Can Israel recover from its precipitous fall?

By dan meridor

Looking back over the past four months, it is astounding to observe how quickly and in how many fields Israel has sustained damages due to the actions of the Netanyahu government.

Currently, negotiations are ongoing between representatives of the Israeli coalition government and the opposition under the banner of searching for a compromise to the ‘judicial reform’ initiative and exiting this unprecedented internal crisis.

However, any serious attempt to reevaluate the balance of power between the three branches of government would, if done correctly, involve a lengthy process lasting a year or two. It would have to involve jurists from across the board, experts from a wide spectrum of views, representatives of civil society, Jews and Arabs, trade unionists and employers – in short, it would be an enormous endeavor. This isn’t something that can be seriously concluded in a matter of weeks.

Looking back, the question of how Israel reached this crisis point in the space of just four months must be asked. Economically, Israel went from being a powerful tech-based start-up nation with a booming economy revered around the world, to a country whose economic officials warn of billions of shekels in losses.

The people issuing these warnings are Netanyahu appointees, like the Bank of Israel Governor Prof. Amir Yaron, and former Bank of Israel Governor Karnit Flug, as well as the world-renowned economist Jacob Frenkel, also a former governor of the BOI.

The economic consensus is clear: if the judicial reform goes ahead, Israel’s outlook will be catastrophic.

Investors see that the government is trying to rob the judiciary of its independence, and, from there, financial damage is quick to follow. Even if the political crisis fades and the judicial changes are stopped in their tracks, the economic damage could be long-lasting as investors may be wary of betting on Israel.

Politically, Israel was considered to be the United States’ strongest ally – and derived much of its power from this alliance. Now, U.S. President Joe Biden explicitly informs the world that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unwelcome in Washington.

Warnings about common values have been issued by other senior American administration officials, such as the secretary of state and the secretary of defense.

And what of the flagship achievement, the Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain? Suddenly, a cold breeze is blowing in Israel’s direction from the Gulf. The damaged Israeli – American alliance is part of the reason. Netanyahu’s vision of on-boarding Saudi Arabia to the Accords will have to wait.

On recent visits to European capitals, the Israeli premier was pummeled with criticism over the judicial reform crisis, albeit the style was less abrasive than Biden’s.

It’s not only relations with the U.S. administration that are on the ropes. So too are relations between the Israeli government and American Jewry. On the domestic front, several crises threaten to snowball into an avalanche. Reservists from prized army and air force units have announced they will not volunteer if the reform goes ahead and Israel is turned into a dictatorship.

All of this has eroded Israeli deterrence and challenged its security establishment –this according to none other than Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, whom Netanyahu initially fired for warning of the dangers posed by the domestic crisis, but then backtracked on his decision under pressure.

Incredibly, this can all be traced back to a single attempt to implement an extreme move to undermine the judiciary’s independence.

Israel has always known bitter disputes over policies and ideologies. Whether it was about reparations from Germany, or land and peace, Israelis have always argued intensely, but almost everyone was united around core democratic values and accepting the decisions of the courts.

In fact, the judicial reform initiative has, until now, been a marginal issue. While Justice Minister Yariv Levin has held strong views on the matter for many years, until the formation of this government, Netanyahu did not take it very seriously. Levin himself admitted in April that had the reform passed as initially presented, Israel could not fit the definition of a democratic state.

The damage hasn’t stopped at national interests – it has harmed Netanyahu politically. A series of polls have shown that the Likud party is losing altitude quickly.

What has caused Netanyahu to embark on such a destructive path? The answer can only be the attempt to weaken the legal system due to Netanyahu’s criminal trial. Although Netanyahu is innocent until proven guilty, he probably does not have an interest in seeing his trial play out and seeing whether he is convicted or not.

Netanyahu loves his country – he served in the elite Sayeret Matkal commando force and fought bravely – but he loves himself more. As a result, until now, Netanyahu has rejected any plea bargain arrangement, which would have likely meant an end to his political career, as he seeks to punish the system that ‘dared’ prosecute him.

In this manner, everyone perceived by Netanyahu as a threat has been tagged as a ‘leftist’ or someone who ‘betrayed the national interest.’ This includes the police, and its former commissioner, the religious settler Roni Alsheikh; the Yeshiva graduate and former state prosecutor, Shai Nitzan; and the religious former Attorney General and Netanyahu appointee, Avichai Mandelblit.

Suddenly, all of the above-mentioned and others are labeled by the Netanyahu lie-machine as ‘leftists’ seeking to harm the state. The worst part is that a swath of the public believes this.

As a result, in the Netanyahu narrative, the courts are now presented as a danger to democracy and to security that frames publicly appointed politicians.

The time is ripe for Netanyahu to face challenges over his conduct from within the Likud. The Likud was once a party that wasn’t afraid to criticize its leader. This was true during the days of Menachem Begin, whose peace deal with Egypt faced multiple challenges from within the party, and through to the era of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who was challenged by senior Likud figures at the time, Ariel Sharon and David Levy.

It would be appropriate for some of the Likud’s 31 Knesset Members today to speak up and tell Netanyahu that he cannot continue harming the country in this way. 

Dan Meridor is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence in the Israeli Government from 2009-2013. Read full bio here.

To reach Israel’s 100th anniversary, we need unity

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Close your eyes for a moment and imagine it’s 2048 and final rehearsals are underway at Mount Herzl, Jerusalem, for Israel’s 100th Independence Day celebrations. In front of the tomb of Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, flags fly proudly and soldiers march in formation.

Now, open your eyes and return to the present day as we marked this year’s Remembrance and Independence Days. The scenario of Israelis celebrating the country’s 100th anniversary as one people waving their flags together, seems, unfortunately, altogether fanciful.

If we do not ensure that we have a common ethos, it is doubtful we will get there – assuming that democracy even remains in place. So, will we celebrate 100 years of our independence together? Were we to hold a referendum, it is fair to assume that the answer to the question “Do you want to reach Israel’s 100th year of independence” would be “Yes,” but the answer to the question, “Will we get there,” will likely be “I don’t know.”

How to get to a 100 years

To provide a conclusive answer to this question, one must first understand the shared identity that propels us forward together – the same identity that creates the fabric of shared life here. The legal coup and the masses who take to the streets week after week are fighting for democracy and against dictatorship.

Yet it is not only the concern that the Israel we once knew is changing its character that is driving the protesters. Those who support the reform claim that the time is ripe for Israel to change its character and that the country has had enough of rulership by elites.

An identity struggle is raging: liberalism vs conservatism, those who share the national burden vs. those who believe that Torah study is an equally valuable endeavor to military service and work. The latter camp holds that Torah study is necessary due to the very existence of Israel, as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

The stage of defining our identity characterizes democratic states and research indicates that this process often occurs in its most intense form in the last quarter of a democracy’s first 100 years. In this respect, we are no different from most of the countries in the free world.

In other words, had the legal revolution not come, another catalyst would probably have led people to the streets, after shedding light on the rift between us reminding us of the feud over how to distribute the national burden and the argument over freedom of choice on how to manage one’s individual life.

Questions we have pushed aside for years due to our fight for our security and existence are now on the national agenda. The process of defining our identity is a complex and fragile process. In Israel, it includes the added and unique tier of being a Jewish, democratic country and the question of a shared identity is one that must consider both religion and state. The result is an equation that is difficult to provide answers for.

The first Independence Day

TO BETTER understand the question of a common ethos, we need to return to the basics. The young state of Israel marked its first Independence Day following the 1949 Independence Day Law. The date was set for the fifth of the Hebrew month of Iyar, the date on which Israel had declared independence a year earlier, in 1948. The Law was passed just three weeks before the celebration.

In fact, the 1949 celebration was not the first time Israel marked its independence. Almost a year earlier, on 20 Tammuz – July 27, 1948, the anniversary of Theodor Herzl’s death, military parades were held throughout the country to mark State Day. The idea was to emphasize the connection between the newly-born state and Herzl, the thinker who envisioned it.

The military’s prominent role in the ceremonies reflects what was, at that time, an undisputed ethos. The people’s army model became an essential element in defining the Israeli identity. There was a clear link between IDF service and Israeliness. The same model stands at the heart of the current divide today and brings to the fore the question of who is an Israeli.

Those who serve vs draft dodgers, the lack of equality in the sharing of the military burden and an unnecessary conflict between Israeliness and Judaism are harming the people’s army model. This will collapse one of Israel’s most important foundational pillars, upon which our identity, as a people and as a state, stands.

In a speech to the nation on Israel’s first Independence Day in 1949, then-prime minister David Ben-Gurion said, “We stood up to serious military campaigns [against us]. We emerged from them all intact and with dignity. However, the dangers to our safety and even our existence have not been eliminated, nor will they soon disappear.”

His remarks remain relevant today, as we mark 75 years of our independence. They indicate that the people’s army model has a key role in the fabric of our shared identity.

If we wish for our soldiers to march together on Mount Herzl in 2048 when we are due to celebrate 100 years of the wonder called Israel, then we are duty-bound to strengthen our common base and to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

We won’t agree on everything, but we can create a common identity so that we can proudly say together, “We are Israelis.”

Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

A quiet civil war

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

The first hundred days of the Benjamin Netanyahu government have seen Israel experience massive turmoil.

While a common Israeli saying holds that those who take office have one hundred days of grace. But this government has not been granted a single day of grace from those who oppose it. On the other hand, the government itself did not wait long before Justice Minister Yariv Levin launched his legal form program.

And that is when the snowball started to roll. It quickly picked up speed, growing larger, heavier, and eventually, unstoppable. In politics, even those with access to the best strategic advisers can experience moments in which they simply lose control.

The Netanyahu government lost control very quickly because the legal reform sparked massive resistance. Behind it was all the power, energy, and financial resources of its rival camp —the ‘just not Bibi camp,’ which is often called the center-left, but is in fact, all about opposing Netanyahu.

In previous rounds of elections, groups of anti-Netanyahu demonstrators raised black flags, telling Netanyahu to “go.”

Now, on Saturday nights, the black flag is replaced with the blue and white flag of Israel, but the protests are ultimately driven by the same message. Millions of shekels are spent on ads to support the protests -- on billboards, on social media, and with paid text messages directly to our phones.

The government froze its reform program to allow a dialogue with the opposition, but the protests continue nevertheless. It is therefore clear that legal reform was just a trigger, and it is the Netanyahu haters who continue to fuel the protests against him.

We are in highly unconventional times. Every Saturday night, Tel Aviv’s Kaplan Junction, a major traffic artery, fills with demonstrators, and a small number of them go on to block traffic on the Ayalon highway, and some of them are arrested. However one looks at it, the goal is to disrupt the routine of people's lives.

Those who front the protests are not necessarily today’s opposition leaders. They are trying to jump on the bandwagon and take the credit, but those who lead the demonstrations from behind the scenes are politicians from the past. Examples include former prime ministers Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak.

They also include the Mayor of Tel Aviv, Ron Huldai, who tried to face Netanyahu in elections and had to resign at the start of the race.

At the end of the day, there is one camp in Israel that is fighting because it was told there would be a dictatorship, while another camp feels that all these protests are merely Netanyahu hatred and an attempt to overthrow the government.

In response to these developments, the rightwing camp has initiated demonstrations in support of legal reform.

Although the ruling coalition has gained sixty-four seats in the ballot box, those who are in charge in Israel are, in fact, Netanyahu's opponents. The media, dominated by the left, the key economic actors, and the national trade union, which disabled international flights as part of the protests.

They have collectively succeeded in applying such a high degree of pressure that the reform has been halted.

There has been no significant breakthrough in talks so far, yet some observers say they are surprised that the negotiations have not yet broken down.

They should not be surprised; the dialogue appears to be, in actuality, an attempt by the government to dissolve its reform initiative.

The big question going forward is, what will the Right do? Will it go all the way with the reform, as it promised? One of its election tickets was to create a balance between the three branches of government.

The Right is unlikely to proceed because Israel is in an unprecedented state of polarization. Everyone is under pressure to take sides, and people are very quickly cataloged. Extremely tense moments occur daily among people in workplaces, family members, and friends.

It feels like Israeli society has sunk into a kind of quiet civil war. Hence, if the government succeeds in passing even a single clause of its reform, that would be considered a major achievement. The more likely scenario is a dissolution of the initiative.

The fact that the coalition is, itself, divided, also contributes to the likelihood of that scenario.

Some of the coalition’s members think the reform should be pursued to the end, others think it should be softened, and some think it should be dropped altogether.

An attempt to pass the reform without broad consensus stands a good chance of leading to the government’s collapse due to these divisions.

If the government drops the reform, the chances that it will fall will decline significantly. Polls show that support for the government has rapidly lost altitude and its members fear their political fate. That provides enough of a basis for them to remain together, even if some, like Levin, who initiated this snowball in the first place by going for large-scale reform, will be furious to see it dropped. 

Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

Israel must prepare a counter-strategy against a multi-arena threat.

By Eitan Dangot

Hamas has been strengthening its cooperation with the Iran-Hezbollah axis for years and the process only seems to be accelerating. The result is the formation of six fronts of aggression against Israel—a “ring of fire” composed of radical Sunni and Shiite axes.

Previous signs of this cooperation could be found in how the Palestinian Sunni Hamas and the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah helped one another upgrade their capabilities. Hezbollah began digging cross-border tunnels into Israel from Lebanon (though these were demolished by the IDF in 2018), just as Hamas did for years from Gaza.

Hamas learned from Hezbollah how to overcome its military inferiority and set up rocket bases in civilian areas. Both terror armies have set up elite cross-border ground infiltration units—Hamas’ Nuhba force and Hezbollah’s Radwan force.

The relationship grew even closer after Saleh Al-Arouri, a senior Hamas official, was expelled from Turkey and relocated to Lebanon several years ago. He began building a Hamas headquarters in Lebanon, from which he both orchestrates terrorism in Judea and Samaria and oversees a growing Hamas presence in Lebanon.

Al-Arouri can be seen as Hamas’ own Qassem Soleimani. Like the late Iranian Quds Force unit commander—assassinated by the United States in 2020—Al-Arouri is drawing up a multi-arena attack strategy to surround the State of Israel and he is doing so with Iranian help.

The hub of Al-Arouri’s activity is Judea and Samaria, where Hamas works day and night to both incite and directly orchestrate terrorist attacks.

The fruit of Al-Arouri’s work in Lebanon became apparent on April 6, when Hamas fired 34 rockets at Israel from Lebanon, the largest such salvo since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. A day earlier, after Passover eve, Palestinian terrorists in Gaza fired some 50 rockets towards Israel.

According to the terror organizations, the rocket fire was a response to clashes between Palestinian youths and Israeli police at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, but in fact, it was a sign of something far more significant.

The attacks are the latest indication of the accelerated convergence between the Palestinian terror axis and the Iran-Hezbollah axis, creating the multi-arena threat Israel now faces with ever-growing intensity.

The common denominator that unites the Iranian-led axis is the goal of combatting Israel. In addition to Gaza and Lebanon, Israel’s enemies are striving to create a front in Syria, where Hamas could soon be sending operatives after reconciling with the Assad regime, and where Hezbollah is working with Iran-backed Shiite militias to set up offensive positions.

Hamas has become a significant partner in the Iranian quest to surround Israel with a ring of fire. The establishment of a coordinated headquarters in Lebanon with Hezbollah and Palestinian terror factions in 2021 was a milestone in this development.

Iran pours funds and weapons into its regional proxies and partners, giving them the capabilities to realize their objectives. In addition, Iran and its Lebanese and Palestinian proxies have entered a mutually-supportive deterrence framework with Hamas operating from Lebanon under the umbrella of Hezbollah’s arsenal of 160,000 projectiles.

Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Yemen are also preparing to enter the multi-arena strategy against Israel through missile and drone attacks.

Meanwhile, the notion of state responsibility over what occurs in their territory has long been irrelevant in Lebanon and Syria, and the ability of the joint Shiite-Sunni radical axes to disrupt life in Israel grows consistently.

These forces don’t need to enter into a full-scale war with Israel. All they need to do is continuously identify optimal points in time to escalate the security situation when they judge Israel to be unwilling or unable to respond forcefully, thus creating regular threats to the ability of Israelis to lead a secure life.

This is precisely what occurred, in the broadest fashion to date, during this year’s Ramadan period.

The pattern we are now witnessing is a direct continuation of the 2021 conflict fought between Hamas and Israel, when Hamas was able to activate another arena—the internal Israeli arena. Widespread violence tore through mixed Arab-Jewish cities, serving as a warning to Israel of what a future multi-front conflict could look like.

All of this serves Iran’s goal of keeping Israel distracted as Iran makes rapid progress in its nuclear program. Iran hopes its program faces fewer disruptions while Israel is busy dealing with Iran’s multi-arena strategy.

This obligates Israel to immediately formulate a counter-strategy, which should be based on high-end Israeli operational capabilities and international cooperation with the U.S. and Sunni states that seriously addresses the dilemma of preemption.

Israel needs to consider the benefits and risks of launching surprise preemptive strikes on Hezbollah targets in response to the force build-up and growing boldness of this primary Iranian regional proxy. In addition, Israel must eliminate its internal crisis as soon as possible by focusing on rapidly building its new national guard, under the command of the Israel Police.

Ultimately, Israel must prepare to operate in multiple arenas, just as its dangerous enemies do.

Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

Hamas’s attack from Lebanon is part of plan to take over West Bank

By David Hacham

The rocket attack against northern Israel in which Hamas fired 34 projectiles from southern Lebanon on April 6 reflects a clear attempt on the group’s part to advance a broader and highly dangerous strategic goal.

Hamas is seeking to create an offensive ring around Israel that constitutes a multi-front threat. As such, it is working to build terrorist infrastructures in Lebanon, in addition to its existing fronts against Israel – the Gaza Strip, which has been under the organization’s control since 2007, and the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority (PA), led by President Mahmoud Abbas, is growing weaker, and where Hamas is working to build a foothold.

Hamas’s grand strategy and its actions in Lebanon are ultimately aimed at boosting its quest of toppling the Fatah-run PA in the West Bank. The PA is gradually losing control there, especially in the Jenin region, and, to a partial extent, in Nablus.

Hamas exploited tensions on the Temple Mount, a highly sensitive Islamic site, to launch its attack from southern Lebanon, likely in full coordination with Hezbollah and Iran.

A Hamas rocket attack of this scope could not have occurred without coordination and a green light from Hezbollah, which is the strongest organization in the Lebanese system. At the time of the April 6 attack, Hamas Politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh was visiting Lebanon, accompanied by his deputy, Salah Arouri – and that is no coincidence.

Hamas - Gaza’s operational approval was not required for this attack, but it was notified in advance by Hamas in Lebanon.

The rocket attack carried out by Hamas from Lebanon against Israel was pre-planned, with Hamas’s intention being essentially a limited escalation.

The rockets were aimed at areas near the Lebanese border but were not intended to hit infrastructure targets of strategic significance. Given that, Hamas' rocket attack was not a declaration of war, or an attempt to deteriorate the situation in a way that would create a general escalation and bring about a renewed military confrontation with Israel on a large scale.

The Israeli response -- selected airstrikes in Gaza and southern Lebanon -- was measured and limited. It was designed to prevent an uncontrolled deterioration and overall war. Israel's limited response to the rocket fire indicates that it is not interested in war at present and that it does not want a confrontation involving several arenas simultaneously.

The internal crisis in Israel surrounding attempts by the government to promote legal reform has eroded Israel’s deterrence, and its enemies assess that it is vulnerable.

All of this is tied to Hamas’s strategic goal of toppling the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank with the end of the Mahmoud Abbas era. The April escalation boosted Hamas’s standing at Fatah’s expense.

Hamas is taking advantage of the governing vacuum in the PA, which is made worse by internal Fatah power struggles. In recent years, several potential candidates, all from Fatah, have entered into a destabilizing competition for the leadership position.

In practice, Hamas has already taken concrete steps to exploit this instability and to position itself to challenge the PA for the Palestinian leadership as soon as the opportunity arises. This has included a reshuffling of Hamas operatives in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, with an emphasis on command levels, as well as cultivating operatives from the younger generations. These operatives include organizationally affiliated Hamas members, and other more loosely affiliated individuals with close ties to Hamas, such as academics, trade unionists, and public sector figures in the West Bank, and they are active in the Islamist stream within Palestinian local councils and civil society institutions.

Hamas is focusing on two major courses of action. The first is the democratic path to power, through a voting process, and the second – a fallback position – is the military takeover of the PA using violent means if necessary. All the while, Hamas labels Fatah as a traitor to the Palestinian people due to its security coordination with Israel.

One of the most prominent operatives among Hamas ranks in the West Bank is engineer Wazan Jaber, a representative of the younger generation in the terror group. A few weeks ago, an attempt was made to assassinate him, likely by Fatah members. Jaber was not injured.

It is worth noting that Fatah is well aware of Hamas's intention to replace it. Fatah is actively engaged in an effort to limit Hamas' power in the West Bank. This includes the continued existence of security coordination with Israel – albeit in a more discreet and limited manner since the PA’s January announcement of its cessation of coordination, in protest against an IDF security operation in the Jenin refugee camp.

The PA is also working to dry up sources of financial aid to Hamas, and Abbas has taken a series of measures to prevent Hamas from gaining a foothold in the Palestinian government system, such as keeping the Palestinian parliament dissolved, thereby preventing Hamas-linked parliament speaker Aziz Dweik from being considered a legal heir to Abbas.

Instead, this power has been transferred to the Palestinian National Council and its Fatah chairman, Rawhi Fattouh (Abbas’s appointment of Hussein Al-Sheikh, the Minister for Civil Affairs, as secretary of the PLO's Executive Committee in May 2022, should not, despite initial impressions, be seen as promoting a desired heir, since Abbas can eject Al-Sheikh from that position at any time).

A Hamas military attack on Fatah positions is possible as soon as Hamas recognizes an opportunity to launch it.

As far as Israel is concerned, there is no replacement for the PA; who would rule Area A of the West Bank in the PA’s place? Should Israel once again enter the Palestinian cities and assume direct responsibility over millions of Palestinians, in addition to being responsible for water and electricity? This is a delusional concept.

As such, Israel must work to ensure the preservation of the PA in the post-Abbas era, despite the PA’s many failings.

It is likely that Israel would intervene in one way or another militarily to prevent a Hamas coup in the West Bank since this would breach an Israeli red line.

David Hacham served for 30 years in various intelligence and political-strategic positions in the IDF, including eight years in the Gaza Strip as advisor for Arab affairs to successive commanders of the Southern Command and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief, Israel marks Memorial Day; but will it bring national unity?

By Yaakov Lappin

Yom Hazikaron, Israel’s Memorial Day for Fallen Soldiers and Victims of Hostile Acts begins at 8 p.m. on Monday, April 24, with a nationwide siren that marks the start of ceremonies across the country. President Isaac Herzog and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi will attend the opening ceremony at the Western Wall, where a memorial candle is lit.

On Tuesday, April 25, a two-minute nationwide siren will sound at 11 a.m. before the main ceremony at the Mount Herzl military cemetery commences. Bereaved family members attend military ceremonies across Israel.

Memorial Day commemorates those who fell in defense of the Israeli people, from the pre-state era to the present day. When the sirens sound, traffic on roads comes to a standstill, and members of the public stop what they are doing to stand in silence in honor of the fallen. Flags fly at half-mast throughout the day.

In an almost unfathomable shift, Memorial Day transitions into the start of celebrations of Israel's 75th Independence Day on the evening of April 25. This is a deliberately designed emotional rollercoaster to remind Israelis that their independence and security are inseparable from the ultimate sacrifices made by the fallen soldiers.  

The big question is whether these vitally important national days will succeed in alleviating to any degree the unprecedented polarization afflicting Israeli society and stemming from the political crisis over the government's judicial reform program, but now extending far beyond it.

In a sign of the times, Yair Lapid, the leader of the opposition, has announced his intention to boycott Independence Day celebrations.

With Iranian and Hezbollah assistance, Hamas tests out its multi-arena strategy.

This month, during Passover and Ramadan, Hamas made dangerous advances toward implementing its four-arena strategy against Israel. According to this doctrine, Hamas launches attacks (or encourages others to launch attacks) from the following arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Jerusalem and elsewhere within Israel.

Hamas's preference is to be able to activate the Lebanese, West Bank, and Jerusalem arenas without endangering its Gaza regime.

After Islamist students instigated clashes with the Israeli Police on the Temple Mount on April 5, some 50 rockets were fired by terrorists in Gaza at southern communities between April 5 and April 7, while 34 rockets were fired from Lebanon at northern Israel on April 6—the heaviest barrage from Lebanon since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. On April 8, three rockets were fired at the Golan Heights from Syria. Hamas is behind the Lebanese and Gazan rocket attacks.

In response, the Israeli Air Force launched airstrikes in Lebanon and mostly in Gaza, signaling to Hamas that its efforts to keep Gaza quiet would fail if the escalation continued.

All these developments contribute to Hamas's goal of promoting a violent Islamist conflict narrative with Israel. As a result, Hamas's main Palestinian competitor, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which Hamas accuses of being traitors and collaborators with Israel, sees its status diminish on the Palestinian street.

This aligns closely with the Iranian-Hezbollah axis's desire to surround Israel with a ring of fire, and it is improbable to believe that Hamas could have activated a Lebanese front at this scale without Hezbollah and Iranian approval, as well as Iranian assistance in rocket production.

The scenario of a multi-arena conflict is one that Iran is actively promoting to try and threaten and demoralize Israel and keep it busy with its borders. But this strategy can be a double-edged sword. Israel too can adopt a multi-arena logic in which, for example, it responds to Hamas in Gaza for attacks coming out of Lebanon. And it can respond to Iran anywhere in the Middle East for actions that the Islamic Republic takes to threaten Israel's security and violate its sovereignty. In other words, the multi-arena tool can be used by anyone in this conflict.

A glimpse into what Israel-Iran relations could one day be like

Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Iranian Shah, made his first visit to Israel on Monday, April 17, together with his wife Yakima.

“We are very happy to be here and are dedicated to working toward the peaceful and prosperous future that the people of our region deserve," he tweeted after landing at Ben-Gurion Airport and being received by Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel, who had helped plan his visit.

“From the children of Cyrus to the children of Israel, we will build this future together, in friendship,” he added, in reference to the Persian king who ended the Babylonian exile and facilitated the re-building of the Temple in Jerusalem

Pahlavi attended Israel’s Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day ceremony on April 17. He provided a small glimpse into the future potential relationship between the Iranian people – 80 % of whom are now opposed to their regime, according to reported Israeli intelligence assessments – and the Israeli people, if one day the radical Islamic regime in Tehran falls. 

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

How Turkey and Israel salvaged their relationship

By Pinhas Avivi

After the Islamist AKP Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power in Turkey in 2002, Ankara’s approach to Israel began to change for the worse. There were major fears at the time that the defense ties that characterized bilateral relations would vanish and create an irreparable rupture.

Within six years, ties indeed went from friendly to hostile.

And yet, the recent Israeli humanitarian delegation sent to assist Turkey in February’s earthquake disaster is the latest reminder of the fact that these days, Jerusalem’s relations with Ankara are marked by a high degree of stability. That’s not something that should be taken for granted; it took years for the two countries to reach this stage after dealing with several major crises.  

The 2010 Mavi Marmara crisis (when Israeli Navy commandos and Turkish Islamist activists trying to reach Gaza were involved in a deadly clash) marked a low point. Yet since then, the two regional powers have found a way to restore relations and maintain them – to a degree.

This was achieved primarily through civilian cooperation, as returning to the military cooperation that existed before Erdogan’s rise to power would be very hard. Israel would have to find alternative security partners in the Mediterranean – which it did in the form of Greece.

Once in power, Erdogan wanted to be the leader of the Islamic world and navigate according to a neo-Ottoman playbook. Unlike Ataturk, who turned Turkey from an empire to a state, Erdogan wants to return his country to empire mode.

On the one hand, Erdogan tried to employ a zero-conflict policy with Turkey’s neighbors, while seeking to increase its influence in the region through soft power, based on leveraging economic and cultural ties, rather than military means.

However, Turkey's military involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya, and severe tensions that developed with Greece and Israel, put a dent in the ‘zero conflict’ approach.

In addition, Turkey’s political influence on Arab Muslim states remained extremely limited. Theoretical predictions look nice on paper, but Erdogan quickly found out that reality doesn’t always align. No one in the Arab Sunni world was willing to accept him as a regional leader – Egypt and Saudi Arabia hold that position in the Sunni bloc.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to give up its role as the leader of the Islamic world.

As a result, Turkey took up the banner of assisting the Palestinians, as part of its regional leadership bid. Yet Erdogan quickly understood that if he wants to be influential in the Arab world, he must have good ties with Israel, or he risks losing relevance.

All the Arab powers have ties with Israel, some formally like Jordan and Egypt, and, since the 2020 Abraham Accords, the UAE and Bahrain, while others, such as Saudi Arabia, maintain informal ties. As the Arab states moved forward, Erdogan was left behind. Erdogan understood that if he remained excluded, the Abraham Accords would further decrease Turkey’s influence on the region and the Arab world – and this realization also helped convince him of the need to change his attitude to Israel.

Meanwhile, Erdogan was a big disappointment to the United States, as it moved closer to Russia and created a crisis in NATO.

Israel, in Erdogan’s view, is therefore an important means for him to repair some of that damage by enabling him to forge new connections with the U.S. and open doors in Europe via improved ties with Jerusalem. Hence, Turkey has focused on promoting civilian ties with the Jewish state.

In addition, economic trade has remained consistently high. Since Erdogan took office as prime minister in 2002, trade between Israel and Turkey has increased fivefold. Furthermore, Erdogan believes that strengthening ties with Israel will benefit his country's economy and increase its global influence.

 As a result, he has made efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Jerusalem – but without giving up his ongoing effort to stress the Palestinian issue.

This is why some Hamas members are still allowed to be active on Turkish soil, though these days, this activity mostly involves Hamas’s political wing. Hamas’s Deputy Political Bureau Chief, Salah Al-Arouri, who in reality oversees West Bank terrorism efforts, is today based in Lebanon after relocating from Turkey. The AKP party views Hamas’s political wing as a sister movement.

Erdogan’s mounting problems

Erdogan’s growing problems mean that he is keener than ever to improve ties with Europe, the U.S., Sunni states, and Israel.

Kurdish autonomous zones in northern Syria have an immediate impact on southern Turkey that Ankara finds disturbing. Millions of Syrian refugees remain in Turkey, creating a serious economic problem. Iran worries Erdogan due to its ongoing attempts to change the balance of power in Syria to the determinant of Turkish-backed Sunni forces in the north of the country. Iranians are present on the Syrian Mediterranean coastline, and this Iranian entrenchment is not viewed positively by Erdogan. Sunni Turkey sees Shi’ite Islamist regional influence as a destructive force. Despite four hundred years of quiet on the Turkish – Iranian border, these are far from being brotherly states.

Erdogan also has huge economic problems and needs to attract new investments by improving ties with Europe and the U.S. He is also interested in becoming a distributor of Israeli gas to Europe.

These factors have led to a substantial change in Erdogan’s tone. When he criticizes Israel, he uses a vastly different tone from the one he used in the early years of his government rule.

The fact that Israeli and Turkish security organizations were reportedly able to cooperate closely to thwart Iranian terror cells on Turkish soil, sent to target Israelis in June 2022, is a further reflection of this change.

Erdogan has not given up his vision of establishing himself as an important Muslim leader who promotes the Palestinian cause, but he has learned that he cannot achieve this by continually bashing Israel.

Turkey also has direct potential gains it can make from its improved ties with Israel.

Israeli companies are already involved in helping Istanbul better manage its water system, with Israeli-made sensors helping to prevent water leakages from its pipes.

There is interest on both sides in further cooperation, but this will continue to be limited to the civilian sector, because Erdogan has not shed all his neo-Ottoman influences.

Greece, for its part, has no reason to feel threatened by the Israeli – Turkish thaw, precisely because it is limited to civilian issues. The good judgement of both Israeli and Turkish decision-makers has enabled ties to become stable once more, as they should be. 

Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

Ukraine-Russia War: An imminent spillover in the Middle East

By Amit Kumar

The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine is exacerbating international tensions. Apart from the critical impact the conflict has on the two engaged nations, it is also leading to wider ramifications for international security and stability, notably in the Middle East. It poses a threat to the fragile peace in the region in numerous ways including its ability to intensify current tensions, particularly between Iran and Israel, and the potential to spark new conflicts by upsetting the international power equilibrium that forces uninvolved nations to become a part of these regional tensions. Keeping these emerging situations in the backdrop, this article investigates how the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is affecting regional geopolitics in the Middle East, and how even neutral states are being forced to take sides - a development that may eventually cause ’the proxy wars between Israel and Iran to escalate into a full-fledged showdown in the near future.

First, the Russia-Ukraine conflict impacts regional stability by aggravating already-existing hostilities. The Syrian civil war, the dispute between Israel and Palestine, and the continuous confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia are just a few of the current crises in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Yemen also remain at odds, while Israel is still in conflict with some Arab nations. Lately, Qatar was also subjected to a blockade by its neighbors because of its support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. This situation is further complicated by the fact that non-state groups such as ISIS and Hamas operate with full impunity in the region.

Nonetheless, in August 2022, Israel successfully neutralized threats in drone strikes during Operation Breaking Dawn. One of these strikes even killed a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad senior commander, Taysheer Jabari. Just recently, Israel was also successful in killing several militants from the Lions’ Den and Hamas in Jenin. Based on these events, it can be deduced that the onus to keep the region’s dreadful threats in check lies on Israel. Therefore, it will be in the positive interest of the region if Israel continues to remain committed to upholding the security and stability of the Middle East rather than diverting its strategic resources toward the Ukraine-Russia war.

The situation in the Middle East is extremely precarious and prone to continuing and recurrent confrontations. The Russia-Ukraine war could potentially worsen the conflicts by providing new opportunities for intervention to the outside powers. For instance, the Syrian government’s military and manpower support to Russia, and Syria's engagement in the Ukraine crisis may prompt more Russian action in the Syrian conflict to favor Assad. Similarly, Ukraine shares good relations with several Middle Eastern governments like Israel, Kuwait and Turkey. In case the conflict escalates, the Middle Eastern countries will come under pressure to support Ukraine under US diplomatic pressure, which may result in a division into two camps, albeit not necessarily explicitly.  

Secondly, even if Russia and Israel's relationship can be said to be realpolitik, they have never really seen eye to eye on Iran. However, the evolving equation between Russia, Israel, and Iran due to the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war could hamper Israel's security. In recent years, Iran and Russia have deepened their strategic partnership. Any perception of Israel's allegiance to Ukraine might be considered a threat to Russia's geopolitical objectives. If Israel were to aid Ukraine militarily, Russia would interpret this as a provocative act and may react by enhancing Iran's military-industrial complex, disregarding Israel’s concerns. Meanwhile, from Israel's perspective, every drone and ballistic missile that Russia purchases from Iran, and every economic deal struck between them, provides Tehran with more cash that can be funneled to its proxies around Israel's sovereign territory.  Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has seen Israel as its main regional adversary, and Russia may incite Tehran to engage in a limited fashion with Israel and thus keep its involvement limited to regional affairs. Also, if the tensions between Israel and Iran escalate, there is a chance it would also intensify the arms race, further proxy conflicts, and potentially even lead to a direct military confrontation between the two countries. Israeli establishment would do well to think twice before engaging in a European war beyond providing humanitarian aid. Anything beyond humanitarian aid might worsen relations between Israel and Russia.

Lastly, the Russia-Ukraine conflict also generates fresh prospective disputes. For instance, it may entice other nations with strong links to Russia or Ukraine to support them covertly or overtly by any means. This side-picking act would eventually prolong the ongoing war while simultaneously generating new wounds and refreshing the old ones in the Middle East. This might apply to  Israel, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, and other countries.  Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that he would consider sending arms to Ukraine, and two weeks later, Israeli lawmakers were found to be encouraging him to do that. Syria has already broken diplomatic ties with Ukraine. Beirut and Jordan enjoy relatively close ties with Moscow. As many reports suggest, Lebanon-based Palestinians are recruited by Russia and deployed to the frontlines in Ukraine.

Other than geographic proximity, diplomatic mistrust, and a persistent threat to sovereign security, the Middle East is also fraught with dictators and strongmen making this region more susceptible to intensifying internal proxy conflicts among themselves based on the sides they might take in the Ukraine-Russia war. As per the western media, staying neutral in this war equates with taking Russia’s side. While it appears that the middle eastern nations have delicately handled the Ukraine-Russia war by maintaining their strategic autonomy, the truth seems to be different. Multiple fissures have surfaced leading to renewed divisions between these nations that make the situation ripe for conflicts and instability.

In conclusion, the Ukraine-Russia war is a Western war or European War and should be left there. The first step toward the Middle East being embroiled in another region's war is Iran's strategic cooperation with Russia. The second step involves Israel building consensus in the Knesset for providing military backing to Ukraine, opening the door for other countries to follow suit and escalating regional proxy wars. In order to lessen the conflict's potential effects on the Middle East, it is crucial that Middle Eastern countries refrain from any sort of military or moral engagement with Ukraine or Russia.

Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge Dale Aluf, Director of Research & Strategy at SIGNAL, Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership, and Aayushi Malhotra for investing the time and energy necessary to review the manuscript, providing insightful comments and suggestions, and editing the paper. These efforts enabled me to raise the quality of the manuscript.

Amit Kumar is a doctoral student at the Birla Institute of Technology and Science, in Pilani, India. His area of specialization is China Studies. Amit has worked as a Political Researcher for the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, India's National Political Party's youth wing. Read full bio here.

A House Divided Cannot Stand

By Chuck Freilich

 

Three months ago, Israel’s economy was booming. Israel still faced severe threats from Iran and Hezbollah, and there had been an increase in Palestinian terrorism, but overall Israel was never more secure. Its ties with states around the world were expanding and hopes for near-term normalization with the Saudis and others abounded. Israel was a vibrant democracy and viewed its approaching 75th anniversary with optimism.

Israel is now convulsed by self-inflicted divisions that are wracking its society and economy, undermining its democracy and threatening the pillars of its national security. Reservists from Israel’s most hallowed military units are in a state of near rebellion and what starts in the reserves will rapidly spill over into the regular army. Israel is on the verge of coming apart.

With international attention focused on Ukraine and the US-Chinese global rivalry, Iran is making steady progress towards a nuclear capability. In essence, it already is a nuclear threshold state, with sufficient fissile material for some five bombs and more soon. The only thing preventing Iran from weaponizing a nuclear warhead, the final hurdle to an operational capability, is its ongoing fear of the international and Israeli response. With both the international community and Israel focused elsewhere, this fear has greatly diminished and a nuclear Iran is an increasingly real possibility.

Moreover, the recent agreement between Iran and its arch-rival, Saudi Arabia, was a significant achievement for the former, that may signal an important realignment of regional forces. The agreement provides for a restoration of diplomatic relations, after a seven-year hiatus, and renewed economic and even military cooperation. Assuming that it is actually implemented - not a foregone conclusion – the agreement would give Iran three important wins: a reduction in regional tensions; a weakening of the American-led regional coalition; and, at a minimum, a blow both to Israel’s hopes of building a military alignment against Iran and for further regional normalization.

Further complicating the picture, the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement was brokered by China, not the US. For decades, China has become an increasingly important economic player in the region, buying vast quantities of oil from both the Saudis and Iran, but it had yet to turn its economic prowess into diplomatic and military might. In recent years, this has begun changing, as China deployed limited forces in the region (Djibouti), conducted repeated naval exercises with Iran and Russia, signed a 25-year strategic agreement with Iran, and now, for the first time, led a major strategic development in the region. The US still remains the preeminent power in the region, especially militarily, but the big question is whether the agreement signifies the beginning of the Chinese era in the Middle East.

The Saudis and Emirates, who also recently renewed ties with Iran, are engaging in classic hedging behavior. Driven by an ongoing loss of confidence in the US guarantee for their security, they are seeking other means of ensuring it, first by expanding ties with Israel, now by reducing hostilities with Iran. One can agree with their thinking, or not, but it is important to understand their mindset.

The Gulf and other Sunni states’ loss of faith in the US guarantee began with the Second Gulf War, in which egregious American miscalculations, in their view, greatly empowered Iran. The US then “abandoned” Egyptian President Mubarak, ostensibly its leading Arab ally. The US negotiated a flawed nuclear deal with Iran, but abruptly withdrew from it, without a Plan B, and failed to respond to a major Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities and to a subsequent attack against the UAE. Ongoing US pressure for human rights reforms, snubbing of the Saudi crown prince, and pressure to end the war in Yemen, added to the sense of animosity. Statements that the US no longer needed Mideast oil, true in a narrow sense, ignored the reality of one global energy market, further heightening Gulf insecurity.

The glitter is also off the Abraham Accords with Israel and the Arab signatories - extent and potential - are re-evaluating their positions. This dramatic breakthrough in relations, which had the potential to transform the region and Israel’s place in it, was driven first and foremost by the common fear of Iran and growing doubts about American resolve to prevent a nuclear Iran. The UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval, sought to build an undeclared alliance with Israel, signed defense cooperation agreements and even began making major purchases of Israeli weapons. The UAE warmly embraced Israel, in dramatic and heretofore unimaginable ways.

Israel could never constitute a substitute for the US, of course, but its ongoing political crisis, with five rounds of elections in three years and now almost complete meltdown, have clearly demonstrated its limitations as a reliable strategic partner for the Gulf states and led to growing disaffection. The Emiratis have reportedly already cancelled weapon sales, Prime Minister Netanyahu has pointedly not been invited to visit, and there is palpable concern among the Abraham Accords states over the directions being taken by the new government, especially regarding the Palestinians.

The breakthrough with Israel was also driven by the Abraham Accords states’ interest in access to Israeli high-tech, especially cyber, and the belief that Israel’s integration into the region would help moderate its policies towards the Palestinians. In both areas, they have been disappointed. The international uproar over Israel’s cyber exports, stemming primarily from the NSO affair, caused Israel to greatly scale back sales to nondemocratic states. The new government’s ultra-hard right composition and de facto intention to annex the West Bank, contradict the hopes of all Gulf states, as well as assurances given to the UAE at the time.

The Middle Eastern landscape is changing before our eyes. Unsurprisingly, neither friend nor foe are sitting back and graciously waiting for Israel to get its house in order. As has long been known, a house divided cannot stand. 

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Now, more than ever, Israel needs a constitution

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Winston Churchill famously coined the term "never let a good crisis go to waste."

“Good” is hardly the appropriate word to describe the current state of chaos – the likes of which the State of Israel has never known –but if we focus on Churchill's call to action then the opportunities presented are clear.

The Netanyahu government’s dangerous, in fact, unprecedented, legislative blitz will not only harm human rights, but is pushing the country toward a tipping point from which there will be no turning back.

The democratic State of Israel, which was established on the basis of the Zionist vision, is in danger of collapse. The time is ripe to put a solution on the table – a way out that was there from the outset, when the State of Israel was established, but which was ignored. Failure now to stop and take advantage of this crisis will mean that in the coming years the third Jewish commonwealth will fall. Establishing a constitution will lay out the rules of the game and fix the broken ties between us and can help us avoid this fate.

Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, foresaw the problems that would arise in due course. The Declaration of Independence stated that a constitution would be determined by the people's assembly within five months. In practice, this never happened. Seventy-five years later, there is no constitution.

Why then do we need a constitution? Some would say that we have the Declaration of Independence and for 75 years we got along just fine without a constitution. Others claim that the Basic Laws and the rulings of former Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak are part of the constitution.

The answer lies in the chaotic situation the country has now reached. After 75 years, we discovered that Israel’s social contract lacks clear boundaries.

The simplest explanation is that a constitution will create order, define national frameworks, and create checks and balances between the authorities. It will define the nature of the state, rights and obligations, and each citizen’s ability to maintain their way of life. A constitution would stabilize the system of government, boost equality, freedom of expression, and act as an unsigned contract between the citizen and the state.

The Netanyahu government, which seeks to pass the first stage of a “judicial reform,” claims its reform will strengthen democracy, restore governance, restore trust in the judicial system, and achieve balance between the three branches of government.

In practice, behind the big words, hides a forceful attempt to change the democratic regime in Israel. The reform is made up of a set of laws that would terminally violate the balance of power and give unreasonable influence to politicians who seek to escape the threat of justice and, alongside them, to the wheelers and dealers who head the ultra-Orthodox parties.

It is enough to look at the bill on the Expansion of Powers to the Rabbinical Courts, which was approved for a first reading by the Knesset Ministerial Committee on Legislation, to understand, in this context, that in the absence of a constitution, the road to a halachic state is growing ever shorter.

Take, for example, the Torah study bill, which, according to the Haredi parties who are pushing to get it passed, will solve the conscription issue.

Today there are 170,000 yeshiva students dedicated to full-time Torah study. According to the vision of Knesset Member Moshe Gafni, chairman of the United Torah Judaism party, at least half of the population will not serve in the military. Add to this the fact that today over 50% of men in the ultra-Orthodox community are not in the labor market, and you will end up with national bankruptcy.

Levin's "reform" not only fails to provide solutions to issues that need to be corrected but also legitimizes the demographic problem that is to come.

These struggles aren’t new. Take a trip back in time more than a century, and you'll find that the leaders of the Zionist movement fought hard against ultra-Orthodox Judaism.

Zionist founding father Theodor Herzl, in his book, The Jewish State, laid out his vision for the future state, including the structure of government and society, the economy, security, and the relationship between religion and state. In his vision, while faith is a bond that unites the Jewish state’s residents, priests would remain confined in the “temples of God.” They would not be involved in the leadership of affairs of state.

The contribution of Herzl's vision to the reality of our state is indisputable, yet in today’s reality, ultra-Orthodox educational institutions budgeted by the state do not include studies of Herzl or the leaders of the Zionist movement.

In an era in which history is rewritten, and in which we forget where we came from and where we are going, we must correct this.

In the absence of a vision, the nation will come undone; the slippery slope which the State of Israel is galloping down leads us to a dangerous place. The current government will, if it does not change course, alter the face of the State of Israel. There are no more checks and balances, and the vision of the Zionist state will gradually recede. The severe crisis we have found ourselves in is an opportunity to stop and create order by demanding a constitution for Israel. If not, demography will win.

Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

The IDF is being dragged into Israel’s political crisis

By Eitan Dangot

When the new IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi took over from his predecessor Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, he didn’t anticipate finding himself in his current predicament. He was sure he’d be able to concentrate on two primary objectives: Identifying the main security dangers to Israel and crafting a vision for Israel’s response. He also expected to be busy with ethical and operational messaging to the IDF’s branches and commanders.

Usually, a chief of staff oversees extensive new plans to improve IDF readiness. In this case, Halevi is focused first and foremost on the Iranian threat. It is also fair to assume that he was preparing to deal with challenges to the “people’s army” model and find new ways of keeping career officers, commanders, operational and technical staff, and NCOs in their positions, as well as boosting the number of recruits from the Israeli periphery into technological units.

Instead of all that, within just two months of Halevi’s appointment, a judicial reform program and a national crisis have thrust him into the role of a military commander navigating a national domestic crisis.

The main issues that Halevi wanted to deal with have been pushed to the side, as opponents and supporters of the judicial reform program focus on the domestic battle, which increasingly threatens to drag in the military. A refusal by reservists to serve if the judicial reform passes is a red warning light, and there are also concerns about disruptions to service by conscripts who object to the judicial reform.

The chief of staff does not want to tackle these issues. They interfere with his main role of identifying and preparing for defense threats against the State of Israel, which are growing more serious. Yet Halevi finds himself having to deal with letters to IDF commanders from reservists in strategic units declaring they will not be reporting for duty in the middle of a socio-political storm.

Such letters, sent by reservists from units that have a significant military history and vital future role in achieving IDF goals, have triggered replies from many politicians, some of whom had no prior military experience or only a brief period of IDF duty.

Halevi is wisely making every effort to avoid political declarations and keep the flames of political dispute low in the military and prevent them from spreading further. But despite those efforts, a significant change has occurred over recent weeks. The conversation has changed. It has evolved into a deep social and national argument that incorporates numerous sectors and is far broader than a dispute over democratic values.

Halevi, who had previously avoided making any public statement on the subject, joined forces with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant after realizing that his personal involvement will have a significant impact.

In response to letters written by former IAF pilots, as well as by reservists with illustrious combat histories in intelligence, technology, ground warfare, elite forces and air defense, Halevi began speaking out publicly. He spoke to members of various protest groups in the reserves, outlining his plans for not only resolving this immediate crisis, but also how to handle additional problems that could arise during his tenure and the future of the IDF.

Halevi recognized that the processes he is now seeing didn’t begin during the current political crisis. Disunity within the IDF has been brewing for years. A significant number of soldiers are graduates of religious seminaries who volunteer for combat service in the ground forces, and some of them have a far-right political orientation. Already during the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza, soldiers with ties to the evacuees discussed the possibility of refusing to serve.

The chief of staff must take all necessary measures to resolve the issue and move quickly to exclude the IDF from any further political discussions. He must be firm with several irresponsible individuals who are calling for refusal to show up for service immediately, while expressing greater understanding for others who are concerned about what may come next.

Halevi prefers to conduct a discreet and quiet conversation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government over these issues, but in this dialogue, it is vital that he and the other defense chiefs voice their opinions with as much force and courage as they displayed on the battlefield.

A discussion like this can jeopardize the chief of staff’s standing with lawmakers, but it is still necessary for someone in his position to help preserve democracy.

Halevi’s troubles don’t end there. He has also had to watch coalition agreements grant unprecedented and confusing power to the new position of Junior Minister in the Defense Ministry occupied by Bezalel Smotrich. From the ministry, Smotrich, who is also Israel’s finance minister, can interfere with the IDF’s Civil Administration, which runs Israeli civilian policies in the West Bank.

Halevi also had to witness the granting of power, at least in theory, over Border Police in Judea and Samaria to the new National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

If these ministers are allowed to implement their new powers in this way, it would be detrimental to the IDF’s ability to work in a unified, coordinated manner, especially for IDF Central Command in Judea and Samaria.

Domestic strife has harmed Israel’s readiness against the Iranian threat. Iran has enriched uranium almost to the 90% military-grade level. This is a warning siren. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is building up its arsenal.

As we approach the beginning of Ramadan, an explosive time in the Palestinian arena, the chief of staff will continue to oversee the campaign against Iranian entrenchment in Syria, build up Israeli war readiness, increase cooperation with the U.S. military regarding the potential need to confront Iran militarily, and actively contribute to Israeli resilience in the face of a potential escalation in the Palestinian arena or within Israel by Arab Israeli extremists.

It would be appropriate for Netanyahu to allow the IDF brass and security forces to concentrate and mobilize all their professional and command energies against the enemy at this time, rather than drag them into complicated situations that put them in the spotlight against their will and hinder their ability to perform their roles effectively.

Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.