations in full swing, it appears there will either be a shaky coalition of strange bedfellows led by Benjamin Netanyahu, a shaky coalition of strange bedfellows led by a rotation of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid or no coalition at all and yet another election.

Much of the political gridlock can be blamed on the fight over whether Prime Minister Netanyahu remains in power. However, even if he were to leave the political arena, or be acquitted of the charges against him, it is clear the system can use an overhaul.

The first item that must be addressed is the fact that the prime minister is under investigation. While Netanyahu is the first prime minister to serve in office under indictment, both Ehud Olmert and Ariel Sharon faced investigations while in office. The Prime Minister of Israel has one of the most difficult jobs in the world. Adding years-long investigations while serving is not in the interest of the country.

The prime minister should be immune from criminal investigation while in office – with exceptions for truly grave or violent crimes. The Knesset would, of course, maintain the prerogative to remove the prime minister from office. The criminal statute of limitations should be frozen while the prime minister is in office and there should be a term limit to prevent a prime minister using the office as a permanent shield from prosecution.  

The second glaring issue is that members of Knesset have no constituencies of Israeli citizens. In the cases of non-democratic parties (meaning those where the list of candidates is chosen exclusively by the party leader), such as Yesh Atid and Yisrael Beiteinu, the parties are essentially an alter ego of the party leader and the members of their factions owe their loyalty to the party leader alone. But even for the democratic parties such as Likud and Labor, after the primary, no members of the faction other than the party leader truly face voters or must concern themselves with constituent services.

The model suggested maintains the current basic structure. There would still be a unicameral 120 seat Knesset. However, only half the Knesset would be elected exactly as it is today. The parties would submit national lists and be allotted seats in the parliament based on their share of the vote total.

The major change is that the remaining 60 seats would be based on geographic districts. With close to 9.3 million citizens, that would amount to 60 districts of roughly 155,000 citizens.

Under this formula, ministers and deputy ministers would all come from the national lists, but committee chairs would mostly come from the constituent districts. This way, those most concerned with constituent services would be most focused on the granular details of legislating, while the leaders of the national slates would concern themselves with executive ministerial functions.

The candidates for the 60 constituent districts would be aligned with one of the parties submitting a national list and would be part of that party’s faction once elected to the Knesset. The national lists would still need to cross a threshold to make the Knesset, but even if they fall short, any candidate winning a local district-based election would enter the Knesset. While this could present a scenario where a single MK could be the “kingmaker” in a close election, the fact that these MKs would not be eligible for ministerial roles would greatly reduce the type of personal ransom a party of one or two, whose national list failed to clear the threshold, could demand to join a coalition.

The district lines would be drawn by a non-partisan commission of technocrats and approved by the full Knesset once a decade. While some manipulation to favor a party or demographic group is unavoidable, the commission’s mandate, anchored in law, would be to draw lines that are as contiguous as possible and keep municipalities together.

Because of the way the Israeli population is distributed geographically, drawing logical, contiguous districts should naturally create districts that will ensure every major demographic group will have at least some representation in the Knesset. And, unlike today, the main mandate of those representatives will be to provide their local constituency a voice in national politics.

This system would not remove party loyalty from the equation, but it would mean that half the Knesset would be attuned to the needs of their local constituency in addition to their party leadership, and that every periphery community would be guaranteed a voice in every Knesset. It would also allow voters the option to split their ticket. For instance, there could a voter with centrist views who nevertheless believes Benjamin Netanyahu is better suited to be Prime Minister than Yair Lapid. That voter would now have the option to vote for the national Likud list, while also supporting the local Yesh Atid candidate.

This short outline is oversimplified and leaves out a great many details. Revamping the Israeli electoral system will be complex and any attempt at change will surely be met with stiff resistance. However, it is imperative that such an attempt is made.

Israel’s electoral system has served it extraordinarily well. It is still nothing short of a miracle that people from dozens of countries, most with no democratic tradition, returned home after two thousand years to establish a vibrant democracy.

The system does not need to be torn down completely, nor will Israel collapse if we continue to elect the Knesset as we have. But as the country has grown, and with the benefit of seven decades of hindsight, it is clear the system can be improved. Given the current stalemate, the public should be as open as ever to major reforms that will make the system more responsive and representative. Now is the time to try.

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Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

MirYam's Interview: The U.S. Attempts To Engage Iran Diplomatically. What Are Israel's Interests?

By Chuck Freilich

The United States is engaged in a fresh attempt to engage Iran diplomatically on a return to the 2015 nuclear deal – sparking a debate over what Israel's interests are going forward. The following is a Q & A with Prof. Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli national security adviser.

How do you view the Biden administration’s attempts to diplomatically engage Iran over its nuclear program?

While the debate on how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state is lengthy and complex, it is important to keep in mind that the only supreme objective is to indeed prevent Iran from going nuclear.

The how is less important than the what, and it is vital to keep the bottom line in sight.

Although the U.S. was probably out-negotiated when it, along with other world powers, signed the Joint Plan of Comprehensive Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2015, the deal back then was, and remains, the least worst option in serving the overall objective of keeping Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed state. 

Despite the fact that the Obama administration was more avid to reach an agreement than Iran was - the wrong way to negotiate - the 2015 agreement was ultimately a reasonable arrangement, which gave Israel ten to fifteen years of quiet. Israel has not  gotten that many years of quiet on any major strategic issue.

The primary criticism of the JPOCA was the sunset clauses. The deal also failed to deal with Iran’s missile program or its regional expansionism, but the U.S.’s thinking focused on the goal of managing the nuclear issue –  an existential issue for Israel and a critical one for the region –  and then handling the other issues separately.

This is the right approach; it is one that was held by many, maybe most, Israeli defense and government officials for many years and still is.

Yet after the deal, Prime Minister Netanyahu attacked former President Barack Obama for years over it, in part because the the agreement failed to address the other Iranian issues. The Obama administration claimed that this was the best deal it could achieve, even if it was not the deal that it wanted.

What should Israel do going forward?

Netanyahu is not wrong to say that the Americans were somewhat out-negotiated. But that is no reason for Israel to now come out strongly against a new deal that the Biden administration is seeking with Iran. In fact, it would be a historic error to repeat that posture.

As it is, the American Democratic Left is furious at Israel, casting a shadow over Israel’s most important alliance. An ongoing collapse in support for Israel is occurring in the progressive side of the Democratic camp, and there is also a major decrease of support for Israel in the Jewish community.

Now, even more than in 2015, it would be a historic error to further alienate these camps. Israel should express its stances behind the scenes and engage in serious debate. But it must also present itself as the major ally of the U.S.

It seems likely that Biden has messaged the Israeli government, asking it for its position, and informing it that its views will be taken into account, but also issued a stern warning to not come after it like Netanyahu did to Obama.

The bilateral Israel – U.S. relationship is sufficiently troubled even without tensions over Iran. The Palestinian issue is again gaining attention and the deteriorating quality of Israel’s democracy is also coming under greater scrutiny.

To be sure, once President Trump decided to exit the nuclear agreement, an historic error, his decision to place Iran under a maximum pressure campaign deserved support. The problem is that he did not have a strategy for dealing with Iran beyond sanctions and it did not achieve its objectives in the three years that it was in effect. Perhaps it could have done so if given an extension, but Israel must face up to the new strategic situation that is taking shape.

What is the wider strategic framework for understanding the debate on how to stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions?

Biden is facing significant pressure from his party to conclude a deal with Iran and not to waste too much time and effort on the Islamic Republic, since the U.S. is interested in prioritizing its foreign policies on China and Russia.

For now, however, Iran is the most pressing foreign policy issue, and the Iranians placed themselves at the center of the agenda. The U.S. will have to decide whether to try to go back to the old 2015 deal or aim for an improved version of it.

Going back to the old arrangement means surrendering the good leverage provided to the Biden administration by Trump, in the form of sanctions. On the other hand, the two choices may well be returning to the old deal, or having no deal at all. If that turns out to be the case, it makes little sense to argue that Israel would be better off without any deal.

How would Israel have been able to take on Iranian entrenchment in Syria and its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon if Iran had gone nuclear in the meantime? The answer is that Israel would be facing a new existential threat, and tackling Iranian entrenchment would become severely more complex.

In a reality in which Iran is armed with nuclear weapons, Israel would have to think many times before it struck Iranian assets in Syria , or anywhere else, including in Iran itself. Even if the odds of a full nuclear escalation are very low, the results of such a scenario would be total devastation. Countries behave very differently under such circumstances. 

It is fair to hope that the U.S. will not give up all of its leverage. One option is reaching an interim deal, in which neither side gives up everything. Iran could essentially come back into compliance and back off some of its violations, while the U.S. eases some sanctions. After the Iranian presidential elections occur in June, further negotiations on a more serious deal could resume.

For Israel, progress between the U.S. and Iran on a nuclear deal will allow it to focus on the vital mission of stopping Iran from creating a forward operating presence in Syria, or transferring significant quantities of precision weapons to Hezbollah. Israel must stop these activities at any cost, including going to war if this becomes necessary.

It is important to create the space and time for Israel to deal with the challenge of Iranian entrenchment. To stop Iran’s program of smuggling ballistic missiles and long-range drones to its terrorist proxies, and to further cement emerging relations with its new Sunni friends.

A new nuclear deal will facilitate this objective.  

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Hamas elections expose intergenerational power struggle

By David Hacham

The Palestinian arena is presently being shaped by two simultaneous election processes, and this has dramatic consequences for the future of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.  

The upcoming elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (the Palestinian Authority parliament that Israel was party to setting up during the Oslo Accords) are scheduled to take place in May. A recent meeting of the Palestinian factions in Cairo, in which an agreement was concluded between the parties over the principal parameters of the elections, are an indication that both Fatah and Hamas remain on course to hold the ballot despite clear reservations within Fatah over the risks inherent in the process.

Meanwhile, Hamas has completed internal elections for its leadership institutions in the Gaza Strip, while these are ongoing in the West Bank, overseas, and within Israeli jails. Three candidates are running for the supreme political bureau: Ismail Haniyeh, the incumbent; Salah Al-Arouri, Haniyeh’s deputy; and Khaled Mashaal, who previously held the position. These elections are held every four years.

While Hamas Gaza leader Yahya Sinwar managed to retain his position as head of the Gazan political bureau, he was nearly unseated by rival Nizar Awadallah, representing the Hamas old guard, in what would have been a dramatic upset in a vote in which Sinwar had been considered a sure winner.

It took four rounds for the 59-year-old  to assure a majority,  meaning that he came close to being defeated after just a single term. Former Hamas political bureau chiefs have usually completed the maximum two terms.

Awadallah has distanced himself from the public spotlight, acting behind the scenes and in the shadows. Like Hamas senior members Mahmoud Al-Zahar and Ismail Haniyeh, Awadallah was part of the inner circle of Hamas’s founding father, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. He has a degree in civil engineering from an Egyptian university and was a lecturer at the Gaza Islamic University. 

Awadallah is a powerful figure in the ultra-dogmatic and more radical faction within Hamas, and has acted as the head of the Al-Mujama Al-Islami social, religious, and charity organization that was the organizational-ideological foundation of Hamas.

During his youth, prior to the First Intifada, he headed the military branch of Al-Mujama, the Mujahadin al-Filastayeen (the Palestinian Holy Warriors).  After the start of the intifada, he was active in Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades.

He was arrested many times by Israel during and after the First Intifada due to his involvement in terrorism, serving multiple jail terms between 1989 to 1996. His home was twice bombed by the Israel Air Force  – during Operation Cast Lead (2008-9) and Operation Protective Edge (2014).

Awadallah played a prominent role in the Hamas negotiations delegation that was active in the agreement with Israel to exchange captive IDF soldier Gilad Shalit for the release of over 1000 Palestinian prisoners in 2011.

Despite Sinwar’s eventual success, the Hamas Gaza elections exposed deep tensions between himself and internal rivals within the organization.

Sinwar’s struggle for re-election has shined attention on the power dynamics within Hamas’s leadership, specifically, between the old guard who were founders of the movement and now feel sidelined, and the intermediate generation that Sinwar represents.

Sinwar’s generation includes Muhammad Def and Marwan Issa, who head the Hamas  military wing.

Sinwar also faces opposition by high-ranking outside members, like Salah Al-Arouri.

These elements have levelled severe criticism at Sinwar, perceiving him as failing to function properly and lacking tangible achievements. From their perspective, the latest election sounded a clear warning to Sinwar over issues such as the quality of life in Gaza, the failed attempt to pressure Israel with ‘return marches to break the siege,’ the failed tactic of incendiary balloons and kites, and rocket fire. None of these efforts have amounted to anything, and Sinwar had to abandon them over a year ago.  

Sinwar has been regarded by some in Hamas as being more of a ‘military’ leader than a ‘political’ one. His brutality has never been in question – Sinwar murdered a Hamas operative in Gaza who was released in the Shalit deal, after accusing him of collaborating with Israel.

Some internal critics of Sinwar suspect that he has grown too close to the Egyptian General Intelligence Service at the expense of ties with Iran, with which Sinwar’s rivals have closer ties.

The fact that Sinwar has also failed to secure a new prisoner exchange deal with Israel, despite holding captive two Israeli civilians and the bodies of two fallen IDF soldiers, has also exposed him to internal criticism.

This is why, during his victory speech, Sinwar stressed his intention to release Palestinian prisoners in Israel as quickly as possible.

Ultimately, Sinwar is interested in continuing his more calculated and apparently pragmatic line when it comes to Israel, prioritizing the alleviation of Gaza’s economy and humanitarian situation, obtaining increased aid supplies, and ensuring continued Qatari civilian funding. To that end, Sinwar has understood that he must significantly decrease for the time being military confrontation with Israel.

One can assume that Sinwar,  will continue to show a degree of flexibility and restraint, while at the same time taking on-board the criticism he faces inside his movement.

The rocky path that led Sinwar to victory means that tensions are sure to continue within the Islamist movement, and that its multiple power centers will compete to influence  future strategy, including over the eternal question of when to engage in conflict with Israel, as well as how to position itself regionally and internationally. This, despite the fact Hamas’s core ideology remains entirely unchanged, and is  unlikely to change.

The power struggle between the old guard as represented by Awadallah and the intermediate generation, of which Sinwar is the prominent representative, will not end with the elections, and these will likely continue to shape critical developments within Hamas.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Israel on the Move: What a Move to CENTCOM Means for US-Israel Military Relations

By Liam Collins

On January 15, 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would shift Israel from the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. The press release attributed the Abraham Accords as providing the “strategic opportunity for the United States to align key partners against shared threats in the Middle East.”

Is this simply a line change on the Pentagon’s map, or does it portend substantive changes for U.S.-Israel military relations? The answer is both. This shift does not fundamentally change relations at the strategic level, but it does better align the Pentagon’s Geographical Combatant Commands (GCC) with the geopolitical realities that exist in 2021. The initial transition may have disruptions, as responsibilities shift from the staff of one GCC to another, but in the long term, being aligned with the most appropriate GCC should result in greater efficiencies and effectiveness that indirectly improve US-Israel military relations.

The Pentagon reviews its Unified Command Plan every two years, so it is important not to make too much of this change, yet to also understand that it is more than cosmetic. With its biennial review, it is not uncommon for the Pentagon to move a state from one GCC’s area of responsibility to another, or create entirely new combatant commands, based on the changing geopolitical situation. In 2004, President Bush moved Syria and Lebanon from EUCOM to CENTCOM, and in 2008, the Pentagon established U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Thus, periodic changes are the norm, rather than the exception.

This realignment should allow for a more unified regional approach by better aligning the Pentagon’s GCCs with the U.S. Department of State’s regional bureaus. The State Department’s Bureau of Near East Affairs includes the countries in the Maghreb, Levant, Arabian Peninsula, and Iran. Previously, this meant the regional bureau had to coordinate with three different GCCs – AFRICOM, CENTCOM, and EUCOM – for regional issues. Moving Israel to CENTCOM means the bureau only needs to coordinate with two; making it easier to plan and execute theater security cooperation strategies.

The realignment also better aligns both GCCs with their strategic interests. Israel’s security challenges are fairly unique from the rest of EUCOM, so transferring Israel allows EUCOM to focus on its primary threat, Russia, and other strategic interests, in which Israel has always been somewhat of an outlier. On the flip side, Israel figures prominently in the campaign plans and the theater security cooperation and engagement plans for CENTCOM. The Abraham Accords should offer new regional security opportunities for Israel, in which CENTCOM is well positioned to facilitate.  

Some have argued that shifting Israel to CENTCOM will put too much of a “burden” on the CENTCOM staff. Not only has its commander, General Frank McKenzie, stated that he expects “little impact on day-to-day operations,” but logically, it should actually reduce the burden on his staff. To coordinate regional security issues, CENTCOM must involve Israel, regardless of the area of responsibility in which Israel resides, so CENTCOM can now engage with Israel directly instead of working through EUCOM. Thus, realignment should produce more efficient mil-to-mil coordination.

In the short term, no doubt, some disruptions in the mil-to-mil partnership can be expected due to the fact that partnerships are built on personal relationships – to include, sometimes, relationships between the GCC commander and senior policy officials – as much as they are on formal agreements. So, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) will have to establish relationships with new people and staffs who they likely do not know and may lack expertise on Israel and the IDF, but the gains will more than offset any short-term hiccups. CENTCOM staff officers know the region, understand the threats, and have relationships with other militaries in the region, including Abraham Accords signees like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. These relationships and regional expertise are far more important to Israel than a relationship with, for example, a Scandinavian military.

Moving Israel into the CENTCOM area of responsibility is simply the most recent move to create a more unified regional approach. This alignment has been 15 years in the making and better aligns both CENTCOM and EUCOM for their respective geopolitical threats and strategic interests. Once again, this change will not fundamentally change the nature of the US-Israel military relationship, but it will allow CENTCOM to better coordinate the security efforts of Israel and other nations within the region.

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Col. Liam Collins is the Executive Director of the Viola Foundation and the Madison Policy Forum and a permanent member with the Council on Foreign Relations. A retired Special Forces Colonel, Liam served in a variety of special operations assignments and conducted operational deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa and South America. Read full bio here.

Israel’s priorities Post Election: economy, Palestinians, Iran

By Amir Avivi

The next Israeli government will need to tend to an array of pressing national security, foreign, economic, and social policies, but there can be no doubt that the economic agenda must be the top priority as Israel exits the coronavirus  pandemic.

Israeli citizens are greatly appreciative of the incredible vaccination campaign that has resulted in a rapid inoculation of the adult population, and by the performance of the health maintenance organizations that ensured that the vaccine is efficiently accessible to all.

Like the rest of the world, Israeli society is concerned first and foremost with economic issues and the need to generate economic recovery as the country returns to normal.

The need to get people back to work and to accelerate economic growth, while providing relief to those who need it, is leading many parties to focus their platforms on lowering taxes, providing more grants, and supporting the self-employed, who have been hit hardest.

Meanwhile, on the regional front, a major opportunity is forming to further expand peace agreements with moderate Arab Sunni states and further states in the Muslim world, such as Indonesia.

Israel has already begun seeing the economic fruits of the agreements in the form of large-scale investment programs by the United Arab Emirates in its economy.

A future ambitious project that is taking shape is the formation of a rail link from Saudi Arabia to Eilat, and connecting Eilat to Ashdod, while significantly expanding the Ashdod, Haifa and Eilat ports.  

This entire project is going to create a major alternative to the Suez Canal for moving goods from the Middle East to Europe and vice versa.

The project will complement the existing movement of trucked goods from Jordan via the Bet She’an crossing to Haifa port. In other words, Israel is explicitly becoming the channel for the east-to-west movement of goods.

The next government will have to place its full weight behind these projects, which will create hundreds of billions of dollars for the state.

In addition, the next government will have to continue to strengthen Israel’s natural gas export market, and the energy alliance that is in place with Greece and Cyprus, which will allow significant exports to Europe, and to strengthen gas exports to Egypt and Jordan.

There is little doubt that the Biden administration’s alienating policies toward Sunni governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, will only boost relations with Sunni states and their dependence on Israel. This creates new opportunities to generate ties, including the development of tourism from Arab countries to Israel, and new investment plans.

Prior to the pandemic, Israeli tourism saw an all-time peak of five million visitors per year. As Israel leaves the pandemic behind, there is now a strong opportunity to not only invite back European and North American tourists, but also new tourists from the Arab world, and possibly beyond, such as from Indonesia.

These regional processes are in turn creating new opportunities for moving forward on the Israeli-Palestinian arena.

Israel is now in a position to weigh and promote fresh solutions, which meet basic Israeli security requirements, and also cater to the needs of Palestinians in Judea and Samaria.

Solutions that Israel can promote include a two-state solution based on the Trump outlines, which in turn is similar to the Oslo vision, but which features higher supervision of demands from the Palestinians. A second option is a decentralized ‘emirates’ model for Palestinians. Both plans can also be combined in future, and integrated with a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.

In Gaza, extending the territory of a Palestinian state into Sinai with Egyptian support remains an idea worth exploring.

A new Palestinian generation that is fed up with the status quo is rising up, and the Israeli government should in turn cast old paradigms aside and begin examining new conceptual solutions, which match the fundamental changes that have washed over the Middle East, and the world.

The coronavirus may be behind us, but Iran is directly ahead of us. The government must have its full focus placed on the Iranian threat. A large diplomatic push to safeguard Israeli interests, in a new and improved nuclear deal, is critical, and Jerusalem must be firm in its demands that pressure and leverage points be exercised on the Islamic Republic to reach a tangibly improved deal compared to the 2015 agreement.

The ability to enforce a new deal is also critical. At the same time, it is unfortunately necessary to keep a credible, ready military option on the table – with cooperation from Israel’s allies.

A scenario in which Iran decides to go for nuclear breakout despite sanctions and international pressure, based on an Iranian decision that this is important enough for it, is realistic, and a preventative strike may therefore be needed. This requires Israeli readiness.

A preventative strike might not automatically lead to regional war, particularly if it includes U.S. participation, the participation of a local coalition, and takes the form of pinpoint strikes on nuclear sites.

This new reality means that traditional divisions in Israeli society between Right and Left are smaller than they appear, and with Iran remaining a coherent threat, the next government should prioritize unifying Israeli society, after years of divisive political rhetoric that has harmed national cohesion. 

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Brigadier General Amir Avivi concluded his service as the Head of the Auditing and Consulting Department of the Israeli Defense Establishment, (including the Israel Defense Force, the Ministry of Defense and Israeli Military Industries). Read full bio here.

Israel’s New Election: No One Else but Bibi

By Josh Hammer

The oft-cited philosophical principle of “Occam’s razor” translates to the notion that the simplest explanation for a causal phenomenon is, more often than not, the correct one. In the context of electoral politics, a natural corollary of “Occam’s razor” is the adage, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”

Applying this principle to Israel’s March 2021 national election, the Jewish state’s fourth in just two years, the best option for American conservatives, Zionists, and friends of Israel becomes clear: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should remain in his power, and his Likud must be again tasked with forming a stable governing coalition. From an American conservative, nationalist, and Zionist perspective, there is—for better or worse—no viable alternative.

The March elections will be held in the not-too-distant wake of President Joe Biden’s succession of former President Donald Trump, a true friend of Israel (and the Jewish people), and possibly the country’s best ally in the history of modern Zionism. Together, Trump and Netanyahu worked hand in hand to forge a new Middle East consensus that rejected the sclerotic pieties of the past and advanced an assertively pro-America, pro-Israel vision for the region. 

It would be cumbersome to list all of the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine’s myriad advancements on behalf of the Jewish state, but, among other accomplishments, the forty-fifth president: meaningfully undercut Iran’s harrowing path to nuclear weaponry, delivered a decisive blow to the Middle East’s ever-festering Sunni jihadism, defiantly stood up for Israel at the infamously anti-Semitic United Nations, and took numerous concrete steps to bolster Israel’s territorial integrity and physical durability—the moving of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the formal recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and the State Department’s dramatic proclamation that “settlements” in Judea and Samaria are not per se illegal, among other moves. 

But the biggest changes of all under the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine were those pertaining to the so-called “peace process” with the recalcitrant Palestinian-Arabs, as well as those touching upon the so-called “Arab-Israeli conflict” more broadly. By affirming the international legality of Jewish life past the 1948 armistice line, shutting down the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Washington, D.C. mission, signing into law the Taylor Force Act, and introducing the most pro-Israel plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace ever suggested by an American president, Trump—and the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine, more broadly—firmly communicated to the Palestinians that their obstinacy, intransigence, jihad glorification, and intergenerational inculcation of anti-Semitism would finally come at a price.  

It was the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine’s fortification of Israel’s strategic, legal, and physical position, combined with the overhanging Iranian threat, that found its ultimate manifestation in the landmark Abraham Accords rapprochement—the most important paradigm shift and debunking of the failed “land for peace” diplomatic consensus in modern Middle East history. The Trump-Netanyahu legacy is thus a doctrine showcasing the virtues of the foreign policy axiom of “peace through strength”—and a vindication of the tangible strategic and geopolitical benefits, for each of America, Israel, and the Middle East, of an emboldened Zionism and a tight-knit U.S.-Israel alliance. 

That legacy is also a resounding defeat for those, like former Secretary of State (and current U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate) John Kerry, who have so long peddled the banality that broader Arab-Israeli reconciliation is impossible without mass Israeli territorial concessions to the Palestinian Authority. The outmoded “inside-out” diplomatic approach in the Middle East was indeed dealt a grievous blow by Trump and Netanyahu, but Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently endorsed the hackneyed “two-state solution” framework nonetheless. It remains to be seen how much, if at all, the new administration may be able to simultaneously advance the Abraham Accords’ “outside-in” approach while simultaneously pushing such discredited “inside-out” diplomatic claptrap. What is certain is that all early indications, such as the administration's intensive courting of the terrorist Iranian regime, its reopening of the United States’ Palestinian-specific consulate in Jerusalem, and its restoring of U.S. aid to the anti-Semitic UN Relief and Works Agency augur poorly and suggest a noxious reprise of the Obama era. 

For American friends of Israel buoyed by both the intrinsic moral dignity of an enhanced Israeli alliance and that alliance’s concrete national security benefits in repelling both Iranian hegemony and Sunni jihad, the thought experiment as to who ought to next lead Israel amounts to the following: “Which candidate for prime minister would be best in sustaining Israel’s marked geopolitical and diplomatic progress, centered around but hardly limited to the Trump-Netanyahu doctrine of Middle East peace, amidst the headwinds of what promises to be an anti-Israel administration redolent of the Barack Obama presidency?” 

The question practically answers itself. Of course, Netanyahu is best-suited to continue leading Israel at the present moment. 

Netanyahu’s now-decade-plus second stint as prime minister largely overlapped with the most anti-Israel U.S. administration in the Jewish state’s history, that of former President Barrack Obama. Netanyahu proved himself admirably adroit and courageous during those tumultuous years, developing a knack for when to strategically appease Obama (for example, the ten-month “settlement” freeze of 2010), mustering the fortitude to loudly confront him when need be (for example, Netanyahu’s spellbinding March 2015 speech before Congress, in opposition to the Iran nuclear deal), and prudently hedging his nation’s decades-long wager on the U.S.-Israel alliance by advancing the Jewish state’s diplomatic interests across Asia, Africa, and Central and South America to hitherto unforeseen heights. Netanyahu, in short, has already weathered the storm of an anti-Israel Democratic presidency without suffering serious blows to Israel’s geopolitical clout, and there is no reason to think he cannot ably do so again. 

But the greatest diplomatic breakthrough for Israel over the last four decades, and quite possibly over the course of its national history, was undoubtedly the signing of the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Those peace agreements would not have been possible without the vision and leadership of Prime Minister Netanyahu, whose skill in selling Israel’s value as a diplomatic, geopolitical, and military ally on the world stage helped land the Jewish state not merely closer defense ties with New Delhi or a new Guatemalan embassy in Jerusalem, but affirmative normalization agreements (and all the beautiful accouterments such agreements necessarily entail) with the very heart of the Arab world itself. 

Netanyahu has established himself as a transformative leader. He has overseen both unprecedented diplomatic success overseas and tremendous economic growth and technological innovation at home. In the annals of Israeli political history, he is surpassed by no one other than perhaps preeminent founding father David Ben-Gurion himself. That is not to say Netanyahu is flawless; on the contrary, despite his resoluteness on the Iranian threat, he has too often lacked the courage of his convictions as it pertains to Palestinian-related issues, such as sovereignty in Judea and Samaria and the perennial thorn in the side of the modern Jewish state that is the Hamas-run Gaza Strip. There have been missed opportunities, from a conservative Zionist perspective.

But there is simply no feasible alternative at the present moment. Some conservative Zionists and longtime supporters of Netanyahu’s, frustrated with the inherent political instability that comes with four national elections in just two years and the reality of Netanyahu’s legal travails at the behest of an opportunistic legal fraternity, have urged Netanyahu that now is the right time to finally step aside. But even ignoring the largely frivolous nature of Netanyahu’s specific legal troubles, to say nothing of the fact that it is puerile to necessarily expect awe-inspiring personal virtue from our political leaders, such speculation falls flat when one considers a blunt but crucial reality: There is simply no one else who can take Netanyahu’s place.  

Yair Lapid would be far too accommodationist toward the Biden presidency, and it is not at all obvious in any event that he possesses anything near Netanyahu’s gravitas and statesmanship. Benny Gantz, Netanyahu’s most recent putative rival, is now a near non-factor, hovering around the electoral viability threshold in polling. Naftali Bennett, the one-time hardliner on Judea and Samaria and Palestinian statehood, has seemingly sold out in courting leftist voters. Avigdor Lieberman is far too factional and pugnacious. Gideon Sa’ar, the Likud expatriate and founder of New Hope, beclowned himself by bringing onboard Lincoln Project hooligans before having to sever ties due to the Lincoln Project’s sordid scandal involving the discredited operative John Weaver, thus undermining any claim he might otherwise have to prudence and sound political judgment. The blunt reality is that, for better or for worse, the “NeverNetanyahu” Israeli Right is best understood right now as a distraction. We true Eretz Yisrael-believing American Zionists might hope for someone even more aggressive or assertive than Netanyahu, but in this Israeli election, there is no mathematical possibility for an alternative, non-Likud-led right-religious coalition that also excludes the dangerous Lapid. The choice between Netanyahu and Lapid appears to be binary—and stark. 

Two and a half decades after the travesty of the Oslo Accords, the Israeli Left is probably on its last legs as a political force. Good riddance. But as frustrating as it may be for those on the Right who seek change for the mere sake of change, or for those who think a shift in leadership at the top will finally bring an end to Israel’s multiyear cycle of electoral drama, the fact remains that there is only one logical path forward: that which, yet again, runs through Netanyahu and Likud. Their success is certainly the outcome that American conservatives and Zionists ought to be hoping for. 

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Josh Hammer is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute, is also opinion editor of Newsweek and a research fellow with the Edmund Burke Foundation.

The UAE’s defense industry has significant potential for Israeli companies

By Yair Ramati

Israeli defense delegations did not attend Abu Dhabi’s IDEX international defense exhibition in late February as they had planned to, and although pandemic-related flight restrictions were cited by the Israeli government as the reason, another possible reason for this may have been due to security concerns.

IDEX is testimony to the United Arab Emirate’s policy of investment in order to promote its own defense industry, and its growing success in developing significant defense products.

The Emirati Edge advanced technology group for defense products, which recently announced a memorandum of understanding with Israel Aerospace Industries for the development of a counter-UAV system tailored to the UAE market, is the latest signal that the UAE, like Saudi Arabia, is determined to build an independent defense industry, which includes independent production capabilities.

Israel too could find a significant role to play in this market, despite the damage that was caused by the absence of Israeli defense companies from IDEX.

Part of what will determine Israel’s involvement in this market will be the openness of the Israeli defense establishment toward the UAE, and its willingness to share technology with the Emiratis.

The more Israel travels down the road of cooperation and moves away from traditional buyer – seller relations, the more likely Israel will be able to establish an important defense industry presence in the UAE and in the Gulf region.

The remaining open question is how long it will take the UAE to reach advanced indigenous defense production capabilities. The UAE has likely been observing other models of domestic defense industries in the region, such as Turkey, Israel, and Iran, and will draw inspiration from those models.  

What begins with maintenance can evolve within years into licensed production.

The UAE appears particularly keen to produce its own drones, and has brought in companies that build aircraft to learn from them.

The Chinese defense industry model can also serve as a valuable lesson for the UAE, since China did not start off by producing high quality drones as it does today, but gradually built up to this level of production with time.

An additional impetus for the UAE is the American decision to reevaluate the decision to sell it and Saudi Arabia air-to-ground munitions, as well as the U.S. reassessment of a decision to sell the UAE Reaper drones and F-35 fighter jets in a deal signed with the Trump administration.

 The UAE is already home to multiple international arms exporters. The country’s navy, ground forces, and air forces all have a combination of European and American equipment. For some platforms, like the fifth-generation fighter jet, the U.S.-made F-35 is the only game in town. In the field of armed drones and missile defense, Europe has little to offer the Emiratis, meaning that should the U.S. decline to sell these products, the UAE (like Saudi Arabia) will run into trouble.

Yet the UAE also cooperates with China and Russia. It has in the past purchased 50 Russian-made Pantsir medium-range ground-based air defense systems and upgraded them, as well armed drones from China. The latter were used to strike the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen and for air strikes in Libya.

The UAE has even purchased missiles from North Korea to support its operations in Yemen.

During the IDEX conference, representatives from across the Russian and Chinese defense industries were present, as well as a high number of representatives from Germany. The UAE is teaming up with German company Rheinmetall Defense for the joint production of shore-to-sea missiles.

Looking ahead, the UAE is interested in gaining the ability to produce its own loitering attack systems, and an array of bombs. The Halcon Emirati defense company is expanding its production program of the Desert Sting 16 precision guided glide weapons, launched from aircraft at ground targets.

Going forward, it is fair to expect the UAE to condition future acquisitions with foreign defense companies on close cooperation and technology sharing, and not to expect traditional buyer- seller relations.

Potential shifts in America’s defense policy toward Gulf states can be expected to create pressure on all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – and not only the UAE. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are also bracing for changes, and pressure on these states appears to be highly problematic from their perspective.

The reassessment by the Biden administration on munitions sales is merely one aspect of an American shift, and the decision not to sell air-to-ground bombs for use in Yemen should be seen as a litmus test on future American steps.

Much like Israel greatly expanded its domestic defense industry following the French arms embargo on it in 1967, the same response could happen among Gulf states.

This could act as an invitation for China and Russia to expand their pre-existing involvement in the Gulf defense market through new acquisitions – while also creating potential space for Israel.  

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

In Every Generation: How The Haggadah Sheds Light on Israel's Security Situation

By Natan Trief

The ancient words that we will soon recite during the Passover Seder can seem archaic or impertinent to our modern-day circumstances. How can the Haggadah, a document assembled so many hundreds of years ago inform our understanding of the threats facing the Jewish Homeland, as well as the strengths in her arsenal? A close reading of the text can illuminate our seemingly unique circumstances and place us squarely in the lustrous pages of the Eternal Jewish People. 

Toward the beginning of the Maggid section of the Haggadah, we read “And this promise is what has stood by our ancestors and us; for it was not only one man who rose up to destroy us: in every single generation people rise up to destroy us.” Indeed, as with countless times throughout Jewish history, it would be easy and justifiable to subscribe to this worldview. As Benjamin Netanyahu emphasizes these realities with fierce determination, we know that much truth lies within. The International Criminal Court continues its witch hunt against democratic Israel as it equates the acts of a sovereign power obligated to defend itself against Hamas, a morally bankrupt terrorist dictatorship. The messianic Iranian regime continues its march to the bomb as Israel worries whether her staunchest ally will back her up, or run back to the fatally flawed provisions of the nuclear accords. A mainstream U.S. news channel pushes a modern-day blood libel and accuses Israel of withholding a life-saving vaccine from its Arab population. We could be forgiven for thinking that the words of the biblical book of Numbers remain true, that we are a “nation that dwells alone.”

It would be easy to find solace in the timeless words of the Haggadah at the end of the Passover Seder as we implore God to, “Shfoch chamatcha – Pour out Your rage upon the nations that do not know You…” Of all Peoples, we, the Jewish People, have had every right to wish for divine retribution against our many enemies. And yet, as Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks (z”l) has said, the Haggadah distinguishes itself in its restraint. Even with all of the atrocities inflicted upon the Jewish People, this is one of the very few sections that asks for divine revenge.

Why? Because that is not who we are at our essence. As Sacks cites a unique addition placed next to these words in a 16th century manuscript from Worms, one of the oldest Jewish communities in Germany, flipping the meaning on its head: “Pour out your love on the nations who have known you…” This supplication on behalf of all the righteous gentiles throughout history accompanies us to this day in many editions of the Passover Haggadah. At its essence, it represents a perfect encapsulation of the Jewish spirit of innovation. As a People forged through the cruel crucible of history, we know that the Jewish People have always turned curses into blessings. A tiny country, surrounded by enemies committed to her destruction, schooled in hatred and war from its inception, names its national anthem, HaTikvah – The Hope.

Again, the Haggadah comes and teaches a profound lesson in compassion and mercy. Some of its most famous words shared at every Seder Table: “B’chol dor va’dor – In every generation, a person must view himself as if he himself left Egypt.” As with so many pearls of Jewish wisdom, this statement encompasses the tension in so much of Jewish history, that tension between the particular and the universal. On one hand, we place ourselves in the footsteps of our ancestors, feeling their pain, solitude and oppression. In so doing, we promise to uphold and defend the State of Israel. Never again, will our People be left so vulnerable and alone. On the other hand, however, in placing ourselves in their footsteps, we also promise to embrace the universal cry for freedom, no matter from where it originates. For this reason, Jews have always stood on the frontlines of others’ calls for Freedom. Moreover, we resist the urge to demonize the Other; for instance, the Iranian People in their own struggle under the yoke of a tyrannical regime.

The Haggadah is so revolutionary precisely because of its resounding calls for empathy. This distinguishing feature of the Jewish People is that, unlike countless other ancient civilizations relegated to the dustbins of history, we do not respond to events with knee-jerk impulsivity. Rather, we leverage our unique circumstances and strengths in our thousands-year-old partnership with each other and the Divine. As this pandemic slowly subsides, and as the threats to Israel continue to loom, may this forever be so.

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Natan Trief grew up in suburban New Jersey not far from New York City. He graduated from Dartmouth College with a double major in Spanish and History. Before the rabbinate was even a glint in his eye, Natan spent the 10 years between Dartmouth and rabbinical school exploring the world and his place in it. Whether the corporate boardrooms of PepsiCo, the hills, valleys and seas of Israel, or the Mongolian desert, the years were never dull. Read full bio here.

Naftali Bennett’s Choice Will Shape Israel’s Future

With a week to go until Israel’s fourth elections in two years, right and center-right parties are currently polling some 80 seats in the 120 seat Knesset. But these elections are no longer about right versus left. Instead, they boil down to one issue: Bibi, or not Bibi.

That is, will Israel’s longest-serving prime minister remain in office for an unprecedented sixth term, or will he be unseated by a disparate coalition, whose only unifying factor is the desire to remove Benjamin Netanyahu from power.

Lining up against the incumbent is what has been dubbed “the bloc for change” —  the parties that have stated they will not, under any circumstance, sit in government with Netanyahu.

This bloc is comprised of New Hope, a center-right party founded by Netanyahu’s former Likud protege, Gideon Sa’ar; Yesh Atid (center); Blue and White (center); Labor and Meretz (left); and reformed right-wing firebrand Avigdor Lieberman and his Yisrael Beiteinu party, running on an anti-Orthodox ticket.

In the opposing corner, Netanyahu and his Likud will team up with the ultra-Orthodox parties — Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) — and with the ultra-nationalist Religious Zionist Party (RZP).

With neither side able to form a coalition, they will both be dependent on the one party that hasn’t made it clear on which side it stands — Naftali Bennett’s Yamina Party, which espouses right-wing views on nationalist issues, a libertarian economic agenda, and “supports individual liberties while cherishing Jewish tradition and heritage.”

Bennett thus holds the key to what the next government will look like, and will have to choose between the religious nationalist bloc led by Netanyahu and the “bloc for change,” which has no clear leader at this stage. Yair Lapid has, as of the time of writing, so far refrained from stating that he is running for prime minister, and has even suggested that he could lead from behind in order to enable a coalition that could bring down Bibi.

There is little in common between the parties of the “bloc for change,” which range from the pro-annexation, anti-Palestinian-state New Hope on the right, to Meretz on the left, which is anti-settlement and for a two-state solution. They also differ on — well, pretty much everything, from economic policy, to their attitude towards the legal system and the courts. But there is one aspect that binds them together — secularism and opposition to the grip of the ultra-Orthodox parties on Israeli politics and society.

Bennett thus may well hold the key not merely to the question of whether Benjamin Netanyahu will stay in office, but to how Israel will be shaped in the years to come.

A look at the polls shows just how strategic a position the former defense minister holds. In the final polls taken by the three major TV channels before this article went to press, Likud was polling 28-29 seats; Yesh Atid 19-20; Yamina 11-12; New Hope 9-10; the Joint Arab List 8-9; Shas 6-8; UTJ 7; Yisrael Beiteinu 7; Labor 6; RZP 4-6; Blue and White 4-5; and Meretz ranges from 4 to teetering below the electoral threshold, as does the United Arab List.

Netanyahu, even if he were to take the unprecedented step of leaning on the support of Abbas Mansour’s United Arab List, can only form a coalition with the help of Bennett — and the same goes for the bloc for change. If the votes fall evenly, then Bennett may not be able to give either party the 61-seat majority required for victory — unless the bloc for change leans on the Joint Arab List for support from the outside, something Bennett adamantly states he will not agree to.

In the dog-eat-dog world of Israeli politics, the big players are jostling for position. Netanyahu — after weeks of portraying the elections as being a competition between a Likud-led government and a “left-wing” coalition led by Yair Lapid, so as to belittle Gideon Sa’ar — has now moved to shore up the Religious Zionist Party to ensure that it passes the threshold, while bludgeoning Bennett in order to cut Yamina down to size.

Lapid, meanwhile, is aiming to gain seats off Benny Gantz’s Blue and White party — a dangerous ploy, because if he is too successful, he will push his former partner under the electoral threshold, and, with Meretz already teetering on the verge, may find he has overplayed his hand.

If either Blue and White or Meretz, or both, fail to make it into the Knesset, then not only will the bloc for change find itself with less seats, but due to Israel’s complex proportional representation system — without going into the mathematical intricacies — Likud stands to gain in the overall calculation.

Although Yamina is only the third largest party in the polls, Bennett insists nevertheless that the race for the premiership is between him and Netanyahu, and says that he will not sit in a “left wing” coalition under Lapid. Bennett’s positioning and self-branding as the man for Israel’s top job despite the fact that at least two parties will finish ahead of him in the elections, gives an insight into his mindset and where he is striving to reach.

Like Netanyahu, the 48-year-old Bennett served in the elite Sayeret Matkal commando unit, and like his former boss — under whom he served as chief of staff — he is very much focused on the end rather than the means.

The end Bennett is focused on is becoming Israel’s prime minister, and he has two routes to the premiership: either in a rotation with other parties in the “bloc of change,” or in a rotation with Netanyahu. His decision, assuming that he is in a position to choose between the two blocs, could very well rest on which option he feels gives him a longer-term advantage.

Come March 23, Israel’s near-term future will depend very much on Bennett’s choice, and where his loyalties really lie: Will he opt to go with Netanyahu and the nationalist religious camp, or will he join up to the bloc for change?

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Ilan Evyatar is an Israeli journalist. He has served as Editor-in-Chief of the award-winning Jerusalem Report magazine; and News Editor of The Jerusalem Post, where he also wrote a weekly column on politics, economics and international affairs. He is currently working on his first book. Read full bio here.

Alon Liel has served as a chargé d’affaires in Turkey and as Israel’s ambassador to South Africa. Following his role in 1999 as foreign affairs adviser to then-chairman of the Labor party Ehud Barak, Liel became director-general of the Foreign Ministry in 2000.

Abbas has proven himself to be a first class strategist

By Eitan Dangot

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is implementing a highly efficient strategy in multiple arenas and maneuvering an array of challenges with visible success.

Since the election of the Biden administration, Abbas has reached an optimal point in his moves to reposition the PA both within the Palestinian arena and internationally, and it is clear that Abbas has been waiting for years for the Trump administration to pass before implementing his recent maneuvers. 

Months before the elections in the United States, Abbas and his inner circle assessed that Biden would likely win, and began signaling their change through a number of ‘softener steps’ designed to move away from Ramallah’s absolutist posture that had rejected cooperation with the U.S. and Israel.

These steps, conducted on the eve of the U.S. elections, included the return of security coordination with the Israel Defense Forces, after many months in which it had been suspended, and a resumption of receipt of tax payments from Israel, which had been frozen for months, creating a significant burden on the PA’s economy and its residents.

Abbas’s goal was to signal to the Biden administration that he is embarking on confidence-building measures vis-à-vis Israel in order to gain Washington’s faith.

As an inseparable part of this policy, Abbas understood that he must also achieve quiet with his hated Islamist rivals, Hamas, whom he will never forgive for the humiliating coup and ejection of Fatah from the Gaza Strip in 2007.

Despite the enmity, Abbas recruited senior PA official Jibril Rajoub to hold  contacts with Hamas – thereby decreasing friction within the Fatah leadership as a side product – and made Cairo the scene of Hamas-Fatah reconciliation talks, thereby returning Egypt to the stance of senior regional mediator, a position it is keen to play.

Meanwhile, Abbas significantly decreased public criticism of the Gulf states that signed normalization deals with Israel, and returned the PA’s ambassador to the UAE. In doing so, he placated Saudi anger at Ramallah, since Riyadh was the main regional power backer of the Abraham Accords, and had increasingly come to see the Palestinians as an obstacle in creating a regional bloc against Iran.

Within the Palestinian arena, the 86-year-old Abbas appears to have set a personal objective of completing his term in the coming years by positioning the PA as the central, exclusive, lead representative of the Palestinians, thereby creating a strong legacy that is designed to justify the manner in which he has ruled since being elected president in 2005.

To further this goal, Abbas’s acceptance of tax funds form Israel and his safeguarding of the economic status quo has provided the PA with stability, which, when viewed in comparison with the economic crises of other Arab states, is particularly prominent.

Abbas’s decision to proceed in a phased manner with Palestinian elections to the national parliament and presidency in May and July respectively is a signal to the U.S. and to the international community, designed to indicate this leadership is striving to repair ‘holes’ in Palestinian governance and make it more democratic.

The elections were also designed to reduce resentment felt by Hamas after Abbas renewed security coordination with Israel and cancelled the reconciliation process.

The elections carry with them major risks should Fatah and Abbas lose, while also carrying a promise of quiet since they attract the support of most Palestinian factions. The decision to move in this direction stems from Abbas’s need to have quiet on the Hamas front at this stage – but he still can cancel the process at any time and blame Israel for the abortion of the elections, using Israel’s refusal to allow them to take place in east Jerusalem as an excuse.

Israel, for its part, is addressing the issue cautiously in order to avoid being accused of disrupting the Palestinian democratic process. Yet any new Israeli government that forms after Israel’s own elections will have very little time to formulate responses on whether to allow Hamas to take part in West Bank ballot counts, or for voting to go ahead in east Jerusalem. 

Abbas also took advantage of the fact that Hamas is holding its own parallel internal elections, a process that is taking up the terror organization’s focus, leaving Hamas less able to focus on campaigning in the wider elections.

The Hamas elections in Gaza resulted in a win for the incumbent Yahya Sinwar, but only after four rounds of elections – a testament to the fact that Hamas’s current path of seeking truce arrangements faces major opposition by the veteran generation that is radical and extreme. This will complicate the manner in which Sinwar will lead, together with whoever wins the elections for the overseas political bureau, Khaled Mashaal or Ismael Haniyeh.

Hamas, for its part, is playing the long game, and views the elections as an opportunity to dominate the PA and the PLO, in line with its central objective of being the future ruler of the Palestinians.

Within Fatah itself, Abbas is working intensively to neutralize almost every attempt to undermine his power, focusing particularly on his sworn enemy, Mohammed Dahlan, as well as Marwan Barghouti, who is imprisoned in an Israeli jail for deadly terror attacks, and political threats from his rival (and the nephew of the late Yasser Arafat) Nasser Al-Qudwah.

Ultimately, Abbas has been able to achieve recognition of his leadership status, portray himself as a unifying figure in the Palestinian arena, and is able to celebrate his achievement of dragging Israel to the International Criminal Court in Hague – a threat that Israel must formulate a practical and wise response to.

He is regaining traditional international support for the PA from the U.S. and Europe, and there can be no doubt that Abbas forms a serious challenge to Israel.

Abbas will now be able to issue demands to return Israel to negotiations with the PA. Despite past regional forecasts, he has proven his ability to bring the Palestinian issue back as a central issue on the Middle Eastern agenda.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

Mid-East adversaries: Signaling Conflict, Avoiding War

By Eitan Dangot

The Middle East has entered a new and significant stage in recent weeks, as all regional actors position themselves around the key question of whether or not the Biden administration renews the Iran nuclear agreement. Failure to achieve an improved nuclear deal and to cause Iran to downgrade its regional destabilizing activities will have long-lasting effects, could create an economic disaster in Iran, and could lead to a military escalation between Iran and America’s regional allies.

The issue of whether sanctions on Iran will be lifted, and the outline of a possible new agreement, is the leading factor that will shape the face of the Middle East in the coming years.

The new American administration is maneuvering through a minefield, in which various developments could impact its decisions on the region.

To understand the new complex Middle Eastern puzzle, it is first necessary to recognize the fact that the Biden administrations is dealing with Iran on two fronts: The first is Tehran’s radical activities and support for armed movements that stretches from Yemen through to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, as part of a grand strategic attempt to change realities in the region. The second is Iran’s nuclear program.

Every attempt by the United States to solve one of these fronts without linking it to the other is doomed to fail. Iran strives to become both a nuclear regional power and to shape a new geo-political era through the rise of terror armies and militias, of which Hezbollah in Lebanon is the most powerful. Hezbollah is in fact the most heavily-armed non-state actor in the world and is in possession of advanced weapons systems.

The moment of reckoning for American policy in the Middle East is approaching in the form of the decision on the nuclear agreement, and this central junction is also influenced by other important events: The upcoming Israeli elections, and the scheduled presidential elections in Iran in June, before which the Islamic Republic may suspend any major decisions.

The formation of a regional bloc made up of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel has, in the wake of the Abraham Accords – a successful leftover from the policy of the Trump administration  – created a challenge to American flexibility on the Iranian issue.

Now, the new administration is presenting a cold shoulder to Israel, and at the same time is reassessing its relationship with Saudi Arabia.

As it reviews its regional policies, Washington should take into account long-term consequences of the way it deals with its central partners in its maneuvering with Iran.

The main threat to the Abraham Accords bloc now could come due to tensions between Washington and Riyadh, which was the main silent partner enabling Israeli-Gulf relations.

Iran is not resting on its laurels, and is actively working to beef up the terrorist-military channels that it has built throughout the Middle East. It is this activity that has led the entire area into an escalatory dynamic, and it is through it that the Iranians send out psychological warfare messages to the U.S. and its principal allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Iran has chosen the naval arena as the main sphere in which to send out these signals. Its actions have created a significant threat to maritime shipping routes, and it is worth noting that more than 90% of Israel’s trade is conducted via shipping.

In its recent attack on an Israeli-owned ship in the Gulf of Oman, Iran has notified Israel of an equation according to which reported Israeli air strikes on Iranian military assets, targeting ground-based attempts to beef up the Iranian crescent, will be answered by attacks on Israeli shipping.

Simultaneously, Iran is activating its proxy in Yemen, the Houthis, and other militias in the region to create a ground-based threat to shipping.

The American strike on an Iranian militia in eastern Syria and the reported Israeli strike on targets in Damascus following the ship attack strengthens the idea that Syria has been selected by both Israel and the U.S. to respond with their own signals to Iran.

This escalation dynamic has not so far caused real harm to the other side, and most of the decisions are still being made in the political-diplomatic sphere, with all sides complimenting their postures with cyber attacks and other low signature activities. All sides are keen to avoid pressing the ‘escalation button’ too soon.

Iran may choose to escalate significantly after a new nuclear agreement is reached, and it has yet to retaliate for the assassinations of former Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and the chief Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakrizadeh. Such a development could certainly ignite the region.

Washington must take into consideration the core interests of its allies, Israel and the Gulf states, who in the meantime are setting up their own independent capabilities for taking on the Iranian nuclear threat. These efforts could in future take individual-state form, or be coordinated under the framework of an alliance.

As a result, no one should be surprised if local military solutions surface as being highly realistic options to deal with the Iranian nuclear program.

Ultimately, Washington should view the spread of the Shi’ite axis, its weapons proliferation, and proxy consolidation program, as being inseparable from the nuclear deal.

The Iranians have proven and continue to prove that despite severe pressure from multiple directions – the pandemic and economic distress – their scheme to expand terror tentacles and their murderous radical ideology will not stop even for a second.

Only a combination of a firm stance in negotiations, the listing of conditions, a show of force, and leaving space for maneuver will pave the path to a contraction of Iran’s nuclear program and a curtailment of its regional activities. A U.S. failure on these counts could well lead Israel to consider a variety of operations against Iran and its militias, including the option of launching a preventive offensive against Hezbollah.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

A Campaign without Meaning

By Justin Pozmanter

Israel is about to go to the polls…again.  

Elections have always been popularity contests, with the personalities of the main candidates playing a huge role in the outcome. This is only amplified when there is a polarizing incumbent on the ballot. However, it is hard to recall an election that has been nearly 100% about a single individual. Even referendums on the incumbent are almost always connected to their views and perceived performance on national security, the economy, healthcare etc.

The 2020 election in the United States was all about Donald Trump, but even then, you heard repeated arguments related to his policies on immigration, COVID-19 and others. It was not at all difficult to see a clear ideological contrast between President Trump and now-President Biden.

Compare this to the 2021 campaign here in Israel. Newspapers once reported polls with ideological blocs of left and right. The stories today are about the “Bibi-bloc” and the “anti-Bibi” bloc.

Gideon Saar is firmly in the anti-Bibi bloc, but you would be hard pressed to find a single substantive issue that separates the two. Meretz is also in the anti-Bibi camp, but there is little else on which they and Saar agree.

This dynamic is damaging for the country. There are essentially three plausible outcomes –  with the caveat that implausible things certainly can happen in Israeli politics.

1. Prime Minister Netanyahu forms a coalition: In this scenario, Naftali Bennett’s Yamina party would likely be the senior coalition partner, joined by the ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, and the new National Religious Party. Prime Minister Netanyahu would continue to serve as an indicted prime minister while on trial. Whether you believe he is guilty on all counts, or that the charges are little more than a political witch hunt, it should be clear that a sitting prime minister under criminal indictment is less than ideal.

For this reason, the Knesset should move as quickly as possible to adopt some form of the so-called French Law (to apply beginning with the next prime minister), whereby prime ministers would be immune from prosecution while in office, but would also be term limited so as not to be above the law.

2. The anti-Bibi bloc forms a coalition: In this scenario Gideon Saar, Naftali Bennett or Yair Lapid (or a rotation) are able to cobble together a coalition of their own New Hope, Yamina and Yesh Atid parties plus some combination of Yisrael Beiteinu, Labor, Blue & White, Meretz and the Joint List.

Most polls show that any such coalition will be just a few seats above 60, so each coalition partner would have effective veto power over every action of the government. Given the highly disparate views of these parties, it is difficult to imagine this coalition lasting more than a few months, meaning Israel would be heading back to elections very quickly.

It appears the purpose of such a coalition would not be to actually govern, but to form a government that removes Prime Minister Netanyahu and then quickly dissolve in the hopes that he would not contest the next round of elections.

3. Nobody can form a coalition: As a result, Israel goes to election number five late this summer. It should be clear this is a bad outcome. Putting aside the expense of each election, and the budgetary gridlock caused by having perpetual interim governments, there will come a point where election after election will cause the Israeli people, and foreign observers, to begin to question the stability and value of our electoral process.

None of these outcomes arouses much excitement or confidence. And that is precisely the problem with an election that is heavy on personality and light on substance. While unchecked ideology is often problematic, and sometimes dangerous, a government run by those with some shared vision for the country, or at least similar enough views to reach plausible compromises, offers the potential for stability and positive action on behalf of the governed.

People want to believe in something, whether it is settlement of the land of Israel, Peace Now, or lower housing prices and higher wages. A government based purely on self-interest or spite will never inspire anyone.

It is also striking how much of a lost opportunity this moment may be for the right. Parties that are generally considered to the right – Likud, Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beiteinu, the National Religious Party, Shas and UTJ – are polling at around 75-80 seats over the last month.

The same polls show the centrist parties (Yesh Atid and Blue & White) at around 20-25, the left (Labor and Meretz) around 10 and the Joint List also at around 10. So, at the moment, polling indicates that over 80% of the electorate ranges from the center to the far right, with the Zionist left and predominantly Arab parties each at around 10% or less.

It is astonishing that after an election where 2/3 of the country will likely vote for a party to the right, a very possible outcome is something other than a right-wing government, whether it is a short-lived government of parties with no shared vision or the inability of anyone to form a coalition at all.

The result is a campaign stripped of ideology and meaning. In a place where ideological fervor and debate have always been part of the fabric of society, the current level of apathy and cynicism two weeks ahead of a national vote is alarming. We can only hope some portion of our leadership will take notice.

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Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

Europe’s bystander approach to the Abraham Accords harms its own interests

By Daphne Richemond Barak

The Abraham Accords are a game changer for the Middle East and for Europe; yet they have been met by European leaders with skepticism. This approach threatens to harm not only the region, but also Europe’s own interests.

Europe’s reaction to the historic accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain has been muted to say the least. Europe was eerily silent after Israel and the UAE signed their historic agreement. It issued a subdued welcoming statement after the Bahraini-Israeli agreement was signed. This statement included a recognition of the United States’ “positive role” in the Middle East, but made no mention of a potential role for the European Union in the aftermath of the signings.

Europe has not been able to recognize what the Accords mean for the stability and prosperity of the Middle East or how they can strengthen Europe’s long-term security.

Recent years have demonstrated that the more unstable and economically-challenged the Middle East is, the more next-door Europe feels knock-on effects, whether through uncontrolled migration of refugees fleeing war-torn regions, or the spread of radical ideology and those whom it indoctrinates.

The Abraham Accords, in contrast, serve as a stabilizing counter-force in the region, decreasing the prospects of conflict and promoting economic prosperity.

As a result, those who dismiss the Accords as a mere political maneuver lacking substance, or who describe them as a formality, are downplaying not only a major transformation of the Middle East but also an event that holds important ramifications for Europe.

Europe’s southern neighborhood, which covers significant parts of the Middle East, has long been the focus of EU action. The EU has encouraged partnerships and cooperation among states, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, invested in limiting climate vulnerability and conflict, and worked toward creating opportunities for all.

The region is currently entering a new era marked by precisely the types of opportunities that EU policies have sought to promote and implement for decades, in an effort to bolster the region and EU security. If it wishes to maintain its credibility and leadership posture in the Middle East, the EU must take a proactive role in the realization of the Abraham Accords.

The reality is that the Abraham Accords are bringing to life new forms of cooperation in an array of fields, and are therefore far more than a political move. From tourism to food security, agriculture, and education, the agreements have created a genuine thirst for change in Israel and the Gulf. Israelis and Gulf state citizens want a new friendship, and this warmth adds a human dimension to the growing diplomatic ties.

Whether critics like it or not, the Accords are therefore a game changer for the region and for Europe. Attempting to deny this fact demonstrates that a certain blindness is leading the response, fueled by political pre-conceptions, such as the fear that embracing the Accords is tantamount to abandoning the Palestinian cause and aspiration for a state.

Yet the two issues are hardly mutually exclusive. Regional normalization does not threaten the Palestinian issue, and the attempt to create such a false dichotomy is baseless and counter-productive.

The habit of placing the Palestinian issue front and center in all issues relating to the Middle East can be found in developments such as the decision by the European Court of Justice to label Israeli settlement products – an indication of the climate that dominates legal institutions within Europe.

This same desire to be protective of the Palestinian issue underlies the ambivalence toward the Abraham Accords. It can also be found in the lack of efforts by some EU members to discourage the International Criminal Court from launching a war crimes probe against Israel.  

In order for the EU to truly recognize the potential of the Abraham Accords, it must cease viewing this historic development through the prism of the Palestinian issue.

Letting go of the old narrative does not mean the international community should cease discussing the Palestinian issue, but rather, recognizing the Abraham Accords as an opportunity in that respect, too.

The EU can use the Abraham Accords to create new momentum to push the Palestinian issue toward resolution. This can be achieved by harnessing the new regional dynamics to generate fresh thinking on conflict resolution. The UAE has supported the Palestinians with generous funds for years, and to present that country as indifferent to the Palestinian people does not do justice to its record and continued efforts.

Ultimately, the Abraham Accords give a glimpse of what can happen when the Middle East stops viewing Israel as the enemy. This same positive narrative can now be pivoted toward the Palestinian issue, instead of allowing the Palestinian issue to hold back active support for the Accords.

The EU therefore has a positive role to play – and not just the United States. This can take the form of convening the UN Security Council to discuss the implications of the Abraham Accords for the Middle East and Europe, or reaching out to the Biden administration to offer the EU’s assistance to the U.S. in keeping up the momentum of regional normalization. 

Rather than making the Accords contentious, Europe can play an important role in making them a unifying event

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Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Here’s how Israel can maintain an advantage in the aerial systems race

By Shachar Shohat & YAIR RAMATI

For the past century, ever since the arrival of the aircraft on history’s stage as an effective and significant military combat tool, a race has been underway between offensive aerial platforms and defensive ground systems.

The basic process by which aerial platform capabilities are developed and then followed by a ground-based response has been with us for over a century. It is a cat-and-mouse game: Once an operational or technical gap appears, and the defense system finds itself lagging behind the attacking air power, the attackers gain air control, with all of its implications. Then the gap is closed, meaning that air defense systems regain an ability to extract high prices from attackers, to the point of being intolerable for them.

In the Middle East, this dynamic was illustrated when, toward the end of the War of Attrition in 1970, dense Egyptian air defense systems challenged the Israeli Air Force’s aerial freedom of operation for the first time.

At the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egyptian and Syrian air defense systems were so effective that air support became an almost impossible mission. Israel lost no less than 102 aircraft during the war; and at its end, it was clear that dealing with air defense systems had become the Israeli Air Force’s biggest challenge.

But in the First Lebanon War of 1982, the Israeli Air Force proved it had developed a clear edge over Russian air defense systems, as it destroyed 19 Syrian batteries and downed 97 Syrian jets without suffering any losses of its own. It was a milestone in the race and formed a revolution in the attacker-defender balance. Yet, it caused Middle Eastern adversaries to turn to new directions.

Even prior to the 1982 war, a new gap had appeared — the threat of ballistic projectiles — one that was left unanswered for years. During the First Gulf War in 1991, Israel was hit by some 40 Al-Hussein missiles fired from Iraq, a ballistic missile that had been used extensively in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War.

The late internalization of the threat dealt Israel a significant strategic blow. In March 2000, however, a partial reply appeared when Israel deployed an operational Arrow system for the interception of ballistic missiles.

The second aspect of the gap created by ballistic threats arrived through rockets and artillery shells. During the Second Lebanon War of 2006, Israel was hit by some 3,500 rockets without the ability to defend against them.

This gap was reduced, at least in the Gaza arena vis-a-vis Hamas, when in April 2011 the Iron Dome air defense system conducted its first interception. Since then it has continued to provide a defensive umbrella throughout several rounds of conflict.

Further afield, we have seen the cat-and-mouse dynamic continue: In September 2019, Iran launched a surprise attack on oil and gas facilities in Saudi Arabia using attack drones and small Iranian-made cruise missiles, placing a question mark over the kingdom’s air defense systems.

The 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan saw the collapse of Armenian front-line air defenses, exposing its Army to systematic destruction through a combination of precision-guided weapons, loitering munitions and armed drones.

Two basic insights arise from these developments. The first is that threats develop in jumps, while responses usually require lengthy development phases. The second is that the timing of conflicts determine whether the defender will have an adequate response to the threat, and what price the attacker or defender will pay accordingly.

For those developing solutions, a built-in conflict exists between working according to procedure and working quickly. Those who want to complete the full processes will need longer. We suggest more daring efforts and more risk-taking, and recommend assessing the form of future threats to guide development.

For example, low-grade rockets evolved into industrial-made rockets, which then morphed into heavy projectiles before becoming accurate missiles. These have been joined by drones, mortar shells and cruise missiles. The Iron Dome can tackle all of these.

Looking ahead is crucial. In addition, spiral development, involving step-by-step innovations, is the right course.

In terms of risk-taking, those unwilling to accept failures during trials will experience incremental progress rather than breakthroughs. At its core, this struggle is an arms race, and if adversaries catch up, the price will be high.

If in the past 50 years the dynamic of threat development was moderate, today the rate has accelerated, while the technological amplitude and range of threats is almost endless.

This is a complex and challenging combination for air defense system developers and operators, which sometimes finds expression in the need to deal with painful dilemmas, such as giving a reasonable response in certain areas only.

As the rate of new threat appearances grows rapidly, air defenders are tasked with the difficult mission of finding rapid solutions. This entails taking risks and breaking rigid development principles, such as systematic technological learning. It also calls for daring in the management of development, including the willingness to absorb failures, and the close cooperation between intelligence elements as well as development and operational personnel.

Israel must win this cat-and-mouse game to maintain its aerial supremacy.

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Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Palestinian elections are still far from certain

By David Hacham

Despite public statements and cautious optimism on the Palestinian street, prospects for Palestinian elections going ahead are still far from certain. Fourteen Palestinian factions met in Cairo in February under the auspices of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate to work out concrete agreements for the holding of elections, but this meeting may have been more show than substance.

Under the latest proposal, elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council are to be held on May 22, for the Palestinian Authority Presidency on July 31, and for the Palestinian National Council (PLO) on August 31. At the same time, Hamas is presently holding its own internal elections for positions of power, including the political bureau that is currently headed by Ismael Haniyeh.

 The factions agreed that the Palestinian police forces would be exclusively in charge of securing the elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They also agreed that an organizing committee and a court would be established to ensure that the elections are free and fair, and that all political prisoners be released. Abbas has in recent days signed a presidential decree that orders the release of all political prisoners.

The agreements call for ensuring the freedom to express opinions under the two rival Palestinian governments of Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, and that security forces in both sectors would remain neutral vis-à-vis the elections.

In theory, these elections are years late, with the last round being held in 2006, and all attempts since to hold new elections having failed. In practice, Fatah kept delaying the elections due to political considerations, until Abbas issued a decree in January calling for new elections to be held in 2021.

Despite all of the above, the path to holding Palestinian elections remains filled with obstacles: Fundamental divisions remain between Fatah and Hamas, and there are a series of problematic, unresolved issues, such as Israel’s position on the elections, which could torpedo the entire process.

In recent weeks, Israel has conducted an intensive wave of arrests of Hamas operatives and leaders in the West Bank, including legislative council members. Hamas says this will not dent its determination to pursue the upcoming elections.

Palestinian sources stress the fact that the next round of talks is scheduled for March in Cairo as a reflection of the fact that divisions could not be resolved within the two days that the factions met in February, and that more time is needed to reach practical agreements to pave the path to elections.

The sources estimated that only when the first round of elections for the legislative council approach in May will the final decision be made on whether to proceed as planned.

Fatah sources have not ruled out the possibility in the absence of agreements and compromise on the substantial divisions that elections will again be suspended or delayed.

The fact that Abbas has announced dates for the elections should therefore not be seen in any way as a guarantee that they will go ahead as stated.

Ultimately, it is vital to keep in mind that all of the steps taken in the direction of elections are reversible, and that all progress thus far has been on the declarative and technical-administrative front.

It still remains highly uncertain that elections will go ahead. Several factors can derail the process at any time. It appears that Abbas is taking part in the elections process to ‘gain points’ vis-à-vis the new Biden administration in the U.S. and to present itself as a democratic Palestinian government. If this is the case, it is fair to assume that Abbas has planted ‘exit ramps’ that will allow him to leave the elections process under the pretext of major divisions with Hamas.

Abbas must be aware of the very real dangers to Fatah’s status in the West Bank in the event of a Hamas election victory, which could prepare the ground for a Hamas takeover of Palestinian institutions.  Palestinian sources have assessed that if Abbas is indeed serious about going  ‘all the way’ in the elections, he would be committing political suicide.

Israel has yet to make its position on the elections public, but it is fair to assume that the defense establishment is holding ongoing situation assessments and preparing multiple action paths to deal with a variety of scenarios. Abbas could use the pretext of an Israeli refusal to allow the elections to take place in East Jerusalem to back away from the process.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Ten years since Iron Dome’s first interception, the system has revolutionized air defense

By SHachar Shohat

Rafael, Israel’s national defense laboratory, is marking ten years to its Iron Dome air defense system intercepting its first enemy rocket in Israeli skies, since when it has revolutionized the world of rocket interceptions.

Today, the system has become a global brand, with countries around the world interested in Iron Dome and its proven capabilities. The U.S. Army has ordered two Iron Dome batteries as part of its deep examination of the system.

By any international benchmark, Rafael invests large amounts of funds in research and development to prepare itself for the future, and to prepare future building blocks that enable rapid technological breakthroughs that find expression in military systems. 

Iron Dome’s story began at the end of the Second Lebanon War, when Hezbollah fired some 4,000 rockets at Israel, which had no response to the threat.

The Israeli Air Force had total air superiority over Lebanon and was able, thanks to precise intelligence, to launch a brilliant opening strike at the start of the war, destroying Hezbollah’s mid-range rocket launchers.  However, the terror organization’s short-range rocket array was almost completely unaffected during the remainder of the war.

This event served as a wake-up call for the State of Israel.

 It removed several layers of resistance that until then had existed with regard to air defense solutions against this type of threat.

Objections included the argument that the only way of winning wars is through offense, not defense, and that it was better to deal ‘with the swamp, not the mosquitoes.’ The Second Lebanon War exposed this approach as being wholly ineffective. Subsequent conflicts, such as the 2008-2009 conflict with Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Operation Cast Lead), also upended this argument. The rate of enemy rocket fire remained high despite the IDF offensive, and the idea that attacking maneuvers alone would result in victory lost credibility.

The government could no longer tell the public that it had to absorb all of the rockets, damage, injuries and deaths, without any defensive systems.

Another objection was based on doubts concerning whether it was technologically possible to intercept these types of rockets. A third layer of resistance claimed that it would cost too much money to create this capability. Others claimed that the system would not be ready in time.

 Rafael stuck to its belief in its technological capability. Taking advantage of its close working relationship with the IDF, Rafael understood the precise operational needs. This effort was bolstered by the keen awareness that the system was being developed to protect the people of Israel, and that it would soon face real-world tests.

Out of fourteen suggested solutions, Israel chose Rafael’s Iron Dome system in 2007. Rafael came together with Israel Aerospace Industries subsidiary Elta, which designed the system’s radar, and the mPrest company, which was responsible for designing Iron Dome’s unique command and control and interface system.  

In less than five years after the decision was made, the first operational Iron Dome battery was handed off to the Israel Air Force’s Air Defense Array in 2011. 

This extraordinary short time frame was made possible through, among other things, the use of parallel development processes. Rather than first developing the system, passing it on to the client, and then waiting a long time for the client to become qualified for operational readiness, in Iron Dome’s case IAF air defenders were involved with the system from day one.

Air force personnel worked closely with developers, studying the system as it was being developed, and directly influencing its design. The speed was driven by the sense of urgency to get the system’s first battery out into the field as soon as possible to defend southern Israel from Gazan projectile attacks.

 In April 2011, Iron Dome made its first real-world interception. Since then, the system has gone on to intercept more than 2,500 enemy projectiles, achieving an interception rate of over 90 percent of projectiles headed toward populated areas in Israel.

The use of spiral development, in which developers look at the next innovation step to take with the system already working, means that Iron Dome undergoes ongoing upgrades. Iron Dome’s robust design, its many interceptors, and its radar capabilities give it the ability to take on unprecedented quantities of projectiles with success – despite enemy attempts to saturate the system.

 The Iron Dome of 2021 is not the same system that it was in 2011. Today’s system can work at sea, assist military forces that are launching ground offensives, protect national strategic sites, and deal with targets at higher and lower altitudes compared to ten years ago.

It can also intercept drones, and take on rapid low-flying targets.

Today, Iron Dome forms a vital part of Israel’s ability to conduct offense as well, since it defends bases that are essential for attacking enemy targets.

It stands guard against threats from the northern and southern fronts.

Rafael is now thinking about introducing inherent components into the system, such as laser technology. In addition, it is installing Artificial Intelligence capabilities to give Iron Dome the ability to learn and recognize new threats on its own.

As adversaries continue to develop rapid threats capable of complex flight paths, the challenge of remaining a step ahead of the enemy remains paramount.

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Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

The ICC’s decision has made clear: Israel needs a robust legal strategy

By Daphne Richemond Barak & Oded Ranaan

The majority judges’ announcement that the Court has jurisdiction over the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem increases the chances of an investigation into crimes Israelis allegedly committed there. In an interview with "The Arena," international law expert Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak explains that while the judges' decision is a worrisome development, Israel still has options – but only if it truly begins planning ahead.

On February 6th, 2021, the International Criminal Court announced that it has jurisdiction to investigate alleged war crimes committed in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem by Israelis and Palestinians since 2014.

In an in-depth interview, we discussed the new situation and possible paths of action for Israel with Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak, Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and an expert in international law.

A year in limbo

Q: The ICC’s announcement may have severe legal implications for senior Israeli politicians, government officials and military officers. Can you go back on the chain of events that led to this important moment?

“The announcement came over a year after the ICC’s Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, announced in December 2019 that there is sufficient evidence to merit an investigation over acts committed on the territory of Palestine. Instead of moving ahead right away with an investigation, however, Bensouda decided to seek the view of the ICC’s Pre-trial Chamber judges on what constitutes the territory of Palestine – which she saw as including the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. She didn’t have to seek the judges’ validation, but she did, and that started a lot of back-and-forth with them which lasted over a year.

“The Pre-trial Chamber’s decision – which embraces Bensouda’s own findings – now enables Bensouda, who is leaving her position in June, to seal her legacy with respect to this high-profile case. Determining the scope and specifics of the investigation, however, will probably be left to her successor, British barrister Karim Khan, who was elected a week after the Court's decision was made public.”

Q: Why did the Prosecutor chose to seek the judges’ opinions given that she wasn’t legally obligated to do so?

“She's had issues in the past with the Pre-Trial Chamber; incidentally, it also involved Israel because it was connected to an investigation on the events related to the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. In 2013 the Comoros Islands, under whose flag the ship sailed, formally requested the Court to investigate what happened on board the ship, but Bensouda declined to open an investigation. This led to a political confrontation between her and the judges, who criticized her decision and even tried to get her to change her mind. She has since stuck to her guns, so they are not on the best possible terms.

“This might be the reason that led her this time around to try and get them on board. When you get people to participate and provide their own opinion, they are less likely to criticize you down the road. A lot of this has to do with internal ICC politics, as you can see.

“But there is another possible reason for her seeking the judges’ validation on what constitutes the territory of Palestine: to endow the investigation with the greatest possible legitimacy, it having been ‘endorsed’ by both the Prosecutor and the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber. One thing is for sure, it is an unusual move and it is not readily evident why Bensouda chose that path.”

Q: So is the Prosecutor now on firm grounds to go ahead with the investigation of acts allegedly committed by Israelis on the territory of Palestine?

“The Court took a very simple route: since the UN General Assembly allowed Palestine to become a part to the Court’s Statute, the Court held that Palestine constitutes a state for purposes of the ICC proceedings – and such proceedings only. Interestingly, the majority decision emphasized on several occasions that this does not prejudge in any way on whether Palestine is a state, or what constitutes its territory. By doing so, the judges purposefully limited the scope of their findings.

“It also stands out that the judge presiding over this panel of three judges dissents on important aspects of the decision. According to Judge Kovács of Hungary, the territory of Palestine does not include ‘the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem,’ as the majority opinion states. In Kovács’s opinion, the Court must take into account the Oslo Accords, which limited Palestinian sovereignty over some of these territories, such as [Israeli-controlled] 'Territory C'. And unlike the majority opinion, Kovács analyzes the Oslo Accords in great detail.

“For Israel, this dissent carried great weight: it weakens the majority opinion, which pales in legal rigor compared to Kovács’s opinion. It conveys the existence of significant disagreement within the bench, and, ultimately might make it more difficult for the Court to investigate acts that occurred in these two areas. But does it prevent the opening of an investigation? Certainly not.”

Law and politics, or just politics?

According to Richemond-Barak, the ICC legal process is heavily influenced by politics. “The judges’ decision”, she explains, “was first expected around the time of Israel’s announcement in the Spring of 2020 that it intends to annex the West Bank by July 1st of that year, having received the thumbs-up from the Trump administration. In the end, a potential annexation was nixed – officially in favor of forging diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and, later, additional Arab and Muslim countries. As July 1st came and went, and annexation did not take place, momentum for a decision faded.

“But if anyone still questioned the significance of the political undercurrents behind this process, the eventual publication of the decision – less than two weeks after President Biden’s inauguration – cleared any doubts. The Court had reasons to fear the Trump administration’s reaction to the decision, which had previously imposed sanctions on Bensouda herself, so it waited. This conduct doesn’t reflect terribly well on the idea of a court of law, driven solely by the ideal of justice and operating undeterred from the pressures of the world around it.”

Q: Now that the judges have published their decision on the question of jurisdiction, do you think Bensouda will advance opening a formal investigation? What other considerations may potentially affect her decision?

“My sense is that she can now leave office having brought this critical preliminary stage to completion. I don’t see her taking any further steps currently, except perhaps formally opening the investigation now that she has, so to speak, received the judges’ blessing. But Khan, her successor, will be the one to actively shape the investigation by deciding which specific acts to investigate, how many indictments to issue and against whom, et cetera.

“I should add that this decision comes on the backdrop of an ongoing crisis of legitimacy for the Court. The institution has recently been scrutinized by an independent committee of experts, tasked with writing a report on issues regarding the ICC as a workplace, but also, in the broader sense, to forecast what the future holds for it. As a relatively young institution, the ICC has yet to carve a role for itself in the international landscape and assert its integrity and credibility. I fear that the latest decision, strikingly weak on the law, may not have been a step in the right direction.”

The Israel connection

Despite the Pre-trial Chamber’s decision, any possible sanctions against Israelis are still uncertain and will likely not occur in the next few years. Nevertheless, Richemond-Barak warns that Israel cannot rely on external factors to solve its issues vis-à-vis the ICC.

“The newly elected Prosecutor is unlikely to shield Israel from scrutiny. I already mentioned that Bensouda paid a heavy political price by declining not to open an investigation into the Mavi Marmara incident.

“Would another prosecutor have made the same decision? It’s hard to say. Any situation that involves Israel always attracts significant attention. But even on the Palestinian issue Bensouda took her time and didn't open the investigations right away, so theoretically Khan could be more aggressive and speed up the process. However, he’s likely to fully review the information before him before making any further decision on this investigation.”

Q: What legal angle do you expect the Court to pursue going forward, and why?

“In my opinion, the most dangerous legal grounds from Israel’s point of view are those that relate to the settlements. The ICC’s mandate is based on the principle of complementarity – it only has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes when states have either been unable or unwilling to do so themselves in a fair manner. The ICC complements states in administering justice, it does not replace them.

“Building settlements is part of the policy of the State of Israel. The Israeli government therefore cannot claim that it is investigating and looking into potential violations of international law that relate to the settlement enterprise.

“This is an area is where Israel is on weaker legal ground, as complementarity and the robust Israel judicial system cannot shield it from the Court’s jurisdiction. Israel should pay careful attention to this matter. There might be a sense that settlement building does not amount to a crime that ‘shocks the conscience of humanity.’ It would certainly have to meet the gravity threshold set under the Court’s statute in order to go forward. For now, however, the recent decision of the judges makes no reference to the settlement enterprise.”

Q: In your opinion, what approach will the new Biden administration likely take vis-à-vis the ICC?

“President Biden is unlikely to go back to the relatively warm relationship that President Obama had with the Court, mostly because right now there's also a looming investigation against US personnel in Afghanistan. It’s important to remember that the US’s position used to be aligned in many ways to that of Israel: Both states chose not to become party to this institution. This explains why the State Department has expressed ‘serious concerns about the ICC’s attempts to exercise its jurisdiction over Israeli personnel’ shortly after the Court’s announcement.

“The State Department also stressed that Palestine does not qualify as a sovereign state. This is an important statement, but Israel should not take it as offering a blanket guarantee of support – particularly on the delicate issue of the settlements, which sidesteps the principle of complementarity and is less likely to be blocked by a Biden administration.”

“Other important states, such as Canada and Australia, have stepped forward in recent days in a similar spirit – primarily objecting to having the question of Palestinian statehood and the delimitation of Palestinian territory resolved by the ICC, instead of bilateral negotiations between the parties. In this regard, it’s important to reiterate that the finding that Palestine is a state within the framework of the ICC does not extend to the status of Palestine outside that context – for example, at the United Nations or before other international judicial institutions.”

Policy recommendations for Israel

Q: Since no one can imagine the current government, or future ones, formally stopping the settlements or dismantling them, what can Israel do now to defuse this situation?

“It's important to stress that since the famous (or infamous) Goldstone Report was issued in 2009, Israel has invested considerable resources and established new departments and processes to tackle international legal challenges. And Israel has done well by publishing Attorney General Mandelblit’s comprehensive report around the same time as the Bensouda published her own in December 2019, providing a snapshot of Israel’s position on the opening of an investigation by the ICC.

“What can Israel do today, ahead of a possible ICC decision to investigate? First, try to shape – or participate in shaping – the priorities of the ICC in the coming five to ten years. I’m not sure what channels of communication exist between states – especially non-party states like Israel – and a prosecutor regarding the scope of an investigation, but I see an added value in maintaining dialogue.

"As a general rule, I am in favor of multilateral engagement. I know decision-makers in Israel don't necessarily share this view, for reasons that range from sheer fatalism – 'it won’t have any impact anyway' – to the fear of conferring too much legitimacy to highly politicized international institutions. In the past, Israel declined to cooperate with commissions of inquiry established by the UN Human Rights Council or with the International Court of Justice when it examined the legality of the security fence. I, however, prefer when Israel lays down its narrative and arguments, directly or indirectly, and makes its case.

“Second, Israel should seek independent advice from leading legal experts. The Palestinians have been doing this for over a decade and have crafted a very smart, creative, and impressive legal strategy when it comes to the ICC and other international bodies. It’s clear that Palestine sought the advice of very clever international lawyers in this respect, who have suggested innovative interpretations of the statute of the Court. Getting access to the ICC was entirely out of reach for the Palestinians only 10 or 12 years ago, but they succeeded, and so to some extent the Court’s recent decision demonstrates that such smart and consistent legal strategy pays off.

“The conclusion is that Israel should seriously seek the advice of people who are going to devote more than five minutes asking themselves what else could be done. They need to spend weeks and months together planning a strategy of proactive engagement. It doesn’t come overnight. The Palestinians have proved that this strategy works and there's no reason why Israel shouldn’t be doing the same. Israel can learn from this.

“I find that too often in this type of decision-making, Israel involves actors at the political level and ministerial levels that can’t agree with one another. In addition, the view that legal processes remain separate from diplomatic and strategic ones remains too prevalent. The political and legal aspects are closely connected.”

Q: So formulate a strategy, not merely tactics.

“Yes. Israel is often busy extinguishing fires, on both the military battlefield and the legal ‘battlefield.’ Its needs instead to devise a long-term plan regarding international institutions, particularly judicial institutions such as the ICC. Dealing with problems as they come is not enough – it’s time to ask the hard questions: where does Israel see itself in the legal arena in five or ten years? What are the objectives and how does it get there? The recent ICC decision demonstrates the necessity behind such a mindset.”

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Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute.

Oded Raanan is Co-founder and Editor-in-Chief of “The Arena”. Before joining the Abba Eban Institute, he worked for the foreign news desk at "Ha'aretz". He holds an M.Phil in International Relations from the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, and an M.A. and a B.A. in Middle Eastern Studies, both from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.