Stop saving UNRWA from itself

By Mark Goldfeder

On Tuesday the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the UN group which is (theoretically) responsible for handling the welfare of Palestinian refugees, announced that the organization is facing a financial crisis and is “on the brink of collapse.” The statement came on the heels of an international fundraising conference that failed to come anywhere close to its goal of covering UNRWA’s annual shortfall, and a day after Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini appeared before the agency’s Advisory Commission expressing shock and indignation at the fact that he had to “beg” for money to meet his bloated budget.

Lazzarini should not be so surprised that the world is reluctant to continue bailing out his ever-sinking ship. It is high time that countries stop using periodic financial interventions to gloss over the very valid reasons why the organization is failing in the first place. For the sake of the Palestinian people that it was originally intended to serve, UNRWA deserves to be put out of its misery.

The original idea behind UNRWA was sound. It was founded in 1949 for “the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees” from the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War. From the beginning, the agency defined Palestinian refugees as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period of June 1, 1946 to May 15, 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” But in 1965, UNRWA unilaterally changed the eligibility requirements to include third-generation descendants. It did so again in 1982, this time redefining “refugees” to include all descendants of Palestine refugee males, regardless of whether they had been granted citizenship elsewhere.

UNRWA’s current definition is utterly inconsistent with how all other refugees are classified, including by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the agency responsible for every other (non-Palestinian) refugee on the planet. For example, under Article I(c)(3) of the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, a person is no longer a refugee if he or she has “acquired a new nationality.” UNRWA’s definition, which is not anchored in treaty but was invented by the organization itself, contains no similar provision. According to one expert, 99% of UNRWA’s 5.7 million “refugees” are not actually refugees at all under the standard definition of that term, while others put that number even higher.

And the differences in agencies are not just definitional. Since its inception, UNHCR has managed to resettle tens of millions of people globally, while UNRWA has resettled – no one. In fact, (using their own numbers) the problem of Palestinian refugees has grown exponentially worse on UNRWA’s watch, despite the fact that they spend roughly four times the amount per refugee that UNHCR does, with over 30,000 personnel (nearly double UNHCR) and a $1.4 billion budget that is almost four times UNHCR’s. Of course those numbers are less surprising when you consider the serious abuses of power, including sexual misconduct, nepotism, bullying and retaliation, that its leadership have been accused of.

UNRWA claims to advocate for a just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but in practice the agency has overlooked terrorist group activity in some of its camps, allowed its schools to be used as human shields for Hamas military tunnels, allowed members of Hamas and other terrorist groups to hold UNRWA staff positions, falsely presented images that stir up hatred against Israel and continues to teach children to demonize and delegitimize Israel using violent propaganda. In short, UNRWA spends more to do less, while perpetuating a problem it was meant to resolve and undermining the peace process itself. That is why some countries, like Germany and the UK, have cut their funding in the first place.

The UN is often, and deservedly, criticized for singling out the State of Israel. But if the nations of the world want to actually help solve the Middle East conflict, they need to stop singling out the Palestinians as well.

Perhaps the UN should support the resettlement of Palestinian refugees – but they should do so only within a framework that would: a) not falsely blame the situation entirely on Israel, and b) involve even trying to accomplish the goal of resettling actual refugees from the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948, using the internationally recognized definition of refugees that applies in every other instance. Doing so is far from impossible. As an example of how this might realistically look, take the 2000 Clinton Peace Parameters in which Israel agreed to allow 100,000 refugees to return – more than three times the estimated number of actual refugees under the definition, but still a reasonable amount. All other “refugees” were to be resettled in their present places of residence, the future Palestinian state, or in third-party countries, with Israel contributing $30b. to fund their resettlement.

In the meantime, it’s not surprising that it’s becoming more difficult to raise money for a corrupt agency whose culture the Palestinians themselves consider “highly problematic” and full of “entitlement and abuse.” A policy of support without accountability for an organization that has long done nothing but disservice to the very population it was meant to protect helps exactly the same amount of people that UNRWA itself does – no one.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Down on his luck at home, Erdogan shows his claws, again

By Tomer Barak

In recent months, Turkey`s foreign policy has swung wildly between threats to its neighbors, to outreach to rivals, including a willingness to receive a warm embrace from the UAE.

Don’t let this apparent incoherence fool you: Both policies derive from the same acute domestic challenges faced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who is concerned about the stability of his regime.

First and foremost, Turkey’s economic crisis seems to be getting worse from month to month: The Turkish Lira slumped 40% against the dollar in November, and some observers believe the currency could drop even further.

In Erdogan’s propaganda world, this devastating economic development derives from foreign intervention that is ‘undermining his regime.’ But this crisis in reality stems from Erdogan’s economic policy of growth at any price, and his ensuant demand to lower the Turkish Central Bank’s interest rate. This has occurred alongside substantial government interventions in decisions by the Bank, and an erosion of the Bank’s independence, leading to a decrease in the willingness of many international actors to invest in the country. All of this, two years into the pandemic crisis, which itself resulted in severe economic fallout in Turkey.

One surprising outcome of this crisis has been the renewal of ties between Turkey and the UAE, who have been regional rivals in recent years.

The UAE’s de facto ruler, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed, paid a visit to Turkey and pledged to establish a $10 billion fund for strategic investments in the country. What price Turkey will be required to pay for this generosity is not yet clear, but time will tell what Erdogan pledged in return with regard to regional policies.

Whether this injection of funds will help kickstart the Turkish economy is another question, with the country facing so many economic challenges.

Elsewhere, Turkey is still struggling to flatten the coronavirus curve, even before the outbreak of the new Omicron variant. The Government`s vaccine campaign is based on China’s Sinovac vaccine, but this campaign is faltering, and the public is not rushing to put its faith in it. This is disabling Turkey’s ability to quickly lift coronavirus restrictions, and increases negative domestic sentiment towards the ruling AKP party.

All of the above is occurring against a background of several disasters in recent months, such as the huge forest fires in western Turkey, which claimed a political toll on Erdogan. According to recent public opinion polls, in the event of elections, Erdogan will be unable, for the first time in his 18-year rule, to lead his party to victory, even if his party joins other parties in a coalition. The far-off date for elections (2023) does not ease Erdogan’s fears regarding this front, while some opposition parties have already called for early elections and rare protests over the economic situation were seen in Ankara and Istanbul.

Some spectators have observed that Erdogan, once again, has looked tired and languid in several public appearances, such as the Glasgow climate summit.

Under the weight of the above strains, Turkey’s regional foreign policy has once again become aggressive. This is a deliberate show of force designed to bolster Erdogan’s public image, but one that falls short of sparking a real regional clash, due to his understanding of the difficult situation faced by Turkey.

Meanwhile, Washington once again finds itself struggling to rein in the Sultan from Istanbul.

The United States has already ejected Ankara from the F-35 program after Erdogan opted to purchase advanced Russian-made S-400 air defense systems. American sanctions on Turkey, anchored by Congressional legislation, were put into place by the Trump administration, despite the relatively warm relationship that existed between the two presidents at that time.

President Biden’s less enthusiastic approach to Turkey and Erdogan hardly decreased tensions. Despite bilateral meetings held between the two leaders, most recently at the G-20 Summit in Rome in October, Erdogan chose to launch a new campaign to ‘retrieve Turkish funds’ paid in the past into the F-35 project, and which the U.S. refuses to return. The Turkish president even presented an alternative solution, in the form of supplying forty new F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, and upgrading the remaining Turkish air force fleet as a substitute for reimbursement.

Congress, it seems safe to assume, will not take a positive view of this offer. Erdogan has warned that a failure to meet his demands for compensation will lead him to further tighten relations with Russia, and to purchase additional Russian defense products, such as more S-400 batteries, advanced fighter jet platforms, and more. Such a maneuver would pose an even greater significant challenge for NATO, of which Turkey is a member.

Moreover, The US is intensifying its military presence in Greece, potentially at the expense of Its Turkish bases, a move that is obviously not viewed favorably in Turkey.

On the diplomatic front, Turkey has been involved in several highly publicized quarrels. Erdogan declared that he would eject ten foreign ambassadors – including the American ambassador – following a joint statement by them calling for the release of a jailed Turkish businessman. This diplomatic crisis was quickly resolved, and Erdogan backed down after most of the countries clarified that they did not mean to intervene in Turkey’s internal affairs. But the affair illustrates Erdogan’s new willingness to take punitive action –  even against the U.S.

The other quarrel was with Israel after an Israeli tourist couple was arrested for taking a photograph of the presidential palace – an act forbidden by law. Talks leading to their release were slow and grueling, and some observers claim that Erdogan exploited this civil incident in order to bolster his public image, by showing how he ‘stood up to Israel.’ In the aftermath of this incident, new lines of communication were set in place, including between Israel’s president and prime minister, and Erdogan. Yet this is no detente in the relations. It is merely a mechanism to prevent future tensions.  

In addition, reports of arrests of supposed spy networks belonging to Israel, Iran, and Russia surfaced, designed to signal to the region that Turkey is ‘determined’ to defend its national interests.

On the military front, Turkey has returned to a pattern of issuing military threats and taking action in its own regional environment. Examples include northern Syria, where Turkey threatened a new military operation to broaden its influence, undermining American and Russian interests. The threats were withdrawn after a stern message from Moscow, and it seems that for the time being Turkey’s appetite for a new conquest in northern Syria has faded.

In northern Iraq as well, Turkey has broadened its operations against “Kurdish terrorism”, but with no risk of a clash with any superpower in the area.

At the same time, Turkey has gone back to threatening Greece and Cyprus in the context of competition for natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey takes a poor view of growing cooperation between Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel within the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum group, and is seeking to torpedo its activities. To that end, after several months of quiet, Turkey has reactivated its gas research ships off the northern Cypriot coast, an act that is tantamount to marking out maritime territory.

At the same time, Turkey is increasing the presence of its military forces in Northern Cyprus, and has upgraded its airbases on the island, enabling them to launch drones. 

Alongside these developments, reports have surfaced over Turkey’s intentions to boost its forces deployed in Libya, on the eve of planned elections in that country.

At the same time, a Turkish ‘campaign of smiles’ has surfaced with the purpose of attracting foreign funds. It is marked by a willingness to swallow some pride and embrace the UAE’s funds, alongside a push for de-escalation of tensions with Egypt, Israel and even Saudi Arabia. This is joined by an attempt by Turkey to show a positive image on the global stage regarding climate change and other issues.

So long as Erdogan is consumed by domestic troubles, he can be expected to continue to show his claws. His occasional demonstration of pragmatism is intended solely to attract funds, and does not fool anyone that he has had a change of heart or that he is willing to let go of his neo-Ottoman aspirations.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

Solidarity with the Palestinian People Includes Honesty

By Mark Goldfeder

On November 29, the United Nations celebrates its International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. Established in 1977, it commemorates the anniversary of the General Assembly passing Resolution 181, the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, which called for the area to be divided into two independent States: one Arab and one Jewish.

In his official message, Secretary General Antonio Guterres noted that the situation in Palestine “remains a challenge to international peace and security,” and called for the international community to “reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the Palestinian people in their quest to achieve their inalienable rights.” He also referred to the “Occupied Palestinian Territories” and called for a two-state solution “based on the 1967 lines.”

It is incredibly odd but unfortunately telling that neither his nor any of the other UN statements commemorating the day even mentioned the very relevant fact that on Nov. 29, 1947, the Arab world rejected the UN’s Partition Plan.

Rather than declare a peaceful Palestinian State, the Arabs chose to instead declare a genocidal war—which they then lost. The rejection of the Partition Plan (and the ensuing decision to attack) is one of the main reasons why the Palestinian question remains unresolved.

Real solidarity with the Palestinian cause would include being honest about the full history of Nov. 29, and acknowledging the real-world consequences of decisions made that still affect the Middle East today. At the time, the UN blamed the Arabs for the violence and aggression that was clearly meant to undermine the Resolution and forcefully take land. Two of the five armies that invaded Israel, Jordan (in the West Bank) and Egypt (in Gaza), illegally occupied territory that they had taken through aggressive action expressly forbidden under international law. In 1967, Israel regained those territories in a defensive war under Article 51 of the UN charter. Ironically, to give meaning to the “1967 lines,” as the Secretary’s statement does, is to retroactively ratify aggression against the UN’s mandate and support illegal occupation.

The United Nations fails the Palestinian people every time it emptily reaffirms its commitment to their national aspirations while ignoring the missteps their leaders have taken on the path to its achievement. Today should be a time to take serious stock and recognize what is and is not possible. It is not possible to turn back the clock to November 29, 1947, and to completely erase the bloody effects of some very bad decisions. But it is still possible to fulfill the spirit of the UN Partition Plan—two nations, Israel and Palestine, living peacefully side by side.

To that end, Israel has repeatedly offered plans for division of the land, some of which were even supported by much of the Arab world. Israel has already given back over 87 percent of the territory it regained in 1967, and at various times in recent history has offered up to 99.3 percent of the remaining disputed territory, plus tens of billions of dollars, all in exchange for peace. Some of the Israeli plans even called for the division of Jerusalem. Each time, however the Palestinians refused, for the same reasons they rejected the Partition Plan—they do not recognize Israel’s legitimate and historical claims to these same areas, and they are thus unwilling to share.

Part of that unwillingness relates to a fundamental misunderstanding that many people have about Israel, the Mandate, and the events of November 29. To be clear Israel’s legitimacy is not rooted in the beneficence of others. The Jewish people’s rightful claims predate the League of Nations, and precede the horrors of the Holocaust. In the early 20th century Jewish people came from around the world to buy and cultivate land in order to further expand the existing Jewish communities that had remained in Israel as a continuous presence since Biblical times and throughout all their exiles. As Winston Churchill, then secretary of state for the colonies, explained, “When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine … but the further development of the existing Jewish community … [I]n order that this community should have the best prospect of free development … it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance.”

This year, November 29 also happens to fall on the first day of Hanukkah, when Jewish people around the world commemorate the Maccabean victory over the Seleucid Empire in 164 BCE and the rededication of the Temple in Jerusalem. Later, when Antioch VII demanded the return of land the Maccabees had won back in their defensive conquest, Simon, the last remaining brother of Judah Maccabee, responded: “We have not taken strange lands, nor are we ruling over foreign territory. We have returned to our ancestral inheritance.” (1 Maccabees 15).

As King Solomon, the Jewish king who ruled that same territory roughly 700 years before the Hannukah story, famously said, there is nothing new under the sun. While Jewish leaders celebrated Nov. 29, 1947 as the day that the world again recognized those claims, no one gave Israel to the Jews, and therefore no one has the right to ever take her away.

The real lesson of November 29th is that the Arab world made a critical mistake in rejecting the UN’s Partition Plan and ignoring the Jewish people’s legitimate and indigenous claims. But that does not mean there cannot be hope for a better future. Standing with the Palestinian people does not mean offering empty platitudes. Real solidarity requires being honest about hard truths and competing but legitimate claims, so that the same mistakes are not repeated over and over again.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Proud to have served the IDF and the U.S. Army

By Jeremiah Rozman

As Veteran’s Day approaches, I feel inclined to reflect upon my privilege to have served in the armies of the world’s most important guardians of freedom. As a Jew, I see the IDF as my people’s most important defensive institution: Israel’s military might ensures that Jews will “never again” be defenseless. Israel has a global role in terms of protecting Jewry, but its military is primarily concerned with its immediate region. The United States has a global role as the leader of a broad coalition in defense of global freedom. It has an expeditionary military to match this mission. Although both militaries face common challenges, they are designed and postured for different missions. This reflection is not intended to critique either military;  I simply offer my story and what I consider to be an interesting comparison of certain aspects of my service in each of them.

In 2005, I immigrated to Israel with the dream of fighting for Jewish liberation. My father risked his life to teach Hebrew and keep Judaism alive in the Soviet Union. His father fought the Nazis in the Soviet Army. I was also strongly influenced by stories of partisans and Jews who fought the Nazis and fought to secure Jewish self-determination in Eretz Israel. I see modern Israel as a direct continuation of Jewish history; a new chapter from the biblical era. I could not pass up the opportunity to serve in what I consider to be the direct legacy of the army of King David. My three younger siblings each made aliya and served in the IDF as well. 

In 2006, Israel sent me to a military ulpan where I spent three months in immersive study of Hebrew and Israel’s culture, history, geography etc. with motivated immigrants from several countries. In 2007, I joined the Golani infantry brigade and served all over the country. I saw combat in Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip.

My other grandfather was a Washington D.C. native who served in the U.S. Army during WWII. The U.S. was the haven where my family built a successful and dignified life. Having served in Israel’s military, I felt the duty to serve the U.S. as well. After two years of working as a national security analyst, I joined the U.S. Army and earned my commission in July 2021. I served as an enlisted combat soldier in the IDF in my teens and early twenties. Now in my thirties, I am a combat support officer in the U.S. Army's Chemical Corps. My service in each army has been rewarding in quite different ways. Nearly everyone inevitably asks me how these two armies compare.

One major difference, especially important for me, is religious life. Being Jewish in the IDF was easy. Being an observant Jew in the U.S. Army has been more spiritually challenging. However, the U.S. Army has always done its best to accommodate my religious needs. While I have certainly encountered much good-natured curiosity, especially as I prayed in my Jewish religious garb after breakfast in formation on each day of basic training, I never experienced even a shred of antisemitism. Isolation from a Jewish community has been my biggest challenge thus far. Chaplains and organizations like the Aleph Institute have been extremely helpful.

The IDF and the U.S. Army have some interesting training differences. In the IDF, non-combat basic trainees undergo brief training that can last as little as two weeks. All U.S. Army soldiers undergo 10 weeks of basic combat training due to the U.S. military’s expeditionary mission which deploys support components into combat zones.

Naturally, basic training in an all-male infantry unit in the IDF was more physically demanding than the basic training that I went through for non-infantry soldiers in the U.S. Army. IDF infantry basic training is probably more similar to U.S. Army infantry training at Fort Benning. Basic training in the U.S. Army is more difficult in other ways. For instance, U.S. Army trainees have their phones locked away and do not leave post until the 10 weeks are through. Trainees in the U.S. Army were more than slightly jealous that in the IDF you usually get your phone for an hour at night, go home on many weekends and can even smoke cigarettes if so inclined.

Another major difference is how IDF infantry trainees conduct all of their training in battle-ready kit, while the U.S. Army strictly regulates access to live ammunition. Having loaded magazines in the barracks in basic training strikes U.S. soldiers as inconceivable. Even more shocking is that IDF soldiers, even in basic training, take their weapons home with them.

Another major difference is the commissioning process. In the U.S. Army, receiving a commission requires a college education. In the IDF, soldiers that prove themselves capable leaders are selected at an early point in their career to go to the IDF’s officer academy and earn their commission without a college degree.

In my experience, without exception, the IDF has a reputation for professionalism and skill. I have heard this from U.S. soldiers of all ranks, from non-commissioned officer (NCO) professionals to high ranking officers. I can say from my time in the IDF that the respect is mutual. 

The U.S. Army and the IDF have much to teach each other. The IDF excels in urban operations, counterterrorism, linking industry to defense needs, and military intelligence. The U.S. Army has vast expeditionary combat experience, unparalleled logistics and an NCO corps that sets the gold standard for professionalism. Both countries’ soldiers share the warrior ethos of bravery, resilience, intelligent initiative and ethical conduct in combat. 

I intend to serve as defense attaché to Israel. My deep familiarity with Israel and the IDF gives me a unique ability to enhance the working relationship between two countries that I believe are forces on the side of good in the world. I am proud to have served both the IDF and the U.S. Army. 

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Cyber-attacks show Israel’s need for cyber defense directives

By Doron Tamir

The recent cyber-attack by the Black Shadow hacking group on Israeli websites – among them the LGBT dating application Atraf which was subject to  a ransom demand and then a leak of account usernames when that demand wasn’t met – could be part of a larger Iranian cyber attrition campaign.

 It is important to clarify what precisely was targeted in this attack, and why the lack of an official cyber law in Israel is generating  confusion over the division of labor regarding data protection in the vulnerable private sector.

In the cyber world, internet service providers (ISPs) like NetVision, whose servers are used by the company that created Atraf’s website, are similar to a hotel or pizza franchise: The ISP ‘rents’ out its servers, enabling others to host their websites on them to create a logistical communications infrastructure.

Next in the cyber chain are the companies that create websites and applications – in this case, a company called CyberServe.

CyberServe was, in fact, the target of Black Shadow’s attack. These types of companies build websites according to the tailored needs of clients and hosts them on its servers.

Clients who request such websites, – be they dating websites or motorcycle stores –  often don’t understand the cyber world and therefore turn to companies to outsource their online needs.

Black Shadow conducted a double infiltration in this incident: Firstly, of CyberServe’s servers, and secondly of Atraf’s apps and websites (as well as other Israeli websites).

CyberServe provided the ‘structure’ for Atraf, and it was CyberServe’s servers that were infiltrated, meaning that the internet service provider, NetVision, is not responsible for the situation.

This, then highlights, a real problem when it comes to cyber security in Israel at this time. Despite Israel being the ‘start-up nation,’ and a world leader in cyber technology, the country’s private sector lacks clear directives over how to set up fortified cyber defense.

Just as a dentist can’t legally obligate someone to brush their teeth or to be vaccinated, the same is true regarding private sector entities and cyber defense. When Israel set up its National Cyber Security Authority, it began supplying lots of advisory material to the private sector, but none of it was binding.

Similarly, the Justice Ministry’s Law, Information and Technology Authority, which even has the power to raid homes in connection with cyber-crime investigations, does not have enforcement capability when it comes to cyber defenses.

Ultimately, this means that chaos characterizes private sector cyber defenses in Israel and, and only a cyber law can address this problem adequately.

Currently, only a few states like Singapore and the United States have such cyber laws, which delegate explicit cyber defense responsibilities to various actors.

In Israel, cyber security is more in oral law format than written law. As a result, it is not totally clear who is responsible for enforcing cyber security standards. The Israeli National Cyber Security Authority can define strategy, policy, budgets, objectives, and desirable levels of protection. But it cannot deal with each individual company or business organization. This creates gaps that can be exploited by malicious actors.

The ability to break into tens of thousands of private accounts on a dating site is a terrible breach of privacy. It does not require hugely sophisticated capabilities, but rather, the ability to exploit standard weak locations.

Unlike the cyber-attack on Israel’s Hillel Yaffe hospital, which involved the encryption of the hospital’s website, and an attack on the option to cancel the encryption, this latest attack was much less sophisticated.

Attackers breached a company whose job is to defend its customers. Now, CyberServe is facing collective legal action, and its chances of winning in court are not high.

Still, CyberServe could argue, based on the absence of a cyber security law, that the company is not legally responsible for security.

As for the perpetrators, it is reasonable to assume that Black Shadow is an Iranian cyber group, which, like other such groups, operates under Iranian supervision.

It is safe to assess that the groups divide up attacking roles among themselves, with the overall goal being to harass the State of Israel as much as possible. This won’t lead to a collapse of the state, but it will disturb it.

Such incidents also harm Israel’s image as a cyber power.

Now, the most important mission is to track the incident back forensically and identify the attackers. This is a difficult process with its own operational doctrine. It is, simply put, a major headache, and one that not all companies have the ability to undertake.

The incident ultimately underscores the conclusion that the time has come to beef up Israel’s current, and partial, cyber defense regulations.  

Clear legislation will stipulate what web service providers must deliver for their clients, and will make it more difficult for groups like Black Shadow to exploit indifference to the issue of cyber defense.

Not every company needs nuclear power plant-level cyber defenses, but between that and having no defense in place there is a large spectrum of security solutions.

The question of how much each company is willing to pay for this capability boils down to a question of cost-benefit considerations.

As time goes by, increasing numbers of companies will realize, as banks already have, that a percentage of their income must go into cyber security, because the cost of failure is far higher.

The latest attack on an LGBT dating application is not the attack that can bring down a state. But it is another razor cut, in a wider Iranian strategy of ‘a thousand cuts,’ that is designed to harm Israel.

On the other hand, when compared to the cyber strike on gas stations around Iran, which some reports have attributed to Israel, it would seem that the two countries do not have equal cyber offensive capabilities, are not even in the same league.

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Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

Reflections on Veterans Day

By Micah Jones

This Veterans Day has a particular weight that I have not felt in years past. Normally a day for me to think of my relatives’, friends’, and my own service to the country, this Veterans Day is particularly significant for two reasons: (1) it marks the first year in which I have been a Veteran longer than I have been on active duty; and (2) it has viscerally reminded me of the importance of what it means to serve in the wake of the United States’ catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan and our betrayal of our Afghan and NATO allies.

I was honorably discharged as a Captain in June 2016, having served just over five years as an active-duty U.S. Army military intelligence branch detail infantry officer. I loved my time in the Army and I truly appreciated the opportunity to serve. Following in the footsteps of my grandfathers and father, I was proud to continue the family lineage of military service to the United States of America. In serving in the Army, I learned what it was like to be humbled, to suffer, and to overcome challenges that I would have previously viewed as unconquerable. In truly internalizing what it meant to put my fellow soldiers before myself, my military service made me a better civilian, a better husband, a better son, and a better man. To now have been a civilian longer than I was an active-duty soldier is a reminder that I will always carry those hard-earned lessons with me, no matter what my future endeavors may be.

This Veterans Day is also a reminder that one’s service does not cease when he takes off the uniform. The mindset of selfless service – and the importance of helping others – that so many other Veterans and I forged during our time in the military, is one that I will keep with me for the rest of my life. For the last two months, countless other Veterans and I have put that mindset to the test as we have been actively involved in helping our former Afghan allies and their families escape horrific fates from the Taliban. As I am still actively assisting a former Afghan colleague, I cannot go into much detail about my own personal involvement, but I can say that I have been working since mid-August in the Veterans’ network helping Afghan refugees. 

Never have I been so simultaneously disappointed in my country and so proud of my fellow Veterans as I have been since the United States of America’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. I believe that there was an unfathomable failure of leadership at the highest levels of the Pentagon, Department of State, and the White House, as we abandoned hundreds of Americans, deserted our Afghan allies, sold nearly 20 million Afghan women into lives of sexual slavery, and caused 13 U.S. service members to be murdered by ISIS-K.  But the Veterans network that I was so fortunate to be a part of demonstrated the warrior ethos of doing our best to not leave anyone behind.  From group chats providing the latest reports of what was happening on the ground in Kabul, to consoling each other during 3:00 a.m. phone calls when the horror of what was transpiring was too much to bear, the Veterans’ network was united in its mutual support and strength. 

No matter the branch of service, and no matter whether we all agreed on the nuances of the issues, the collective Veterans’ network was there for each other because we all shared a mutual understanding of what it was like to have served.  We knew that we were doing what we had been trained to do: to help those less fortunate and to represent the best values of our country. 

As I reflect on this Veterans Day, I will think of my family, friends, and fellow service members who have donned the uniform of one of the branches of the U.S. military in service to the nation.  Most of all, I will think of the Veterans who have continued to do everything they can in order to help Afghans and allies in need, as well as each other.  At a time in which the country can feel like it is at an inflection point, and coming apart at the seams, my fellow Veterans give me hope in the future of America because they know that no matter our differences, it is our common strength and identity as a nation that will carry the day.

So to my fellow Veterans on this Veterans Day 2021, thank you for your service to the country we love.

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Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. Read full bio here.

The Common Bond of Soldiering

By Geoffrey Corn

PROFESSOR OF LAW, SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW. US ARMY (RET.)

The eleventh hour, of the eleventh day, of the eleventh month: the guns fell silent on the Western Front. On Veteran’s Day we honor all those who wore a military uniform of our nation, but in fact the significance of the day is rooted in a much deeper recognition of the common bond of service that connects all veterans.

The armistice that silenced the guns on the Western Front in 1918 brought to an end the most destructive war mankind had ever experienced. Soldiers on all sides made enormous sacrifice, with millions killed or permanently scarred by the experience. These men did not choose to fight and almost never influenced the decisions that imposed such an immense burden they were required to bear. But they bore that burden as servants of their respective nations. While the nature of warfare has certainly changed dramatically since then, bearing this burden is a thread that connects veterans throughout history.

It is this devotion to duty and willingness to face immense mortal risk at the call of political leaders who decide when, where, and often how to fight that we honor on Veteran’s Day. And that is a common bond among all soldiers. Indeed, most veterans will tell you that the greatest reward of their service – often the thing that kept them in uniform – was being part of an organization with a common and unquestioned commitment to selfless service.

This bond transcends national borders; soldiers who serve together in coalition operations see first-hand that there while their uniforms and equipment may look different, the core ethos of service is indeed a common foundation of respect. Even former enemies often forge bonds of respect that grow from the one thing that connected both friend and foe in war: devotion to duty.

When I reflect on the many bonds that defined my 21 years of experience in uniform, my mind goes to many friends and colleagues whose uniforms bore the flags of different countries. Indeed, I was often in awe of the professionalism of soldiers I encountered who served other political masters. This has always been especially true of my many friends and colleagues who served or continue to serve as military legal advisors. My respect for these veterans resulted from much more than the professional excellence I came to expect in my encounters. It was the moral courage they consistently displayed and how this ethos enabled them to speak proverbial “truth to power” in relation to the myriad of complex legal compliance issues they routinely encountered when advising commanders faced with the unenviable task of leading troops in combat.

It might seem odd that my reflection on selfless service would gravitate toward law and lawyers, but in fact the responsibility of such uniformed public servants is increasingly central to the legitimacy of the causes their armed forces are asked to fight for. It is also a foundation for the common respect forged among veterans, even if it may be imperceptible to many. War, or more specifically participation in war, involves the use of immense destructive power and the infliction of undeniable human suffering.

But the authority to inflict that suffering is not unlimited, a principle of war at the very foundation of the legal regulation of war. As noted by one of the great commentaries on law in war, for soldiers this means that war does not provide a license to kill. But it also means that war, and the obligation of duty, involves a duty to kill. And, as another author and veteran of close combat in Vietnam noted so eloquently,

“War gives the appearance of condoning almost everything, but men must live with their actions for a long time afterward. A leader has to help them understand that there are lines they must not cross. He is their link to normalcy, to order, to humanity”.

Understanding and respecting those lines is the essence of duty; of selfless service; of professionalism in arms. Our collective respect for all veterans presumes, or so I believe, that their service was a manifestation of the complex responsibility to answer the call to arms but to also respect these lines. And when men and women are thrust into mortal combat, their ability to do so is indeed worthy of respect.

Like the origin of Veteran’s Day itself, the honor this day reflects extends beyond just those of us who served in the U.S. armed forces. Military duty is, ultimately, far more complex than merely obeying orders; it is the requirement to retain an innate sense of morality in an inherently immoral endeavor. Every man and woman who has been called to walk this complex tightrope that requires balance between violence and constraint is worthy of the respect central to this national holiday.

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Geoffrey S. Corn is the Gary A Kuiper distinguished professor of National Security Law, at South Texas College of Law, Houston, and a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Read full bio here.

The next pointless Gaza operation

BY Grisha Yakubovich

The fourteen years that have passed since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip have made it clear that the time has come for Israel to adopt a new strategy in dealing with the Gaza challenge.

The idea that in a future security escalation the State of Israel and the IDF will conquer Gaza, vanquish terrorism, and destroy Hamas’s capabilities is not relevant, even though Israel could certainly achieve this objective were it to decide to do so.

When it comes to a major Gaza offensive, the key question for Israel is not what it can do, but what is right for it to do.

Thus, while Israel is perfectly capable of launching a major air campaign and a ground offensive to topple Hamas in response to the next rocket barrage, it is the last thing Israel should do.

In the event of a full ground invasion, Israel would sustain enormous harm to its international legitimacy. Tens of thousands of Gazan casualties would likely result from such an operation, as well as hundreds of Israeli casualties. If Israel establishes a military government in Gaza to provide civilians with basic services – which it would be obligated to do in the event it toppled the Hamas regime – this would cost it 13 to 16 billion shekels per year.

A scaled down operation, involving only an air campaign – something Israel has done repeatedly since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, would provide no long-term strategic gain, as past operations have demonstrated. The most this would achieve is quiet for several months or perhaps even a few years, but it would fail to stop Hamas’s terrorism and it would not halt Hamas’s military force build-up.

The net strategic gain from such operations is therefore difficult to see. After multiple Israeli operations, Hamas remains in power, Palestinian Islamic Jihad remains intact, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) has almost no say about what happens in Gaza. Long-range rocket production, construction of tunnels, manufacture of drones, and development of a naval force have not stopped –  Hamas is investing millions in its military buildup.

So, what has been accomplished following Operation Guardians of the Wall in May? Hamas has, once again, been strengthened. When Egyptian delegations enter the Strip to facilitate mediated diplomacy with Hamas, the terror faction is perceived on the Palestinian street as ‘Jerusalem’s defender.’ Meanwhile, Hamas’s destabilizing activities in the West Bank challenge the PA and Israel alike, while the Islamist group is also active in Turkey and Lebanon.

It seems that no matter what military actions Israel launches in Gaza, Hamas returns in new sectors, like mushrooms after the rain.  Therefore, Israel’s first directive should be going after Hamas’s tentacles across the region rather than being dragged into Gaza.

In addition, decision makers in Israel need to consider that the next war in Gaza will serve absolutely no useful objective.  Every round of combat since Operation Cast Least in 2008-9 has left Hamas on its feet, emerging stronger than before.

Hamas has been engaging Israel in multi-domain conflict before the IDF even began speaking about the need to develop multi-domain capabilities. In the diplomatic, military, cognitive, and cat-and-mouse game of wits, Hamas has created a strategic challenge of the first order for Israel.

Hamas is aware of the limitations it has placed on Israel’s use of force, and the limitations it has imposed on Israel in the international arena, and this is the source of its daring.

As a result of the above, a new military strategy is critical for Israel. Signs of this new approach could already be seen during the May escalation, when Israel’s missile precision and ability to conduct pin-point strikes on Hamas targets were on display. Adapting the size of bombs to their targets in order to reduce noncombatant casualties was a key feature of Israel’s approach.  

This is a part of a global military trend in combat arenas that has seen the adaptation of warheads to the size of the target to avoid collateral damage in strikes conducted as a response to emerging terrorist threats –  this development results from an understanding of the limits of Western military power:

Israel relied more on cyber capabilities and targeted assassinations in the last round, and these tactics should be the seeds of Israel’s next response to a Hamas rocket barrage on Israeli cities. Instead of unleashing a time-limited ‘beast’ of an operation, Israel should declare an open season of highly surgical strikes, and pick off Hamas’s personnel and capabilities at such time that is beneficial to it. The next operation should not start as a declared operation. This can be announced ahead of time, or the government can wait to declare this new reality at the start of the operation.

There is reason to believe that Israel’s leadership is beginning to see the need for this shift. While any Israeli government always faces a political trap during security escalations, and public pressure to resort to familiar responses during Gaza escalations is acute, a greater trap would be to empower Hamas with yet another time-limited military operation.

No less importantly, on the diplomatic-political front, Israel must enable the gradual – albeit unofficial – integration of Gaza into Egypt.  Egypt is the party that is leading the reconstruction of Gaza today. Enabling Gaza to turn into a de facto ‘state between two states’ – Israel and Egypt – is a process that is already underway. Allowing this to happen would force Hamas to focus its energies on maneuvering in the Arab arena, which is a less comfortable arena for it than dealing with Israel.

Hamas could earn money on taxation of goods imported from Egypt, as indeed is happening today, while Egyptian-led international aid programs would help raise  the quality of life for Gazan civilians. The more Hamas can be tied down to dealing with economic civilian and political matters, the more Israel’s interest is served, and the further away the next war is pushed back.  This development would rob Hamas of its status as ‘defender of Jerusalem,’ and undermine its cognitive achievements from the May escalation.

Hamas desperately needs money for the stability of its regime. Israel’s central objective should therefore be to force Hamas to deal with its economic needs and to encourage it to abandon war  –  because armed conflict is Hamas’s bridge to increasing its power base in the West Bank.

War with Israel is what keeps Hamas relevant. Hamas needs casualties and headlines to dominate the Palestinian and Arab arenas, as well as the pro-Palestinian arena worldwide. On the other hand, Hamas being sucked into an Egyptian reconstruction plan serves Israel’s interest.

One must hope that the government in Jerusalem understands these strategic calculations and adopts them as it makes new decisions. The more Gaza is connected to Egypt and the less connected it is to Israel and the West Bank, the better.

This is the Palestinian-Israeli trap. Support for ’Two States for Two Peoples’ in actuality ends up meaning two Palestinian states.

Should Hamas once against flood Israeli cities with rockets, the government should take a deep, long breath, rely on Iron Dome to deal with the initial attacks, and then launch an open-ended campaign – a campaign of strategic attrition and targeted strikes, that could go on for a year or more, without any declared deadline.

The sell-by date of repeated Israeli intensive operations as a toolkit for dealing with Gaza has expired. Encouraging Hamas to engage on Gaza’s economy and dealing with Egypt, as it gradually melts into Egyptian influence, should be the new Israeli strategic game in town.

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Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

The PA sobers up on expectations from the Biden administration

By David Hacham

Just over a  year on from President Joe Biden’s election victory, the Palestinian Authority is showing signs of adopting more sober, realistic expectations from his administration.

One clear example is the understanding in Ramallah that the United States will not return its embassy to Tel Aviv from Jerusalem, and that the move to Israel’s capital is a fait accompli. Biden can’t simply turn the clock back.

In addition, the PA also appears to be coming to terms with the limitations of what Israel’s fragile coalition government can do in the Palestinian arena.

Despite the lack of any significant diplomatic-political developments on the Palestinian front, no new major crisis has developed in relations between the PA and Israel, or the U.S. That is because Ramallah now anticipates  a freeze in any diplomatic progress.

This was far from being inevitable. Following President Donald Trump’s failure to gain re-election, the PA and its President, Mahmoud Abbas, initially expected new American trends and gestures toward the Palestinians, characterized by support and more active American attention to the Palestinian problem.

Those expectations were accompanied by hopes that the U.S. would lead attempts to reignite diplomatic talks between the PA and Israel over a peace settlement, after almost a decade of stalled talks.

Today, however the Palestinian leadership is aware that current conditions simply do not allow for such developments. Israel’s unusual coalition make-up, in which right-wing and left-wing parties make up the government, means that policy changes on the Palestinian issue are practically impossible. In the U.S., the Biden administration is preoccupied with rebuilding the American economy, ending the pandemic, and dealing with China.

It is now clear to the PA that chances of any diplomatic breakthrough are slim to none.

This did not stop Ramallah from sending a detailed document to Washington containing a list of 30 concrete suggested steps to take in the Palestinian arena. These include consolidating the PA’s rule in the West Bank, strengthening the Palestinian economy, and raising the standard of living for West Bank Palestinians.

The rational for sending such a document is that the American administration can promote some of those recommendations quietly and discreetly. Specific steps listed in the document include increasing the number of permits for  Palestinians to work in Israel, enabling more family unifications of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, and enabling Palestinian construction in Area C of the West Bank.

Despite the aspirations detailed in the list, the overall assessment in Ramallah is that declarations on the Palestinian issue in Washington are little more than lip service.

This attitude found expression in a PLO Executive Committee meeting held on October 19 in Ramallah, chaired by Abbas. The Committee assessed relations with the U.S. after nine months of the Biden administration being in power, and noted the slow-motion political-diplomatic activity regarding Washington’s Palestinian policies, and the economic hardships faced by  the PA.

Still, the low expectations from the Biden administration can be seen in a different light when compared to Ramallah’s experience of four years of the Trump administration, which the Palestinians viewed as nothing short of a nightmare.

During that time, the U.S. recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moved its ambassador to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv, froze annual financial support to the PA, and ceased aid to UNRWA. The U.S. shuttered the PLO Office in Washington and sent the PLO ambassador packing. It also stopped financial assistance to the PA’s security forces.  

All of these steps were however overshadowed by Trump’s ‘deal of the century’ peace plan, which paved the way for significant Israeli annexation of the parts of the West Bank, and buried the idea of a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO based on the 1967 borders, which is the only concept that Ramallah supports.

When Biden dismissed the ‘deal of the century,’ sighs of relief in Ramallah could be heard loud and clear. That relief, however, quickly gave way to a realization that American activity to renew the political process between Israel and the Palestinians would be slow and sporadic.

Still, Washington restarted funding programs to the PA and UNRWA, and the Palestinians were clearly glad that Biden had won, despite the limitations that have come to light since his election victory.

This satisfaction, however, is intermixed with sober, limited expectations, after hopes that the U.S. would take a stronger stand on Israeli settlement construction were left unanswered.

When Biden said during his UN General Assembly speech on September 21 that the two-state solution cannot be realized at this time, the U.S.’s lack of any rush to invest resources in new peace talks became more apparent than ever.

Biden is busy with dealing with the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic and kickstarting the American economy. His administration has no plans under the current conditions to allocate attention to the effort to reach new Israeli – Palestinian political agreements.

The administration’s failure so far to appoint a permanent representative for Israel and Palestinian affairs is another sign of the low priority Washington assigns to this issue. Instead, it makes do with sending Hady Amr, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Israeli and Palestinian affairs, to the region on visits.

According to media reports, Israeli sources who met Amr on his visit in mid-July heard concerns from Washington about the PA’s economic situation, and pressure on Israel to assist Ramallah to avoid a cashflow crisis. This request was answered by Defense Minister Benny Gantz, who approved a 500-million-dollar loan to the PA, based on tax collection funds that Israel transfers to Ramallah (Israel has withheld some of this money over the PA’s practice of paying salaries to security prisoners and families of terrorists). In addition, Amr discussed ways to assist Gaza’s humanitarian situation following the May armed conflict between Hamas and Israel.

During his meeting with PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayah, Amr called for tighter relations between Washington and Ramallah, and for Israel to facilitate  Gazan reconstruction efforts. UNRWA announced a new cooperation agreement with the U.S. during the visit, according to which the agency will receive 136.8 million dollars, in addition to the 150 million dollars it already received from Washington, and a payment of 33 million dollars sent in May. Still, this assistance likely represents the limits of what the U.S. plans to do in the region for now.

Secretary of State Blinken’s harsh criticism of Israel’s decision to build 3100 housing units in the West Bank in October (alongside approval for 1400 Palestinian units) – all in Area C – represents minor pressure on Israel.

The administration’s condemnation of Israel’s decision to declare six Palestinian human rights organizations as entities tied to the PFLP terror organization led to a need by Israel to clarify its decision, and to explain the background and intelligence that drove it.

Ultimately, the U.S. is aware that applying too much pressure on the Bennett government and forcing its hand would expose it to destabilizing domestic pressure from the Israeli Right. This is something the American administration apparently wishes to avoid.

The Palestinians, for their part, have adopted a wait-and-see approach, and are patiently biding their time to see whether the Biden administration will provide them with more significant gains further down the road.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

A hardening of U.S. policies toward Turkey is in order

By Tomer Barak

Relations between the United States and Turkey in recent years have been characterized by deep tensions over a series of divisive issues at the heart of their bilateral relations. Moreover, the two countries have not managed to abate tensions even though they are NATO partners, with proper lines of communications between governments and militaries, and had good dialogue at the presidential level during the Trump administration.

Tensions between the two countries have increased in recent months. The latest meeting between Presidents Erdogan and Biden on October 31 on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Rome took place in a strained environment. Biden expressed concern about Turkey’s purchase of S-400 air defense batteries from Russia, and about the state of human rights within Turkey.

Statement from both countries, indicating willingness to establish a new “joint mechanism” to strengthen ties, did not disguise the growing gap between their leaderships.

Recently, Erdogan threatened to designate 10  foreign ambassadors –  including the American ambassador – as “persona non grata”, following a joint statement by the ambassadors calling for the release of a jailed Turkish businessman.  

The diplomatic crisis was quickly resolved and Erdogan backed down after most of the countries clarified that they did not mean to intervene in Turkey’s internal affairs. But the affair underlines just how fragile Turkish-Western relations are, and that Erdogan in not deterred from taking punitive steps even toward very powerful nations. 

The ongoing fallout from Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400 system from Moscow, and Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 fighter jet project, continue to reverberate.

Turkey is currently attempting to retrieve funds that it transferred in the past to the F-35 project –  a sum totaling, according to Erdogan, some 1.4 billion dollars. As an alternative, Turkey is willing to receive new U.S.-made F-16 jets, or to upgrade those already in its inventory.

Every transaction of this type would require approval from Congress where the current prevailing attitude to Turkey is highly critical of Ankara’s human rights record, its aggressive regional behavior, and its poor relations with Europe and the U.S.

Additional sore points – such as Turkey’s occupation of extensive areas of northern Syria, its aggressive conduct in Libya and the Mediterranean, illicit economic ties with Iran, support for Hamas, and the Biden administrations’ recognition of the Armenian genocide have all deepened the crisis in bilateral relations.

Washington’s policy to Turkey is binary. On the one hand, it still views Turkey as a significant partner and an important NATO member. As a result, the U.S. still attempts to safeguard continuous and positive working ties, as well as a dialogue between the leaderships. On the other hand, the understanding that Turkey is moving away from the West and is becoming a problem has sunk in. The U.S. therefore applies pressure and ‘sticks’ to prevent more negative conduct, with Congress appearing to be particularly hawkish in this regard. Until now, these efforts have led only to the most partial of successes.

Turkey, from its perspective, is skillfully maneuvering between the great powers. It is stretching the rope but not tearing it. It is exploiting opportunities to realize regional objectives, and to strengthen its strategic stability in northern Syria, Libya, Northern Cyprus, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey is also embarking on a military force build-up campaign using an array of defense product sources, while building its own domestic defense industry.

At the current point of time, it would be most beneficial to produce a stricter American approach towards Turkey, particularly in order to rein in its regional aggressive policies. In that regard, Turkey’s economic weakness at this time, and its severe currency crisis, could provide the U.S. and Europe with a needed and powerful leverage.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

Governments: Denounce Terror, Support Human Rights

By Mark Goldfeder

Last week the Israeli Ministry of Defense designated six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations. The internet immediately exploded with articles and tweets accusing Israel of trying to criminalize Palestinian civil society, while antisemitic activists like Rep. Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib called for “immediate consequences” for the Jewish State.

Even the State Department jumped on the empty virtue signaling bandwagon, with spokesperson Ned Price claiming, “We believe respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a strong civil society are critically important for responsible and responsive governance,” before adding that the U.S. will “be engaging our Israeli partners for more information regarding the basis for these designations.” For the record, Israel also believes in respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which is why they made these designations in the first place.

The six NGOs were included on the list because of their strong ties to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a U.S., EU, Canada and Israel designated terrorist organization. Among the problematic ties, these organizations have employed PFLP terrorists, diverted humanitarian funds from European donors to the PFLP, recruited members to the terrorist group, and hosted meetings for senior leadership including actual convicted terrorists. Far from being hidden or classified, much of the evidence is readily available, compiled over years by organizations like NGO Monitor, and it is important to note that the PFLP has not even bothered denying these connections.

Here is a small sample of that evidence: On August 23, 2019, PFLP terrorists detonated a roadside bomb and murdered innocent 17-year-old Rina Shnerb while she was hiking with her father and brother, who were also injured. Shortly thereafter, three PFLP members were arrested; all three were employed in senior financial roles at the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, one of the newly designated NGOs. In an official statement, the PFLP referred to one of those terrorists, who had led the operation, as a “commander, comrade, and hero.” The Bisan Center, another of the newly-designated NGOs, was headed by another one of the operatives on that very attack. As to the other organizations: Three Addameer employees appeared on the PFLP’s 2021 election slate; Defense for Children-Palestine is headed by two senior PFLP members; Al-Haq by a third (and a convicted terrorist to boot); and the Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees Vice President openly refers to it as the PFLP’s “feminist framework.”

Israeli law allows the Minister of Defense to declare an association a “terrorist organization” if it is: perpetrating or intentionally promoting the perpetration of terrorist acts; conducting training or providing guidance for executing terrorist acts; engaging in a transaction involving a weapon with the goal of perpetrating terrorist acts; or assisting or acting with the goal of advancing the activities of such a group.

It is hard to imagine that anyone is truly baffled by the idea that a humanitarian NGO—which may legitimately do some very good things­—could also be engaged in providing some material support for terrorists on the side. It is especially surprising for the State Department to express confusion about such a determination, given the nature of their own obligations under U.S. counterterrorism law. Moreover, 8 U.S.C. §1189 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate foreign terrorist organizations as such if they engage in terrorist activities. The statutory definition of “engage in terrorist activity” includes affording material support to a terrorist or terrorist organization even if such support is confined to non-terrorist activities. In addition, under 18 U.S.C. §2339, it is a federal crime to “knowingly provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization”—even if you happen to be a human rights organization that also does some good. Sadly, that happens not infrequently, and in 2014 the Financial Action Task Force, an inter-governmental money laundering and terror financing watchdog, issued a report specifically warning against the special risks proposed by non-profit organizations in this context. In fact, the leading U.S. case in this area, Holder v. Humanitarian Law, is literally and explicitly about human rights groups providing material support to terrorist orgs.

Price also claimed that Israel did not give the U.S. advance warning of the changes, but Israeli officials dispute this, saying they did give the Biden administration notice and proof, and are happy to do so again, with Israeli officials preparing to fly to Washington with evidence including “footage and receipts.”

To recap: The evidence that these six NGOs (at the very least) provided material support for terrorism is readily available and yet to be refuted; tellingly, none of the statements released by the various NGOs and activists condemning Israel bothered to actually address the underlying issue. Despite how it is being painted by reflexively anti-Israel groups and activists, including some members of Congress, the legal process Israel followed is not in any way unique. In fact, it is very similar to our own well-established practice. And if any of these organizations really do believe that a mistake has been made, there is an appellate procedure available, with claims to be submitted to the Advisory Committee regarding designations on Terror Organizations. Not surprisingly, none of the groups has yet appealed.

In the meantime, if all of those wringing their hands at the thought of these poor NGOs getting in trouble are really that concerned about their welfare, or even about human rights generally, there is one ready solution. The quickest way to solve this problem would be to stop focusing on how these groups ended up getting caught, and start pressuring them to actually stop supporting terror.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

The Kabul Debacle: A Catalyst for India-Israel Strategic Alliance

By Amit Kumar

With Afghanistan now anarchic and a breeding ground for Islamic extremists, the Taliban's presence in Afghanistan promotes ultra-orthodox Islamic culture, highlighting the retreat of the United States from liberal international ideals. The complex web of jihadi organisational networks (figure 1) clouding over from the East Mediterranean via India to Indonesia poses a national security threat to both India and Israel, among other nations. In theory, the Taliban is the epicenter from which all jihadist organisations radiate and receive spiritual and material support during a crisis. Taliban vying for legitimacy from China, Pakistan, and cross fertilisation with major terror groups - Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and Haqqani - is a lethal concoction for the peaceful and secular world.

The Taliban's takeover has sent a clear message to other terrorist organizations that a glorious victory is achievable in the end. While these Islamic extremists' actions and interests differ, their ideology and terror motivation make them a security hazard. In the absence of America's security cover, secular democracies - Israel and India - are under grave threat and require reengineering of their strategic bilateral partnership against the developing intricate network of terror hovering over a large region.

Figure 1: Disturbing Web of Terror Organizations hovering over Eastern Mediterranean via India to Indonesia (Built upon Philip B. K. Potter’s diagram)

Converging Security threat for India & Israel

The Taliban's integrated jihadist network has strong roots in Pakistan - Haqqani, Al Qaeda and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM); the changed geopolitical dynamics offer Pakistan an advantage in nurturing, training, and sponsoring terrorism, which would fuel its goal of making India bleed through a thousand cuts by intensifying terrorist operations in Kashmir. Furthermore, China's financial and low-cost defense technology assistance to Pakistan and Afghanistan will worsen India's counter-terrorism efforts. The escalation of tensions between China and India, guerrilla organisations in Myanmar trained by the Chinese Communist Party, and an increase in insurgents from the Pakistan and Bangladesh borders will result in a security nightmare. 

Iran's cultivation of the Shiite Crescent, explicit backing for Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, and its nuclear ambitions, constitute a significant threat to Israel's security in the Gulf area. The changing dynamics between Iran and the Taliban will support the radical objectives of Iran's proxies - Hamas, Palestinian Islamist Jihad, and Hezbollah - in exchange for legitimacy and support against ISIS. This would contribute to what Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander General Hossein Salami refers to as Iran's "strategic objective of eliminating Israel off the world political map."

With the United States withdrawal, the overarching security cover is blown, further fracturing the power equilibrium and creating a hegemonic void. Furthermore, the emergence of the Taliban at the crossroads of West and South Asia exacerbates the already fragile security environment. The disposal of modernised armament left behind by the Americans is what makes the Taliban and its offshoot jihadi network formidable. Additionally, China, in its self-interest of preserving its western border, Uyghur nationalism from radicalization, and Belt and Road investment, was keen to recognise the Taliban as a legitimate authority. China has a long history of assisting authoritarian governments through financing and high-tech low-cost weapons, such as Iran in the Gulf War, while maintaining plausible deniability. Its symbiotic relationship with the Taliban will dramatically increase the latter’s firepower, leading to proliferation to other terror organisations.

The emerging geopolitics have driven unrestrained Islamic extremism to unprecedented heights. This necessitates a reorientation of security policies of both India and Israel. Since they share a fundamental apprehension of existential threats and a common interest in defending borders and upholding democratic ideals, both need to deepen their strategic ties and develop a well-coordinated system of efforts for their converging interest to contain and thwart threats emanating from Islamic radicalization.

Deepening of India-Israel Strategic Cooperation

India and Israel must broaden and deepen their collaboration to strengthen security against the region's developing terror network. Joint defense manufacturing and weapons production, including missiles, AWACS, radars, 3D printed weapons, and drone technology. More R&D is urgently needed in electronic warfare, space warfare, cybersecurity, sensors, artificial intelligence, and defence subsystems. Technology has emerged as an engine of security, which Israel's brilliance and India's size can fully utilise. The battle-hardened Israel and India should annually hold Blue Flag drills to boost special forces capabilities, including cross-border counter-terrorist operations. This will provide their armed forces a qualitative military edge, boost interoperability, and present a united front against Islamist extremists. The high degree of mutual trust should unleash full exchange of military and intelligence sharing between R&AW and Mossad.

India should flex soft power muscles and Israel's Abraham Accords to acquire the trust of Arab countries in order to safeguard the region from extremism. In the absence of America, Israel's comparative advantage in the armaments industry, the Abraham pact, and India's links with the GCC nations should garner support to fill the security void. Because of the altered geostrategic environment, the two nations must develop a situation-based strategic collaboration to combat terrorism.

Conclusion 

The Taliban's incapacity to rule and secure Afghanistan will feed regional terrorism. China's economic incentives for the Taliban, along with the United States' retreat, have increased the morale of Islamic extremism, resulting in national security implications for India and Israel. The failure of the world's major powers to intervene in Afghanistan against Islamist extremists has ripped a vacuum in security leadership that must be filled by the combined efforts of Israel and India. India's military and security supremacy in South Asia, combined with Israel's offensive and defensive technical marvels and unfettered access to American high-grade weapons, can defend the region against a complex web of radicals. The Taliban’s takeover provides Israel and India with the opportunity to take their strategic partnership to greater heights, with the potential to become an alliance against Islamist radicals and to resist China's expansion.

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Amit Kumar is a doctoral student at BITS PILANI in India. His primary study focus is China's relationship with Islam. Amit has worked as a Political Researcher for the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, India's National Political Party's youth wing. Read full bio here.

To Address crime in Arab sector, Israel Must re-establish sovereignty

By Gershon Hacohen

The Israeli government recently approved a new plan for fighting rampant crime in the Arab-Israeli sector, but this plan is just the latest example of a refusal by the state to recognize the deep structural issues behind the problem.

At a superficial level, the problem is violent crime, and the requisite solution would be to battle inequality, as well as treating the phenomenon as a crime problem only.

In reality, the criminal patterns on display are deeply intertwined with nationalistic sentiments that reject the sovereignty of Israel as a Jewish state.

Between the lines, it is this sentiment that guided several Arab-Israeli Knesset Members to reject an initiative to send in the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) into the Arab sector to take on crime.

But if the police alone face the problem, it is doomed to fail, as police lack the critical mass of personnel required to focus on crime hotspots.

Sufficiently massing forces, and persistence, are the twin tools needed to truly begin lowering crime levels in the Arab-Israeli sector. A lack of either will guarantee mission failure.

Part of the blindness to the problem stems from the idea that all problems in human societies are universal and all people are the same. But such wishful philosophies should be replaced with more accurate theories, such as the one proposed by the American Jewish thinker Daniel Goldhagen, who clearly grasps that particular issues affect particular people, and that not all afflictions are universal. Societies also have differing wishes and expectations.

When dealing with human action, it is essential to always ask what the overall rationale is, unlike the analysis of natural phenomenon, which can be explained purely through a break-down of unintentional processes.

Those who cling to universalist explanations will not be able to drill down to the real motivations behind crises faced by different societies.

While the idea of improving socio-economic conditions in parts of the Arab Israeli sector is a legitimate goal, it is not an adequate explanation for the spiraling levels of violence. Nor can merely ‘bringing in professionals’ to diagnose socio-economic ills and prescribe remedies seriously change the situation.

Rather, Israel must do as the French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, recommends, and to ‘love others as they are different.’

This means recognizing the ‘otherness’ and responding to it in policies designed to deal with cultural uniqueness, rather than universalism.

In light of the above, throwing more money at the problem of violent crime is ignoring the rationale being manifested through widespread lawless behavior.

That rationale is a religious-nationalist undercurrent that rejects the very sovereignty of the Israeli state.

Failing to recognize and respond to this emerging phenomenon will result in a further loss of control.

In 1976, after the first Land Day, in which Arab Israelis held demonstrations and disturbances, and clashed with security forces, resulting in six people killed, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin set up a committee of inquiry.

He later accepted that inquiry’s recommendations to improve Arab civil rights – a worthy goal in and of itself - but he also stressed that what the state is offering is a fostering of religious-cultural existence – not a separate ethnic-national Palestinian entity within the Jewish state.

Rabin’s clarity on that matter must guide Israel today as it deals with raging violent crime in the Arab sector.

While the vast majority of victims of Arab crime are themselves Arab-Israelis, the drug dealer who feels he can open fire in a drive-by shooting acts with immunity because he has the backing of his family and clan. Even if the gunman’s family goes on to fear him, they initially enabled him to act because his crimes were perceived as a chipping away of sovereignty.

The power projection and ‘respect’ placed on violent criminals goes hand in hand with a perception that the Jewish state should not be applying its sovereignty.

As a result, we have today reached a situation in which special police units have to accompany the Tax Authority when it collects taxes. Once sovereignty fails to be applied, the meaning is clear: Sovereignty has been lost.

This is visible in the Negev and the Galilee in the most explicit manner. It is also why criminal guns were turned against Jews during the May escalation with Hamas in Gaza.

This then is the underlying structure fueling the violence within Israel.

There is no doubt that many Arab Israeli citizens are actively asking the state for help, and many are suffering greatly from the crime raging in their communities.

But helping them – and the state – means recognizing that the criminals are operating with substantial nationalistic-religious baggage as well.

Understanding this will enable the state to win the campaign. Israel has no option but to activate force – in a moderate and selective manner – by focusing large-scale deployments on violent hotspots. 

In recent days, the government announced that it would send two Border Police battalions – around 1,000 personnel – to the Negev to deal with Bedouin crime issues. When I was commander of the Gaza disengagement, I focused 20,000 security forces on the Nave Dekalim Jewish community which was being evacuated, an area the size of one neighborhood in Beersheba, and the entire disengagement ended within five days without a single casualty.

This is the advantage created by injecting a critical mass of forces. When dealing with national events, sending in inadequate forces can create dangerous situations that actually increase the chance that deadly force would be required.

Large forces, on the other hand, accomplish just the opposite, enabling greater control.  

Persistence and the deployment of large-scale forces are therefore the basic conditions needed to restore Israeli sovereignty and to really bring down violent crime that is plaguing the Arab-Israeli sector today.  

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Major General Gershon Hacohen served as Commander of the Northern Corps of the IDF. He previously held various positions, including Commander of the IDF Colleges, Head of Training & Doctrine Division in the General Staff, Reserve Division Commander of the Northern Command and Commander of the 7th Brigade of the IDF Armor Division. Read full bio here.

Hospital cyber ransom attack is not ‘more of the same’

By Doron Tamir

The recent cyber ransom attack on the Hillel Yaffe Medical Center in Hadera should not be mistaken as just another cyber incident.

The group behind the attack, Deep Blue Magic, is a top-level cyber-offensive outfit that is well versed in bits and bytes and has caused havoc around the world.

While previous high-profile cyber-strikes on Israeli targets, such as the November, 2020 ransom attack on the Shirbit insurance company, were widely believed to be Iranian proxy attacks on Israel disguised as criminal incidents, in the case of Hillel Yaffe, the ransom attack appears to be authentic – and likely a game changer.

Hillel Yaffe is a government-owned hospital, meaning that it is the government – in this case the Health Ministry backed by the Israel National Cyber Directorate –  that is responsible for responding. The attackers likely were not aware that a government-owned hospital would  opt to not pay the ransom, unlike some privately-owned hospitals that might be tempted to choose a faster solution.  

The hospital remains under attack, and it appears as if not all of the details about this incident have come to light.

Until now, most ransom attacks in Israel have either been tests of capabilities, or decoys to distract attention from larger cyber operations. There have been few instances of actual ransom attacks, in which attackers usually ask for small amounts of money to return critical servers and files to the victim. Usually, in such cases, the attackers ask for a few thousand dollars – and they do this from many victims, rather than seeking millions from a single target.

Within hospitals, there are two types of computing systems. The first system is a logistical system, which handles functions such as registrations, the monitoring of drug distribution, and other activities. These activities represent around half of all patient care. The networks also contain the private medical details of patients.

The second type of system – the more ‘frightening’ kind of target – is operative, and is used to keep surgery theaters, life support,  dialysis, and medical robotic machines running. Some hospitals disconnect such systems from one another, creating independent computing systems – but this is far more difficult to defend against cyber events. Other systems run on a single, holistic cloud server, and here, defense is easier.

Yet neither of these models are immune to cyber-attacks in any way. Over the past five years, health systems have been the number one  target of cyber-attacks in the United States.  Those attacks have mostly seen data privacy breaches, but there have also been more severe types of incidents.

The Hillel Yaffe hospital attack falls under the category of a severe attack.

The importance of awareness

In the immediate timeframe after the incident, a hospital can switch to manual care for patients, and this is likely what Hillel Yaffe chose as its initial response. Surgeons can still operate and doctors can still prescribe medicines without computers. But in the modern world, this set up cannot continue for more than a day or two.

The hospital’s back-up computer system also appears to have been taken out, meaning that this option for returning to normal is not available.

As a result, the Hillel Yaffe incident is a serious source of concern, and does not represent ‘more of the same’ in cyber security incidents. The level of disruption is extensive, and not easily neutralized.

Many of the medical computing systems are used by personnel who are simply not aware of the security world. This lack of awareness constitutes a serious problem. Nurses who hit ‘enter’ after distributing blood pressure pills need training on how to keep the system secure.  

Financial organizations like banks have already grasped the importance of awareness, and know that without it, they lose money. Hospitals can lose patients without sufficient awareness.

It seems reasonable to assume that cyber authorities in Israel are now gathering forensic information in an effort to track down the attackers.

Yet days after the incident began, it has not ended, and this is a reflection of how extraordinarily disruptive the attack has been.

Incident management is a key area in the cybersecurity world, and it is an area organizations must be prepared for in the event that prevention efforts fail.

An Israeli company called Demisto enables automated responses to cyber-attacks, and is an example of where cutting-edge technology is headed in this regard. Demisto’s system, once activated, scans the attacked computer system, identifies weaknesses and locates the presence of malicious programs, thwarting them – all without human intervention.

The fact that the Health Ministry, which is responsible for hospital cybersecurity, did establish a solid protection system, backed by the Israel National Cyber Directorate, and that the attack still occurred is evidence of the severity of this event.

In addition, the fact that the attack has yet to be resolved also testifies to the seriousness of the event.

As the forensic investigation into the attackers makes progress, Israel and other countries around the world will have to be on even higher alert for such incidents.

The Hillel Yaffe incident has generated significant public relations for ransomware attackers, and could serve as encouragement for more.

We have reached an important junction. A powerful hacking group created chaos in a government-owned hospital, and even when Hillel Yaffe returns to normal, the cyber war will not end. The next incident is just a matter of time.

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Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

Dealing with an intransigent Iran

By Yochai Guiski

This article is the third in a series dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. The previous installments dealt with Iran’s unwillingness to return to the JCPOA and China’s increasing importance to the Iran nuclear file.

The concrete possibility that Iran is not interested in returning to the JCPOA and merely wishes to attain sanctions relief through negotiations (“result oriented negotiations” as the Iranians put it) is now clear to decision makers in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.

Furthermore, they now also understand that the current situation is untenable as Iran is no longer checking its nuclear program, and is willing to be bolder in its use of force, including harassing, attacking and hijacking ships.

As Europe (and the IAEA) are still heavily invested in the negotiations track it must fall to other players to deal with the implications. This means the US and Israel should swiftly plan and develop a strategy that should address three distinct issues:

·     Crisis planning and management, as part of moving Iran from its sweet spot of never-ending negotiations, and the application of pressure to get the situation under control both in the nuclear realm and regional security one.

·     China’s role vis-à-vis Iran, as its influence could be paramount if it chooses to engage on the matter. Russia has also an important role to play, as it is still shielding Iran from scrutiny by the IAEA.

·     Creating a better situation to deal with a “no deal” reality.

To that end, Israel and the U.S. should first agree on a set of priorities and acceptable outcomes. Even if Israel is not thrilled with the prospect of a U.S. return to the JCPOA, and the U.S. is wary of using non-diplomatic means to prod Iran form its current trajectory, there should be room for understanding and executing a shared strategy.

In order to have the best chance of success, additional Arab partners should be approached, consulted, and integrated into the strategy as they are major stakeholders in the Iran issue and possess additional tools and capabilities vis-à-vis China and Russia (oil and gas), as well as against Iran.

A major part of the strategy should be addressing China’s role and engaging it diplomatically to use its influence on Tehran. China’s involvement may come at a certain cost, but ultimately it is also in its best interest to keep the region from escalation. Gulf nations should play a major role in engaging China since they represent another vital interest for the middle kingdom.

As the U.S. is disinclined to wade into the non-diplomatic realms it should nonetheless aid Israel in applying pressure on Iran and preventing it from further expanding its destabilizing role in the region. A U.S.-Israeli agreement on these issues could lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive strategy involving additional U.S. partners in the region.

Such an arrangement would allow both sides to act while not surprising each other and could be the cornerstone for a new U.S. security architecture in the Middle East, as it plans to turn its attention to the Indo-Pacific. Dealing with Iran that way may also give the U.S. insights and experience in “grey zone” operations that are necessary for strategic competition elsewhere.

At the very least, the planning and strategizing process could put both countries on better footing in order to address a possible aggressive Iran under its new hardline leadership. After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the drawdown of combat operations in Iraq, Iran may see an opening to cement its grip on the region and further escalate the pressure on U.S. partners in Iraq, Yemen the Gulf, and possibly even against Israel.  

Israel should also focus on diplomacy with the two other world powers and describe, in no uncertain terms, the dangers posed by a nuclear Iran:

·      The countries of the region would see Russia and China as culpable for their economic and strategic support for Iran if the regime emerges from the current situation as a nuclear actor. Iran is already viewed as an existential threat to many countries in the region and they would not easily forget that.

·      As Iran grows in confidence, the leverage of Russia and China on Tehran would decline. Iran would emerge as a competitor to Russia’s oil and has already tried to get involved in the Caucasus (threating Azerbaijan). Regional instability would also undermine Chinese interests in the region including much needed energy supplies and strategic projects that are part of the “Belt and Road” initiative.

·      Israel should press Russia to back the IAEA demands to verify and investigate probable violations of the NPT safeguards. As long as Russia prevents any action vis-à-vis Iran by the nuclear watchdog, brazen Iranian activities will increase and Russia may find it very difficult to get Iran to adhere to the NPT (not to mention the JCPOA) if it is left unchecked.

Iran has shown it is willing to go to great lengths and endure economic and humanitarian hardships (sanctions and rampant Covid-19 surging through the country), in order to avoid making concessions in the nuclear realm. Iran has also doubled down on its regional activities targeting various countries with missiles, drones, and cyber-attacks, while providing its militia proxies with advanced weapons and financial aid.

All of the above shows that Iran would remain a regional threat, and it would pose an enduring challenge to the security of the region and to the interests of the U.S, and Israel, and their partners.

But Iran is not invincible, and its rise is not preordained – its resiliency is suspect, it is an oil and gas producer in a decarbonating world, and the climate crisis is likely to hit it hard. Showing Iran an unyielding and united front that is willing to act against aggression, while offering it a diplomatic solution (backed by China and Russia) to truly address its nuclear program and make sure it never gets a nuclear weapon is still the best option.  

The U.S. and Israel should not shy away from developing both lines of effort.

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

North Korea’s arms set to influence the Middle East

By Yair Ramati

The weapons industry worldwide is flourishing. But while sales of classic military platforms – tanks, planes, and ships – have not stopped, it is UAVs, projectiles, and munitions, both offensive and defensive, that are driving the industry forward.

While in the past, the great powers – the United States., Russia, and China – had a monopoly over advanced armaments, today medium-sized and even small countries are producing them as well. North Korea, South Korea, Iran, and Turkey all manufacture advanced military equipment. Israel, of course, does too.

Against this global backdrop, it appears as if the flow of weapons from the Democratic Republic of North Korea to Iran is set to once again influence the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

Some waves of North Korean force build-up have in the past reached Iran and its proxies – either through direct technological transfers from Pyongyang to Tehran, such as missiles, or through ‘twists’ that the Iranian weapons producers conducted on North Korean technology.

North Korea is rapidly accelerating its force build-up, and this is likely to result in new weapons ending up in the hands of Iran.  Among these new weapons are  a combination of high-level technologies and products, such as submarine-launched cruise missiles and air defense systems.

This time, the direction of ‘traffic’ could be two-way, with Iranian drone technology possibly heading in the opposite direction from Iran to North Korea. 

Pyongyang has an economic interest in selling its arms to the Middle East, and its technology has significantly influenced Iran’s missile program. Mutual visits between Iranian and North Korean defense and weapons industry officials are routine.

As global tensions rise, including in southeast Asia, North Korea is ratcheting up its arms development. The past has demonstrated that this affects the Middle East, fueling Iranian capabilities and ambitions.

Just as Iran has in the past taken Russian missiles, such as the Kh-55 air-to-surface cruise missile, turning it into three different Iranian missiles, it will likely do the same when it receives North Korea’s domestically produced cruise missile.

These types of technological transfers fuel Iran’s weapons industries, which are decentralized and run along parallel lines to encourage competition and creativity.

In Iran today, multiple weapons production centers are active, with tension between them, in a way that is reminiscent of Israel’s defense industries in the 1970s and 80s. Even today, Israeli defense companies compete in producing missile defense systems, for example.

The South Korean connection

Meanwhile, as its arch-enemy North Korea develops new arms, South Korea is stepping up its own domestic arms industry production – and this trend will result in new competition in export markets for Israeli defense companies.

Israel already competes with Turkey’s weapons industries, which have deployed a modern armed drone, the Bayraktar TB2, used effectively by Azerbaijan in the recent Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and which has been acquired by Poland.

Thus, the U.S., Russia, and China are no longer the only major armed UAV exporters.

These developments also mean that traditional arms proliferation treaties are gradually losing their relevance.

The U.S. could no longer limit South Korea’s initiative to build missiles beyond the 300-kilometer range, enabling Seoul to develop missiles that cover the whole of North Korea –600 miles. South Korea also has missiles that have ranges of beyond 700 miles. This represents another step in the erosion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The latest example of this is the U.S. decision to sell submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles to Australia, as part of its nuclear-propelled submarine deal. Until now, only Britain has been allowed to purchase Tomahawk missiles. Thus, another erosion takes place.

In summary, the world of armament industries is flourishing in an unprecedented manner, as medium-sized and smaller countries become significant players in the market. North Korea is producing a whole spectrum of armaments, and these will, in one form or another, find their way to Iran, influencing the Iranian threat profile faced by Israel.

Meanwhile, Israeli defense industries must prepare themselves to compete with South Korean for exports.

And worldwide, arms treaties are beginning to recede as they lose their gravitas.

With precision weapons becoming ubiquitous, Iran and its proxies are able to proliferate this technology, and Israel and Saudi Arabia have been the chief countries to suffer from this in the Middle East.

Air bases, a major tool for power projection, are under increasing threat from precision firepower, and Israel as well as regional pragmatic states need to think of new ways to counter the threat, including the formation of their own active missile units for returning fire in ways not dependent on fighter jets. 

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

A solution to antisemitism in the media

By Mark Goldfeder

Axel Springer, the publishing giant that just bought Politico, made waves last week when its CEO said in an interview that he wants all staffers to adhere to companywide guiding principles, including support for “Israel’s right to exist.” As Mathias Dopfner explained , this is simply part and parcel of his newsroom expectations for unbiased nonpartisan journalism.

Dofpner’s statement drew immediate criticism from those who see recognition of Israel’s right to exist, and a newspaper's requirement that those who report the facts not openly deny them, as a company enforcing “propaganda.” Articles twisted Dopfner’s words to make it seem as if he required everyone who works for him to actively support the Jewish state. To be clear, Dopfner never said that anyone could not or should not criticize the state of Israel or vociferously disagree with any or all aspects of its policies or leadership. All he said was that he did not want to print lies pretending that Israel does not have a right to exist — a right that even Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, has openly affirmed .

If you cannot tell the difference between acknowledging Israel as a legitimate country and “partisan propaganda,” you might want to ask yourself whether you might be harboring some antisemitism. Here is a simple test: Are there any other countries in the world that you dislike and think should not exist? If the answer to the second question is no, then the answer to the first one is yes.

The pushback in this particular episode is surprising only because Israel’s right to exist should have been a fairly easy line to draw in the sand. Usually, the antisemitism in legacy media newsrooms is a little bit more nuanced. Still, there are times when it positively screams out.

In July of 2020, for example, former New York Times opinion editor Bari Weiss resigned, citing, among other things, alleged instances of unlawful discrimination and harassment. This included being called a Nazi by her colleagues and hearing disparaging comments about how often she would write about “the Jews.” In describing the editorial policies of the New York Times that she could no longer abide by, she called out a comparative willingness to amplify antisemitic voices without caveat as opposed to other problematic or controversial statements that received disclaimers. Casual antisemitism in the media is not really surprising and has not gone away — it’s just not every day that an editor confirms it.

The truth is there have been entire books written on the New York Times and its biased coverage of both Jews and the Jewish state. Sometimes it gets caught , and when the bias is egregious enough and there is overwhelming pressure, it apologizes . But more often, this bias goes unchecked because it is so routine that it has just become part of the background.

To be fair, the New York Times is not alone in its not-so-subtle antisemitic slanting. Study after study, report after report, and book after book after book have documented the persistent media stereotypes and misrepresentations that are contributing to a rise in antisemitism around the country and around the world — a fact made even more incredible given that research shows many people actually believe the antisemitic claim that Jews control the media.

The normalization of antisemitism in public media forums — from the lowbrow rants of John Oliver and Trevor Noah to the interview with proud antisemite Alice Walker that Weiss mentioned in her letter — allows hateful rhetoric, including classic and surprisingly unoriginal antisemitic motifs , to seep into public consciousness. What then should be done?

Over the last couple of years , there has been a very public pushback on cancel culture, with an accompanying desire to hear more about fixing than firing, to use identified problems as teachable moments that can perhaps effect real change. There is incredibly important work being done now on racial equality and gay rights, yet at the same time, there is another slow-boiling problem that needs to be addressed. In that spirit, what can we do about persistent media bias so insidious and deep that editors often seem unable to detect it, even when it is literally highlighted ?

Here is one solution, or at the very least a concrete first step toward eliminating conscious and unconscious antisemitism in the media: Journalists should adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism and refrain from publishing anything that violates its terms.

This idea is hardly radical, and I am not the first to propose it. Indeed, several other people and groups are working on similar initiatives, including Jeff Ballabon, formerly a senior executive at CBS News. But recent events, and particularly Axel Springer’s announcement, make the timing right for this to finally happen.

There must be some objective standard for what is and is not acceptable, and the IHRA definition is as close to a consensus as it is possible to get. It is already used by the federal government, the 31 member countries of IHRA, almost all 50 countries that comprise the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Commission, the European Parliament, Australia, Serbia, Bahrain, and Albania. It has been endorsed by a growing number of world leaders, including U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and adopted by a growing number of universities. It is used by a variety of intergovernmental agencies, including the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and nongovernmental agencies, including the Iraq-based Global Imams Council. While it is not an exhaustive definition, its use as a standard in media will increase the awareness and understanding of the parameters of contemporary anti-Jewish discrimination.

The IHRA definition is particularly helpful precisely because it includes useful examples of discriminatory anti-Israel statements that cross the line into antisemitism. Legitimate criticism of Israel is explicitly fine under IHRA, and if you are merely criticizing Israel, even harshly and regularly, then signing on to such a statement should not affect your writing or publishing one iota. If you are actually demonizing and delegitimizing the Jewish state or applying a double standard by requiring of it behaviors not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation, then maybe your paper should stop and think twice about the impression you are giving with your coverage.

It might be challenging at first to swim against the current, but when the world is finally recognizing that the current is antisemitic, it is time to take the plunge.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Gaza: An unofficial calm takes hold

By David Hacham

The current situation in Gaza can best be described as de facto, but not de jure calm.

It is a calm that has been led by Egypt's effort to promote a longer-term arrangement in Gaza, as part of its interest in re-establishing itself as a leading player in the Arab arena, by fulfilling an active central role in Palestinian affairs.  

In addition, Cairo wants Egyptian companies to take part in projects aimed at rebuilding Gaza and to take advantage of budgets allocated for that purpose.

Hamas, for its part, is motivated to maintain the calm in order to reap maximum benefits from it. Meanwhile, Hamas is diverting the conflict with Israel toward the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and it hopes to also get Arab-Israelis involved.  

The ongoing calm in Gaza has been bolstered by the authorization of 6,000 work permits for Gazan workers and traders to work in Israel on a daily basis. Tens of thousands of Gazans signed up at trade bureaus in Gaza to work in Israel, signaling the importance of working in Israel for them in light of Gaza’s severe economic crisis.

There is a continuous flow of goods entering Gaza from Israel via the Kerem Shalom crossing, including products and material such as wood and steel. Humanitarian assistance enters the Strip on a daily basis.

Reconstruction of civilian infrastructure, following the May security escalation between Hamas and Israel, is occurring under the leadership and auspices of Egypt.

There has been no significant progress on negotiations between Hamas and Israel to secure the release of the remains of two IDF personnel killed in the 2014 conflict in Gaza as well as two civilians being held captive in the Strip. There has been plenty of psychological warfare and disinformation by Hamas on the issue, giving false impressions of progress, when in fact no such progress has been made.

Although Israel has conditioned significant Gazan recovery efforts on progress on the MIA issue, it has not objected to Egyptian efforts to lead Gazan recovery programs from its side, via the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Sinai.

Egypt has been moving construction equipment, workers, engineers, and infrastructure and road-building materials into Gaza, with the backing of the U.S., and in coordination with Israel.

This role serves Egypt’s interest of playing an active role in Gaza following the May military escalation, and as part of Cairo’s campaign to display its centrality to regional stability to the Biden administration, which recently reduced its annual military aid to Egypt in protest over human rights issues.

Meanwhile, Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel is leading the mediation efforts between Israel and Hamas over the MIA issue, with Germany also taking a part. However, those efforts are largely redundant in light of the fact that Egypt has become the outlet for Gaza’s construction – and large-scale Gazan construction efforts have been a key Hamas condition for undeclared calm.

Ultimately, Egypt’s interest is also to keep Gaza contained and to prevent a new escalation, as such an escalation can also spill over into the Sinai, where ISIS remains active. The U.S., recently sent its Deputy Assistant Secretary for Israeli and Palestinian affairs, Hady Amr, to the region to promote Egypt’s efforts.

The above factors contribute to an overall assessment that Gaza is headed for a quiet period, albeit temporary. Israel is certainly a part of these efforts, easing certain security restrictions, and allowing materials that it previously barred to enter from its territory into Gaza.

In October,  Hamas sent a delegation for talks in Cairo, after an Israeli delegation visited the Egyptian capital.

Hamas sent its upper leadership to Egypt. The delegation discussed the MIA issue, assistance to Gaza from Israel, and possibilities leading to a fuller arrangement with Israel.

The Hamas delegation was headed by the organization’s political bureau chief  Ismael Haniyeh and included the head of Hamas in the West Bank, Lebanon-based Salah Al-Arouri, who is responsible for terror activity in that sector, as well as the head of Hamas’s overseas bureau, Khaled Mashaal, and the head of Hamas’s Gazan political bureau, Yahya Sinwar.

The delegation held prolonged talks with Kamal, and with members of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate.  It was the first time in a lengthy period in which the most senior Hamas operatives from leadership ranks – from both the territories and abroad – visited Egypt.

Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate holds the Israeli-Palestinian portfolio, and it is in charge of coordinating contacts with the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. The Directorate’s chief mission is to deepen the calm in Gaza.  

The visit displays a willingness by Hamas to acknowledge Egypt’s leadership role, and to hold a dialogue with Cairo over ways to promote a longer-term arrangement with Israel.

As behind-the-scenes diplomacy continues, Gaza is entering a time of several weeks of quiet, with Hamas seeing some of its core demands accepted and met – albeit unofficially.  

Qatari cash has also been flowing in for needy Gazan families, and recent Hamas demands for more Qatari money to enter are fairly standard. Qatar’s envoy to Gaza, Mohammad al-Emadi, visited the Strip in recent days, signifying that the Qatari involvement and cash assistance remains active and in motion. Hamas is intent on setting up a fixed mechanism for allowing the third part of the Qatari grant money to arrive, and assist some 30,000 Hamas government employees receive their salaries.

Hamas shares an interest in promoting calm, to serve its current goal of improving the socio-economic situation of Gazans – a goal it has pursued through violent extortion. It is therefore allowing a rise in the number of traders and workers who can work in Israel (and the West Bank).

As Hamas focuses on promoting an unofficial calm in Gaza, it has recently escalated its terrorist activities in the West Bank. A large-scale IDF counter-terrorist operation, based on Shin Bet intelligence alerts, earlier this month to disband an imminent Hamas plot to attack the Jerusalem area is evidence of these efforts.

Hamas’s demands of Israel to release large numbers of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for releasing Israeli MIAs and civilians are impossible for Israel to meet. While in the past it appeared as if this was a major stumbling block to stabilizing Gaza, it now seems that Hamas, Egypt, and Israel, backed by the U.S. and with Qatari cash, have found unofficial ways to enter into a period of calm – although no one knows how long it will last.

Despite Hamas’s maximalist demands on the MIA issue, Gaza has cooled off – for now. Hamas’s long-term objectives remain unchanged: Non-recognition of Israel’s existence, together with war against it and the establishment of an Islamic state on Israel’s ruins. 

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Three Things US Can Learn From EU'S New Strategic Plan

By Mark Goldfeder

Last week the European Commission, the Executive Branch of the  European Union, unveiled a new comprehensive EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life to address a significant increase in incidents around the 27-country bloc. While the United States has seen a similar trajectory, our federal government has yet to develop an encompassing governmental response to the problem. Perhaps the EU will inspire the U.S.

On a practical level, the EU proposal contains a number of concrete suggestions—including annual stakeholder forums designed to maximize the effect of joint actions and funding, and additional resources dedicated to better understanding and tracking the spread of online hate—that could aid in the fight against domestic antisemitism. More broadly, it addresses three crucial areas in which U.S. federal and state policy have been lacking: defining, monitoring and preventing antisemitism.

First, the Commission actively encourages all member states to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, an essential tool used to determine its contemporary manifestations. The federal government does use the definition, but some politicians have been hesitant to embrace it because among its illustrations of things that could contextually be antisemitic are examples of problematic anti-Zionism, and these officials are ostensibly concerned that embracing IHRA would somehow stifle speech. That argument, however, is a legal red herring and the EU did not take the bait.

Aside from the fact that IHRA itself distinguishes between criticizing Israel and antisemitism, the use of a definition alone simply does not silence any speech—it just allows people to label it correctly. You cannot fight what you can’t define, and what the EU got right is that the IHRA definition is helpful precisely because it includes those useful examples of discriminatory anti-Israel acts that can cross the line into antisemitism—for example, “holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.” No one who labels sexist speech sexist, or racist speech racist is accused of stifling speech. In fact, officials are often praised for using their own speech to condemn these types of (legal) expression, without crossing the line into censorship. Our government should, consistent with the First Amendment, follow the EU’s lead and actively promote the implementation of IHRA in anti-discrimination policies at all levels. If necessary, they can even issue a handbook (like the EU did) for IHRA’s practical use. Meanwhile, passing the bi-partisan bi-cameral Anti-Semitism Awareness Act, which reaffirms the use of IHRA on campus, would be a great step in this direction.

Next the EU recognized that under current reporting standards it is challenging to obtain reliable and comparable data on antisemitic incidents. The new plan commits resources to help Member States improve and align their methodologies for consistently recording, collecting and assessing information on hate crimes, including antisemitism. But those in the EU are not the only ones experiencing this problem.

In the U.S., under the Hate Crime Statistics Act (modified by The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act), the Attorney General, through the FBI, is tasked with monitoring crimes in which there was “manifest evidence of prejudice” against the victim’s race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or ethnicity. The FBI  relies on local law enforcement agencies to submit data, but thousands opt out of the reporting, and, according to one report, even “among the 15,000 that do, some 88 percent reported they had no hate crimes.”

One issue is the lack of definitions: That same report found that “investigators frequently did not mark down incidents as motivated by bias, even if there was evidence suggesting this was so—a spray-painted swastika, for example, might be classified simply as vandalism and not also as a hate crime.” In 2019 (i.e. just before COVID), the number of agencies participating further declined, but the number of reported hate crimes actually rose by 113 percent, including a 14 percent increase in anti-Jewish hate crimes. All across the country 63 percent of the total reported religion-based crimes were directed against Jewish people and institutions, and one can only imagine the real number. Standardized and aligning methodologies for federal reporting of bias incidents—including but not limited to the use of IHRA—would be helpful in making sure that the statistics about antisemitism more accurately reflect reality. 

Finally, the EU plan contains several affirmative steps to attempt to prevent antisemitic sentiments from flourishing. Acknowledging that ignorance and indifference are key culprits, it lays out a number of educational initiatives focused on celebrating Jewish life, culture and societal contributions, while raising awareness about antisemitism and the Holocaust. It also calls for the Commission to ascertain that there is no antisemitism in EU textbooks or classrooms, and to ensure that EU funds are not allocated to antisemitic activities. 

If only the U.S. would do the same.

In stark contrast, the same week the EU established these programs, Governor Gavin Newsom signed California’s Assembly Bill 101 into law, making ethnic studies a high school graduation requirement. While there is nothing inherently wrong about the idea, the first draft of the bill’s model curriculum was so stunningly, openly antisemitic that Newsom himself apologized on behalf of the State, called it “offensive in so many ways, particularly to the Jewish community,” and vowed the draft “would never see the light of day.” Legislators redid the course to make it less objectionable, and appended seven amendments to confirm against anti-Jewish hate being taught. As Tammi Rossman-Benjamin has noted, “the fact that no less than seven “guardrails” were deemed necessary for preventing AB 101 from facilitating the widespread promotion of antisemitism is itself a stunning indictment of the bill and the dangers it poses for Jewish students and the Jewish community.”  But aside from that, as the LA Times warned, these measures will actually do absolutely nothing. The bill still allows schools to use their own curricula, and multiple districts and teachers’ unions have already signed statements promising to use the original, highly antisemitic, version of the course.

It did not have to be this way. For example, the bill could have just required schools to use the new model, or to submit their own curriculums for review. But apparently, as the AMCHA Initiative (an organization which fought against the bill) explained,  the concerns of hundreds of Holocaust survivors and their descendants, dozens of religious, civil rights and education organizations, thousands of Californians, and hundreds of students and parents begging the government to protect them and their families from state-sponsored antisemitism simply did not matter enough. The onus now shifts to Jewish parents and children in each of California’s 13,000 school districts to fend for themselves against the harmful and long-lasting effects of antisemitic material being taught to their children in a state-mandated class. 

Unless, of course, the federal government, like the EU, steps in where they can and should.  

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs, and federal education funding is distributed to states and school districts through a variety of grants. A school district announcing its plans to teach discriminatory material is exposing itself to liability, and the Department of Education should proactively cut off funding from those who flaunt its rules. It should never have come to this, but the federal government must put these schools on notice that under Title VI they have an affirmative legal obligation to protect their Jewish students—even from their own teachers and unions if need be.  

The U.S. must do better, and do our part, in the global fight against antisemitism. That includes adopting and enforcing standards for defining, monitoring and preventing antisemitism. The tools are there, the time is now, and the EU has shown the way. 

If they can do it, so can we. 

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.