Ceasefire Agreements and the Question of Israel's Sovereignty

By Grant Newman

The current conflict between Israel and Hamas raises not just the question of whether Israel has the right to defend itself — and more specifically whether the State of Israel has the duty to defend its citizens from terrorist attacks — but also raises the question of Israel's sovereignty as it pertains to developing state policy.  The only party in the current conflict between Israel and Hamas that genuinely has Israel's interest in mind is the State of Israel and its citizens.  Even the United States is conflicted, as the Biden Administration attempts to juggle America's historic support for Israel with a Democratic Party succumbing more and more to anti-Semitism.  Israel must stand firm in the face of global anti-Israel sentiment and not allow such anti-Israel sentiment to influence its domestic decision-making mechanisms in order to ensure that Israel’s future remains in Israel’s hands.

The past week has seen protests around the world supporting Hamas and condemning Israel.  A pro-Hamas protest in front of the Consulate General of Israel in Midtown Manhattan resulted in the closure of 2nd Avenue.  Hamas supporters in London cried profanities and curses repugnantly aimed at Jews (and, even more repugnantly, their daughters), while their compatriots in Los Angeles attacked diners at a restaurant after asking them whether they were Jewish (they were).  Similar occurrences and mass protests were seen across the United States, Great Britain, and Europe.  For all the talk of anti-Israel sentiment and anti-Semitism being entirely separate categories, such events indicate that there is an alarming level of cross-pollination occurring between these two supposedly separate categories.  Nevertheless, these non-Israeli protesters undoubtedly have sway over their own non-Israeli political leaders, and these non-Israeli political leaders in turn are trying to influence Israel’s political leaders.

Meanwhile, in the diplomatic realm, these same non-Israeli political leaders, who are beholden to the protesters at home, are increasingly calling for a deescalation of the conflict, and talks of negotiating a ceasefire are reportedly ongoing, with the United Nations holding votes on the matter.  As with everything the United Nations does, these votes serve no legitimate purpose, lack any binding effect whatsoever on Israel, and should be entirely ignored by serious individuals.  Likewise, mutual efforts between the United States and Russia to find solutions to the conflict should be viewed with skepticism, as the two powers look to the Middle East not so much for the sake of the Middle East, but rather as a proxy situation through which they can sort out their own relations which have effectively been put on life-support since Biden entered the White House and called Putin a “killer”.  Indeed, the United States and Russia are self-interested parties on issues pertaining to Israel, and any efforts to assert pressure  on Israel have undoubtedly been calculated according to an algorithm meant to benefit first and foremost the United States and Russia, respectively.

Whatever the global consensus regarding the Israel conflict might be, a substantial portion of Israelis — the backbone of the nation of Israel — appear committed to continuing military operations against Hamas.  Polls by the Times of Israel and Channel 9 suggest that between 70 percent and 80 percent of responding Israelis support a continuation of Operation Guardian of the Walls, with many residents of Israel's southern regions voicing support for a continuation of military operations if doing so will result in an extended period of peace.  Whether the Times of Israel and Channel 9 polls are representative of Israel's population as a whole is perhaps debatable.  But these polls do suggest that significant portions of Israelis — who, unlike the protestors in the United States and Europe and their political leaders in Washington and Paris, are in Hamas' line of fire — are in favor of continuing Operation Guardian of the Walls.

In the face of such worldly influences, Israel must act in such a way that will enable it to maintain its sovereignty and ensure that Israel's domestic mechanisms are making the decisions that affect Israel, and not allow outside forces to influence those decisions.  For example, if Israel were to decide to a ceasefire at this moment in the conflict after the aforementioned wave of anti-Israel protests and anti-Semitic attacks, then Israel risks setting a dangerous precedent whereby it is willing to make such decisions based on outside pressure from foreign streets.  In other words, a ceasefire now could signal to the rest of the world that if enough protesters take to the streets and maintain their presence there long enough, then international media outlets will promote an information campaign against Israel, foreign political leaders will be influenced to pressure Israel's political leaders, and Israel will ultimately acquiesce to the demands of the protesters.  This would be a massive hit to Israel’s sovereignty as it would effectively cause Israel to become a hostage to anonymous protesters marching on foreign soil.

This is not necessarily to suggest that Operation Guardian of the Walls should continue solely for the purpose of showing the world that Israel will not give in to external street pressure.  It would likely be unjust for a state to bomb an enemy simply to teach the world a lesson in sovereignty — even if the enemy were a terrorist organization and even if the world desperately needed such a lesson.  Rather, Israel should enter into a ceasefire with Hamas only because it has concluded that doing so is in its national interest, and not because supporters of Hamas flooded the streets of foreign cities.

Oftentimes the means by which a decision is made are just as important as the decision itself.  It is essential for Israel to make known to the world that, whatever decision it makes regarding the continuation of military operations against Hamas, such a decision was made without even the slightest bit of influence from Hamas' supporters in the West. By doing so, Israel can ensure that its future remains in its own hands.

Grant Newman graduated from Harvard Law School where he was an executive editor of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. Grant was the recipient of the Federalist Society’s James Madison Award in 2019, and was active in the Alliance for Israel. Prior to law school, Grant graduated from Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, with a degree in Business Strategy. Read full bio here.

All is (not) fair in late-night TV and war

By Mark Goldfeder

John Oliver's pompous and uneducated moral relativism is unacceptable and amounts to nothing short of antisemitic support for murderous terrorism. HBO should be utterly ashamed

In his segment Sunday night, Oliver presented a recounting of the events surrounding the current conflict in Israel that was either intentionally misleading or shockingly ill-informed. He repeatedly framed it as a struggle between the Palestinians and Israelis. Perhaps someone should tell him that this is not a battle between Palestinians and Israelis, it is between Hamas, a US designated terror organization, and Israel, a US ally.

Oliver claims that while some things are incredibly complex and require context, others are just wrong. He is right about that at least: Hamas is a terrorist organization that indiscriminately targets civilians, with a charter to kill every Jewish man, woman, and child. Israel is a democratic nation that did not start this fight, and with great restraint tries hard to avoid any civilian casualties.

But Oliver thinks that the story is simple because there is a severe power imbalance between Hamas and Israel, which has led to more casualties for Hamas. Oliver barely pays lip service to the idea that terrorists firing rockets at civilians is unacceptable, before shamefully giving them a pass because Israel, a country that invests in research and development instead of terror tunnels, has managed to intercept many, but not all of the deadly missiles.

In Oliver's antisemitic opinion, it is okay to shoot at innocent Jewish people as long as they are fast enough to run away, at least much of the time.

Of course, it matters little to Simple John that Hamas started this fight, by targeting innocent Israelis. Would Oliver be happier if more innocent Jews were dead? Would that make it more of a fair fight? In his little fantasy world is it ok to kill just a few innocent Jews, and then cry "stop it" when their country hits back?

Proportionality in wartime is not what Oliver thinks it is. Article 8(2)(b(4) of the Rome Statute recognizes that civilian casualties are a terrible but inevitable part of conflict, and forbids attacks in which the anticipated civilian casualties will be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage gained. It has nothing to do with the relative number of people killed on both sides. The reason for this is simple: When you judge the appropriateness of an attack based on the number of people who died, you incentivize human shields, one of Hamas' favorite tactics.

Idiots like Oliver, who are impressed by dead body counts, are precisely why Hamas operatives continuously surround themselves with their own civilians, just to let them die. People like him are why terrorists now store weapons in schools and hospitals, and why they shoot their missiles from civilian structures in populated areas. Because the media, and shows like Last Week Tonight, reward them for it and make it doubly hard for Israel to dismantle terrorist infrastructure.

In an incredible display of hubristic contempt, Oliver notes that unlike Hamas, which openly targets civilians, Israel has only aimed at military targets, but vaguely implies, with not a shred of evidence, that Israel might be lying- despite the fact that Israel has shared much of the relevant intelligence with the US Oliver mentions the fact that, unlike any other army in history, Israel repeatedly warns people in the area in advance of their attacks and actively works to evacuate civilians. But he immediately dismisses that massive display of morality and restraint by saying that no matter the facts, it "sure seems like a war crime." Thank God he does not actually hold any position of real power.

In this one short segment, Oliver managed to become a full-fledged mouthpiece for Hamas. Aside from excusing murder and trying to muddy the waters on who does and does not target civilians, Oliver also weighed in on the Sheikh Jarrah situation, a private civil court case between two parties that did involve unpaid rent, but did not actually involve the state of Israel at all. Of course, he makes no mention of the details, including the fact that the owners of the four houses in question have acknowledged that they do in fact belong to the Jewish owners. Apparently, because the owners are Jewish, Oliver believes that they are not entitled to their rent. Set aside the facts though; regardless of what happened, in his infantilization of Hamas, Oliver believes that confusion on this topic is enough of an excuse to make murder understandable, if not acceptable.

He also called Israel an apartheid state. Forget that Israeli Arabs enjoy positions in the highest levels of every branch of government, including the legislative branch (the Knesset), the executive branch (the Israeli cabinet) and the judicial branch (the Supreme Court), a fact that of course Oliver did not mention and likely does not know, and ignoring the fact that Israeli Arabs have full and equal rights, apartheid involves an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups committed with the intention of maintaining that regime. For the record, Israel has repeatedly, over 30 times, offered plans for peace and division of the land. Some of them, including the Clinton Peace Parameters, were even supported by much of the Arab world.

Again, for Oliver's edification, Israel (legitimately) gained a total of 26,178 square miles of territory in 1967. To date, it has ceded sovereignty over 23,871 square miles or 87% of that territory. At various times in recent history (including deals proposed in 2000, 2008, and 2014), Israel has offered up to 99.3% of the remaining disputed territory in exchange for peace. Each time, the Palestinians refused. There cannot be apartheid when one side keeps trying to offer plans for peace.

In a mere five minutes, Oliver spread slander about Israeli policy and history, justified Hamas' use of violence, dismissed the deaths of innocent Israeli civilians as unimportant to the conversation, and discounted the fact that Israel works hard to prevent civilian casualties, while the other side works hard to inflict them.

If Oliver really cared about innocent Gazans he would work to hold Hamas accountable for their failed leadership and murderous schemes. In this case Simple John is simply wrong.

Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

The status quo is the key to Jerusalem’s stability

By Shaul gordon

Shaul+Gordon.jpg

When it comes to policing a city as complex as Jerusalem, the mission of guarding the status quo is of supreme importance. The importance of the status quo in Jerusalem cannot be overstated, and any deviation can ignite not only the city, but the entire Middle East.

Jerusalem is a holy city to three religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Religious sites with huge historical significance are packed next to one another, and highly varied populations live side by side.

This naturally leads to sensitivities and tensions. Jerusalem, central as it is to the three religions, has always been at the center of wars and conflicts, and in this respect, the latest clashes in the city and in its name are nothing new.

Politically, the fact that it is the capital of Israel gives it even more symbolism. The Israeli parliament and state institutions are located in the city. After Israel liberated Jerusalem in the 1967 Six-Day War and annexed the Old City as well as the east of the city, the territory of greater Jerusalem grew dramatically.  

It is no coincidence that terror attacks in the Second Intifada focused on Jerusalem. Cafes and buses were frequently targeted by suicide bombers because the terror organizations too view Jerusalem as special.

The latest incidents are merely a continuation of this special sensitivity.

Demographically, out of every nine Jerusalemites, three are Arab, and the remainder are divided  equally between ultra-orthodox, conservative-religious, and secular Jews.

There have been fierce cultural-religious struggles between ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews, as well as between the ultra-Orthodox and the state. If this wasn’t enough, the ultra-Orthodox themselves are conflicted and divided into various sects.

Demonstrators who want to make their cause known go to Jerusalem, where the government is located.

How should the Israel Police deal with such a city?

 The Israel Police is responsible not only for fighting crime, law enforcement, traffic, and public order, but also for security. This is a fairly unique addition to its mission list, compared to other police forces around the world. 

As recent events have demonstrated, any deviation from the status quo can set the city on fire. Does Damascus Gate have a new barricade or not? The answer to this question can spark international incidents. It is doubtful whether placing an obstacle anywhere else in the world can lead to mass rioting and be cited as a cause for an armed conflict.

One cannot be a police officer or commander in Jerusalem without knowing its history. In Jerusalem, one does not just decide to change or move things. Instead, the first question is: What did my predecessors do?  This is how to avoid stepping into a minefield.

In the latest unrest, the Jerusalem district chief took an operational decision that was correct. Seeking to prevent crowding at Damascus Gate, he placed barricades around the plaza outside the gate. But the consequences were major clashes, because the issue is not the barricades, but rather, the status quo.   

On the flip side of the coin, Jews ascending the Temple Mount are seen in a poor light by Muslims at the site.  The Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement tried to stop such visits,  setting up Murabitoun, male activists, and Murabitat, female activists, to ‘guard’ the Al Aqsa Mosque and prevent Jews from accessing the Temple Mount, which is part of the same compound. The Islamist activists arrived by the busload, and clashes erupted. Israel decided to defend the status quo of Jewish visitations, and banned the Northern Branch using emergency legislation. Soon, quiet returned to the Temple Mount.

 The moral of the story is that it is vital to guard the status quo of Arabs and Jews alike in the city.

A second vital ingredient for successful policing in the capital is the integration of the ‘green’ paramilitary Border Police with the ‘blue’ civilian Israel Police. In Jerusalem, the forces are combined. This gives police an edge when, for example, it must respond to major security or criminal challenges in the Shuafat Refugee Camp.

The issue of cultural competence is no less important. This means knowing the population that police are facing and understanding its cultural codes. It means not placing a checkpoint to examine driving licenses at the entrance to an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood two hours before the Sabbath, or just before the end of a Ramadan fast outside of an Arab village.

Police that know the culture of the people it polices and respects it will prevent unnecessary friction, and only deal with those incidents that it must.

Part of cultural competence means developing daily dialogue with the heads of various communities.

This also facilitates the reporting of crimes in communities that often refrain from turning to the police and prefer to deal with incidents internally.

Jewish, Muslim, and Christian religious leaders attended a ceremony marking the changing of the Jerusalem district police commander, because he is everyone’s district chief.

The chief must not be perceived as being on the side of one community at the expense of another, but as upholding the rule of law, without question. Such ties can also enable police to send messages to community leaders to help calm the atmosphere during tensions and prevent incidents.

In such a heterogeneous and explosive city, these are the tools that police have at their disposal to keep Jerusalem stable. In such a complex city, the Israel Police cannot let up for even one moment, because one small match can set Jerusalem and even the entire Middle East ablaze.

Brigadier General Shaul Gordon has extensive experience serving in a legal capacity within the Israel National Police (INP) and the Israel Defense Forces, including holding the position of Senior Legal Advisor to the INP from 2006-2016. Read full bio here.

What Trevor Noah gets wrong about Israel

By Mark Goldfeder

Last week Comedy Central’s The Daily Show host Trevor Noah did an ill-advised segment on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After explaining that he was not trying to place blame, he went on to blame Israel simply because there are more dead Palestinians than dead Israelis.

He also echoed the insane argument of Congresswoman Ilhan Omar, that somehow the fight is not fair because Israel has a better missile defense system.

Noah’s approach was not surprising given his history of borderline antisemitic tweets, but it is still worth responding to his argument because there is undoubtedly a strong impulse to want to count bodies and assign fault. That kind of thinking, however, is logically flawed and incredibly dangerous. Especially when someone as popular as Noah gives it voice.

US-designated terrorist organizations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are sending thousands of rockets screaming into densely populated Israeli cities. The express, unwavering goal of these terrorists is to kill every Jewish man, woman and child. Israel’s defense system knocks down most of the missiles, but some get through and kill or injure innocents. If Israel had not invested in research and development to protect its people and instead focused on digging terror tunnels like Hamas, there would be hundreds more dead Israelis. Would that make Noah feel better?

Israel is not at fault for being able to defend herself and has every right to respond to aggression. Hamas should not be rewarded or excused by the media for its poor aim and misplaced priorities.

Proportionality in wartime is a prospective legal analysis that falls under Article 8(2)(b(4) of the Rome Statute, not the opinion of an armchair quarterback a day later, even if that quarterback has a talk show. International law recognizes that civilian casualties are a horrible but inevitable part of conflict, and forbids attacks in which the anticipated civilian casualties will be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage gained.

Note that it does not say in comparison to how many of your people the other side managed to kill. The reason for this is clear: When you judge the appropriateness of an attack based solely on the number of people who died you do not end up protecting civilians, instead you incentivize.

Human shields

That is precisely why Hamas operatives continuously surround themselves with civilians, just to let them die. That is why they store weapons in schools, and in hospitals, and why they shoot them from civilian structures in populated areas.

Under the kind of effects-based, non-legal analysis by influential media folk like Trevor Noah, Hamas’s use of human shields to build up the number of casualties is actually rewarded. To paraphrase a quote often attributed to prime minister Golda Meir, if they only loved their children as much as they hated ours this war would be over.

Unlike Hamas and PIJ, Israel has only aimed at military targets, and even Hamas seems to begrudgingly admit that. While innocent people have tragically been killed, Israel has done everything it can to limit casualties, including warning civilians in advance to leave the targeted areas. In fact, as Noah ironically notes, Israel has the ability to completely destroy the other side, but they have shown great restraint in not doing so.

It is also unfair to fault Israel for its technological advantage. Noah punctuated his remarks by asking, “If you are in a fight where the other person cannot beat you, how hard should you retaliate when they try to hurt you?”

That ridiculous question assumes that the deaths and maiming of innocent Israelis killed by terrorists can be dismissed because Hamas was just “trying to hurt” Israel. Death and injuries do hurt, and constant rocket barrages make it impossible for Israelis to live a normal life. Should the US not have responded to 9/11 because the Taliban could not really beat us?

His question also ignores the fact that the other side is intent on winning. Hamas is openly hell-bent on destroying Israel, is using relatively sophisticated weaponry, and believes that it can do it. Israel has every right to take Hamas at its word and does not have to let it keep trying.

Here is the simple unavoidable truth as summarized by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: “If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence. If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel.”

The answer to Noah’s question is quite clear then: Israel should hit back just hard enough so that the other side stops targeting its civilians and is deterred from targeting them again. If Noah disapproves of Israel’s methods because too many innocent Palestinians are being incidentally killed as Israel works to take out the strategic military outposts used by terrorists to kill their people, perhaps he should call out Hamas for its destructive behavior, instead of giving it a pass for its ineptitude and rewarding its self-inflated blood counts.

Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Israel's Strike on the Gaza Media Building Complies With The Law Of Armed Conflict 

By Eli Bar-On

DEPUTY MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL, IDF (2012-2015)

May 2021 will be remembered as a particularly hot month in Israel, but not because of the boiling weather. On May 10th, after several days of clashes between Palestinians and Israelis in East Jerusalem, Hamas, the terror organization that has been ruling the Gaza Strip for almost 15 years, returned to the number one war crime in its playbook: launching rockets towards cities and villages across Israel.

By now, well above 3,500 rockets have been fired from Gaza into Israel. Most were intercepted by the Israeli Iron Dome air defense system. Yet, some managed to penetrate those defenses and kill several Israeli civilians. In response to these attacks, Israel launched its own military campaign - Operation Guardian of the Walls - and has so far targeted over 800 military targets belonging to Hamas and other terror groups operating inside Gaza.

One of the Israeli strikes that gained the  greatest global attention - and criticism - was the attack on the Al-Jalaa building in Gaza. Apparently, what made this strike exceptional was not the fact that this was a fairly tall building, with twelve floors, nor the number of casualties in the strike (there were none). What was special about this building was the fact that it housed the offices of foreign news agencies, including the Associated Press and Al Jazeera. As detailed by the testimonies of several employees in these agencies (here and here, for example), the IDF notified the residents of the building that they should evacuate it within one hour because the IDF intended to target it. Once the building was evacuated, the IDF struck and destroyed it.

Assuming the IDF knew that the building was home to news agencies among other civilian offices and apartments, was it lawful to carry out this strike? Let us examine the legal basis that needs to be substantiated in order to claim that the attack was lawful.

The first thing we need to look at is whether the building was a military objective. The principle of distinction, which is the touchstone of the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC), requires all fighting parties to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, and to direct their strikes only against military objectives. A military objective is an object which, by its nature, location, purpose or use, makes an effective contribution to military action, and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances at play at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

How then, does the IDF explain the attack against the building, which appears to be civilian in nature? In a statement made by the IDF, it was claimed that the building contained military assets belonging to the intelligence offices of Hamas. The IDF also claimed that the building housed a Hamas research and development unit operating technological equipment against Israel, which constituted "a unique asset to the Hamas terrorist organization." If that is the case, those assets can indeed qualify as military objectives. But does this mean that the whole building qualifies as a military objective? The LOAC stipulate that clearly separated and distinct military objectives should not be attacked as a single military objective.

Were the specific offices, from which Hamas was operating in the building, "clearly separated and distinct military objectives" that should have been attacked surgically, without attacking the building as a whole? Did the IDF, which has precision-guided munitions and often uses them for pinpoint strikes of specific elements of a structure, have a legal obligation to direct the attack only against the Hamas offices in the building? It seems like this is a very good question to which there is no clear answer.

But in the concrete circumstances of the case, the Israeli military spokesman said: "There was no way of taking down only the Hamas facilities that were in the building. They occupied several floors in the building and it was impossible only to take down those floors. It was deemed necessary to take down the whole building." If that was indeed the case, it seems reasonable enough to claim that the structure was a single unit that qualified as a military objective in its entirety, since through its use it made an effective contribution to Hamas's military action, and its destruction offered a definite military advantage to the IDF. In this respect, the classification of the whole building as a military objective remains correct regardless of its civilian nature and uses.

Now, we should take one step forward with our legal analysis. The qualification of an object as a military target is not enough. The LOAC require the targeting party to take all sorts of precautions to spare civilians and civilian objects. One of the most important precautions is that effective advance warning shall be given of attacks that may affect the civilian population - unless circumstances do not permit.

As was learned from the testimonies of the residents of the building, the IDF did indeed give them time to evacuate and only struck the building after its owner assured the IDF it had been fully evacuated. The fact that there were no civilian casualties or injuries as a consequence of the attack of such a large structure is also proof of the highly effective advance warning that was given. Further proof of that fact could be found in the many photographers who were anticipating the strike and took videos documenting it from different angles.

Finally, the fact that the building was a military objective and that precautions have been taken during the attack is not enough. The LOAC also require that an attack that could be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, will not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

This means that the collateral damage to civilians and civilian property from the attack has to be proportionate to the military gain. In this case, there were no civilian casualties or injuries. If we consider the whole structure to be one military objective, we can also exclude the civilian offices in the building from the proportionality analysis. The civilian property that remains to be considered in this analysis is thus the objects inside the civilian offices and apartments in the building and any expected collateral damage to objects in the vicinity of the building. Presumably, some part of the residents managed to extract from the building at least some of the most precious and valuable equipment that they could within the short time they had to evacuate.

Obviously, the damage to the property that remained in the building is much less significant than any damage to human lives that could have been occurred.

This analysis must be carried out by the IDF commander who decided to approve the strike. Assuming such an assessment has been made, in accordance with the IDF procedures, and assuming that the civilian objects' damage assessment was not excessive in proportion to the direct military gain from the attack, this strike should be considered proportional and lawful.

For understandable reasons, the public outcry after the attack was immense. The strike was criticized by a host of groups around the world. There is no reason to doubt the AP’s statement that it had no indication of Hamas being in, or active in, the building.

At the same time, years of experience with Hamas's modus operandi have taught the IDF that Hamas will never shy away from using civilians as human shields, with the knowledge and consent of these civilians, or with the lack thereof.

Journalists are not immune from this tactic. If the IDF's claim regarding Hamas's use of the building for military purposes is correct, this should come as no surprise.

Hamas did not coincidentally locate its offices in this building, having known full well that it houses the offices of big foreign media outlets. It used their presence cynically, hoping to deter the IDF from striking the building in order to avoid the PR damage that inevitably follows such a strike.

AP and Al Jazeera have called for the IDF to publish the evidence that Hamas was using the building. Prime Minister Netanyahu claimed that such evidence will be passed to the US through intelligence channels. Obviously, making a public case to present the evidence of the attack is almost an insurmountable challenge, because these operations are almost always based on classified information. The publication of such information can endanger the lives of human sources or risk the exposure of invaluable methods of collecting intelligence.

Freedom of the press should always be respected and in times of war even more so. This is why military strikes that bear collateral damage to journalists and press assets should be carried out only after very careful consideration. At the same time, the reality dictated by terror organizations such as Hamas in which journalists sometimes serve as human shields without their knowledge should not deter law-abiding militaries such as the IDF to strike these terror groups even at the cost of harming assets of press agencies, as was done in this case.

Claiming otherwise will only incentivize the terror organizations to keep using these war crimes tactics. This is yet another example of why the civilized world must fight and condemn groups such as Hamas in every possible way.

Eli Bar-On concluded his career in the Israel Defense Forces holding the position of instructor at the IDF National Defense College (the INDC). Prior to that position, Bar-on served as the Deputy Military Advocate General of the IDF (2012 to 2015), where he was in command of approximately 1,000 lawyers and legal experts, including prior to, during and following Operation Pillar of Defense & Operation Protective Edge. He also served as the Chief Legal Advisor for the IDF in the West Bank from 2009 to 2012.

It’s time to change the rules of the game with Hamas

By David Hacham

Operation Guardian of the Walls reached its ninth day on Tuesday, and pressure on Israel to enter into a truce in the near future is growing.

 Past operations have shown that it takes days for ceasefire agreements to be implemented.

The IDF is firm in its position that the operation will continue for a few more days at least, in order to complete its objectives, unlike Hamas which appears keen to reach a truce. Hamas has sustained major strikes on its infrastructure and combat capabilities, as has Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The broad range of precise IAF strikes and eliminations of senior terrorists is pushing Hamas to become highly interested in a truce at this stage. Hamas is suffering from low morale, symbolic blows, and the elimination of expert knowledge on military terrorist experience.

Meanwhile, commentary in Israel from senior representatives of the government and a number of former military officers have promoted the idea that the IDF’s objective is to create ‘a few years of quiet.’

This fits into the longer-term trend that has seen Israel end operations and enable Hamas to threaten it again in a short amount of time, which usually amounts to months or a few years.

Yet the time has come for Israel to consider new options that will prevent another military campaign, and which can break the cycle of escalations that follow one another every number of years.

The formula in place between Israel and Hamas in the past 15 years has followed the same pattern. During each IDF operation to subdue Gazan rocket fire on Israel – Operation Cast Lead in 2008, Pillar of Defense 2012, Protective Edge in 2014, and other smaller flare ups in recent years, military strikes rain down on Hamas and other terror organizations.

After the rounds are over, Hamas and other terror organizations rehabilitate themselves, and prepare for the next round.

Then, after a while, it all begins anew.

Israel also frequently avoided escalations in Gaza due its desire to retain optimal levels of readiness for its more threatening fronts with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and focus on its disruption of Iranian military entrenchment in Syria.

Israel must disrupt this repetitive Gaza cycle, which is going nowhere, by first ensuring that preventing a re-arming of Hamas and the rebuilding of its military capabilities be denied as part of any post-conflict arrangement. This can be done by recruiting the international community, with an emphasis on the U.S., in the event that Hamas continues to act as the regime in Gaza.

Neutralizing Hamas’s military capabilities should be followed up by an internationally-backed arrangement to promote a civilian effort to rehabilitate Gaza and economically develop it.  

Israel must not be intoxicated by its military achievements, but rather focus on the mission of preventing Hamas from rebuilding, and its repositioning as a terror organization that threatens Israeli security.

This requires new Israeli policy for the Palestinian arena.

Since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, Israel has worked to keep the Gaza calm as much as possible, and learned to accept the Hamas regime. It avoided any act to return Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to Gaza.

It allowed the continuous flow of goods and trade to Gaza, and ongoing Qatari financial aid that now amounts to billions of dollars for the Hamas regime.

Some of those funds clearly leaked to the military wing of Hamas.

The arrangement described above never held up for very long, collapsing each time after a round of fighting, and then resuming. To aim to return to this failed model would be a major miss by Israel and highly dangerous.  

After the guns go quiet, and mediators obtain a new ceasefire, Israel should invest maximum effort to reach a situation in which the rules of the game will change.

In addition to setting up mechanisms to prevent Hamas from re-arming, it is time for Jerusalem to stop its acceptance of Hamas’s existence as a ruling regime in Gaza at the cost of a major weakening of the Palestinian Authority.

This pattern has led the PA to be pushed into the corner, and it has led to the blocking of every initiative designed to restart diplomatic talks between Israel and the PA.

It is clear that PA President Mahmoud Abbas represents only one part of the Palestinian system, and he cannot negotiate with Israel as a lame duck, partial representative.

His current weakness makes Abbas look like a puppet, and Fatah, which runs the PA, is seeing serious internal cracks in the stability of its rule in the West Bank.

Reversing this trend will certainly serve Israel’s security interest.

In addition, Israel must make it clear that it will not tolerate any attempt by Hamas to connect Gaza to future events in Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound.

Vitally, Israel cannot forget its obligation to secure the release of two of its civilians and the bodies of two of its soldiers being held by Hamas as bargaining chips. Basic Israeli and IDF moral codes mean that no one must be left behind.

When the dust settles, Israel will need to hold itself to account over the question of how such a terrorist monster was allowed to rear its head in Gaza. 

Part of the answer lies in the blind eye Israeli authorities turned, for decades, to Palestinian Islamist forces, including the 1979 Israeli recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Al Mujama al-Islami group. This group fought Fatah and other secular PLO organizations in the 1980s, setting the foundation for the establishment of Hamas in 1987 a few days after the eruption of the First Intifada.

Subsequent mistakes led to Hamas getting stronger in the Palestinian territories, particularly in Gaza, such the decision in 1992 to expel 415 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic operatives to Lebanon following the kidnap and murder of a Border Policeman – only for Israel to allow them to return to the territories a year later, equipped with training, radical ideology and new political clout.

In 2005, the disengagement from Gaza was conducted in a unilateral manner, without an agreement with the PA, which then ruled the Strip, exhibiting Israel’s short sightedness. This set the stage for Hamas’s takeover in 2007. The decision to allow Hamas to compete in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian parliament in east Jerusalem, under U.S. and international pressure, was another strategic error that benefited Hamas. Hamas went on to win a majority in those elections, paving the way for the 2007 coup.

Looking ahead, it is vital for Israel to now learn the appropriate lessons from the past, and act differently in the present and future.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Hamas Seeks To Be Crowned Guardian Of Jerusalem 

BY Grisha Yakubovich

 

The current major escalation between Israel and Hamas is a result of the terror organization’s long-term strategic vision aimed at ultimately crowning itself as ‘Jerusalem’s defender,’ both in the internal Palestinian arena and throughout the Middle East.

The origins of the present round can be traced back to recent months, when Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas floated a trial balloon in the form of elections to the Palestinian parliament.

Abbas’s goal was to test out Fatah’s position, Israel’s response, and the responses of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. He also wanted to see how the Palestinian street would respond. It was always clear both to Abbas and Hamas that elections would not actually go ahead.

Hamas analyzed Abbas’s motives two steps ahead. Its leaders knew that Abbas would cancel elections and blame Israel for refusing to allow a  vote in east Jerusalem.

Hamas decided to leverage the situation to consolidate its position as the defender of Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, Islam’s third holiest site.

The move serves Hamas’s interests on multiple levels. On the Palestinian street, it positions Hamas as the dominant party in the struggle for leadership with Fatah. In the Arab world, it pushes back against Arab states engaged in normalization in Israel, by sending out the message to their publics that these countries are counterfeit defenders of Jerusalem, while Hamas is the genuine deal.

This creates long-term legitimacy for Hamas in the Arab world, reversing its isolation. It could see Hamas receive significant support and funding in the future, even if it currently risks the immediate goals of rebuilding Gaza now.

The role of Iran and its regional axis cannot be ignored either. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad serve as the representatives of Iran’s power display in the post-Trump era. The Islamic Republic recently marked  Quds Day, the last Friday of every Ramadan, which is dedicated to protests in Iranian cities and Shi’ite population centers in the region, calling for Israel’s destruction.

An escalation now drives home the impression of a broad, region-wide radical axis that stands firm against Israel, under Iranian guidance. This complements the recent sense of euphoria felt by the Iranian leadership, relieved by the departure of Trump, and welcoming what it perceives as the weak Biden.

Thus, by escalating over Jerusalem now, Hamas’s strategy works for it on three different dimensions at the same time.

Most crucial, however, is Hamas’s positioning inside the Palestinian arena.  

Israel made unnecessary mistakes by initially proceeding with the court ruling on the Sheikh Jarrah evictions during the sensitive  Ramadan period , lighting another match in a room full combustible material. Israel realized this late in the proceedings, but its efforts to de-escalate only made things worse, as they were perceived by east Jerusalem Palestinians as signs of weakness.

When the Israel Police surrendered to demands to remove barricades from the Old City’s Damascus Gate, this created motivation among the rioters in the capital to continue the struggle. Removing the barriers escalated events further and gave the Palestinians hope that they could also lead to the cancelation of Jerusalem Day festivities when the national religious camp celebrates the unification of the city.

Against the backdrop of this expectation, Hamas stepped in. It issued an unprecedented ultimatum on Monday, demanding that Israel withdraw forces from east Jerusalem and the Temple Mount – not because it had any expectations that Israel would meet the demands, but because it was out to present itself as the dominant element in the Palestinian arena, the true protector of Jerusalem.

The next step for Hamas was to make good on its promise to ‘defend’ Al-Aqsa and fire rockets at Israel.      

Israel has made the right move by broadcasting to Hamas and to the intermediaries it has sent to seek a truce the following message: Hamas is going to pay a heavy price for what it has done, and it does not matter what Hamas says at this stage.

This course of action is the only way to force Hamas to realize that Israel will no longer dance to its tune. Israel will not start and stop escalations at Hamas’s command and let the terror organization score points over Jerusalem at its expense.

Looking ahead, Hamas did not expect a lengthy conflict. It sought to exploit the momentum surrounding Jerusalem, fire a limited number of rockets, absorb a proportionate Israeli response, and exit the escalation within days.

It is important that Israel continues to deny Hamas that gain.  

When Israel transferred responsibility over 80 kilometers of its territory from the Gaza border north to the IDF, it sent an important message to Hamas that it will now have to march according to Israel’s pace.

Israel’s drafting of reservists sends the same message.

At this stage, no one knows whether Israel and Hamas will end up in a full war. While Hamas did not plan for this, to push it  its cause of being crowned as protector of Jerusalem, it is willing to pay that price too,

Israel must now take advantage of the current momentum and not let up until a hefty price has been paid by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The killings of senior commanders from the organization is a step in this direction.

The killing of two Israeli civilians in Ashkelon is, tragically, the kind of ‘achievement’ that Hamas and allied groups desire before being prepared to de-escalate themselves.

Hamas has, in fact, begun sending out feelers for a truce, as seen in statements calling on international intervention over Israel’s decision to stop fuel movement into Gaza.

It is too soon to anticipate a truce, as both sides enter into more escalatory stages in their planned campaigns.

When the fighting does end, Israel must reach the stage where it has not only extracted a high price from Hamas, but also seized the opportunity to significantly roll back its terrorist-army force build-up in Gaza.

Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.).

The Biden Administration’s Foreign Policy Will Have Dangerous Consequences for America, Israel, and the West

By Micah Jones

In less than six months, the Biden Administration’s foreign policy has harmed America’s strategic reach, trust with Israel, and the values of Western nations. Each of these realities is demonstrated by a recent event: (1) the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, (2) the leaking of conversations between former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif regarding covert Israeli military actions in Syria, and (3) current US Secretary of State Antony Blinken being insulted on U.S. soil during U.S.-China diplomatic talks in Anchorage, Alaska.

Beginning with the withdrawal of American military forces in Afghanistan, the U.S. will force an abrupt end to the longest war in the nation’s history. Nearly 20 years to the day that American forces entered Afghanistan to topple the Taliban, the U.S. will aim to withdraw all troops by September 11, 2021. This is a disastrous, short-sighted, decision. Not only will the sudden withdrawal provide little consolation for America’s extreme sacrifice of blood and treasure, it will leave the tenuous, NATO-backed, government in Kabul in the crosshairs of a resurgent Talban. Once American forces withdraw, there will be no bulwark to withstand the onslaught of violence that will likely spiral the country into a sectarian civil war. The tenuous, hard-fought, gains for women and minorities will be immediately erased as Islamist forces quickly regain control.

 Not only will this American troop withdrawal hurt the Afghan people, it will also threaten America’s strategic and military reach within a critical area of the globe. U.S. bases in Afghanistan provide the American military with significant force projection throughout all of the Middle East and Central Asia. This is a region that is growing more chaotic as Russia, Iran, and Turkey rattle their sabers. The removal of U.S. troops will create a void that will be filled with the very forces that America and its allies spent 20 years fighting.

 The Biden Administration’s foreign policy has also harmed the U.S.-Israeli relationship. In April, The New York Times reported on a leaked audio recording from an interview with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Apparently intended for Iranian-only channels, the recording included an astonishing portion in which Mr. Zarif discussed how former Secretary of State John Kerry had told him about nearly 200 covert Israeli operations in Syria. Later news confirmed, contrary to assertions by Mr. Kerry, now the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, that the information was not public when he told it to Mr. Zarif.

This revelation is devastating for the U.S.-Israel relationship. Israel will now be less likely to share sensitive material with the Biden Administration. In deflecting blame from Mr. Kerry, the Biden Administration also seems to indicate that it will not publicly-support Israel’s legitimate concerns about the dangers of the Iranian regime. Such stances will hurt both countries as important information may be kept secret when it could be beneficial for their mutual security interests. 

            Finally, the hegemony of Western nations will be tested as the Biden Administration concedes American global leadership to China. This retreat was demonstrated in March when U.S. and Chinese diplomatic envoys met in Anchorage, Alaska. After Secretary of State Blinken presented his opening remarks, he was excoriated by Yang Jiechi, a high-ranking Chinese government official. Mr. Yang criticized America’s democratic institutions and alleged that America was no longer fit to lead the world as it engaged in imperialism abroad and had racial unrest at home. Rather than forcefully rebuke Mr. Yang and the Chinese delegation, perhaps citing China’s failure to contain COVID-19 or condemning it for its internment of Uighur Muslims, Mr. Blinken took a conciliatory tone. 

Such an episode cannot be understated. The Chinese delegation did more than insult America on American soil. By criticizing America’s democratic institutions and foreign policy, it attacked the liberal values of the free world. When America did not confront this slander, China pushed itself closer to its desired position as the next superpower to dictate global affairs. But unlike America and the West, China’s worldview is one that would crush dissent, imprison minorities, and force an authoritarian regime upon formerly free peoples.

In these three episodes, the Biden Administration has demonstrated that it will not stand up for its allies or the values it holds dear. If it continues down this path, the consequences will be devastating for America, Israel, and the West. As liberalism the world over recedes, authoritarianism will take its place.

Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. Read full bio here.



Jerusalem violence and cancellation of P.A. elections are closely linked

By David Hacham

Some of the recent violence seen in Jerusalem and the West Bank can be traced back to the fallout from the recent cancellation of the Palestinian elections, and more trouble could be on the way.

The Palestinian elections train entered its final station earlier then officially planned, when Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on April 21 ‘delaying’ them.

Abbas conveniently blamed the decision on Israel’s refusal to allow elections to be held in East Jerusalem. His decree was signed by the PLO’s Executive Committee, the Fatah Central Committee, and heads of Palestinian factions.

With his announcement, Abbas deliberately avoided promoting a creative workaround solution to the issue of East Jerusalem, such as online voting, or the placement of ballots in mosques, churches, foreign consulates, postal voting (as was done in the 2006 elections, with Israeli approval) or Palestinian neighborhoods beyond the security fence in East Jerusalem.

His de facto cancellation of the elections was highly predictable, despite the advanced stage that the elections process was in.

The writing had been on the wall for a long time. Abbas had been searching for an escape hatchet and a ladder to climb down from elections, since going ahead would have placed his ruling Fatah movement at great risk.

The last time a vote was held in the Palestinian arena was in January 2006, when Hamas won a majority of parliamentary seats. A repetition of this scenario was highly likely had the elections taken place.

The Palestinians are likely to wait for a long time for elections, if they occur at all. In its statement, the PA categorically stated that elections must include all Palestinians, including East Jerusalem residents, and that campaigning must be held without restrictions in any location.

Abbas stressed in his announcement that "we will not give up on Jerusalem and we won’t give up on the right of our people in Jerusalem to exercise their democratic rights."

He called on the international community to pressure Israel to uphold its obligations to signed agreements with the Palestinians – including their right to take part in elections. Abbas also called for national unity, reconciliation, and continued, non-violent ‘popular resistance,’ as well as for the formation of a national unity government that is committed to international agreements, namely the Oslo Peace Accords.

Behind the scenes, however, senior Fatah elements had been signaling for weeks that Abbas was likely to suspend the elections.

Senior Fatah elements were deeply concerned by the prospect of failing to win a majority in the Palestinian parliament, meaning that its chances of being the ruling government in the West Bank would have been in jeopardy had the vote gone ahead.

This is due to the fact that Fatah was headed to elections from a clearly inferior position. It was running under three separate party lists, headed by Abbas; the imprisoned terrorist, Marwan Barghouti; and the exiled former senior Fatah member, Mohammed Dahlan, who is based in the UAE.  

It is highly likely that the entire elections initiative was in fact a push by Abbas to showcase his democratic credentials for the international community and especially the Biden administration.

But Abbas did not want to go through with the process, and found the right excuse just in time to call it off. He sent messages to Hamas to try and reach an agreement over the delay, and to avoid a major new Fatah – Hamas clash.

At the same time, Abbas is facing resistance to the cancellation at home too. Jibril Rajoub, Secretary General of the Fatah Central Committee, has established himself as a central candidate to succeed Abbas, and he has expressed a genuine interest in holding the elections.

The same is true of the Deputy Chairman of the Fatah movement, Mahmoud al-Aloul, who has described the issue of holding elections in East Jerusalem as a political, sovereign, and religious matter, and not a technical or administrative hurdle.

Hamas, for its part, threw its full weight in favor of holding the elections in general, and in Jerusalem specifically. It objected to their cancellation because the elections represented a platform for consolidating its power in the West Bank, and a necessary step for taking over the Palestinian Authority.

Hamas released unequivocal statements that Jerusalem is a “red line” and that no elections could go ahead without it.

It added that it rejects any delay or cancellation of the elections, and that a national ‘day of confrontation’ should be held to force Israel to allow the vote to take place in East Jerusalem.

The elections represented an attractive opportunity for Hamas to broaden its control over the Palestinian arena, under near optimal conditions, at the twilight of Abbas’s rule.

The deputy chief of the Hamas political bureau, Saleh al-Arouri, said the cancellation of the elections would deepen divisions in the Palestinian arena, and signs of his forecast have already been bubbling up to the surface in the latest security escalation.

Hamas holds Israel responsible for giving Abbas a comfortable exit lane, thereby saving him from defeat, and has vowed to make Israel pay a price.

The United States appears to understand the delay. Egypt and Jordan, for their part, had deep reservations about the elections to begin with, and stressed to Abbas the need to suspend the process. The chiefs of Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence drove this point home during meetings with PA officials, warning that allowing the elections to go ahead would lead to the rise of radical Islam in the West Bank, at the expense of Fatah and the PA.

Against this explosive background, and following Ramadan riots in Jerusalem, additional loaded days lie ahead on the calendar this month. The marking of Nakba Day on May 15 could form a new trigger for violence.

A dynamic of escalation has already set in following the cancellation, and it could continue. The motivation by Hamas and other Palestinian terror factions to escalate the situation with acts of violence and terror in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza, has risen.

Israel has chosen to try contain the escalation to Jerusalem and to limit its spread in the West Bank, while seeking to prevent a new conflict with Gazan armed factions.

Hamas, for its part, is also interested in preventing a new head-on clash with Israel, as this would draw Israeli firepower to its infrastructure in Gaza, and make Gaza’s already dire humanitarian situation even worse. In the background, the coronavirus situation remains far from resolved in the Strip.

The remainder of May holds the potential for major escalation, but Israel will do all that it can to try and inject calm into the Palestinian arena.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

A change is needed in the U.S. approach to the Yemen war

By Tomer Barak

A brutal war has been raging in recent years in Yemen between Iranian-backed Houthi rebels (also known as Ansar Allah) and a Saudi-led coalition. Recent attempts by the UN and the U.S. to achieve a cease fire between the two sides have so far failed, and unfortunately have also emboldened the radical Iranian axis.

As a result of the war, Yemen is suffering from the most severe humanitarian crises in the world today. The number of casualties is staggering. Some 230,000 people have been killed (more than 100,000 as a result of the fighting and some 130,000 from indirect causes such as famine and poor health services), and some 4 million have become refugees and IDPs (Internally displaced people).

The conflict in Yemen has a long history. The last six years of intense fighting have led to a stalemate. Each side has dug into its positions, and the country is divided between the two parties (with other parts controlled by Jihadi groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and ISIS). Clashes are a daily affair, and the two sides fire projectiles at each other’s civilian population centers and infrastructure (airports and energy sectors).

Moreover, it seems that the conflict is growing in intensity, as the Shi’ite Houthis are engaged in a force build-up process that is accelerating, with high-quality know-how, technology, and capabilities delivered to them by Iran.

UN reports have indicated that Iran is providing the Houthis with sophisticated drones, anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles.

The Houthis of Yemen are a social and political tribal power who lived in the peripheral regions of Yemen’s mountainous northern region for years and attempted to gain political capital (with little success) during Yemen’s Sunni ruling government after the country unified in 1991. 

After 2011, when the wave of revolutions and insurgencies spread throughout the region, the Houthis saw an opportunity to gain control of further territory. They took advantage of Iran’s willingness to provide aid, and began stocking up on more advanced weapons. In late 2014 they marched south and managed to seize the capital, Sana`a. Since then, Iran’s willingness to provide support has allowed the Houthis to leap ahead in their military capabilities. 

Today, the Houthis control a third of Yemeni territory, which covers more than 10 million people, and they run a full government that includes components of a healthcare system, education, tax collection, and other state functions. Houthi diplomatic missions are active in Iran, among Iraqi militia areas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other locations.

The Houthis area local organization with localized Yemeni interests, but they also adhere to a virulent anti-Western and anti-Israel ideology. The Houthi flag expresses this radicalism succinctly through its slogans of ‘Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, and Victory for Islam”.

The Houthi-run ‘state’ possesses an organized military with structured command and control, including a general headquarters that is responsible for future force build-up, and which features combat commands. The Houthi army includes an air wing that operates long-range cruise missiles, attack drones, and ballistic missiles.

The Houthis have proven long-range firepower, including unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles that can reach over 1,700 kilometers, with high levels of precision. Attacks on Riyadh and the UAE from Yemen have demonstrated such capabilities.

Alongside aerial power, the Houthis are in possession of advanced maritime capabilities and can interrupt the freedom of navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. In recent years, they have demonstrated their willingness to target oil tankers (using UAVs, shore-to-sea missiles, and naval mines).

It must be assumed that the Houthis are continuing to develop long-range strike capabilities. Houthi leaders have threatened to strike Israel in the event of a future military conflict and are believed to be working diligently to acquire the ability to strike targets in Israel, more than 2,200 kilometers from their bases in Yemen.

The Biden administration led a rapid review of U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen. In this context, Washington canceled the Trump administration’s categorization of the Houthis as a terrorist entity (to allow NGOs access to Houthi-run areas), put a temporary hold on offensive weapons deals with Saudi Arabia, and doubled down on its diplomatic efforts to achieve an end to the conflict in Yemen.

However, this approach is only part of a larger U.S. campaign in the region, focusing in bringing Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table.

In that regard, The U.S. is trying to achieve a combination of several short-term goals: Reducing potential escalation that will harm the talks with Iran; managing the humanitarian crisis; helping Saudi Arabia to exit the quagmire in Yemen; and focusing U.S. military efforts to downsize Washington’s deployment in the greater Middle East.

However, past reconciliation attempts and ceasefire periods allowed the Houthis comfort zones for significant force build-ups, which they used to independently build their armed force with good manufacturing skills (contrary to common perceptions) and by receiving Iranian support. The result was always an intense escalation.

A premature ceasefire without a major pushback against the Houthis will likely counter American goals in the long run, and assist Iran in gaining a foothold in a sensitive area, allowing the Shi’ite axis to threaten regional, U.S., and Israeli interests. 

Instead, the U.S. should consider changing its approach based on an understanding that it has a window of opportunity to show firmness on Yemen together with its partners in the Gulf - Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman.

The U.S. has the means to play a dominant role in the campaign, employing air power and intelligence resources while pressuring the Houthis extensively in their areas of control, possibly to the point of defeating them, and at the same time, to better supervise coalition efforts in order to make sure that armed conflict standards are being maintained.

This would send a clear message of U.S. determination throughout the region, and possibly be beneficial even to the nuclear talks with Iran.

Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

The Bennet riddle

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

One week before the deadline expires for Benjamin Netanyahu to either form a new government or return the mandate to President Rivlin, the prime minister appears to be at a dead end. While seven days is time enough for a last-minute breakthrough, Netanyahu’s path to forming a government appears to be obstructed by the very bloc he put together before the elections.

Prior to the March vote, Netanyahu worked to strengthen the position of the Religious Zionist Party, headed by Bezalel Smotrich. Netanyahu helped the party push through the electoral threshold  on the understanding that Smotrich  would help him form a right-wing government.

But Smotrich is unwilling to hear of any coalition that would lean on the support of the Islamist movement affiliated United Arab List and its leader, Mansour Abbas. The UAL, which squeezed past the post to gain four seats, has become the smallest party to date to become kingmaker – and is now a decisive factor in whether a coalition can arise or whether the country will go to fifth elections.

On Saturday evening, Smotrich, outraged by Netanyahu’s call for all sides to cool tensions after violent events in Jerusalem, went as far as to say that it might be time to replace the prime minister, triggering return fire from Netanyahu.

All eyes are now on Yamina party leader Naftali Bennett, who finds himself facing an acute dilemma.

Should he form a government with center and left-wing parties, he would, at the tender age of 49, become prime minister of Israel. But he would be a prime minister of compromise in a government that would not be right- wing. It would be a government ‘of change’ – that change being the expulsion of Netanyahu from the political scene.

It would also include Gideon Sa’ar’s Tikva Hadasha (‘New Hope’) party, which, while right-wing like Bennett, has vowed never to sit under Netanyahu.

Yamina’s name reflects its ideology – it literally means “rightward”. And yet it is now considering entering into a government of compromise. Herein lies the Bennett riddle. Will he give up his right-wing values and realize a one-time opportunity to become prime minister?

If he does enter into a rotation agreement with Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, Bennett will go down in history as the man who ended Netanyahu’s long reign in power. There are many political forces in Israel who want to see this happen, as well as several media organizations in Israel.

Yet Bennett’s voters cast their ballot for a right-wing government. Prior to the elections, Bennett appeared on Channel 20 and signed a document before viewers vowing not to sit in a Lapid government.  

He is now facing pushback from people in his own party. Bennett is facing the dilemma of his life. He could make history if he becomes prime minister, but if, due to its internal tensions and delicate nature, the compromise government falls soon after being born, it could end Bennett’s political career.

On the other hand, should Bennett enter the fifth round of elections since 2019 as the incumbent prime minister, this might strengthen his chances of gaining broader support for Yamina.

The parties examining the possibility of forming a government without Netanyahu are marketing the potential coalition as a unity government. But this government would be boycotting Netanyahu, so the badge of ‘unity’ appears somewhat out of place.

Rather, it would be made up of an assortment of elements, many of which have nothing in common. Nevertheless, negotiations are firmly under way over who would get what role in such a government.

All of the potential party members of the anti-Netanyahu coalition have appointed representatives to take part. Their central objective is to reach the goal of being able to tell President Rivlin that they are capable of forming a government if, as seems likely, Netanyahu returns the mandate to form a government he received from the president. If they obtain this objective, they will receive a shot at forming the next government.

According to sources in Yesh Atid, the second largest party in in parliament after Likud, Lapid is acting as the responsible adult, promoting the message that what  matters most is to form a government and not who gets which portfolio.t. This is a message that is particularly aimed at Bennett. It comes as negotiations about distributing roles enter an intense phase.

Disputes are already arising. According to Channel 12 News, Sa’ar has marked out the position of defense minister – a development that caused Gantz to clarify that he will not take part in the compromise government if he does not continue in the role he holds in the current government.

This threat raises the question of whether the assumption that Gantz is automatically in the pocket of the anti-Netanyahu bloc is in fact correct. It even raises speculation that Netanyahu might again be able to entice Gantz back into a government with him, by offering him to be prime minister first in a new rotation agreement.

While in theory this scenario seems unlikely, in the end Gantz has already made such a U-turn in the past, so it could potentially happen again.

As the political press monitors negotiations over future positions, it remains possible that Netanyahu is cooking up a new ‘magic trick’ to find a way out of the dead end.

As with all good magicians, Netanyahu has proven adept at getting the media to look at one ‘show,’ while preparing to pull a surprise far from where the public’s attention is focused. He might well be doing it again.

As for the idea that Netanyahu become a candidate for the next president, this seems to be more of a concept conjured up by the media than a real initiative. As a defendant in a trial that is just getting started, Netanyahu will get better treatment as a sitting prime minister. He therefore has a clear interest in hanging on to his position for as long as he can as the trial moves forward.

Danielle Roth-Avneri is a journalist and reporter on political matters, as well as an editor for the Israel Hayom/Israel Todaynewspaper, the most widely circulated publication in Israel. Read full bio here.

Erdogan faces his most severe challenge since coming to power

By Pinhas Avivi

Pinhas+Avivi.jpg

Recent signs indicate that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been very keen to score foreign policy achievements. Ultimately, Erdogan’s efforts can be tied to the poor state of the Turkish economy, multiple domestic crises, and his resounding foreign policy failures. 

Turkey’s economic situation can be described as an ongoing avalanche, and this situation is made worse by Ankara’s failure to gain control of the coronavirus. Turkey’s struggle to get hold of sufficient numbers of vaccines, despite its agreement with China, is a major source of concern for Erdogan.

Unlike his first four years in power, when Erdogan was able to create a sense of economic stability, and continuity from his predecessors, using the same tools they employed to try and turn traditional central Turkey into a more prosperous region, today Erdogan is far removed from such visions. 

The Turkish lira is down by 12 percent since mid-March, over four million people are unemployed, and traditional Muslim sectors of Turkish society are losing out economically, thereby jeopardizing their support for Erdogan. Significant migration from Turkey is underway. 

Prior to the Justice and Development Party coming to power in 2002, Turkey ran a secular, free economy, but it was Turkey’s inner cities and their traditional communities that rejected the secular approach and helped elect Erdogan. 

Now that they too are part of the economic problem, Erdogan’s base, and his political situation, are under threat.  

Erdogan has little to be happy about foreign policy-wise either. Regional dynamics have seen a crystallization of an Israeli- Sunni bloc, which firmly excludes Turkey. 

Erdogan does not have many good foreign policy options and has no achievements whatsoever to point to. He has remained locked in diplomatic conflict with Europe since the failed 2016 coup and is embroiled in a long-term diplomatic crisis with the U.S., due to his purchase of S-400 missile defense systems from Russia. The latter move has seen Turkey’s role in NATO placed under a troubling question mark – a far cry from NATO’s traditional view of Turkey as a key component of its front against threats from the East. 

When taken together, such factors can explain why Erdogan has been sending out feelers to Israel, in a bid to rekindle the badly damaged bilateral relationship. 

Erdogan understands that without a connection to Israel, he will not be able to influence the Middle East. He also views ties with Jerusalem as his best bet to influence the new Biden administration – despite diplomatic tensions between President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu. 

As a result, Turkey’s feelers should be seen as a serious attempt to improve ties. 

The same factors have led Erdogan to attempt to salvage Turkey’s damaged relations with Egypt. 

A common interest in resolving the situation in Libya, which affects both Cairo and Ankara, has formed a backdrop to fresh Turkish-Egyptian talks, although Cairo has shown less motivation than Ankara in pursuing this channel. 

And despite agreements with Moscow, Russian forces are acting with a greater degree of freedom on Turkey’s border with Syria. 

Despite the common assumption that Iran is a partner of Turkey, the two countries are in fact in conflict. Iran is busy trying to build its hegemonic axis across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. 

Meanwhile, at home, troubles keep mounting. Not only is Turkey suffering a serious unemployment problem, but it is also now facing a student revolt. 

Navy reserve officers are apparently turning against the Erdogan government as well, as seen in a series of arrests and investigations conducted against them by Turkish security forces. 

Erdogan has pulled Turkey out of a European women’s rights treaty and has proven himself incapable of accepting LGBT rights. 

Without a doubt, Erdogan is facing one of his most difficult moments since rising to power. He has failed to achieve a single objective that he set for himself – foreign or domestic, and is in a weak position. 

The question arises,  how can Erdogan maintain an Islamist ideology and his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, while still sending feelers out to Israel and Egypt?  

In Erdogan’s mind, it is possible to support the Muslim Brotherhood’s social welfare and religious agendas without being seen as a terror supporter. But that hasn’t stopped Erdogan from hosting Hamas’s terrorist headquarters on Turkish soil. 

These factors can act as major stumbling blocks when it comes to thawing relations with Israel. 

Still, Erdogan views Israel as a good bet to improve his situation vis-à-vis the U.S. and Europe. 

Turkey’s announcement at the end of March that it is ready to officially exchange ambassadors with Israel after a deep freeze is highly significant. 

This is an important offer, and Israel should examine the best way to accept it. While defense relations will never go back to what they were prior to Erdogan’s appearance, economic relations between Israel and Turkey are continuing to do well and flourish.

Turkey’s geostrategic weight and trade ties with Israel mean that maintaining ties with it that are as good as possible under present conditions is a serious Israeli interest. 

As a result, Jerusalem should consider Turkey’s offer to exchange ambassadors with interest, without playing ‘public honor games.’ Israeli conditions for such an exchange should be sent privately, through diplomatic channels, while publicly, proper diplomatic relations should be reinstated. 

Those same private channels are the place to address Turkey’s relations with Hamas, rather than in newspaper headlines. 

Additionally, none of the above should harm Israel’s prospering alliance with Greece and Cyprus, which includes military cooperation and working together on natural gas, as well as bilateral tourism agreements. 

Going some way to repairing established relations with Turkey is not a zero-sum game when it comes to Israel’s strategic alliance with Greece. Both interests should be pursued simultaneously. 

Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

Israel and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): The COVID-19 Pandemic as a Golden Opportunity

By Eitan Barak

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The Covid-19 pandemic and allegations that the virus was engineered in China before spreading globally, even if inadvertently, have made clear to all the inherent danger of biological weapons )BW) use.  This category of weapons has been declared illegal under international law due to the inherit inability to use them while simultaneously maintaining the required distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Even the most lethal agents require substantial time (“a latency period”) before the victims are aware of their fate. Undoubtedly, in the modern era, even several hours is sufficient for infected combatants to travel to populated areas and infect masses of innocent civilians.

Therefore, by the 1970s, the international community had drafted a treaty (commonly referred to as “The Biological Weapons Convention” or BWC) with the intent of eliminating all BWs. By joining (through ratification or accession) the Convention, the member states committed themselves to never develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, or retain these weapons, alongside fulfilling their obligation to destroy or divert existing BWs in their arsenals to peaceful use within nine months of joining,

Indeed, on March 26, 2020, while the world was celebrating the BWC’s 45th anniversary, [IE1] the pandemic reverberated throughout in all the respective addresses, including that of the U.S. representative, ironically the state which is the main culprit for the Convention’s intrinsic flaw: the absence of an effective verification regime. Thus, despite various significant steps introduced during the years to strengthen BW verification, many perceived the BWC’s main function to be the symbolic declaration of a universal moral stance. 

Nevertheless, the Convention’s universal acceptance has steadily spread, with 183 member states currently counted. Four additional states (Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, and Syria) have only signed the treaty.

Unfortunately, Israel, together with the r island states of the Comoro Islands, Kiribati, Micronesia, and Tuvalu, as well as five African nations (Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Namibia, and South Sudan) has kept itself completely outside the Convention. Furthermore, according to UN reports, in addition to Haiti, which is under process of ratification, initial procedures (or final ones in the cases of Micronesia and South Sudan) to join the Convention have started in all nine states except the Comoro Islands and Eritrea.

In short, Israel finds itself belonging to a club of only five states (Egypt, Syria, Somalia, the Comoro Islands and Eritrea) having no intent of joining the Convention. Given the other members’ identities, Israel has surely gained little prestige by its membership.

As such, the question of Israel’s refusal remains prickly. After all, in 1969, Israel joined the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, banning the use of chemical and “bacteriological methods of warfare”. Although Israel has reserved the right to retaliate in kind, it is clear that even if Israel does possess such abhorrent weapons, they simply won’t be used, even within the context of retaliation. For a democratic state seeking to be part of the West and being dependent, to some extent, on the U.S., the moral taboo on using such weapons and the expected harsh reaction of the international community effectively rules out any such action.

A serious explanation of this refusal is not to be found in the official statements where Israel has justified its longstanding refusal to accede to the BWC by making the somehow traditional claim that BW disarmament requires regional negotiations aimed at establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ), including the elimination of ballistic missiles. 

Given that such weapons provide Israel with no valuable strategic military benefits, we must turn to the political setting for an answer. However, the treaty’s absence of penetrating means of verification, assured that Israel’s historic concerns over abuse of these means by its foes are irrelevant. Instead, it appears that the main reason for its refusal is hard to formally articulate: the dangers aroused by the “slippery slope” scenario. 

According to this reasoning, Israel’s joining the BWC will broaden and accelerate the efforts of the Arab states and their supporters in the international community to force Israel to relinquish its alleged nuclear arsenal. Formally, this can be done either by forcing accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Israel can join only as non-nuclear weapons state, or by extracting its consent to the establishment of a regional WMDFZ. The latter means overruling Israel’s preconditions for such a zone – mainly the signing of peace agreements with all its neighbor states, including Iraq and Iran, and the elapse of a two-year period following the signing of these agreements to ensure that they are indeed lasting. Armament, according to the contested Israeli view, is not the “disease” to be cured; rather, it is the main symptom. Therefore, if an appropriate response to the real “disease” (the absence of lasting peace agreements in the region) is to be found, the symptom must first, naturally, be resolved.

 In fact, some argue that the anticipated pressures on Israel to disarm its alleged nuclear arsenal may come only after an “intermediate phase” in the process: an attempt made to force Israel to ratify its 1993 signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Due to the strong link in the international community between these two categories of weapons – well-reflected in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol – this scenario is quite plausible.

In light of this troublesome situation and the isolation in which Israel finds itself, it is worthwhile viewing the COVID-19 pandemic as a unique window of opportunity in which to do “the right thing” and join the BWC. The pandemic provides Israel with the framework as well as the valuable justification for taking such a step while making it very difficult for her adversaries to misrepresent her joining. Should it join the BWC, Israel can be portrayed as a nation that, by virtue of the current unique circumstances, knows how to set aside the trivial political considerations belonging to a pre-Coronavirus world. Any abusive attempt to realize the “slippery slope” would then be perceived very negatively.    

Eighteen years ago, Avner Cohen wrote with respect to the BWC that: “The time has come” for Israel “to [finally-EB] put itself squarely on the ‘right’ side, that of Western civilization”. If this was a call for action in the pre-COVID world, it is surely a cry for action in its wake.

Dr. Eitan Barak is a senior researcher at the International Relations Department, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Prior to joining the Department, Dr. Barak was a Fulbright postdoctoral grantee in the International Security Program at Harvard. Read full bio here.

On Israeli Independence and Modern Antisemitism

By Mark Goldfeder

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As we celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel it is worth reflecting on the connection between the Jewish people and their state; why anti-Zionism can sometimes function as a thinly veiled form of antisemitism, and why the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition provides an excellent tool to demarcate the difference between political discussion and discriminatory hatred.

Zionism is the movement for the re-establishment - and today, for the development and protection - of a Jewish nation in its ancestral homeland.  Zionism is not just a political movement; for the vast majority of Jewish people across time and space, Zionism is and always has been an integral part of their Jewish, often their religious, identities. Zionism and Judaism are indelibly intertwined, for the better, and sadly (when bad actors are involved,) also for the worse.

As the late Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks z”tl noted, antisemitism often looks at Jews as a collective, the idea being that while individual Jews might be tolerable, Jews as a separate collective identity should not be allowed to exist with the same rights as other groups. That is why the majority of antisemitism in any given era tends to focus on the primary form of collective Jewish identity at that point in history.  Throughout the Middle Ages Jews were for the most part a religious community and so they were hated for their religion. As many Jews became secularized in the 19th and 20th centuries, the primary unifying collective identity of the Jewish people was their ethnicity, and so the hatred mutated to focus on race. Today when the primary collective embodiment of Jewish people on the world stage is the people of Israel in their national homeland, Jews around the world are hated and held accountable for ‘their’ state. It is a new focus, but not a new form, of antisemitism.

Sometimes the “new” antisemitism is easy to spot. All too often when people are complaining about Israel it is obvious that their “anti-Zionist” rhetoric is really merely code for “anti-Jewish.” This happens, for example, when people use classic antisemitic images and stereotypes to discuss the “collective Jew among the nations,” as a proxy for how antisemites historically would talk about Jewish individuals. It can include accusations of Jewish conspiracies, blood libels, and the portrayal of Jews (usually caricatures of religious Jews) as demonic and evil. When that happens, consciously or unconsciously, the symbols and language used easily break through the anti-Israel veil and belie the underlying antisemitic intent.

Of course, Israel is not perfect, and it is absolutely fine to criticize the country and her leaders. But when ‘criticism’ of Israel is done in a discriminatory manner, i.e., when the world’s only Jewish state is singled out for disparate treatment, not for what it does but simply for what it is, that is antisemitism.

At other times the antisemitism involved in anti-Zionism might not be as obvious to a casual observer. That is exactly why there needs to be an objective definition of the phenomena, and that is also why antisemites do not like the IHRA definition- because it takes away their freedom to push past the line and feign ignorance.

As IHRA explains, denying world history to claim that the Jews are not indigenous to Israel; denying (only) the Jewish people their right to self-determination; calling for the elimination of the world’s only Jewish state; and implicitly or explicitly advocating for the ethnic cleansing of the region, and/or the genocidal extermination of the millions of Jewish people who live there, are all common examples contemporary manifestations of antisemitism- even without a plainly obvious resort to classic tropes.

Per the European Commission’s Practical Handbook for IHRA, “Denying the Jewish people the right to self- determination and a national homeland is antisemitic because it denies the religious and historic ties of Jews to the land of Israel.” 

That is a particularly important lesson for everyone, Jewish people included, to remember as we once again celebrate Israel’s Independence.

Israel’s legitimacy is not rooted in the beneficence of others; the Jewish people’s rightful claims to the land predate the United Nations, and precede the horrors of the Holocaust. While we joyfully celebrate Yom Ha’atzmaut as the day that the world recognized those claims, no one gave Israel to the Jews, and no one has the right to ever take her away.  

Israel’s modern re-birthday is an important time to celebrate her overwhelming accomplishments. As the only democracy in the Middle East that protects the rights of all peoples and all religions, Israel has a tremendous amount to offer as a prism through which the world can learn about the dignity of difference, the power of coexistence, and the strength that comes from tolerance. But coming as it does directly on the heels of Yom Hazikaron, Israel’s Memorial Day for all of those heroes who have fallen to defend her, it is also an important time to reaffirm the unequivocal truth - that Israelis have the right to be a sovereign people in their own land and to sustain an existence that is free from the threats of violence, force, or coercion.

Last year marked an unprecedented stride forward in terms of the greater Arab world’s recognition of this axiomatic principle. The signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain celebrated the normalization of relations between Israel and those countries, complete with treaties of cooperation, plans for collaboration, and the genuine hope of future partners and co-signers.  May this be the year in which that hope is fulfilled, and Israel’s unapologetic need for guaranteed national security, alongside her undeterred optimism for an everlasting peace with all her neighbors are both finally fully realized. 

Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.