MIRYAM IN THE MEDIA: WHAT ISRAEL'S MOVE TOWARDS ABBAS MEANS

By Eitan Dangot

Hamas has good reason to be concerned by the recent meeting between Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah, a former senior Israeli defense official said.

According to Maj. Gen. (res.) Eitan Dangot, Israel's former coordinator of government activities in the territories, or COGAT, and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, the meeting between Gantz and Abbas was overdue and sent important signals that Hamas will find troubling.

"The very fact that the meeting took place is the central change," said Dangot, who also served as military secretary to three defense ministers. For Hamas, the meeting represents a signal of Israel's intention to continue to separate Gaza from the West Bank, he argued.

Israel is emphasizing, through the meeting, that it will hold highly contrasting policies towards these two territories, according to Dangot. Security tensions will dominate Israel's approach to Gaza, ruled by a radical terrorist regime, while Israel will seek ways to improve a variety of issues in its management of policy towards the PA.

"It is also a signal to Hamas that Israel might weigh up a future option, under which it could go back to the idea of seeing PA elements return to Gaza, with international backing. Israel could decide that this scenario does stand a chance. That could significantly weaken Hamas," said Dangot.

The fact that a senior Israeli decision-maker met with Abbas for the first time in 10 years is highly significant, he stated, adding that the meeting should have occurred sooner.

"It is a mistake to make Gaza more important than Judea and Samaria," said Dangot. "In my view, Judea and Samaria has much more importance for the internal security of Israel than Gaza. Gaza has clear boundaries, and Israel is facing a radical extremist movement that has the ideological goal of shedding the blood of its civilians and soldiers, and harming its existence. While there are criticisms of the PA's conduct, its residents, more than 2.7 million Palestinians, are living in daily coexistence with over 400,000 Israelis who live in Area C."

Daily interaction on the roads, at checkpoints and even during shopping at stores means Israel has a clear interest in boosting its influence over the PA, Dangot argued.

Meanwhile, the PA is facing its own especially sensitive period, with an unsettled Palestinian street, made more agitated by the power struggles of would-be successors to Abbas. Public demonstrations against the PA have rocked the Ramallah government, with members of the West Bank public also expressing disgust with corruption and the cost of living, according to Dangot's assessment.

During their meeting, Gantz and Abbas discussed political, security, civilian and economic issues. Following the event, Israel moved to provide the PA with a 500-million-shekel ($156 million) loan to help stabilize its troubled economic situation.

According to the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, the meeting received widespread coverage in Palestinian media, Fatah welcomed the event, while Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad condemned Abbas and accused of him being a traitor.

"They agreed to continue communicating further on the issues that were raised during the meeting," a statement from Gantz's office said.

The meeting was also attended by the current head of COGAT, Maj. Gen. Ghasan Alyan, PA Minister Hussein al-Sheikh, and the head of the PA's General Intelligence Service, Majed Faraj.

Dangot said such meetings "were routine when I was military secretary and head of COGAT," adding that "not holding meetings caused a degree of damage. Personal dialogue can lead to changes."

Preparing for a post-Abbas era

Traditionally, the PA has faced obstacles to its rule in the Hebron area, where there is a concentration of Hamas supporters, Dangot noted. The fact that the PA is facing cracks in the stability of its rule – which began to emerge in earnest after Abbas cancelled Palestinian elections in April – means that the post-Abbas era has effectively begun, he warned.

"As a result, the PA is taking a certain risk in holding a meeting with senior Israeli figure, since many would-be successors of Abbas from Fatah are positioning themselves at this time, and are not interested in affiliating themselves with Israel. Abbas took a certain risk," Dangot said.

"On the other hand, this gives the PA an advantage since Abbas projected stability to the Palestinian street. He sent the message that security and civilian coordination with Israel will continue in face of threats at home, led mainly by Hamas, which is seeking to incite and fracture his rule. Hence, this meeting delivers a message that a large part of the Palestinian public is looking for – continued economic stability," the former officer stated.

Dangot stressed the importance of personal dialogue as a mechanism for better dealing with future crises.

"In the present, the goal of this meeting was to improve the PA's economic capabilities, and as a by-product, to prevent parts of the Palestinian public from joining violent incidents."

"Since 2008, large parts of the Palestinian public have demonstrated that economy comes before national issues for them. They understand the cost of losing, and were not part of Middle East revolutions. Hence, Israel's obligation is to exercise its ability to continue to advance the lives of Palestinian civilians, promote economic development, and helping economic initiatives," said Dangot.

Israel needs to seriously prepare for the post-Abbas era, he said, by getting a better sense of the Palestinian public mood and a better understanding of who potential Abbas successors will be.

Dangot said there is "no argument" over the fact that the PA is involved in multiple troubling activities, such as its push to place Israel on trial at the International Criminal Court, ongoing incitement, and the policy of paying stipends to security prisoners and the families of terrorists killed in their attack efforts.

"All criticisms of these things are fully justified," he said. "But a country has to set its strategy based on an ongoing assessment and of the alternatives that are at its disposal. Due to the high importance of Judea and Samaria for Israeli security, Israel cannot stick its head in the sand and fail to lead on a policy that it set. It has to deal with these problems as part of a general dialogue with the other side."

Dangot argued that while Abbas is not a fan of Israel and "not the ideal leader," he is still "the one who is signed onto agreements that commit the PA. It is his security forces who, almost daily, return Israeli civilians who got lost and found themselves in Area A safely to the IDF. There is a clear joint interest for the PA and Israel to prevent a radical movement like Hamas from entrenching itself in Judea and Samaria. This interest becomes the strongest."

This has led Dangot to the conclusion that it is possible to continue to keep levels of violence low in the West Bank, while still "not ignoring the other problems" that stem from the PA's conduct as described above. Israel must demand a decrease in the use of money by the PA for supporting families of terrorists and security prisoners, he said.

During Abbas's era, he added, "there will be no political agreement. Abbas won't end his role in the PA with a legacy of giving up on the 'right of return' in an agreement with Israel. But he won't want to collapse his entire concept by losing control and seeing chaos take over in Judea and Samaria either," he added.

Past experience has shown that Israel, backed by American pressure, has been able to cause Abbas to reign in his diplomatic and legal attacks on Israel, Dangot noted.

Israel must demand that the PA decrease its payments to families of terrorists and security prisoners, and halt its activities at the ICC, he added. "Together with the U.S., it is possible to stop these processes."

This has led Dangot to the conclusion that it is possible to continue to keep levels of violence low in the West Bank, while still "not ignoring the other problems" that stem from the PA's conduct as described above. Israel must demand a decrease in the use of money by the PA for supporting families of terrorists and security prisoners, he said.

During Abbas's era, he added, "there will be no political agreement. Abbas won't end his role in the PA with a legacy of giving up on the 'right of return' in an agreement with Israel. But he won't want to collapse his entire concept by losing control and seeing chaos take over in Judea and Samaria either," he added.

Past experience has shown that Israel, backed by American pressure, has been able to cause Abbas to reign in his diplomatic and legal attacks on Israel, Dangot noted.

Israel must demand that the PA decrease its payments to families of terrorists and security prisoners, and halt its activities at the ICC, he added. "Together with the U.S., it is possible to stop these processes."

Since August 21, Hamas has continued to escalate the border region with Israel through a series of violent disturbances. Border Policeman Barel Hadaria Shmueli, who was killed by a Hamas gunman at the border during a violent disturbance on August 21, was laid to rest on Monday. Several Palestinian rioters were shot during the disturbances, some fatally.

On August 28, Hamas restarted its harassment and attrition activities at nights along the border fence, sending activists to hurl explosive devices and launching arson balloons towards Israeli communities. Hamas is demanding that Israel loosen security restrictions around Gaza, and enable rebuilding projects to go ahead, even after an arrangement to facilitate the transfer of $10 million of Qatari cash per month has begun for needy Gazan families.

Israel has announced a series of measures to ease conditions in Gaza, including the entry of building material for the first time since May's conflict. Egypt reopened Rafah Crossing after closing it for six days. On Wednesday, Israel expanded the Gazan fishing zone to 15 nautical miles, and opened the Kerem Shalom Border Crossing for more equipment and commodities to pass through it. It also increased Gazan entry permits for traders, from 2,000 to 7,000. Yet none of this seems to be enough for Hamas, which continues to threaten further escalation.

"I sense a desire by the Israeli government to prevent an escalation for the coming months," said Dangot. Should Israel give up on its conditions, stipulated after the May conflict, such as conditioning widespread rebuilding projects on Gaza on Hamas's release of the remains of two IDF personnel killed in action in 2014 as well as two captive civilians, that will not lead to calm, Dangot warned.

Should Israel continue to insist on conditioning a breakthrough arrangement on Hamas meeting those conditions, he believes that too will lead to an escalation.

"In either case, both routes lead to one clear thing: an escalation with Hamas," said Dangot. "This is inevitable. The question is the timing."

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

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UNC-Chapel Hill’s New Antisemitic Anti-Israel Class Violates Federal and State Law

By Mark Goldfeder

Last week students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) showed up for their first class in a course called “The Conflict Over Israel Palestine.” But instead of learning about competing narratives and claims over the course of the semester, they will be treated to a one-sided antisemitic hate-fest from a graduate student professor who has been outspoken about her illegal plans.

It is clear that the course will be one-sided and antisemitic because the teacher in question, Kylie Broderick, has said so. In a tweet about how hard it is to pretend there are two sides to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, she wrote “there is only 1 legitimate side – the oppressed – versus imperialist propaganda. I don’t ever want to encourage them to believe there is reason to take on good faith the oppressive ideologies of American and Western imperialism, Zionists, & autocrats.” In other posts she described all of Israel as occupied territory, and just a few months ago she spread a vicious blood libel, tweeting that “Palestinians are being murdered for just being alive & bc [because] they’re inconvenient to Israel & its patron, the US imperialist death cult.” 

That particular outburst was written while Israel was daring to defend itself from indiscriminate rocket attacks launched at its civilian population by a designated terrorist group. Five days later she wrote an op-ed in support of the antisemitic Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, in which she managed to squeeze in dozens of lies about the Jewish state while avoiding any mention of Hamas, the terrorist organization that started this round of violence.

After early reports about the course by Peter Reitzes, a board member of Voice4Israel of North Carolina, prompted some public pushback, UNC defended its decision to allow the class to be taught by a hostile professor who intends to demonize, delegitimize, and apply a double-standard to Israel by pretending that such an offering was somehow part of an “abiding respect for the First Amendment, academic freedom, and the open exchange of ideas.” 

UNC is just wrong as a matter of law. But the worst part is that they know it, and they do not seem to care.

As it relates to academic freedom, there is a difference between education and indoctrination. Per the American Association of University Professors 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, an instructor who address “controversial matters” should present “the divergent opinions of other investigators” and “above all” should “remember that his business is not to provide his students with ready-made conclusions, but to train them to think for themselves, and to provide them access to those materials which they need if they are to think intelligently.” 

As former Assistant Secretary of Education for Civil Rights Kenneth Marcus has explained, there is a difference between a professor sharing their opinion versus disingenuously presenting that opinion as if it were truth. In the first Supreme Court case to expound upon the concept of academic freedom, Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), the Court wrote that “The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. …Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.” In Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967) the Court again noted that “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’”

Allowing professors to share biased lies cast as truth in the guise of academic freedom while shutting down an exploration of alternative viewpoints is to violate entirely all that academic freedom is meant to protect. What student in their right mind would feel comfortable challenging a professor’s anti-Zionist perspective, when that professor has recently referred to  Zionists  as “dirtbags,” and moderated an event that tried to legitimize violence against Israelis? 

When it comes to the First Amendment, the freedom of speech—even offensive speech—must be cherished and protected. But as the United States Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights has made clear, there are times when even speech can cross over into harassment and invidious discrimination. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs and activities, on the basis of race, color, or national origin. While Title VI does not include religion, discrimination against Jews may give rise to a violation if it is based on race or national origin. Under Executive Order 13899 (Combating Anti-Semitism), when evaluating potential Title VI claims, the government uses the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism. Per the IHRA definition, it is antisemitic to, among other things, deny the Jewish people their right to self-determination, engage in blood libels, or apply a double standard by requiring of the Jewish state a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.

Speech crosses over from protected territory into harassing verbal conduct when it is “sufficiently severe, pervasive or persistent so as to interfere with or limit the ability of an individual to participate in or benefit from the services, activities or privileges provided by a recipient.” In their messages to the University, members of the Jewish community on campus confirmed what should already be obvious; they are fearful that students who support and have a connection with Israel will be unwelcome or unsafe in this classroom environment, which is not only an impingement on their academic freedom but also a violation of Title VI, as well as other state and university policies against discrimination. 

A violation of Title VI may be found if discrimination is encouraged, tolerated, not adequately addressed, or ignored by administrators, and complaints alleging such violations may be filed with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights or in the federal district courts. But of course, UNC already knows all of this because this is not their first, nor even their first recent, Title VI antisemitism rodeo: In 2019 the University hosted an antisemitic conference, and was forced to settle the ensuing Title VI complaint with the Department of Education. In their   resolution agreement, the school agreed to “take all steps reasonably designed to ensure that students enrolled in the University are not subjected to a hostile environment.”  

The University’s commitment to that requirement is laughable, and in fact the Zionist Organization of America has already filed a letter with the Department of Education notifying them of the breach. But the potential result is no laughing matter. Study after study has shown that the kind of inflammatory discriminatory anti-Zionist rhetoric that Broderick intends to continue spreading under the banner of UNC eventually leads to antisemitic action, and to people getting hurt. Over the last few months, and particularly in the immediate aftermath of the most recent outbreak of violence in the Middle East last May, antisemitic attacks around the world shot up over 400%. On college campuses, in between dodging protests, ignoring death threats, and removing Nazi symbols, Jewish students have been subjected to campaigns that call Israel a colonialist settler state, negate the history of their people, and dismiss the lives of their co-religionists, if they are even worth mentioning at all.

This is not a new problem, but the intensification of an existing phenomenon. On university campuses around the country, antisemitism has become entrenched and systemic, with recent studies showing that the number of Jewish students experiencing antisemitism has spiked to nearly 75 percent. North Carolina has also not been immune from this alarming trend, nor has the Chapel Hill campus itself, and it is in this environment that UNC is knowingly shirking responsibility.

That is too bad for them. Universities have duty to protect students from hatred and bigotry motivated by discriminatory animus, including antisemitism, and students need to know that if the University won’t protect them, there are people who will have their back. If UNC will not do this the easy way, by standing up for its Jewish constituents and against unapologetic hate, then they will be forced to do it the harder way, and risk their federal funding—again. And this time, they will have to do more than make empty promises they don’t intend to keep.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

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Jonny Gould's Jewish State podcast · 62: Melanie Phillips: “Israel is potentially the West’s last man standing”

Jordan’s positive era could lead to improved ties with Israel

By Tomer Barak

Despite facing an array of challenges, some of which may worsen again soon, Jordan`s King Abdullah should be quite pleased with recent trends  – both inside the kingdom and along its borders. 

This can be understood and analyzed through a number of factors.

Most importantly, it seems that the turmoil inside the royal court has quietened. The alleged April plot against the king, led by his half-brother, Prince Hamza, is over. Some high-ranking scapegoats were ‘sacrificed’ and placed on trial, but the family is working hard to show renewed unity within its ranks.

At the same time, Jordan has been able to block a third wave of Covid-19. Following the second wave that ended in May, Jordanians are gradually being vaccinated, the kingdom is receiving donations for further doses, and it has installed strong border supervision to prevent the entry of the Delta and other variants.

This situation could change rapidly, but it seems King Abdullah has gained a few months respite.

The economy is recovering to the extent possible from the previous pandemic wave. Jordan forecasts that in 2021, it will receive a total of four billion dollars of international assistance. Out of that sum, two billion dollars are designated for public programs such as health and social welfare, and not to security or military needs. This is a significant sum for development projects.

However, despite the positive economic indicators, the Jordanian economy remains shaky, lacks major growth engines, and remains heavily dependent on international assistance.

Externally, King Abdullah’s regional and international status is back on the up. He became the first Arab leader to meet with President Joe Biden in Washington in a visit that might mark the start of a new regional role for Jordan. The Trump administration viewed Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the centerpiece of the regional architecture.

King Abdullah is in a position to promote Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic talks without being in opposition to the Gulf states that signed the Abraham Accords. Rather than being mutually exclusive, Abdullah has found a way, under the Biden administration, to deliver the Palestinian story to the Abraham Accords momentum, using his natural position as ‘caretaker’ of the Palestinian issue. 

Meanwhile, Jordan is creating new relations with Egypt and Iraq. This axis is critical to Jordan’s stability, economic development, and struggle to influence Iraq against Iranian influence (and at the same time against Saudi and Emirati influence).

The upcoming American withdrawal from Iraq is set to intensify this regional competition.

Iran is seeking to strengthen its Shi’ite militias in Iraq, led by Kataib Hezbollah. Jordan is preparing for the American exit, and is working to secure its economic, political, and security interests in Iraq, and along the border, so that it does not become an eastern zone for Iranian-backed aggression.

In Washington, Abdullah spoke of Iranian-made drones that attacked Jordan and of his  concerns regarding Iran’s activities in the region. The King also mentioned that the conflict between Israel and Iran in Syria affects Jordan, and how, on several occasions, missiles fired at Israel from Syria landed in Jordan.

This is even more important in light of the fact that the U.S. is preparing to move some of its military presence from Qatar to Jordan in order to reduce exposure to Iran’s firepower range.

On the Syrian front, Jordan has managed to harness other Arab countries to improve their relations with the Assad regime, while improving trade channels along the border. It is not yet clear how renewed fighting in the Dara region, in southern Syria, will impact this trend. 

Jordan is studying the new government in Israel and it views a number of improvement points from its perspective, while recognizing the limitations of how far relations can really improve under current conditions.  

After years of bad blood between Abdullah and Netanyahu, a series of high-level bilateral meetings between the King and Israeli leaders has ignited hopes of a brighter future.

Core problems have not been solved, but a new process of dialogue has clearly begun.

In addition, several obstacles have been removed; Israel agreed to boost water supplies to Jordan, and the World Bank’s decision to abolish the Red Sea-Dead Sea program has extracted a thorny issue between the sides.

Tensions however very much remain. Israeli actions in East Jerusalem and settlement construction in Judea and Samaria receive ongoing Jordanian condemnations, just as they always have.

King Abdullah is aware that the new Israeli government cannot maneuver significantly regarding the Palestinians.  He recently said that the government was not ideal, but his discourse with its leaders gives him optimism.

Moreover, the relatively tranquil period gives the King the ability to advance relations with Israel – with minimal public wrath. This stands in stark contrast to previous times when protests led the King to take policy decision to foul relations as a tool to calm unrest.

The above leads to the conclusion that the glass ceiling of Israeli-Jordanian relations remain in place, although after years of being stuck, there is now a way to boost diplomatic, civil, and economic relations – albeit below that ceiling.

For Israel, improved relations serve the national interest. The peace treaty with Jordan is a core strategic asset, facilitating security arrangements along Israel’s eastern border, repelling threats from the East, and supporting regional stability. Jordan’s influence on the region is positive. Thus, even if the peace between the two nations is a cold one, especially due to anti-Israeli sentiment among the Jordanian public, the relationship forms another part of the regional puzzle which, when combined with the Abraham Accords, enables multi-lateral regional cooperation that includes Israel on a range of essential civilian matters.

The bottom line is that the Biden administration should view Jordan as a key component of its regional stability architecture, along with Egypt and the Gulf states. It would be a waste not to utilize King Abdullah’s window of opportunity to step forward with his vast experience and skills of being an innovator, a recruiter, and a connector who can energize regional processes.  

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

US Afghanistan Withdrawal: Lessons for Israel

By Jeremiah Rozman

The United States has definitively lost Afghanistan. U.S. military power ousted the Taliban and prevented its return for twenty years. As the U.S. withdrew, the product of two decades of nation building melted away as if it never existed, save the heaps of military hardware left behind. The collapse of the U.S.’s Afghanistan strategy highlights the risks Israel would incur in creating a Palestinian state, as these projects hold key similarities.

Firstly, both the U.S. and Israel were involved in nation building. The U.S. sought to build an Afghan democracy capable of governing Afghanistan and maintaining peace and stability. Since the Oslo Accords, Israel has been working with the U.S. to build a Palestinian democracy capable of governing a future Palestinian state and of making peace with Israel.

Both of these efforts involved building and training armies capable of suppressing terrorists. Both involved introducing western style democracy into regions without prior experience with it. And both sought to defeat and marginalize well-organized Islamic fundamentalist groups with a strong sense of purpose and robust networks of support. Both attempts at nation building ultimately failed.

In Afghanistan, the corrupt U.S.-backed government never had much legitimacy, and its military quickly dissolved when U.S. forces withdrew. The corrupt Palestinian Authority never enjoyed legitimacy either. It lost an election to the militant group Hamas, and its U.S. trained forces were swiftly routed by Hamas when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from Gaza. The forces that Israel backed in southern Lebanon were quickly defeated by Hezbollah when the IDF withdrew. History demonstrates that organized, internationally supported, and motivated Islamist groups usually win in power vacuums.

Both the U.S. and Israel had the military ability to defeat their Islamic fundamentalist enemies, but only had sufficient political will necessary to keep them at bay and maintain a manageable status quo. For Israel, international pressure and low domestic tolerance for casualties drove it to risk its security by removing its forces from Gaza and Lebanon. The botched U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was an unforced error. There was no major domestic or international demand for the U.S. to withdraw its remaining 2,500 troops immediately. In fact, international allies were left blindsided by President Biden’s rapid pullout. No U.S. soldier had been killed in combat there in over 18 months, and the cost of maintaining an effective counterterrorism base of operations was sustainable.

The U.S. decision to withdraw under minimal pressure bodes ominously for countries promised U.S. protection. Will that protection be rescinded when there really is pressure? After the U.S. appeared to flee before its own shadow, abandoning billions of dollars of sophisticated equipment to an enemy with no air force, no satellites, and no nuclear missiles, are Taiwan and South Korea still truly confident in U.S. protection if nuclear armed dictators come knocking?

In 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry offered Israel technology and promises of international protection if it withdrew its military from the strategically important Jordan Valley to allow a Palestinian state to include that territory. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan suggests that Israel was right to rely on itself.

Both Democrat and Republican U.S. administrations promoted the “two-state solution” which in essence sought to nation build in the Middle East. The Trump administration was the first to break with that thinking which had persisted since Clinton. The Biden administration is back to the old playbook. It officially supports the creation of a Palestinian state. From Clinton’s Oslo Accords to George W. Bush’s “Roadmap” and “Disengagement,” the U.S. has reassured Israel that a future Palestinian state would not pose a security threat.

However, the U.S.’s poor track record at nation building in the Middle East is mirrored by its poor track record predicting outcomes in that region. The Oslo Accords ended in a bloody intifada; the Disengagement ended in Hamas capturing Gaza and turning it into a terror platform. De-Baathification in Iraq ended in a bloody insurgency, and the withdrawal from Afghanistan yielded a rapid Taliban victory that apparently caught the Biden administration by surprise.

The world now has one more fundamentalist Islamic state, the Taliban run Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. There is little doubt a future Palestinian state would be the same. According to recent polls, Hamas would still win Palestinian elections, but in the Middle East, more important than ballots are bullets, as the 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza clearly show. 

The U.S. military kept the Taliban at bay in Afghanistan, and the IDF keeps Hamas from taking over Judea and Samaria. While a fundamentalist Islamic victory is surely a tragedy for liberty, tolerance, and human rights, especially women's rights, it is first and foremost a security threat. A Taliban-run Afghanistan harbored Al Qaeda, resulting in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Many fear that it will once again become a safe haven for terrorists and that the next big attack is only a matter of time.

For Israel, a Hamas-run state bordering Israel's major population centers, economic centers, and international airport would pose an existential threat. All of Israel would be within range of a variety of short- and long-range rockets, mortars, and sniper fire and easily infiltrated through tunnels. In the twenty-first century, oceans are no guarantee of national security, but at least for now, the Taliban or Al Qaeda cannot fire volleys of rockets at Washington, D.C. from Afghanistan.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan tells the world’s dictators and terrorists that the U.S. is no longer interested in its post-WWII role as the military guarantor of freedom. Any country would be wise to understand that it can ultimately only rely on its own power. “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” If Israel severely weakens its ability to defend itself by withdrawing its forces to create a Palestinian state, it must understand that it will assuredly be left to suffer what it must when that state falls to Islamic fundamentalists as history and the facts on the ground strongly predict.

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

MIRYAM'S RIGHT OF REPLY: CRITIQUING BENJAMIN ANTHONY ON GAZA.

By Yochai Guiski

In his article ‘Some Democracies Can Withdraw. Israel is Not One of Them,’ Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, offers a scathing indictment of the Gaza disengagement and the subsequent inconclusive use of force in that arena, which he also sees as degrading the social fabric of Israeli society.

 I would like to respectfully offer a different approach:

1.      The disengagement from Gaza has indeed proven to be a failure. It has created a hotbed of terror and misery, while the international community still places the blame on Israel for its perceived control and security measures. But hindsight is always 20/20. If we are to harshly judge the leaders who decided on the disengagement, we should also see the threats and the benefits they saw coming.

2.      “Mowing the lawn” is meant to describe continuous and high tempo operational activity which seeks to put constant pressure on the enemy and deny it the ability to regenerate and establish new terror cells or other threats. The issue with Gaza is that the IDF did not “mow the lawn” effectively following the withdrawal and ceased almost completely after  “Operation Cast Lead” (2009). It  moved to a model of deterrence that is similar to the one used against Lebanese Hezbollah. Had we continued to pressure Hamas at every corner, our current situation might have been significantly better.

3.      The criticism should be leveled at the right target. It is not the IDF that decides how it should be employed; it is Israel’s elected officials. Blaming the IDF for not being utilized properly seems unfair.

4.      Israel’s social contract does seem unfair: In the south, people are subjected to attacks at the whim of terrorists, while other parts of Israel are not. However, this has been the reality for Israelis since the days of the British Mandate – border communities were always at the forefront, be it from Palestinian terrorism from Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, and Lebanon, until the 1980s (including rocket fire, artillery, infiltration, IEDs), to be replaced with attacks from Lebanon by Shia groups, and Palestinian terrorism all over Israel during the 1990s and 2000s. Each time it was a different Israeli group that bore the brunt of the attacks.

5.      It is not surprising therefore that Israel’s defense doctrine from Ben-Gurion to Jabotinsky has emphasized the need to accept the fact that our enemies would not relent. It dictates that we are always to be vigilant and defeat them in a cycle that will end only when they accept Israel and learn to live with it peacefully.

6.      It is a Sisyphean task, and currently Gaza is at the epicenter. However, to this day, we have not  cracked under the pressure; we endured, we persevered, and we prospered, while our enemies remain in squalor, backwardness, and poverty.

We are stronger than we seem, and we have the endurance to outlast our enemies. But in order to last for generations and centuries to come, we need to have the leadership and foresight to make tough, necessary, and prudent decisions.

The withdrawal from Gaza was not one our best moments, and possibly neither was the policy that followed, but this must not stop us from having the courage to make tough and sometimes risky decisions. Let us hope, pray, and vote for leaders who can make those decisions, and then follow through and make them work.  

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Gaza will remain a powder keg, Qatari cash or not

By David Hacham

Three months after the end of the May conflict between Israel and Hamas, it appears as if the Egyptian-mediated talks between the two sides are moving in an extremely limited manner toward the goal of reaching a post-conflict arrangement to stabilize the ceasefire and reach a long-term calm. Qatar and the United Nations are also involved in mediation efforts.

There appears to have been some progress toward finding a solution on how to inject Qatari financial assistance for the needy, with a mechanism enabling ten million dollars to reach 100,000 families per month seemingly close to being finalized.

Egyptian General Intelligence Service chief Abbas Kamel recently met with Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to push this initiative toward completion.

However, the remainder of the arrangement designed to boost Gaza’s recovery and decrease tensions hinges on the completion of a deal in which Hamas releases the remains of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 war with Israel, and two Israeli civilians who crossed into Gaza in recent years. On that front, it appears as if there is no concrete progress.

Even the issue that does appear to be making some progress, the Qatari assistance, has seen deep divisions between Hamas and Israel. Israel, fearing the money would reach Hamas’s military wing, called for the cash to be transferred to the families through the UN’s food assistance program to Gaza. Hamas rejected this call. A workaround solution appears to have been found, involving the allocation of special debit-type cards to the families, who can then withdraw the money from Gazan cash machines. Under this proposal, the money would be transferred under UN supervision.

Israel has insisted on strict supervision of this money to ensure it goes to needy families alone, and that the list of recipients does not include Hamas members, or other terror operatives.

In recent weeks, banks located in the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank rejected a proposal to get them involved in the Qatari cash’ transfers, fearing that this would expose them to legal action over terror financing violations.

Hamas, for its part, gave up on its earlier demand to be the one that allocates the assistance funds – 100 dollars per family.

The new mechanism, if finalized, would see an end to past practices of suitcases full of cash entering Gaza, carried by Qatar’s special envoy to the Strip.

Hamas is keen to reach an arrangement on this money as soon as possible, and to this end, it green lighted the release of arson balloons toward Israeli communities near Gaza in recent weeks, while threatening to repeat this action if progress remains stuck – an action that could quickly lead to an escalation.

As part of Israel’s attempts to prevent a new escalation, it recently authorized the entry of 1,000 Gazan merchants and 350 businesspeople into Israel.

The Strip’s factions however agreed to restart open demonstrations against Israel along the border starting on August 21. This decision appears aimed at sending an immediate and unequivocal message – particularly to the Egyptian mediators – to fast-track progress on the Hamas-Israel arrangement, particularly regarding the transfer of financial payments needed to rebuild civilian infrastructure destroyed during Operation Guardian of the Walls in May.

An additional signal was sent by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad during meetings held between their leaders – Ismail Haniyeh and Ziad Nakhaleh – and the new Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. The meeting symbolizes the positioning of Hamas firmly within the Iranian camp, with PIJ being a well-established Iranian proxy.

Outstanding issues

Additional issues that appear to be no closer to resolution as part of any potential arrangement include salary payments for 30,000 Hamas government employees – officials appointed by Hamas after its violent takeover of Gaza in 2007.

These officials are not recognized by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas fears that the PA could drag its feet over sending money for them.

Other central issues that the sides seem very far apart over include the critical question of a deal that would see Israel release security prisoners in exchange for the release by Hamas of its captive civilians, Avera Mengistu and Hisham Al-Sayed, and the remains of its MIA personnel, Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul.

Hamas has resolutely rejected Israel’s attempts to link financial assistance to Gaza with progress to a deal for their release, or the attempt to link an increased flow of goods into Gaza via the Kerem Shalom Crossing to progress on such a deal.

Hamas insists on separating the issues; Israel rejects that approach completely. This disagreement is blocking progress on the core pillars of any future arrangement.

Meanwhile, Hamas’s leaders are using conflict with Israel to beef up their internal political credentials. Yahya Sinwar, who was voted in March 2021 to a second term as head of Hamas’s political bureau in Gaza in internal Hamas elections, has tightened his political grip on power in the Strip following the May conflict with Israel. Sinwar accomplished this after a narrow win in the March elections, which led to previous questions about his power and support within Hamas.

Saleh Al-Arouri, who is head of Hamas’s activities in the West Bank but is based in Lebanon, and who is also the deputy of Ismael Haniyeh, head of Hamas’s overall political bureau, is working to destabilize the West Bank through terror cell activity.

At home in Gaza, Hamas faces no opposition to its regime. Despite its highly problematic track record and lack of tangible achievements in civilian matters, and despite Gaza’s distressing figures in the employment, health, and education sectors, Hamas’s position as the regime is assured.

Its security control of the Strip is unchallenged, and its rival, the Fatah movement, is almost totally restricted and inactive in Gaza.

Still, it appears as if many Gazan civilians are suspicious and distrustful of Hamas’s messaging – just as they are of Israel’s messages.

Some Gazans even suspect that Hamas and Israel exist in a state of undeclared ‘harmony,’ with undeclared coordination between them.

In actuality, Hamas and its supporters hold an extreme and uncompromising position toward Israel, are genuinely dogmatic, and claim to be marching on a path of ‘divine victory’ over Israel.

As a result, it is possible to assess with a high degree of confidence that even if partial agreements are reached between Hamas and Israel, Gaza’s problems will not vanish from the daily agenda, but instead will remain as fixed, disturbing issues, and they will continue to act as trigger points leading to potential security escalations.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

PODCAST: America Withdraws from Afghanistan, US Army Veterans Analyze and Opine

Afghan Veterans and MirYam Contributors and Adjuncts Weigh In

My View On The American Withdrawal From Afghanistan

BY Daniel Calbi

The events of the past two weeks in Afghanistan do not completely surprise me. The speed and swiftness with which they occurred was unforeseen. Prior to the U.S. invasion in winter 2001, the Taliban provided safe harbor to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The United States’ primary mission in Afghanistan since 2001 was counterterrorism, not nation building. My thoughts on the United States withdrawal come from the perspective of counterterrorism, not nation building.

There are many questions that appear unanswered regarding the sudden and rapid downfall of the Afghan Government. In the forefront are the following questions that need to be addressed– who were the leaders in the United States telling Donald Trump in late 2019 and early 2020, and Joe Biden in 2021 that Afghanistan was stable enough to be turned over to the Afghan Government? Was stability a concern, or was a war weary nation the driving factor in the removal of U.S. troops and their support for the Afghans? What steps prior to the U.S. withdrawal were taken to ensure that the Afghan military had the ability to supply their troops with ammunition, food, ensure wages, repair their equipment (most importantly air assets), and that they would not capitulate without a fight?  

President Biden has highlighted that the Afghan military and police are unwilling to fight for themselves, a now proven fact. In countless provinces, and specifically the major cities of Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Kabul the military did not counter the Taliban advancement. The Afghan military was underequipped and minimally supported by their government, making it nearly impossible to gain the initiative and defeat an advancing enemy. I reference my list of earlier questions – did the decision makers in the United States convey to our President that these Afghans were severely depleted of supplies, had little to no air support and little conviction to the fight? Afghan President Ashraf Ghani refused to resign, a tenet of a two-week ceasefire between GIRoA and the Taliban in early August. Yet, he fled the country as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. If the leader of a country is unwilling to lead, is it fair to expect it from his military?

It has become clear over the last few days that throughout the withdrawal process the plan of the United States was an imminent departure regardless of the situation on the ground. During the week of August 16th, 2021, there were over 7,000 troops in Afghanistan, the majority of whom were surged to the country as a response, not a planned tactical withdrawal, to accommodate the rapid exit of our remaining citizens and partners. It is possible that the United States government expected the Taliban would regain control, and simply miscalculated the timing in which it would occur. One can argue the morality of that decision, but the premier issue in the execution of the United States withdrawal is that it was not completed before the country fell. The misjudgment regarding the power of the Taliban and the fragility of the Afghan Government cannot be overlooked.

The Wall Street Journal reported on August 17th, 2021, that senior military and intelligence officials warned the Biden administration that a rapid, untimely exit from Afghanistan could have dire consequences. It seems that the reality of this exit was even more serious than they anticipated. No matter the circumstance of the discussions between senior officials and the White House the U.S. military answers to the American people, and acts at their will via elected officials.  It is unnerving that military, intelligence and other governmental agency leadership were unable to conjure a plan that met the timeline provided to them by the Biden administration or that the White House disregarded the findings of their senior leaders.

During my tenure in the country, 2015-2019, the Afghans were incapable of fighting on their own and relied heavily on logistical and military support of coalition partner nations. What was done at the strategic level to alleviate this issue or ensure that the United States had the necessary time and assets for an orderly and safe exit? I’m not confident that senior leaders of the United States can  provide a clear answer. America is beyond fortunate that we suffered no casualties from the blitzkrieg-like advancement of the Taliban. What has and will continue to suffer is the Afghan people and the greater Central Asia region.

Will this new, emboldened Taliban revert to their old ways, or will they honor their pledge to not allow Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to operate within their borders? Time will tell, but what is certain is that the manner in which the United States departed from the region is a calamitous black eye that will have repercussions for years to come.

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Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. Read full bio here.

U.S., Israel must prepare for Iran possibly not rejoining JCPOA

By Yochai Guiski

The realization that Iran under President Ebrahim Raisi may not wish to move forward with the nuclear negotiations and recommit itself to the nuclear deal (JCPOA) has dawned on decisions makers and analysts in Israel and the United States in recent weeks.

This should come as no surprise. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, never had any real interest in the deal in the first place. He was always very suspicious of the notion of a deal, as he feared it would bring the “corrupting” influence of the West to Iranian society. He has always favored perseverance and resistance to the West’s influence, even at great economic cost.

Although there are other approaches in Iran, such as the one championed by former president Hassan Rouhani, it is ultimately the Supreme Leader’s reservations that need to be addressed to get to a deal.

Any scholar in the field of decision making can explain that a deal is reached when three conditions are met – the deal itself is worthwhile (and there is a path to reach it), there are no better options for either participant, and the benefits of having a deal outweigh the prospects of not having one.

For example, reaching a deal to sell a car for 10,000$ requires that you have a buyer willing to pay; that you don’t have an alternative buyer willing to pay 11,000$; and that you are willing to part ways with the car (it would not leave you unable to work or move around).

When analyzing the JCPOA, one can see that a deal was reached because:

1.       Iran was promised economic benefits and sanctions relief, while keeping the core of the nuclear program intact, and being able to gradually grow it over time.

2.       There was no alternative to a deal with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1), and no real way to avoid dealing with the demands of the U.S. and the Europeans, since they controlled the world financial system, and China and Russia were unable and unwilling to oppose them.

3.       The option of not having a deal would have entailed more sanctions and economic hardship, and even a military escalation, which may have put the survival of the regime at stake.

The sum of these three conditions, and the Supreme Leader’s cautious nature, was great enough to overcome the supreme leader’s aversion and led him to “drink form the poisoned chalice” and accept the deal after being  persuaded by President Rouhani and his ministers.

The current situation is very different:

1.       The benefits of a deal have shrunk considerably. Six years into the JCPOA, Iran has learned it cannot trust the U.S. to live up to its end of the bargain; that the private sector is extremely risk averse regarding investment in Iran; and that a decarbonizing western economy would not be a good fit for an oil and gas exporting Iran.   

2.       China has emerged as a significant possible alternative to economic ties with the West. China is now Iran’s most important economic partner, it is hungry for oil and gas, has signed a strategic partnership agreement with Tehran and sees it as part of its “Belt and Road” initiative. Even if Beijing may view Iran as just a small part of its growing Middle East portfolio (which includes strong ties to the UAE and Saudi Arabia), the view from Tehran is different.

3.       The possibility of war because of a “no deal” situation is practically nonexistent (after no response to Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia and the downing of a U.S. spy plane, and the U.S. strategy of accepting the situation in North Korea and Afghanistan). Sanctions are still in place, but the Iranian leadership thinks the worst has passed, and Iran has been able to adjust to the sanctions.

Under these conditions it is no surprise that the Supreme Leader has been unwilling sign off on a return to the JCPOA, this even while Rouhani was still president (and supposedly pushing for it).

It seems that the Supreme Leader was looking for something else when he allowed Iranian diplomats to return to the negotiating table (while not allowing them to directly negotiate with their U.S. counterparts):

1.       Extract concessions and sanctions relief from the U.S. during the negotiations, without returning to the deal itself.

2.       Deny the U.S. the capability of applying pressure on Iran, for fear of being blamed for the failure of the negotiations and being seen as a warmonger by different political actors in the U.S.

3.       Provide time and space to advance the nuclear program, and other regional activities, while the U.S. is deterred (as bargaining chips and as tangible assets).

4.       Create the conditions to enhance Iran’s ties with China, as its economic and political future, while Tehran uses the negotiations to embarrass the U.S. and show its abuse of power.  

Up until now Iran’s logic has proven itself to be precise, as its actions have led to few consequences. The U.S. and Europe are not inclined to pressure Iran or lead to a crisis with Tehran, even as it enriches uranium to 60%, commences work on uranium metal, operates advanced centrifuges, and attacks various ships at sea and in port. All the while, China and Russia are still on Iran’s side and are calling on the U.S. to address Iran’s demands.

Going forward, one can expect Iran to continue the following trends:

1.       Dragging out the negotiations, possibly in the hopes of strong-arming their counterparts to accept the status of Iran’s program as “fait accompli” and not rolling it back much.  

2.       Aspiring to enhance its relations with China.

3.       Advancing the nuclear program: With a new hardline leadership and the understanding that no one will stop it, there is no telling when and if Iran would stop. Iran might even eventually decide to develop a nuclear device if it assesses that there is no credible U.S. military threat, and that the world might prefer to accept the situation and blame the Trump administration for the mess, instead of confronting Iran.

4.       The growing pressure on Iran’s government from the accelerating Covid outbreak (Iran now ranks third in the world in the number of newly infected individuals) may play a part in a change of heart and a return to the JCPOA, but that seems unlikely.

The belief that Iran is willing to rejoin the deal and the view that acceleration of its nuclear program is aimed at attaining bargaining chips for the negotiating table have allowed Iran to advance its program without real cost (even if actions attributed to Israel set the program back in a few areas). Thus, it is imperative to make sure that Secretary of State Blinken’s statement that “negotiations cannot go on indefinitely” is translated into plans and action both in the U.S. and Israel.

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

SOME DEMOCRACIES CAN WITHDRAW. ISRAEL IS NOT ONE OF THEM.

By Benjamin Anthony

The unilateral withdrawal from Gaza removed 8,500 Israeli citizens and soldiers from the enclave. Twenty one Jewish communities within the Gaza strip were uprooted. The final resting place of those Israelis buried within the Strip proved to be anything but final, as their bodies were exhumed for reburial inside Israel. The loss felt by those who mourned for them was renewed. Synagogues were razed and the agricultural infrastructure used by Jewish communities in the Strip to make the desert bloom and to attain self-reliance were smashed by Palestinian-Arabs hell bent on pursuing perennial reliance on the international community and wanton self-immiseration; to be weaponized against the Jewish state.

The government that oversaw Israel's withdrawal from Gaza failed to provide appropriate housing, employment or compensation to too many displaced Jews who needed to rebuild their broken lives. Unilateral withdrawal, a gambit served up by a Prime Minister of the Israeli right and feted by many on the left as one that would grant Israel greater international approval - a naive hope if ever there was one - fashioned a permanent rend within Israeli society. No international legitimacy followed. No domestic consensus was forged. Some gambit.

This commemoration of the disengagement coincides with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the scenes resulting from that policy are internalized and judgement best rendered by Americans, it is appropriate to highlight those aspects of unilateral withdrawal that are particular to the state and the citizens of Israel, contrasting as they are with the experiences of most democracies, with a view to ensuring that even as others may have the luxury of pursuing such a policy, Israel has no such option.

Typically, when democracies withdraw from a stronghold, the majority of their civilians observe the fallout from afar. The homefront is rarely impacted directly. When Israel withdraws, its conscripted military, its citizen-soldiers and its home-front feel the effects of withdrawal in their daily lives, for years and generations to come. The folly of unrequited concessions for peace reverberates in Israeli backyards and living rooms; literally and figuratively.

Israel’s unilateral withdrawal tilled the very soil that was once used by Jewish communities into a fertile launchpad for hostilities against the Jewish state. By negotiating no pact of peace with its enemy, Israel entreated all manner of aggression, particularly the rocketing of its communities. In the little more than three years between the disengagement and Operation Cast Lead (2008), the number of Israeli citizens living with steady rocket bombardement rested at one million, including residents of Beersheba, Ashkelon, Ashdod and Netivot. Today, despite three additional defensive operations by the IDF against Gazan terror, Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), Operation Protective Edge (2014) and Operation Guardians Of The Walls (2021), the reach of those rockets has dramatically increased. Added to the aforementioned population centers are areas as far north as Haifa. Jerusalem - the city so 'sacred' to Hamas that they fire rockets toward it deliberately and indiscriminately - is regularly targeted, as are the cities in the Dan bloc, including Tel-Aviv. 

Reprehensibly, it is only once those rocket barrages fall in the greater Tel-Aviv area that the IDF stirs in any meaningful way. Absent that, successive Israeli governments have decreed Israel’s citizens of the south be little more than the "Jews" of the Jewish state - a separate collective sentenced to suffer a double standard; overlooked and ignored. At the time of writing, rockets were again fired from the Gaza Strip toward Israeli civilians there. 

Over five million Israeli citizens, two-thirds of the Jewish population of the Jewish state, now face a reality wherein terrorist organizations determine the timing and intensity of when they will be terrorized. Were that dynamic superimposed onto an American map, if the U.S. began absorbing rocket fire from her eastern flank, all states up to Colorado and all citizens therein, would find themselves in the firing line.  

Also particular to Israel is that the price of wrong-headed policies is paid not by professional men or women-at-arms who elect to join the military, but by its civilians and its citizen-soldiers. 

The IDF certainly benefits from exceptional professional officers, but the bulk of its wartime manpower is made up by its reservists. These are men and women who serve as conscripts and then continue to report for annual duty as part of the social contract. They are proud to do so. If called to war, however, with all of its attendant dangers, those wars should be as swift and overwhelming to the enemy as possible, in pursuit of a clear strategic outcome.

A smudging of that social contract emerged when the term "mowing the lawn" was coined by Israeli strategists some years ago to describe policy toward Gaza. The term was applauded for its pithiness and wisdom. But neither the phrase nor the policy it describes were ever wise and the subject matter is ill-suited to cheap sloganism.

The reservists mobilized to carry out the policy are Israel's professionals and entrepreneurs. They are Israel's fathers and mothers. Only utterly detached governments could view a policy that drafts such individuals from their boardrooms to the battlefield - with a frequency more intense than that of World Cup soccer tournaments - as reasonable. 

Drafting the same individuals, to face down the same enemy, with the same lack of conclusion; who return from the battlefield escorted by the same foreboding sense that they will soon return to the same fray, within the coming few years is not a serious policy. Men and women, drafted by the tens of thousands, cannot be asked to place their lives on the line in pursuit of 'mowing the lawn,' a clear legacy of the disengagement.  

The author was drafted into two such inconclusive campaigns. He has no wife and no children and so listened carefully to the conversations of his fellow reservists as they wished their first child goodnight in 2012 and their second child the same in 2014. These men have too much at stake to be disrupted so dramatically, as do those who await their return from combat.  

Strategists often argue that the pursuit of conclusive military outcomes requires large scale campaigns that yield large scale casualties. As a result, the still only effective method of destroying terror organizations, a sustained incursion by the ground forces, is avoided at almost any cost. Witness again the sullying of the social contract. It is the task of the military to defend the citizenry, not the other way around. Since the disengagement, Israel’s citizenry has borne increasingly more of the brunt of what emanates from the Strip and they have been designated to do so in order to spare the military. The appropriate dynamic has been inverted and must be righted once more. 

All military casualties are painful, but a ground force as casualty-averse as Israel's has become, risks no longer being a ground force at all. Gradually, it will become something of a police force, best used in matters of law enforcement, not in war-fighting. The IDF has long traded on the power of deterrence. Yet where Gaza is concerned, it is clear that not only has Israel lost much of its deterrence - tragically it is Israel that has now become deterred. 

Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza provided Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad with the space and time to expand, plan and execute. Israel’s weakest enemy has evolved into a strategic threat. A game Hamas, if joined by Hezbollah or another, will stress test to the maximum Israel's ability to defend herself on two fronts simultaneously.  

Many invoke the disengagement as evidence that Jewish populations in Judea and Samaria may also be uprooted in exchange for a viable peace. Such opinions ought to be viewed askance. They ignore the lessons of the past and of the present. Far more congruent with the consequences of the Gaza withdrawal is the realization that unilateral withdrawal has not and will not work. Repeating the errors of Gaza in Judea and Samaria will simply repeat and expand the list of crises Israel faces. It’s societal rift will deepen and likely turn violent. Vacated territory will become a larger hotbed for terror. Israel's main population areas will be not at the furthest limits of its enemy’s firepower but in the near ground and when Israel defends itself, it will garner only greater international criticism, sanction and censure; and it will have to draft ever more of its citizens to fight the same conflict against a never changing enemy. 

Some speak of the demographic threat to Israel to justify further withdrawal. Even if real, such an eventuality is far from upon Israel. Israel would be wiser to avoid present kinetic threats than to pursue policies that defer to perceived threats that may never actualize. Rejecting further concessions would be a good first step.

How to resolve Gaza is unclear. But one teaching from Israel's experience that must be internalized by all is that the policy of unilateral, territorial concession is unworthy of consideration. It merely lays the ground for engagement with a bolder, better equipped and more proximate enemy; one that will harass and harm Israel for as long as the Jewish state exists. What other democracies do, Israel shall not emulate. 

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Benjamin Anthony is Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, Benjamin brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. Read full bio here.

I Served in Afghanistan. This US Policy Is Disgraceful.

By Micah Jones

By the time this piece is published, the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan will be complete. In seeing the images of Taliban fighters riding in stolen American vehicles, Afghans waiting in line at government passport offices hoping to flee the country, and US Army helicopters evacuating diplomatic personnel, I have been overwhelmed with emotion over the complete and utter waste that has occurred following America’s disastrous withdrawal.  Besides the incomprehensible human suffering that will undoubtedly unfold, particularly for Afghan women and minorities, I am disgusted by the damage that America’s retreat has already done to the United States’ credibility among both its allies and enemies alike.

I served in Afghanistan from September 2014 to September 2015. I initially worked as an intelligence advisor to the Afghan Ground Forces Command, before being interviewed and selected to be the aide to the brigadier general in charge of NATO’s Rule of Law mission. In this role, I was a given a privileged view of the war effort. From weekly meetings with the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, to discussions with the Afghan Vice President, to briefings with four-star generals, I had the opportunity to be the fly on the wall in the rooms where the decisions were truly being made. Most importantly, I had the opportunity to work with dozens of dedicated and patriotic Afghans who wanted nothing more than to improve their country. I came to know Afghanistan, Kabul, and the Afghan people intimately well.

Returning home from that year-long deployment, I came away with the understanding that America was likely not going to ever have a decisive victory against the Taliban. Nevertheless, I left Afghanistan truly believing that America, and its NATO allies, were genuinely improving the lives of the Afghan people. Most importantly, I believed that our continued presence in Afghanistan had been successful in preventing the Taliban and Al Qaeda from ever being strong enough to recreate a 9/11-level attack on American soil. Finally, I believed that American bases in Afghanistan gave us broad force projection throughout a dangerous and chaotic part of the world. With borders to China and Iran, American bases in Afghanistan gave the United States strategic leverage to push back against those nefarious actors.

I am someone who firmly believes that America is a force for good in the world. When the United States retreats, the world becomes a darker place. And when it is not American and Western values being shared in an area or projected throughout the world, it is someone else’s, who is likely reprehensible and antithetical to everything we believe in.

With thousands of American troops currently stationed throughout the word, including Japan, Germany, and Korea, I do not believe that it was a heavy lift to maintain a minimum number of troops in Afghanistan. With no combat deaths since 2020, the American mission in Afghanistan had essentially become a peace keeping mission in which the price to pay was small when compared to the dangers that could arise following an ill-timed, and unprepared exit.

Tragically, that is exactly what has happened and what we are collectively watching in real time. The Biden Administration’s complete and utter lack of preparation to facilitate a strategic withdrawal is evident as the Taliban have run roughshod over the country, taking over many provincial capitals in a matter of days. Even worse, America now looks like a paper tiger. We have lost credibility amongst both our allies and enemies.

For our allies, why would anyone risk their life, literally, to work with future American endeavors? Yes, the United States is attempting to bring many Afghan interpreters and civilians who aided the 20 year war-effort back to US soil, but many thousands more will be left behind. I do not trust for one moment that the Taliban will treat them well. Furthermore, why would America’s allies the world over trust us to back them up if they were to go to war? Why would Taiwan now think that the United States would be a credible foil to China? Why would Israel believe that America would back it against Iranian aggression? Those countries would not be wrong for having second thoughts about America’s commitment.

We have also lost all credibility with our enemies. The lesson here is that if you wait out the United States long enough, Americans will cut and run.  It also demonstrates to America’s truly strategic enemies of Russia, China, and Iran, that if America does not have the will to defend its interests in a country where it has all available assets, what stomach, if any, will it have in preventing those nations from exerting more control over their own spheres of influence? China will likely fill the vacuum that we have created, thus extending its authoritarian regime over an even greater portion of the world.

The feeling of disgust that I have in the United States withdrawal in Afghanistan will never go away. But for my generation of veterans who served, and for those of us who will eventually be in positions of power and influence, I hope that we never forget these images and this moment in history so that we do not make these same mistakes in the future. I hope that we never forget the good that we did for so many Afghan people. I hope we never forget our friends who were killed in service to protect the United States of America from future terrorist attacks. And I hope that we never forget that America is a force for good.

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Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. Read full bio here.

PODCAST: Was Lebanon 2 A Prelude To Lebanon 3?

Former Commander Of The Lebanon Formation Weighs In

Video: MirYam Institute Expert: Eitan Dangot, I:24 News

MirYam Institute Expert Eitan Dangot Interviews with I:24 News about the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict.

PODCAST: The MirYam Institute Hosts Secretary Mike Pompeo

Secretary Mike Pompeo: America, Israel & Iran. Regional Threats & Opportunities: Past, Present & Future.

On July 17th, 2021, former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, sat down for a long form interview by Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder of The MirYam Institute, at a private breakfast briefing in Manhattan, NY.

During the interview, the Secretary weighed in on numerous subjects including:

The likelihood of a return to the JCPOA

The support he would have granted to Israel in the event of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities

The credibility of a military threat to Iran’s nuclear ambitions

His faith and conviction in the context of policy making

His views on the Peace to Prosperity proposal between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs.

To learn about the work of The MirYam Institute with U.S. Military Academies, U.S. Graduate Schools and the U.S. House of Representatives, visit: www.MirYamInstitute.org

Universities Must Shift Their Conception of Jewish Students

By Mark Goldfeder

As universities and colleges across the country gear up for the academic year, institutional offices of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) are working hard to schedule programs designed to celebrate difference while facilitating greater inclusion and delivering on the promise of equality in higher education. DEI offices usually focus on historically marginalized populations, including racial and ethnic groups that have traditionally experienced discrimination. So it’s strange that in the vast majority of these offices, there is one historically marginalized and oft discriminated-against group that is routinely missing altogether, if not from the mission statement, then certainly from the mission practice.

The Jewish people.

But why the gap? The reason is that universities tend to think about the “Jewish issues” facing students as a subset of “religious issues,” falling under the purview of their Offices of Religious Life, or any of the various clergy groups on campus, as opposed to a racial or ethnic problem better handled by the DEI office. But while it is true that Judaism is a religion, and that Jewish students do sometimes face issues—such as the scheduling of exams on holidays—that might best be defined as religious discrimination and handled by someone with a focus in that area, reflexively putting Jewish issues in an exclusively religious box is both limiting and wrong.

It is also true that for the vast and ever-expanding number of Jewish students encountering antisemitic hatred on campus, their experience has nothing to do with their religious practice, and everything to do with their racial, ethnic or cultural identity. And for the most part, handling this kind of discrimination falls outside the purview and expertise of even the most well-meaning chaplain. Universities need to realize this, adjust their lenses, and plan accordingly, just as they do for other minority groups that might need assistance.

In an age of intersectionality, appreciating that Jewish students can and do hold multiple identities should not be controversial. Federal law, for instance, has already come to this realization and corrected its own definitional understanding for how to properly protect Jewish students.

Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act requires schools to ensure their programs and activities are free from harassment, intimidation and discrimination on the basis of race, color and national origin. Notably, the Act does not give the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights jurisdiction to investigate religious bias, and so until 2004, OCR was making the same mistake that university DEI offices are still making today: they were declining to investigate antisemitic complaints under their regular well-established framework for dealing with discrimination against other minorities because they saw Jews as only a religious group, and not a race, ethnicity or type of national origin. Because antisemitism fell outside the bounds of the normal system, it was much easier to get away with.

In 2004, however, OCR issued a series of policy statements announcing that they would henceforth investigate antisemitism complaints, to the extent that they implicate ethnic or ancestral bias. As the policy directive explained, “[g]roups that face discrimination on the basis of shared ethnic characteristics may not be denied the protection of our civil rights laws on the ground that they also share a common faith.” This idea has been confirmed in both Title VI and Title VII cases. It is high time for schools to actually put it into practice on campus as well.

Around the country, antisemitism has become entrenched and systemic, with recent studies showing that the number of Jewish students experiencing antisemitism had spiked to nearly 75 percent, and that Jewish students need and want their schools to be doing more to help them. Under Title VI, administrators have a responsibility to protect students and faculty from acts of hate and bigotry motivated by discriminatory animus—including antisemitism—and to proactively work to create a safe environment for everyone. They must ensure that when people discriminate against Jews for being Jewish (as opposed to their religious practice) it is treated as seriously and as quickly, and with the same procedures and processes in place, as discrimination against any other member of a minority group targeted for their racial or ethnic identity.

A step in the right direction toward shifting the framework through which colleges and universities see their Jewish communities would be to have someone in the DEI office specifically attuned or at the very least paying attention to the different aspects of Jewish life on campus. Jewish students across all spectrums, like any other group, should be celebrated for the diversity they bring, and appreciated for the contributions they make to campus life. At the very least they should feel free to express their full identities without fear, and have proper recourse and a designated someone to turn to if they are in fact excluded.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Israel Can Carry The Torch In The Fight Against Anti-Semitism

By Nachman Shai

Like the flaming arrow used to launch the Olympics in games past, the swastika carved into an elevator of the US State Department this week hit its mark at the center of Western democracy and diplomacy, proving that no space is beyond antisemitism’s reach.

The State of Israel is now called upon to rise to the occasion as partners in the united effort to combat antisemitism and respond to hate in all its forms within the Israeli government, in relation to Jewish communities, and on the international stage.

The severe rise in global antisemitic events following Israel’s last military conflict was a wake-up call regarding how events in Israel directly impact the Jewish world. Antisemitic actors took full advantage of Operation Guardian of the Walls to double down on their efforts by transforming Jewish communities into global targets.

Today, Jewish individuals are perceived as representatives of the Israeli government, whether or not they identify themselves as such. Antisemitism rose more than 500% in the UK over the 11-day event. In the US, antisemitic attacks rose by 69% in New York City alone, according to the NYPD. And these numbers were reflected around the world.

But the issue is ongoing. According to the latest Pew study, over half of American Jews reported experiencing antisemitism in 2020, and the Jewish Electorate Institute’s July 2021 national survey found that an astounding 90% of American Jews are concerned about antisemitism. I hear the deeply personal implications of this data when engaging with individuals from South Africa to the UK to the US who share with me their potent fears. Only recently, we believed that such experiences were reserved for the pages of our pre-1948 history books.

Israel must recognize this new reality, and take into account how our actions directly impact the safety, security and communal life of Jewish communities around the world.

As the new government moves in the coming days to pass a state budget and delegate responsibilities and priorities, it is our duty as the Jewish nation-state to put antisemitism at the heart of our agenda by increasing our investment and streamlining our emergency and long-term Jewish community-resilience strategy.

The stark rise in antisemitism, matched with a fresh mindset in this broad coalition, provide us with a unique opportunity to set the foundation for a new paradigm driving Israel’s approach to antisemitism.

THIS PARADIGM must be grounded in the Israeli government’s formal acknowledgment that the safety and viability of world Jewry is not only central to Israel’s identity as the Jewish nation-state, but crucial to our national security and foreign policy approach.

Unfortunately, in previous governments, the work of combating antisemitism was split across offices, with no driving work plan.

It’s time for Israel to organize the many bodies that deal with antisemitism into one framework in order to provide a more effective and strategic response.

The Diaspora Affairs Ministry is the natural convener to organize and lead activities inside and outside of Israel regarding antisemitism. I’ve started this work informally by reporting to the cabinet how communities are being challenged and in what ways they are looking for leadership and support from the Jewish state.

These briefings are based on my daily conversations with Jewish communal leaders who share with me their experiences and needs on the ground.

At the same time, just this week, I led an emergency forum on antisemitism in partnership with the Jewish Agency and Foreign Ministry to discuss pressing dangers facing specific Jewish communities and our government’s response. Within such a forum, the Diaspora Affairs Ministry holds a unique global perspective, with the ability to connect trends, needs and best practices in the field with the government’s developing tool kit.

Moving forward, I will advocate from the budget-negotiations table for an increase in state funding to combat antisemitism, and request the formalization of my office as the focal point for this effort.

Finally, in addition to our work within Israel and in relation to Jewish communities, the state must show up on the global stage. Ultimately, we will only succeed to combat antisemitism if it is taken on as a united and international cause.

As we saw at this year’s Tokyo Olympics that today’s games are launched not with an arrow but with a torch, which burns through the end of the games.

In the same spirit of global unity and responsibility, the State of Israel is ready to carry this torch both today and in the days to come.

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Dr. Nachman Shai currently serves as Israel's Minister for Diaspora Affairs. Previously, he was a Member of Knesset, from 2009-2019 as a member of the Labor party.. Read full bio here.