Antisemitism Finds a Home With the A.B.I.L.A

By Mark Goldfeder

The prominent American Branch of the International Law Association (ABILA) has apparently been hijacked by the advocates of modern antisemitism. Sadly, illustrious New York law firms, the New York Bar Association, and Fordham Law School are among their unwitting enablers.

From October 20 to October 22, 2022 the ILA’s American Branch will hold its annual meeting in New York City. This year, the program includes a panel dedicated to the demonstrable lie that the Jewish state is racist, guilty of the crime against humanity of apartheid, and therefore deserving of criminal prosecution and economic ruin.

For the past month, the online program described the annual meeting on “Racism and the Crime of Apartheid in International Law” this way: “Today, in contexts across the world, from Myanmar’s abuses of Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State, to the Israeli authorities’ systematic oppression of Palestinians, to the Chinese government’s actions in Xinxiang against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, human rights organizations, UN bodies, experts, and scholars have concluded that the crime of apartheid is being committed with impunity.” In just one paragraph, the authors did their very best to casually lump Israel in with some of the worst human rights abusers in the world.

According to the official program, the Opening Plenary and Reception is taking place at the New York City Bar Association. The Centennial Gala is hosted by the law firm of White & Case LLP, the Opening Reception by Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, and the panel itself by Fordham Law School. The panel’s list of participants is a who’s who of Israel-bashing advocates and nobody from the other side. This stands in marked contrast to the promise of the ILA to exemplify a “diverse and inclusive community of individuals working or interested in international law,” the promise of legal practitioners to hear and evaluate all sides fairly, and the promise of the legal academy to ensure students and faculty are educated, not brainwashed.

Brainwashed they will be, however. The panel includes a UN official, E. Tendayi Achiume who charges Israel with vaguely defined international crimes at every chance she gets—sometimes working with an Israeli-designated terrorist organization to do so. Her UN anti-racism mission has a well-documented blind spot when it comes to advocating for racial and ethnic justice for Jews, and in 2021 Achiume herself signed a wildly antisemitic letter expressing outrage that UCLA dared to condemn antisemitic attacks in the United States (during a massive uptick of such incidents) without also condemning “Jewish supremacists” in Israel.

The panel also includes an academic, Victor Kattan, who claims that only the non-existent State of Palestine has sovereign title over Jerusalem, and has encouraged the Palestinians to file claims against the United States at the International Criminal Court for daring to move the U.S. Embassy to Israel’s capital city. But the highlight is probably Omar Shakir, an NGO activist and extremistwho has publicly supported and defended murderous terrorists and antisemites. For years he advocated and worked for the antisemitic Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, and then, when Israel revoked his work visa for engaging in boycott activities, lied and claimed that he had not done so. Since then, he has worked hard to mainstream the thoroughly debunked Human Rights Watch report that denied Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state, dismissed its security concerns, and accused Israel of apartheid.

Lest you be concerned that a neutral moderator might ask these folks some hard-hitting questions for the benefit of those watching who may not know better, rest assured that the rabid anti-Israel spell will not be broken. The moderator is Mai el Sadany, a human rights attorney who, among other things, has demanded that the NY Bar Association rescind an invitation to Dani Dayan, the former Consul General of Israel in New York, falsely accusing him of racism, apartheid and other criminal activity. She has also accused the United States of collaborating with Israel to cover up human rights violations.

Lest you be concerned that a neutral moderator might ask these folks some hard-hitting questions for the benefit of those watching who may not know better, rest assured that the rabid anti-Israel spell will not be broken.

For the record, because facts matter, apartheid involves an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups committed with the intention of maintaining that regime. Israeli Arabs enjoy full equal rights, and hold positions in the highest levels of every branch of government. Israel does distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, as does every country, but that has nothing to do with race, which is why when Amnesty International made the same claim of apartheid a few months back, they had to literally invent a new definition that was not based on race in order to play a game of antisemitic double standard “gotcha” with the Jewish state.

It is dangerous when antisemites use the imprimatur and gravitas of once-respectable institutions to mainstream hate and lies. This is particularly so in a dangerous environment of rising antisemitic hated and the inextricable bond between accusing Israel of apartheid and antisemitism. We let these claims go unchallenged at our peril because study after study has shown that this kind of inflammatory, discriminatory, antisemitic, anti-Zionist rhetoric is actually dangerous, and leads directly to the kinds of antisemitic attacks against innocent Jewish people and institutions that we are seeing around the world.

Late last week, the law firms in question and Fordham Law School began to receive inquiries about why they would host and celebrate such a gathering. In response, the ABILA did two things: First, the program description in the online brochure was reworded so it did not explicitly accuse Israel of international crimes. Second, they added an additional speaker, ostensibly to bring balance to the panel. The speaker they added, however, Mia Swart, is an Al Jazeera reporter who has done fawning interviews with Omar Shakir “calling out Israeli apartheid,” and just last week tweeted in support of another event in which the leader of an Israeli-designated terror organization gave a talk on “Apartheid and Israel’s Assault on Palestinian Civil Society.” So much for offering a different perspective.

These changes were clearly made so that the hosts could have plausible deniability. They don’t have it. They know exactly what is going on—at their expense, and at the expense of all the attendees who deserve better.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Israel must prepare for a nuclear Iran

By Danny Ayalon

Israel is pursuing a delicate balancing act as it seeks to preserve and strengthen its alliance with its number one ally, the US, while at the same time objecting to the revival of the 2015 nuclear deal. To understand the intricacies of this diplomatic maneuver, it is worth first examining the origins of the US-Israeli special relationship.

While no formal defense treaty exists between the two countries, there are numerous strategic formal and informal agreements on energy, technology, defense, intelligence cooperation, economy and trade. The bilateral bonds are strong, wide-ranging, and deep. Additionally, Israel is more than simply another ally or a recipient of generous American assistance; it actively assists the US.

American financial military funds for Israel, amounting to $3.9 billion a year, are invested in American defense industries. Israeli battlefield experience and technology directly assist American ballistic missile defense development, cyber defense and more. At the community level, in the US, Jewish and evangelical communities both treasure Israel’s welfare and security.

This is the foundation for some extremely significant principles that characterize bilateral relations. The first principle is complete transparency, meaning no concealment, and mutual respect.

The second principle is that of no surprises. This applies less to the tactical-military level and more to the grand strategic and political level. Neither side wants to catch the other off guard when making a significant move. This also suggests that both parties would know in advance about any US failure to veto a UN Security Council resolution against Israel.

The third principle is bipartisan American support for Israel. This is one of the three golden rules, and according to it, Israel is above any political debate in the US. Today, with extreme polarization underway in the US – something that has been in place throughout both the Obama and Trump administrations – this principle has been eroded.

Today, Israel deals with a new US president, one who is not necessarily a trailblazer, but who maintains fair ties with Israel. This is an administration that is well versed – as is the current Israeli government – in knowing how to agree to disagree. This means that relations are not undermined by a lack of agreement.

Can Washington revive the Iran deal?

INTO THIS framework enters the effort by Washington to revive the Iranian nuclear deal, which was scrapped in 2015. Back when the nuclear deal was first passed seven years ago, Israel bet on going to Congress to torpedo it, but this was a total failure, and as a result, the US excluded Israel from the talks. Back then, Jerusalem found itself without any control or up-to-date knowledge regarding the specifics of the agreement.

Based on the bitter experience of 2015, Israel should avoid public fights with the US, or any move that can be regarded as meddling in internal American politics. It should avoid crossing the known boundaries – but without giving up on any of its principled objections to the would-be deal, and the dangers that it could bring.

It is not necessary for Israel to align itself with all American policies; rather, it must communicate discreetly with members of Congress. This isn’t about self-censorship, but rather, about how the message is delivered.

Israel is still obligated to exert every effort that it can, without harming ties, to object to the proposed nuclear agreement. If the US still decides to sign the deal in the end, Israel will have the ability to reserve its right to announce that it is not a party to the agreement and that it retains its freedom of action.

In such a scenario, Israel’s government should switch to a “Plan B” – a compensation package for Israel that would better position it to strike Iran’s nuclear program in the future. American officials, including the Ambassador to Israel Thomas R. Nides, have openly stated that they would not restrict Israel from acting if it felt compelled to do so.

This means that if Israel felt it needed to strike the nuclear program in the future, Jerusalem would have to alert Washington (in a way that would not jeopardize the information’s security). This has precedent.

I was a political adviser to ex-Israeli premier Ariel Sharon, when the Americans first arrived in Afghanistan in 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11. We received a call from then-president George W. Bush to warn us that the attack was coming and that there could be regional repercussions from Islamists. In 2003, a similar scenario played out prior to the American attack on the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.   

In assessing the Israeli government’s performance in its dealings with the US administration over the current Iran nuclear negotiations, the government receives a good grade. Both prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid have been able to strike the balance described above.

It must also be noted that Israel’s influence on this issue is limited. The US is driven by global economic and military interests, such as bringing down energy prices – something Iranian oil and gas can certainly help to do if sanctions are lifted – and prioritizing great power competition with China and Russia.

These are factors Israel must comprehend, even if it does not like them.

Israel will now have to make preparations for “Plan C” – defending itself against the threat posed by a nuclear Iran. It must fully utilize the delivery of military platforms that it can secure from the US to do so. 

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Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

How Intelligence Diplomacy Strengthened Israel-Egypt Ties

By Yaakov Peri

At the end of August, reports emerged in Hebrew media that Ronen Bar, the director of Israel’s Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency had traveled to Egypt for a meeting with his counterpart, Abbas Kamel, the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate.

The purpose of the meeting was reportedly to overcome a crisis in bilateral relations following the end of the three-day Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Operation Breaking Dawn against Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza.

The diplomatic tensions stemmed from the IDF’s continued actions against PIJ operatives in the West Bank, contrary to the Egyptian belief that under the ceasefire they had brokered between Israel and PIJ to end Operation Breaking Dawn, the IDF would ease military pressure on the terror organization in the territories. The Egyptians also demanded the release of PIJ prisoners to consolidate the truce.

But Israel did not release the prisoners, and increased pressure on PIJ, acting contrary to Egyptian expectations. Immediately after the operation, Israel conducted a series of arrests of PIJ members in the West Bank, during which several Palestinians were killed in clashes with the IDF in Nablus.

Egypt acted as the key intermediary to bring about the truce after three days of conflict, and Cairo perceived these developments as an affront.

Signs of tension were visible when Kamel canceled a planned trip to Israel after the Gaza operation. Political and security sources assessed that this was a mid-level crisis that would not be difficult to resolve.

During talks with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid said that “Egypt has a most significant role to play in preserving the stability of regional security.” This statement reflects an important fact: recently, Egypt has been practically the only political element that can act as an intermediary and is able to secure ceasefires between Hamas, as well as other armed organizations in the Gaza Strip, and Israel.

It is clear that the reason Egypt took offense was Israel’s lack of cooperation with its understanding of the ceasefire agreement. Cairo saw this as a blow to Egypt’s honor and status, in line with Egypt’s self-perception in the region and its important role in Gaza.

For many years, Egypt has invested greatly in preserving its status as the leading power in the Arab world—a role Turkey has attempted to infringe upon in recent years with varying degrees of success. After some erosion, Egypt has begun to recover its predominance. This recovery is mainly attributable to Sisi’s calm and moderate leadership.

Egypt also perceives itself as a state able to resolve regional issues, including the never-ending confrontation between Israel and Gazan terror factions, primarily Hamas and PIJ.

Cairo is keen on preserving this role, and to that end, it regularly dispatches intelligence delegations to Gaza, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

Israeli and Egyptian intelligence communities enjoy excellent relations, both at the personal and professional levels.

Egypt also regards good ties with Israel as critical for ensuring proper relations with the United States and the West, particularly after being greatly disappointed in its history of dealings with the Soviet Union.

All of these factors have helped propel Egypt to the forefront of the region, a position it wishes to maintain. 

It seeks to do this despite its conflict with Hamas’s Egyptian sister movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has harmed state security. In order to avoid inflaming clear tensions with Hamas, Egypt busies itself with dealing with political and diplomatic issues and stays clear of theological disputes with Gaza’s rulers.

Egypt is wary of Islamist forces, and combats extreme Islamic terrorists in Sinai on a non-stop basis, including losing many members of its security forces in the fight against ISIS in recent years.

A History of Intelligence Diplomacy

The dispatch of Israeli intelligence chiefs to defuse diplomatic tensions has a good precedent.

In the past, heads of the Shin Bet also set out for political missions to resolve crises with states and organizations. But this was usually done covertly and did not attract headlines. Conditions have changed, however, and the journey of a Shin Bet chief today attracts both media coverage and analysis.

Meetings between intelligence chiefs are routine and acceptable worldwide. Often, government cabinets feel that the head of an intelligence agency is optimally positioned to carry out diplomatic missions, and, as such, entrust them with confidence and credibility.

Intelligence cooperation brings states together, and requires a high degree of trust and intimacy. Hence, both sides often trust the “messengers” more than the average politician. Intelligence chiefs are apolitical figures, despite being appointed by the highest political echelons. They enable unique and very close relations between intelligence services.

When a government sends the head of an intelligence agency to handle what appears to be a diplomatic-political issue, it is sending a figure that is often free of political baggage. This approach has proven itself over time. For example, when Israel was able to patch up relations with Jordan following the botched assassination attempt of senior Hamas member Khaled Mashaal on Jordanian territory, and ongoing contacts between Israeli intelligence chiefs and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Similarly, intelligence diplomacy played a central role in growing relationships between Israel and Gulf Arab governments prior to the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords. Whole foundations for relations were founded on contacts between the states’ intelligence agencies. Each agency received instructions and guidance from the highest levels of government during such contacts.

Ultimately, the Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic affair appears to be of mediocre severity, neither very serious nor trivial. It is not difficult to overcome such an issue, and it seems likely that bilateral relations between the two state systems will continue without harm.

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Mr. Yaakov Peri concluded his distinguished career as Director of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Service). He served in that position from 1988-1995. Prior to that role he held the position of Head of the Shin Bet Northern Command and the Judea & Samaria Command. In 2013 he joined the Yesh Atid party, was elected to the Knesset and was appointed Minister of Science, Technology and Space.

The Palestinian Tragedy Is Israel's Too

By Chuck Freilich

In his recent speech at the United Nations, Israeli prime minister Yair Lapid breathed some life back into the long-dormant two-state solution process. Some believe that it is too late and that the point of no return has already been crossed. There is certainly not much time left before the Palestinians permanently reject themselves out of having any state and Israel settles itself out of a Jewish and fully democratic future.

Since 2009, when Benjamin Netanyahu returned to office, the number of settlers in the West Bank has grown by 60 percent, to over 475,000, gradually but inexorably creating a binational reality. Moreover, the land available for potential territorial swaps is increasingly being used for other purposes. The status quo is an illusion.

The Palestinians have similarly contributed to the emerging binational reality. They repeatedly rejected dramatic proposals that would have given them a state on essentially all of the contested territory and remain paralyzed by a seemingly immutable adherence to an all-or-nothing approach that has, indeed, left the Palestinians with nothing—and deep internal divisions. No end is in sight to the split between the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas is in the twilight of his reign, the Palestinian Authority is tottering, and Hamas remains implacably opposed to any accommodation with Israel. Indeed, a Hamas take-over of the West Bank may be the most likely end to the ongoing rupture.

The Palestinians are thus in dire danger of missing a historic opportunity to have a state of their own. That is their tragedy. Unfortunately, it is also Israel’s. The fate of the Zionist movement, one of history’s most successful national movements, is inextricably linked to that of the Palestinians, who have one of history’s most dysfunctional national movements.

Lapid’s resurrection of the two-state solution notwithstanding, the Palestinian issue will play virtually no role in the upcoming elections, much like all elections since 2015. For most Israelis, the Palestinian issue has little bearing on their lives, seemingly played out in a distant country that they have never visited and which only penetrates their consciousness after particularly heinous acts of terrorism. Israel has become a global high-tech power, its economy is booming, and the Abraham Accords demonstrated that regional normalization is possible without the Palestinians. More pressing issues present themselves.

Today, however, just 60 percent of the combined populations of Israel and the West Bank are Jewish—hardly a Jewish state—and a majority would have been Arab had Israel not withdrawn from Gaza. Most Israelis are cognizant of the long-term demographic threat to the nation’s character, but they believe there is nothing Israel can do to change Palestinian rejectionism in any event. Thus, they have adopted Israel’s tried and true approach of yehiye beseder (“things will work out”) and simply moved on.

Binational states, as exemplified by Syria and Iraq, are often a recipe for disaster, and a nearly wall-to-wall consensus in Israel opposes an outcome of this nature. The never-ending violence that plays out on Israel’s TV screens, along with the repeated rounds of conflict with Hamas, should be proof enough of what a binational future holds in store. Remarkably, however, right-wing voters continue to vote for parties whose policies will lead directly to this. A disconnect between voter preferences and voting patterns is hardly unique to Israel, but rarely is it so pronounced.

A revitalized peace process should build off the Abraham Accords. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, along with Egypt, Jordan, the European Union, and others, should be invited to help broker the talks, under the auspices of the United States. Inclusion among the “conveners” would be based on a number of principles.

First, Israel’s final borders, as stated in President George Bush’s 2004 letter, will reflect “demographic realities” (i.e. the settlement blocs). In practice, this means that Israel will retain 4 to 6 percent of the West Bank, in which nearly 80 percent of the settlers live, in exchange for land swaps, but will withdraw from the rest. The United States and the EU have long accepted the need for land swaps, as, in fact, have some Arab states and even the Palestinians.

Second, Palestinian refugees would be offered a choice between a “return” to the Palestinian state, remaining in situ, or moving elsewhere with compensation, but not to Israel itself (with the exception of limited numbers). In effect, this would result in a de facto international disavowal of the Palestinian claim to an unlimited “right of return,” which together with Jerusalem, constitutes the two ultimate issues dividing the sides.

On Jerusalem, the most feasible solution would likely be akin to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s 2008 proposal: the division of the city along its national lines, with an international body to govern the “holy basin” (the Old City and additional holy sites), pending final resolution of the issue. Whereas Olmert had proposed that the international body include the United States, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Palestinians, an updated proposal would add the Abraham Accords states.

Finally, the conveners would reaffirm that the Oslo Accords, contrary to the public image, never predetermined the negotiations’ final outcome and that the possible establishment of a Palestinian state remains contingent on the successful completion of two critical tests, at which the Palestinians have so far failed abysmally: the establishment of effective self-governance and the prevention of terrorism. The conveners would be expected to finally hold the Palestinians to these conditions. Israel, for its part, would be expected to cease settlement activity beyond the fence line during the negotiations.

Should attempts to reach a negotiated agreement along these lines fail to achieve rapid progress, Israel should act unilaterally to determine its boundaries, renounce sovereignty over the 90 percent of the West Bank beyond the security fence, and begin a phased withdrawal of settlers. The thousands of rockets fired into Israel from Gaza demonstrate the need for ongoing Israel Defense Forces deployments throughout the West Bank for defensive purposes.

Disengagement from the West Bank, as in Gaza, would be unilateral vis-a-vis the Palestinians, but it should be coordinated this time with all of the conveners, not just the United States. It should also be made contingent on a significant quid pro quo —on the refugee issue, for instance—and public recognition that Israel had fulfilled most of the measures expected of it. The actual extent of Israel’s withdrawal might serve as an inducement to do so.

U.S. leverage over Israel is, and should remain, constrained both by the fundamental closeness of the relationship and Israel’s ongoing need for assistance in the face of the threats of Iran and Hezbollah. Even limited American pressure, however, has major resonance in Israel and, if applied in conjunction with the other conveners, the impact would be magnified. Overall, a “carrot” approach would be most effective, including even greater American assistance for missile defense and potentially even a defense treaty; an upgrade of EU ties with Israel, just short of membership; open formalization of ties with Saudi Arabia and others; and a significant expansion of regional cooperation. The impact on Israel’s strategic circumstances and public opinion would be dramatic.

With the Palestinians, American and convener leverage is more straightforward, and the demands must be stark: abandon the rejectionist all-or-nothing approach, agree to a state on almost all of the territory, but not all, and compromise on refugees and Jerusalem, as proposed above, or lose outside support for a Palestinian state. In addition to what should be the ultimate inducement for the Palestinians, the prospect of finally having a state, the conveners would also offer major development aid.

Both Israel and the Palestinians are past masters at stonewalling and derailing unwanted peace initiatives. A breakthrough should only be attempted if and when the appropriate political circumstances prevail on both sides, and even then, only if Washington is truly willing to apply pressure and offer significant inducements.

Bitter experiences with the corrupt dictatorship established by the Palestinians in the West Bank and the radical theocracy in Gaza indicate that a future Palestinian state is more likely than not to be another failed, authoritarian, unstable, and irredentist Arab state. This, then, begs the question of why one would continue to pursue a two-state solution. The answer is simple. The alternative, a binational state, is far worse.

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

The Long-Term Competition doctrine – Israel’s theory of victory vs Iran

By Yaakov Lappin

In May this year, Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the former deputy chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, published an important paper that provides a glimpse into a new doctrine increasingly shaping the Israeli defense establishment’s view on how to deal with Iran.

In the paper, published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Zamir, laid out a concept known as Long-Term Competition (LTC), and, specifically, how Israel should apply it to take on the threat posed by Iran.

Iran, Zamir pointed out, is dedicated to the long-term goal of destroying Israel and becoming the regional hegemonic power. It seeks to achieve this by creating heavily-armed proxies and partners, surrounding Israel with rings of rocket and missile bases, and placing a nuclear umbrella over this tightening noose.

Citing the American foreign policy scholar Hal Brands, Zamir noted that any LTC doctrine must include a theory of victory – meaning defining a state’s long-term strategic goal and how it plans to achieve it.

Other key tenets of an LTC include leveraging one’s asymmetric advantage, embracing ideological competition, competing comprehensively and holistically, operating multilaterally, and exploiting “the strategic importance of time.”

Ultimately, a country engaged in an LTC against an adversary must pace itself for the long haul.

Zamir proposed that Israel’s LTC against Iran apply seven core principles, which are as follows:

·         A multilateral, long-term campaign organized regionally in which roles and players (meaning other states in the Middle East also threatened by Iran) are clearly defined.

·         Targeting the Iranian Islamic Republican Guards Corps, in Iran and throughout the Middle East. The IRGC was defined by Zamir as Iran’s “center of gravity,” and weakening it means undermining Tehran’s regional influence

·         Denying the ability of Iran to operate indirectly, through proxies, by responding to such actions with direct deterrent reprisals – meaning targeting Iran directly for the actions of its proxies.

·         Hitting targets belonging to Iran’s proxies continuously.

·         Applying direct pressure on the Iranian regime due to its terrorist actions whether a nuclear agreement is signed or not.

·         Expanding Israel’s deniable shadow war actions, currently active against Iranian interests in Syria, to target the whole of the Iranian regime, the IRGC, and regional Iranian assets.

·         And waging an “ideological cultural” campaign to win over Middle Eastern hearts and minds among sects, tribes, and other populations to highlight the advantages of moderate Islam and democracy, with Shi’ite communities being the prime target audience.

Signs that this doctrine is increasingly shaping the Israel defense establishment’s thinking have been emerging steadily over the last few years. In 2021, Maj. Gen. Tal Kelman, head of the IDF’s Strategy and Third Circle Directorate (a reference to countries in Israel's third-circle periphery with Iran being the focal point), which was founded in June 2020, told the Hebrew daily Maariv newspaper, “The Shi’ite axis is expanding, and Iran is engaged in a long-term strategic competition with us. The incredible thing is that despite the heavy prices paid by Iranian citizens… the internal-economic low, which is perhaps the worst in Iran since its war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran continues to strive to implement its strategy.” 

Thus, Iran is engaged in a long-term campaign aimed at Israel’s eventual demise, and the response by Israel’s defense establishment is an Israeli long-term campaign designed to thwart all of the Iranian regime’s strategic goals and to contribute to its weakness, with the end goal being defined by Zamir as “the extended isolation and weakening of the enemy until its surrender, where surrender equals the defeated camp being forced to accept its enemy’s terms and losing its motivation to continue fighting given the high cost of the campaign.”

This view was echoed by Kelman, who stated last year, “The significance of the campaign against Iran is not that, in the end, I conquer Tehran and plant a flag there, but a campaign in which I cause Iran to pay very heavy prices, harm its centers of gravity, military capabilities, force it to pay a significant economic price for its aggressive conduct against the State of Israel,” he stated.

Such an Israeli campaign needs to play out across multiple sectors simultaneously, such as Syria, Iran itself, and other locations, and it must become Israel’s top priority, Kelman argued. “Part of the reason that for the past ten years we have been engaged in a campaign between wars in Syria [to roll back Iran’s entrenchment there] and not allowing Iran to build a Hezbollah-like organization there is exactly this,” he stated.

Previous conversations this author held with sources from the IDF’s Strategy and Third Circle Directorate found that the IDF has adopted a comprehensive, holistic view of developing challenges to Israel from Iran, and is assembling ‘puzzle pieces’ that were once seen separately to form a complete picture of threat. The picture begins on Iranian soil and reaches the borders of Israel (in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza) through an integrated lens, rather than viewing each incident or sector isolation.

"Against this, we have to develop a range of capabilities – both to be ready at any minute for any development and also for the other side to be sufficiently deterred – and to know that Israel has the ability to respond unequivocally to any action or desire by the enemy," a source from the Directorate told me in 2020.

Zamir’s paper published in May this year seeks to take this LTC doctrine to the next stage and to bring moderate Sunni powers on board this struggle.

“More than ever before, the anti-Iran nations of the Middle East together with the United States must formulate a joint smart strategy to confront the geopolitical and regional changes appropriately,” Zamir stated. The fact that China and Russia are engaged in intense great power competition with the United States over the global order will also directly influence the Middle East and the long-term struggle in the region between the Islamic Republic’s radical axis and the anti-Iran bloc, he argued.

“The United States is the enemy of the Iranian regime, which views it as the Great Satan. The regime plans to seize control of the Middle East; the global power it intends to partner with is China. The strengthening of this strategic partnership was signaled in March 2021 when China and Iran signed an agreement of economic and security cooperation agreement that includes significant Chinese investments in Iran in exchange for a twenty-five-year supply of oil, which is so critical to the Chinese economy,” said Zamir.

He added that in the military field, China-Iran cooperation is growing, including the transfer of military technologies and advanced Chinese weapons deals, while at the same time, Iran’s navy holds joint exercises and maneuvers with the navies of China and Russia.

Zamir called on Israel to set itself the target of weakening Iran and its deterrence capabilities, denying it the ability to use its forces and resources to destabilize the region, and curbing its expansion to regional states, before forcing it to withdraw.

The contours of the Iranian and Israeli long-term competition doctrines are becoming clear; and while Israel’s campaign is motivated entirely by defensive requirements, the campaign will likely increasingly focus on the need to go on the attack beyond Syria, and to onboard new allies wherever possible.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Beyond Killer Robots: How AI impacts security, military affairs

By Daphne Richemond Barak

For too long, the conversation on AI and militaries has been narrowly focused on autonomous weapons and the ethical issues that come with them. The time is ripe to take stock of the myriad of other ways that AI will impact security and military affairs.

Just as AI is dramatically changing a range of sectors in the civilian world, improving efficiency, reducing costs, and automating processes, there is no reason to believe that militaries, too, will not be joining the AI revolution.

Israel is a world leader in developing autonomous military capabilities, from Iron Dome interceptors to unmanned aerial vehicles to ground-based platforms – though all currently rely on human approval before kinetic firepower can be activated, in line with the values of the Israeli defense establishment.

The question of what will happen when adversaries deploy autonomous weapons that do not seek a person in the loop for approval to use lethal firepower looms on the horizon for all militaries defending democratic states.

It seems reasonable to believe that even those states that have set some limits on AI capabilities will encounter adversaries who have no qualms about doing so, putting the states that limit integrating AI for national security at a considerable disadvantage. Thus, it’s imperative for states to understand the full extent of what AI can do.

While autonomous weapons attract a lot of attention, much of the conversation about this technology is negative, causing analysts to overlook the positive application of AI in areas such as force protection and the reduction of civilian casualties.

The many benefits of artificial intelligence

Other AI functions – including optimizing chain-of-command communications, human-machine teaming in areas like logistics, and predicting adversary maneuvers – offer equally promising avenues. Many are already being developed by western militaries, including by the Israel Defense Forces.

As time goes by, military commanders will feel increasingly comfortable relying on this technology, just as consumers have in the civilian world. Whether AI is introduced in the civilian or military realm does not mean suspending human involvement or judgment, but rather, receiving a new tool to boost performance.

Military commanders will use AI to minimize the fog of war. While they will continue to make maneuver decisions, AI capabilities will augment their decision-making capabilities during battle by providing a more accurate picture of the reality on the ground and keeping to the speed of modern warfare, thanks to continuously updated sensor data.

AI technologies will also help decision-makers and analysts combat the effects of information overload, and to better organize and process growing data pools on enemy behavior. AI will not only alleviate this information clutter, but it will allow for forces to make predictions about future events and outcomes, allowing states to better prepare for war.

The use of AI to better understand an adversary is shaping up to be one of the most promising and fascinating aspects of this tool. This will enable faster, real-time gathering of information, detecting patterns, mapping out communication networks, and even better understanding of how the enemy ‘feels,’ in terms of its morale, by analyzing its language on social media and other platforms. These new AI capabilities amount to intelligence gathering 2.0.

This type of analysis can be extended to both military communications and social media activities by civilians in adversarial states, to better understand a nation’s will to fight based on societal trends on any given day. The will to fight remains the most critical factor in human warfare, and being able to identify when this will decrease, in real time, could prove enormously beneficial for decision-makers in the civilian and military worlds.

In the area of military logistics and maintenance, AI can create revolutionary cost-saving efficiency, which is why most militaries are prioritizing making progress on this front. Typically considered a more technical aspect, logistics will probably lead to the most radical changes in how militaries “do business.”

AI systems can also optimize the procurement process and automate supply chains. They can forecast the need to repair equipment and order resupplies while minimizing costs. They can also be used in personnel allocation by helping militaries figure out which soldier is best suited to what unit. And unlike other aspects of AI, these applications are unlikely to raise any significant legal or ethical issues.

AI-based technologies can also enhance the capabilities of individual soldiers, and this should not be seen as unethical or dangerous across the board. In the past, amphetamines and caffeine have been handed out to soldiers for similar purposes.

What are the applications for AI in defense?

Just as limiting blood loss and boosting resistance to extreme conditions are worthy goals to help soldiers, providing them with new situational awareness and command capabilities are equally legitimate objectives. Human enhancement calls for certain limits – but those have yet to be (publicly) set. Such limits should consider force protection and the preservation of a soldier’s autonomy to choose to undergo a given enhancement, whether it can be reversed, and if it poses long-term health risks.

At the strategic level, AI can boost the capabilities of air defense systems. Emerging weapons, such as hypersonic missiles, can avoid detection from defense systems due to their speed. Air defense systems integrated with AI processing capabilities will be able to properly detect and intercept these incoming missiles.

In the area of information warfare, AI can, of course, help fabricate deep fakes and spread misinformation. Ironically, it can also help governments quickly verify information or recognize efforts by a hostile actor at shaping public perception in a harmful or disruptive manner.

This could give NATO states an ability to know, in real-time, if Russia is trying to use fake news to destabilize its security environment and threaten the alliance.

Ultimately, such capabilities extend far beyond the area of autonomous weapons and fears of ‘killer robots.’ The security community must broaden its grasp of AI capabilities and acknowledge positive as well as disruptive AI applications.

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Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Israel's core curriculum failure

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

The comprehensive investigative report by the New York Times into the issue of the teaching of core curriculum in New York State ultra-Orthodox schools did not cause anyone in Israel to fall off their chair.

In little Israel, there is no need for an investigative piece to understand the reality of ultra-Orthodox school systems. If the New York Times had just called, we would have been happy to tell them.

According to the report, ultra-Orthodox schools in New York receive billions from state budgets, and yet, even though they are supposed to teach basic core subjects to give pupils tools to deal with the modern world, these institutions function as if they were an autonomy.

In New York, that’s a legal offense, but here in Israel, there is no equivalent law. Despite oceans separating the two places, there are, however, certain parallels, such as the intervention of wheelers and dealers in politics, and the harm that this causes to the economy. In both places, children are left behind and coerced into ignorance.

Why is it that important to learn core subjects?

The answer lies in the symbolic date of 9/11 when the American newspaper chose to publish its piece. The ultra-Orthodox community claims that the publication date symbolizes a kind of terror attack against them in New York, though the newspaper apparently chose this date to underline the view that children who do not acquire basic tools grow up ignorant and live in poverty, leading to social disaster if not stopped.

The day that this reality knocks on our door isn’t far away. In Israel, the percentage of ultra-Orthodox men in employment is around 50%, while among secular men, the employment rate stands at over 80%.

If the ultra-Orthodox male employment rate ever matches the secular one, the Israeli economy would, every year, receive another 29 billion shekels. In effect,  billions of shekels would enter the collective fund of Israeli citizens, through which the state finances its defense budget, police, education, health infrastructure, and more.

If a change does not occur, the State of Israel will not be able to continue to fund these vital systems, and the burden will fall on the shoulders of working people, who will have to pay higher taxes: National bankruptcy won’t be far behind.

And what about Torah studies, some will surely ask? There is no contradiction between religious studies and teaching core curriculum. The only ones exploiting the situation are politicians who hold an entire public hostage. In Israel, like in the state of New York, a community that does not support itself, and lives in poverty, is a community that needs economic assistance and support, and it is easier to manage such a community. The stipend comes with a voting ballot.

To grasp the full picture, let’s zoom out of the present day, and go back in time by a  year to 2021 when Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman issued a call to ensure core curriculum by conditioning budgets to ultra-Orthodox institutions that taught it. This was done to strengthen the Israeli economy and increase the cycle of employment among ultra-Orthodox men (a similar push is needed regarding Arab Israeli women).

It did not take long for positive momentum to build. The Belz Hassidic community took the initiative, and in a bold move, the community’s rebbe announced that he would insert core curriculum into the education system in the coming year. The firestorm quickly appeared too, with critics claiming that such a move would harm religious studies. Ultra-Orthodox Members of Knesset demanded to know why the government thought it had the right to intervene in children’s curriculum.

The investigative report published overseas encountered an Israeli political reality that has been hit by storms over exactly the same issue. Opposition Chairman Benjamin Netanyahu understood that he had to prevent a split between the Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael parties (who jointly form the United Torah Judaism list) since this could damage his chances of returning to power. So he promised to match the funding for institutions that do not teach core curriculum subjects to the budgets of the state education system.

The promise worked, and the political parties again merged into a single list. It is clear to all that if ultra-Orthodox politicians Aryeh Deri and Moshe Gafni are partners in the next government, Liberman’s historical achievement will begin to fade.

Meanwhile, New York State decided that in December 2023, budgets will be denied to educational institutions that fail to teach core curriculum. In Israel, if a government headed by Netanyahu is formed, not only will the situation be the opposite of that in New York, but rather, educational institutions will receive a special bonus for failing to teach basic subjects.

This would be the case even if the current Defense Minister Benny Gantz or Prime Minister Yair Lapid join a coalition including ultra-Orthodox parties.  In such a scenario, core curriculum subjects would also be thrown under the bus, and this would constitute a disaster for the Zionist vision and the Israeli economy.

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Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

Democratic norms and the rule of law at stake in Israel’s elections

By Dan Meridor

The upcoming November 1 Israeli national elections, the fifth in three years, are not merely another electoral contest, or just the latest effort to break out of political deadlock.

Rather, they represent a key junction for Israeli society, which will have to make fateful decisions about the kind of ethical and legal systems that will govern the State of Israel in the near and distant future.

Two factors are converging to threaten Israel’s democratic norms and rule of law. The first is the likely attempt by Opposition Leader Benjamin Netanyahu to disrupt the trials underway against him, and the second is the rise of authoritarian political forces that wish to undermine the system of checks and balances and make the Knesset the all-powerful branch of state. These two elements are joining forces.

Until now, the rule of law in Israel has been based on a critical moral foundation of ethical values, which have underpinned Israel’s democratic – Jewish nature. These values are what enable the balance that Israeli democracy has successfully maintained between the Jewish national cause and adhering to liberal democratic norms.

Such norms include equality of all citizens, freedom of expression, and ensuring individual citizen rights. Israelis have relied on state mechanisms like legislation, the police, state prosecutors, attorney generals, and the High Court to ensure these values.

Now, unfortunately, this system is in jeopardy.

Since Israel’s inception in 1948, there have always been substantial disputes between political camps, and in that context, between Herut (the pre-Likud party) and Mapai (the pre-Labor democratic socialist party) over multiple issues. These ranged from whether or not to accept German Holocaust reparation offers in 1952, or decades of dispute over the land-for-peace formula, as well as bitter arguments over whether a free-market economy or deep government-involved socialism should govern the Israeli social-economic sphere.

Over the years, the electorate made its decisions, and Israel continued as a functioning state and society despite these serious divisions. What enabled this to happen was a national consensus on the need for a fundamental ethical framework, which was universally accepted. Institutions made their decisions and society accepted these decisions whether people agreed with them or not.

Until now.

For the first time in Israel, the High Court’s authority, or respect for legal institutions and legal rulings, are under attack. This flies in the face of the national–liberal tradition of the Herut party, which was always committed to upholding the rule of law.

The late prime minister Menachem Begin consistently argued that the High Court should have the authority to overturn Knesset legislation if it violates human rights. I am proud to have been the Justice Minister for the Likud when we initiated legislation to guard basic human rights (known as the constitutional revolution).

In 1953, the High Court told Ben Gurion that he could not decide the balance between freedom of speech and security, and overturned his decision to close the Kol Ha’am newspaper – not very long after the 1948 War of Independence.

The legal system has not changed. The same judges, now accused of being “leftists” by the pro-Netanyahu camp, ruled against Ben Gurion. In 1977, Aharon Barak, the Attorney General at the time, was about to indict former Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, prompting his resignation. He then indicted a number of senior members of the Labor camp.  

This is what the separation of powers looks like, and this is how the judicial branch applies checks and balances on the government and the Knesset – just as it was designed to do – to prevent unchecked power or tyrannical rule.

Liberal democracy has never advocated for unchecked majority rule, and while the majority certainly can select the identity of the government and influence critical policies, it cannot decide who is guilty or innocent. A court has the legitimate and legal powers to also cancel rules that violate democratic norms.

In 1988, we in the Likud led the unusual initiative to ban the racist Kach party from running in the elections. We gathered public information about its activities and delivered it to the National Elections Committee. That is because racism has no place in a Jewish democratic state, whether one is on the Right or Left, Jewish or Arab -- according to the Basic Law, which was changed in 1985 by the national unity Likud – Labor government. The change we introduced banned racist parties.

Today, Itamar Ben-Gvir, a student of the late racist Meir Kahane -- the founder of the Kach party -- who until recently had a photograph of Jewish terrorist Baruch Goldstein in his living room, and who was convicted in the past of support for a terror organization, has gained, to our dismay, legitimacy in the political system. Netanyahu brought Ben-Gvir into the political sphere in order to reach a parliamentary majority.

This is the clearest demonstration of how values once taken for granted are now being questioned. Israel is a Jewish state because it has a Jewish majority, not because it discriminates individually against Arab citizens. The value of equality is now under assault.

The pro-Netanyahu bloc seeks to actively weaken the judicial system because it has identified it as the gatekeeper. The courts, the state comptroller (who has the power to expose corruption and who was weakened), and the police chief have all been targeted by rhetoric designed to delegitimize these institutions and to personally attack those who head them. This includes anyone who does not fall in line with the pro-Netanyahu agenda, such as the former settler police commissioner, Ronnie Alsheikh, the former religious attorney general, Avichai Mandelblit, and the former chief prosecutor and yeshiva graduate, Shai Nitzan. None have been spared from the wrath of the Netanyahu camp or dodged charges of being “leftist” conspirators seeking to dislodge Netanyahu from power in a nefarious plot.

Such unprecedented attacks are, essentially, attacks on the state as we know it. A state cannot exist without agreed-upon methods for resolving disputes.

Now that the trials have already begun, Netanyahu, who has already accused the judges of being ‘leftists,’ is probably examining options to stop them. The past four elections held in Israel since 2019 were about one issue: The likely effort by Netanyahu to gain legal immunity and prevent criminal trials against him from starting.

A weakened court system, which could then be passed to cancel the trial using a step like the ‘French Law,’ is one such scenario that Netanyahu may hope to achieve.

While Netanyahu has the right to be assumed innocent until proven otherwise, a failure to complete his legal process would constitute a significant blow to the concept of equality in the face of the law.

Zionism is a just cause. Justice is critical to it.  Today, those that espouse values like democracy, human rights, and rule of law, are tagged as ‘leftwing,’ although these are the precise values that were espoused by Begin, Herut, and the older version of the Likud party.

Ultimately, all of these developments project onto the core of the Zionist movement. Zionism holds that after 2,000 years of not employing sovereignty or force – with disastrous consequences – the time for the Jewish people to return to statehood has arrived. However, the right to use force comes with the responsibility to preserve righteousness, and that, in turn, is based on the preservation of democratic rights and values.

It is this mix of national and liberal values that the old Herut party once championed, and which the current pro-Netanyahu bloc is threatening to weaken and largely disable.

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Dan Meridor is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence in the Israeli Government from 2009-2013. Read full bio here.

Israel's political merry go round must stop

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

In Israel, elections have become a new Olympic sport. One round of elections after another has cost the country roughly NIS 12 billion over the past five years, not to mention the economic losses caused by the absence of a national budget for government ministries, the direct damage to our personal finances, and the persistent turmoil that has damaged every national institution.

The political merry-go-round makes it harder to govern and run the state effectively. In the absence of a clear planning agenda, combating the rising cost of living, addressing the housing supply shortage, building a stable national health system, combating crime, reducing road deaths, and implementing comprehensive infrastructure plans become a challenge, to say the least.

What could have been accomplished with NIS 2.4 billion (the cost of each round of elections)? Numerous institutions in Israel would benefit substantially from a fraction of that sum.

Political instability in Israel is nothing new: Calls for a change in Israel’s electoral and governing systems have been around since the days of Mapai. Few Israeli governments have completed their full term, but the past four years have seen Israel’s political instability hit new lows.

Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu has mastered the game of rewriting the rules of the political system. From his perspective, securing his future, evading justice, and paving the path for his return to the Prime Minister’s Office are the most crucial objectives to pursue.

As far as Netanyahu is concerned, governmental stability should only occur after he accomplishes these objectives. In the meantime, Netanyahu has violated unwritten political norms, among them his refusal to resign after being indicted on corruption charges – a far cry from his insistence that former prime minister Ehud Olmert step down when he was indicted.

The current state of affairs endangers the State of Israel and generates a crisis of confidence between the people and their elected officials that worsens with each election cycle.

Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman recently noted that politicians are dragging the Israeli people through a fifth round of elections, and that, looking ahead, it is therefore essential to secure governmental stability in the simplest and most straightforward way possible.

Liberman proposed passing new legislation to boost governmental stability. According to his proposal, the new legislation would adopt the model of the existing Knesset Chairperson Law. According to Liberman’s proposal, instead of the current setup, in which 61 votes are needed to both swear in a Knesset and disperse it, 90 votes would be required to disperse a future Knesset, after the Knesset passes a two-year budget. This legislation would adopt an existing formula and apply it in the Knesset to boost governmental stability. By linking the legislation to the passing of a two-year budget, this maneuver would introduce at least two years of government stability.

This is now the story of these elections. The time has come to stop the merry-go-round.

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Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

17 Years Later: Did Israel’s Gaza Withdrawal Aid Peace?

By Chuck Freilich

Seventeen years ago this week, Israel withdrew from Gaza and dismantled the seventeen settlements that existed there. To demonstrate that it was prepared to go ahead on the West Bank as well, Israel dismantled four settlements there, too. Israel’s preconditions for further progress were straightforward: a demonstration of the Palestinians’ ability to govern responsibly and end terrorism.

The Palestinian response was similarly straightforward. Hamas seized control in Gaza from the Palestinian Authority (PA), established a radical theocracy, and together with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), fired tens of thousands of rockets at Israel’s civilian population, over 1,100 in the recent round alone. The PA, in the West Bank, became a corrupt, if feckless, dictatorship.

No criticism of Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians can excuse, or explain away, the intentional and indiscriminate targeting of civilians: that is terrorism and murder. The fact that some Palestinian civilians are unavoidably killed when Israel responds is heartbreaking, but there is no moral equivalence. Israel’s right to defend its citizens is inviolate.

There is no purely military solution to the problem that Gaza proposes. Tragically, there may not be a political one either.

Despite decades of efforts, Israel’s ability to prevent and suppress rocket fire is still limited. Fortunately, Israel’s Iron Dome defensive system has proven extraordinarily effective and its casualties, since the system was first deployed in 2012, have been comparatively small. Had it not been for Iron Dome, Israel’s casualties would have been severe, and it would have been forced to launch a major ground operation. As it is, disruption to the economy and national life is significant.

The only way to truly cut Hamas and PIJ’s large rocket arsenals down to size, and Hezbollah’s mammoth one, is through a ground operation. Israel would have to occupy all of Gaza, or Lebanon, and go house-to-house for months in a bloody battle to root out the rockets. Once Israel withdrew, however, Iran would rapidly replenish the arsenal and the period of calm gained—at the price of hundreds of Israeli casualties (and far more Gazans or Lebanese)—would likely be short-lived. Some suggest that Israel topple Hamas or Hezbollah, but they would probably just rapidly reconstitute or be replaced by something even worse, e.g., ISIS.

For these reasons, every Israeli government in recent decades, regardless of political complexion, has refrained from doing so. Israel may ultimately have no choice, but at least for now, the remedy exceeds the threat.

Unsurprisingly, the repeated rounds of conflict in Gaza, following the withdrawl, have convinced many in Israel that it is a proven failure. If so judged, this would certainly cast a pall over recommendations that Israel undertake a far riskier withdrawal from the West Bank; indeed, over the entire concept of a two-state solution. The West Bank literally abuts central Israel, where it is just 8.7 miles wide, and is in easy rocket and artillery range from Tel Aviv and Beersheba, even small-arms range from Jerusalem.

On the one hand, Israel was unable to prevent Hamas from firing thousands of rockets even before the withdrawal, when it was in complete control of Gaza. In that sense, the withdrawal has not fundamentally changed the situation, even if the repeated rounds have exacerbated it. On a more positive note, Israel no longer occupies 2 million people. Moreover, had Israel not withdrawn, more than half of the population under its control today would not have been Jewish. As such, the withdrawal was a critical step towards full separation from the Palestinians and a future two-state solution.

Conversely, detractors correctly assert that Israel’s post-withdrawal experience has greatly dampened prospects for this. Israel simply cannot allow the West Bank to become another rocket launching pad, and widespread public recognition of this has greatly undermined support for further progress with the Palestinians. Whether truly effective security arrangements can be devised is debatable—and without them, no one in Israel, Left or Right, will withdraw.

If Israel cannot ignore withdrawal’s disappointing consequences, it also cannot allow them to dictate future policy. For all of the greater near-term certainty in the current situation, it, too, poses grave risks. The absence of a political horizon feeds into Palestinian despair, increases the likelihood of a further armed uprising in the West Bank—or at least a surge in terrorism—and ultimately endangers Israel’s national character.

For decades, various overly optimistic analysts have predicted Hamas’s eventual moderation and pursuit of a more diplomatic course, as some terrorist organizations have done in the past. In practice, Hamas’ fundamental enmity toward Israel remains unchanged. However, this fact does not preclude Israeli from pursuing peace negotiations with the PA or taking measures to improve the quality of life in Gaza. Hamas, however, has proven to be an only partial partner even for such limited measures, repeatedly launching rockets at Israel just as it was opening the border. This seemingly self-defeating behavior only appears inexplicable if one refuses to accept Hamas for what it is, a jihadi organization bent on Israel’s destruction.

The situation in Gaza deteriorated so severely in recent years, however, that even Hamas was forced to support some economic reconstruction and growth measures. As the de facto government, Hamas seeks to ensure that the public does not become so disaffected that it rises up against it, but also not so satisfied with the new status quo that it ceases to support ongoing operations against Israel. In practice, the periods of calm between the rounds have grown shorter, not longer, despite Israel’s repeated attempts to promote economic growth.

Palestinian rejectionism has, unfortunately, not been limited to Hamas. PA presidents, Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, both rejected dramatic proposals for peace, which would have given the Palestinians a state on essentially 100 percent of the territory, a capital in East Jerusalem, and a limited return of refugees, years ago. One cannot ignore the truly wrenching question, whether the Palestinians are prepared to accept any deal that requires that they live in peace alongside Israel.

Israel heads to the polls again in November and a new centrist government is not unimaginable. The battle to succeed Abbas is also underway and, though less likely, a more moderate Palestinian leadership, too, may emerge. Such are the faint glimmers of hope in the Mideast.

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Israel must beware of dangerous delusions after Gaza conflict

By Yaakov Lappin

The ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad appears to be holding stable, creating an opportunity to review the key takeaways from the three-day round of fighting from August 5 to August 7.

The Israeli defense establishment conducted a highly successful and effective short, sharp shock to the Iranian-backed PIJ terror faction. Yet it is the weakest of Israel’s adversaries, and the Israeli public needs to manage its expectations accordingly.

Acting on intelligence of an imminent guided missile attack from Gaza on Israeli targets, the Israeli Air Force, the Shin Bet, the Military Intelligence Directorate, Southern Command, and the IDF Armored Corps integrated their firepower efforts in a coordinated opening strike, which eliminated PIJ’s senior military leadership in northern Gaza, PIJ field attack squads, and PIJ observation towers used to coordinate enemy activity -- all at the same time.

The Israeli operational momentum continued throughout the operation, with precision strikes displaying a marriage of accurate firepower and real-time intelligence superiority.

Meanwhile, on the defensive side, Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system broke its previous records and achieved a 97% successful interception rate of rockets heading for built-up areas. Standing guard over Israeli cities, towns, and villages, the Iron Dome intercepted 380 projectiles.

The conflict was fought entirely as an exchange of standoff firepower, with both sides sending firepower strikes at one another. PIJ directed 1,100 rockets indiscriminately at Israeli targets, while the IAF took the utmost care to reduce harm to noncombatants to the extent possible, including aborting strikes when civilians were spotted in the designated strike zone.

According to IDF figures, 15 Palestinians were killed by failed PIJ rockets, meaning that more Palestinian civilians were killed by PIJ than by Israel in this conflict.

The IDF attacked a total of 170 PIJ targets during the three days of fighting, also going on to eliminate the organization’s southern commander.

It is easy to become deluded by the effective defense of the Israeli home front during this conflict, and easy to forget that should Hamas get involved, with its significantly larger arsenal of rockets, or Hezbollah, which has a monstrous arsenal of 150,000 projectiles – larger than that of most NATO armies --  air defenses will be flooded and will only be partially effective in preventing impacts in Israel.

More importantly, it is important to view Gaza as Iran sees it: One more arena in a multi-arena choke hold that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is trying to wrap around Israel’s neck.

By financing and providing knowhow to Gaza’s terror factions to build rocket arsenals and adding their firepower to that of Hezbollah, together with its entrenchment in Syria where it has ballistic and cruise missile bases, as well as its deployment of missiles and UAVs to Iraq and missile launch sites in Iran itself, the Islamic Republic is building a region-wide multi-front firepower assault staging ground against Israel.

This is the true context in which Gaza should be viewed. The three-day clash with the second largest Gazan terror faction is therefore no indication of the real security challenges faced by Israel.

It is precisely because of this force build-up by the Iranian-led axis, and the alarming progress of Iran’s nuclear program, that Israel’s defense establishment views Gaza as a third-tier priority, and one which must not act as a distraction or drain on Israeli military resources through a large-scale conflict.

Ultimately, however, although it is a mistake to view Gaza in isolation from the wider strategic picture, Israel is still overdue for a more in-depth discussion on its available options regarding the Gaza Strip conundrum.

Israel has two main strategic options when it comes to the Hamas-ruled Islamist enclave: Rounds of fighting designed to create periods of calm and quiet, or re-occupation of the Gaza Strip and a years-long military operation to root out the terrorists that would result in large numbers of casualties and a military regime imposed on 2.2 million Palestinians.

There are no other visible options at this time, and the Israeli defense establishment has repeatedly concluded that limited campaigns to top up Israeli deterrence are the lesser of the two evils.

This is a legitimate and critical debate for Israelis to engage in and those who advocate for toppling the Hamas regime must answer the question of who they think can replace it.

The idea of getting the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority to ‘ride into Gaza on Israeli tanks’ appears to be lacking in credibility, both because of the legitimacy crash that this would cause Fatah, and because of the severe doubts that exist over Fatah’s ability to hold Gaza, after losing the enclave to Hamas in a violent coup in 2007.

If Israel does continue to choose to allow Hamas to rule the Strip, meaning an acceptance of a cycle of enemy force build-up and habitual rounds of fighting, it must also think about ways of strengthening the status of the shaky Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, to avoid giving Palestinians the impression that Hamas’s way of armed conflict and radical Islamism will promote Palestinian interests and national prestige more than the PA’s modus operandi.

The PA’s ‘hybrid’ model of pursuing quiet security coordination with Israel against the common foe of Hamas and PIJ, together with diplomatic assaults on Israel and nods to martyrdom culture and incitement, will be insufficient to compete with Hamas if the PA does not soon begin delivering some political achievements for the Palestinians living under its rule. Those achievements can then act as a lever for Israeli demands for the PA to tone down its incitement.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

ISRAEL'S TECH INVESTMENTS ARE GOOD FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

By Doron Tamir

As technological developments race ahead across the board, governments must take the initiative and create incentives for the private sector to develop those that serve the national interest -- or face being left behind.

The State of Israel’s initiatives to promote eco-systems of development in the cyber sphere are an example of what government-guided development can do for both national security and the national economy.

Societies that are not interested in leaving their wellbeing up to market forces alone need governments that clearly define national technological requirements, and chart ways to reach those objectives.

While governments cannot force companies to research and develop anything, they can certainly encourage them to do so through tax breaks and investments, as Israel’s Office of the Chief Scientist has been doing for over a decade.

Often, technological development comes in recognition of a requirement, and many of these requirements have their origins in wars. For example, mass train transport took on a new dimension after trains became key to moving troops in World War One.

During the Cold War, many defense-related technological developments, like satellite communications and global positioning systems, later revolutionized the civilian world as spinoff technologies emerged.

The emergence in the 20th century of nuclear power from the science behind the atomic bomb solved severe energy issues for many advanced countries, particularly among states lacking oil.

It took around forty years to develop advanced unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver battlefield intelligence in real-time, a process in which Israel played a pioneering role. Today, however, quadcopters deliver packages and monitor traffic.

Yet, despite the plethora of development, many countries are also seeing the appearance of technologies that have no obvious good use.

This deluge of technology without any guiding hand means that governments face dilemmas when they plan for times of crisis – times where falling back on national technological development can make the difference between getting through a crisis successfully or not.

This was the thinking that guided Israel’s establishment of its National Cyber Directorate in 2012 after the government completed a process of defining just what kind of technological objectives it wished to achieve.

Unfortunately, this is not a frequent or common pattern in state-level decision-making, particularly in the West. While states excel in forming institutions and academic infrastructure, they have not fared as well in providing a deliberate guiding hand to technological development.

Israel, a relatively new country, which was barely functional 70 years ago, is a technological hub that competes with major powers, specifically because it has encouraged industries like cyber-security.

The same is true of Israel’s domestic defense industries, which truly began to flourish after the French arms embargo against Israel in 1968; until that time Israel had relied on French weapons systems.

Israel’s lead in agricultural technological development is another case in point – and with the prospect of food insecurity being a larger threat globally than war, countries must urgently begin developing such technologies.

Impending climate change and disruption to food supplies created by events like Russia’s war on Ukraine risk the death of millions of people. Famine is not the only threat faced by vulnerable countries-- droughts are another peril, which is why developing national desalination infrastructure provides states with a shield (albeit an expensive one) against such dangers, as Israel has learned through its pioneering desalination technology.

These maneuvers require governments to take a strategic view of present and future requirements, and to position themselves in ways that enable technological developments to serve as a defense against major threats, be they the result of natural phenomena or be they manmade.

Such a guiding government hand also yields significant economic dividends. When Israel established the National Cyber Directorate a decade ago, at the time it exported just hundreds of millions of dollars worth of cyber security solutions. Today, those exports surpass ten billion dollars a year – not including billions in investment by international companies in the local cyber industry. Today, that pace of growth is slowing down, but its economic and national achievements remain prominent.

Looking ahead, artificial intelligence will be a major sector for deliberate government-fueled development, for any country that wishes to be influential and relevant in the 21st century.  A failure to set such objectives will result in huge resources being poured into the research and development of projects that may yield negligible tangible results on the national level.

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Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

IRAN'S PROXY PIJ, BEHIND ESCALATION HAMAS STAYING OUT, FOR NOW

By David Hacham

Iran’s puppet in the Palestinian arena, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), is a purely military-terrorist organization with a clear pro-Iranian orientation.

With some 10,000 armed members, it is the second largest armed faction in Gaza behind the ruling faction, Hamas, which, while expressing support for PIJ so far, has not rushed to join in the combat – and for good reason, though this could change.

Designated as a terror organization by the United States, Britain, the European Union, Canada, Australia, and Japan, the PIJ was founded by Gazan radical Islamists, who fused fanatical Islamic ideology with nationalism as a tool to promote the goal of destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamic state. PIJ was the first organization to position itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah party.  

The Sunni PIJ is hugely dependent on external supporters, first and foremost, the Shi’ite Islamic Republic of Iran. It is no coincidence that PIJ’s leader, Ziyad Al-Nakhalah, has spent recent days in Tehran with his backers, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

PIJ is also dependent on support from the Assad regime in Syria, which permits Nakhalah to run a PIJ headquarters from Damascus, as well as from Beirut.

While the PIJ makes local operational decisions, they are in tune with the overall expectations and instructions that Iran transmits to its Palestinian proxy. Iran is actively behind the current escalation and is far from being a passive onlooker.  

Tehran finances almost the whole of the PIJ’s annual budget, and while it directly armed PIJ in past years, today PIJ produces rockets in Gazan factories, based on Iranian know-how.

The central question at the time of this writing is whether Hamas will join the fighting. At this stage, the impression is that Hamas is in no rush to get involved, and this is due to the fact that Hamas absorbed a painful blow from Israel during its own May 2021 conflict with Israel. Since then, Hamas has been licking its wounds, recovering militarily, rebuilding its rocket stockpiles, and encouraging civilian-economic-humanitarian rehabilitation efforts in Gaza as well.

Hamas thus has no immediate and real interest to join the fighting against Israel. It fears that doing so would set it back considerably in terms of military, civilian, and economic damages.

It is fair to assume that Israel’s combat objectives are designed to avoid encouraging Hamas from jumping into the fray. Israel has been focusing its military activity on pinpoint strikes on targets designed to avoid drawing Hamas into the fight.

Still, none of this guarantees that Hamas will remain uninvolved. In the event of an IDF operation resulting in the unintentional killing of large numbers of Palestinian civilians, not only would large-scale international pressure come down on Israel to end its campaign, but also, Hamas would be far more likely to join hostilities. As long as the operation continues, the risk of operational errors grows.

Precisely for this reason, Israel has an interest in limiting the extent of fighting to the extent that it can. On the other hand, PIJ has an opposite interest – in dragging out hostilities in the hope that the IDF makes a mistake, resulting in Hamas joining forces with PIJ on the battlefield.

Either way, even if a ceasefire is implemented in Gaza, observers should have no illusions. An escalation could erupt anew at any time. The conflict between Israel and Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a story that has no end.

Still, Israel does not want to get dragged into the Gazan mud in the form of a large-scale ground operation, which would result in Israeli casualties and damage national morale.

In addition, Israel has a clear set of priorities in terms of its security challenges, and Gaza is not at the top of the list. Iran and its nuclear program are very much at the top of the priority list, followed by Iranian entrenchment efforts in Syria, and Tehran’s military assistance to Hezbollah.

Hence, Israel cannot invest all of its energy in Gaza, when it has other threats to prioritize.

Israel took the initiative, launching Operation Breaking Dawn on August 5 and assassinating PIJ northern commander Taysar Jabari in a surprise aerial strike, along with additional strikes on PIJ attack cells approaching the Israeli border.

This was a similar opening to move to that employed in Operation Black Belt in November 2019, which began with the assassination of Baha Abu al-Atta, Jabari’s predecessor. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi presided over both targeted killing operations.

In both 2019 and now, the IDF worked to attack PIJ targets exclusively and tried to avoid an escalation with Hamas.

Jabari, 50, had previously served as deputy to his late predecessor, Abu al-Atta, as head of PIJ operations, and as a coordinator of PIJ activities with Hamas. Jabari coordinated hundreds of rocket launches at Israel during the May 2021 conflict. After surviving past assassination attempts, he met his end on Friday.

During the current operation, the head of PIJ’s southern division, Khaled Mansour, who was involved in rocket fire against Israel during the May 2021 conflict, was also killed by the IDF in a targeted strike.

After the May 2021 conflict, southern Israel experienced almost total quiet, something not seen in Gaza for years. Hamas and PIJ exploited this to rebuild their military capabilities, including replenishing their rocket stockpiles.  

Hamas reaped the benefits of international efforts aimed at rebuilding Gaza’s civilian infrastructure, led by Egypt, and ongoing Qatari financial support for needy Gazan families, as well as fuel for Gaza’s power plant. Israel also encouraged this process by providing permits for 15,000 Gazan workers to enter Israel for employment.  

This escalation could torpedo the process of Israeli civilian gestures toward the Gazan population.  

In the end, civilians on both sides are, once again, paying the cost for the uncompromising radical ideology of Gaza’s terror organizations, which are willing to sacrifice the lives of Palestinians for their own extremist goals. This operation is one more station in what Gaza’s Islamic terrorist groups see as a never-ending journey of conflict.  

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

The PIJ – Israel conflict places Hamas in a trap

BY Grisha Yakubovich

The latest round of conflict between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Israel has produced a key conclusion: Hamas is the only ‘resistance’ element in the Palestinian arena that can impose an equation of its making on Israel.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad has been seeking to copy Hamas: It tried to mimic Hamas’s strategy of linking the West Bank to the Gazan arena and responding to events in the former by threatening and activating force from the latter.

PIJ has failed in this task. On the one hand, this failure strengthens Hamas, because it provides proof that the ruling faction in Gaza and it alone has the ability to challenge Israel through its terrorist army in the Strip.

There is, however, a flip side to this coin. Hamas is under pressure to join the fighting and prove its credentials as a ‘resistance’ movement. Hamas is in a bind.

Operationally, there is no doubt that the Israeli action against PIJ in Gaza has been beneficial for Hamas. Israel has been targeting PIJ, a competitor to Hamas that is seeking to position itself as the ‘resistance’ entity and steal some of Hamas’s prestige.

PIJ has been able to take a lead position in the northern West Bank, particularly in Jenin, and it is seeking to bolster its position in Gaza too. This troubles Hamas.

Hamas, though it will never admit it publicly, could not ask for a better result than the battering PIJ has received from Israel. The end result, Hamas can hope, will be a message to the Palestinian arena: All smaller armed groups should follow its lead. If they try to wage war on Israel by themselves they are doomed to failure.

This strengthens Hamas significantly. But PIJ has been trying to obtain a different result by prolonging the conflict (although at the time of writing reports of ceasefire negotiations are surfacing) in the hope that Hamas will be entrapped into joining the hostilities.

Israel has understood this sensitive situation very well, and this understanding has been reflected in its precise, cautious targeting of PIJ targets in the Gaza Strip.

It wouldn’t have taken much for Hamas’s calculation to change, and to alter its position to remain out of the fighting.

Still, Hamas is keenly aware that such a result runs contrary to its core interests. At its core, Hamas represents an ideological concept based on the idea of rejecting diplomacy with Israel, rejecting the path of the Palestinian Authority, and continuing with armed conflict.

Both Hamas and PIJ represent the thinking of Palestinian Muslims who reject the path chosen by their secular brethren, who have opted for understanding that they have to live with Israel.

Now, with PIJ weakened by Israel, Hamas can not only rest assured that it has an exclusive lead position in Gaza, it can also begin to fill a void in the northern West Bank, where Israel has arrested large numbers of PIJ operatives.

All of this can significantly help Hamas position itself in the race for the Palestinian leadership when the 87-year-old Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas finally steps down. Hamas becomes the most relevant movement, outshining Fatah, and certainly outshining PIJ, as the only one that can force Israel to change its policies towards Gaza.

Still, these interests do not guarantee that Hamas would not get involved, if not in this round of fighting, then potentially in a future one under similar circumstances. If Hamas did feel compelled to act, it can be expected to do so with massive action, in a surprising manner, hitting Israel as hard as it can with rockets, armed drones, sea attacks, and cyber-attacks.

If that does not happen, however, in the near term future, then PIJ will be on record as failing to replicate Hamas’s impressive achievements at the cognitive-national level. 

The May 2021 conflict that Hamas fought with Israel stands as proof, as far as Hamas is concerned, that it is on the right path, leading as it did to increasing international and Israeli investment in Gaza’s economy, and a boost to Hamas’s status as ‘guardian of Jerusalem,’ the banner under which it sparked that confrontation last year.

PIJ’s pale imitation of this achievement saw the group fire rockets at Jerusalem on Sunday, at a time when Jews mounted the Temple Mount in the Old City to mark the holy Jewish day of Tisha B’Av. But unlike Hamas, that attack, like the remainder of PIJ’s attacks, are a shadow of Hamas’s capabilities.

Ultimately, PIJ’s attempt to be ‘the next Hamas’ failed, and the results of that failure will continue to be felt by Hamas, the PA, and Israel long after the next truce comes into effect.

At the same time, reality on the ground has demonstrated more than once that failure can form the basis for future success. Time will reveal if this will be the case.

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Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

Russia-Ukraine war: A driver for Israeli defense exports to Europe?

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

As European states reassess their security situation amid the fallout of Russia’s war against Ukraine, signs are growing that acquisitions of Israeli defense products by European clients – and not only European clients – could substantially increase.

In 2021, according to Defense Ministry figures, Europe was the highest importer of Israeli defense technology. Overall exports hit a new record of $11.3 billion that year, with Europe accounting for 41% of that figure.

However, for this to increase further, European defense budgets will need to rise too, and the extent to which this will happen depends greatly on whether European states develop comprehensive defense strategies.

Such strategies go much further than decisions on defense budget increases.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was one of the biggest opponents of former US President Donald Trump’s insistence that NATO states allocate 2% of their GDP to defense. Now, Scholz how pledged to create a 100 billion Euro defense fund, and exceed the 2% threshold. But will this commitment last into the long-term? It is too soon to answer that question and meanwhile, the annual defense budget that Scholz is proposing is based on a gradual increase, not an immediate jump.

The second key question pertaining to Israeli defense exports to Europe relates to Israeli portfolio adaptability. Are the lessons now emerging from the Russian – Ukraine war relevant to Israeli defense company specialty areas, in a manner that favors distinct products from Israel?

The answer to this is more complex than meets the eye. The United States, for example, can easily supply Ukraine with anti-tank Javelin missiles, or Stinger man-portable air defense systems, by taking them out of US Military storage sites, or from storage facilities allocated for allies. Israel is not in the same situation.

While Rafael has been able to mass produce spike missiles for European clients (Euro Spike), Israeli UAV makers must produce systems from scratch, as is the case with most Israeli defense exports.

The repertoire of Israeli defense companies is generally strongest when it comes to suites for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance requirements, but not the platforms themselves.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance elements such as radars, on the other hand, are easier for Israeli companies to supply in significant numbers.

Additionally, some of the battlefield lessons emerging from Ukraine have changed since Russia launched its offensive in February. At the start of the war, songs of praise were written for Turkey’s Bayraktar TB-2 armed UAVs from the medium altitude long endurance category. Yet limited release of video footage of Bayraktar strikes is testimony of the limited and sporadic use made of this system (unlike the Azeri use of the Bayraktar against Armenian forces in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war).

In the skies, Russia effectively controls the medium to high altitudes, while neutralizing the armed UAVs. It is reasonable to assume that Israeli-made lightweight UAVs or loitering munitions will perform in this environment.

Both Russia and Ukraine have abandoned the low-altitude arena. For Russia, this means precision strike and ground support fire capabilities were largely lost, and Russia reverted to artillery strikes and high-altitude air strikes, conducted by powerful assault helicopters and fighter jets.

These trends reveal three things to Israel’s defense industry. The first is the growing need for standoff weapons, enabling warfighters to avoid getting too close to the ranges of enemy firepower.

Additionally, there is a growing need for advanced soft and hard kill active defense suites for various platforms such as tanks, helicopters, etc.  

Thirdly, air defense requirements are diverse. The Ukrainians are armed with a multitude of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, and not all warfighters are covered under medium-long range air defense umbrella.

Thus, it is unsurprising that Germany and others are showing interest in Israeli missile defense systems, like the Arrow program, and airborne balloon-carrying radar systems, which can detect cruise missiles and UAVs better than ground-based radars.

Meanwhile, the role of precision surface-to-surface rockets is increasing in the war, as the US and UK supply the Ukrainians with such systems, for example, GMLRS. Even though their numbers are small so far, their influence is highly significant.

In the cyber sphere, Russia failed to achieve its objectives, causing limited damage to Ukraine. Still, Ukraine’s communications networks, water, and electricity, transportation, keep working – and this underlines the central importance of cyber defense systems.

Electronic warfare is undoubtedly growing more influential as the war progresses.

These are the essential lessons that Israel’s defense industry can take away thus far from the war raging in Europe.

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.

Israel elections: Israel is in for a wild campaign season

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

After the upcoming Jewish holidays, Israelis will go to the polls on November 1. That means Israelis are in for a four-month-long election season instead of the usual three and thus face one of the longest campaign seasons in the country’s history.

Four months of spin, promises and manipulations are in store for Israelis as political parties work to try and conquer the hearts and minds of voters – voters who are already saturated by the unfulfilled promises of four elections in the past five years.

Instead of a prime minister leading a small six-member party, Israel now has a caretaker prime minister, which is just another way of saying a temporary prime minister in office for four months.

Lapid and Yesh Atid

Many things can be said about Yesh Atid, chairman and caretaker Prime Minister Yair Lapid, but one thing cannot be taken away from him: He managed to realize his dream of becoming premier. That’s not something many in politics can say.

But that achievement is a mere step in Lapid’s grand strategy of being voted in as prime minister, which he is pursuing with a lot more planning and political calculation than meets the eye. For example, Lapid’s decision to let former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett be first in the rotation between the two was not, as is often presented, a gentleman-like act, but rather, the result of a consideration that whoever enters elections as serving prime minister has an advantage.

There’s an Israeli saying that says that nothing is more permanent than the temporary and Lapid understands the political aspects of this very well. His temporary step up is part of a bigger goal to lead a real government.

The catch is, however, that Lapid’s ability to assemble a government will depend not only on his maneuvers but also on those of his fellow members in the center-left bloc.

Gantz and Sa'ar

Unlike in the last, exhausting four rounds of elections, this time around, the Israeli political map appears to be changing somewhat. Recently, Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Chairman of the Blue and White party, who was a political partner of Lapid, decided to challenge Lapid’s bid to become prime minister by forming a joint list together with Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar, head of the rightist New Hope Party.

This pushes Lapid more to the left of the political map. For Sa’ar the maneuver makes good political sense since polls show him barely scraping across the threshold in the next elections if he runs alone. Gantz, for his part, becomes a real candidate for prime minister in the face-off against the opposition led by Benjamin Netanyahu and Gantz’s new joint list could lure some center-right voters who are fed up with the Netanyahu-led bloc.

These advantages, however, could all be undermined by the fact that Gantz’s messaging is too confused to clearly position himself politically.

Gantz attempts to satisfy everyone – the Left, the Right, the middle class, the Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox. In both politics and life, one can’t satisfy everyone. At this time, it seems that it is Sa’ar who closed an excellent deal for himself and is riding on Gantz’s shoulders, saving himself from erasure from the political map.

Ayelet Shaked

Meanwhile, Within the rightist bloc the Likud party grows stronger, according to the polls, despite the multiple trials that Netanyahu is facing. His base of voters remains loyal and seems to be getting stronger. Still, Netanyahu’s bloc would have to reach 61 Knesset seats to gain power and it may turn out that the only way he could do this is with the help of Interior Minister and Yamina party chairwoman, Ayelet Shaked, known to some as the princess of the right.

Shaked is still recovering from finding out very late, while on a state visit to Morocco, that the government she was a part of had fallen apart. She was practically the last person to know about the fall of the government despite her full loyalty to Bennett, her former Yamina colleague.

The shock and sense of treachery she felt in the face of Bennett’s failure to update her was clearly visible. Shaked’s party has been deeply scarred by the departure of members from the party itself and from the previous government, and her situation in the polls isn’t great. But if she joins forces with Netanyahu, this could be the push that the bloc needs to get into government.

Shaked has four months to reinvent herself, and she has a big advantage going into the elections since she is able to market herself as a right-wing force operating for the benefit of all.

As a result, it is worth closely tracking Shaked’s progress over the next four months. She could well be the decisive factor regarding what kind of government Israel has after the elections.

Labor and Meretz

Meanwhile, on the Left, Labor and Meretz find themselves under Lapid’s leadership. Meretz has more than its fair share of trouble. Health Minister and Party Chairman Nitzan Horowitz announced that he will not compete in the upcoming primaries for the party leadership, and the party’s number two, Environmental Protection Minister Tamar Zandberg, announced that she is taking a pause from political life.

Both of them understand that the ship is sinking and that they must jump off it. Meretz is scratching the electoral threshold in polls, and its sister party, Labor, refuses to merge with it. This week, former Meretz chairwoman Zehava Galon declared that she will return to politics to run for the party leadership. This move is designed to revive the party and could certainly prove effective since Galon is considered a skilled and highly esteemed political operative.

United Arab List

The Arab sector, for its part, will soon answer an important question as well: How many votes will the United Arab List party of Mansour Abbas gain after making history and becoming the first Arab party to serve in the ruling coalition government?

Will the Arab Israeli population reward Abbas for his actions or will they erase him from the political map?

Former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, who declared his intention to enter politics, is currently shopping for parties and could run with either Lapid or Gantz-Sa’ar. It’s important to remember, however, that the Israeli population is no longer automatically enthralled with generals and former chiefs of staff, and demands someone who puts their quality of life at the top of their list of priorities.

In Israel, every day is dramatic and this is true all the more so in politics. The situation is highly fluid and the political arena is filled with capricious actors pursuing their dreams and ambitions, alongside “mere ideology.”

What remains certain, however, is that this campaign will be primal and highly charged.

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

Founding a Middle Eastern NATO

By Henrique Cymerman

The Middle East is experiencing a geostrategic earthquake, and its epicenter is in Saudi Arabia. This seismic shift is leading to the creation of a military alliance between countries that, at least technically, are still enemies.

The political and commercial contacts between Israel and the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, led by Saudi Arabia, stopped being a secret in August 2020 when the dramatic signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain took place. Later, Morocco and Sudan joined the framework.  

Now, however, the new alliance is on the cusp of evolving into a regional NATO-type system, with states cooperating under an all-for-one and one-for-all logic. There have been a series of recent reports regarding regular meetings between military chiefs from Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, as well as ongoing discussions about joint defense agreements against missile and drone attacks from Iran, or its proxies.

The publicizing of joint Israeli–Emirati air force drills employing F-15 and F-16 fighter jet pilots flying side by side would have been the stuff of science fiction just a few years ago. Today, it is a concrete reality.  

During recent trips to the Gulf cities of Jeddah, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, I received explanations that cast light on these developments. The Iranian threat – both nuclear and conventional – is the glue that binds together this unique coalition.

According to senior military officials say, as early as 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, the Arab powers already understood that there is no military option against Israel. A former Saudi intelligence chief explained this reasoning to me in detail, saying, “We surprised you on your Day of Atonement. You started the war on your knees, but in the end, you won it. And now Israel is much stronger, it is the greatest power between Indonesia and Gibraltar."

The rulers of Abu Dhabi, the capital city-state of the UAE, do not hide their dream of turning the Israeli "startup nation" into a "startup region.”

"What we are looking for is not to buy and sell like in a bazaar, but to do joint ventures," a prominent Emirati businessman told me. According to him, for the UAE, peace with Israel is a strategic bet on the future.

Many secret and private flights have occurred in recent years between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and heads of the Mossad have reportedly made such journeys.

Even a few weeks ago, a private jet with prominent Israeli businessmen and women was reported to have made this journey. All of them first landed in Jordan just for a few minutes so that they could not be tracked by any app and so that no questions were raised, and then they continued to Saudi Arabia.

In his first tour as American president in the Middle East, Joe Biden, who ultimately understood the extraordinary potential of the Abraham Accords achieved by the previous Republican administration, decided that Air Force One would be the first plane to fly directly from Tel Aviv, Israel to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where a summit was scheduled to take place under the leadership of the Saudi kingdom.

Some say that Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), Crown Prince and strong man of the kingdom, is carrying out a revolution and that if his grandfather and some of his uncles saw it, they would roll over in their graves.

Many of the internal Saudi dynamics that enable this change are tied to a demographic factor that is so noticeable on the streets of Jeddah, Riyadh, and the rest of the Gulf’s capitals: 70% of the population is aged under 30. And for most of them, the 20th-century wars between Israel and the Arabs are as ancient and irrelevant as the wars of the Romans.

The Saudis have removed all antisemitic references from their school curriculum textbooks, and even the Secretary General of the Muslim World League, Mohammed al-Issa made it a point to visit Auschwitz and maintain close relations with rabbis from Israel and from around the world. His critics call him "the Zionist Imam". Last week, he was chosen by the Saudi authorities to deliver the main sermon for the festivity of Eid Al-Adha.

MBS, together with his Abu Dhabi mentor and the new Emirati President, Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ), Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, are now betting on Biden's help to push the Abraham Accords into a new phase.

The American president is seeking to reach an agreement that will be a win-win for the four countries.

According to this arrangement, Saudi Arabia will grant Israel complete freedom of flights over its airspace for all Israeli and foreign airlines operating out of Israel, effectively shortening all flights from Tel Aviv to many Asian capitals.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia will receive approval from Israel for the transfer of two strategic Egyptian-controlled islands in the Red Sea, Sanafir and Tiran, off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula, to Saudi hands (Israel’s approval for this is stipulated by the 1979 Egypt – Israel Peace Treaty).

Cairo will be financially rewarded significantly by Riyadh, and this will pump plenty of financial oxygen into the very poor and fragile Egyptian economy.

Finally, the US will achieve an increase in oil production from Saudi Arabia, which is necessary to replace the black gold lost by the West as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Biden, who throughout his political career was one of the champions of the 80-year-old strategic alliance between the United States and Israel, also visited East Jerusalem and Bethlehem, to remind the region that the Palestinian issue remains pending. The Palestinians do not hide their concern that they have been relegated to the sidelines in world politics by the new cold war, the global energy crisis, and the ongoing normalization process between Israel and a growing number of Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries.

It is said that what happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas. The events of recent times prove once again that what happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East. And that, although American presidents want to leave the region, the Middle East will pursue them wherever they go.

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Henrique Cymerman is a journalist of global renown whose writings regularly appear in media publications in Europe, the USA, Latin America and Israel. He lectures in five languages. Henrique has covered current affairs in the Middle East for over 30 years and has been nominated "Comendador," a title of nobility, by the King of Spain and the President of Portugal. Read full bio here.

Israel is politically gridlocked

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

As all Israelis are painfully aware, the country is quite literally stuck in a traffic jam. But Israel is also stuck in a figurative gridlock. Over the past few years, the lives of Israeli citizens have been disrupted by one man, who is fleeing his trials and is attempting, in every way, to obstruct the state’s systems.

Citizens who are upset about the spending of NIS 2.4 billion on the upcoming November 1 elections should not be deceived into thinking that the opposition is working earnestly for the public good: It is working in the interests of Benjamin Netanyahu, the leader of the opposition.

Let us look, for example, at the Metro Bill. The traffic jams that afflict greater Tel Aviv have become one of Israel’s most acute problems. To address the causes of this chronic congestion, the government decided to turn words into policy, and after years of promises made by its predecessors, launched the largest infrastructure project in the country’s history of Israel, at a cost of NIS 200 billion.

While many European cities have operated metro railways since the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Israel’s metropolises still lack underground mass transit systems. The project is no less than historic.

The planned metro project stretches out across the whole of the Dan Region, from Rehovot in the south to Hod Hasharon in the north, and it is designed to offer a real solution to the chronic problem of traffic, as well as to housing and employment issues. The projected benefits from this national project are estimated to surpass NIS 420 billion, and some NIS 25 billion per year.

The Metro Bill was a flagship initiative for Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman. It successfully passed its first reading in the Knesset and was put up for debate before the Knesset’s Special National Infrastructure Projects Committee.

But then the opposition stepped in. Those who believed there could be no reason to sabotage such an important bill, one that serves the citizens of Israel, irrespective of what side of the political spectrum they are on, were proved to be mistaken. At the National Infrastructure Projects Committee, the opposition caused a gridlock by submitting endless reservations leaving it stuck in committee, waiting for approval.

Liberman, who understood that soon the bill would be lost, together with an investment of billions of shekels, fought to save the bill, turning to every faction, including coalition factions that were showing signs of giving up and pleaded with them to put politics aside.

Trying to pass the bill

After the bill finally made it through the National Infrastructure Committee, Liberman made a desperate attempt to push the bill through second and third readings in the Knesset on the eve of parliament’s dissolution, pleading with opposition factions to put politics aside and telling them that a vote against the bill was a vote against the citizens of Israel.

“This is not about opposition and coalition, or religious or secular, or Left and Right. This is the most important infrastructure project in the history of the State of Israel, and it is being sacrificed on the altar of political interests,” Liberman said.

Even now, as Israel heads to elections, Liberman is asking the Knesset to convene to approve the bill, yet without the opposition’s cooperation, it seems this will not happen.

At first, it seemed as if the opposition, having achieved its goal of toppling the government, had decided to support the bill. But then it changed course again, making new, bizarre demands that had nothing to do with the interests of Israel’s citizens.

Just a few examples to illustrate the point. The opposition said it would consider voting for the Metro Bill if Yamina, headed by former prime minister Naftali Bennett, would revoke Chikli’s rebel status – a move that would have enabled him to run with the Likud party in the next elections.

Or, consider a demand to increase election funding to NIS 1.66 million shekels per MK.

MK Yoav Kisch (Likud) went a step further. He said he would be prepared to pass the Metro bill only if the coalition would be willing to bring forward elections by a week, as this would boost the Likud-led bloc’s chance of winning more votes because yeshiva students will be home on holiday that week.

Could the opposition’s demands be any more effective in highlighting its priorities, which clearly put the national interest second to its political interests?

And now, Israel is, once again, heading to elections for the fifth time in three-and-a-half years, and it’s not only its roads that are at a standstill: Israelis can no longer bear the endless gridlock in the political system. They deserve a sane and functioning country, and leaders who place the public interests before their personal and political interests.

When Israelis ask themselves “Are these elections necessary?” and “What could have been done with the NIS 2.4 billion shekels that they will cost?” they would do well to remember the story of the Metro bill. 

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Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.