True Equality Is Far Off

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

In late February, I represented the Knesset at the annual open hearing of the United Nations General Assembly and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Among the issues on the agenda was advancing gender equality as a foundation for government stability.

The list of speakers wishing to address this important issue was the largest among the conference sessions – everyone wanted to talk about the importance of gender equality. When my turn to speak arrived, I sought to place reality on the table and to collectively examine how words can change reality. In my address, I stated, “I hear big, moving words here that touch on the importance of gender quality to the stability of the world in which we all live.”

In my speech, I compared the words spoken at the conference to a beautiful photograph, in which women who make up half the world population hold central positions, lead processes and are decision-makers. In reality, the picture is very different. While women indeed work in every sector of life and most of us believe in advancing gender equality as an important factor for government stability – I have placed bills before the 24th Israeli Knesset on this very issue – the reality is that the more senior the position, the fewer women there are.

I told the conference that even at the General Assembly hall that hosted us, even at the UN, a woman has never served as secretary-general. My observation drew applause from the plenum.

The post-COVID-19 world has to recover as it marches forward and our role as parliament members from around the world is to work together toward this recovery. The goal of gender equality to boost the level of government worldwide is a common mission.

Israel has indeed had a woman prime minister in the 1970s, but at the same time, due to the ultra-Orthodox political parties that have banned women from their ranks, Israel is currently listed 64th in the global gender equality index. We must not accept that.

On March 8, International Women’s Day was marked in Israel and around the world. As they do every year, voices surfaced claiming that this is an unnecessary event. International Women’s Day was first marked in the US in 1908. Two years later, in Copenhagen, Denmark, a strategy was set to promote women’s equality, including the right to vote.

While this right has been secured and the lives we lead today are different from those of our mothers and grandmothers, there is still a long way to go. We have yet to complete the journey to full gender equality. We live in a reality in which there are income gaps, glass ceilings, jobs that are not staffed by women and severe violence against women that sometimes ends in murder.

We live in a reality in which women struggle in rabbinical courts to achieve full freedom, in which women can be denied divorce and in which young women still have to fight in court for the right to be able to fulfill certain roles in the Israel Defense Forces. We live in a reality in which only once has a woman served as head of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

In this reality, we must continue to mark International Women’s Day to remind ourselves that the obligation to create change applies to us all. The path to gender equality needs to be walked by men and women together, as it passes through legislative reform, education and adapting the job market to parenthood and family life.

We women who have dared and achieved must also continue to walk on this path, and to declare loudly and clearly to other women: Yes we can!

---

MK Sharon Roffe Ofir was elected to the 24th Knesset on behalf of the Yisrael Beitenu Party. She has previously served as deputy council head, and worked as a journalist and senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years.. Read full bio here.

PM Bennett must mediate Russia Ukraine conflict

By Yochai Guiski

As events in Ukraine unfolded over the past few weeks we witnessed a Russian ground invasion, a valiant Ukrainian defensive effort, thousands of deaths, over a million refugees, and heavy sanctions by the United States and Europe on Russia.  Israel for its part tried to stay out of the fray and avoid taking a harsh tone with Russia.

As a result, Jerusalem’s partners in the United States and Europe, as well as journalists in the Israeli and international media, pushed it to adopt a more vocal and unambiguous tone regarding Russia’s assault on Ukraine.

Reports suggested that U.S. officials, and even President Biden himself, were critical of Israel’s stance, expecting it to be “on the right side of history” and to join the chorus of condemnation of Russia’s aggression, at least at the United Nations. If U.S. anger with the policies of India and the United Arab Emirates is any indication, the pressure on Jerusalem must have been intense.

As Israel tried to stay the course, Washington pushed harder and a few days into the war, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid condemned Russia’s attack on Ukraine, supported Ukrainian territorial integrity, and voiced Israel’s commitment to humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine.

Even these steps were seen as insufficient and expectations of Israel to provide additional support, including weapon systems were expressed by Ukrainian officials and by U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham. Although at least, the nonsensical idea of providing Iron Dome systems to Ukraine, which has been circulated by the media, was rightfully rejected by Ukrainian defense officials.

But Israel’s boldest move came over the weekend when Prime Minister Bennett secretly flew to Moscow to meet with President Vladimir Putin and then on to Berlin to meet with Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The prime minister was also in contact with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during his journey. Israel also sought to coordinate the effort with the U.S. by reportedly conferring with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan before the flights.

The reactions to the prime minister’s initiative ranged from lukewarm support to dismissal and outright criticism of his actions.

But was Israel right to forge ahead with its mediation effort or should its leaders have toed the line, adopted a forceful approach toward Russia, and let other nations tend to the conflict? I believe the Prime Minister made the right call.

Even now, millions are in harm’s way or fleeing their homes in Ukraine to become refugees, and many millions more may suffer the same or much worse, as the crisis in Ukraine is set to intensify. The direct human toll could be extremely heavy, and the indirect costs of the conflict may be just as bad.

Shortages in grain supplies from major producers Russia and Ukraine, as well as the skyrocketing prices of wheat, may bring famine and instability to many countries including in the volatile Middle East.  

In these circumstances, Israel is one of the very few countries that are still on good terms with Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., and Europe. Should Israel walk away from its unique position and simply join the litany of states that forcefully criticize Russia (but do little else), or should it attempt to use its position to do some good?

There are several ways Israel can make positive use of its position vis-à-vis Russia:

1. Provide a secure and discreet back channel between the West and Russia. As the conflict in Ukraine intensifies and the specter of nuclear escalation looms, there would be value in such channels.

2. Allow for indirect communication between Russian and Ukrainian leadership, through Israel.

3. Communicate the need for humanitarian consideration to be incorporated into the Russian operations in Ukraine, as well as specific humanitarian requests.

4.  Assist the U.S. in understating Putin’s state of mind, and potentially help the U.S. develop and execute an exit strategy from the conflict and provide an “off-ramp” for the Russian leadership to de-escalate the situation.  

The value inherent in these possibilities is already being partly realized, as both President Putin and President Zelenskyy and other leaders conduct talks with Prime Minster Bennett, while the Ukrainian ambassador has commended his mediation effort, and even suggested that Jerusalem might be a venue for high-level negotiations.

The strategic and moral imperative dictates that Israel tries to use its influence to prevent more loss of life and alleviate the suffering of those who are still caught in the fighting, instead of joining the Western efforts to exact a toll from Russia for its actions.

Hundreds of thousands of Jews living in Ukraine and Russia would be part of the suffering, and as history teaches us, there are always dark forces of antisemitism at play in times of strife, who would seek to scapegoat and attack these communities.

There has been enough death and bloodshed in Ukraine, including the brutal murders of countless Jews during the Holocaust. The ground is already quenched with the blood of innocents - it need not get any more.

The Jewish Talmud teaches us a moral lesson - whoever saves one life saves the whole world. Israel must rise to the challenge and seize the moment to help save as many people as possible.

Doing so will not be achieved by joining the group of countries cutting ties with Russia and imposing sanctions on it, as the Israeli contribution to the overall effort would be negligible. Israel should focus on using the relations between Moscow and Jerusalem to help save lives.   

In his famous poem “The road not taken,” Robert Frost describes the contemplation of a person between two roads in the forest.  Like the choice made in the poem, Israel should also take the road less traveled, and hope that it makes all the difference.    

---

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Babyn Yar: Re-Burying the Holocaust by Bullets

By Michael B. Snyder

Russian dissident poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko’s famous 1961 poem “Babyy Yar” begins: “Over Babyy Yar, there are no monuments.” Resulting in what can be fairly termed the most attention ever paid to the largest mass shootings of Jews in German-occupied Europe, Russian aggression causing unspecified damage to the still-under-construction Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center is symbolic of unfinished business: the decades it took for recognition of the Holocaust by bullets in Soviet killing fields and the constant antisemitic attacks against the Shoah.  The site has become a rallying point for Jewish outrage against Russia; reasons for outrage, however, have long existed.

Before the Wannsee Conference that decided that the answer to the “Jewish Question” was the total destruction of European Jewry, and also prior to the German invasion of its then ally the Soviet Union during “Operation Barbarossa” in June 1941, there were 160,000 Jews living in Kyiv, thought to be about 20 percent of its population.  Approximately 100,000 Jews immediately fled or were already absent serving in the Soviet army. 

As part of German advances following this surprise attack, Einsatzgruppen (mobile groups of Nazis killing largely by bullets) pushed west, slaughtering 4200 Jews in Kamenetz-Podolsk, 6000 in Lomzha, Poland, 25,000 in Odessa, then 33,771 (along with 19,000 non-Jews) just outside Kyiv in the Babyn Yar ravine.  Jews died “by systematic, merciless executions” that were first considered random murders due to infrequent reports and accounts of other Jews dying from starvation, disease, or as part of other groups.  It was an ominous sign that the political affairs director for the World Jewish Congress said that many Jews “complain now as a sheer matter of habit....” in response to American Jews grumbling over the disinterest shown by the Allies.

The post-war history of the site is rife with significant controversy encased within political intrigue as a memorial was sought.  In March 1945, the Ukrainian government and Communist Party agreed to build a monument in the form of an abstract large black granite form that would not recognize Jewish victims.  The Soviet Ukrainian Ministry of Culture halted the program due to its refusal to build any monument at all, hoping to sweep away the atrocities altogether. 

During the 1950s, attempts to physically erase Babyn Yar occurred under the guise of “residential planning.” Liquid mud waste dumped over the mass grave as a primary weapon to bury the past proved so heavy that the dam abutting the land collapsed under its weight. The subsequent surge of water killed 145 people and destroyed 70 buildings in the area. A Jewish cemetery adjacent to the flood was paved over shortly thereafter to build a sports complex. 

The Ministry of Culture of Soviet Ukraine continued to control decisions in the 1960s, initiating a “closed competition” for monuments in memory of Soviet citizens and soldiers who perished during the Nazi occupation of Kyiv.  In response, a memorial park to be built on bridges over the Babyn Yar ravine, along with other entries that would memorialize Jews, were rejected as “Zionist.” The location became a person-made memorial with no official recognition when Russian and Ukrainian writers, many of whom were jailed, gave impassioned speeches (including the unveiling of the above “Babiyy Yar” poem) to 1,000 people decrying the suffering of the Jewish people and the necessity of the struggle against antisemitism.

On August 24, 1991, Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence was approved. Jews looked to it with the hope that it would mark the end of state-sponsored antisemitism.  Finally, 50 years after the Babyn Yar massacre, authorities for the first time admitted publicly that most of the victims were Jews. The man who would become the first President of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, delivered a speech that stressed Jews were killed in Babyn Yar only because they were Jews.

Despite the continued Russian threat, the Ukraine government moved forward with reforms.  It was in Israel where the dam was broken: then-President Poroshenko spoke to the Knesset in 2015, emphasizing that Babyn Yar is a shared, open wound of Ukrainians and Jews, that 1.5 million Ukrainian Jews perished during the Holocaust, and apologizing to the children and grandchildren of Holocaust victims for the Ukrainian “collaborationists.” 

Finally, on the evening of October 6, 2021, the sacred ground saw the opening of the memorial that is not just for the memory of Nazi horror but also to symbolize continued repression of and antisemitism against Jews by the Soviet Union, Russia, and the Ukrainian collaborationists. With Ukraine’s Jewish president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a witness, the chair of the memorial’s advisory board and former refusenik and MK Natan Sharansky said, “Babyn Yar is not only the symbol of the Holocaust by bullets but it is the symbol of the efforts of Soviet communist regime to raze the Holocaust memory.” 

And now, the symbol comes full circle. With Purim’s own form of memorial approaching, the Jewish world pivots. Trending globally from Ukraine and Babyn Yar includes Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett undertaking at least temporary leadership in shuttle diplomacy; two Jews and Israel surging to front and center leadership in a conflict that includes the bombing of a Holocaust memorial. Israel opened its border to welcome home what could be ten thousand Ukrainian Jews making Aliyah (becoming Israeli citizens), along with increasing the number of non-Jewish refugees it will absorb for the coming year. 

At the same time, antisemitism and antizionism roar, fully integrated with political correctness. Israel is being compared to Russia, memorializing six million Jews remains under attack against charges of denial and distortion, and conspiracy theorists blame Jews for their own and Arab genocide without evidence.  Yet Israel and world Jewry is leading by showing and not telling, by acting and not pontificating. There is no reason to expect or desire credit as Israel shows the world and diaspora Jews what is possible despite the never-ending denunciation. 

---

Michael B. Snyder is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute, he is an attorney with over 35 years of experience in the areas of children’s rights, human rights and Non-Government Organizations in the United States, Israel and Africa. Read full bio here.

Does the Abu Dhabi attack signal the budding of a Middle East NATO?

By Henrique Cymerman

The January 17 missile and UAV attacks on Abu Dhabi carried out by the Houthis in Yemen were a kind of ultimatum.

The message from the Iranian-backed Houthis to the UAE was: Stop attacks on us in Yemen or deal with our attacks. The deadly strike claimed three innocent lives, but also caused extensive damage to the UAE’s image, psychology, and economy that goes beyond the incident itself.

The UAE and Dubai’s stock market are seen as an island of stability and sanity unlike other states in the Middle East. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia all ceased existing as we previously knew them as the Middle East declared war on itself over the past decade. Yet investors always saw Dubai and Abu Dhabi as safe zone emirates for tourism, real estate, business, and shopping.

Twenty-two million tourists visited the UAE in 2019. Undoubtedly, every new Houthi attack can harm the UAE’s brand as a safe place for business and investment.

The Houthi spokesman even threatened to target Dubai’s Expo, which opened in October and has attracted 13 million visitors so far. Such an attack would be a game-changer for Dubai’s tourism and business hub perception.

After seven years of fighting stronger armies, the Houthis are acting as if they’ve already won their war. Despite accounting for just 35% of Yemen’s population, they control an area that is home to most of the country’s 30 million people and are in the process of strengthening their regime under the influence of the Iranian political model – the same Iran that arms them.

 On January 31, the Houthis fired again on Abu Dhabi, just when Israeli President Isaac Herzog was visiting the UAE. An Iranian message here was carried by the missiles – punishment for joining the Abraham Accords.

These events represent the seeds for a new regional defense arrangement, NATO-style, which could take shape in the coming years.

The pact between Israel and several Sunni states could begin with a joint effort to deal with suicide UAVs.

A dialogue underway between Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other countries could lead to a situation in which every state that identifies the threat of a UAV attack on another state will alert it and assist in preventing the attack. The same cooperation could be extended to deal collectively with ballistic missile threats.

Such an arrangement would be hugely significant. It would have been difficult to imagine two years ago, and yet now it is approaching reality.

Israel’s February 3 defense agreement with Bahrain is, similarly, all about dealing with Iran and its partner.

The shock that residents of Abu Dhabi experienced last month – which I saw firsthand as I was visiting the emirate when the attack occurred – signifies the change underway in the region.

Authorities could not deny the attack as images of the damage spread like wildfire on social media.

Saudi Arabia, in contrast, has grown accustomed to these attacks from Yemen, and to intercept them.

The Abraham Accords present moderate states in the Middle East with the ideal platform on which to plan out the response to their collective security. Currently involving Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, many more countries could join. The Accords are the most significant development for Israel concerning its regional status since the signing of the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan.

They do not cancel out the big danger of a de facto war between Israel and Iran, but they do solidify cooperation against the common threat posed by the radical regime in Tehran.

Russia, a military neighbor of Israel, may change its attitude toward Israeli operations against Iranian targets in Syria – another key unknown – following the war in Ukraine.

But Israel can be counted on to continue its surgical strikes against Tehran, whether in Syria or by covert means in Iran itself, where it targets nuclear threats, likely with the assistance of other states.

Iran’s proxies and partners, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, occasionally remind Israel that they can harm it.

Now, the Houthis have joined this map of threats from the distant south. Can they target Eilat, the Israeli popular resort at the northern tip of the Red Sea? Are their threats to hit Israel credible? Although attacking Israel has always been popular among public opinion across the region, no one knows yet.

Is Israel now facing a new ‘southern Hezbollah’? It seems that Jerusalem is getting used to that possibility and that it has begun to gather intelligence on the Houthis, despite having no connection to Yemen in the past, as opposed to Lebanon, where Israel’s intelligence coverage of Hezbollah is phenomenal.

As the war in Yemen drags on, its horrific proportions seem lost on an indifferent world. An estimated 400,000 casualties of war, starvation, and disease have led the UN to declare Yemen the worst humanitarian disaster since the Second World War. Yet the international community is aloof.

The Houthis are clearly on an upward trajectory since taking over the Yemeni capital of Sanaa in 2014. They have yet to attack Israel, 2000 kilometers away, as this is low down on their priority list and prefer to rely on hostile rhetoric instead. But their attack from eastern Yemen on the UAE – 1600 kilometers away – with precise weapons, is an indication of just how much the Houthi offensive capability has grown.

 In contrast, the Houthi attack on Saudi oil targets in 2019 covered 650 kilometers. 

The Houthis’ proximity to the Straits of Hormuz and Bab El-Mandeb waterways means they can also threaten strategic sea routes for the transfer of a sizable portion of the world’s energy and fuels.

These conditions set the stage for the gradual evolution of a new regional NATO. Israel has been assisting Saudi Arabia, sharing its knowledge and experience, and since the attacks on Abu Dhabi, dozens of Israeli private companies have offered Abu Dhabi their technology.

In October 2021, the commander of the UAE's Air Force made a historic visit to Israel's Blue Flag international air drill, which involved seven countries. In the following month, the navies of Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain took part in a naval drill in the Red Sea, led by the United States.

The region is only at the start of this event. The Houthis are going nowhere, and Iran’s backing is steadfast. Whether or not they direct their fire at Israel remains to be seen.

---

Henrique Cymerman is a journalist of global renown whose writings regularly appear in media publications in Europe, the USA, Latin America and Israel. He lectures in five languages. Henrique has covered current affairs in the Middle East for over 30 years and has been nominated "Comendador," a title of nobility, by the King of Spain and the President of Portugal. Read full bio here.

How Israel can fight political-legal wars waged against it

By Danny Ayalon

Unlike the peace treaties that Israel signed with Egypt and Jordan, its conflict with the Palestinians is not about changes to territorial borders and cannot be resolved in this manner.

While exchanging territory for peace worked with Jordan and Egypt, with the Palestinians this would not lead to the same result. The Palestinian aspiration remains to replace all of Israel with an Arab-Muslim state. This is illustrated in textbooks in Palestinian Authority schools that make no differentiation between Judea and Samaria, Gaza, Tel Aviv, Ashkelon, Jaffa, or Haifa. Hamas relays this ideology day and night.

 As a result, the conflict spans military, terrorist, and economic arenas. It includes actions such as the organization of boycott movements, a weapon that the Palestinians have sought to employ against Israel.

The political-legal arena is a vital dimension in this conflict and is used to ram Israel in international institutions. The Palestinians would, if they could, eject Israel from all international institutions, and place it under sanctions.

This political-legal war is being waged at the Hague, the United Nations, UNICEF, and UNESCO. All of these efforts are part of the political war to combat Israel, isolate it politically, and create opportunities for a future economic or military assault against it when conditions are ripe.

On this front, unfortunately, there is no daylight between the PA and Hamas. The PA is in comfortable agreement with Hamas on the need to wage political-legal war on Israel, even though IDF protects the PA from being toppled by Hamas in the territories, as it was in Gaza in 2007.

Without Israel’s security presence in areas B and C of the territories, the PA would have vanished long ago, and PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas would have been thrown out of power in Ramallah by Hamas in little time.

Hence, the security coordination between Israel and the PA is very convenient for Abbas, serving the PA and him personally. On the other hand, Abbas and the PA continue with a systematic campaign of delegitimization against Israel, and they shed no tears when Hamas fires rockets on Israeli cities. This way, the PA can dance at two weddings.

When talking about international institutions, it is vital to understand that the Palestinians enjoy a relative advantage over Israel, as opposed to the economic, military, and technological arenas, where Israel has the upper hand.

This is because the Palestinians have an automatic majority in international organizations. Two-thirds of the UN’s 193 member states are non-democratic states. Dozens are members of the Organization of Islamic States or are dependent on Arab oil.

Before even placing a condemnation resolution on the table, the Palestinian Authority already has a majority to utilize. It receives on-demand anti-Israel resolutions whenever it so chooses.  

When UNESCO condemned Israel and denied the link between the Jewish people and the Temple Mount, affirming that only the PA has a link to this holy site, this was an example of the exploitation of that majority.

The only reason Israel has not been kicked out of the UN or placed under sanctions is that the UN Security Council is the only authority with weight in the UN, and it is there that the US has a veto. As a result, Palestinian initiatives against Israel do not succeed.

But the wider diplomatic campaign against Israel has been very successful. Despite lacking any operative significance, this campaign has public significance. When pupils in a school in, say Germany, learn about the UN and its importance, and then see that most of its decisions are against Israel, they will reach the assumption that those decisions must be justified.

Hence Israel’s image absorbs massive damage in many countries.

In Europe, as a result, Israel’s image is severely tarnished.

A poll taken among respondents in European countries by the BBC in 2013 found that Israel came fourth from the bottom in country popularity. Only Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea fared worse. This is the direct result of the political warfare that Israel is subject to.

The same model of delegitimizing Israel is now being exported from Europe to the United States, with great effect.

So, what can Israel do in response? The first thing to do is expose how anti-Israel decisions are taken in international institutions. This is an uphill, Sisyphean task.

To secure assistance, Israel must build a supporting network of organizations, made up of NGOs, which can be Jewish or Christian, and hi-tech companies who have an interest in acting as a counter-weight in this political struggle.

With all due respect to Israeli diplomacy, when university students in Brussels hear from an Israeli ambassador, they’re naturally skeptical and often can dismiss claims with the explanation that it is the ambassador’s job to defend his country. So non-Israeli ambassadors are key in this effort.

Recruiting ambassadors in trade unions, engineering committees, and businesses, is an extremely effective approach.

Additionally, it is important to campaign in the United States for the defunding of organizations that adopt virulent anti-Israel positions. This effort becomes far more effective when it receives support from the White House.

When it comes to the struggle in the Hague, Israel has multiple allies since a conviction could have a significant negative impact on the U.S., Britain, and NATO countries too. These countries also fight low-intensity wars in which regular armies take on terror entities embedded in civilian regions. Israel is not alone in facing this situation.

The U.S. and British militaries fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, meaning that any prosecutions of Israeli soldiers or officers will pave a path for the prosecution of U.S. and British armed forces too.

Thus, recruiting their support is easy.

When the ICC was created at the end of the 1990s, Israel and the U.S. remained as non-members precisely for this reason –  concern that a lofty goal could soon be abused by terrorist countries.

Despite what many believe, the tide of global public opinion is not moving dramatically against Israel,  but neither is it moving in Israel’s favor. The tide however could turn rapidly to Israel’s detriment. The most important thing is to keep fighting the good fight and to use the right tools in arenas where Israel suffers from a disadvantage.

---

Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

Ga. Legislature should act on new antisemitism bill

By Mark Goldfeder

On Monday, State Rep. Mike Wilensky, D-Dunwoody, and State Rep. John Carson, R-Marietta, filed a bill that will fill a gap in Georgia’s existing antidiscrimination laws by providing officials with a standard definition of antisemitism -- the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition -- to be considered when assessing facially discriminatory conduct.

Wilensky’s bill comes as antisemitism is surging around the country, and the Peach State has not been immune.  Over the last five years Georgia has had 188 reported incidents of antisemitism, and in 2018 it had the highest number of incidents in the Southeast. Officials have a responsibility to protect their citizens from acts of hate and bigotry, and must be given the proper tools to do so.

Valid monitoring, informed analysis and effective policymaking all require uniform definitions. To that end, the IHRA definition is already used by the U.S. federal government, the 31 member countries of IHRA, the European Union, Serbia, Bahrain, and Albania, among others. It has been endorsed by a growing number of world leaders, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres. The Georgia bill does not revise any anti-discrimination policy; it just clarifies a term with an accepted definition to ensure that the laws will be administered properly.

There are two reasons why this bill is important, and why the IHRA definition is appropriate for a state like Georgia to use when considering the motivation behind discriminatory acts. (Full disclosure --- the bill is heavily based on a model law that I drafted). The first reason relates to the practical difficulty of defining antisemitism, and the second to the legal standard of objectivity required whenever assessing intent.

The practical problem in defining antisemitism is that it is a mutating virus; Jews are often condemned for being whatever a society, or a particular part of society, dislikes at the moment. Depending on which antisemite you ask, Jews can be simultaneously too liberal and too conservative, too rich and a drain on the society. They are at once too strong and too weak, too influential and too parasitical.

A definition of antisemitism that can encompass all of these possibilities and more needs to be able to cut through the timely rationales given for this timeless hatred. In order to actually protect people, we need a definition that focuses not on the reasons why people hate but rather on the actions taken by those expressing hatred; a conduct-based definition. The definition that best serves this goal is the IHRA definition, precisely because the examples it gives focus on the modern manifestations of antisemitism, meaning what antisemites do, as opposed to why they do it.

Critics have challenged IHRA’s use in policymaking on two grounds. First, they claim that it conflates political speech against Israel with antisemitism. That part is simply not true; there is a safe harbor provision in IHRA itself which says that “criticism for Israel similar to that leveled against any other country” is not antisemitism, as well as an express caveat that all of the examples given, including the ones about Israel, “could, taking into account the overall context,” be antisemitic. The reason the specific examples are provided (and are important) is explicitly not because all criticism of Israel is antisemitic, but because there are those who falsely claim that no criticism of Israel can ever cross the line, and use their anti-Zionism as a thinly-veiled excuse for antisemitic action. For example, on campuses across the country, and even in Georgia, Jewish students routinely hear antisemitic comments, and when they complain are told that it’s fine because it was “merely anti-Zionism.” IHRA will help to objectively clarify that line, as it already does for Title VI complaints.

The second objection to using the IHRA definition in a policy context is that in the wrong hands, it could theoretically be used to stifle speech. That argument is a red herring. Of course, free speech is a core aspect of democracy; that is why such bills cannot and do not take the form of a speech code. But discriminatory harassment and criminal conduct are not just speech, even if words are sometimes used. Unlike speech, such conduct is absolutely subject to government regulation. Well-established Supreme Court precedent requires behavior to be “objectively offensive” to fall under the category of discriminatory harassment. To meet this “objectively offensive” standard, the definition used in the discriminatory antisemitism motivational analysis must be objectively well-accepted. The IHRA definition is once again the obvious choice.

The new Georgia bill already has bipartisan support, and in theory it should be a no-brainer for every legislator to sign on. But it was still an act of bravery for Wilensky, the only Jewish representative in the entire state, to shoulder the burden of ushering it through the Gold Dome when no one else had. For their courage in actually taking a stand and trying to make the world better, Wilensky and Carson deserve all of our thanks – and of course our political support.

---

Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

American Jewry’s PTSD and its Cure

By Michael B. Snyder

Physical and psychological antisemitic violence has again become the daily news narrative, with the Diaspora responding with a clear desire to be accepted, liked, or at the very least to distinguish their Judaism from Zionism. Rather than making this mistake again, it is time to adopt a different strategy, based on the fact that American Judaism has fallen into a pattern of accepting or even joining with organizations that either reject Jews outright (i.e., the Women’s March, Black Lives Matter, BDS, Students for Justice in Palestine, Jewish Voice for Peace, etc.), otherwise distance themselves from being Jewish, religiously and culturally, and reject Israel’s right to self-defense. As antisemitism has again come out of the closet, it has never been clearer that regardless of how Jews view themselves and attempt to be part of the American melting pot, they are used and discarded, depending upon the always-changing political landscape. 

Truth be told, Jewish suffering continues, as reflected in American psychoanalytic psychiatrist

Elvin Semrad’s blunt assessment that, “The greatest sources of our suffering are the lies we tell ourselves.” Just two examples of the countless difficult truths: America’s beloved President Franklin Roosevelt famously kept the borders closed and allowed his bombers to ignore the railroad tracks delivering Auschwitz victims, yet 90% of Jews gave him their vote despite the acknowledgment that the Final Solution had been successfully implemented.  Just this year, within days after International Holocaust Remembrance Day (invented by the proudly antisemitic United Nations) commemorating the “liberation” of Auschwitz after the death of close to one million Jews, America released $29 billion to the Iranian regime vowing to destroy Israel. Examples abound as America perpetrates against the same Jews that believe they will be accepted and welcomed as equals if only they clear the unattainable, undefined next hurdle. The collective with closed eyes and impeccable placement thereby ignores the Torah creed not to place a stumbling block before the blind.

Bessel Van der Kolk, a second-generation survivor, and a psychiatrist who is considered the “father of PTSD” wrote extensively of generational Shoah responses. He formulated the accepted credo that victims either seek to join with the perpetrators or continue to reengineer scenarios in order to remain close to trauma. If one considers the incessant antisemitic drumbeat a form of chronic, wear-‘em-down victimization, it is not surprising that American Jews have done both.  Further, there is evidence that intergenerational trauma passes generationally through genetic changes to DNA. 

Regardless, Jewish history is steeped in brave leaders literally and figuratively splitting the waters while forging freedom. While some believe another historical flood has commenced, revisiting hope and taking responsibility to break the cycle must begin with bitter realities that cause American Jews to turn those whose words can lead change.  

Emerging from President Woodrow Wilson’s fear presents an appropriate starting point for healing: Jews, he declared, were “forced to frame excuses for their birth” in an ingrained morality that failed to recognize the possibility of self-determination.  Freedom’s path opens with Jewish values becoming public and steadfast, with the boldness that others’ judgments can neither define nor victimize.  After thousands of years of continued reliance on others’ messaging and definitions that continue to place the so-called victims of antisemitism in retreat, Hannah Arendt’s chilling words must act as a creed: “If one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a German or a world citizen, or an upholder of human rights.” The inevitable “dual loyalties” response to this sentiment must be appropriately ignored, replaced by the realization that “crypto-Judaism” – an ancient term describing the practice of Jews who hid their Judaism to survive – be placed under the Never Again heading. To paraphrase Israel’s Foreign Minister Abba Eban regarding the 1967 war, the choice is to live or perish; to defend existence or to forfeit it for all time. Paraphrasing Eban, Jews are too large to be dominated, too self-reliant to be confined by tutelage, and too ferociously resistant to be thwarted. As David Ben Gurion said in his declaration of independence: it “... is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate... .”

Rather than accepting or aligning with those that flaunt antisemitism as a platform while operating generally free from real consequence, the harsh truth of American Jewry’s collective failure must be accepted in order to stop victimization. Rather than supporting antisemitism through joining with other minority groups who fight for their own civil rights while denying those of the Jews, Theodor Herzl’s impassioned plea for alliance should be the siren, his lament that without unity Jews achieve nothing.  As he said when the Jews of Russia walked out of the Sixth Zionist Congress, “These people have a rope around their necks, and still refuse!” The Jewish collective today must answer the question of why such a failed chasing of those who would harm us is still pursued.  Craving self-determination, not the forever-elusive acceptance, creates space for, rather than retreats from, Jews’ historical need, if not their clear desire.

When Israel was transformed from David into Goliath overnight by overcoming the existential attacks in 1967, Eban foresaw the future in the past when he said that Israel “had committed the dark sin of survival.”  Debate of legitimacy will end by overcoming the American Jewish form of PTSD when French philosopher and historian Ernest Renan’s definition is met: “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. To have a common glory in the past, a common will in the present.  To have done great things together, to want to do them again -- these are the conditions for the existence of a nation.”  As long as diaspora Jews frame excuses for their birth, seek approval from others to be who they are, and hold on to the essence of crypto-Judaism, Jews will not be safe or be one... and victimhood will be self-perpetuated, again. 

---

Michael B. Snyder is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute, he is an attorney with over 35 years of experience in the areas of children’s rights, human rights and Non-Government Organizations in the United States, Israel and Africa. Read full bio here.

How Israeli technology can bolster Gulf air defenses

By Yaakov Lappin

With the world firmly fixed on the Ukraine crisis and a deeply problematic nuclear agreement with Iran taking shape, there is added importance to tightening the alliance between Israel and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Recent cruise and ballistic missile, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen on Abu Dhabi, have acted as a critical reminder of the need for the UAE to bolster its air defenses. The same likely applies to other members of the GCC, mainly Saudi Arabia.

Since Israel faces a similar threat profile, its systems could significantly bolster the air defense capabilities of the GCC countries.

The UAE’s decision to purchase South Korea’s M-SAM air defense system, valued at around $3.5 billion, decreases the chances of it buying the Israeli-made, Rafael-produced, Iron Dome system, though it does not rule it out completely.

According to a Western source, Saudi Arabia and the UAE not only have the largest defense budgets, but also have the most urgent need for air defense systems.

The source said Israel could theoretically supply three types of air and missile defense systems.

 The first is Rafael’s David’s Sling air defense system. “One variation of this option is providing Rafael-made SkyCeptor interceptor missiles that can be fired from Patriot batteries,” the source explained. Patriot batteries are already in the service of Saudi and Emirati air defenses.

Israel has already offered this option to Poland in the past.   

A second option is to supply Gulf partners like the UAE with Israel Aerospace Industries’ Barak family of air defense systems, which also represent high-quality products in their long, medium, and short-range configurations, against various threats: Ballistic and cruise missiles, and attack UAVs.

The final option is Rafael’s Spyder family of short, medium, and long-range systems. Spyder is in service around the world with several clients.

It is also possible to create hybrid options between the two companies, Rafael and IAI, or other Emirati or Saudi air defense assets, by combining Spyder and Barak systems of various ranges, according to the source.

The above represents the spectrum of available interception systems that can effectively handle the new air threats posed by Iran and its proxies.

The next step would presumably involve supplying detection systems. The principal limitation in detecting low-flying attacking UAVs and cruise missiles is their detection.

Israel can sell a wide array of radars and electro-optic detection systems. It can place them on aerostats, such as IAI’s Dew of the Sky High Availability Aerostat System (HAAS), which was unveiled last year by the Israeli Defense Ministry in northern Israel.

The HAAS was developed by IAI-subsidiary Elta and was made and inflated by the US company TCOM.  Its unique radar has an outstanding performance against low-flying objects.

“This type of airship could cover the whole of the UAE’s territory,” said the Western source.

Air-based radars would certainly compliment the UAE’s existing American-made Patriot and future Korean M-Sam systems. Korean-made radars are ground-based, but tracking cruise missiles and attacking UAVs is best achieved with ‘an eye in the sky.’

The Israeli interest in supplying such systems is significantly broader than mere business interests. “Israel has a clear interest in strengthening the air defense capabilities of the UAE, Bahrain, and others in the GCC, as a fruit of the Abraham Accords,” said the source.

In general, such contracts today require not only a procurement agreement but also a willingness to work with local industries, which have evolved in Gulf countries. This type of technology transfer creates a win-win situation for both sides, the source argued.

 If Israel wishes to cooperate with the GCC states on defense, there is no doubt that focusing on air defense systems is the most comfortable way of doing this, he affirmed. Hi-tech military systems are most advanced in the areas of intelligence and air defense, the source noted.

Currently, the UAE operates American-made THAAD air defense systems, PAC (Patriot advanced capability) 2 and PAC 3 systems, and Swiss-made Sky Guard radar-directed guns. The Saudis similarly possess PAC 2 and PAC 3, THAAD, and Sky Guard 104 mm guns. The latter have reasonable capabilities but without the appropriate detection abilities are not effective against modern low-altitude threats, said the source.  

“We saw this was the case in the 2019 UAV attacks on Saudi Aramco oil sites that temporarily took out half of Riyadh’s oil export capabilities,” he noted.

 Point defense short-range air defense systems that rely on electronic jamming and laser can be suitable for defending sensitive targets.

For a city, however, it is necessary to have defense systems that can intercept at ranges of at least 10 to 20 kilometers.

The advent of long-range slow-moving UAVs with engines about as powerful as scooter motors, which nevertheless have very precise strike capabilities, represents a revolution in military attack capabilities by adversaries, said the source.

Israel, for its part, will be closely analyzing the recent attacks in the Gulf and drawing the most detailed conclusions to learn from the incidents.

---

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Fewer Israelis are serving in the IDF - this needs to be fixed

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

A few weeks ago, my eldest daughter was drafted into the IDF. With feelings of pride, anxiety and motherly concern, I accompanied her to the draft office. Other parents were there with their children, as well. Some, like me, shed a tear. There was one certainty that united us all: The knowledge that our child had to report for the military draft.

The Israeli draft station forms an important stage on the journey of Israelis. It forms a key stop in our common lives as a people and society, and shapes our identity. The knowledge that our children will serve in the military has been with me, as a mother, since the time I was pregnant.

For my generation, being drafted into the IDF and being Israeli are one and the same – an unchallenged equation. That same equation, so obvious to my generation, is eroding now. It is sufficient to glance at the draft figures to see a consistently downward trend.

In Israel’s history, one primal sin established the norm according to which not all sons and daughters of the land are subject to the mandatory draft. It was Israel’s first prime minister David Ben-Gurion who led the concept of a people’s army, viewing it as a necessary melting pot – a military that provides a protective shield and security, and leads societal and educational processes. The IDF wields together all of Israeli society’s unique sectors.

On the other hand, Ben-Gurion also agreed to exempt a few hundred ultra-Orthodox Jews, based on their religious beliefs to pursue religious studies over military service, all Arab youths and a growing number of young women, due to their religious beliefs. Those few hundred exemptions turned into many thousands as the years passed.

The need for a new draft law is an issue that has surfaced repeatedly in recent years, provoking numerous coalition crises. The national draft law built Israeli identity over the years, but something that should have been a given has turned into a political bargaining chip. Those who call for a mandatory draft are expressing opposition to the idea that one sector of society or another can be exempt from bearing its share of the national burden.

Should a call for equality in bearing that burden become a bone of contention against specific groups? Perhaps, it is possible to turn it into a unifying call? In 2012, Yisrael Beytenu proposed a universal draft law. The bill failed to pass its initial reading, with 74 Knesset members voting against it.

“What the law will not do, reality will,” Yisrael Beytenu chairman Avigdor Liberman said at the time. A decade later, here we are, with reality knocking on the nation’s door. In 2005, 77% of Jewish men served in the IDF, a figure that dropped to 69% in 2019. The percentage of women serving in 2005 was 59%, dropping to 56% in 2019.

If this trend is not stopped, in a few years we will find ourselves in a reality in which the number of conscripts will not be sufficient to meet the country’s security needs. As well, the resilience and unity of Israeli society will sustain significant damage. The people’s army will turn into half the people’s army.

In January, the Knesset held a vote on a new draft bill, which calls for cutting the exemption age for yeshiva students from age 23 to age 21. The bill, which passed its first reading, is the first step of a process that will lead to a comprehensive reform of the draft.

Israel cannot afford for the slogan “equality of burden” to be empty of content. It must be part of a broad process, based on the assumption that everyone is in favor of Israeli security, the military, and equality of rights and duties. The Yisrael Beytenu party led a clear policy over the years, which states that not only the ultra-Orthodox, but also Israel’s Arab population must contribute to the state in which they live.

There is simply no reason for an ultra-Orthodox or Arab-Israeli youth to avoid such responsibilities – if not in the context of military service, than in other ways, such as serving in the IDF Home Front Command or a civilian national service program. If lone soldiers that arrive in Israel seek to do this for the country, there is no good reason that mandatory drafts should not apply to all citizens of the state.

---

MK Sharon Roffe Ofir was elected to the 24th Knesset on behalf of the Yisrael Beitenu Party. She has previously served as deputy council head, and worked as a journalist and senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years.. Read full bio here.

As Russia – Ukraine standoff escalates, Israel must tread carefully

By Pinhas Avivi

In recent days Ukraine has been pressing Israel to take a clear stand over escalating tensions between Kyiv and Moscow. But it is important to clarify that this is something Israel cannot do.

As tensions between Russia and Ukraine continue to escalate, Israel has no choice but to tread extremely carefully, and to avoid making statements in support of either side.

Doing so could cause severe harm to relations with the United States on the one hand, or with Russia on the other. Israel’s security in the Middle East relies to a large extent on maintaining proper relations with both superpowers, even though the U.S. is of course Israel’s number one strategic ally.

Israel has been able to roll back Iranian entrenchment efforts in Syria, in part through its ability to maintain good relations with Russia. Israel therefore cannot allow itself to enter into this divide– and it must hope that nothing happens that will end up forcing Israel to take sides.

Beyond Israel’s considerations, it is also important to note that troubled relations between Russia and Ukraine stretch back centuries. Ukraine was never just another country for Russia, and conflict is no stranger to that part of the world.

In the 20th century, Ukraine was Russia’s wheat basket, and its agriculture helped feed the whole of the Soviet Union. In 1932 and 33, Stalin caused mass starvation that killed millions of Ukrainians as part of a deliberate policy to punish attempts by Ukrainian farmers to gain some independence.

In addition, Ukraine’s position on the Black Sea and its Crimean Peninsula represents a hugely important strategic asset for Russia, due to its position as a passageway to warm waters further south. Russia cannot access warm waters from the north, or to the west, where the Baltic Sea freezes in winter, and its eastern coast is near Japan. Hence Russia attaches great importance to its ability to move ships to the Black Sea and from there south to the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, as well as the Indian Ocean, to defend itself in case of a global war with the West.

Russia has always worked to secure warm water bases for itself, including in the Suez Canal under the Soviet era and the Horn Africa, and from 2015 onwards, on the Syrian coastline.

After invading Crimea, Russia is now consolidating its position in this regard.

For Moscow, Ukraine is also a passage zone of energy from Russia to all of Europe. In 2014, when Ukraine underwent a revolution that toppled a pro-Russian government, the Russians froze gas exports to Ukraine, and all of Western Europe suffered shortages as a result.

Many in Europe had to buy electric stoves to heat their homes in place of Russian gas that ran dry.

Within Ukraine itself, the eastern section is filled with mostly Russian-speaking people who support close ties with Moscow, while the western half is made up mostly of Ukrainian speakers.

Russia views the Ukraine as a safety ‘brake zone’ for perceived Western threats. During a 2018 NATO meeting in Bucharest, Romania, the alliance said it would positively consider requests to join it from Ukraine and Georgia. Upon hearing about this, several Israeli diplomats felt this would undoubtedly cause Russia to end up doing all that it could to prevent NATO’s borders from reaching Ukraine itself.

One possible outcome is Russia seeking to take control of these countries. This view was strengthened further when Russia came out against the West’s support for Kosovan independence, with the claim that minority self-determination must occur only in agreement from the state in which the minority exists.

Russia justified its invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which have Russian-speaking majorities, during the 2008 war with Georgia, by claiming that if Kosovo deserves independence, so do both of those territories.

Against this background, it is clear that Russia will not permit in any way for NATO to expand eastwards to Ukraine or northwards to Georgia. Hence, it has focused its forces on the border with Ukraine to twist the arm of the Americans on this issue.

The question of whether Russia will end up invading soon can only be answered by prophets. But what can be said is that an arm-wrestling match is underway and that Russia views Europe as weak, while it also sees that the U.S. is refusing to take responsibility for events outside of its borders. It notes that Washington has no interest in conflict in Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East. Hence, it feels that the situation is in Russia’s favor and that it can flex its muscles.

Russia’s decision to attack or not largely depends on what the U.S. is willing to do. The more muscles that the U.S. flexes, the less willing Russia will be to invade, and vice versa. 

The Russian threat to freeze gas supplies to and via Ukraine is a double-edged sword since Russia needs to sell this gas.

Ultimately, if Russia senses a real willingness by the West – militarily (less likely) or economically (more likely) to go full force in its response, this would reduce the chance of an invasion, or limit it to Ukraine’s eastern side, which in any event supports Russia. 

When the U.S. is unwilling to take bold steps, this impacts all of America’s allies, including Israel, but at the same time, there are limits to this effect – since Israel never expected anyone to fight with it or for it against its adversaries.

---

Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

A Russian Invasion of Ukraine: A Game Changer, but Unlikely

By Liam Collins

The number of nations in the world has more than doubled since the conclusion of World War II, yet the incidence of interstate war has declined. Nowhere has that trend been more evident than in Europe. Once the epicenter of interstate war, the relative peace on the continent in recent decades has led to debate as to whether interstate war in Europe is obsolete.

Yet Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its subsequent seizure of Crimea and active support for separatists in Ukraine’s east in 2014 has led some to question whether interstate war in Europe is truly dead. Today, Russia has amassed some 100,000 troops along its nearly 1,200-mile land border with Ukraine, leading to speculation that a Russian invasion could be imminent.

A Russian invasion in 2022 while likely to be a game-changer and fundamentally different from its previous incursions, is however unlikely.

Why it would be a game-changer

A Russian invasion today would be game-changing because it would represent the first undeniable and telegraphed invasion in Europe since the end of World War II when Russia gobbled up Eastern Europe. Vladimir Putin tried to convince the world that he was protecting Ossetians from Georgian “genocide”  to justify his 2008 invasion under the pretense of the international norm of the responsibility to protect. The evidence, however, indicated that the war was “premeditated” and Georgia acted preemptively, similar to what Israel did in 1967’s Six-Day War. Thus, the international community did not buy Putin’s justification.

Learning from this experience, Putin avoided using overt military forces in Ukraine in 2014. Instead, he used “Little Green Men” and other hybrid means to seize and ultimately annex Crimea without firing a shot. After Ukraine had Russian-backed separatist forces on the ropes, Putin was forced to send smaller formations into Ukraine’s east, but he continued to deny Russian support.

What makes an invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally different from Russia’s previous invasions is that this one is being telegraphed by Moscow. Russia’s invasion of Georgia came as a complete surprise, as did its seizure of Crimea. A second major difference is that Russia lacks even an implausible justification for the invasion. In both previous wars, Russia attempted to justify its interventions under the responsibility to protect.

Neither of these conditions exist in 2022. While Putin has yet to directly threaten “invasion,” his words—he has threatened “appropriate retaliatory military-technical measures” if the West’s aggressive approach continues—and actions—the troop buildup—portend a potential invasion. Likewise, Putin lacks even the feeblest pretense for invasion. There is no population that Putin can claim that he needs to defend. Quite the contrary. Ukrainians have seen the devastation and the lack of opportunity in the Donbas and want no part of it.

Thus, if Russia were to invade, it would be a game-changer — an invasion within Europe that has been telegraphed in advance with no justification. It would be an unequivocal declaration of war. It would demonstrate the weakness of the international system that was unable to deter. It would also erode confidence in various international institutions and the West in general. Russia, no doubt, would pay a steep political price, but in a battle of relative gains, it is not clear that Russia’s price would be any higher than the West’s price — a clear demonstration of the West’s impotence.  

Why an invasion is unlikely

Nevertheless, an invasion is also unlikely. Putin is calculated and behaves fairly rationally, even if he routinely operates outside of widely accepted international norms. He recognizes that he would pay a high economic cost for an invasion. Sanctions against Russia following its seizure of Crimea in 2014 have been estimated to have cost Russia roughly $50 billion per year. With President Joe Biden signaling to Russia that it would “pay a heavy price” for any invasion, Putin knows that sanctions would be swift and severe if it were to invade.

Likewise, Putin knows that any invasion would come at a significant military cost. In its five-day war with Georgia, Russia lost as many as 22 aircraft. A price that Russia seemed unwilling to pay because it caused Russia to significantly decrease its air support after losing so many aircraft in the opening days. With Stinger missiles being transferred to Ukraine from Lithuania and Latvia, Putin realizes that he would likely lose a significant number of aircraft with any invasion.

When Putin sent T-90 tanks across the border in 2014, they were almost “impenetrable.” Since then, the United States has provided Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles, with additional missiles arriving from Estonia. Since 2014, the United States has also invested nearly $2.7 billion in training and equipment to reform Ukraine’s defense establishment. Putin, thus, recognizes that he would face a much tougher enemy than he did in 2014.

Putin also realizes he would likely pay a domestic cost for the victory. Russian mothers do not like their sons coming home in body bags any more than Western mothers. And while Putin is likely confident that he would score an initial victory, albeit at heavy costs, he also has to recognize that he would likely face a costly insurgency. Ukraine recently adopted a law enshrining civilian resistance as part of Ukraine’s national defense and these volunteers have been training.

Finally, an invasion would seem to accomplish little in terms of likely policy objectives. Crimea was unique; it was “strategic territory”, it provided Russia access to the Black Sea and housed its Naval Base in Sevastopol. Russia could have attempted to annex Georgia’s South Ossetia or Ukraine’s Donbas, but it did not. Russia’s objective was not about capturing territory, instead, it was about control: preventing both from joining NATO.

NATO is unlikely to let any nation that does not control its territory join. With no end in sight for the current status quo in Ukraine’s Donbas, it would appear that Russia is achieving its strategic objective at a fairly low cost. An invasion would only increase the cost, with no additional gain. And if the occupation became costly, as it likely would, the domestic repercussions could lead to his demise. Thus, invasion, though still possible, seems unlikely.

What an invasion could mean for Israel

An invasion could weaken international norms, but that seems unlikely to have any effect on Israel given that none of its immediate neighbors have the desire or capability to invade at present. A Russian invasion, however, would demonstrate the weakness of the international community at deterring action, which could embolden terrorist actors in the Middle East. It might also embolden Israel to be freer with its actions.

Regardless, an invasion does not appear in anyone’s best interest, especially Ukrainians and Russians.

---

Col. Liam Collins is the Executive Director of the Viola Foundation and the Madison Policy Forum and a permanent member with the Council on Foreign Relations. A retired Special Forces Colonel, Liam served in a variety of special operations assignments and conducted operational deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa and South America. Read full bio here.

Ukraine is not the most important square on the chessboard

By Jeremiah Rozman

The Cold War was the last time that the United States faced real competition from a peer adversary. It was the formative crisis for most of the current U.S. policy establishment and much of the politically engaged adult population. Furthermore, American trade, culture, and treaties tie it strongly to Europe. Therefore, it is understandable that a crisis in Europe involving Russia is currently consuming the bulk of U.S. attention. However, today China is the only country with the potential to contest U.S. global leadership and Europe is not the most important arena for Sino-U.S. competition. Nor is Ukraine the most likely flashpoint for a potentially catastrophic great power showdown. The U.S. has recently sought to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. The crisis in Ukraine threatens to defer, if not derail, this necessary re-posturing, but effective compromise with Russia could turn this crisis into an opportunity.

Keeping Ukraine in context

Keeping Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence is not a vital U.S. interest. Defending Ukraine’s ability to preserve its self-determination is ethical. However, as has always been the case in global affairs, power trumps ethics, institutions, and often even strongly-worded threats, condemnations, and sanctions. The U.S. is no longer the undisputed hegemon that it was at the end of the Cold War. In Europe, power and resolve have shifted in Russia’s favor.

Allowing Ukraine to fall into the Russian sphere does not threaten the integrity of NATO, nor the security of its members. Disputing the strategic importance of Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Emma Ashford noted that “during the Cold War, the line was a thousand miles further West.” Yet, the U.S. emerged victorious against a true global competitor. Today, Russia does not pose the same peer threat that the Soviet Union did. That role is filled by China. Unlike China, Russia does not have the economic potential nor the stated desire to compete with the U.S. for global leadership. Rather, it wants a buffer zone from NATO military hardware and European Union political and economic encroachment. This is understandable. The U.S. Monroe Doctrine has long held the Western hemisphere as its sphere of influence. When the Soviet Union brought Cuba into its sphere and militarized it, the U.S. considered it to be intolerable.

It’s no longer 1992

In the heady years after the U.S. emerged victorious from the Cold War – from which Russia emerged in shambles – more sanguine voices that anticipated the need to consider Russian interests in a future European security paradigm lost out to advocates for rapid NATO enlargement. The ghosts of this decision would come back to haunt European peace in 2008, 2014, and now. Boris Yeltsin’s drunken ravings over NATO expansion in 1994 have been echoed many times by the eminently sober Vladimir Putin. While the U.S. would prefer to continue in its unfettered dominance, it has explicitly stated that it is unwilling to risk U.S. troops in defense of Ukraine. Conversely, Russia has signaled that it sees Ukraine as a vital interest, one that it is willing to go to war over. If Russia is willing to pay the price of sanctions and an estimated 3,000 to 10,000 troop deaths, what will stop it from invading?

If Russia is determined to invade, the more the U.S. protests and invests, the more reputation and resources it stands to lose when it happens. Some prominent voices are pushing the U.S. to take a strong stance, even risking military conflict because “China is watching.” Russia invading Ukraine would not invite China to invade Taiwan if the U.S. articulates that it sees Taiwan’s defense as non-negotiable, on par with defending actual NATO members while distancing itself from promises to defend Ukraine. However, putting the U.S. reputation on the line over Ukraine and losing, while shifting resources to Europe that otherwise would have gone to the Indo-Pacific, could make it more likely that China invades Taiwan. Therein lies the greatest strategic risk of the Ukraine crisis; it threatens to derail the urgently needed U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan is not just more important to U.S. interests because it produces over 92 percent of the world’s semiconductors critical to all forms of modern technology, but mainly because unlike Russia, China is a peer threat.

Economic and military options?

The U.S. and its allies have limited economic and military options to deter Russia. At best, these would postpone the next crisis. Economic options that would have the sharpest impact are likely to also harm the countries imposing them. For example, removing Russia from the international banking SWIFT system would “really sting,” but the U.S. and European allies might have already rejected this option due to the potential for major economic harm.

Another strong economic policy would be to block the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. President Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have explicitly threatened Russia that it will be rendered non-operational if Russia invades Ukraine. However, European reliance on Russian oil and high gas prices in the U.S., blunt the West’s ability to harm Russia’s heavily oil-dependent economy without harming itself. Furthermore, China appears inclined to undermine any U.S. imposed sanctions.

Alongside economic options, the U.S. could arm Ukraine to “bleed Russia.” Skeptics note that no conceivable amount of Western military support will enable Ukraine to defeat a determined Russian offensive. Russian regular units are not the separatist irregulars that Ukrainian nationalists have been fighting in Donbas. Russian regular units made mincemeat of Ukrainian armored battalions in a matter of minutes in 2015. Highly successful Russian use of force could showcase a new “revolution in military affairs,” a modern version of what the U.S. succeeded in doing when it showed the world the effectiveness of its new military capabilities in the Gulf War. Putin might even prefer this to achieving his goals without bloodshed.

Detente with Russia aids competition with China

Areas for compromise and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia abound, from counterterrorism to arms control. Effective detente would undercut the growing Sino-Russian relationship which poses a significant threat. In the Ukraine crisis, China backs Russia due to a shared interest in revising the international order through force. Coordination with Russia over European security could pull Russia away from China, a country with which it shares a long and historically disputed border. Good relations with Russia would help the U.S. to compete with China, while enduring crisis with Russia would tie up U.S. resources in Europe.

In Ukraine, compromise is clearly the best option, although conceding to Putin goes against America’s long-held policy of liberal internationalism. This crisis can be an opportunity to finally develop what U.S. preponderance has allowed it to put off for nearly three decades, a durable European security structure that takes into account the needs (not wants) of NATO and Russia. This would enable the U.S. to more effectively compete where it matters most.

---

The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

The genius of Dubai’s EXPO: A lesson in nation-branding.

By Daphne Richemond Barak

With the Dubai EXPO 2020 event, the United Arab Emirates has once again displayed its innovative approach to nation-branding – one that other countries can learn from.

Every four years, a different country is selected to showcase national achievements as part of world expositions. Unlike past expos, which quickly faded from collective memory, the Dubai expo is likely to continue radiating its aura well into the future.

Thanks to sophisticated targeted messaging on traditional media platforms and social media, smart design, and high visibility, EXPO 2020 has reached a wide audience, within and outside the UAE. One hundred and ninety-two pavilions were set up to highlight national achievements and narratives. 

The Dubai EXPO features quality family entertainment, leisure outings, and ample opportunities to educate about regional and global challenges. As many as 5.6 million people had visited EXPO by the end of 2021, and many more wished they could drop by.

EXPO 2020 is built as a place of learning for adults and children alike.

Through the EXPO School Program, children can take a virtual cartoon trip around EXPO; teachers can find teaching material – and even teach the “universal language of music” thanks to the official EXPO song. Top students serve as EXPO ambassadors, contributing social media content on a regular basis.

UAE government employees were given six extra vacation days to visit the event, and entrance to EXPO was free on the UAE’s 50th National Day. EXPO is clearly the product of a highly coordinated effort by various government agencies and private organizations to create an unparalleled experience combining education, learning, culture, multiculturalism, and – as it turns out – diplomacy.

Rather unexpectedly, Dubai’s EXPO has come to function as a dynamic diplomatic platform, where decision-makers and leading thinkers regularly meet. It has become an essential stop in any official visit to the UAE, including by heads of state.

Twenty-six heads of states and presidents, including the presidents of France, Pakistan, Latvia, Turkmenistan, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the King of the Netherlands, visited their country’s pavilion at EXPO before heading for the capital. The fact that they land at Dubai’s airport makes such a visit all the more appealing.

THIS REPRESENTS a certain shift in attention from Abu Dhabi to Dubai. When Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the main two emirates, decided to unite in 1971 and establish the UAE, the meeting took place in the middle of the desert to convey the message that no emirate would dominate the other.

Since that time, Abu Dhabi has been the place where government officials and diplomats converge, while Dubai serves as the business hub of the country – a reflection of the careful equilibrium achieved between the two most influential emirates in the UAE. EXPO 2020 has – willfully or not – afforded Dubai some appeal in the diplomatic and political arena.

As such, EXPO Dubai has become a central element of the UAE’s innovative nation-branding efforts. It is part and parcel of the UAE’s efforts to position itself as a central actor in the Arab world and a key global hub.

EXPO DUBAI opened in October 2021 – following a postponement due to the COVID-19 pandemic – and is set to run until March 2022, but it will likely turn into a permanent fixture, and fulfill its out-of-the-ordinary role, in one way or another, going forward.

Its main themes – Opportunity, Mobility and Sustainability – crafted around the UN’s Sustainability Development Goals, were chosen with this long-term vision in mind. They provide some insight into EXPO’s ambitions, as well as the UAE’s worldview and priorities.

Beyond the spotlight on sustainable development goals, the UN’s presence at EXPO can be felt via the countless opportunities that EXPO offers for informal diplomacy.

The UN has created a special website for the event, and UN diplomats regularly visit the various pavilions. A model UN conference (simulating real UN work and activities) will be held during the closing week of EXPO in March 2022.

Until then, the “UN Hub” – like all other pavilions – has put together impressive programming, including cultural and diplomatic events, and workshops on UN- related issues.

Clearly, the UN has seized a unique opportunity to share its message and make itself relevant. The UN’s unprecedented engagement at EXPO has amplified and strengthened the UAE’s own forward-looking and inclusive message. 

EXPO 2020 has turned the UAE into the center of the world, the place where everything is possible – where Palestine, Iran and Israel each have a pavilion within a few meters of each other, and where Qatar (a nation subject to an embargo by Saudi Arabia and the UAE until early 2021) was able to join at the last minute.

EXPO 2020 has been shaped into a tool of nation-branding. It has helped the UAE to market itself as a nation of tolerance, and one that connects people and cultures. This is how the Gulf state colored its EXPO with its unique brush. In the midst of a worldwide pandemic, it has also succeeded in showing the world that in-person events are not only possible – they also have an irreplaceable value.

There is no doubt that EXPO Dubai will continue to make waves, and that the UAE will continue to reap the benefits of its well-thought-out nation-branding strategy.

---

Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Preparations For A Possible Strike On Iran Leave IAF Better Prepared.

By Avishai Levi

The year 2022 has been designated as the year that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) prioritizes its readiness to deal with Iran and its nuclear program. This directive carries with it significant influences on the entire IAF.

At the organizational level, the IAF knows well how to direct itself and all of its internal units around a new order from headquarters.

Once the order is received to prepare long-range strike capabilities for Iran, a clear working plan is formulated and implemented. This means synchronizing the preparation efforts both internally and externally, with other branches of the military to ensure that this unusual directive results in new operational capabilities.

The ability to refocus around a new directive has existed in the IAF for many years, but when a new mission is defined, one that falls outside of the annual and multi-year working plan, this requires special new measures.

Creating new operational readiness against Iran obligates the IAF to make significant changes to its current working plan. This includes changes to operational capabilities, force build-up processes, weapons systems, ammunition, and intelligence – both within the IAF and in the wider Israeli intelligence community, which must be well synchronized with the IAF’s intelligence units.

Personnel resources and budgetary prioritization are all significantly affected by this directive.

All of these elements have to be oriented toward the mission of building a working plan that allows a suitable level of readiness within a given schedule.

Iran falls under the 1,000-mile mission range – a very long flight range that requires myriad steps in various domains. This means that the IAF has to stretch its abilities to the maximum in terms of intelligence, flights, the ability to deal with threats on the way, and weather forecasts – the length of the journey to Iran means that the weather can change by the time aircraft arrive at their destinations.

Intimate knowledge of Iran’s weather in all four seasons and the months and days of the year are factored into the hours that could ultimately be selected for the attack time.

Listening to Iranian television weather forecasts isn’t enough – being familiar with the weather conditions throughout the entire flight there and the duration of the activity is necessary. In addition, Iran is a big geographic country with varying weather conditions.

On the intelligence front, the entire intelligence community must be activated to ensure a good understanding of the relevant sites and threats, and the many changing conditions, including Iran’s air defense systems, and the nuclear sites themselves.

Such a mission means that aircraft will be operating on the edge of their fuel capacity – an observation that helps explain the complexity of the mission. The aircraft will always be on limited fuel supplies on such a mission.

Meanwhile, flight crews and their supporting arrays, including flight controllers, have to build a deep understanding and drill the potential scenarios and responses to them, including the ability to amend situations. All of this represents stretching the IAF to the limits of its capacity.

Deciding which munitions to take and knowing what their abilities and limitations are forms another critical part of the planning.

In addition, flying to such ranges is not a matter of being in the air for an hour – meaning that adversaries will have likely opportunities to detect the attack and prepare accordingly. This means that the IAF must not assume that it can conduct a surprise attack.

The question of whether one wave of aircraft or two will be used is a key factor. If the answer is more than one, the element of surprise would become irrelevant for any subsequent wave of aircraft.

Enemies that are prepared for attack form a much more complex challenge, compared to a successful surprise mission, such as the morning strike waves conducted by the IAF at the outset of the 1967 Six Day War on Egypt.

All of this means that the most meticulous planning and drilling are required, including the ability to adapt the plan during its design phase to reflect changes in enemy capabilities, and in Israel’s own capabilities, such as new weapons coming online.

The challenges are great.

In addition, the IAF’s directive of being ready for Iran also impacts its day-to-day grey zone campaign against Iranian entrenchment in the Middle East and its readiness against existing adversaries such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian terror factions in Gaza.

Building readiness for Iran inevitably creates a certain decrease in the depth of the readiness for other arenas that the IAF prepares for on an ongoing basis. However, it is fair to assume that when the IAF prepares for Iran, it does not prepare only for the Islamic Republic.

Modular, phased planning is designed to safeguard immediate readiness to defend Israel’s skies and to ensure they are not abandoned for a single minute.

In addition, preparing such capabilities – platforms, ammunition, intelligence-gathering, the most accurate weather forecasting, and maintenance – improve the IAF to a great extent.

Ongoing training and sharpening of dilemmas at the longest range mean that the IAF will be better for every kind of mission, and will further optimize its ability to find solutions to operational and intelligence questions.

The IAF’s core abilities in other arenas, be it in Gaza, Lebanon, or the gray zone campaign between the wars, are subsequently adapted and improved, and the IAF’s muscle memory gets stronger.

Hence, from the moment that the directive was received by the IAF, it began a process that improved its basic readiness significantly and improved its ongoing operations.

Ultimately, the complexity involved in planning for such a challenging long-range mission and synchronizing all of the required efforts is enormous, yet fully within the IAF's scope. The IAF will be planning the mission and drilling it, becoming better as a whole organization, while also not abandoning its continuous missions.

---

Brigadier General Avishai Levi served for 30 years in the Israeli Air Force (IAF), a career that culminated as the Head of Intelligence and Reconnaissance for the IAF from 2007-2010. It was during his tenure that the Israeli Air Force successfully detonated the Syrian nuclear reactor. Read full bio here.

When it comes to Iran, Israel’s defense policy can’t be based on panic

By Gershon Hacohen

There is no doubting the existence of an objective Iranian threat to Israeli security, but how severe that threat is and what risks Israel should take in dealing with it are issues that are more complex than meets the eye.

Iran is marching toward nuclear weapons, although Israel reserves the option of striking Tehran’s nuclear program.

Nuclear weapons are not new, and obtaining them is far from impossible for a regional power like Iran. Public vows by Israeli defense officials that Iran will “never” get nuclear weapons are irresponsible.

Yes, Israel should and will try very hard to prevent Iran from going nuclear. But the Iranian nuclear program is unlike the Iraqi and Syrian programs. These were focused on single sites that were attacked and destroyed by the Israeli Air Force. After studying Israel’s modus operandi for years, the Iranians spread out their nuclear sites and dug them deep underground.

In addition, Iran’s nuclear knowledge is based on local capabilities. In light of the fact that Iran is a developed nation, with highly educated scientists, mathematicians, and engineers, killing some members of its nuclear weapons group will only result in their substitution with others. It is not possible to assassinate knowledge once a country has obtained it.

A more important question is why Iran wants nuclear weapons in the first place. Why is possessing this 20th-century weapon so important for Tehran?

Addressing this question is an intelligence challenge that goes beyond modern data processing systems and artificial intelligence tools that some in the intelligence community are so infatuated with today.  

It is a question that is also tied to another key question – is it inevitable that Iran will always be our biggest enemy?

Such strategic intelligence is vital for knowing which general direction to take. Israel’s founder, David Ben-Gurion, relied on human intelligence sources to figure out the intentions of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria before the 1948 War of Independence, and this is the definition of strategic intelligence – the type of knowledge we now need on Iran.

Even if Iran wants to destroy Israel, this does not mean it would be prepared to pay any price to do so. It is not clear that Iran is prepared to destroy itself in order to destroy Israel. Yet when Israelis think about the Iranian threat, existential threats immediately surface, and Holocaust associations rise in the collective subconscious.

This is too simplistic. Israel cannot manage its defense policy based on deterministic concepts about its enemies.

Iran is not a monolithic country, and ongoing power struggles between the conservative camp and the reformists are a fixture of political life in that country.

Holocaust traumas do not make sound policy guides for a sovereign nation. The year is not 1942 when Jews could not retaliate or exact prices. Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s flagship messaging to Israelis was that he would not allow an ‘Auschwitz 2.0’ in the form of a nuclear Iran.

But the security of a state cannot be based on panic.

It was easy for Netanyahu to unite the people behind the need to fight this threat, which is uncontroversial and is not subject to the ideological divisions that plague Israeli society.

Netanyahu presented the issue in ‘no choice war’ terms and was able to get the people behind him. He was able to achieve this unity on Iran in ways that he could not do on other fateful, ideological questions closer to home, such as guaranteeing that Jerusalem would never be divided.

This is because ideological positions have lost their legitimacy – yet fighting against a nuclear Iran is not an ideological position, it is purely a security matter.

As a result, Netanyahu was far more vocal on Iran than on issues such as defending Israel’s rights in Area C of Judea and Samaria, or when an Arab uprising over Jerusalem erupted within the State of Israel in May 2021.

In addition, a commitment to stopping Iran’s nuclear program at all costs increases Israel’s dependence on the United States, since any objective analysis cannot avoid the conclusion that Israel needs the U.S. to deal with Iran.

Israel alone cannot fight a war against the Iranians, and this means Israel enslaving its other interests to American directives in many areas. This is particularly true of Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria. The fact that Israel is in fact doing this is already a major achievement for Iran.

From a physical perspective, the nuclear weapon involves launching the weapon and its detonation upon impact, but from a wider strategic-holistic perspective, the Iranian nuclear project has already for years been generating a highly significant process that requires recognition. This process has led Israeli policy to focus its resources and attention on the Iranian bomb, to make its interests subservient to American interests, and to act with containment and restraint in other arenas, while giving up on active operative initiatives. This represents an unprecedented achievement for the Iranian bomb – an achievement that has been entirely overlooked in Israel and one that has not been taken into consideration in the map of policy calculations.

Furthermore, the level of preparations that the Israeli defense establishment must undertake to prepare for a strike on Iran harms the ability of the IDF Ground Forces to prepare for other, closer threats in Israel’s environment, by taking resources away from those preparations.

 Ultimately, the State of Israel must be prepared for the Iranian threat, and it must reserve the option of attacking. But it cannot completely devote itself to this threat at the expense of all other interests and preparations for other threats that it faces.

---

Major General Gershon Hacohen served as Commander of the Northern Corps of the IDF. He previously held various positions, including Commander of the IDF Colleges, Head of Training & Doctrine Division in the General Staff, Reserve Division Commander of the Northern Command and Commander of the 7th Brigade of the IDF Armor Division. Read full bio here.

Jews must take responsibility for their own security

By Micah Jones

Thankfully, the January 15 hostage situation at Congregation Beth Israel in Colleyville, Texas, ended as it should have: With terrorist Malik Faisal Akram killed and all hostages, including Rabbi Charlie Cytron-Walker, freed unharmed. Akram was demanding the release of Aafia Siddiqui, colloquially known as “Lady Al Qaeda,” a Pakistani neuroscientist who is currently serving an 86-year sentence for the attempted murder of FBI and US Army personnel.  Siddiqui is a notorious antisemite, who declared that she did not want anyone with a “Zionist or Israeli background,” on her jury. Following her conviction, she stated that “this is a verdict coming from Israel and not from America. That’s where the anger belongs.”

Despite the FBI’s initial reluctance to clearly describe the Congregation Beth Israel hostage situation as a deliberate attack on Jews, Akram’s evil intent was obvious to Jews the world over. Akram chose to attack Congregation Beth Israel, on Shabbat, because he knew that he would encounter Jews. And despite many recent efforts by American Jews to distance themselves from Israel, Akram did not make such a distinction.  He, like violent extremists the world over, views Jews as a collective scourge that must be eliminated. In the minds of terrorists like Akram and Siddiqi,  Jews are Jews regardless of their political beliefs or where they live.

Although thankfully ending without the murder of innocent Jews, Saturday’s events in Colleyville were a grim reminder of the increased antisemitic events that have taken place over the last few years here in America and abroad.  According to the Anti-Defamation League’s (“ADL”) “Audit of Antisemitic Incidents,” the most recent data from 2020 details that there were “2,024 reported antisemitic incidents throughout the country.” Moreover, this was the “third-highest year on record since ADL began tracking antisemitic incidents in 1979.” From Pittsburgh to Poway, the last few years have involved horrific acts of violence against the American Jewish community. And, of course, the ADL’s report does not include the terrible attacks against Israeli Jews who, this past May 2021, endured nearly two weeks of incessant rocket fire from the radical terrorist group Hamas.  

The ADL’s data demonstrates that Jews are a hated people. This is a fact that, thankfully, has been allowed to be momentarily forgotten in such philosemitic societies such as the modern-day United States. But antisemitism is a pernicious and insidious force that rears its ugly head in every generation. No amount of education and advocacy will ever eliminate antisemitism, such hatred is too entrenched. Therefore, Saturday’s events, and the ADL’s data, reinforce the mindset that I have long believed: Jews must be responsible for their own safety and security.

Jewish places of worship and community must make themselves hard targets. This means that they should have both armed security, as well as encourage those congregation members with the appropriate training and credentials to be a part of that security apparatus. This may include congregation members with the appropriate state-issued licenses to conceal carry firearms during services or to participate in emergency preparedness drills with the security team. 

Communication and planning are paramount to ensure that all members of the congregation or community understand what to do in an emergency.  This takes more than lip service. It requires rehearsals. Most of all, there must be a mindset change and a realization that law enforcement response time will likely be slow. The Jewish community or congregation must assume that no one will come to rescue them, and must be prepared to protect themselves at all costs.

Such a mindset change does not eliminate the ability for the Jewish congregation or community to be welcoming and loving to the outside world.  So much of what makes Judaism special — the rich community ties, the tradition, and the hope to improve the world — can still exist, and perhaps increase more, through a congregation or community that knows how to protect itself. Through increased training and readiness, Jewish communities and congregations ensure that they will be able to react quickly and effectively if an emergency arises. By changing their mindset to one of preparedness, Jewish communities and congregations ensure that they will continue to be there for future generations and not become the next Poway, Pittsburgh, or Colleyville. 

---

Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. Read full bio here.

The Time Has Come For Zionism 2.0

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Of all the end-of-year headlines and images, one photo in particular caught my eye. Two days before 2021 came to an end, a planeload of olim landed in Israel – the last such flight of the year. Perhaps those watching from the sidelines will struggle to understand how in the midst of a pandemic, economic difficulties, tragedies, security threats and other issues, there are those who choose to move to Israel.

Yet, some 30,000 new immigrants made Israel their home in 2021. It is this picture of the last flight of olim in 2021 that encapsulates our story. For me, it is the photo of the year.

Most Israelis probably won’t agree with my choice of photo of the year. It is equally unlikely that many would agree that this photo represents the DNA of the story that we continue to create in Israel every day.

In December, 1947, the poet Natan Alterman wrote his immortal “The Silver Platter”, sealing his poem with the words:

“Then a nation in tears and amazement

will ask: ‘Who are you?’

And they will answer quietly

‘We are the silver platter on which the Jewish State was given.’

Thus, they will say and fall back in shadows

And the rest will be told

In the chronicles and generations of Israel.”

SINCE THAT time, we have told and created the Israeli story anew every day. The chronicles of Israel are a Zionist and democratic story, intertwined with laughter and tears, building and renewal, as well as a story scorched with blood and pain. The story is embroidered like golden stones from pieces of this land.

Our roots, which brought us here from East and West, are what created this unique human fabric that formed Israeli society. The State of Israel is an explicit miracle given to us on a silver platter. Over the years, it took shape, but instead of turning into one human fabric, the spirit of division and the focus on others has taken hold of our society: Religious vs secular, residents of central cities vs those who live in the periphery, Ashkenazi vs Mizrahi, and so on. Phrases such as, “First Israel” (a political attitude: that of the old Ashkenazi elites, who wish to see Netanyahu convicted and kicked out of the political arena, and represent only half of Israel) and “Second Israel” (representing Israel’s predominantly non-Ashkenazi population in the periphery) that were said by Dr. Avishay Ben Haim, Channel 13, have come to dominate the public discourse.

We have grown used to coming together in unity during moments of pain – we are all aware of the unsigned contract that exists between Israelis: If one runs into danger the other will rise to protect him.

Yosef Trumpeldor’s famous phrase, “It is good to die for our country,” has become part of our cultural heritage, but the time has now come to plant the phrase that should characterize the next stage of Zionism: “It is good to live for our country.”

On the 74th year of existence of the miracle that Alterman wrote about in his poem, the time has come to outline the foundations of Zionism 2.0.

The Zionist movement succeeded in bringing us to this land, but its conceptual basis is no longer a given in the 21st century. We must now turn our attention to defining the meaning of Zionism today.

An intrinsic part of the answer is how we characterize the Israeli experience taking shape in the modern era. And how this modern experience can be linked to a path that, looking back, runs through the apocalyptic memory of the Holocaust and the rebirth of Israel. It leaves the Diaspora experience behind, opening a new chapter in the chronicles of Israel.

Zionism 2.0 remains affixed to the legacy of the past, while being in tune with the present Israeli experience, and turns its eyes to our own future. As a society, this is the Zionism that we should pass on to our children: a contemporary Zionism that speaks to our youth - who are, after all, the future generation.

These fundamental questions engage me on a daily basis, and shape my outlook and the education I give to my children, the next link in the chain. They are, quite likely, the central reason that brought me to the Knesset.

One of the answers to these questions came to me during a visit to Yad Vashem – The World Holocaust Remembrance Center. After visiting the Hall of Names and looking at the photographs of my murdered people, where binders commemorate the testimonies of some six million victims, I walked out of Yad Vashem and toward the hills of Jerusalem, which appeared out of the madness.

I knew that from here we must take another step, since “a country is not only known for its actions, but also for what it is willing to carry with it,” as a German Jewish Holocaust victim once wrote. This is their will. We must take another step, this time out of power and confidence in the Israeli story that we have created.

My mother’s parents arrived in Israel exactly a century ago and brought with them 100 olim, my late father’s family arrived here at the end of the 14th century, and I proudly carry the name Roffe as the twentieth generation of that family in this land.

As a child, when I was asked what my background was, I found myself shyly trying to explain the roots of a family that moved from Germany to Padua, Italy and from there to the Greek island of Crete. Today, I proudly testify that I am an Israeli mix, my children are too and so are yours.

Our roots will always form the previous chapters in our story and will remind us of a reality of persecution and antisemitism that accompanied, and still does, so many Jews. However, the path ahead will be united and glow with the precious light of Israel.

The State of Israel is larger than the sum of its parts. The Zionist project has not reached its conclusion, and never will. Its path runs through the building of Israel – here and in the Diaspora. The project that began with the founding of the Zionist movement at the end of the 19th century is still being built in Israeli homes every day.

The writer is an MK and a publishing expert at the MirYam Institute. She was elected to the 24th Knesset on behalf of the Yisrael Beytenu party. She has served as a deputy local council head, and worked as a journalist and senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years.

---

MK Sharon Roffe Ofir was elected to the 24th Knesset on behalf of the Yisrael Beitenu Party. She has previously served as deputy council head, and worked as a journalist and senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years.. Read full bio here.

Gantz-Abbas meeting strengthens PA ahead of ‘changing of the guard’

By David Hacham

The meeting between Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas at Gantz’s home in Rosh Ha’ayin on December 28 was undoubtedly an important event, but exaggerations of its significance should be avoided.

The meeting – the second between Gantz and Abbas since August, when they met in Ramallah – was held with the full knowledge and approval of Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. The meeting also paved the way for Gantz’s subsequent meeting with Jordan’s King Abdullah in Amman.

The two meetings were the first between the PA leader and a senior Israeli minister for over a decade. They occurred after teams from both sides smoothed over and clarified positions before the discussions, including attempts from Abbas’s office to get Gantz to weigh in on violence by some Israeli settlers, and Israel’s decision to ban six Palestinian NGOs in October that are tied to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorist organization.

These preparations and exchanges of messages mean that the meeting was far more than just a technical discussion on daily affairs.

Still, for a number of reasons, the meeting was of only limited significance. In Israel, the coalition government that has been in place for the past six months is paralyzed and unable to make dramatic decisions on the Palestinian issue, due to its composition. On the Palestinian side, Abbas is in the twilight zone of his rule, and power struggles are already raging under the surface over who among Fatah’s senior ranks will succeed him.

The positions that each side put forward before the meeting accurately reflect the true nature of the gap between their respective expectations. The Palestinian side stressed ‘on the ground’ issues, civilian-economic affairs, and the importance of diplomatic progress on the horizon to promote a political solution that grants the Palestinians statehood.

In a tweet, the PA’s Civilian Affairs Minister Hussein El-Sheikh said the meeting represents the last opportunity “before the explosion” that will result from a dead end. He described a “serious attempt” to open a political path based on “international legitimacy that will end escalatory steps against Palestinians.”

During the talks, it is fair to assume that Abbas took advantage of the fact that Gantz is in charge of ties with the PA to flag potentially explosive developments on the ground that can lead to a security escalation, as well as arguing for the necessity of taking steps to restart political talks between the PA and Israel.

Abbas also likely related the message that despite the covert battle to succeed him, he remains the only authorized representative of the Palestinian people capable of working with Israel to promote a political process and prevent an uncontrollable security deterioration. However, even if the political process came up, it is also fair to assume that it was discussed in a shallow manner.

From Abbas’s perspective, arriving at Gantz’s home and risking harm to his image on the Palestinian street looks like the right call, since he was able to send a message to Israel warning of an escalation around the corner. 

Gantz, who was IDF chief of staff during the 2014 conflict between Hamas and Israel, is perceived among Palestinians as a war criminal who killed thousands – yet Abbas still chose to visit him at his home.

In Israel, efforts to minimize the importance of the meeting were clearly made by the government, as well as the claim that no political dialogue took place, and that only civilian-security matters were discussed.

Gantz’s office said that the two-and-a-half-hour meeting saw talks on strengthening security coordination, boosting stability, and preventing terrorism and violence. According to this narrative, the political dialogue, if it occurred, was marginal.

Still, it seems unlikely that Abbas would have left Ramallah and entered the Israeli defense minister’s home only to talk about civilian-humanitarian issues.

The Palestinian public holds tense expectations for changes on the ground, particularly in reining in provocative steps by some settlers, limiting settlement construction, promoting Palestinian construction in Area C of the West Bank, and promoting economic projects.

Palestinian sources also said that Abbas called on Gantz to reverse the decision to ban the Palestinian NGOs, reduce tensions in both east Jerusalem and the West Bank, and return the bodies of Palestinian terrorists killed carrying out attacks.

And indeed, the meeting saw Israeli steps taken subsequently to reduce tensions, including the decision to allow 6,000 West Bank residents and 3,500 Gazan residents into the Palestinian population census, thereby assisting people who had no defined resident status until now.

Israel also agreed to facilitate early payment of taxes it collects for the PA, to the tune of NIS 100 million, and to provide 600 entry permits to Palestinian businesspeople. Senior PA officials have been promised VIP permits granting them free travel.

The PA is also set to benefit from a new Israeli pilot program that allows shipping containers to enter from Jordan via the Allenby Crossing and the creation of an online platform for Israeli employers to pay Palestinian employees.

The online system will lead to a rise in bank transfers, and the PA is expected to make some NIS 40 million per month in taxes from this.

Palestinian opposition elements, meanwhile, fiercely criticized Abbas since they perceived the meeting as a tool for tightening security coordination with Israel.

Hamas operatives published a cartoon that showed Abbas as a pathetic, mocked, surrendering figure, shining Gantz’s shoes. A Hamas spokesperson described the meeting as a knife in the back of the Palestinians, while a Palestinian Islamic Jihad figure said the meeting demonstrates that Abbas is a “contractor” for Israel.

In the broad historical perspective, Abbas’s meeting with Gantz is not unusual – past Israeli prime ministers such as Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak met with the late PLO chief leader Yasser Arafat in their own homes too.  Yet unlike past meetings, the current meeting was held under conditions of Israeli government paralysis on the Palestinian issue.

From the Israeli perspective, the meeting was useful in further boosting security coordination, mutual confidence-building, and strengthening the PA’s position while weakening Hamas and its goal of increasing its influence in the West Bank, before going on to take over the entire Palestinian government system.   

It is reasonable to assume that Israel will continue to pursue its interests in the Palestinian arena overtly and covertly in the post-Abbas era, and that means not allowing Hamas to take over, while working with both Abbas and whoever replaces him.

---

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

The similarities between Iranian and Russian belligerent foreign policy

By Yochai Guiski

Two separate high-stakes showdowns have been played out in recent months on the world stage: The first concerns the Iranian nuclear program, while the second is between Russia and the United States and European countries concerning Ukraine.

In the showdown over the Iranian nuclear program, Tehran has been pushing hard against U.S. and European demands to return to the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and presented (at least initially) hardline negotiating demands. All the while, Iran’s continued non-compliance with the deal and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have raised the specter of conflict arising from an attempt to delay the program by military means.

In the Ukraine, Western countries have seen Russia amass significant military forces (over 100 thousand troops and military equipment), threaten Kiev with military attack, and produce false narratives about Western aggression that requires a Russian response.

Moscow is already under sanctions for occupying and annexing the Crimean Peninsula and has received warnings from the U.S. about stiff sanctions should it initiate a military operation.

At first glance, these two issues seem unrelated: One is a multilateral nonproliferation negotiation regarding return to a nuclear deal that was abandoned by the Trump administration, and Iran’s noncompliance with the terms of the deal in response; the second is a potential war on European soil, which may lead to a crisis between two nuclear-armed great powers.

But at a closer look, the similarities begin to emerge:

1. Iran and Russia are both belligerent actors in their respective arenas:

a. The Kremlin and its allies are continuously intervening (through various tools - diplomatic, economic, covert, information, military) in the affairs of former Soviet republics, attempting to stifle pro-democracy dissent and prop up pro-Russian leaders, while supporting separatist pro-Russian groups.

b. Iran is also employing various tools to undermine the governments of Middle Eastern countries while funding and arming proxies who serve as its long arm. Iranian involvement perpetuated governance crises in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, and has exacerbated the humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria.

2. Iran and Russia have both increased their belligerence in response to sanctions that sought to deal with their behavior. They are also willing to use capabilities that are deemed unacceptable by the West such as assassinations (including using chemical agents), supporting terror groups, and developing various WMD capabilities.

3. Both Iran and Russia do not shy from sending forces to prop up authoritarian allies or from the use of force to quash popular demands, such as in Syria, Belarus, or Kazakhstan.

4. Iran and Russia see themselves as victims of the current situation or at least adopt these positions outwardly:   

a. Iran depicts itself as a victim of Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on Tehran. However, the “Nuclear Archives” showed that Iran had manifestly violated the JCPOA and the NPT by holding on to the blueprints and components of a military nuclear program, and it has violated NPT safeguards by holding and hiding enriched uranium. Iran has also leveraged the West’s interest in IAEA monitoring of its nuclear sites to prevent any meaningful investigation by the agency into its numerous violations.

b. Iran has also expanded its support for militias and terror groups around the Middle East that have targeted U.S. forces and their allies while claiming the U.S. is violating the nuclear agreement by sanctioning it for those behaviors.

c. Russia also sees itself as a victim of western interference. It sees the 20+ years of NATO enlargement to the east as an encroachment on its borders by a military alliance that primarily views Russia as its enemy. All the while remembering that the wars Russia fought in Europe were instigated by European nations.

d. It also views the development and deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe over the past decade as a significantly destabilizing development as these can reduce the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence.

e. Russia viewed the political change in Ukraine with genuine alarm, as its territory plays host to vital military installations (such as the only exit to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean) whose loss would have significant strategic implications. It reacted swiftly by seizing and annexing Crimea. Moscow also sees the NATO presence in Ukraine as an unacceptable risk to its national security (the distance between Moscow and the Ukrainian border is only about 500 Km of relatively open terrain).   

5. Conspicuously, both Iran and Russia seek guarantees from the U.S. and its allies that they would refrain from actions that could inhibit their ability to exercise their power in their respective (contested) spheres of influence (Russia provided treaty suggestions to the U.S. and Iran demands guarantees as part of the nuclear negotiations). They seek these guarantees knowing full well that their demands are near impossible to accept and even agreeing to discuss them might be interpreted as selling out U.S. partners in the region.

As the U.S. seeks to reinforce the notion of a rules-based international order, it is of paramount importance that regional bullies do not get a free pass on their behavior. Even if the U.S. and its allies might have done better in dealing with both nations, it is ultimately their aggressive policies that bear most of the responsibility for their current predicament.

Accepting the narrative that Iran or Russia are victims who just seek to have some protection from bullying U.S. policies would be counterproductive and an open invitation to aggression, which would also be closely monitored by an attentive Beijing.

Even if diplomacy is still the best road to address most of the issues between the U.S., Russia, and Iran, it would be foolhardy to attempt to kick the can down the road by acquiescing to unacceptable demands. Accepting them in diplomatic discourse with one actor would surely embolden the other to seek the same.

Even if the U.S. and Israel cannot fully agree on the nuclear negotiations with Iran, this should be a point they are united on. 

---

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.