Jenin Operation Was Successful, But Israel needs a strategy.

By YAIR GOLAN

The two-day IDF raid on Jenin, which, unusually, began with the activation of UAV air strikes, was an operational and tactical success but strategically will change nothing so long as Israel’s government remains on its current course.

The decision to send a brigade-sized Israeli military force to deal with a security hot spot in the West Bank is not as new as it might seem; This was done regularly in 2005 (I led operations like this as commander of the Judea and Samaria Division), at the end of the Second Intifada.

Ahead of Operation Home and Garden, which took place July 3 and 4, the IDF and Shin Bet diligently collected the needed intelligence and decided to use UAVs to strike targets that were physically difficult to reach in the opening phase of the operation – representing good adjustment of munitions to challenges.

Operationally, the IDF successfully learned from recent past failures and improved its responses to security challenges. Previously, in Jenin and Nablus, IDF operations featuring ordinary infantry units in small numbers produced very high levels of friction with Palestinians, resulting in Palestinian noncombatant deaths and escalating the situation instead of stabilizing it.  

The IDF Central Command and the Judea and Samaria Division Headquarters concluded that there was a gap in their operational readiness and decided to instead send in the best of Israel’s special forces. As a result of the use of these highly skilled units, trained for this very challenge, there were no noncombatant deaths in the Jenin operation.

The terrorists of Jenin lost their motivation to confront the IDF when it sent its elite units in. Despite the tragic death of a soldier from the Egoz unit, F.-Sgt. David Yitzchak, in the operation, the elite IDF forces completed their mission of destroying extensive terrorist infrastructures in the city.

Strategically, however, a major gap exists between the sober and responsible approach taken by the heads of Israel’s defense establishment-- who understand that there is no silver bullet against terrorism and who seek greater involvement by the Palestinian Authority on the ground -- and the Israeli government, which lacks any strategy at best, and which contains elements that have messianic aspirations at worst.

While the IDF General Staff and Central Command understand that ‘mowing the lawn’ is necessary on occasion, the political echelon is marketing the operation as a paradigm shift – and in doing so is promoting a baseless claim.

The government in Israel today is paralyzed, and its approach to the West Bank cannot be clearly discerned. In 2020, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the Trump peace plan. The plan’s merits and faults can be debated legitimately, but it is a partition plan, which bypasses the painful issue of evacuating settlements and offers the Palestinians land compensation, including land from the Negev that would be annexed to the Gaza Strip.

Today, however, Netanyahu leads a coalition that is making every effort, including by elements like Finance Minister and Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich, to advance full Israeli annexation of the West Bank.

Smotrich adheres to a vision he laid out in 2017, according to which, Israel will exercise full control of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea; Palestinians who choose to live under Israeli rule will receive subject status, but not citizenship, those who decide to leave will be encouraged, and those who reject both options will be fought.

Who should we believe when it comes to West Bank policy? Netanyahu or Smotrich?

In all his years in power, Netanyahu has never made a strategic decision on this, the most sensitive of issues. Every day that Israel fails to decide, events on the ground decide for it, and the situation is drifting toward a one-state nightmare.

The overall silence in Israel over this state of affairs means that a minority on the far right has been able to force its view on the majority, leading to de facto annexation, fueled by a messianic ideology.

Those who believe Israel can annex millions of Palestinians are clueless about Israel’s international reality, dependence on the United States, and need for international trade.

Meanwhile, on the Palestinian side, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad extremists are leading Palestinians to disaster. The result is that in the absence of any change of strategy, the area is heading toward further bloodshed, regardless of how successful the Jenin operation was at the tactical and operative levels.

It was Carl von Clausewitz who said that war is “a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means.” Military achievements are supposed to serve as the basis of political achievements, but if this does not happen, their effects erode quickly.

The deep emotional ties held by Jews to the West Bank, known in Israel as Judea and Samaria, are completely understandable; the region is the cradle of Jewish civilization, and there can be no way to unlink Jews from sites like the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, or Shiloh, where the Bible tells us of seminal events in Jewish history. The land historically belongs to the Jewish people.

But this cannot translate into a reality in which Israel controls millions of Palestinians, a reality which, if unchanged, will eventually create international pressure that will lead to Israel’s collapse.

Hence, the operation in Jenin should be seen for what it is; the product of a highly competent military and intelligence community, capable of mapping out and dealing with security threats, but no substitute for real and needed strategy on the future of the West Bank. 

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Maj.-Gen. Yair Golan (ret.) is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He is a former deputy IDF chief of staff, and is Israel’s deputy minister of economics and industry. Read full bio here.

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Stop The Nonsense

By JUSTIN POZMANTER

It has now been over half a year of the ongoing fight over the judiciary in Israel. At this point, it is hard to conclude which side has lost the script to a greater degree.

 Israel is a democracy, and a very imperfect and messy one at that.

One side says there is a tyranny of the justices, the other says that if reform passes Israel will become a dictatorship. Both claims are dangerous and hyperbolic nonsense.

Israel’s judiciary does not function as it should. It is too powerful and relies on murky or undefined legal structures such as “reasonableness” to justify ruling as it pleases and to get involved in matters it shouldn’t. It is desperately in need of reform.

However, with it functioning as it has, Israelis and Israel’s supporters, across the political spectrum, have proudly stated for decades that we are the only democracy in the Middle East and touted our values and freedoms to the world…and we were correct in doing so.

Despite the need for reform of the judiciary, the reform put forward by the current coalition has been done sloppily, with a heavy hand and is a gross overreach.

But even if there is an over-correction that is democratically damaging, a legislature elected in free and fair democratic elections with too much power rather than an unelected judiciary with too much power does not a dictatorship make.

When you hear either side screaming about a coup, questioning the legitimacy of democratically elected officials, or claiming everything they don’t like is equal to a dictatorship, anarchy or a lack of loyalty to the country, it says a lot more about the speaker than it does the process of selecting judges or the precise application of legal doctrine.

It isn’t a coincidence that the very same people leading the protests were those leading the anti-Netanyahu protests years before the reform was introduced, or he was indicted. Nor is it a coincidence that those who are the most uncompromising on the reform are the same people who for years have slandered anyone to their left (which is nearly the whole country) as traitorous leftists.

It usually tells you more about how these “leaders”, a term that should be used very lightly, feel about the PEOPLE they oppose than the judicial system or legislation they support. They either don’t like those who have been in power for years (secular and Ashkenazi) or they are afraid of those who may be in power for years to come (religious, traditional, Mizrachi). Opposing, or overzealously supporting, people or personalities rather than ideas or policies is almost always a recipe for disaster.

This is not to attack on those protesting. The rights to free speech and assembly and the right to protest that flows from them are as fundamental as any rights that exist in a democracy. And I believe most protestors’ hearts are in the right place – in support or opposition. But it only takes about five minutes observing either side to see there is a sharp divide on religious/secular/Ashkenazi/Mizrachi lines which should give any sincere activist pause.

The real danger is not in the current judiciary or in potential reform. It is losing the very thing that allows Israel to survive against sometimes daunting challenges – our sense of shared purpose.

I was recently in the United States having a conversation over dinner about the dangers of social media for kids. Someone made the point that sometimes social media is positive for teenagers because it can give them a sense of community and purpose, they feel they are lacking.

I responded that may be true, but that I didn’t think it applied to Israel to the same degree. Israelis – with of course many, many individual and sectoral exceptions - generally feel a part of something larger, something to which they belong and are willing to fight to protect. That shared sense of purpose has allowed Israelis to overcome nearly constant economic, diplomatic and, of course, military and strategic challenges for years.

Later that evening in my hotel room I felt an overwhelming sense of unease that maybe what I was so sure of, what makes Israel such a special and resilient place, is nothing near a sure thing, not just long-term, but even in the immediate future.

The greatest risk of the fight over the judicial reform is that it seems to be a far more intense and comprehensive proxy battle for the other serious challenges pulling at the fabric of Israeli society. Isn’t it odd that the battle lines on this issue are so clearly drawn on religious/secular, Ashkenazi/Mizrachi, center/periphery lines?

There really should be no connection between sectors on this issue. Smart people can disagree on the relationship between branches of government, but there is no reason why where you come down on judicial power should be so directly connected to your salary, neighborhood, where or if you pray, or where your grandparents were born.  

How did we get here? Maybe the country was never as cohesive as we’d like to believe. Maybe it’s a consequence of greater polarization across the western world to which Israel isn’t immune. Or maybe Israel itself has in fact changed.

Two things are clear: 1. The blame game is pointless. There are many culprits, and nobody will admit anyone on their side is one of them; and 2. Israel won’t be the Israel that any patriotic Israeli or passionate Zionist anywhere in the world wants if we don’t find our sense of common purpose. I only hope we still can.

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Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

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Geo-political changes are challenging Israel’s strategic position

By DORON TAMIR

Israel is facing new strategic challenges as the result of international and regional geo-political developments, and events on the home front. The Israeli government should take note of these paradigm shifts and act systemically to counter them.

Globally, the Russian – Ukrainian war is increasingly a source of concern, together with challenges from China that are pulling the United States away from the Middle East, thereby negatively affecting Israel’s regional status.

With Russia escalating the war further, stability on the European continent is far from assured. The recent NATO-run multi-national air exercise is a late attempt by the West to boost deterrence against Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Disturbingly, the question of how far Putin is willing to go when pushed into a corner remains unanswered. These events have created shock waves for the global system and have also directly affected Israel’s hi-tech sector due to disruptions in supply chains.

The world’s banks and investment firms are anxiously looking at the conflict’s after-effects, coming so soon after the coronavirus pandemic.

Regionally, in the Middle East, paradigm shifts are underway: Saudi Arabia is talking to Iran, as is Egypt, and Syria’s President Bashar Assad, a mass murderer, has suddenly become a regional darling. Meanwhile, Israel is being increasingly endangered by the arsenal and actions of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon.

As the U.S. is focused on new tensions in the South China Sea and Russia, its weakness in the Middle East is the elephant in the room. The Biden administration’s successive failures in engaging with Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt plays directly into the hands of the Iranian led axis. 

In the Middle East, Israel’s traditional Arab partners – Egypt and Jordan – continue to maintain good cooperation with it, but Jordan’s ruler, King Abdullah II, is facing an increasingly difficult domestic position due to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict and sensitivities over Jerusalem.

Israel needs to be more attentive to Abdullah’s predicaments, since Jordan forms a crucial aspect of regional stability. This means ensuring the status quo remains unchallenged in the Temple Mount, for example, and avoiding irresponsible moves in this sector.

Egypt’s cooperation with Israel, despite the tragic terrorist attack launched by a rogue Egyptian border guard, remains a major strategic asset for both countries and a pillar of stability.

On the other hand, the fact that Saudi Arabia has established new ties with Iran is deeply troubling and is reflection America’s regional weakness.

Meanwhile, domestically, Israel has experienced unprecedented domestic instability and crisis over the government’s legal reform initiative. This has frightened American, European, and other investment firms.

Israel’s hi-tech sector, the main engine of the national economy, is robust, but it would be wrong to pretend that it has not suffered a major blow due to the domestic instability. Investment in Israeli hi-tech is at a five-year low.

In Europe, Israel’s situation is complex, with some countries, particularly in the center and east of the continent, supporting Israel, while others are growing increasingly critical of the Jewish state. The European Union in general is quite hostile to Israel, although Germany, the most powerful state in the EU, remains politically supportive, despite the erosion in Israel’s image there.

When taken together, a strategic deterioration is the inevitable conclusion.

To counteract these trends, the first and most important action that Israel should take is to strengthen its alliance with the United States. While ongoing cooperation in the military and intelligence spheres remain strong, political-diplomatic tensions between Washington and Jerusalem are eroding Israel’s overall strategic situation.

Bilateral defense ties can, over time, be affected by bad winds blowing from the relationship between the governments, and this is a risk that Israel should not take.

To be sure, the U.S. also gains from its military alliance with Israel, gleaning intelligence information that is supremely valuable for American security.

But the extraordinary alliance must be based not just on shared interests; it must also be based on shared values.

Be it access to world-leading F-35 jets, or to American support in the United Nations Security Council, the idea that Israel can get by without its alliance with America is simply detached from reality, despite the belief in this concept in some sections of the extreme Israeli Right.

Israel must take steps to stabilize its own political system and economy. It needs to resurrect the image of a strong, stable Israel, which knows what it wants and has clear strategic goals. To be seen again as a country with a prosperous hi-tech sector that is worthwhile allying with Israel must regain its stability. 

Moreover, Israel should pursue the goal of formalizing ties with Saudi Arabia, strengthening ties with Abraham Accord states, and decreasing tensions with Jordan.

Relations with these states are highly fragile and are subject to almost immediate changes each time significant developments occur in the Palestinian arena.

The Palestinian issue cannot, for its part, remain sidelined forever. Time is not on Israel’s side on this matter. Sooner or later, Israel will have to make strategic, fateful decisions on how it proceeds vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

The era of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is ending, and Israel must see what kind of leadership will take his place in Ramallah.

To be clear, there is no silver bullet solution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, particularly with Hamas ruling Gaza. But there are steps available to Israel and the PA that can neutralize and decrease much of the current tensions.

The Israeli government has much work at hand to reverse the current trend, and to begin improving Israel’s strategic situation.

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Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

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How Far Will Israel Go For Normalization With Saudi Arabia?

By Tomer Barak

In recent weeks, talk of progress in the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with American mediation, has resurfaced in the media.

The discourse on the subject follows two main focal points. The first is the apparent Saudi effort to show pragmatism, signaling to both the United States and Israel that 'there is something to talk about'. The goal is to score points in Washington, and as a result, receive various benefits.

The very fact that such positive Saudi voices exist, whether they have merit or not, has an impact on preparing the Arab street for some movement toward Israel in the future.

At the same time, growing voices in Israel and the U.S. are arguing that a new window of opportunity has opened for normalization.

A second media talking point focuses on the demands and conditions placed by Saudi Arabia for progress to be made. This discussion also brings to light the hurdles that stand in the way of the desired breakthrough.

This discussion focuses on four core Saudi demands:

The first is the need to complete the rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) in the U.S., as well as bring about a change in the broader American political perception of Saudi Arabia.  Both have been tarnished in Washington in recent years following the murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the war in Yemen, and more.

Mainly within the Democratic Party, Saudi Arabia is viewed as part of the problem in the Middle East, and not as part of the solution.

President Joe Biden will have to carefully consider his steps and decide whether the political achievements inherent in an Israeli-Saudi breakthrough are worth the political price he could pay in an election year.

The second challenge concerns a Saudi armament and security wish list containing advanced U.S. military capabilities and other security guarantees. In this context, the US will have to balance the preservation of Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), in accordance with American law, and with Biden's deep commitment to this principle -- as well as with the desire to strengthen an important regional partner as part of the regional campaign against Iran and the problematic Saudi track record regarding the improper use of U.S.-made weaponry in the Yemen war.

This balancing act will require a discourse with Israel, which for its part will also need to make decisions on how far it will acquiesce to Saudi expectations and refrain from objecting to arms sales to Riyadh, and whether it is prepared to make an active effort to counter objections in Congress.

The third challenge deals with Saudi aspirations to advance the Kingdom's civilian nuclear program. These aspirations include aspects of uranium enrichment on Saudi territory.

U.S. and Israeli officials have voiced over the years similar concerns regarding the proliferation of civilian nuclear technologies that could be converted into military capabilities. That is especially true in a country that has a history of hiding military capabilities and has cooperated with China on long-range surface-to-surface missile development.

The U.S. outline for an acceptable pathway for Riyadh on civilian nuclear progress, based on a limited model (like the one taken by the UAE, which gave up on uranium enrichment on its soil), is unacceptable to the Saudis.

The danger is that it will seek to develop its nuclear program via non-Western channels (China or Russia). Even if Riyadh does not create a linkage between the normalization process and progress in its civilian nuclear program, in the current situation, where China is gaining ground in the region, it makes sense for the U.S. (in coordination with Israel) to create a compromise sphere. In this sphere, Riyadh could implement its ambitions in a broader manner, but under very strict supervision mechanisms.

The final challenge is the Palestinian arena. On the surface, the escalation in recent weeks in the West Bank and the Israeli government's moves create an insurmountable obstacle for the Saudi leadership regarding any progress in the normalization process.

In the background is King Salman's traditional position, which places the issue as a main topic, unlike his son who is largely tired of the Palestinian issue and sees it as merely disruptive. Assumably, MBS would settle for a prolonged lull that would allow him to make progress in normalization.

It should be noted that the issue of the Palestinians has and continues to come up in American discourse on normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia -- though in this case, this seems to be the result of some leveraging the normalization option to pressure the Israeli government.

Some observers believe that the Palestinian issue can be placed on a lower level of prioritization and 'bypassed' through a series of relatively limited Israeli moves -- but even then, it is not certain that all members of the current Israeli government would see the moves in that way. Prime Minister Netanyahu could, however, try to market the political profit of such a maneuver and lead to their approval by his government.

So where do things stand?

There is no doubt that normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia is an important and very lucrative goal. There is good reason that it is considered the 'holy grail' of the Middle East peace process.

The process would, in theory and practice, constitute official confirmation of Israel's acceptance in the Middle East, and mark the end of the era of hostility with the Sunni bloc.

Normalization agreements would be accompanied by economic and other agreements that will create many options when it comes to regional connectivity, business cooperation, the development of interconnected infrastructure in transport and energy, joint climate crisis adaptation, and more.

In the face of the common Iranian threat, the security dimension is also of great importance. However, dangers are inherent in Saudi security and nuclear demands.

Points of balance can be found between Israel’s security needs and Saudi ambitions, as well as the common desire to build a regional system against Iran.

But it must be clear - Even if the U.S. is willing to go the extra mile toward MBS and even if the Palestinian issue is somehow set aside, Israel cannot and must not compromise on two basic demands: the preservation of its QME, and the prevention, or very tight monitoring, of any Saudi nuclear capability that could potentially enable development of military nuclear capabilities.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

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Lessons from the Ukraine war

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

Many lessons are emerging from Russia’s war on Ukraine, some of which are of much interest to Israel.

One key lesson Israel can learn at this stage is that its decision to install various defenses on armored vehicles is critical and will likely enable the success of future Israeli ground maneuvers—unlike those of Russia and Ukraine.

Before continuing, it is important to issue a disclaimer: The attempt to apply lessons from the war in Ukraine to the Middle East is by nature complex. Among other things, the two regions do not share the same geography, climate, population or adversarial forces.

At the same time, as the war in Ukraine goes on, strategists worldwide are busy taking notes and looking for tactical and strategic insights that can be applied elsewhere—and the same is true in Israel.

So, what can we learn?

During the initial stage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the war was marked by the failure of the Russian armored ground offensive, which invaded from the north towards Kyiv.

With time, we gradually learned that the offensive failed mainly due to logistical issues: Fuel and ammunition ran out and hundreds of tanks, APCs and trucks were abandoned or destroyed. Only some of these vehicles were hit and destroyed by anti-tank weapons, mainly Javelin missiles, which are devastatingly effective. It seems that armored maneuvers on long roads in dense anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) environments became too costly.

Israel, in contrast, has equipped a significant part of its armored brigades with active protection systems. This means Israeli maneuverability is relatively protected.

At the same time, using man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), the Ukrainian military brought down about 200 Russian attack helicopters and close air-support craft.

Israeli close air support relies on stand-off precision strike munitions that eliminate the need to fly low and close.

In the first three weeks of the war, Ukraine used its Turkish armed UAVs—TB-2 Bayraktars. Their effectiveness was marginal and Russian air defenses downed the entire Ukrainian fleet fairly quickly. Is this scenario currently applicable to Middle Eastern arenas? For now, the likely answer is not yet.

With Russia failing to destroy all of Ukraine’s air defenses, it resorted to using huge numbers of cruise missiles—over 5,000—and hundreds of ballistic missiles to attack deep in Ukraine. This was before Iranian-made UAVs joined in the Russian attacks.

At first, Ukraine’s air defense systems struggled to intercept the cruise missiles, giving the Russians deep-strike precision stand-off capabilities for a while. But gradually, starting at the end of 2022, Western air defenses replaced the older Ukrainian Soviet-made systems, and Kyiv could shoot cruise missiles out of the sky alongside ballistic missiles and Iranian Shahed 131/136 UAVs. The U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) 3 shot down  a few of Russia’s hypersonic Kinzhal missiles.

The arrival of the Shahed Iranian-made suicide drones, first used in Sept. 2019 against Saudi Aramco facilities, gave Russia a cheap, low-flying, precise firepower capability, which, together with the cruise missiles, are emptying out expensive Ukrainian air defense ammunition.

The warning here for Israel is clear. On the bright side, however, Israel’s Iron Dome interceptors are relatively cheap—up to 50 can be purchased for the cost of a single PAC 3 interceptor.

The bigger question for Israel stemming from the Russia-Ukraine war is whether Israel is correctly balancing its spending on armaments per million dollars as opposed to platforms. For example, should Israel purchase another squadron of F-35 fighter jets or spend the money on many more joint direct ammunition (JDAM) surface-to-air bombs, Iron Dome interceptors and 155-millimeter shells?

Meanwhile, Russia has fielded its own loitering munitions. One system, the Zala KYB, proved to be not very effective. The second, the Kalashnikov Lancet 3, has met with more success against Ukrainian targets such as radar installations, tanks, APCs and various air defense assets.

Ultimately, Russia’s long-range firepower threat remains substantial and Ukraine is using up ammunition in its air defenses at an alarming rate.

Ukraine, for its part, is missing key components in its arsenal that the United States has so far failed to deliver, such as heavy ground combat main battle tanks—the first Abrams tanks are not scheduled to arrive until the end of 2023)—aerial transport planes and long-range missiles.

However, Ukraine has made good use of anti-radiation missiles, such as high-speed radiation missiles (HARMs) that target enemy air defense radars and artillery-directing radars.

Ukraine is also heavily reliant on two types of U.S.-provided surface-to-surface guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS). There are two types: The M-142 launcher—a high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMAR)—and the M-270 guided rocket launcher.

Both of those systems provide Ukraine with a high and effective strike rate. The Russians are unable to intercept these weapons, forcing them to move their positions back from the front. This includes the relocation of key military headquarters and arms storage centers.

Ukraine has also received the Storm Shadow cruise missile from Britain, with a 250-kilometer range. The effectiveness of this weapon shows how important long-range, precision stand-off munitions are in modern warfare.

The West generally lacks precise surface-to-surface armaments that can reach targets 400 kilometers away. The U.S.’s own systems reach only around 300 kilometers, and they have yet to be delivered to Ukraine.

Israel, in contrast, has a range of high-precision long-range rockets in its inventory.

While the American weapons industry is supplying Ukraine with huge amounts of equipment and the White House keeps pumping cash into the Ukrainian war effort, it must be clear to Israel that no such precedent would be followed in its case. Israel will have to stand on its own two feet in the event of a major war.

Ukraine has 45 million people, not counting the five million refugees who have left the country. Russia's population is some 150 million. This means that both countries can put large numbers of soldiers on the ground. They have both sustained huge losses, but Ukraine has proven its long-standing fighting power, unity and national resilience.

These factors are not relevant to Israel, which can neither sustain such losses nor absorb warfare for that long without a rapid endgame due to its small geographical size and population. In Israel’s case, a ground maneuver will be essential as soon as the war begins.

The international community may condemn or even try to intervene in response to significant civilian casualties in a future Middle East war. Therefore, careful Israeli planning and strategic decision-making are crucial to executing a successful offensive while minimizing collateral damage.

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief: Terror Attack, Israel-Iran & The Economy

By Yaakov Lappin

Israel mourned four of its civilians on June 20 after they were murdered in a Palestinian shooting terror attack at a gas station near the settlement of Eli in Samaria. Armed with M-16s, two Palestinian gunmen affiliated with Hamas, but not official members of it, conducted the attack.

An armed Israeli bystander killed one of the terrorists at the scene, while the other escaped and two hour later was located and killed by a team of Israeli special forces and Shin Bet agents.

The attack is the latest escalation in what has been a long-standing deterioration of the security situation in the northern West Bank, prompting growing calls for a larger security operation.

The first signs of a new Israeli approach to security in the region emerged on June 21, when an Israeli unmanned aerial vehicle struck a vehicle carrying Palestinian gunmen on the way to carry out a terrorist attack, according to the IDF and Shin Bet.

Two days earlier, the Israel Defense Forces had to call in air assistance in the form of an Apache helicopter strike to assist stranded ground forces in Jenin on June 19

The use of air support reflects the worsening nature of the fighting in Samaria, where a routine security operation to arrest two terror suspects, one from Hamas and one from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, became entangled.

IDF and Border Police forces raided Jenin camp and engaged in intense exchanges of fire that resulted in the deaths of four to five Palestinian combatants. They, in turn, detonated powerful IEDs that caused a number of Israeli Panther armored vehicles to become stranded. Eight Israeli security personnel were injured in the incident.

When an IDF helicopter sent in to evacuate the wounded personnel came under fire, IDF commanders sent in air reinforcements, to enable the evacuation to proceed.

Looking at the bigger picture, it is clear that Jenin is out of control and that the likelihood of a large-scale IDF operation there is growing with time.

The Palestinian Authority in practice has no presence there, and it has become a major base of operations for terrorists, not only locally, but also from across the West Bank, who view it as a refuge. It seems that both terrorists and arms are flowing into the city.

The linkage between political instability and Israeli economic performance

After Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on June 18 that his coalition administration would go ahead with parts of its controversial judicial reform program, the shekel lost value, and Israeli shares were trading between losses and gains.

On June 19, a day after Netanyahu’s statement, the shekel fell as low as 3.61 to the dollar and was trading at 3.60 at the close of trade.

The blue-chip TA-35 index on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange was flat, while the benchmark TA-125 index fell 0.1%, the Times of Israel reported. The TA-5 Bank Index was down 0.4%, and the TA-Finance Index was down 0.6%.

The report cited Sabina Levy, head of research at Leader Capital Markets, as stating that volatility around trading in the exchange rate was mainly influenced by comments from Israeli government officials and reports around the plans for the judicial reform.

This is the latest unmistakable sign that Israel’s economy needs political stability and consensus politics if it is to continue to perform well, and that political instability threatens Israel’s economic future in a strategic manner.

The Israeli – Iranian arms race

On June 14th, Israeli defense company Rafael revealed that it is working on a new missile interceptor dubbed "Sky Sonic," which is specifically intended to counter the new threat of hypersonic missiles. The announcement came days after Iran announced that it is working on its first hypersonic missile, which it said is highly maneuverable and unpredictable.

Hypersonic missiles travel at high speeds like ballistic missiles do, but unlike ballistic missiles, employ high maneuverability to take unpredictable courses to their targets.

Ahead of the globally important Paris Air Show, Rafael released a statement calling its new interceptor a groundbreaking defensive response to the growing threat of hypersonic missiles.

A "major technological leap" with "exceptional maneuverability and high-speed capabilities," Sky Sonic "neutralizes hypersonic missiles, which travel at ten times the speed of sound, with unmatched precision and stealth," the company stated.

The interceptor operates above the 20-kilometer mark and below the 100-kilometer level, where hypersonic threats are active, and where current air defense systems are not.

According to the sources, the interceptor is programmed to intercept at an altitude and location that allows air defenders to avoid needing to know the precise onward trajectory of the threat, representing a breakthrough in air defenses.

A reliable source stated, "At that altitude, it doesn't matter where it [the threat] is going."

 When the system detects a hypersonic threat, the kill vehicle splits from the booster body and rapidly travels to a designated interception point.

Rafael sources further explained that the three-year development of Sky Sonic has been funded by the firm’s own research and development funds,  

According to the sources, the kill vehicle is equipped with its own sensors, but they would not elaborate on what those sensors are. The system will rely on a completely integrated "sky picture" provided by several radars, they added.

The system was presented to the US Missile Defense Agency.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Israel Tour For U.S. & Canadian Military Cadets, 2023

By ETGAR LEFKOVITS

Nearly 50 American and Canadian military cadets toured Israel and German death camps in Poland this month, in a trip that seeks to buttress the future officers’ awareness of the history and shared values at the core of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

The two-week Israel Strategy and Policy tour, which was initiated by the New York-based MirYam Institute in partnership with the U.S. Defense Department, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the Virginia Military Institute and the Royal Military College of Canada, presented past and present to the future officers.

The cadets’ trip began with a three-day tour of the Nazi death camps, followed by 12 days spent crisscrossing Israel, taking in the sights and meeting with IDF soldiers and commanders.

For the non-Jewish cadets on the tour, the country’s size, diversity, mix of modernity and ancient, and the inseparable integration of the people’s army that is the IDF, came as a revelation.

“I was surprised flying in how much smaller Israel is compared to the U.S. and how densely packed everything is,” said Ian M., 19, from Cincinnati, Ohio, a cadet at West Point. “I was struck by the mix of the modern infrastructure in such an historic place.”

Sohum A., 21, a future infantry officer from New Jersey, also attends the United States Military Academy at West Point.

“I was surprised by how in such a small country you have widely different people and cultures who through thousands of years of history maintained their own identity while simultaneously living in close proximity,” he said.

Macy H., 21, from Seattle, also a cadet at West Point, said, “I knew that the IDF was a conscripted army but it is amazing how the IDF is part of society and how society is the army, and how integrated and inseparable the two are.”

Melina B., 19, from North Carolina and the Virginia Military Institute, offered, “The passion that Israelis have for their country and maintaining this place where they seek refuge and are able to be free even though there are wars is striking.”

Mission-ready academies

The cadets came from a wide variety of backgrounds across the U.S., as well as a handful from Canada. They will be integrated across the military including, for the Americans, the Marines, the U.S. Army’s Armor and Infantry Branches, and the U.S. Navy during their multi-year service.

The trip sidestepped the Palestinian territories due to State Department-imposed security restrictions that did not allow them to enter the biblical heartland.

(Active duty officers on a separate tour that MirYam offers are provided with helicopter rides and briefings over Judea and Samaria, commonly known as the West Bank.)

“We seek to impact the leaders of today and tomorrow now,” MirYam CEO Benjamin Anthony said in a statement. “By exposing these officers to the broad array of policymaking considerations in Israel we assist the academies with their goal of building mission-ready academies.”

MirYam has brought hundreds of cadets and officers to Israel since its inception in 2017.

“The vast majority of the participants are not of the Jewish faith yet the connection they forge with Israel … is deeply rooted in shared values and common challenges to Israel, the U.S., Canada and the entire free world,” said Rozita Pnini, the MirYam Institute’s chief operating officer.

Willpower and resolve

“Seeing the sites of the biggest demonstration of antisemitism in world history showed us the power of having a Jewish state and better appreciate the willpower and resolve of the people of the State of Israel,” said Bethany J., 19, a future armor officer from Orlando, Florida, who attends West Point.

“My grandfather landed in Normandy during World War II and liberated some of the death camps,” said Alexander D., 20, a West Point cadet from Wisconsin. He recounted his grandfather’s harrowing description of seeing bulldozers pilling up bodies for mass graves.

During a visit to the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem, the group saw a video showing that same scene. “It made me realize why Israel is so important,” he said.

Ela F., 20, a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute from Gettysburg, Pennslyvania, said, “That feeling in my stomach standing in Auschwitz and at Yad Vashem will never go away.”

Not on the news

A recurring comment among the cadets was that Israel is not what you see on the news and is something you have to experience for yourself.

“The American people and the people of Israel share a lot of the same interests but from seeing the news headlines some people don’t realize this,” said Justin P., 21, from Washington, D.C., and the Virginia Military Institute. He called the trip an “eye-opening experience.”

Alexander D. added, “Standing on the Golan and hearing from the IDF soldiers makes you understand the significance of what the IDF is doing.”

Ela F. said, “You expect fear, but you see the day-to-day life of the clubs, parties, beaches and nightlife of Tel Aviv as people go on with their lives.”

Paul M., 20, also from Washington, D.C., and the Virginia Military Institute, said, “The ability to discuss things openly despite the proximity to danger and not get rebuked by your flag officer really struck me.”

Melina B. said, “These are things you can’t get from reading a book, watching a video or watching the news. You have to have your foot on the land.”

The cadets said that the news from Israel was one of rockets raining down on the country, Israeli attacks on Palestinians in Gaza, or a government in turmoil, a picture of a country constantly at war externally or internally.

“You are not getting the full story in the media,” Alexander D. said.

“They talk about the conflict but never tell you about the fundamental history,” Paul M. said.

“Israel has a PR crisis,” Ian M. said. “Remind people why the Jewish state has to exist. If people understand that they will have much more sympathy.”

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Benjamin Anthony is Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, Benjamin brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. Read full bio here.

Israel is Soft on “Soft Power”

By Chuck Freilich

“Soft power” is a function of a state’s ability to achieve its national security objectives through the appeal of its culture (arts, science, economy), the moral authority of its ideals (human rights, equality, democracy), and the quality of its domestic and foreign policy, rather than by coercive means. The more universal a state’s values, the greater its soft power.

In its early decades, Israel enjoyed great soft power. The horrors of the Holocaust created international sympathy and support for the Jewish people. Israel’s heroic early years were the subject of books, movies and song. The pioneers who reclaimed the ancient land and the kibbutz, came to epitomize Zionism’s attempt to build a new and just society.  The dramatic ingathering of the exiles is the story of legend. Israeli democracy was highly regarded and Israel was hailed as a “light unto the nations”.

Jews around the world cheered, cried and rejoiced upon Israel’s rebirth and celebrated its achievements, with the warm support of many Gentiles. Israel’s military victories were a source of international admiration and a balm for the souls of Jews worldwide, who saw in them the ultimate revenge against the Nazis. Israeli development projects, especially in agriculture and water, were deeply appreciated models in many developing countries.

The seemingly never-ending occupation, however, and especially the settlements, have fundamentally transformed Israel’s image. Israel is widely regarded today as an aggressive occupying power, bent on denying Palestinian rights. Nearly six decades after the Six-Day War, Israel has utterly failed to convince the international community of its claim to the West Bank.

Israel’s image has been further tarnished by questions relating to the quality of its domestic policies and democracy, including the recent “judicial reforms”, excessive prerogatives of the ultra-orthodox, status of Israeli Arabs, and rise of the radical right.

Over the decades, as Israel’s international standing waned, and the Arab refusal to make peace, or even negotiate, left Israel with little choice, military force came to occupy an outsized portion of its national security strategy. Moreover, force seemed to work; Egypt and Jordan made peace, and even Syria and the Palestinians conducted advanced negotiations. For a variety of reasons, however, Israel is reaching the limits to the efficacy of military force. It can continue to defend itself successfully and buy time, but there is no military solution to Palestinian nationalism, the Hezbollah and Hamas threats, or Iranian nuclear program.

In the interim, Israel has downplayed its soft power, or undermined it through some of its policies. The Palestinians, who have repeatedly rejected dramatic peace proposals, never presented a peace proposal of their own and who are governed by a dictatorship in the West Bank and a theocracy in Gaza, have wielded “soft power” very effectively and are winning the war for international opinion. 

In practice, Israel still enjoys considerable soft power. The epic story of the early decades may have faded, but diaspora Jews still harbor a deep sense of affiliation and caring for Israel. Christians around the world view Israel as the Holy Land and realization of divine scripture. Many still buy Jaffa oranges, an outdated symbol of Israeli agriculture, or fly El Al, long a fully privatized company, out of a sense of identification. Today, multinational corporations and scientists from around the world flock to the “Start-Up Nation”, seeking the technological creativity they cannot find elsewhere. Israeli arts and science enjoy an international reputation. Israel’s chaotic democracy still stands out in a dark sea of Middle Eastern authoritarianism.

These sources of soft power are the indispensable basis for much of Israel’s “hard” power, especially in the US. American support for Israel derives from three primary factors: the pro-Israel lobby and Israel’s strategic importance, but stems overwhelmingly from its soft power, the shared values that are the basis for the broad identification of the American public as a whole. Without this sense of identification, American support would not have remained as high as it has, for decades. American and European leaders’ opposition to the “judicial reforms” was so strong, precisely because they feared that Israel itself was undermining the normative basis for their countries’ relationships with it.

Soft power is of limited efficacy as a direct instrument of policy. It is hard to sway other countries just out of a sense of warmth and identification. Nevertheless, no country should be more attuned to soft power than Israel, whose right to a national homeland and subsequently to an independent state was recognized by the League of Nations and United Nations respectively and whose American support stems largely from it. Furthermore, Israel has successfully concluded many deals with foreign leaders and officials over the years, because in situations in which they could have adopted different decisions, identification with Israel was the determining factor.

Israel will not be able to fundamentally alter its international standing without resolving the West Bank issue, or at least achieving significant progress. Nevertheless, there are a number of important changes that Israel can make to improve its strategic circumstances, all of which are related to its soft power.

The use of force must be subject to clear political objectives, including the war of the narratives, which is almost as important today as the action itself, in some cases more. International standing, images and delegitimization campaigns, have a significant and even decisive impact on the outcome of policy initiatives, especially those that involve military action. Too often Israel wins the battles, but loses the war of narratives.

Israel must position itself so that it is always perceived as the side actively pursuing peace and accommodation, not the obstacle. The Jewish diaspora must come to be seen as a vital national security partner and asset, which greatly expands Israel’s capabilities beyond its indigenous ones, and treated accordingly.

Israel is a world leader in some of the primary issues of international concern today, including food security and agriculture, water, the environment and global warming, migration, poverty and entrepreneurship. Israel must do more to leverage its expertise in international organizations. Israeli aid programs (“Mashav”) are a pittance and should be increased. An Israel-diaspora “Jewish Peace Corps” would expand Israeli involvement in these areas and deepen Israeli-diaspora ties, especially between the young. Israel should also continue to provide emergency assistance in times of crisis, as it has so successfully done, notably in Haiti, Turkey and Ukraine.

The Palestinians miss virtually no opportunity to present their case in every possible international forum, with a long-term cumulative effect. Together with the US and others, Israel should target a few select and less politicized international organizations, such as the IAEA, in which a sustained effort can be made.

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Deciphering Hezbollah’s decision-making

By Yochai Guiski

Contrary to frequent statements made of late in both Israel and Lebanon, it is far from clear that Israel and Hezbollah are entering a period characterized by heightened risk of miscalculation.

Rather, the current period appears to be marked by a more intense exchange of warning signals between the two adversaries – particularly in Syria, where Israel has reportedly been highly active.

Hezbollah, for its part, has also initiated maneuvers, such as the March cross-border Megiddo highway terror bombing, although these have not succeeded in causing Israel to lose its balance. In April, Hamas in Lebanon fired 34 rockets at northern Israel, sparking Israeli retaliatory airstrikes.

Last year, Hezbollah threatened Israeli offshore gas rigs in the Mediterranean in the lead-up to the Lebanese – Israeli maritime border agreement and sent unmanned aerial vehicles in the direction of one of the rigs.

Together, such incidents could collectively suggest that we are in an era of heightened tensions in which any miscalculation could drag the region into conflict, much like the period leading up to the 2006 Second Lebanon War.

But another way of seeing things is that the situation is far from being on a slippery slope and that it is far from being a repeat of 2006.

It is true that Hezbollah seems to feel freer to launch tactical attacks and also more capable of doing so. And that Israel feels the need to reset the dynamics, returning to a situation in which Hezbollah was more restrained. But this does not mean that either side is likely to make a gross miscalculation any time soon.

The last decade has demonstrated that both Israel and Hezbollah can de-escalate – even when one or both of the sides sustain casualties. Both sides have learned too much from the 2006 war to blindly repeat those actions.

Is Hezbollah wrongly judging reality due to internal tensions in Israel? So far, Hezbollah has shown that it does understand the Israeli system well. However, there is a joker in the pack that could still upset the situation: Iran.

If Israel concludes that it must take action because the Iranian nuclear program is advancing too far, then it may, potentially, also feel the need to take Hezbollah out of the equation in parallel military actions. If the Iranian arena stabilizes, however, and the U.S. reaches some sort of arrangement with Tehran, that will neutralize the above scenario.

Despite all of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's bravado in his speeches, he is, in practice, very cautious and understands the fragility of his situation. 

Hezbollah’s decision-making vis-à-vis Iran

First and foremost, Hezbollah is an independent entity, both in its decision-making and in choosing how to respond to Iranian calls to action.  Of course, Iran has a very significant dialogue with Hezbollah, but in the end, Hezbollah is independent.

Does that mean Hezbollah will turn Iran down on the day of the order to go into combat with Israel? Most likely, it will not do that, but it could decide to limit the intensity of the action, and the scope of the action that it takes.

There is also the question of how other players figure into Hezbollah’s decisions. Hamas is not really an influence. Hamas leaders will not decide if Hezbollah or Iran escalate. On the flip side, however, Hamas’s leaders may decide that they will join in a future Israel – Hezbollah conflict.

Would Hezbollah be the initiator of conflict, like Egypt was in 1967? That scenario seems highly unlikely at this time. At the very least, Syria would have to stabilize first, much more than it currently is.

Would Hezbollah be willing to consider “lying on the fence” for Iran? It may choose to do that to a certain extent, and that is why Hezbollah is always preparing for war.

Hezbollah lives in dissonance between its Shi'ite Islamist messianic vision of destroying Israel and its day-to-day realpolitik considerations, which very much guide it and dominate its actual decision-making.

An Iranian nuclear umbrella is certainly an event that could change the situation, boosting Hezbollah’s tolerance for clashes. But this scenario is far down the road.

For the most part, and on a daily basis, Hezbollah’s decisions are guided by very rational calculations, much like those of its benefactor, Iran.

One often repeated question about Hezbollah’s decision-making is the role played by Israeli deterrence. But a more precise way of analyzing this aspect is to inquire about Hezbollah’s overall balance of interests.

Deterrence is too imprecise a concept to measure decisions by since it reduces all actions to binary dos or don’ts. Deterrence is by definition the power to dissuade an adversary from acting. In reality, Hezbollah is building up force and does initiate some hostile actions, but its overall balance of interests prevents it from initiating war with Israel.

Hezbollah has a concept of defense and attack, and it is keenly aware that it has a powerful enemy located to the south with many capabilities that are dangerous to it. Part of its war readiness against Israel is tied to its ideological values and affiliation with Iran. These all factor into Hezbollah’s complex balance of interests.

Lebanese domestic interests greatly affect Nasrallah’s decisions too – more than is often given credit for.

The interests of Lebanese Shiites themselves within Lebanon, the dynamics within the Lebanese government, relations with non-Shi’ite Lebanese allies, external relationships between outside players and the Lebanese state, the involvement of foreign powers in the region, all play a role, adding another layer of complexity to Hezbollah’s decision-making process.

It is a process that requires in-depth study, and one that cannot be reduced to pure ideology or to merely following Iranian directives.

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Gaza operation won’t stop next escalation

By Zvika Haimovich

The latest conflict between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Israel in early May has changed nothing when it comes to the basic strategic equation in place between Israel and the Gazan terror factions.

The fact that Hamas stayed out of this latest campaign means that the stop clock has begun to the next escalation involving Gaza’s ruling faction.

It is time for Israelis to ask themselves what the government’s strategy is for dealing with Palestinian terror factions in Gaza. They should do so immediately and not wait again passively for the next escalation to occur to raise this question.

Public comments by government representatives who claim that Israel has changed the equation in Gaza are simply false. The basic equation in Gaza remains identical to the situation that existed before Operation Shield and Arrow, just as it has before and after every previous round of fighting between Israel and Gazan terror factions over the past 15 years.

The question that should be guiding Israel’s strategy is how to delay the next break out of violence from Gaza for many years, not months. The first step in moving in that direction is to create political leverage on top of Israel’s military achievements, rather than relying on the IDF’s capabilities alone to buy a little more quiet.

One answer for shaping a new Israeli strategy should involve the recruitment of a regional coalition of powerful actors, involving Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and others, who would be significantly more involved in Gazan affairs. The goal of such a coalition would be to push for a long-term political arrangement between Hamas and Israel that would produce years of quiet.

As part of such an arrangement, Israel must also present to the world its legitimate demand that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad cease their continuous production of projectiles, whose sole intention is to terrorize, kill and injure Israeli civilians, while using Gazan civilians as human shields.

While Gaza won’t disarm tomorrow, it is important to begin delegitimizing the war crimes of Gazan terror factions on the world stage and to counter the trend of normalizing such actions, which has become all too common in recent years.

The escalation was ultimately a highly limited campaign, which must not be confused with the main combat scenario that Israel needs to prepare for.

During the five-day escalation, Israeli air defenses performed well, intercepting more than 95% of projectiles heading for built-up areas – but not providing a hermetic defense, a fact that took on a tragic form in the killings of two civilians in Rehovot and the western Negev during the fighting.

This is another reminder that no hermetic air defense solution exists, despite the advanced technology, sensors, and interceptors that take on Gazan-made projectiles. These rockets can follow unusual trajectories, presenting real challenges for air defenses.

Iron Dome has undergone continuous upgrades over the years, meaning that today’s system can cover far larger areas, deal with larger barrages and deal with more threatening projectiles. It is only the same system as the one first unveiled in 2011 in name, not in substance or capabilities; its evolution has been dramatic. No other air defense system in the world can even compare with Iron Dome’s performance.

Iron Dome forms one layer in Israel’s multi-layered air defense system, which also includes David’s Sling, the intermediate altitude system successfully employed for the first time during the May clashes, and the Arrow 2 and 3 systems against long-range ballistic missiles.

When the Iron Beam laser system becomes operational, an added layer of interception will become available to Israel’s air defenders.

If the Israeli Air Force can establish that terror rockets are repeatedly destroyed before entering Israeli air space, this could have an eventual effect on the IDF’s policy of sounding sirens for every rocket launch, enabling Israel to decrease such sirens potentially.

For this change to take place, it will be necessary to prove that the laser system – at first the ground-based interceptors, which will take around two years to be fully operational, and later, the aerial version placed on drones – can truly make some of the sirens redundant.

Israel is not yet at this stage, however, and even the laser system does not offer the guarantee of hermetic defenses.

Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind that the significant military threat facing Israel is the prospect of a multi-arena conflict involving Iran and its array of ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs, Hezbollah, with its mammoth projectile arsenal, Hamas in Gaza, and others.

Such a scenario, which would be a completely different challenge to the Israeli home front, compared to the most recent escalation, needs to be placed on the Israeli public agenda now; it is the threat that Israel needs to focus on.

The danger of public complacency based on the misunderstanding that this conflict is indicative of all of Israel’s future wars is real.

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Zvika Haimovich served as Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces from 2015-2018. He was Active Defense Wing Commander during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). Read full bio here.

The state budget is Irresponsible

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

If all goes well for the government and things proceed according to plan, by the time this column is published, the state budget for 2023 - 2024 will have passed. Beyond the disputes within the coalition, the tendency of each party to pull in its direction and try and get a bigger slice of the cake, beyond the numbers and charts, beyond the headlines, the budget book tells a story, one in which numbers, unlike words, cannot lie, and the story does not have a happy ending.

To simplify the picture without having to dive into the numbers, imagine that you have a sum of money in the bank today that you would like to use for investment. After you look carefully over your bank statement, which includes your expenses and revenues, you search for the investment options that can deliver a maximum return. Your goal is to take care of your children’s future; their education, weddings, or helping them buy an apartment. At the same time, you want to make sure that your retirement is also taken care of.

It sounds simple, but if we seek to apply this same logic to the state budget presented to the Knesset, we will see that the current government has its own rules. If the train continues at high speed down the current route, we will all end up in the abyss. Or to put it differently, everyone gets wet when it rains.

The planned state budget for 2023 is NIS 484 billion and NIS 514 billion in 2024. Before we look at where the money is going, and who the state has chosen to invest in, let's recollect where the money comes from.

The bulk of the state budget comes from us, the citizens who work and carry the burden on our shoulders, with about 300 billion NIS in state revenues coming from taxes. The equation is simple -- the less economic ability Israel’s citizens have, the greater the harm to the State of Israel -- and that is without even addressing the issue of risk-averse investors, who have identified problematic trends and are pulling their money out.

The Chief Economist at the Finance Ministry, Shira Greenberg, recently released a report warning of the dire consequences for the Israeli economy resulting from the way the budget is being distributed. Among other things, she wrote that these decisions would increase the gaps in Israeli society and discourage people from joining the labor market. Greenberg referred to the fact that growth in Israel is expected to fall by 3.1% in 2023 and that state revenues are expected to be NIS 5.3 billion short of the original forecast. The loss of GDP resulting from the failure to employ the ultra-Orthodox will hit NIS 6.7 trillion over the coming decades, inflation will exceed the annual target, and the uncertainty produced by the judicial reform may also exacerbate the current situation.

Greenberg is a professional appointment, and she is looking at the numbers with great concern, while asking the government to bring the train to a stop. Yet instead of pulling the brakes, it is rushing ahead. The ultra-Orthodox party leaders who have become accustomed over the years to the patent of someone else carrying the economic burden are insatiable. Appetite comes with eating.

Where is the money going? Torah-study institutions will receive an additional seven billion shekels, about four billion will be allocated for benefits for married religious scholars, NIS 125 million will go to support ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture, NIS 600 million for family purity programs, half a billion to religious state education budgets, NIS 279 million to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, of which NIS 67 million will be used to hire more rabbis. Four million shekels will go to paying for religious legal rulings for overseas communities (yes, you read that correctly). Religious institutions that are exempt from teaching the core curriculum will also receive millions of shekels in additional budgets.

What about the middle class, you may ask? Where has the promise of free education from the age of 0-3 gone, what about the cost of living, investment in the geographic and economic periphery, strengthening the Negev and Galilee regions, reinforcing border communities against rocket threats, domestic security, providing for the elderly, students, directing resources to economic growth engines such as high tech and artificial intelligence? The answer will surely be that Israel is a Jewish state and that without its wise religious scholars, we have no right to exist.

Those who provide that answer, however, will forget to mention that an economy that lacks bread will also have no Torah.

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Israel lacks a coordinated public diplomacy system.

By Arthur Koll

The five-day escalation between Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and Israel in early May produced a mixed diplomatic result for Israel, and, above all, underlined the lack of a long-term Israeli strategy regarding the Hamas-controlled enclave as well as an ineffective Israeli public diplomacy system.

On the positive side, the escalation demonstrated that despite President Joe Biden’s negative perception of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu following the latter’s attempt to reform Israel’s judicial system, the American commitment to Israel remains strong.  This vital commitment continues to extend into international organizations, as demonstrated by Washington’s blockage of an attempt to pass an anti-Israel decision at the United Nations Security Council.

During this last escalation, the international media and the international community’s criticism of Israel’s actions was not extraordinarily voluminous. This resulted from the fact that the escalation was short-lived with a relatively low number of casualties and limited destruction in Gaza, when compared to previous rounds of fighting against Hamas.

At the tactical-military level, Israel achieved its goal in the first few seconds of Operation Shield and Arrow, when it simultaneously hit three senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad )PIJ( commanders in Gaza, in three different locations. At this point, after regaining at least some of its lost deterrence power vis-à-vis the terror organizations, Israel would have preferred a swift end of hostilities.

However, the operation dragged on for five more days, due to the absence of an effective completion mechanism to bring it to a halt. Iran, which finances and trains the PIJ, encouraged its proxy to continue firing on Israel.

In addition, the operation exposed a gaping hole in Israel’s ability to coordinate a unified public messaging campaign that involves various components, such as the Prime Minister’s office, the Foreign Ministry, the IDF Spokesperson Unit, and others.

To this day, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has failed to appoint a head of the public diplomacy division, which is stationed in his own office and is answerable to him directly. Nor has he yet appointed a spokesperson to the international media. Luckily, this last Gaza operation ended before international pressure started to mount.  Israel cannot however afford the luxury of lacking a functioning professional public diplomacy apparatus.

To make things worse, The Israeli Minister for Public Diplomacy, Galit Distel Atbaryan, lacks any experience in this line of activity. She appeared to be caught off guard by the military operation and released amateur and ineffective video messages during the escalation, which appeared to be a diversion from her focus of acting as a divisive internal Israeli voice that attacks protesters against the judicial reform.

Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has always given great attention to public diplomacy should urgently pay attention to this matter and repair what is now clearly a dysfunctional structure -- before a much more serious regional or international challenge erupts.

During this minor escalation with the relatively marginal PIJ terror organization, Israel did not pay a heavy price for this governmental chaos. But future, larger conflicts, will surely extract heavier prices from Israel on the international stage.

This latest round, therefore, is a clear warning that the prime minister must take significant steps to put his house in order.

Israel’s diplomatic standing is also harmed by the fact that Jerusalem lacks a strategy for Gaza, and the Palestinian issue in general. This lack of strategy has a knock-on effect on all other aspects of the state’s performance in this context, including public diplomacy. Rather than looking for an arrangement, or at least some sort of long-term agreement, it seems that Israel is dragged into endless bursts of violent eruptions against Hamas, PIJ, or both. And it seems that the intervals between these rounds are getting shorter.

The lack of any new strategic concept that can fundamentally chip away at the old Gaza equation is taking a toll, internally, regionally, and in the wider international arena. Thus, it is clear that the next round is around the corner.

The world is preoccupied with burning global issues, like Russia’s assault on Ukraine and economic challenges, and is getting tired of repetitious clashes between Gazan terror factions and Israel.

This is not welcome news for Israel, which needs active international attention directed to Iran's nuclear advances and its network of terror.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a small part of the Iranian web of client terror organizations that constantly threaten to destabilize the region. Much more significant members of this network are Hamas and, of course, Hezbollah. The likelihood of simultaneous attacks on Israel by Iranian proxies on more than one front is growing.

The IDF is preparing for such developments. It is essential that Prime Minister Netanyahu also uses this time to put his public diplomacy structure in order. It may be needed sooner rather than later. 

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Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

Israel Has Lost Its Deterrence

BY Grisha Yakubovich

Despite often repeated statements in Israel made in recent days that the five-day escalation between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the IDF in early May changed the situation in the Gaza Strip to Hamas’s detriment, the militant Islamic group that rules the Strip has in fact emerged as the biggest victor from the clash.

This is due to two primary factors. The first is that Israel officially set itself the goal of keeping Hamas out of the conflict – Israeli commentators celebrated the fact that Hamas indeed stayed out of the fighting – signifying the fact that Hamas has figured out how to deter Israel, rather than the other way around.

The second factor is PIJ’s relatively poor performance against Israel, which, on the Palestinian street, enabled Hamas to once again market itself as the most effective “resistance” force in the Palestinian arena. The implicit message is that only Hamas knows when and how to fight Israel.

This operation alerts us to the fact that Israel will have to deal not only with the Hamas threat triangle on three fronts – Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon, but also with the larger threat triangle made up of all factions in Lebanon/Syria, Gaza, and Iran – a double triangle of threats.

As a result of this “double triple catch,” Hamas believes that Israel is reluctant to attack it. This is the third time that Israel has struck PIJ alone while leaving Hamas out of the fighting, a decision that serves Hamas’s deterrence – even if the Israeli narrative is different.

Meanwhile, Hamas has identified an opportunity, with the expected departure – sooner or later –of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, to topple the Fatah-run entity, which it portrays as weak and as collaborating with Israel.

To be sure, not all is smooth sailing for Hamas. The latest escalation has enabled PIJ to challenge, to a certain degree, Hamas’s narrative of being the lead combat force against Israel, and the fury of the PIJ leadership over Hamas’s refusal to join the fighting could be seen in the way that the organization’s leader, Ziad al-Nakhalah, failed to thank Hamas in his speech summarizing the escalation (while thanking Iran and Hezbollah).

Just as Hamas, over the years, undermined Fatah’s rule and initiated escalations with Israel, so too is PIJ now doing the same to Hamas – with Iranian encouragement.

Still, Hamas has been able to respond to this challenge with sophistication and success.

On the one hand, it openly welcomed and backed PIJ’s escalatory steps, thereby promoting the message of ‘Palestinian unity’ – a useful ticket for it, up ahead of its goal of taking over the West Bank. On the other hand, it did not lift a finger as Israel’s considerable air power and intelligence pummeled PIJ in one strike after another in Gaza.

Hamas not only made it clear that it would not be dragged into wars by PIJ and Iran – it has also discreetly signaled to Iran that Hamas needed to be taken into consideration before escalations are embarked upon.

Meanwhile, on the flip side of the equation, the Israeli sigh of relief over Hamas’s non-involvement topped up Hamas’s deterrence and promoted its ability to threaten future escalation against Israel and call upon Iran for assistance as a member of the Iranian axis, which can activate multiple arenas.

Thus, in the final score, Hamas came out on top, despite the minor damage it incurred to its ‘street credibility’ by failing to go into battle alongside PIJ.

Even PIJ, despite its heavy losses, gained long-term points in this conflict, due to its ability to fight Israel, a major regional military power, on equal footing, sending millions of Israelis running for shelter with projectile attacks and air raid sirens.

In PIJ’s worldview, that in itself is a victory – regardless of how this is viewed in Israel or the West.

It is therefore vital to understand how Israel’s adversaries truly understand and interpret Operation Shield and Arrow, and to avoid the temptation of being enamored with one’s own military prowess and tactical achievements. As impressive as these are, strategically, the Gaza operation brings little good news for Israel because there is no long-term Israeli strategy for countering Hamas’s own calculated and sophisticated maneuvers.

One thing that Israel should consider is responding to the strategic Hamas challenge by formulating a well-thought-out strategy, which could involve weakening Hamas’s future ability to pursue terrorism and armed conflict by saddling it even further with the responsibilities and the privilege of power.

In effect, this would mean pushing for Gaza’s independence, giving it a port, full control over its borders, and major economic assets – giving the Gazan population, and the Hamas regime, a great deal to lose in a future war against Israel.

The status quo of a Gaza dependent on Israel for its economic needs, such as the sending of 17,000 workers from the Strip into Israel, the hundreds of trucks that deliver basic supplies via Israeli crossings every day, and Israel’s role in arranging electricity and fuel means that Gaza remains interlinked and dependent on Israel. Hamas and Gazans feel they have much to lose.

The more independent and prosperous Gaza is, the more targets Israel will have in a future conflict, the more Hamas and Gaza will have to lose, and the weaker Hamas becomes. In addition, Egypt should be given as much influence as possible over events in the Strip, freeing Israel from this painful geo-strategic bone that has been struck in its throat for too many years.

As counter-intuitive as it may seem, turning Gaza into a de facto independent Palestinian state is one of the most effective ways of neutralizing Hamas’s ability to wage war, and terrorize Israel’s civilians.

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Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

Washington Is Key To Saudi-Israel Normalization

By Henrique Cymerman

The Middle East is currently undergoing its largest geo-strategic revolution in decades, and Israel is at the heart of it.

From being a country surrounded by enemies calling for its elimination, the Jewish state has become a potential strategic partner for the most powerful Sunni-Arab state in the region, Saudi Arabia.

Saudi officials give four reasons when asked why they changed their mind about Israel:

The two states have common enemies, the 1973 Yom Kippur War demonstrated once and for all that the Arabs have no military option, Israel has blossomed into the start-up nation, and could help jump-start a start-up region, and finally, 70% of Saudis are under 30, and are not bogged down by 20th-century historical baggage.

In May, I visited the Saudi capital of Riyadh to meet with senior Saudi officials, just as a new escalation erupted between Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and Israel.

My concerns that the meeting would be canceled in light of the escalation were unfounded. The opposite occurred, and the meeting went ahead.

At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the Palestinian issue is an elephant in the room of Israeli – Saudi relations, casting a shadow.

When Jake Sullivan, the United States National Security Advisor, asked the Saudis what conditions are needed for normalizing relations with Israel, most of what he was told by Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, related to obtaining sophisticated American weapons, resuming that strategic Saudi alliance with the US, obtaining nuclear power for civilian purposes, and for the US to stop condemning Saudi Arabia on human rights issues, or to keep bringing up the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

This shows that the Palestinian issue is a factor in normalization, but not a main one. For Saudi Arabia, Jerusalem and the future of the Haram Al-Sharif (the Temple Mount) is paramount.

It is an important issue for nearly two billion Muslims – and it also forms an opportunity for the Saudis to play a role in Jerusalem.

Most critically, however, any future normalization agreement between Riyadh and Jerusalem will have to run through Washington, not Gaza.

Furthermore, the Saudis make clear that the recent Iranian – Saudi normalization agreement does not come at the expense of normalization with Israel.

“Not everything happens through you the Israelis. The fact that 7 years after the break with Tehran we reopen the embassy, has to do with various national interests. The UK, Spain, Germany, France, they all have an embassy in Tehran,” a Saudi minister explained with a smile.

The Saudis are insulted when they are compared with smaller Gulf states, through the question of whether they will follow the UAE and Bahrain in joining the Abraham Accords.

This is due to the fact that the Saudis are the custodians of Mecca and Medina, the holiest sites of Islam, and where Islam was born, as well as being the world's main oil producer.

“With all the respect to our neighbors, we Saudi Arabia are the Israeli gateway to the Arab and Muslim world,” said one official.

And he is right. Unofficial normalization has long been underway. Security cooperation appears to be occurring in the Red Sea, for example.

Saudi officials point out that it is no coincidence that the phenomenal futuristic city of Neom is being built only 350 km from the Israeli border.

They are also happy that there are currently about five hundred monthly flights between the UAE and Israel, all full, and that a million Israelis have visited that country in the last year.

The danger to this trend comes from "spoilers" being plotted by Iran, which supports Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories. This axis wants nothing more than to spoil the party of agreements between Israel and the pragmatic Arab countries.

For Israel, a new chance is emerging for a type of second independence. The new geopolitical situation, despite the dangers of a confrontation on several fronts between Israel and Iran's proxies, forces decision-makers in the region, in many capitals, to reevaluate all the previous paradigms.

While tensions and doubts exist in some Arab countries due to the presence of extreme right elements in the current Israeli government coalition, the chances of a new coalition in Israel gives those rooting for normalization in the Arab world some hope.

Despite the risks and potential traps along the way, Israel and Saudi Arabia are only in the opening chapter of a long book.

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Henrique Cymerman is a journalist of global renown whose writings regularly appear in media publications in Europe, the USA, Latin America and Israel. He lectures in five languages. Henrique has covered current affairs in the Middle East for over 30 years and has been nominated "Comendador," a title of nobility, by the King of Spain and the President of Portugal. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief, Has Israel Strengthened Its Deterrence?

By Yaakov Lappin

Israel and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror faction in Gaza were embroiled in a five-day conflict, which ended on May 12, dubbed Operation Shield and Arrow by the Israel Defense Forces. At the time of this writing, the truce between the sides had entered its first day with a projectile fired from Gaza violating the ceasefire less than 24 hours after it was reached. The IDF responded by striking two Hamas military posts, representing a return to the Israeli policy of holding Hamas responsible for attacks out of Gaza.

These events may seem eerily similar to the security situation that existed before the launch of Shield and Arrow on May 9, but appearances can be deceptive.

At the strategic level, the operation was not designed to change the basic equation in Gaza. It is still ruled over by Hamas, a terrorist Islamist regime, with its own Iranian-funded army and rocket arsenal. It is still home to other, smaller, factions that do not have government responsibilities, but are just as murderous as Hamas, if not more so – with one Iranian proxy, PIJ, standing out.

After PIJ terrorized the residents of Sderot with a 102-rocket barrage on May 2, to ‘avenge’ the suicide of its hunger-striking prisoner in an Israeli prison, the Israeli defense establishment felt the time had come to stabilize the Southern and Gazan arena and to knock PIJ back down to size or face a broader escalation scenario involving Hamas.

As a result, on May 9, after days of intricate intelligence tracking, and waiting for operational opportunities to arise, within the space of three seconds, simultaneous Israeli airstrikes in three separate locations eliminated three of PIJ’s senior military commanders.

PIJ then set out to terrorize Israeli civilians for the next five days and thereby exposed its operatives and assets to accurate and devastating Israeli firepower, guided by the highest quality intelligence.

When the smoke cleared, PIJ had lost twenty-one of its operatives, including the decapitation of its entire operational command level – with six senior commanders killed. Many of its rocket launchers and weapons bases, as well as command and control centers, were destroyed. PIJ’s leader, Ziad al-Nakhalah, sitting comfortably on the Iranian payroll in Beirut, and under Iranian pressure to keep going, could no longer ignore the calls from his own embattled operatives to accept the truce. Israel had proven that it is prepared to launch surprise attacks, to overcome terrorist tactics of human shielding, and to employ precision air power anywhere it needed to. The obvious message reverberated among larger enemies, Hamas and Hezbollah. Their operatives aren’t immune either.

Air defenses

In five days of conflict, PIJ fired 1,469 rockets at Israel, of which 1,139 crossed into Israeli air space, while 291 misfired and fell in Gaza. Three Palestinian civilians were killed by PIJ rockets falling in Gaza.

More than 95% of projectiles aimed at inhabited areas were intercepted by Iron Dome. The system offers a very high – but not hermetic level of defense. The approximate 5 percent gap in defenses stopped being a dry statistic and took on tragic real-life form when a rocket slammed into a residential building in Rehovot, south of Tel Aviv, killing an 80-year-old woman in her living room. A Gazan worker was the second civilian killed in Israel by PIJ rockets, in the western Negev region.

David’s Sling, the intermediate altitude defense system, made its first operationally successful appearance since going online in 2017. The Israeli Air Force used it to intercept two projectiles, testing its capabilities.

In the coming year, Israel is expected to begin deploying its Iron Beam laser interceptor, first on the ground, and later, on-board UAVs, which will be used to intercept rockets, mortars, and drones at the speed of light, and at a fraction of the cost of kinetic interceptors.

With Hamas’s cross-border tunnels cut off by Israel’s underground barrier, and Israeli air defenses improving by the year, the growing technological gap gives Israeli decision-makers hope that they can contain the threats from Gaza, and even significantly reduce the number of sirens in the Israeli home front in the future with the help of the laser interception technology, which can destroy some of the rockets over Gaza before they enter Israeli airspace.  

Offense

The IDF struck 371 PIJ targets, including apartments used by PIJ for command and control, weapons storage facilities, rocket launchers, and bases.

Israeli aircraft, both manned and unmanned – jets, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles – were nourished with intelligence from a range of sources. The IDF Southern Command, Military Intelligence, and the Shin Bet intelligence agency worked hand-in-hand to locate targets and ensure they were free of large numbers of civilians. All of this, in dense difficult urban conditions, with PIJ cynically employing human shielding tactics, which are a core aspect of the doctrine of the region’s terror armies.

IDF officials shared accounts of watching PIJ commanders issue orders to rocket launching squads as they stood in apartments and drove in vehicles surrounded by their children. The IDF waited patiently for better opportunities and struck when they presented.

Looking ahead

The Gaza ceasefire seems likely to hold. On May 18, Israel will mark Jerusalem Day, celebrating the reunification of the city during the 1967 Six-Day War. This is always a period of high tension in Jerusalem, but one that Israel can manage in a manner that does not necessarily lead to new escalations in the capital or the West Bank.

Israel’s goal of stabilizing Gaza, without being drawn into a costly and major war, will be put to the test in the coming weeks. Other arenas are far more urgent: Iran is approaching dangerous nuclear thresholds, Hezbollah in Lebanon has amassed a monstrous arsenal of projectiles, including precision-guided missiles, and Iran is continuously trying to smuggle offensive capabilities into Syria, where it would like to build a second Hezbollah.

Israel’s multi-arena challenges mean that Gaza is but one arena among many.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

It is Time for Israel to Act Decisively

By Jeremiah Rozman

Let me start with a controversial proposition: Iron Dome has thus far done Israel no favors. The technologically brilliant missile defense system is praised as a shining exemplar of Israeli ingenuity, a point of pride. Indeed, criticizing Iron Dome to an Israeli or someone in the pro-Israel community is akin to speaking ill of Israel's latest Eurovision finalist. However, I stand by my assertion. This latest round with Gaza shows why. 

The problem with Iron Dome is not its technology. Its capabilities have impressed to the point that even the world's preeminent arms exporter, the United States has purchased batteries, as have several other advanced European militaries. Its technology can save lives if used in a strategically wise manner. But, to say it has would be an unprovable counterfactual. Indeed, the evidence suggests otherwise. Since Iron Dome became a mainstay in Israel's arsenal, conflicts with Gaza have been longer, more destructive, and resulted in more Israeli casualties. 

A weapon is only as good as how it is used. To quote Knesset Member Yoni Chetboun from 2019, Iron Dome has become a “sleeping pill” for the Israeli government. It has allowed Israel to manage the conflict with Gaza without having to seriously degrade the threat. Instead, despite a few flare-ups each year where Israel claims each time to have dealt a "severe blow" or "changed the equation," or something along those lines, each time Gazan militants rebuild and emerge with greater launch capabilities and new leadership.

The truth is that Iron Dome has allowed Israel’s government to avoid decisions that require unity and stability. It does this by enabling Israel to manage this conflict through what I call a greater skew toward defensive vs offensive denial. Denial means blocking an enemy from hitting you. Deterrence means persuading an enemy not to hit you through the threat of hitting them back to the point that they calculate that it is not worth it. As I argue in my book Socializing Militants, How States End Conflict with Non-State Militants, terrorist entities that are willing to die to carry out an absolutist agenda cannot be deterred and cannot be negotiated with to end the conflict. Israel cannot agree to cease to exist on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) exist to fight Israel or die trying. You cannot deter a group of people willing to die by threatening them with death. At best Israel can achieve a strategic pause where they recover and prepare for their next aggression. This is precisely the pattern we see. Hamas is rearming while PIJ provides a shield as the current magnet for Israel's strikes. Either Hamas will join in when it deems the time right, or PIJ will become the new big player in Gaza and the West Bank, this is already becoming the case, with PIJ increasingly getting a larger share of Iranian support. With deterrence off the table, Israel needs to effectively deny its enemies the ability to attack. Israel’s periodic strikes do not inflict anything close to a mortal wound. Within a few months, PIJ and Hamas will be better prepared than before this last round and Israel will have better intelligence, precision, and missile defense. So where does this go? The answer is… a continuation of the same dynamic. 

For Israel, this is a loss. It is an abnegation of the duties of a government for Israel to allow its south and increasingly its center to become war zones every few months. Israel must realize that effective denial requires offense, seriously degrading its enemies’ capabilities instead of relying on defensive capabilities that allow it to become increasingly comfortable with an ever-growing threat. Some call this strategy "mowing the lawn." To effectively mow the lawn, Israel needs to use its army, not just its air force and missile defense. It requires ground forces to do more than take out tunnels. It requires a prolonged operation to kill off thousands of terrorists and destroy their arsenals. Israel has the capability. But does it have the will?

Israel paid with the lives of one percent of its population to emerge as a sovereign state in 1948. If in the past, Israel had been unwilling to take casualties to prevent a noose tightening around its neck, it never would have been able to score its strategically crucial victories over its adversaries in 1948, 1956, and 1967. If Israel is no longer willing to pay the butcher’s bill, it will never have security.

Some ask why Israel needs to strike Gaza at all since it has Iron Dome. I heard a senior IDF officer answer: "Just because I'm wearing a cup doesn't mean I will let you kick me in the groin all day." For nearly-two decades Israel has allowed its southern communities to be pummeled and abused, its children growing up under fire. Israel should use Iron Dome not to forestall military action but to defend the home front while it cleans house. Israel’s government must be willing to take risks. This requires the government, the media, and the people to stop filtering every action or inaction through the lens of domestic politics. National security must supersede political bickering. 

The Zionist ideal was a Jewish state willing and able to defend itself, not a state that is a punching bag for jihadists. Using Iron Dome to avoid risking IDF casualties and to put off tough decisions is not working. It is time to use the IDF for its intended purpose. Every soldier understands their duty to risk their lives to defend their civilians. If given the order, Israeli soldiers will bravely take the fight to these terrorist organizations instead of allowing communities to be bombarded. This decision lies with the government. If Israel does not wish to retake control over Gaza, it must at least mow the lawn, and thoroughly this time. Iron Dome should enable this, not prevent it.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Speaker McCarthy Certainly Got This One Right

By Mark Goldfeder

On Tuesday evening House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) canceled an event that Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) was set to host today at the U.S. Capitol with the purpose of mainstreaming her antisemitic historical revisionist views. Tlaib may yet find another (less prestigious) venue and, of course, she has the right to say whatever she wants, however abhorrent, about Jews and the Jewish State. But the public should hold her accountable for the lies she is now spreading; they have been used to justify the murders of Americans and Israelis.

Tlaib's "Nakbah Day" commemoration was designed to "educate members of Congress and their staff" with a falsified Middle East narrative. But the modern history of Israel is not lost in the shrouds of time, and there are clear contemporaneous records that give the lie to Tlaib's words.

In 1922, the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine officially established an area in the Middle East to be a national home for the Jewish People and entrusted it to Great Britain. Jewish people came from around the world to buy and cultivate land to further expand the existing Jewish communities that had remained in Israel as a continuous presence since Biblical times. As Winston Churchill, then secretary of state for the colonies, explained,

"When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine... but the further development of the existing Jewish community... [I]n order that this community should have the best prospect of free development... it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection."

Britain was allowed to change the terms in the territory east of the Jordan: it did so, and gave 77 percent of the original area to what is now Jordan. When the United Nations was formed, it proposed a partition plan for the remaining 23 percent: Resolution 181 would have created two states, an independent Israel and an independent Palestine. The Jewish community accepted those terms, and declared the State of Israel. The Arab community refused, and launched a genocidal war that they then lost.

Over time, Palestinians developed the "Nakba" myth, in which the would-be ethnic-cleansing Arab armies (who had failed in their stated mission to kill all the Jews) are reimagined as the helpless victims of a horrible catastrophe (or "nakba," in Arabic). The Nakbah legend—that the Jews came in and violently expelled the majority of Arabs from their homes—fuels much of modern anti-Zionism. And it is also worth noting that the 'Nakbah' commemoration is not even ostensibly about any kind of settlement or post-1967 occupation claims: this is nakedly a demonstration against Israel's very existence.

It is important to correct the record, for two reasons:

First, because truth matters. Primary sources from around the world describe how the vast majority of Arabs who left their homes did so either voluntarily, or under orders from the invading Arab armies—not from the Israelis.

Just read the Jordanian daily Ad Difaa (September 6, 1954), for example: "The Arab governments told us: Get out so that we can get in. So, we got out, but they did not get in." Or just look at the UN Security Council Official Records (Third Year N. 62, April 23, 1948, p. 14), in which Jamal Bey Husseini, representative of the Arab Higher Committee, explained that "The Arabs did not want to submit to a truce . . . they rather preferred to abandon their homes, their belongings and everything they possessed in the world and leave the town. This is in fact what they did."

Oddly enough, and almost as if to reinforce what the real disaster was, the official 'Nakbah Day' is May 15—the anniversary of the day on which the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq all invaded Israel in their doomed attempt to destroy it.

The second reason to correct the record is because this lie in particular has deadly consequences for both Americans and Israelis.

In March 1976, in a column for Falastin a-Thaura (the PLO's weekly), Mahmoud Abbas noted that "The Arab armies entered Palestine to protect the Palestinians from the Zionist tyranny but, instead, they abandoned them, forced them to emigrate and to leave their homeland, and threw them into prisons similar to the ghettos in which the Jews used to live."

Then 'Nakbah Day' was invented by Yasser Arafat in 1998, and by 2011 Abbas' memory had faded in direct proportion to its rising popularity. Abbas, now president of the Palestinian Authority, rewrote history in a New York Times op-ed claiming that "Zionist forces expelled Palestinian Arabs to ensure a decisive Jewish majority in the future state of Israel, and Arab armies intervened." But even that was not enough.

Just last year, in 2022, Abbas used the annual commemoration of the nakba—the same events Tlaib was to be marking at the Capitol—as an excuse to reaffirm his government's ongoing commitment to "pay for slay," the Palestinian Authority policy under which terrorists who kill Israeli or American citizens are celebrated as heroes and financially rewarded.

Of course, it was a disaster for the Arabs to reject the U.N.'s Partition Plan; ignore the Jewish people's legitimate and indigenous claims; and resort to deadly violence. But that does not mean there cannot be hope for a better future. The continuing disaster is the 'leadership' of people like Abbas and Tlaib who engage in the same delegitimization and denial that led to the mistakes of 1948, and think that this time, somehow, their results might be different. Hopefully that will change, but in the meantime kudos to the speaker for not letting Tlaib share her ahistorical, antisemitic views under the false imprimatur and borrowed respectability of a congressional event.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Hamas’s al-Arouri and the Iranian connection

Yaakov Lappin IN CONVERSATION WITH: COL. DAVID HACHAM

Hamas’s deputy political bureau chief, Saleh al-Arouri, currently based in Lebanon, is interested in surrounding Israel with rocket and terror bases, and so is Iran.
That common interest has enabled al-Arouri to create new levels of cooperation between his Sunni-Islamist terror faction and the radical Shi’ite regime in Tehran.

“This is actually one of the strong people within Hamas. I would actually say that he is among the top three of the movement,” said IDF Col. (res.) Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, and a senior researcher at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Reichman University in Herzliya.

According to Milshtein, al-Arouri is responsible for the Judea and Samaria arena on behalf of Hamas, including Jerusalem. In addition, al-Arouri coordinates Hamas activity with other members of “the axis of resistance,” said Milshtein, ex-head of the Department for Palestinians Affairs in IDF Military Intelligence.

Al-Arouri is also responsible for a large portion of Hamas’s military operations abroad, said Milshtein. He “manages to direct tactical military activity but also be involved and think strategically, and basically ‘swim’ between the two worlds,” he added.

IDF Col. (res.) David Hacham, a senior research associate at the MirYam Institute and a former adviser on Arab affairs to seven Israeli defense ministers, said al-Arouri joined Hamas’s military in the early 1990s, during the First Intifada.’

“He was responsible for establishing Hamas’s military wing in the Judea and Samaria region. For his activities, he sat in an Israeli prison for 18 years. After his release, he went o to Syria, where he settled. Later, in 2012, he left Syria after the outbreak of the country’s civil war, and came to Turkey where he headed Hamas headquarters,” said Hacham.

“In 2015, after Israeli and American pressure on Turkey, he moved to Qatar along with most of Hamas’s overseas leadership. After a short stopover in Malaysia, he arrived in Lebanon where he currently operates,” Hacham said.

In 2014, the Israeli military demolished his home in the village of Aroura, near Ramallah, believing him to have been involved in the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in Judea and Samaria.

Al-Arouri, like the head of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, represents the younger generation in the Hamas leadership, according to the Israeli observers. Both have operational experience and have served lengthy prison terms, speak Hebrew and are familiar with Israel, unlike members of the older Hamas generation, such as Khaled Mashaal, said Hacham.

Milshtein described al-Arouri as a major connector between Hamas and other members of the radical Islamist camp opposed to Israel’s existence. For example, al-Arouri’s role in the launch by Hamas of 34 rockets at northern Israel from Lebanon in April this year was a prominent one, he said.

Al-Arouri’s unique role is enabled by two factors, according to Milshtein. “One is Arouri’s location in Beirut. And the other is his basic approach for vigorous promotion of jihad in several arenas. Especially in Judea and Samaria and the newer arena—Lebanon. This makes him a favorite for Tehran and Hezbollah,” said Milshtein. “In this context, he is involved in formulating strategic relations, but also in practical terms, he is involved in weapons procurement, training, organization, military cooperation and more.”

Hacham cautioned that Arouri’s objective of unifying fronts against Israel directly contradicts Israel’s essential interest of differentiating between the arenas.

“This is particularly true for Israel’s differentiation between Gaza and Judea and Samaria. Hamas, on the other hand, wants to create as close a connection as possible between the various conflict arenas—Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Jerusalem, the Arab sector in Israel and Lebanon—and to gain effective control over the power switch of escalation,” he said.

“Hamas strives to ensure its ability to ignite and activate the arenas, individually or together, at an appropriate time according to the circumstances,” he added.

According to Milshtein, Al-Arouri’s intense efforts help him greatly with regard to fortifying his status within Hamas as someone who succeeds in preserving “the jihad,” and who found a way to activate arenas against Israel.

“I would describe al-Arouri and Sinwar as two halves of the same whole. Each is responsible for another major activity area in Hamas. They share the same concept, and I believe both are strategically coordinated,” said Milshtein.

Hacham said Israel has so far avoided eliminating al-Arouri for a number of reasons.

First, he spent many of the past 15 years in sovereign countries, some of which have diplomatic ties with Israel, Hacham noted. Second, previous targeted killings have shown that leaders are quickly replaced in terror factions, and third, there is concern that his elimination would increase motivation for terrorist revenge attacks on Israeli targets, or could spark a wider escalation.

Nevertheless, said Hacham, al-Arouri could certainly become a future target for assassination.

“Targeted killings are the number one worry of the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaderships,” said Hacham, who spoke with JNS before Israel launched “Operation Shield and Arrow” on Tuesday with the assassination of three senior PIJ commanders in Gaza.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Can Israel recover from its precipitous fall?

By dan meridor

Looking back over the past four months, it is astounding to observe how quickly and in how many fields Israel has sustained damages due to the actions of the Netanyahu government.

Currently, negotiations are ongoing between representatives of the Israeli coalition government and the opposition under the banner of searching for a compromise to the ‘judicial reform’ initiative and exiting this unprecedented internal crisis.

However, any serious attempt to reevaluate the balance of power between the three branches of government would, if done correctly, involve a lengthy process lasting a year or two. It would have to involve jurists from across the board, experts from a wide spectrum of views, representatives of civil society, Jews and Arabs, trade unionists and employers – in short, it would be an enormous endeavor. This isn’t something that can be seriously concluded in a matter of weeks.

Looking back, the question of how Israel reached this crisis point in the space of just four months must be asked. Economically, Israel went from being a powerful tech-based start-up nation with a booming economy revered around the world, to a country whose economic officials warn of billions of shekels in losses.

The people issuing these warnings are Netanyahu appointees, like the Bank of Israel Governor Prof. Amir Yaron, and former Bank of Israel Governor Karnit Flug, as well as the world-renowned economist Jacob Frenkel, also a former governor of the BOI.

The economic consensus is clear: if the judicial reform goes ahead, Israel’s outlook will be catastrophic.

Investors see that the government is trying to rob the judiciary of its independence, and, from there, financial damage is quick to follow. Even if the political crisis fades and the judicial changes are stopped in their tracks, the economic damage could be long-lasting as investors may be wary of betting on Israel.

Politically, Israel was considered to be the United States’ strongest ally – and derived much of its power from this alliance. Now, U.S. President Joe Biden explicitly informs the world that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unwelcome in Washington.

Warnings about common values have been issued by other senior American administration officials, such as the secretary of state and the secretary of defense.

And what of the flagship achievement, the Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain? Suddenly, a cold breeze is blowing in Israel’s direction from the Gulf. The damaged Israeli – American alliance is part of the reason. Netanyahu’s vision of on-boarding Saudi Arabia to the Accords will have to wait.

On recent visits to European capitals, the Israeli premier was pummeled with criticism over the judicial reform crisis, albeit the style was less abrasive than Biden’s.

It’s not only relations with the U.S. administration that are on the ropes. So too are relations between the Israeli government and American Jewry. On the domestic front, several crises threaten to snowball into an avalanche. Reservists from prized army and air force units have announced they will not volunteer if the reform goes ahead and Israel is turned into a dictatorship.

All of this has eroded Israeli deterrence and challenged its security establishment –this according to none other than Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, whom Netanyahu initially fired for warning of the dangers posed by the domestic crisis, but then backtracked on his decision under pressure.

Incredibly, this can all be traced back to a single attempt to implement an extreme move to undermine the judiciary’s independence.

Israel has always known bitter disputes over policies and ideologies. Whether it was about reparations from Germany, or land and peace, Israelis have always argued intensely, but almost everyone was united around core democratic values and accepting the decisions of the courts.

In fact, the judicial reform initiative has, until now, been a marginal issue. While Justice Minister Yariv Levin has held strong views on the matter for many years, until the formation of this government, Netanyahu did not take it very seriously. Levin himself admitted in April that had the reform passed as initially presented, Israel could not fit the definition of a democratic state.

The damage hasn’t stopped at national interests – it has harmed Netanyahu politically. A series of polls have shown that the Likud party is losing altitude quickly.

What has caused Netanyahu to embark on such a destructive path? The answer can only be the attempt to weaken the legal system due to Netanyahu’s criminal trial. Although Netanyahu is innocent until proven guilty, he probably does not have an interest in seeing his trial play out and seeing whether he is convicted or not.

Netanyahu loves his country – he served in the elite Sayeret Matkal commando force and fought bravely – but he loves himself more. As a result, until now, Netanyahu has rejected any plea bargain arrangement, which would have likely meant an end to his political career, as he seeks to punish the system that ‘dared’ prosecute him.

In this manner, everyone perceived by Netanyahu as a threat has been tagged as a ‘leftist’ or someone who ‘betrayed the national interest.’ This includes the police, and its former commissioner, the religious settler Roni Alsheikh; the Yeshiva graduate and former state prosecutor, Shai Nitzan; and the religious former Attorney General and Netanyahu appointee, Avichai Mandelblit.

Suddenly, all of the above-mentioned and others are labeled by the Netanyahu lie-machine as ‘leftists’ seeking to harm the state. The worst part is that a swath of the public believes this.

As a result, in the Netanyahu narrative, the courts are now presented as a danger to democracy and to security that frames publicly appointed politicians.

The time is ripe for Netanyahu to face challenges over his conduct from within the Likud. The Likud was once a party that wasn’t afraid to criticize its leader. This was true during the days of Menachem Begin, whose peace deal with Egypt faced multiple challenges from within the party, and through to the era of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who was challenged by senior Likud figures at the time, Ariel Sharon and David Levy.

It would be appropriate for some of the Likud’s 31 Knesset Members today to speak up and tell Netanyahu that he cannot continue harming the country in this way. 

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Dan Meridor is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence in the Israeli Government from 2009-2013. Read full bio here.

To reach Israel’s 100th anniversary, we need unity

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Close your eyes for a moment and imagine it’s 2048 and final rehearsals are underway at Mount Herzl, Jerusalem, for Israel’s 100th Independence Day celebrations. In front of the tomb of Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, flags fly proudly and soldiers march in formation.

Now, open your eyes and return to the present day as we marked this year’s Remembrance and Independence Days. The scenario of Israelis celebrating the country’s 100th anniversary as one people waving their flags together, seems, unfortunately, altogether fanciful.

If we do not ensure that we have a common ethos, it is doubtful we will get there – assuming that democracy even remains in place. So, will we celebrate 100 years of our independence together? Were we to hold a referendum, it is fair to assume that the answer to the question “Do you want to reach Israel’s 100th year of independence” would be “Yes,” but the answer to the question, “Will we get there,” will likely be “I don’t know.”

How to get to a 100 years

To provide a conclusive answer to this question, one must first understand the shared identity that propels us forward together – the same identity that creates the fabric of shared life here. The legal coup and the masses who take to the streets week after week are fighting for democracy and against dictatorship.

Yet it is not only the concern that the Israel we once knew is changing its character that is driving the protesters. Those who support the reform claim that the time is ripe for Israel to change its character and that the country has had enough of rulership by elites.

An identity struggle is raging: liberalism vs conservatism, those who share the national burden vs. those who believe that Torah study is an equally valuable endeavor to military service and work. The latter camp holds that Torah study is necessary due to the very existence of Israel, as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

The stage of defining our identity characterizes democratic states and research indicates that this process often occurs in its most intense form in the last quarter of a democracy’s first 100 years. In this respect, we are no different from most of the countries in the free world.

In other words, had the legal revolution not come, another catalyst would probably have led people to the streets, after shedding light on the rift between us reminding us of the feud over how to distribute the national burden and the argument over freedom of choice on how to manage one’s individual life.

Questions we have pushed aside for years due to our fight for our security and existence are now on the national agenda. The process of defining our identity is a complex and fragile process. In Israel, it includes the added and unique tier of being a Jewish, democratic country and the question of a shared identity is one that must consider both religion and state. The result is an equation that is difficult to provide answers for.

The first Independence Day

TO BETTER understand the question of a common ethos, we need to return to the basics. The young state of Israel marked its first Independence Day following the 1949 Independence Day Law. The date was set for the fifth of the Hebrew month of Iyar, the date on which Israel had declared independence a year earlier, in 1948. The Law was passed just three weeks before the celebration.

In fact, the 1949 celebration was not the first time Israel marked its independence. Almost a year earlier, on 20 Tammuz – July 27, 1948, the anniversary of Theodor Herzl’s death, military parades were held throughout the country to mark State Day. The idea was to emphasize the connection between the newly-born state and Herzl, the thinker who envisioned it.

The military’s prominent role in the ceremonies reflects what was, at that time, an undisputed ethos. The people’s army model became an essential element in defining the Israeli identity. There was a clear link between IDF service and Israeliness. The same model stands at the heart of the current divide today and brings to the fore the question of who is an Israeli.

Those who serve vs draft dodgers, the lack of equality in the sharing of the military burden and an unnecessary conflict between Israeliness and Judaism are harming the people’s army model. This will collapse one of Israel’s most important foundational pillars, upon which our identity, as a people and as a state, stands.

In a speech to the nation on Israel’s first Independence Day in 1949, then-prime minister David Ben-Gurion said, “We stood up to serious military campaigns [against us]. We emerged from them all intact and with dignity. However, the dangers to our safety and even our existence have not been eliminated, nor will they soon disappear.”

His remarks remain relevant today, as we mark 75 years of our independence. They indicate that the people’s army model has a key role in the fabric of our shared identity.

If we wish for our soldiers to march together on Mount Herzl in 2048 when we are due to celebrate 100 years of the wonder called Israel, then we are duty-bound to strengthen our common base and to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

We won’t agree on everything, but we can create a common identity so that we can proudly say together, “We are Israelis.”

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.