We are approaching a potential inflection point of political and economic instability that may have dire social…
In Every Generation: How The Haggadah Sheds Light on Israel's Security Situation
By Natan Trief
The ancient words that we will soon recite during the Passover Seder can seem archaic or impertinent to our modern-day circumstances. How can the Haggadah, a document assembled so many hundreds of years ago inform our understanding of the threats facing the Jewish Homeland, as well as the strengths in her arsenal? A close reading of the text can illuminate our seemingly unique circumstances and place us squarely in the lustrous pages of the Eternal Jewish People.
Toward the beginning of the Maggid section of the Haggadah, we read “And this promise is what has stood by our ancestors and us; for it was not only one man who rose up to destroy us: in every single generation people rise up to destroy us.” Indeed, as with countless times throughout Jewish history, it would be easy and justifiable to subscribe to this worldview. As Benjamin Netanyahu emphasizes these realities with fierce determination, we know that much truth lies within. The International Criminal Court continues its witch hunt against democratic Israel as it equates the acts of a sovereign power obligated to defend itself against Hamas, a morally bankrupt terrorist dictatorship. The messianic Iranian regime continues its march to the bomb as Israel worries whether her staunchest ally will back her up, or run back to the fatally flawed provisions of the nuclear accords. A mainstream U.S. news channel pushes a modern-day blood libel and accuses Israel of withholding a life-saving vaccine from its Arab population. We could be forgiven for thinking that the words of the biblical book of Numbers remain true, that we are a “nation that dwells alone.”
It would be easy to find solace in the timeless words of the Haggadah at the end of the Passover Seder as we implore God to, “Shfoch chamatcha – Pour out Your rage upon the nations that do not know You…” Of all Peoples, we, the Jewish People, have had every right to wish for divine retribution against our many enemies. And yet, as Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks (z”l) has said, the Haggadah distinguishes itself in its restraint. Even with all of the atrocities inflicted upon the Jewish People, this is one of the very few sections that asks for divine revenge.
Why? Because that is not who we are at our essence. As Sacks cites a unique addition placed next to these words in a 16th century manuscript from Worms, one of the oldest Jewish communities in Germany, flipping the meaning on its head: “Pour out your love on the nations who have known you…” This supplication on behalf of all the righteous gentiles throughout history accompanies us to this day in many editions of the Passover Haggadah. At its essence, it represents a perfect encapsulation of the Jewish spirit of innovation. As a People forged through the cruel crucible of history, we know that the Jewish People have always turned curses into blessings. A tiny country, surrounded by enemies committed to her destruction, schooled in hatred and war from its inception, names its national anthem, HaTikvah – The Hope.
Again, the Haggadah comes and teaches a profound lesson in compassion and mercy. Some of its most famous words shared at every Seder Table: “B’chol dor va’dor – In every generation, a person must view himself as if he himself left Egypt.” As with so many pearls of Jewish wisdom, this statement encompasses the tension in so much of Jewish history, that tension between the particular and the universal. On one hand, we place ourselves in the footsteps of our ancestors, feeling their pain, solitude and oppression. In so doing, we promise to uphold and defend the State of Israel. Never again, will our People be left so vulnerable and alone. On the other hand, however, in placing ourselves in their footsteps, we also promise to embrace the universal cry for freedom, no matter from where it originates. For this reason, Jews have always stood on the frontlines of others’ calls for Freedom. Moreover, we resist the urge to demonize the Other; for instance, the Iranian People in their own struggle under the yoke of a tyrannical regime.
The Haggadah is so revolutionary precisely because of its resounding calls for empathy. This distinguishing feature of the Jewish People is that, unlike countless other ancient civilizations relegated to the dustbins of history, we do not respond to events with knee-jerk impulsivity. Rather, we leverage our unique circumstances and strengths in our thousands-year-old partnership with each other and the Divine. As this pandemic slowly subsides, and as the threats to Israel continue to loom, may this forever be so.
Natan Trief grew up in suburban New Jersey not far from New York City. He graduated from Dartmouth College with a double major in Spanish and History. Before the rabbinate was even a glint in his eye, Natan spent the 10 years between Dartmouth and rabbinical school exploring the world and his place in it. Whether the corporate boardrooms of PepsiCo, the hills, valleys and seas of Israel, or the Mongolian desert, the years were never dull. Read full bio here.
Naftali Bennett’s Choice Will Shape Israel’s Future
With a week to go until Israel’s fourth elections in two years, right and center-right parties are currently polling some 80 seats in the 120 seat Knesset. But these elections are no longer about right versus left. Instead, they boil down to one issue: Bibi, or not Bibi.
That is, will Israel’s longest-serving prime minister remain in office for an unprecedented sixth term, or will he be unseated by a disparate coalition, whose only unifying factor is the desire to remove Benjamin Netanyahu from power.
Lining up against the incumbent is what has been dubbed “the bloc for change” — the parties that have stated they will not, under any circumstance, sit in government with Netanyahu.
This bloc is comprised of New Hope, a center-right party founded by Netanyahu’s former Likud protege, Gideon Sa’ar; Yesh Atid (center); Blue and White (center); Labor and Meretz (left); and reformed right-wing firebrand Avigdor Lieberman and his Yisrael Beiteinu party, running on an anti-Orthodox ticket.
In the opposing corner, Netanyahu and his Likud will team up with the ultra-Orthodox parties — Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) — and with the ultra-nationalist Religious Zionist Party (RZP).
With neither side able to form a coalition, they will both be dependent on the one party that hasn’t made it clear on which side it stands — Naftali Bennett’s Yamina Party, which espouses right-wing views on nationalist issues, a libertarian economic agenda, and “supports individual liberties while cherishing Jewish tradition and heritage.”
Bennett thus holds the key to what the next government will look like, and will have to choose between the religious nationalist bloc led by Netanyahu and the “bloc for change,” which has no clear leader at this stage. Yair Lapid has, as of the time of writing, so far refrained from stating that he is running for prime minister, and has even suggested that he could lead from behind in order to enable a coalition that could bring down Bibi.
There is little in common between the parties of the “bloc for change,” which range from the pro-annexation, anti-Palestinian-state New Hope on the right, to Meretz on the left, which is anti-settlement and for a two-state solution. They also differ on — well, pretty much everything, from economic policy, to their attitude towards the legal system and the courts. But there is one aspect that binds them together — secularism and opposition to the grip of the ultra-Orthodox parties on Israeli politics and society.
Bennett thus may well hold the key not merely to the question of whether Benjamin Netanyahu will stay in office, but to how Israel will be shaped in the years to come.
A look at the polls shows just how strategic a position the former defense minister holds. In the final polls taken by the three major TV channels before this article went to press, Likud was polling 28-29 seats; Yesh Atid 19-20; Yamina 11-12; New Hope 9-10; the Joint Arab List 8-9; Shas 6-8; UTJ 7; Yisrael Beiteinu 7; Labor 6; RZP 4-6; Blue and White 4-5; and Meretz ranges from 4 to teetering below the electoral threshold, as does the United Arab List.
Netanyahu, even if he were to take the unprecedented step of leaning on the support of Abbas Mansour’s United Arab List, can only form a coalition with the help of Bennett — and the same goes for the bloc for change. If the votes fall evenly, then Bennett may not be able to give either party the 61-seat majority required for victory — unless the bloc for change leans on the Joint Arab List for support from the outside, something Bennett adamantly states he will not agree to.
In the dog-eat-dog world of Israeli politics, the big players are jostling for position. Netanyahu — after weeks of portraying the elections as being a competition between a Likud-led government and a “left-wing” coalition led by Yair Lapid, so as to belittle Gideon Sa’ar — has now moved to shore up the Religious Zionist Party to ensure that it passes the threshold, while bludgeoning Bennett in order to cut Yamina down to size.
Lapid, meanwhile, is aiming to gain seats off Benny Gantz’s Blue and White party — a dangerous ploy, because if he is too successful, he will push his former partner under the electoral threshold, and, with Meretz already teetering on the verge, may find he has overplayed his hand.
If either Blue and White or Meretz, or both, fail to make it into the Knesset, then not only will the bloc for change find itself with less seats, but due to Israel’s complex proportional representation system — without going into the mathematical intricacies — Likud stands to gain in the overall calculation.
Although Yamina is only the third largest party in the polls, Bennett insists nevertheless that the race for the premiership is between him and Netanyahu, and says that he will not sit in a “left wing” coalition under Lapid. Bennett’s positioning and self-branding as the man for Israel’s top job despite the fact that at least two parties will finish ahead of him in the elections, gives an insight into his mindset and where he is striving to reach.
Like Netanyahu, the 48-year-old Bennett served in the elite Sayeret Matkal commando unit, and like his former boss — under whom he served as chief of staff — he is very much focused on the end rather than the means.
The end Bennett is focused on is becoming Israel’s prime minister, and he has two routes to the premiership: either in a rotation with other parties in the “bloc of change,” or in a rotation with Netanyahu. His decision, assuming that he is in a position to choose between the two blocs, could very well rest on which option he feels gives him a longer-term advantage.
Come March 23, Israel’s near-term future will depend very much on Bennett’s choice, and where his loyalties really lie: Will he opt to go with Netanyahu and the nationalist religious camp, or will he join up to the bloc for change?
Ilan Evyatar is an Israeli journalist. He has served as Editor-in-Chief of the award-winning Jerusalem Report magazine; and News Editor of The Jerusalem Post, where he also wrote a weekly column on politics, economics and international affairs. He is currently working on his first book. Read full bio here.
Alon Liel has served as a chargé d’affaires in Turkey and as Israel’s ambassador to South Africa. Following his role in 1999 as foreign affairs adviser to then-chairman of the Labor party Ehud Barak, Liel became director-general of the Foreign Ministry in 2000.
Abbas has proven himself to be a first class strategist
By Eitan Dangot
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is implementing a highly efficient strategy in multiple arenas and maneuvering an array of challenges with visible success.
Since the election of the Biden administration, Abbas has reached an optimal point in his moves to reposition the PA both within the Palestinian arena and internationally, and it is clear that Abbas has been waiting for years for the Trump administration to pass before implementing his recent maneuvers.
Months before the elections in the United States, Abbas and his inner circle assessed that Biden would likely win, and began signaling their change through a number of ‘softener steps’ designed to move away from Ramallah’s absolutist posture that had rejected cooperation with the U.S. and Israel.
These steps, conducted on the eve of the U.S. elections, included the return of security coordination with the Israel Defense Forces, after many months in which it had been suspended, and a resumption of receipt of tax payments from Israel, which had been frozen for months, creating a significant burden on the PA’s economy and its residents.
Abbas’s goal was to signal to the Biden administration that he is embarking on confidence-building measures vis-à-vis Israel in order to gain Washington’s faith.
As an inseparable part of this policy, Abbas understood that he must also achieve quiet with his hated Islamist rivals, Hamas, whom he will never forgive for the humiliating coup and ejection of Fatah from the Gaza Strip in 2007.
Despite the enmity, Abbas recruited senior PA official Jibril Rajoub to hold contacts with Hamas – thereby decreasing friction within the Fatah leadership as a side product – and made Cairo the scene of Hamas-Fatah reconciliation talks, thereby returning Egypt to the stance of senior regional mediator, a position it is keen to play.
Meanwhile, Abbas significantly decreased public criticism of the Gulf states that signed normalization deals with Israel, and returned the PA’s ambassador to the UAE. In doing so, he placated Saudi anger at Ramallah, since Riyadh was the main regional power backer of the Abraham Accords, and had increasingly come to see the Palestinians as an obstacle in creating a regional bloc against Iran.
Within the Palestinian arena, the 86-year-old Abbas appears to have set a personal objective of completing his term in the coming years by positioning the PA as the central, exclusive, lead representative of the Palestinians, thereby creating a strong legacy that is designed to justify the manner in which he has ruled since being elected president in 2005.
To further this goal, Abbas’s acceptance of tax funds form Israel and his safeguarding of the economic status quo has provided the PA with stability, which, when viewed in comparison with the economic crises of other Arab states, is particularly prominent.
Abbas’s decision to proceed in a phased manner with Palestinian elections to the national parliament and presidency in May and July respectively is a signal to the U.S. and to the international community, designed to indicate this leadership is striving to repair ‘holes’ in Palestinian governance and make it more democratic.
The elections were also designed to reduce resentment felt by Hamas after Abbas renewed security coordination with Israel and cancelled the reconciliation process.
The elections carry with them major risks should Fatah and Abbas lose, while also carrying a promise of quiet since they attract the support of most Palestinian factions. The decision to move in this direction stems from Abbas’s need to have quiet on the Hamas front at this stage – but he still can cancel the process at any time and blame Israel for the abortion of the elections, using Israel’s refusal to allow them to take place in east Jerusalem as an excuse.
Israel, for its part, is addressing the issue cautiously in order to avoid being accused of disrupting the Palestinian democratic process. Yet any new Israeli government that forms after Israel’s own elections will have very little time to formulate responses on whether to allow Hamas to take part in West Bank ballot counts, or for voting to go ahead in east Jerusalem.
Abbas also took advantage of the fact that Hamas is holding its own parallel internal elections, a process that is taking up the terror organization’s focus, leaving Hamas less able to focus on campaigning in the wider elections.
The Hamas elections in Gaza resulted in a win for the incumbent Yahya Sinwar, but only after four rounds of elections – a testament to the fact that Hamas’s current path of seeking truce arrangements faces major opposition by the veteran generation that is radical and extreme. This will complicate the manner in which Sinwar will lead, together with whoever wins the elections for the overseas political bureau, Khaled Mashaal or Ismael Haniyeh.
Hamas, for its part, is playing the long game, and views the elections as an opportunity to dominate the PA and the PLO, in line with its central objective of being the future ruler of the Palestinians.
Within Fatah itself, Abbas is working intensively to neutralize almost every attempt to undermine his power, focusing particularly on his sworn enemy, Mohammed Dahlan, as well as Marwan Barghouti, who is imprisoned in an Israeli jail for deadly terror attacks, and political threats from his rival (and the nephew of the late Yasser Arafat) Nasser Al-Qudwah.
Ultimately, Abbas has been able to achieve recognition of his leadership status, portray himself as a unifying figure in the Palestinian arena, and is able to celebrate his achievement of dragging Israel to the International Criminal Court in Hague – a threat that Israel must formulate a practical and wise response to.
He is regaining traditional international support for the PA from the U.S. and Europe, and there can be no doubt that Abbas forms a serious challenge to Israel.
Abbas will now be able to issue demands to return Israel to negotiations with the PA. Despite past regional forecasts, he has proven his ability to bring the Palestinian issue back as a central issue on the Middle Eastern agenda.
Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.
Mid-East adversaries: Signaling Conflict, Avoiding War
By Eitan Dangot
The Middle East has entered a new and significant stage in recent weeks, as all regional actors position themselves around the key question of whether or not the Biden administration renews the Iran nuclear agreement. Failure to achieve an improved nuclear deal and to cause Iran to downgrade its regional destabilizing activities will have long-lasting effects, could create an economic disaster in Iran, and could lead to a military escalation between Iran and America’s regional allies.
The issue of whether sanctions on Iran will be lifted, and the outline of a possible new agreement, is the leading factor that will shape the face of the Middle East in the coming years.
The new American administration is maneuvering through a minefield, in which various developments could impact its decisions on the region.
To understand the new complex Middle Eastern puzzle, it is first necessary to recognize the fact that the Biden administrations is dealing with Iran on two fronts: The first is Tehran’s radical activities and support for armed movements that stretches from Yemen through to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, as part of a grand strategic attempt to change realities in the region. The second is Iran’s nuclear program.
Every attempt by the United States to solve one of these fronts without linking it to the other is doomed to fail. Iran strives to become both a nuclear regional power and to shape a new geo-political era through the rise of terror armies and militias, of which Hezbollah in Lebanon is the most powerful. Hezbollah is in fact the most heavily-armed non-state actor in the world and is in possession of advanced weapons systems.
The moment of reckoning for American policy in the Middle East is approaching in the form of the decision on the nuclear agreement, and this central junction is also influenced by other important events: The upcoming Israeli elections, and the scheduled presidential elections in Iran in June, before which the Islamic Republic may suspend any major decisions.
The formation of a regional bloc made up of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel has, in the wake of the Abraham Accords – a successful leftover from the policy of the Trump administration – created a challenge to American flexibility on the Iranian issue.
Now, the new administration is presenting a cold shoulder to Israel, and at the same time is reassessing its relationship with Saudi Arabia.
As it reviews its regional policies, Washington should take into account long-term consequences of the way it deals with its central partners in its maneuvering with Iran.
The main threat to the Abraham Accords bloc now could come due to tensions between Washington and Riyadh, which was the main silent partner enabling Israeli-Gulf relations.
Iran is not resting on its laurels, and is actively working to beef up the terrorist-military channels that it has built throughout the Middle East. It is this activity that has led the entire area into an escalatory dynamic, and it is through it that the Iranians send out psychological warfare messages to the U.S. and its principal allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Iran has chosen the naval arena as the main sphere in which to send out these signals. Its actions have created a significant threat to maritime shipping routes, and it is worth noting that more than 90% of Israel’s trade is conducted via shipping.
In its recent attack on an Israeli-owned ship in the Gulf of Oman, Iran has notified Israel of an equation according to which reported Israeli air strikes on Iranian military assets, targeting ground-based attempts to beef up the Iranian crescent, will be answered by attacks on Israeli shipping.
Simultaneously, Iran is activating its proxy in Yemen, the Houthis, and other militias in the region to create a ground-based threat to shipping.
The American strike on an Iranian militia in eastern Syria and the reported Israeli strike on targets in Damascus following the ship attack strengthens the idea that Syria has been selected by both Israel and the U.S. to respond with their own signals to Iran.
This escalation dynamic has not so far caused real harm to the other side, and most of the decisions are still being made in the political-diplomatic sphere, with all sides complimenting their postures with cyber attacks and other low signature activities. All sides are keen to avoid pressing the ‘escalation button’ too soon.
Iran may choose to escalate significantly after a new nuclear agreement is reached, and it has yet to retaliate for the assassinations of former Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and the chief Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakrizadeh. Such a development could certainly ignite the region.
Washington must take into consideration the core interests of its allies, Israel and the Gulf states, who in the meantime are setting up their own independent capabilities for taking on the Iranian nuclear threat. These efforts could in future take individual-state form, or be coordinated under the framework of an alliance.
As a result, no one should be surprised if local military solutions surface as being highly realistic options to deal with the Iranian nuclear program.
Ultimately, Washington should view the spread of the Shi’ite axis, its weapons proliferation, and proxy consolidation program, as being inseparable from the nuclear deal.
The Iranians have proven and continue to prove that despite severe pressure from multiple directions – the pandemic and economic distress – their scheme to expand terror tentacles and their murderous radical ideology will not stop even for a second.
Only a combination of a firm stance in negotiations, the listing of conditions, a show of force, and leaving space for maneuver will pave the path to a contraction of Iran’s nuclear program and a curtailment of its regional activities. A U.S. failure on these counts could well lead Israel to consider a variety of operations against Iran and its militias, including the option of launching a preventive offensive against Hezbollah.
Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.
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A Campaign without Meaning
By Justin Pozmanter
Israel is about to go to the polls…again.
Elections have always been popularity contests, with the personalities of the main candidates playing a huge role in the outcome. This is only amplified when there is a polarizing incumbent on the ballot. However, it is hard to recall an election that has been nearly 100% about a single individual. Even referendums on the incumbent are almost always connected to their views and perceived performance on national security, the economy, healthcare etc.
The 2020 election in the United States was all about Donald Trump, but even then, you heard repeated arguments related to his policies on immigration, COVID-19 and others. It was not at all difficult to see a clear ideological contrast between President Trump and now-President Biden.
Compare this to the 2021 campaign here in Israel. Newspapers once reported polls with ideological blocs of left and right. The stories today are about the “Bibi-bloc” and the “anti-Bibi” bloc.
Gideon Saar is firmly in the anti-Bibi bloc, but you would be hard pressed to find a single substantive issue that separates the two. Meretz is also in the anti-Bibi camp, but there is little else on which they and Saar agree.
This dynamic is damaging for the country. There are essentially three plausible outcomes – with the caveat that implausible things certainly can happen in Israeli politics.
1. Prime Minister Netanyahu forms a coalition: In this scenario, Naftali Bennett’s Yamina party would likely be the senior coalition partner, joined by the ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism, and the new National Religious Party. Prime Minister Netanyahu would continue to serve as an indicted prime minister while on trial. Whether you believe he is guilty on all counts, or that the charges are little more than a political witch hunt, it should be clear that a sitting prime minister under criminal indictment is less than ideal.
For this reason, the Knesset should move as quickly as possible to adopt some form of the so-called French Law (to apply beginning with the next prime minister), whereby prime ministers would be immune from prosecution while in office, but would also be term limited so as not to be above the law.
2. The anti-Bibi bloc forms a coalition: In this scenario Gideon Saar, Naftali Bennett or Yair Lapid (or a rotation) are able to cobble together a coalition of their own New Hope, Yamina and Yesh Atid parties plus some combination of Yisrael Beiteinu, Labor, Blue & White, Meretz and the Joint List.
Most polls show that any such coalition will be just a few seats above 60, so each coalition partner would have effective veto power over every action of the government. Given the highly disparate views of these parties, it is difficult to imagine this coalition lasting more than a few months, meaning Israel would be heading back to elections very quickly.
It appears the purpose of such a coalition would not be to actually govern, but to form a government that removes Prime Minister Netanyahu and then quickly dissolve in the hopes that he would not contest the next round of elections.
3. Nobody can form a coalition: As a result, Israel goes to election number five late this summer. It should be clear this is a bad outcome. Putting aside the expense of each election, and the budgetary gridlock caused by having perpetual interim governments, there will come a point where election after election will cause the Israeli people, and foreign observers, to begin to question the stability and value of our electoral process.
None of these outcomes arouses much excitement or confidence. And that is precisely the problem with an election that is heavy on personality and light on substance. While unchecked ideology is often problematic, and sometimes dangerous, a government run by those with some shared vision for the country, or at least similar enough views to reach plausible compromises, offers the potential for stability and positive action on behalf of the governed.
People want to believe in something, whether it is settlement of the land of Israel, Peace Now, or lower housing prices and higher wages. A government based purely on self-interest or spite will never inspire anyone.
It is also striking how much of a lost opportunity this moment may be for the right. Parties that are generally considered to the right – Likud, Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beiteinu, the National Religious Party, Shas and UTJ – are polling at around 75-80 seats over the last month.
The same polls show the centrist parties (Yesh Atid and Blue & White) at around 20-25, the left (Labor and Meretz) around 10 and the Joint List also at around 10. So, at the moment, polling indicates that over 80% of the electorate ranges from the center to the far right, with the Zionist left and predominantly Arab parties each at around 10% or less.
It is astonishing that after an election where 2/3 of the country will likely vote for a party to the right, a very possible outcome is something other than a right-wing government, whether it is a short-lived government of parties with no shared vision or the inability of anyone to form a coalition at all.
The result is a campaign stripped of ideology and meaning. In a place where ideological fervor and debate have always been part of the fabric of society, the current level of apathy and cynicism two weeks ahead of a national vote is alarming. We can only hope some portion of our leadership will take notice.
Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.
Europe’s bystander approach to the Abraham Accords harms its own interests
By Daphne Richemond Barak
The Abraham Accords are a game changer for the Middle East and for Europe; yet they have been met by European leaders with skepticism. This approach threatens to harm not only the region, but also Europe’s own interests.
Europe’s reaction to the historic accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain has been muted to say the least. Europe was eerily silent after Israel and the UAE signed their historic agreement. It issued a subdued welcoming statement after the Bahraini-Israeli agreement was signed. This statement included a recognition of the United States’ “positive role” in the Middle East, but made no mention of a potential role for the European Union in the aftermath of the signings.
Europe has not been able to recognize what the Accords mean for the stability and prosperity of the Middle East or how they can strengthen Europe’s long-term security.
Recent years have demonstrated that the more unstable and economically-challenged the Middle East is, the more next-door Europe feels knock-on effects, whether through uncontrolled migration of refugees fleeing war-torn regions, or the spread of radical ideology and those whom it indoctrinates.
The Abraham Accords, in contrast, serve as a stabilizing counter-force in the region, decreasing the prospects of conflict and promoting economic prosperity.
As a result, those who dismiss the Accords as a mere political maneuver lacking substance, or who describe them as a formality, are downplaying not only a major transformation of the Middle East but also an event that holds important ramifications for Europe.
Europe’s southern neighborhood, which covers significant parts of the Middle East, has long been the focus of EU action. The EU has encouraged partnerships and cooperation among states, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, invested in limiting climate vulnerability and conflict, and worked toward creating opportunities for all.
The region is currently entering a new era marked by precisely the types of opportunities that EU policies have sought to promote and implement for decades, in an effort to bolster the region and EU security. If it wishes to maintain its credibility and leadership posture in the Middle East, the EU must take a proactive role in the realization of the Abraham Accords.
The reality is that the Abraham Accords are bringing to life new forms of cooperation in an array of fields, and are therefore far more than a political move. From tourism to food security, agriculture, and education, the agreements have created a genuine thirst for change in Israel and the Gulf. Israelis and Gulf state citizens want a new friendship, and this warmth adds a human dimension to the growing diplomatic ties.
Whether critics like it or not, the Accords are therefore a game changer for the region and for Europe. Attempting to deny this fact demonstrates that a certain blindness is leading the response, fueled by political pre-conceptions, such as the fear that embracing the Accords is tantamount to abandoning the Palestinian cause and aspiration for a state.
Yet the two issues are hardly mutually exclusive. Regional normalization does not threaten the Palestinian issue, and the attempt to create such a false dichotomy is baseless and counter-productive.
The habit of placing the Palestinian issue front and center in all issues relating to the Middle East can be found in developments such as the decision by the European Court of Justice to label Israeli settlement products – an indication of the climate that dominates legal institutions within Europe.
This same desire to be protective of the Palestinian issue underlies the ambivalence toward the Abraham Accords. It can also be found in the lack of efforts by some EU members to discourage the International Criminal Court from launching a war crimes probe against Israel.
In order for the EU to truly recognize the potential of the Abraham Accords, it must cease viewing this historic development through the prism of the Palestinian issue.
Letting go of the old narrative does not mean the international community should cease discussing the Palestinian issue, but rather, recognizing the Abraham Accords as an opportunity in that respect, too.
The EU can use the Abraham Accords to create new momentum to push the Palestinian issue toward resolution. This can be achieved by harnessing the new regional dynamics to generate fresh thinking on conflict resolution. The UAE has supported the Palestinians with generous funds for years, and to present that country as indifferent to the Palestinian people does not do justice to its record and continued efforts.
Ultimately, the Abraham Accords give a glimpse of what can happen when the Middle East stops viewing Israel as the enemy. This same positive narrative can now be pivoted toward the Palestinian issue, instead of allowing the Palestinian issue to hold back active support for the Accords.
The EU therefore has a positive role to play – and not just the United States. This can take the form of convening the UN Security Council to discuss the implications of the Abraham Accords for the Middle East and Europe, or reaching out to the Biden administration to offer the EU’s assistance to the U.S. in keeping up the momentum of regional normalization.
Rather than making the Accords contentious, Europe can play an important role in making them a unifying event
Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.
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Here’s how Israel can maintain an advantage in the aerial systems race
By Shachar Shohat & YAIR RAMATI
For the past century, ever since the arrival of the aircraft on history’s stage as an effective and significant military combat tool, a race has been underway between offensive aerial platforms and defensive ground systems.
The basic process by which aerial platform capabilities are developed and then followed by a ground-based response has been with us for over a century. It is a cat-and-mouse game: Once an operational or technical gap appears, and the defense system finds itself lagging behind the attacking air power, the attackers gain air control, with all of its implications. Then the gap is closed, meaning that air defense systems regain an ability to extract high prices from attackers, to the point of being intolerable for them.
In the Middle East, this dynamic was illustrated when, toward the end of the War of Attrition in 1970, dense Egyptian air defense systems challenged the Israeli Air Force’s aerial freedom of operation for the first time.
At the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egyptian and Syrian air defense systems were so effective that air support became an almost impossible mission. Israel lost no less than 102 aircraft during the war; and at its end, it was clear that dealing with air defense systems had become the Israeli Air Force’s biggest challenge.
But in the First Lebanon War of 1982, the Israeli Air Force proved it had developed a clear edge over Russian air defense systems, as it destroyed 19 Syrian batteries and downed 97 Syrian jets without suffering any losses of its own. It was a milestone in the race and formed a revolution in the attacker-defender balance. Yet, it caused Middle Eastern adversaries to turn to new directions.
Even prior to the 1982 war, a new gap had appeared — the threat of ballistic projectiles — one that was left unanswered for years. During the First Gulf War in 1991, Israel was hit by some 40 Al-Hussein missiles fired from Iraq, a ballistic missile that had been used extensively in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War.
The late internalization of the threat dealt Israel a significant strategic blow. In March 2000, however, a partial reply appeared when Israel deployed an operational Arrow system for the interception of ballistic missiles.
The second aspect of the gap created by ballistic threats arrived through rockets and artillery shells. During the Second Lebanon War of 2006, Israel was hit by some 3,500 rockets without the ability to defend against them.
This gap was reduced, at least in the Gaza arena vis-a-vis Hamas, when in April 2011 the Iron Dome air defense system conducted its first interception. Since then it has continued to provide a defensive umbrella throughout several rounds of conflict.
Further afield, we have seen the cat-and-mouse dynamic continue: In September 2019, Iran launched a surprise attack on oil and gas facilities in Saudi Arabia using attack drones and small Iranian-made cruise missiles, placing a question mark over the kingdom’s air defense systems.
The 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan saw the collapse of Armenian front-line air defenses, exposing its Army to systematic destruction through a combination of precision-guided weapons, loitering munitions and armed drones.
Two basic insights arise from these developments. The first is that threats develop in jumps, while responses usually require lengthy development phases. The second is that the timing of conflicts determine whether the defender will have an adequate response to the threat, and what price the attacker or defender will pay accordingly.
For those developing solutions, a built-in conflict exists between working according to procedure and working quickly. Those who want to complete the full processes will need longer. We suggest more daring efforts and more risk-taking, and recommend assessing the form of future threats to guide development.
For example, low-grade rockets evolved into industrial-made rockets, which then morphed into heavy projectiles before becoming accurate missiles. These have been joined by drones, mortar shells and cruise missiles. The Iron Dome can tackle all of these.
Looking ahead is crucial. In addition, spiral development, involving step-by-step innovations, is the right course.
In terms of risk-taking, those unwilling to accept failures during trials will experience incremental progress rather than breakthroughs. At its core, this struggle is an arms race, and if adversaries catch up, the price will be high.
If in the past 50 years the dynamic of threat development was moderate, today the rate has accelerated, while the technological amplitude and range of threats is almost endless.
This is a complex and challenging combination for air defense system developers and operators, which sometimes finds expression in the need to deal with painful dilemmas, such as giving a reasonable response in certain areas only.
As the rate of new threat appearances grows rapidly, air defenders are tasked with the difficult mission of finding rapid solutions. This entails taking risks and breaking rigid development principles, such as systematic technological learning. It also calls for daring in the management of development, including the willingness to absorb failures, and the close cooperation between intelligence elements as well as development and operational personnel.
Israel must win this cat-and-mouse game to maintain its aerial supremacy.
Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.
Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.
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Palestinian elections are still far from certain
By David Hacham
Despite public statements and cautious optimism on the Palestinian street, prospects for Palestinian elections going ahead are still far from certain. Fourteen Palestinian factions met in Cairo in February under the auspices of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate to work out concrete agreements for the holding of elections, but this meeting may have been more show than substance.
Under the latest proposal, elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council are to be held on May 22, for the Palestinian Authority Presidency on July 31, and for the Palestinian National Council (PLO) on August 31. At the same time, Hamas is presently holding its own internal elections for positions of power, including the political bureau that is currently headed by Ismael Haniyeh.
The factions agreed that the Palestinian police forces would be exclusively in charge of securing the elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They also agreed that an organizing committee and a court would be established to ensure that the elections are free and fair, and that all political prisoners be released. Abbas has in recent days signed a presidential decree that orders the release of all political prisoners.
The agreements call for ensuring the freedom to express opinions under the two rival Palestinian governments of Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, and that security forces in both sectors would remain neutral vis-à-vis the elections.
In theory, these elections are years late, with the last round being held in 2006, and all attempts since to hold new elections having failed. In practice, Fatah kept delaying the elections due to political considerations, until Abbas issued a decree in January calling for new elections to be held in 2021.
Despite all of the above, the path to holding Palestinian elections remains filled with obstacles: Fundamental divisions remain between Fatah and Hamas, and there are a series of problematic, unresolved issues, such as Israel’s position on the elections, which could torpedo the entire process.
In recent weeks, Israel has conducted an intensive wave of arrests of Hamas operatives and leaders in the West Bank, including legislative council members. Hamas says this will not dent its determination to pursue the upcoming elections.
Palestinian sources stress the fact that the next round of talks is scheduled for March in Cairo as a reflection of the fact that divisions could not be resolved within the two days that the factions met in February, and that more time is needed to reach practical agreements to pave the path to elections.
The sources estimated that only when the first round of elections for the legislative council approach in May will the final decision be made on whether to proceed as planned.
Fatah sources have not ruled out the possibility in the absence of agreements and compromise on the substantial divisions that elections will again be suspended or delayed.
The fact that Abbas has announced dates for the elections should therefore not be seen in any way as a guarantee that they will go ahead as stated.
Ultimately, it is vital to keep in mind that all of the steps taken in the direction of elections are reversible, and that all progress thus far has been on the declarative and technical-administrative front.
It still remains highly uncertain that elections will go ahead. Several factors can derail the process at any time. It appears that Abbas is taking part in the elections process to ‘gain points’ vis-à-vis the new Biden administration in the U.S. and to present itself as a democratic Palestinian government. If this is the case, it is fair to assume that Abbas has planted ‘exit ramps’ that will allow him to leave the elections process under the pretext of major divisions with Hamas.
Abbas must be aware of the very real dangers to Fatah’s status in the West Bank in the event of a Hamas election victory, which could prepare the ground for a Hamas takeover of Palestinian institutions. Palestinian sources have assessed that if Abbas is indeed serious about going ‘all the way’ in the elections, he would be committing political suicide.
Israel has yet to make its position on the elections public, but it is fair to assume that the defense establishment is holding ongoing situation assessments and preparing multiple action paths to deal with a variety of scenarios. Abbas could use the pretext of an Israeli refusal to allow the elections to take place in East Jerusalem to back away from the process.
David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.
Ten years since Iron Dome’s first interception, the system has revolutionized air defense
By SHachar Shohat
Rafael, Israel’s national defense laboratory, is marking ten years to its Iron Dome air defense system intercepting its first enemy rocket in Israeli skies, since when it has revolutionized the world of rocket interceptions.
Today, the system has become a global brand, with countries around the world interested in Iron Dome and its proven capabilities. The U.S. Army has ordered two Iron Dome batteries as part of its deep examination of the system.
By any international benchmark, Rafael invests large amounts of funds in research and development to prepare itself for the future, and to prepare future building blocks that enable rapid technological breakthroughs that find expression in military systems.
Iron Dome’s story began at the end of the Second Lebanon War, when Hezbollah fired some 4,000 rockets at Israel, which had no response to the threat.
The Israeli Air Force had total air superiority over Lebanon and was able, thanks to precise intelligence, to launch a brilliant opening strike at the start of the war, destroying Hezbollah’s mid-range rocket launchers. However, the terror organization’s short-range rocket array was almost completely unaffected during the remainder of the war.
This event served as a wake-up call for the State of Israel.
It removed several layers of resistance that until then had existed with regard to air defense solutions against this type of threat.
Objections included the argument that the only way of winning wars is through offense, not defense, and that it was better to deal ‘with the swamp, not the mosquitoes.’ The Second Lebanon War exposed this approach as being wholly ineffective. Subsequent conflicts, such as the 2008-2009 conflict with Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Operation Cast Lead), also upended this argument. The rate of enemy rocket fire remained high despite the IDF offensive, and the idea that attacking maneuvers alone would result in victory lost credibility.
The government could no longer tell the public that it had to absorb all of the rockets, damage, injuries and deaths, without any defensive systems.
Another objection was based on doubts concerning whether it was technologically possible to intercept these types of rockets. A third layer of resistance claimed that it would cost too much money to create this capability. Others claimed that the system would not be ready in time.
Rafael stuck to its belief in its technological capability. Taking advantage of its close working relationship with the IDF, Rafael understood the precise operational needs. This effort was bolstered by the keen awareness that the system was being developed to protect the people of Israel, and that it would soon face real-world tests.
Out of fourteen suggested solutions, Israel chose Rafael’s Iron Dome system in 2007. Rafael came together with Israel Aerospace Industries subsidiary Elta, which designed the system’s radar, and the mPrest company, which was responsible for designing Iron Dome’s unique command and control and interface system.
In less than five years after the decision was made, the first operational Iron Dome battery was handed off to the Israel Air Force’s Air Defense Array in 2011.
This extraordinary short time frame was made possible through, among other things, the use of parallel development processes. Rather than first developing the system, passing it on to the client, and then waiting a long time for the client to become qualified for operational readiness, in Iron Dome’s case IAF air defenders were involved with the system from day one.
Air force personnel worked closely with developers, studying the system as it was being developed, and directly influencing its design. The speed was driven by the sense of urgency to get the system’s first battery out into the field as soon as possible to defend southern Israel from Gazan projectile attacks.
In April 2011, Iron Dome made its first real-world interception. Since then, the system has gone on to intercept more than 2,500 enemy projectiles, achieving an interception rate of over 90 percent of projectiles headed toward populated areas in Israel.
The use of spiral development, in which developers look at the next innovation step to take with the system already working, means that Iron Dome undergoes ongoing upgrades. Iron Dome’s robust design, its many interceptors, and its radar capabilities give it the ability to take on unprecedented quantities of projectiles with success – despite enemy attempts to saturate the system.
The Iron Dome of 2021 is not the same system that it was in 2011. Today’s system can work at sea, assist military forces that are launching ground offensives, protect national strategic sites, and deal with targets at higher and lower altitudes compared to ten years ago.
It can also intercept drones, and take on rapid low-flying targets.
Today, Iron Dome forms a vital part of Israel’s ability to conduct offense as well, since it defends bases that are essential for attacking enemy targets.
It stands guard against threats from the northern and southern fronts.
Rafael is now thinking about introducing inherent components into the system, such as laser technology. In addition, it is installing Artificial Intelligence capabilities to give Iron Dome the ability to learn and recognize new threats on its own.
As adversaries continue to develop rapid threats capable of complex flight paths, the challenge of remaining a step ahead of the enemy remains paramount.
Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.
The ICC’s decision has made clear: Israel needs a robust legal strategy
By Daphne Richemond Barak & Oded Ranaan
The majority judges’ announcement that the Court has jurisdiction over the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem increases the chances of an investigation into crimes Israelis allegedly committed there. In an interview with "The Arena," international law expert Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak explains that while the judges' decision is a worrisome development, Israel still has options – but only if it truly begins planning ahead.
On February 6th, 2021, the International Criminal Court announced that it has jurisdiction to investigate alleged war crimes committed in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem by Israelis and Palestinians since 2014.
In an in-depth interview, we discussed the new situation and possible paths of action for Israel with Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak, Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and an expert in international law.
A year in limbo
Q: The ICC’s announcement may have severe legal implications for senior Israeli politicians, government officials and military officers. Can you go back on the chain of events that led to this important moment?
“The announcement came over a year after the ICC’s Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, announced in December 2019 that there is sufficient evidence to merit an investigation over acts committed on the territory of Palestine. Instead of moving ahead right away with an investigation, however, Bensouda decided to seek the view of the ICC’s Pre-trial Chamber judges on what constitutes the territory of Palestine – which she saw as including the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. She didn’t have to seek the judges’ validation, but she did, and that started a lot of back-and-forth with them which lasted over a year.
“The Pre-trial Chamber’s decision – which embraces Bensouda’s own findings – now enables Bensouda, who is leaving her position in June, to seal her legacy with respect to this high-profile case. Determining the scope and specifics of the investigation, however, will probably be left to her successor, British barrister Karim Khan, who was elected a week after the Court's decision was made public.”
Q: Why did the Prosecutor chose to seek the judges’ opinions given that she wasn’t legally obligated to do so?
“She's had issues in the past with the Pre-Trial Chamber; incidentally, it also involved Israel because it was connected to an investigation on the events related to the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. In 2013 the Comoros Islands, under whose flag the ship sailed, formally requested the Court to investigate what happened on board the ship, but Bensouda declined to open an investigation. This led to a political confrontation between her and the judges, who criticized her decision and even tried to get her to change her mind. She has since stuck to her guns, so they are not on the best possible terms.
“This might be the reason that led her this time around to try and get them on board. When you get people to participate and provide their own opinion, they are less likely to criticize you down the road. A lot of this has to do with internal ICC politics, as you can see.
“But there is another possible reason for her seeking the judges’ validation on what constitutes the territory of Palestine: to endow the investigation with the greatest possible legitimacy, it having been ‘endorsed’ by both the Prosecutor and the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber. One thing is for sure, it is an unusual move and it is not readily evident why Bensouda chose that path.”
Q: So is the Prosecutor now on firm grounds to go ahead with the investigation of acts allegedly committed by Israelis on the territory of Palestine?
“The Court took a very simple route: since the UN General Assembly allowed Palestine to become a part to the Court’s Statute, the Court held that Palestine constitutes a state for purposes of the ICC proceedings – and such proceedings only. Interestingly, the majority decision emphasized on several occasions that this does not prejudge in any way on whether Palestine is a state, or what constitutes its territory. By doing so, the judges purposefully limited the scope of their findings.
“It also stands out that the judge presiding over this panel of three judges dissents on important aspects of the decision. According to Judge Kovács of Hungary, the territory of Palestine does not include ‘the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem,’ as the majority opinion states. In Kovács’s opinion, the Court must take into account the Oslo Accords, which limited Palestinian sovereignty over some of these territories, such as [Israeli-controlled] 'Territory C'. And unlike the majority opinion, Kovács analyzes the Oslo Accords in great detail.
“For Israel, this dissent carried great weight: it weakens the majority opinion, which pales in legal rigor compared to Kovács’s opinion. It conveys the existence of significant disagreement within the bench, and, ultimately might make it more difficult for the Court to investigate acts that occurred in these two areas. But does it prevent the opening of an investigation? Certainly not.”
Law and politics, or just politics?
According to Richemond-Barak, the ICC legal process is heavily influenced by politics. “The judges’ decision”, she explains, “was first expected around the time of Israel’s announcement in the Spring of 2020 that it intends to annex the West Bank by July 1st of that year, having received the thumbs-up from the Trump administration. In the end, a potential annexation was nixed – officially in favor of forging diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and, later, additional Arab and Muslim countries. As July 1st came and went, and annexation did not take place, momentum for a decision faded.
“But if anyone still questioned the significance of the political undercurrents behind this process, the eventual publication of the decision – less than two weeks after President Biden’s inauguration – cleared any doubts. The Court had reasons to fear the Trump administration’s reaction to the decision, which had previously imposed sanctions on Bensouda herself, so it waited. This conduct doesn’t reflect terribly well on the idea of a court of law, driven solely by the ideal of justice and operating undeterred from the pressures of the world around it.”
Q: Now that the judges have published their decision on the question of jurisdiction, do you think Bensouda will advance opening a formal investigation? What other considerations may potentially affect her decision?
“My sense is that she can now leave office having brought this critical preliminary stage to completion. I don’t see her taking any further steps currently, except perhaps formally opening the investigation now that she has, so to speak, received the judges’ blessing. But Khan, her successor, will be the one to actively shape the investigation by deciding which specific acts to investigate, how many indictments to issue and against whom, et cetera.
“I should add that this decision comes on the backdrop of an ongoing crisis of legitimacy for the Court. The institution has recently been scrutinized by an independent committee of experts, tasked with writing a report on issues regarding the ICC as a workplace, but also, in the broader sense, to forecast what the future holds for it. As a relatively young institution, the ICC has yet to carve a role for itself in the international landscape and assert its integrity and credibility. I fear that the latest decision, strikingly weak on the law, may not have been a step in the right direction.”
The Israel connection
Despite the Pre-trial Chamber’s decision, any possible sanctions against Israelis are still uncertain and will likely not occur in the next few years. Nevertheless, Richemond-Barak warns that Israel cannot rely on external factors to solve its issues vis-à-vis the ICC.
“The newly elected Prosecutor is unlikely to shield Israel from scrutiny. I already mentioned that Bensouda paid a heavy political price by declining not to open an investigation into the Mavi Marmara incident.
“Would another prosecutor have made the same decision? It’s hard to say. Any situation that involves Israel always attracts significant attention. But even on the Palestinian issue Bensouda took her time and didn't open the investigations right away, so theoretically Khan could be more aggressive and speed up the process. However, he’s likely to fully review the information before him before making any further decision on this investigation.”
Q: What legal angle do you expect the Court to pursue going forward, and why?
“In my opinion, the most dangerous legal grounds from Israel’s point of view are those that relate to the settlements. The ICC’s mandate is based on the principle of complementarity – it only has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes when states have either been unable or unwilling to do so themselves in a fair manner. The ICC complements states in administering justice, it does not replace them.
“Building settlements is part of the policy of the State of Israel. The Israeli government therefore cannot claim that it is investigating and looking into potential violations of international law that relate to the settlement enterprise.
“This is an area is where Israel is on weaker legal ground, as complementarity and the robust Israel judicial system cannot shield it from the Court’s jurisdiction. Israel should pay careful attention to this matter. There might be a sense that settlement building does not amount to a crime that ‘shocks the conscience of humanity.’ It would certainly have to meet the gravity threshold set under the Court’s statute in order to go forward. For now, however, the recent decision of the judges makes no reference to the settlement enterprise.”
Q: In your opinion, what approach will the new Biden administration likely take vis-à-vis the ICC?
“President Biden is unlikely to go back to the relatively warm relationship that President Obama had with the Court, mostly because right now there's also a looming investigation against US personnel in Afghanistan. It’s important to remember that the US’s position used to be aligned in many ways to that of Israel: Both states chose not to become party to this institution. This explains why the State Department has expressed ‘serious concerns about the ICC’s attempts to exercise its jurisdiction over Israeli personnel’ shortly after the Court’s announcement.
“The State Department also stressed that Palestine does not qualify as a sovereign state. This is an important statement, but Israel should not take it as offering a blanket guarantee of support – particularly on the delicate issue of the settlements, which sidesteps the principle of complementarity and is less likely to be blocked by a Biden administration.”
“Other important states, such as Canada and Australia, have stepped forward in recent days in a similar spirit – primarily objecting to having the question of Palestinian statehood and the delimitation of Palestinian territory resolved by the ICC, instead of bilateral negotiations between the parties. In this regard, it’s important to reiterate that the finding that Palestine is a state within the framework of the ICC does not extend to the status of Palestine outside that context – for example, at the United Nations or before other international judicial institutions.”
Policy recommendations for Israel
Q: Since no one can imagine the current government, or future ones, formally stopping the settlements or dismantling them, what can Israel do now to defuse this situation?
“It's important to stress that since the famous (or infamous) Goldstone Report was issued in 2009, Israel has invested considerable resources and established new departments and processes to tackle international legal challenges. And Israel has done well by publishing Attorney General Mandelblit’s comprehensive report around the same time as the Bensouda published her own in December 2019, providing a snapshot of Israel’s position on the opening of an investigation by the ICC.
“What can Israel do today, ahead of a possible ICC decision to investigate? First, try to shape – or participate in shaping – the priorities of the ICC in the coming five to ten years. I’m not sure what channels of communication exist between states – especially non-party states like Israel – and a prosecutor regarding the scope of an investigation, but I see an added value in maintaining dialogue.
"As a general rule, I am in favor of multilateral engagement. I know decision-makers in Israel don't necessarily share this view, for reasons that range from sheer fatalism – 'it won’t have any impact anyway' – to the fear of conferring too much legitimacy to highly politicized international institutions. In the past, Israel declined to cooperate with commissions of inquiry established by the UN Human Rights Council or with the International Court of Justice when it examined the legality of the security fence. I, however, prefer when Israel lays down its narrative and arguments, directly or indirectly, and makes its case.
“Second, Israel should seek independent advice from leading legal experts. The Palestinians have been doing this for over a decade and have crafted a very smart, creative, and impressive legal strategy when it comes to the ICC and other international bodies. It’s clear that Palestine sought the advice of very clever international lawyers in this respect, who have suggested innovative interpretations of the statute of the Court. Getting access to the ICC was entirely out of reach for the Palestinians only 10 or 12 years ago, but they succeeded, and so to some extent the Court’s recent decision demonstrates that such smart and consistent legal strategy pays off.
“The conclusion is that Israel should seriously seek the advice of people who are going to devote more than five minutes asking themselves what else could be done. They need to spend weeks and months together planning a strategy of proactive engagement. It doesn’t come overnight. The Palestinians have proved that this strategy works and there's no reason why Israel shouldn’t be doing the same. Israel can learn from this.
“I find that too often in this type of decision-making, Israel involves actors at the political level and ministerial levels that can’t agree with one another. In addition, the view that legal processes remain separate from diplomatic and strategic ones remains too prevalent. The political and legal aspects are closely connected.”
Q: So formulate a strategy, not merely tactics.
“Yes. Israel is often busy extinguishing fires, on both the military battlefield and the legal ‘battlefield.’ Its needs instead to devise a long-term plan regarding international institutions, particularly judicial institutions such as the ICC. Dealing with problems as they come is not enough – it’s time to ask the hard questions: where does Israel see itself in the legal arena in five or ten years? What are the objectives and how does it get there? The recent ICC decision demonstrates the necessity behind such a mindset.”
Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute.
Oded Raanan is Co-founder and Editor-in-Chief of “The Arena”. Before joining the Abba Eban Institute, he worked for the foreign news desk at "Ha'aretz". He holds an M.Phil in International Relations from the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, and an M.A. and a B.A. in Middle Eastern Studies, both from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
President Biden: Promise & Pitfalls
By Justin Pozmanter
There is a new administration in Washington. When it comes to Israel, commentators across the spectrum are hard at work telling their readers and listeners what to think. Some say it is the dawn of a bright new day, others seem to think the sky is falling. However, despite what we all think may happen next, we need to wait for concrete actions before passing judgment.
The Trump administration was arguably the most pro-Israel in history. In this context “pro-Israel” means generally in agreement with the views of the democratically elected government of the state of Israel.
The actions taken by the Trump administration related to Israel were in line with the direction of the Republican Party, which has trended more and more pro-Israel over the last two decades. The Democratic Party, which has traditionally been just as supportive as the Republicans, has generally trended in the opposite direction, particularly since 2009.
However, despite this trend, very few Democratic voters are ideologues whose views reflect strong feelings toward Israeli policy. This is a key mistake people make when following this issue. The actions of Israel, or the current Prime Minister, generally do not guide partisan attitudes in the United States.
Polls show that Democrats dislike Prime Minister Netanyahu and Republicans like him, but it is doubtful that a significant percentage of respondents could site a single difference in the Prime Minister’s policies as compared to any of his opponents.
How members of each party view the Israeli Prime Minister has more to do with their relationship with the current President, or recent Presidents, and how the President publicly frames the relationship, than Israeli policies.
This is not to say Israel is blameless when there are rifts. Israeli actions, and just as often rhetoric, play a very prominent role in how administration officials, from the President down the line, as well as Congressional leaders, perceive and publicly address the US-Israel relationship.
The current trend of the Democratic party places an outsized importance on the Biden administration when it comes to the long-term strength of the US-Israel relationship.
Today, there is nothing that could be more beneficial to the long-term health of the US-Israel relationship than a Democratic administration perceived as strongly pro-Israel. While the attitude of party leadership has always been important, it is exacerbated in today’s era of hyper-partisanship.
Given the feelings of nearly every Democrat towards President Trump, the prevailing instinct is to oppose anything he supported. The Biden administration will distance itself from the Trump agenda almost across the board. Hopefully, they will realize that many of the Trump administration’s policies related to Israel and the region – recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, sovereignty in the Golan, leaving the JCPOA, and spearheading regional peace and normalization – are positives for Israel, the United States, and the region.
While a Democratic President can have a broader and deeper impact on Democratic voters than anyone else, maintaining bipartisan support for Israel does not fall on President Biden and Democrats alone.
While some Democratic members of Congress have taken outwardly hostile stands against Israel, and in some cases Jews more generally, Republicans angling for pro-Israel votes by lumping all Democratic leaders, most of whom are generally pro-Israel, with the handful of hostile members is unhelpful.
Bipartisan support is not simply a talking point. It is indispensable to the ongoing strength of the bilateral relationship and a critical aspect of Israel’s strategic outlook. Therefore, everyone who cares about Israel should be thankful for support from Democrats and Republicans alike.
As things stand today, we do not know exactly where President Biden stands on specific issues. It has been over a dozen years since his last Senate vote.
In President Biden’s first foreign policy address at the State Department on February 4, he did not mention Israel or the Iranian nuclear program. His only reference to the Middle East was a few sentences related to the civil war in Yemen.
There have been a few indications since taking office, most clearly coming from his Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, in a wide-ranging interview on CNN.
Secretary Blinken’s answers were a mixed bag. He was positive on Jerusalem, the Abraham Accords and by stating the administration recognizes that only Israel and the Palestinians can negotiate final status issues, he signaled that there will be no grand American plan neither side can accept.
However, he also fell into the false equivalencies of “unilateral actions on both sides” and while recognizing current Israeli control of the Golan, he also left open the possibility Israeli sovereignty could be called into question in the future.
There almost certainly will be disagreements on issues such as settlement construction. However, it appears the Biden administration, while perhaps not as accommodating to Israeli positions as its predecessor, is signaling a more realistic approach than that of the Obama administration.
On the JCPOA, Secretary Blinken’s comments were mostly, though not entirely, negative. It is clear the administration would like to rejoin the deal. This would set up a confrontation with Israel, regardless of who wins the Israeli election in March. However, despite the recent announcement of a willingness to initiate talks to re-enter the deal, there are also some signs that the approach to Iran will not be quite as accommodating as that of the Obama administration.
As with everything else, thus far the administration is simply signaling what they plan to do. Rarely does any administration do precisely what they say in their first 100 days in office, either because of a change of heart or changes in circumstances. Therefore, everyone who cares about Israel and the US-Israel relationship should wait and see what policies the administration ultimately pursues. There are reasons for major concern, but there are also reasons for optimism. The Biden administration certainly will not be the Trump administration, but it is also unlikely to simply be a third term of the Obama administration.
Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.