Kamala Harris should apologize for NOT REFUTING SLANDER ABOUT ISRAEL

By Mark Goldfeder

On Tuesday, Vice President Kamala Harris gave a talk about voting rights to students at George Mason University. During the question-and-answer session that followed, a student complained that “just a few days ago there were funds allocated to continue backing Israel, which hurts my heart because it’s an ethnic genocide and a displacement of people — the same that happened in America — and I’m sure you’re aware of this.”

Instead of taking the opportunity to actually educate the people in the room about the relationship between the United States and Israel, or even, at the very least, to correct the record by factually responding to the false and discriminatory allegations made against the Jewish State, the vice president instead thanked the woman for her contribution to the discussion and told her that “your truth should not be suppressed and it must be heard, right?”

Harris’ response was irresponsible and dangerous. She should immediately apologize, because facts matter and truth is not subjective.

Here are the facts: Last week, an overwhelming bipartisan majority of Congress approved (by a vote of 420-9) $1 billion in funding for Israel’s Iron Dome, a missile defense system that protects innocent Israeli and Palestinian men, women and children alike from the indiscriminate rockets attacks of terrorist groups like Hamas. Iron Dome uses radar to detect incoming missiles and shoot them down before they kill innocent people. It poses absolutely zero offensive threat to anyone, anywhere. All it does is reduce the death toll in Israel, and minimize the need for preemptive strikes and ground maneuvers.

Iron Dome’s store of interceptors was somewhat depleted last May after Hamas, a U.S. designated terror organization, fired over 4,300 rockets at Israeli population centers. It is beyond shameful that even nine U.S. lawmakers would vote against funding a defensive system that saves innocent lives. A vote against Iron Dome is nothing short of a vote for more effective terrorism, and for more dead civilians.

The vice president could have easily explained all this. She could have also clarified American military aid to Israel is generous to be sure, but it is an investment and not a charity. Supporting Israel in combatting Middle East terrorist groups and expansionist potentates is crucial for America’s own national security. Israel is our closest ally in the Middle East and our only reliable source of intelligence and cyber-defense in that region. As President Biden once said at an Israeli Day Celebration, “…Were there no Israel, America would have to invent one. We’d have to invent one because…you protect our interests like we protect yours.” Our shared security interests include but are not limited to preventing nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, containing Iranian, Turkish and Russian expansionism, and promoting the rule of democracy. In addition, American military aid to Israel is actually spent in the United States, providing jobs and economic growth that benefit our own economy and defense industry.

The vice president could have, and should have, explained all that as well. But at the very least she had a responsibility to call out the harmful slander of Israel as a genocidal state, and to debunk the false narrative of Israel as an occupying power.

The idea that Israel is committing ethnic genocide against the Palestinians is just an uninspired update on a classic anti-Semitic trope: the blood libel. Thankfully it is also quite easy to refute — at least for someone who is interested in doing so. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide says that genocidal acts are “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” The problem with the claim that Israel is committing genocide (aside from the complete lack of evidence for such a charge) is that the irrefutable math here tells a very different story. Since 1967, the Palestinian Arab population has actually increased by 387%.

The vice president, however, said none of that. Nor did she push back on the fundamentally false narrative of displacement which denies the demonstrable historical and legal Jewish claims to the land and places the blame for the current situation entirely on Israel.

Maybe the student asking the question really did not know that the Jews are the indigenous people living in their own ancestral homeland. Maybe the others in that classroom weren’t aware that Israel has repeatedly (over 30 times) offered plans for peace and division of the land, and that some of those plans were even supported by much of the Arab world.

But the vice president knew, and she didn’t tell them.

Our government has a responsibility to protect its citizens from acts of hate and bigotry that are motivated by discriminatory animus- including antisemitism. Study after study has shown that the kind of inflammatory discriminatory rhetoric that the vice president heard and appeared to affirm eventually leads to violent anti-Semitic action, and to innocent Jewish people around the world getting hurt. The vice president had an opportunity to distance herself and her party from these demonizing and delegitimizing lies. Instead, she gave them validation.

No one is saying that this student should have had her question or her voice suppressed. Free speech, even wrong and offensive speech, is part of what makes our democracy great. But as Harris herself once said, “Anyone who claims to be a leader must speak like a leader. That means speaking with integrity and truth.”

An apology, and a correction, are the necessary next steps.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Netanyahu’s shadow is keeping the coalition together

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

Israel’s governing coalition has reached the significant milestone of 100 days in power. The fact that it has remained intact is very much thanks to the shadow cast by Benjamin Netanyahu, the former prime minister, and now leader of the opposition, whose presence acts as the number one stabilizing force keeping the coalition together. The fear that Netanyahu could return and take power is enough to keep the disparate coalition from falling apart.

The effects of Netanyahu’s potential return were also apparent during Bennett’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly on October 27, when Israelis  watching the speech had one key question in mind: How did it compare to Netanyahu’s speeches in the same forum?

Bennett struggled to live up to Netanyahu’s standard, and his political rivals and Netanyahu’s circle in the Likud fanned the flames by playing up images of an empty UN building during the prime minister’s speech, along with statements mocking Bennett for being premier despite heading a party with only six Knesset seats – a critical mantra that has yet to vanish after more than 100 days in office. In the meantime, Bennett placed himself in direct conflict with the Health Ministry, by arguing that national leaders take the full picture into consideration beyond those raised by health officials.

It is customary to give a new government a 100-day honeymoon period and that is exactly what this coalition got. With a largely friendly media in place, the sense is that most criticism levelled at the government has been gentle.  

This phenomenon has had two important side effects. The first is that decisions on how to manage the fourth wave of the coronavirus pandemic have been less than optimal. The second is that government decisions that would otherwise have attracted firestorms of controversy from within the coalition have seen the factions quietly work together instead.

There is no sign of the loud media feuding over government decisions – a sight that was so common in the last coalition.

The ‘radio silence’ can mostly be attributed to the fear of a Netanyahu comeback.

As a political affairs journalist, it is rare to hear so few MKs briefing the media against one another.

Another factor behind this cooperative spirit is the fact that several ministers and deputy ministers – politicians who have never before had portfolios in the past – are now realizing their dreams.

Meanwhile, the coalition’s member factions continue to either ignore or disregard multiple election promises they made throughout the four recent election campaigns. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett promised not to sit with Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, or with the United Arab List party – both key members of the current coalition.

Bennett’s critics in the Israeli public, on the other hand, have not forgotten these promises, and are far from reaching the stage where they have put their outrage behind them.

For Lapid, disappearing ‘behind the scenes’ into the work of the Foreign Ministry has been a convenient maneuver, as the country grapples with the Delta wave of the coronavirus, and the number of deaths remains high.   

Lapid has additional reasons to keep a low profile. As chairman of the Yesh Atid party, while in opposition he pledged to form a government no larger than 18 members. That was before he became  Foreign Minister in a government that has 28 ministers, and a number of deputy ministers.

This government has also not been shy about activating the Norwegian Law, which allows MKs to resign, become ministers, and automatically enlarge the government by bringing the next MKs on the party list into the coalition in their place. These moves, combined with the appearance of deputy ministers, cost the taxpayer  tens of millions of shekels.

Yet criticism of all of this has been muted, with the exception of some rumblings in the opposition ranks.

Thus, the coalition has reached absurd situations, such as the appointment of Yisrael Beitenu’s Eli Avidar as Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office – a role that no one seems to know much about.

Meanwhile, right-wing coalition members are embarrassed by the government’s agenda, but are keeping quiet about it. The long called for demolition of the Khan al-Ahmar Beduin settlement –  between Jerusalem and the Dead Sea  –  is off the agenda, and Defense Minister Benny Gantz is warming relations with the Palestinian Authority. These moves are being ‘contained’ by the government’s right-wing ministers.

The left-wingers in the government are also unhappy about the government’s approval of outposts in Judea and Samaria and settlement construction, but they too have learned to censor themselves.

The United Arab List has learned how to vanish during security escalations.

And yet, the government deserves credit for delivering on one of its core promises: Quiet for the Israeli people. This goal has been achieved.

Should the government succeed in passing the bi-annual state budget, this would likely guarantee stability for two years. After passing that milestone, a breaking apart of the coalition becomes highly unlikely.

Prior to the second and third budget votes, we are likely to witness ultimatums, as various coalition elements try to pull budgetary resources in their direction. But in all likelihood, the arguments will be resolved in the last minute through compromise.

Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman promised a raise in the wages of conscripted soldiers prior to the elections. He found a way to throw this pledge aside, after available funds all went to other causes.

Liberman did not cheerlead Benny Gantz’s move to pass an increase in the pension for career IDF officers, who often retire at the age of 45. But he nevertheless went along with it. This is a sign of the ‘spirit of compromise’ that can allow a budget to be passed by this coalition.

When Netanyahu was on an extended holiday in Hawaii, one of the jokes circulating among government officials expressed the hope that he’d fall in love with the place and stay there.

In reality, of course, Netanyahu came back, and his Likud party is preparing to continue disrupting Knesset discussions with protest shouts.

That won’t be enough to bring down this coalition. Only two things can do that: Failure to pass the budget, or Netanyahu leaving politics.

If Netanyahu stops leading the Likud, the main roadblock for Likud joining the government would be lifted. The Centrist parties could find new motivation to join the Likud – motivation that will never appear in any way so long as Netanyahu heads that party.

It is this personal boycott of Netanyahu that led the current government into existence, and so long as Netanyahu remains leader of the opposition, the fear that he may return will keep the coalition together.

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a journalist and reporter on political matters, as well as an editor for the Israel Hayom/Israel Todaynewspaper, the most widely circulated publication in Israel. Read full bio here.

China now holds the keys to an Iran nuclear deal

By Yochai Guiski

Iran has come to the conclusion that a deal with the United States and Europe over its nuclear capabilities (JCPOA) no longer meets its cost-benefit analysis. The decarbonizing West may no longer serve as a destination for Iran’s oil and gas,  and, in Tehran’s view, cannot be trusted to adhere to a deal (even though the same clearly goes for Iran), while the Western economy and political system are no longer viewed favorably in the wake of the Covid-19 economic crisis.

China on the other hand has emerged as a favorable alternative for Iran:

1.      China has shown its appetite for Iran’s oil and gas over the years, and its growing economy will maintain demand for decades. China has maintained its thirst for Iranian oil even under sanctions, and even assisted Tehran in skirting them.

2.    China has a centralized political system more in line with Iran’s and would not pressure Tehran to change its regime or internal policies   – and may even provide it with better tools to control and monitor the Iranian population.

3.     China seems to view Iran favorably and is willing to invest in the country as part of the “Belt and Road” initiative (B&R). Beijing has signed a comprehensive strategic cooperation deal with Tehran, and has broadened its military ties with it (conducting joint military exercises).

4.   Both countries view the U.S. as their chief strategic rival/threat. They are both pursuing policies to weaken Washington’s power, standing and influence in their respective regions, and develop military capabilities to deny and disrupt the U.S. armed force’s ability to project power into these regions.

Despite the rosy outlook from Tehran, China seems to take a more nuanced approach toward Iran:

1.     China still views Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as strong partners in the Middle East and does not want to sour the relations with them by embracing Iran.  

2.     The amount of Chinese investment in Iran is still limited even though Iran is part of the B&R.

3.     China is still careful not to anger the U.S. by overtly and comprehensively defying sanctions.

4.      It seems that China is content to let the JCPOA negotiations drag out and has been leveraging it to criticize the U.S. and point out Washington’s failures in the Middle East.

5.      As the U.S. intends to drawdown from the Middle East in order to focus on the “Indo-Pacific” China might find Iran useful in disrupting Washington’s plans.

Whether China likes it or not, it now seems to own the Iran issue:

1.      China’s singular importance to Iran’s current and future economy lends it significant influence over Tehran to limit its nuclear actions and regional behavior.

2.     The Iranian strategic bet on China plays a major part in the failure to return the JCPOA, their ability to sustain their economy under sanctions, and in Iran’s pursuit of a “resistance economy”.

3.     Should China continue with its current policy regarding the nuclear negotiations, Iran may use the space and time to advance its nuclear plans and may even view it as a tacit approval to develop a nuclear weapon, much like North Korea did. If this scenario comes to pass it would impact China’s image as a willing backer of such regimes, and an ally to an emboldened enemy of many in the Middle East.

It is therefore important that:

1.      China recognizes its unique position and plays a responsible and prominent role in addressing Iran’s behavior and preventing it from further destabilizing the region.

2.     China understands that if Iran is left unchecked, even before it reaches a nuclear weapon, it would destabilize a region which is critical to China’s energy needs, and might foment ill will toward Beijing in an area that is a willing economic partner.  

3.      Middle Eastern nations wary of Iran’s regional and nuclear aspirations seek to influence Beijing’s policies towards Iran. They should try and encourage China to view the situation not as a “zero sum game” with the U.S., seek initiatives that help stabilize the region, and show that both great powers can work together, even in competition.

4.      The U.S. and Israel (separately and jointly) should devise a China-Iran policy that:

a.     Engages China on Iran and shared interests in maintaining stability in the Middle East  – especially the Persian Gulf  –  and even develop a joint understanding on the goals, ways and means, to do so.

b.     Seeks to enhance Beijing’s role in the nuclear negotiations, as it holds the relevant leverages to prod and cajole Tehran to return to a nuclear deal and to possibly commit to a more comprehensive deal down the line.

c.     Seeks to reduce the viability of Iran’s strategy of dependence on China, and impose increasing costs on such policies if engaging China fails.  

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

The Israel Prison Service’s resilience is put to the test

By Alon Levavi

The recapture of last two escaped Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists in a pre-dawn raid by Israeli security forces in Jenin on September 19 will go some way to restoring deterrence after they and four others dug their way out of the high-security Gilboa Prison almost two weeks earlier. But their capture does not cancel out the massive failure that enabled their escape in the first place.

The fact that Israel’s most secure prison, built after the Second Intifada, was the scene of a tunnel breakout, without any prior intelligence obtained by prison authorities and without any attempt made to stop the prisoners’ flight, represents an unprecedented and even surreal failure in the recent history of the Israel Prisons Service.

On the other hand, the rapid and silent  Jenin arrest operation that ended successfully without a single soldier – or escaped terrorist – suffering a scratch, is testament to the determination and skill of all of the security forces involved.

The Jenin operation came after the center of gravity of the pursuit shifted toward the intelligence sphere. Initially, the operation focused on the deployment of thousands of police officers and soldiers, but at a certain stage, spreading out such large forces on the ground was no longer useful. This is when the lead role went to the Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency, which activated its varied intelligence sources and technology to home in on the dangerous fugitives.

From the moment that the intelligence indication came in, security forces - the Shin Bet and its operational arm, the Israel Police’s elite Counter-Terrorism Unit, together with the IDF, and the Israel Police began planning a sophisticated operation.

It is safe to assume that from that point onward, the messaging  the authorities were putting out were not always a full reflection of what was taking place on the ground  – this in order to avoid giving away sensitive information and harming the operation.

The escaped terrorists and their collaborators were monitoring Israeli media. Security forces planned a deceptive decoy maneuver. It seems safe to assume that large forces were sent to one section of Jenin – a city that contains neighborhoods that are filled with gunmen – and conducted a ‘loud operation’ to attract attention, while a separate force went to the location where the Shin Bet knew the two escaped prisoners were hiding to carry out the   real, and quiet, escape operation.

The Israel Police’s Counter-Terrorism Unit is the go-to address for the most extreme security missions. Police have invested much in this elite unit, in terms of training, developing its fighters, investing in their facilities, and providing them operational technologies.

How the pursuit was managed

Prior to the recapture of the escaped terrorists, the various security branches joined forces in a unique manner to manage the largest-scale pursuit Israel has seen in years.

The Israel Police’s Northern District, which is still recovering from its own trauma dating back to the deadly Mount Meron stampede in April, took center stage in this pursuit. The first objective was to prevent the terrorists from escaping to nearby Jordan or  crossing the Green Line into the Jenin area of the northern West Bank.

All of the security organizations joined up with the Israel Police, bringing their capabilities to the pursuit. The Israel Prisons Service’s area of responsibility stops at prison walls, and anything beyond that in Israeli territory falls under police jurisdiction. The IDF led the search in Judea and Samaria with its forces, while the Shin Bet was injecting intelligence into all of the organizations’ efforts, and receiving intelligence from them.

The police force threw everything it had into the pursuit – helicopters, drones, night-vision, scouts, officers on horseback, canine units, the bomb squad, and its Counter-Terror Unit.

The Northern District’s personnel is simply not big enough to cover such a large area, and it had to receive back up from other police entities, such as Traffic Police, Border Police, and other districts.

The initial objective: To flood the ground with as many flashing blue lights and forces as possible, to make the terrorists hunker down in their location and stop them from crossing any borders. This made the terrorists aware that large forces were nearby looking for them at all times, and would stop most of them from advancing far. 

Since the escaped prisoners had no phones, it was not possible to track them technologically, making the mission far more challenging.

In the end though, most of the terrorists were caught alone, unarmed, unharmed, hungry and thirsty. The photos of their captures are of major significance for public perception in Israel and among the Palestinians. The fact that law-abiding Arab Israeli citizens called the police to report suspicious movements also had significant effect on the narratives surrounding the escape. 

Ultimately, despite their daring and sophistication in the early stages of the escape plan, the fact that the terrorists were found in poor condition was a twist in the plot, demonstrating no planning for the second stage of their flight , and harming the Palestinian euphoria that accompanied the escape.

The Israel Prisons Service: A time for review and rebuilding  

The Israel Prisons Service is currently facing one of the most significant leadership tests in its in history. The organization’s resilience is now being put to the test. It did not have the time to review the series of failures that allowed the escapes, and fix the problems – as it was busy dealing with prison riots, and the after-effects of its initiative to end the organizational separation of Palestinian Islamic Jihad prisoners in their own cells. It has been in ongoing crisis management mode.

To its credit, the Israel Prisons Service has not blinked as it pushes ahead with the break-up of terror factions inside prison wards, despite protests by the terror factions and threats of hunger strikes.

As it does this, the service is at the center of a government commission of inquiry, and a criminal investigation being run by the Israel Police into the escape. The police is investigating the Israel Prisons Service even as the two organizations worked shoulder to shoulder to recapture the prisoners – an extraordinary dissonance that the two organizations have had to learn to live with.

The Israel Prisons Service has absorbed an obvious shock following the escape. As an organization that is usually in the shadow of larger security organizations – ones that do not deal with the volcanos known as prisons, the current challenge forms an enormous test.

Yet it is also an opportunity for the service to seize on the situation and to begin to prioritize issues that it struggled to focus on until now, such as new security technologies, personnel development, and building better infrastructure. Many of Israel’s prisons date back to the British mandate of the 1920s and 1930s, and the escape crisis is a real opportunity to reexamine prison facilities and to start properly addressing the weak links within them.

Organizations are measured by their ability to cope with crises. In order to do that, they must build organizational resilience ahead of time. It is up to the organization’s leaders to build this resilience, which will be tested by its ability to rapidly exit this crisis, and to do so in a manner that leaves the service stronger.

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Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Palestinian and regional players prepare for life after Abbas

By David Hacham

The Palestinian Authority’s rule in the West Bank is facing a series of challenges, ranging from regular clashes between Palestinians and the IDF and settlers to Hamas’s strategic program to consolidate its foothold in the territory.

Nevertheless, the PA has been able to maintain overall security control, even as the era of President Mahmoud Abbas appears to be in its last lap.

The question of whether the PA will be able to maintain its grip, in light of its significant political weakness, is however becoming acute as fears grow over the scenario of a post-Abbas era marked by instability and violent clashes.

Abbas himself has done little to ease concerns, since he, like Arafat before him, has avoided fostering a clear successor to replace him.

Sources in Fatah remain optimistic that even if a post-Abbas succession power struggle creates tensions, it will not deteriorate into all-out chaos and conflict. According to this assumption, the relevant external power players involved in the Palestinian arena – Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the international community – mainly the United States and the European Union –  will activate their influence to prevent this scenario from coming to pass.

Jordan has already tried to introduce stability by suggesting to Abbas that he appoints three deputies – one in charge of political affairs, the second to supervise security, and the third to run economic affairs – so as to safeguard Abbas’s position and ensure a continuous, functional PA government in the post-Abbas era.

It appears as if Abbas has yet to answer this proposal. This has led observers in Ramallah to the conclusion that following Abbas’s departure a temporary transition council made up of senior Fatah members will take over –  with three separate figures for the PA, the PLO, and Fatah –  until conditions ripen for an approved leader to take over the Palestinian leadership.

Meanwhile, conditions on the ground are marked by tensions and security incidents, as demonstrated by Israel’s recent arrest of two escaped Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists in Jenin. Israel is now making a concerted effort to avoid Palestinian casualties in its operations, including during the Jenin operation, out of an awareness that significant casualties could undermine the PA’s stability. The PA is encouraged by Israel’s restraint.

The IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, asked Central Command to reduce incidents of deadly clashes after a recent period in which over 40 Palestinians were killed in clashes with the IDF in regular hot spots.

Despite these incidents, the scenario of a broad popular uprising does not look near, or realistic.

Still, should new incidents lead to new casualties, a broader security deterioration could very much be back on the agenda.

Over the past months, known friction zones have stood out as sources of a potential escalation. These include Kfar Beta, south of Nablus, located near the Israeli outpost of Evyatar, where settlers have been evicted by the IDF, but soldiers remain. Palestinians have employed the tactics of Hamas ‘nighttime harassment operatives’ on the Gaza border at this West Bank site, and engaged in nocturnal incidents.

Other hotpots have included Silwad, Abu Dis, and elsewhere.

In Palestinian refugee camps in Jenin and in Balata near Nablus, the sight of gunmen marching in the streets has recently become more common. Firefights between armed terrorists and Israeli security forces have increased in recent months in these camps.

The battle for succession is growing more intense

Meanwhile, within Fatah and the PA, the succession battle over who will replace Abbas is growing more intense. Would-be successors include the current Palestinian Prime Minister, Mohammad Shtayyeh; Fatah Deputy Chairman Fatah, Mahmoud Aloul; Fatah Central Committee Secretary General, Jibril Rajoub; Minister for Civilian Affairs, Hussein al-Sheikh; General Intelligence Services chief, Majed Faraj; and imprisoned Fatah terrorist Marwan Barghouti. Additional candidates include former Fatah senior member Mohammed Dahlan who Abbas expelled from Fatah a decade ago due to an intense personal rivalry.

All of the aforementioned  are in a state of heightened expectation and are closely following developments as they prepare for ‘D-Day’ – the day that Abbas departs the arena.

Other senior figures are fearful that once D-Day comes, their careers will end, and that perhaps their personal safety will be at risk. These include Intisar Abu Amara, the influential head of Abbas’s bureau; PA Police Chief, Hazem Atallah, and PA Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki. 

These figures are examining options and preparing possible escape routes, lest it become too late for them to move.

Meanwhile within the PA, al-Sheikh and Faraj are both growing stronger and they are closest to Abbas due to their position as members of his inner most circle. They take part in Abbas’s meetings in Ramallah and accompany him on official international visits.

Abbas is gradually losing his power and within Fatah itself there are those who see him becoming a lame duck leader. As a result of the above conditions, the PA can be described as being strong security wise and in possession of security forces with proven capabilities that continue to wield deterrence – but weak politically.

The first visit from an Israeli minister

On August 30, Defense Minister Benny Gantz visited Abbas in Ramallah, becoming the first senior Israeli minister to do so in over a decade. Abbas reported to the PLO’s Executive Committee after the meeting that Gantz stressed Israel’s commitment to the two-state solution as a basis for a future arrangement, but that he also recognized that the political reality in Israel meant that the Israeli government in its current make-up could not take steps toward a political process.

The meeting nevertheless produced a series of practical steps with the most noteworthy of them being an Israeli loan of 500 million shekels to Ramallah in order to strengthen the PA. According to Fatah sources, this loan, which comes from cleared tax funds that Israel collects on behalf of the PA,  but that are withheld due to the PA’s payment to terrorists and their families, is likely to turn into a grant.

Abbas also sought Israel’s approval for  PA police to act against criminals in Area C – the area of the West Bank under Israeli security and civilian control  – and for Israel to decrease its counter-terror activities in Area A, which is under PA security and civilian control.

Both sides share an interest in blocking Hamas’s goal of building a foothold in the West Bank and preventing it from expanding out of its Gazan home base.

Meanwhile, Hamas continues to pose a problematic threat for the PA’s rule in the West Bank due to its strategic objective of taking over the Palestinian government there.  

Hamas is working to improve its influence via social-welfare organizations, as well as in professional unions, student organizations, and other civilian society institutions.  

Hamas is not waiting for Abbas to depart, and is already working on the ground to consolidate its position as a lead force challenging the present Palestinian leadership.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

The Next Accord of the Abraham Accords

By Efraim Chalamish

The Abraham Accords, signed in September a year ago, have changed the Middle East forever. From hundreds of thousands of Israeli visitors to the UAE, to headlines about major potential cross-border transactions, to other Gulf countries that would like to join the new Middle East – new Arabian winds are blowing and are here to stay.

Yet, this moment of reflection is also a unique opportunity to look more carefully at how local, regional and global markets reacted and what needs to be done to remove the barriers that make progress more challenging on the ground.

The disproportionately high number of Israeli visitors to the UAE this past year, and the urge to capitalize quickly on the agreement, jeopardized the level of knowledge parties have. The cancelation of the potential investment by a UAE royal in Jerusalem’s leading soccer team due to his questionable finances and other similar cases have highlighted the trust deficit and the limited intelligence available to the respective entities. Better background checks, more structured and longer processes, and humble expectations will be needed to prevent similar fiascos.

The presence of international players can help to solve this issue by providing both Israelis and Gulf-based entities the necessary linkage and legitimacy. It has been reported that Japanese companies are interested in transactions that would create an energy corridor from Israel to the Gulf, and similar strategic moves are needed.  The Abraham Fund, an international financial commitment to support cross-border infrastructure and energy security projects, should be saved despite recent calls to suspend it.

Gulf-based investors are often looking for the strategic value in every project. While financial returns are important, there is a need for a strategic alignment. The Delek-Mubadala deal in which Abu Dhabi-based Mubadala Petroleum purchased a $1 billion stake in the Tamar natural gas field is a case in point. The parties will be better off focusing on similar transactions in the next few years. 

Cultural differences have also been identified. While Israelis have been looking for ‘quick wins’, such as venture investing with a short timeframe, Emirati and Bahraini individuals and companies have different time horizons, expecting relationships to develop and mature over time until they can generate the expected results. This gap has created significant frustrations on both sides and should be considered as part of the learning curve of the Abraham Accords and their consequences. While cultures cannot change overnight, governments on both sides should not create false expectations and should better prepare the parties for a more constructive dialogue.

In addition, we should not forget the framework of the Abraham Accords and the original text of the declaration. The accords are named after Abraham, the common patriarch of the three monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The spiritual aspect was an important component of the journey to the accords and their current framework. Leaders from all relevant religions have met over the years as part of the track-II diplomacy efforts to bring the countries together. They all emphasized what values and practices those religions have in common.

Unfortunately, the rush to advance commercial transactions left the spiritual component behind. While certain projects and deals are short-lived, the religious aspect can give the long-term oxygen, legitimacy, and much-needed resilience to the agreements. Despite the ongoing political sensitivities in the region, religious leaders and programs should be accelerated.

The need to re-emphasize the religious component should be part of broader efforts to add bottom-up stories following the leaders’ framework. A recent report by the Atlantic Council and INSS think tanks and policy groups highlights the areas where civic engagement can be improved and developed. Religious dialogue, sports activities, and academic research programs are some of the key elements. 

As the report shows, the progress in this area has been limited, and a lot can be done with local and international support. The incentives are concrete and beyond relationships maintenance. For instance, religious leaders from both sides can de-legitimize extremist groups in the region. The decline in enrollment in Israeli academic institutions in recent years can be addressed by a rise in participation of Gulf students. Israel’s leading athletes, such as chess players, can help the Emiratis improve their performance via joint camps, training programs, and yearly competitions. The United States can and should play an important role in this civic engagement by providing the necessary umbrella for the various projects.

As we are all eager to see the next chapter of the Abraham Accords and Jewish-Muslim relations in the Middle East more generally, only a nuanced and transparent approach can lead to the desired progress and regional growth.

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Dr. Efraim Chalamish is an international economic law professor, advisor, and media commentator. He has been involved in international legal practice in New York, Paris and Israel, along with research in, and analysis of, cutting edge areas in public and private international economic law. Dr. Chalamish teaches at NYU Law School. Read full bio here.

Diplomacy, not sabotage, top option for Iran nuclear PROGRAM

By Eitan Barak

A recent report that Israel gave the United States less than two-hours’ notice prior to its alleged April 11 sabotage attack on the underground Natanz uranium enrichment site , thereby leaving U.S. intelligence agencies with insufficient time to respond, has drawn attention to the relationship between then Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the newly elected Biden administration. Yet its greater importance lies in the fact that Israel, in the view of the administration, was required by “longstanding, unwritten agreement to at least advise the United States of covert operations, giving Washington a chance to object”.

Irrespective of the embarrassment, the affair should cheer Israeli readers.

Such a tacit agreement means that the U.S. condoned, if not cooperated in, previous alleged Israeli sabotage actions targeting Iran’s nuclear program, at least since May 2018. In other words, both sides’ cost-benefit calculations suggest that this is the “right thing to do” given the absence of a diplomatic solution (i.e., a viable, effective agreement), the immense difficulties for Israel in executing a military solution, and the U.S. reluctance to push for such a solution.

Indeed, from the Israeli perspective, even tactical actions are preferable to doing nothing in the face of Iran’s increasing efforts in the nuclear realm. Furthermore, due to many factors, including the parties’ avoidance of declaring responsibility, this policy has so far not triggered a full-scale war between the two sides.

In conclusion, it is hard to challenge Israel’s adoption of this tactic as long as Iran refrains from abiding by any international agreement (e.g., the JCPOA) aiming to curb its nuclear program.

After all, Israel’s resort to sabotage attacks is a long-standing practice. In the early 1960s, for instance, Israel launched “Operation Damocles”, in which sabotage attacks, including targeted killings, were directed at the German scientists and technicians developing rockets for Egypt up to the end of 1963.

Although used against most of Israel’s enemies, this practice represents an important stage in implementing the so-called “Sharon/Begin Doctrine”, specifically, in Sharon’s words, that “Israel cannot permit the introduction of nuclear weapons [to the Middle East-E.B.]. For us, this is not a question of the balance of terror but our continued existence. So, it will be our duty to nip this danger in the bud”.

Under this doctrine’s umbrella, Israel carried out “Operation Opera” in Iraq (June 1981) and “Operation Outside the Box” in Syria (September 2007). In both cases, the aerial strikes were considered a “last resort”, after exhaustion of all other tools (i.e., diplomatic pressuring of supplier states, sabotage actions and, finally, an implicit appeal to the US to execute the military strike that, although rejected as expected, was considered as providing a “green light” for Israeli actions). 

To illustrate, only three months ago, in June 2021, a sort of formal confirmation was received that two years prior to the 1981 attack on the Iraqi reactor, Israel had sabotaged, on French soil, a shipment of materials destined for the Iraqi facility. As in the 1960s, the action followed multiple phone calls to French and Italian workers in the involved companies at the sites “advising” them to avoid any connection with Iraq and the reactor’s construction. Research has since suggested, however,  that this military strike was somewhat counterproductive as, inter alia, it triggered a new covert program that, despite gross inefficiencies, placed Iraq at the threshold of nuclear weapons capability a decade later.

In the present case, given the prevailing estimates that Iran had reached self-reliance in its nuclear program after 2010, no third parties are available as targets for diplomatic pressures and sabotage actions. Furthermore, giving the immense difficulties involved in executing a successful military strike against Iranian nuclear installations, in the absence of a diplomatic solution Israel sees few options available beyond continuing sabotage attacks that can – at best – delay the program while gaining time to reach a diplomatic solution.

Unfortunately, all the historical lessons suggest that sabotage attacks can do little other than slowing the pace of state-initiated military nuclear programs. This view seems to be shared by Israel’s defense establishment, to the point where it ascribes the Iranian slowdown in its nuclear race during the last three months solely to renewal of the Vienna talks.

After numerous sabotage attacks, it seems clear that diplomacy is the best if not the only solution to Israel’s predicament vis-a-vis Iran’s nuclear program.

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Dr. Eitan Barak is a senior researcher at the International Relations Department, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Prior to joining the Department, Dr. Barak was a Fulbright postdoctoral grantee in the International Security Program at Harvard. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Could Gilboa Prison Escape Spark An Intifada?

By Yaakov Lappin

The dramatic escape of six Palestinian terrorists from Gilboa Prison in northern Israel on Monday carries the potential of a broader security escalation, a former defense official has cautioned.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, a former Arab-affairs adviser to seven Israeli defense ministers and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, told JNS that the breakout could lead to a chain of incidents and an escalation dynamic, although this is not a certainty.

He recalled a highly relevant precedent from the 1980s. In May 1987, six senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) security prisoners escaped from an Israeli prison in the Gaza Strip. In October of that year, a gun battle between Israeli security forces and five of the escaped prisoners erupted in Gaza’s Shejaiya neighborhood district. The cell’s members were killed, and an Israeli Shin Bet member, Victor Arajwan, was also killed in the firefight.

The PIJ to this day considers the incident to be a catalyst for the start of the First Intifada, said Hacham.

In Monday’s escape, five out of the six prisoners are PIJ terrorists convicted of taking part in deadly attacks on Israelis, while the sixth is the former commander of the Fatah-aligned Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Jenin, Zakaria Zubeidi.

All six are from the West Bank city of Jenin, which lies just across the Green Line from Gilboa Prison.

“The 1987 escape was a catalyst event ahead of the First Intifada, and today, this event also has the potential to be that type of event,” said Hacham. “Should the prisoners be killed in a firefight, this could boost the already high levels of motivation among PIJ, Hamas and Fatah-affiliated organizations in Judea and Samaria,” said Hacham, noting that this does not include the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, which maintain daily coordination with the Israel Defense Forces.

Hacham assessed that it was unlikely that the P.A. would play a role in helping Israel capture the escaped prisoners, due to the fact that security prisoners are considered to be a consensus issue of paramount importance in Palestinian society.

“The word ‘intifada’ is in the air,” said Hacham. “The escape is being perceived by Palestinians as a humiliation to Israel, just as it was in May 1987. As an event that underlines Israeli vulnerability. The event joins the incident in which 21-year-old Border Police Sgt. Bar-El Hadaria Shmueli was shot dead on the Gaza border.”

The escape also strengthens the status of PIJ as an armed faction that is at the forefront of conflict with Israel. “In Gaza, Hamas runs the Strip, but PIJ is even more virulent and ideological than Hamas is. It has no real political component. It is exclusively a terrorist-military force,” explained Hacham.

The scenario of a violent apprehension of the escaped terrorists might not only trigger violence in the West Bank, but is likely to do so in Gaza, said Hacham, leading to new arson balloon attacks on Israeli communities and possibly rocket attacks as well.

Such a sequence of events could cause “regional escalation,” he added.

While Hamas and PIJ share a command center in Gaza, “sometimes PIJ acts independently without coordinating with Hamas,” said Hacham.

‘One of many prominent failures’

“When I heard of the escape, it immediately took me more than 30 years back to 1987, in the months before the First Intifada,” said Hacham.

The only escaped security prisoner not killed in the October 1987 firefight was a terrorist named Imad Saftawi, the son of a senior Fatah member (himself later slain in 1993 in an internal Fatah power dispute). Saftawi, who was convicted of killing an Israeli Military Police officer, escaped to Egypt and from there made his way to Yasser Arafat’s PLO headquarters in Tunis.

At that time, prisoners were able to dislodge bars on their cell, climb over the barbed wires and perimeter wall, and escape the facility under the cover of darkness. The Shin Bet intelligence agency led the manhunt. Its intelligence enabled the IDF to plant an ambush for the cell in Gaza’s Shejaiya neighborhood.

One central difference between the 1987 escape and Monday’s incident is the fact that in 1987, the cell escaped into Gaza immediately, which was a “familiar, supporting environment, into which they could vanish instantly,” noted Hacham.

Hacham is in little doubt that the six escaped terrorists from Gilboa Prison received outside assistance, and that they likely walked a few kilometers before a getaway vehicle awaited them.

“I assume some of them are still in the area,” he said, assessing that some could try to cross the Green Line into the West Bank or the international border towards Jordan. Some reports speculated that they would seek to reach Lebanon.

“It will be hard for them to get into Gaza. For now, they will probably look for a hideout and seek to vanish from the radar, to evade the Shin Bet,” said Hacham, who also advised commanders of the IDF’s Southern Command.

The terrorists could potentially be hiding in Jenin’s refugee camp, which in recent days has seen PIJ gunmen hold marches and displaying their firearms in a warning to Israel against conducting raids in the area.

Hacham noted with concern the “massive outpouring of euphoria in the territories.”

He noted that the failure by the Israel Prisons Service to block cell-phone signals in the prison compound is “one of many prominent failures.” That failure likely allowed the plotters to coordinate their plans without outside helpers.

‘A morale boost for Palestinian ‘resistance’ organizations’

“This is a serious failure on the part of the IPS. But it projects onto the full Israeli defense establishment,” said Hacham.

“This is the reoccurring theme in how Palestinians are describing the event,” he continued. “People I speak into Ramallah are calling it a ‘heroic Palestinian operation,’ which has exposed Israeli security forces. Three of the terrorists were designated high-risk escape candidates. Zubeidi was a central figure from the Second Intifada. The group includes two PIJ members who are brothers. All of these were in a single cell. This looks problematic.”

The escape operation likely involved “many months of detailed planning and preparation,” said Hacham, including the tunnel digging and preparing the escape opening beyond the prison wall. Someone had to wait for them on the outside and help them find a hiding place.”

The multiple failures by the IPS in gaining intelligence about the tunnel and in adequately monitoring the activities of high-risk security prisoners were joined by negligent search activities, likely due to prison guards who did not wish to “stir the pot” and risk too much violence, he said.

The decision to incarcerate the terrorists so close to their home city of Jenin also needs to be scrutinized, he added.

“This is seen as an operational achievement and a morale boost for Palestinian ‘resistance’ organizations. They don’t only view it through the narrow lens of an escape from prison,” stated Hacham. “For Palestinians, it is a source of pride. There is now a sense of victory over the ‘Israeli war machine,” and all Palestinian factions are issuing their congratulations, not only the Islamists.”

According to Hacham, the Israeli pursuit will take two main forms. The first is at the field level, involving significant numbers of police, Border Police and IDF personnel scanning the ground and searching for escape routes, as well as clues to their location.

“The second part is the intelligence front,” he said. “The Shin Bet will focus this effort, which will be aimed at locating, surveillance and utilizing all means to get hold of reliable, precise intelligence on the circumstances of the escape and hideout locations where they could have ended up.”

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

The Army Needs to Understand the Afghanistan Disaster

By Frank Sobchak & Matthew Zais

The U.S. war in Afghanistan was a costly failure. More than 2,400 Americans died during the two-decade conflict. Tens of thousands more returned home with life-altering wounds. The Kabul government collapsed before American forces had withdrawn and the Afghan Army simply evaporated. The Taliban marked its victory with celebratory gunfire and parades.

This disastrous outcome deserves an honest reckoning. Such introspection is especially needed within the U.S. Army, which provided most of the mission commanders and a majority of the troops. Unfortunately, there is little incentive for either the service’s leaders or bureaucracy to conduct such an inquiry.

Iraqi forces similarly collapsed after the U.S. departure. We helped draft the Army’s historical inquiry of the Iraq war from 2013 to 2019. This effort was championed by Gen. Ray Odierno, at the time the Army chief of staff, and Gen. Lloyd Austin, who then ran Central Command and is now defense secretary.

Our findings weren’t always flattering, including that American generals had offered inflated assessments of Iraqi military capability. Gen. Odierno’s successor, Gen. Mark Milley, attempted to bury the work and its lessons. Gen. Omar Jones, the Army’s senior public affairs officer who had tried to block a conference that aimed to draw lessons from the My Lai Massacre, supported Gen. Milley’s effort to quash the Iraq study. Gen. Milley eventually agreed to publish the Iraq war history, after the story appeared in the press.

Gen. Milley was successful, however, in shelving plans to incorporate the findings into the Army’s professional military education; releasing the full declassified archives that accompanied the history; and printing copies for military leaders and soldiers. A bootlegged version from Amazon is now the easiest way to get a copy.

The U.S. military needs to avoid repeating the mistakes that doomed the efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. But who should conduct this study? And how should it be done? The House Armed Services Committee recently approved a commission, but an inquiry done by lawmakers will fall prey to partisanship.

The Army’s record suggests the service can’t conduct an unvarnished review of itself. In the 1980s, Army leaders tried to suppress one of the seminal works of the Vietnam conflict, Andrew Krepinevich’s “The Army in the Vietnam War.” The Defense Department and Secretary Austin should instead direct the formation of a team of academics and practitioners. This team should answer to the National Defense University, while being fully empowered by the Defense secretary.

Organizing the group outside normal military structures and having it led by civilians should prevent the services from trying to kill an unflattering assessment. As an additional precaution, the group’s charter should allow civilian leaders to publish the findings without the approval of the military services.

The group should be diverse and include civilian academics, journalists and current and former military members who served and didn’t serve in Afghanistan. The leader will need bipartisan credentials, perhaps an acclaimed author of military history. The inquiry should include members from all service branches, though the team should be focused on the ground war and thus draw members largely from the Army and Marines. 

Once formed, the team should focus on providing a brutally honest assessment, one unafraid to criticize senior military officers. The perspective should be of the theater commander, while also including strategic deliberations with the president, senior Pentagon officials and Congress. The study should also look at how well battlefield commanders carried out that strategy.

The study must be unclassified and, similar to the Iraq inquiry, the team should be granted full access to the emails of all general officers who served in or had responsibility for Afghanistan. Secretary Austin should order a full declassification effort and direct his subordinates to cooperate.

The first step in recovery is admitting that one has a problem. Deep introspection is necessary at the Defense Department to understand the role the U.S. military and its uniformed leaders played in the Afghanistan tragedy. The military isn’t infallible, and it is time to be held accountable for our part in defeat.

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Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. Read full bio here.

Matthew Zais, a retired Infantry colonel, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Both were co-authors of the Army’s history of the Iraq war.

I know Israel has let you down. We are doing teshuvah – repentance

By Nachman Shai

To the rabbis and religious leaders putting the finishing touches to your High Holiday sermons, I’d like to make a suggestion: Use this Jewish New Year to talk about Israel from the pulpit.

And not just Israel. Talk about the bonds between us, as a Jewish people, about our shared past and imagined future. Talk about the challenges, but also the opportunities.

Share with your congregants that we in Israel are slowly but surely taking responsibility for our side of the relationship in a way that you have never seen, that we realize we have disappointed you and are doing teshuvah, repentance, with a sincere desire to make things right in the future. Share with them that this new government is committed to bringing back a Kotel Compromise — that is, formalizing an egalitarian prayer section at the Western Wall. It is committed to learning and understanding how our actions impact your communities. Tell them that we believe in you and that we are ready for both your critique and your ideas.

Most importantly, share with your communities that Israel desires to be your partner, to not let our politics or diverse identities serve as barriers to our fundamental belief that we are a people with a common fate and destiny.

I know this message might not be easy to convey. I’ve lived long enough to see how Israel has turned from a point of pride to tension. And it’s understandable. Generations built their Judaism around the ideal of Israel and the promise of peace as the focal point of Jewish identity and Zionist hope. So when Israel disappoints, organized Jewish frameworks can also disappoint, intensifying political divides within communities, especially among the rising generation. So why would a rabbi waste his or her precious annual moment with a quiet audience on a subject that increasingly causes more controversy than connection?

I believe the answer is simple. Despite the very significant challenges that stand between us, the truth is that we need each other, and I am convinced ultimately want to be in relationship with each other.

The last year highlighted just how intertwined we are as a people when Israel’s military operation in Gaza in May led not only to a frightening rise in antisemitism but significant stress and frustration within communities. It is becoming increasingly imperative for us to work together to ensure ongoing safety, security and communal cohesion.

We also still have the ability to bring out the best in each other. Israel needs your clarity and backbone to empower us to make the bold decisions that will ensure our continuity as both a Jewish and democratic state. We need your justice-minded values to assure Israelis that moving toward two states for two peoples is the only solution, both for our security and our soul. We have room to be inspired by your models of pluralism and diversity, and of organized Jewish communal life within our own religious practice.

On the other end, Israel continues to be the proud manifestation of the Jewish people’s 2,000-year-old-dream. Israel — the state, the land and its people — with all of its complexities, deserves to remain a central component of Jewish identity-building and experiences around the world.

Finally, you and I have a mutual mission to elevate not only our own people but the entire world through the development of shared projects on climate change as well as biomedical and technological innovation.

But before we can make progress toward true peace, revitalized pluralism in Israel and the next great global initiative, we must begin with a basic conversation about peoplehood — who we are, what are our common values and language. You have the opportunity to lead your communities with these questions.

As Rabbi Mordechai Kaplan wrote, “The individual Jew who regards this world as the scene of salvation depends upon the Jewish people to help [them] achieve it. For that reason, [they] must be able to feel that in investing the best part of [themselves] in the Jewish people, [they are] investing in something that has a worthwhile future, and thereby achieving an earthly immortality.”

From the pulpit, let us wrestle with these ideas and imagine this worthwhile future together.

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Dr. Nachman Shai currently serves as Israel's Minister for Diaspora Affairs. Previously, he was a Member of Knesset, from 2009-2019 as a member of the Labor party.. Read full bio here.

MIRYAM IN THE MEDIA: Hamas Demands The Impossible From Israel

By David Hacham

Hamas in the Gaza Strip is pursuing terms that are impossible for Israel to accept as part of its extortion attempt to “change the rules of the equation,” a former defense official and expert on Gaza has said.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, an Arab-affairs adviser to seven Israeli defense ministers and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, told JNS that a central impasse blocking the path to a broader arrangement between Israel and Gaza is Hamas’s refusal to come up with realistic proposals to facilitate a deal for the release of the remains of two missing-in-action Israel Defense Forces’ soldiers who were killed in the 2014 war, in addition to two living Israeli civilians who entered Gaza and are being held by the terrorist organization.

With Israel linking progress on this issue to progress on a broader arrangement for Gaza’s reconstruction and economy—and Hamas refusing to budge on its unrealistic demands for facilitating an exchange deal to secure the release of the Israelis—a structural problem is in place, noted Hacham.

“Israel says that if Hamas wants progress on a broader arrangement, progress must be made on an exchange deal. Hamas says these are two separate issues, and it wants separate talks on increasing the entry of commodities and services into Gaza, and the entry of Gazan workers into Israel,” he said. “This is the key issue on the agenda. It is the central reason for all of the incidents we are seeing on the border. Hamas demands that Israel ‘lifts the siege.’ ”

In exchange for the release of Israeli civilians Avera Mengistu and Hisham Al-Sayed, and the remains of MIA personnel Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, has demanded that Israel release 1,111 Palestinian security prisoners.

“Hamas is raising impossible standards for Israel,” said Hacham.

“In principle, Hamas is seeking to change the terms of the equation that has existed for a long time between Israel and Hamas,” he said. “Their slogan of ‘lifting the siege’ means opening up Gaza’s border crossings to Israel and the outside world, the naval arena and the air arena.”

Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate has played the central role in mediating talks between Israel and Hamas, with most of the talks taking place in Cairo.

With no progress being made on the swap deal, the other negotiations channel is designed to achieve what Israel calls an “arrangement” and what Hamas calls a hudna (“calm”).

To that end, talks have revolved on enabling more traffic of goods, merchants and businesspeople through the Gaza-Israel border crossings. Even though no final arrangement has been reached, Israel recently took the step of allowing 1,000 Gazan merchants and 250 businesspeople into Israel.

Throughout the deliberations, Israel has ensured a constant humanitarian flow of basic goods, food and medical supply into Gaza though trucks that pass through Kerem Shalom Crossing.

Hamas is also demanding the entry of funds for rebuilding sections of the Strip and repairing damages following the May conflict it prompted and fought with Israel.

Yet the fact that the talks are stuck on the swap issue means there is “no moving forward,” said Hacham.

This will not change as long as “Hamas does not allow progress on the MIA’s remains and captive issue,” he stated. Hamas’s initiative to jump-start Gaza’s economy and see large-scale infrastructure projects take place is thus being stalled by Hamas’s own refusal to compromise on its demands.

As a result, the fact that an agreement was reached in recent days allowing some $100 million a month of Qatari assistance cash for needy Gazan families to come has not altered the impasse.

That agreement will see the United Nations allocate the funds through special ATM withdrawal cards, after a list of recipients was authorized by Israel, which is a far cry from the old allocation method, when Qatar’s envoy to Gaza, Muhammad Al-Emadi, would arrive with suitcases brimming with cash.

In the old arrangement, Hacham said, “Israel didn’t fully supervise where this money went. We can assume that not all of it went to needy families; some went to developing Hamas’s terror infrastructure and local rocket-production centers.”

As a result, Israel refused to consider going back to the old arrangement. Yet now that the deal was reached, Hamas is far from being satisfied or willing to scale back its escalation tactics on the border.

‘Hamas believes its charger was drawn up by God’

Hacham said that those who are holding out hopes for a change in Hamas’s radical worldview are clinging to fantasies.

“Hamas is an enemy. It is guided, conceptually and ideologically, by a call for Israel’s destruction. It does not recognize Israel. Hamas has not changed its ideology, concepts or objectives,” he said. “And it can’t change them. I remember speaking with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who founded Hamas during the First Intifada in 1987, and asking him if the movement’s stances could change, whether mutual recognition could change. He told me, ‘Our charter was drawn up by God. So humans cannot change our charter.’ ”

Hamas’s 1988 covenant continues to reflect its ideology and policy towards Israel, said Hacham. “But we have to distinguish between Hamas’s practical actions and ideology. For tactical reasons, it is willing to reach ceasefires (hudnas), but not at the cost of recognition of Israel or acceptance of Israel as a legitimate element. Only as part of a tactical need.”

As a result of these dynamics, the chances of a long-term quiet with Hamas are slim, he assessed. However, stepped-up Israeli offensive actions and an Israeli determination to respond to each act of Hamas aggression could boost Israeli deterrence, he argued.

Boosted Israeli deterrence would, in turn, enable Israel to prioritize its strategic task of preventing Iran from breaking out to a nuclear weapon and dealing with Iran’s entrenchment in Syria, and Hezbollah’s threatening force build-up in Lebanon. “These are the issues at the top of Israel’s priority list. Hence, Gaza is a problem that has to be confined,” he said.

Deterrence can be improved through steps such as “commando raids or destroying their weapons storehouses, tunnels or even targeted killings—a tool that has proven itself,” said Hacham, while stressing that he is not in favor of a reoccupation of Gaza.

“But Israel can’t exclude retaking Gaza either. It has to take this option into account, but only in a scenario in which there are no other options,” he said.

Such a maneuver would involve heavy casualties among young IDF soldiers, he said, as well as civilians on both sides, despite Israeli efforts to avoid this; as such, it must be reserved as a last option.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

MIRYAM IN THE MEDIA: WHAT ISRAEL'S MOVE TOWARDS ABBAS MEANS

By Eitan Dangot

Hamas has good reason to be concerned by the recent meeting between Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah, a former senior Israeli defense official said.

According to Maj. Gen. (res.) Eitan Dangot, Israel's former coordinator of government activities in the territories, or COGAT, and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, the meeting between Gantz and Abbas was overdue and sent important signals that Hamas will find troubling.

"The very fact that the meeting took place is the central change," said Dangot, who also served as military secretary to three defense ministers. For Hamas, the meeting represents a signal of Israel's intention to continue to separate Gaza from the West Bank, he argued.

Israel is emphasizing, through the meeting, that it will hold highly contrasting policies towards these two territories, according to Dangot. Security tensions will dominate Israel's approach to Gaza, ruled by a radical terrorist regime, while Israel will seek ways to improve a variety of issues in its management of policy towards the PA.

"It is also a signal to Hamas that Israel might weigh up a future option, under which it could go back to the idea of seeing PA elements return to Gaza, with international backing. Israel could decide that this scenario does stand a chance. That could significantly weaken Hamas," said Dangot.

The fact that a senior Israeli decision-maker met with Abbas for the first time in 10 years is highly significant, he stated, adding that the meeting should have occurred sooner.

"It is a mistake to make Gaza more important than Judea and Samaria," said Dangot. "In my view, Judea and Samaria has much more importance for the internal security of Israel than Gaza. Gaza has clear boundaries, and Israel is facing a radical extremist movement that has the ideological goal of shedding the blood of its civilians and soldiers, and harming its existence. While there are criticisms of the PA's conduct, its residents, more than 2.7 million Palestinians, are living in daily coexistence with over 400,000 Israelis who live in Area C."

Daily interaction on the roads, at checkpoints and even during shopping at stores means Israel has a clear interest in boosting its influence over the PA, Dangot argued.

Meanwhile, the PA is facing its own especially sensitive period, with an unsettled Palestinian street, made more agitated by the power struggles of would-be successors to Abbas. Public demonstrations against the PA have rocked the Ramallah government, with members of the West Bank public also expressing disgust with corruption and the cost of living, according to Dangot's assessment.

During their meeting, Gantz and Abbas discussed political, security, civilian and economic issues. Following the event, Israel moved to provide the PA with a 500-million-shekel ($156 million) loan to help stabilize its troubled economic situation.

According to the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, the meeting received widespread coverage in Palestinian media, Fatah welcomed the event, while Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad condemned Abbas and accused of him being a traitor.

"They agreed to continue communicating further on the issues that were raised during the meeting," a statement from Gantz's office said.

The meeting was also attended by the current head of COGAT, Maj. Gen. Ghasan Alyan, PA Minister Hussein al-Sheikh, and the head of the PA's General Intelligence Service, Majed Faraj.

Dangot said such meetings "were routine when I was military secretary and head of COGAT," adding that "not holding meetings caused a degree of damage. Personal dialogue can lead to changes."

Preparing for a post-Abbas era

Traditionally, the PA has faced obstacles to its rule in the Hebron area, where there is a concentration of Hamas supporters, Dangot noted. The fact that the PA is facing cracks in the stability of its rule – which began to emerge in earnest after Abbas cancelled Palestinian elections in April – means that the post-Abbas era has effectively begun, he warned.

"As a result, the PA is taking a certain risk in holding a meeting with senior Israeli figure, since many would-be successors of Abbas from Fatah are positioning themselves at this time, and are not interested in affiliating themselves with Israel. Abbas took a certain risk," Dangot said.

"On the other hand, this gives the PA an advantage since Abbas projected stability to the Palestinian street. He sent the message that security and civilian coordination with Israel will continue in face of threats at home, led mainly by Hamas, which is seeking to incite and fracture his rule. Hence, this meeting delivers a message that a large part of the Palestinian public is looking for – continued economic stability," the former officer stated.

Dangot stressed the importance of personal dialogue as a mechanism for better dealing with future crises.

"In the present, the goal of this meeting was to improve the PA's economic capabilities, and as a by-product, to prevent parts of the Palestinian public from joining violent incidents."

"Since 2008, large parts of the Palestinian public have demonstrated that economy comes before national issues for them. They understand the cost of losing, and were not part of Middle East revolutions. Hence, Israel's obligation is to exercise its ability to continue to advance the lives of Palestinian civilians, promote economic development, and helping economic initiatives," said Dangot.

Israel needs to seriously prepare for the post-Abbas era, he said, by getting a better sense of the Palestinian public mood and a better understanding of who potential Abbas successors will be.

Dangot said there is "no argument" over the fact that the PA is involved in multiple troubling activities, such as its push to place Israel on trial at the International Criminal Court, ongoing incitement, and the policy of paying stipends to security prisoners and the families of terrorists killed in their attack efforts.

"All criticisms of these things are fully justified," he said. "But a country has to set its strategy based on an ongoing assessment and of the alternatives that are at its disposal. Due to the high importance of Judea and Samaria for Israeli security, Israel cannot stick its head in the sand and fail to lead on a policy that it set. It has to deal with these problems as part of a general dialogue with the other side."

Dangot argued that while Abbas is not a fan of Israel and "not the ideal leader," he is still "the one who is signed onto agreements that commit the PA. It is his security forces who, almost daily, return Israeli civilians who got lost and found themselves in Area A safely to the IDF. There is a clear joint interest for the PA and Israel to prevent a radical movement like Hamas from entrenching itself in Judea and Samaria. This interest becomes the strongest."

This has led Dangot to the conclusion that it is possible to continue to keep levels of violence low in the West Bank, while still "not ignoring the other problems" that stem from the PA's conduct as described above. Israel must demand a decrease in the use of money by the PA for supporting families of terrorists and security prisoners, he said.

During Abbas's era, he added, "there will be no political agreement. Abbas won't end his role in the PA with a legacy of giving up on the 'right of return' in an agreement with Israel. But he won't want to collapse his entire concept by losing control and seeing chaos take over in Judea and Samaria either," he added.

Past experience has shown that Israel, backed by American pressure, has been able to cause Abbas to reign in his diplomatic and legal attacks on Israel, Dangot noted.

Israel must demand that the PA decrease its payments to families of terrorists and security prisoners, and halt its activities at the ICC, he added. "Together with the U.S., it is possible to stop these processes."

This has led Dangot to the conclusion that it is possible to continue to keep levels of violence low in the West Bank, while still "not ignoring the other problems" that stem from the PA's conduct as described above. Israel must demand a decrease in the use of money by the PA for supporting families of terrorists and security prisoners, he said.

During Abbas's era, he added, "there will be no political agreement. Abbas won't end his role in the PA with a legacy of giving up on the 'right of return' in an agreement with Israel. But he won't want to collapse his entire concept by losing control and seeing chaos take over in Judea and Samaria either," he added.

Past experience has shown that Israel, backed by American pressure, has been able to cause Abbas to reign in his diplomatic and legal attacks on Israel, Dangot noted.

Israel must demand that the PA decrease its payments to families of terrorists and security prisoners, and halt its activities at the ICC, he added. "Together with the U.S., it is possible to stop these processes."

Since August 21, Hamas has continued to escalate the border region with Israel through a series of violent disturbances. Border Policeman Barel Hadaria Shmueli, who was killed by a Hamas gunman at the border during a violent disturbance on August 21, was laid to rest on Monday. Several Palestinian rioters were shot during the disturbances, some fatally.

On August 28, Hamas restarted its harassment and attrition activities at nights along the border fence, sending activists to hurl explosive devices and launching arson balloons towards Israeli communities. Hamas is demanding that Israel loosen security restrictions around Gaza, and enable rebuilding projects to go ahead, even after an arrangement to facilitate the transfer of $10 million of Qatari cash per month has begun for needy Gazan families.

Israel has announced a series of measures to ease conditions in Gaza, including the entry of building material for the first time since May's conflict. Egypt reopened Rafah Crossing after closing it for six days. On Wednesday, Israel expanded the Gazan fishing zone to 15 nautical miles, and opened the Kerem Shalom Border Crossing for more equipment and commodities to pass through it. It also increased Gazan entry permits for traders, from 2,000 to 7,000. Yet none of this seems to be enough for Hamas, which continues to threaten further escalation.

"I sense a desire by the Israeli government to prevent an escalation for the coming months," said Dangot. Should Israel give up on its conditions, stipulated after the May conflict, such as conditioning widespread rebuilding projects on Gaza on Hamas's release of the remains of two IDF personnel killed in action in 2014 as well as two captive civilians, that will not lead to calm, Dangot warned.

Should Israel continue to insist on conditioning a breakthrough arrangement on Hamas meeting those conditions, he believes that too will lead to an escalation.

"In either case, both routes lead to one clear thing: an escalation with Hamas," said Dangot. "This is inevitable. The question is the timing."

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

UNC-Chapel Hill’s New Antisemitic Anti-Israel Class Violates Federal and State Law

By Mark Goldfeder

Last week students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) showed up for their first class in a course called “The Conflict Over Israel Palestine.” But instead of learning about competing narratives and claims over the course of the semester, they will be treated to a one-sided antisemitic hate-fest from a graduate student professor who has been outspoken about her illegal plans.

It is clear that the course will be one-sided and antisemitic because the teacher in question, Kylie Broderick, has said so. In a tweet about how hard it is to pretend there are two sides to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, she wrote “there is only 1 legitimate side – the oppressed – versus imperialist propaganda. I don’t ever want to encourage them to believe there is reason to take on good faith the oppressive ideologies of American and Western imperialism, Zionists, & autocrats.” In other posts she described all of Israel as occupied territory, and just a few months ago she spread a vicious blood libel, tweeting that “Palestinians are being murdered for just being alive & bc [because] they’re inconvenient to Israel & its patron, the US imperialist death cult.” 

That particular outburst was written while Israel was daring to defend itself from indiscriminate rocket attacks launched at its civilian population by a designated terrorist group. Five days later she wrote an op-ed in support of the antisemitic Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, in which she managed to squeeze in dozens of lies about the Jewish state while avoiding any mention of Hamas, the terrorist organization that started this round of violence.

After early reports about the course by Peter Reitzes, a board member of Voice4Israel of North Carolina, prompted some public pushback, UNC defended its decision to allow the class to be taught by a hostile professor who intends to demonize, delegitimize, and apply a double-standard to Israel by pretending that such an offering was somehow part of an “abiding respect for the First Amendment, academic freedom, and the open exchange of ideas.” 

UNC is just wrong as a matter of law. But the worst part is that they know it, and they do not seem to care.

As it relates to academic freedom, there is a difference between education and indoctrination. Per the American Association of University Professors 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, an instructor who address “controversial matters” should present “the divergent opinions of other investigators” and “above all” should “remember that his business is not to provide his students with ready-made conclusions, but to train them to think for themselves, and to provide them access to those materials which they need if they are to think intelligently.” 

As former Assistant Secretary of Education for Civil Rights Kenneth Marcus has explained, there is a difference between a professor sharing their opinion versus disingenuously presenting that opinion as if it were truth. In the first Supreme Court case to expound upon the concept of academic freedom, Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), the Court wrote that “The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. …Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.” In Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967) the Court again noted that “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’”

Allowing professors to share biased lies cast as truth in the guise of academic freedom while shutting down an exploration of alternative viewpoints is to violate entirely all that academic freedom is meant to protect. What student in their right mind would feel comfortable challenging a professor’s anti-Zionist perspective, when that professor has recently referred to  Zionists  as “dirtbags,” and moderated an event that tried to legitimize violence against Israelis? 

When it comes to the First Amendment, the freedom of speech—even offensive speech—must be cherished and protected. But as the United States Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights has made clear, there are times when even speech can cross over into harassment and invidious discrimination. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs and activities, on the basis of race, color, or national origin. While Title VI does not include religion, discrimination against Jews may give rise to a violation if it is based on race or national origin. Under Executive Order 13899 (Combating Anti-Semitism), when evaluating potential Title VI claims, the government uses the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism. Per the IHRA definition, it is antisemitic to, among other things, deny the Jewish people their right to self-determination, engage in blood libels, or apply a double standard by requiring of the Jewish state a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.

Speech crosses over from protected territory into harassing verbal conduct when it is “sufficiently severe, pervasive or persistent so as to interfere with or limit the ability of an individual to participate in or benefit from the services, activities or privileges provided by a recipient.” In their messages to the University, members of the Jewish community on campus confirmed what should already be obvious; they are fearful that students who support and have a connection with Israel will be unwelcome or unsafe in this classroom environment, which is not only an impingement on their academic freedom but also a violation of Title VI, as well as other state and university policies against discrimination. 

A violation of Title VI may be found if discrimination is encouraged, tolerated, not adequately addressed, or ignored by administrators, and complaints alleging such violations may be filed with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights or in the federal district courts. But of course, UNC already knows all of this because this is not their first, nor even their first recent, Title VI antisemitism rodeo: In 2019 the University hosted an antisemitic conference, and was forced to settle the ensuing Title VI complaint with the Department of Education. In their   resolution agreement, the school agreed to “take all steps reasonably designed to ensure that students enrolled in the University are not subjected to a hostile environment.”  

The University’s commitment to that requirement is laughable, and in fact the Zionist Organization of America has already filed a letter with the Department of Education notifying them of the breach. But the potential result is no laughing matter. Study after study has shown that the kind of inflammatory discriminatory anti-Zionist rhetoric that Broderick intends to continue spreading under the banner of UNC eventually leads to antisemitic action, and to people getting hurt. Over the last few months, and particularly in the immediate aftermath of the most recent outbreak of violence in the Middle East last May, antisemitic attacks around the world shot up over 400%. On college campuses, in between dodging protests, ignoring death threats, and removing Nazi symbols, Jewish students have been subjected to campaigns that call Israel a colonialist settler state, negate the history of their people, and dismiss the lives of their co-religionists, if they are even worth mentioning at all.

This is not a new problem, but the intensification of an existing phenomenon. On university campuses around the country, antisemitism has become entrenched and systemic, with recent studies showing that the number of Jewish students experiencing antisemitism has spiked to nearly 75 percent. North Carolina has also not been immune from this alarming trend, nor has the Chapel Hill campus itself, and it is in this environment that UNC is knowingly shirking responsibility.

That is too bad for them. Universities have duty to protect students from hatred and bigotry motivated by discriminatory animus, including antisemitism, and students need to know that if the University won’t protect them, there are people who will have their back. If UNC will not do this the easy way, by standing up for its Jewish constituents and against unapologetic hate, then they will be forced to do it the harder way, and risk their federal funding—again. And this time, they will have to do more than make empty promises they don’t intend to keep.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Jordan’s positive era could lead to improved ties with Israel

By Tomer Barak

Despite facing an array of challenges, some of which may worsen again soon, Jordan`s King Abdullah should be quite pleased with recent trends  – both inside the kingdom and along its borders. 

This can be understood and analyzed through a number of factors.

Most importantly, it seems that the turmoil inside the royal court has quietened. The alleged April plot against the king, led by his half-brother, Prince Hamza, is over. Some high-ranking scapegoats were ‘sacrificed’ and placed on trial, but the family is working hard to show renewed unity within its ranks.

At the same time, Jordan has been able to block a third wave of Covid-19. Following the second wave that ended in May, Jordanians are gradually being vaccinated, the kingdom is receiving donations for further doses, and it has installed strong border supervision to prevent the entry of the Delta and other variants.

This situation could change rapidly, but it seems King Abdullah has gained a few months respite.

The economy is recovering to the extent possible from the previous pandemic wave. Jordan forecasts that in 2021, it will receive a total of four billion dollars of international assistance. Out of that sum, two billion dollars are designated for public programs such as health and social welfare, and not to security or military needs. This is a significant sum for development projects.

However, despite the positive economic indicators, the Jordanian economy remains shaky, lacks major growth engines, and remains heavily dependent on international assistance.

Externally, King Abdullah’s regional and international status is back on the up. He became the first Arab leader to meet with President Joe Biden in Washington in a visit that might mark the start of a new regional role for Jordan. The Trump administration viewed Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the centerpiece of the regional architecture.

King Abdullah is in a position to promote Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic talks without being in opposition to the Gulf states that signed the Abraham Accords. Rather than being mutually exclusive, Abdullah has found a way, under the Biden administration, to deliver the Palestinian story to the Abraham Accords momentum, using his natural position as ‘caretaker’ of the Palestinian issue. 

Meanwhile, Jordan is creating new relations with Egypt and Iraq. This axis is critical to Jordan’s stability, economic development, and struggle to influence Iraq against Iranian influence (and at the same time against Saudi and Emirati influence).

The upcoming American withdrawal from Iraq is set to intensify this regional competition.

Iran is seeking to strengthen its Shi’ite militias in Iraq, led by Kataib Hezbollah. Jordan is preparing for the American exit, and is working to secure its economic, political, and security interests in Iraq, and along the border, so that it does not become an eastern zone for Iranian-backed aggression.

In Washington, Abdullah spoke of Iranian-made drones that attacked Jordan and of his  concerns regarding Iran’s activities in the region. The King also mentioned that the conflict between Israel and Iran in Syria affects Jordan, and how, on several occasions, missiles fired at Israel from Syria landed in Jordan.

This is even more important in light of the fact that the U.S. is preparing to move some of its military presence from Qatar to Jordan in order to reduce exposure to Iran’s firepower range.

On the Syrian front, Jordan has managed to harness other Arab countries to improve their relations with the Assad regime, while improving trade channels along the border. It is not yet clear how renewed fighting in the Dara region, in southern Syria, will impact this trend. 

Jordan is studying the new government in Israel and it views a number of improvement points from its perspective, while recognizing the limitations of how far relations can really improve under current conditions.  

After years of bad blood between Abdullah and Netanyahu, a series of high-level bilateral meetings between the King and Israeli leaders has ignited hopes of a brighter future.

Core problems have not been solved, but a new process of dialogue has clearly begun.

In addition, several obstacles have been removed; Israel agreed to boost water supplies to Jordan, and the World Bank’s decision to abolish the Red Sea-Dead Sea program has extracted a thorny issue between the sides.

Tensions however very much remain. Israeli actions in East Jerusalem and settlement construction in Judea and Samaria receive ongoing Jordanian condemnations, just as they always have.

King Abdullah is aware that the new Israeli government cannot maneuver significantly regarding the Palestinians.  He recently said that the government was not ideal, but his discourse with its leaders gives him optimism.

Moreover, the relatively tranquil period gives the King the ability to advance relations with Israel – with minimal public wrath. This stands in stark contrast to previous times when protests led the King to take policy decision to foul relations as a tool to calm unrest.

The above leads to the conclusion that the glass ceiling of Israeli-Jordanian relations remain in place, although after years of being stuck, there is now a way to boost diplomatic, civil, and economic relations – albeit below that ceiling.

For Israel, improved relations serve the national interest. The peace treaty with Jordan is a core strategic asset, facilitating security arrangements along Israel’s eastern border, repelling threats from the East, and supporting regional stability. Jordan’s influence on the region is positive. Thus, even if the peace between the two nations is a cold one, especially due to anti-Israeli sentiment among the Jordanian public, the relationship forms another part of the regional puzzle which, when combined with the Abraham Accords, enables multi-lateral regional cooperation that includes Israel on a range of essential civilian matters.

The bottom line is that the Biden administration should view Jordan as a key component of its regional stability architecture, along with Egypt and the Gulf states. It would be a waste not to utilize King Abdullah’s window of opportunity to step forward with his vast experience and skills of being an innovator, a recruiter, and a connector who can energize regional processes.  

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

US Afghanistan Withdrawal: Lessons for Israel

By Jeremiah Rozman

The United States has definitively lost Afghanistan. U.S. military power ousted the Taliban and prevented its return for twenty years. As the U.S. withdrew, the product of two decades of nation building melted away as if it never existed, save the heaps of military hardware left behind. The collapse of the U.S.’s Afghanistan strategy highlights the risks Israel would incur in creating a Palestinian state, as these projects hold key similarities.

Firstly, both the U.S. and Israel were involved in nation building. The U.S. sought to build an Afghan democracy capable of governing Afghanistan and maintaining peace and stability. Since the Oslo Accords, Israel has been working with the U.S. to build a Palestinian democracy capable of governing a future Palestinian state and of making peace with Israel.

Both of these efforts involved building and training armies capable of suppressing terrorists. Both involved introducing western style democracy into regions without prior experience with it. And both sought to defeat and marginalize well-organized Islamic fundamentalist groups with a strong sense of purpose and robust networks of support. Both attempts at nation building ultimately failed.

In Afghanistan, the corrupt U.S.-backed government never had much legitimacy, and its military quickly dissolved when U.S. forces withdrew. The corrupt Palestinian Authority never enjoyed legitimacy either. It lost an election to the militant group Hamas, and its U.S. trained forces were swiftly routed by Hamas when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from Gaza. The forces that Israel backed in southern Lebanon were quickly defeated by Hezbollah when the IDF withdrew. History demonstrates that organized, internationally supported, and motivated Islamist groups usually win in power vacuums.

Both the U.S. and Israel had the military ability to defeat their Islamic fundamentalist enemies, but only had sufficient political will necessary to keep them at bay and maintain a manageable status quo. For Israel, international pressure and low domestic tolerance for casualties drove it to risk its security by removing its forces from Gaza and Lebanon. The botched U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was an unforced error. There was no major domestic or international demand for the U.S. to withdraw its remaining 2,500 troops immediately. In fact, international allies were left blindsided by President Biden’s rapid pullout. No U.S. soldier had been killed in combat there in over 18 months, and the cost of maintaining an effective counterterrorism base of operations was sustainable.

The U.S. decision to withdraw under minimal pressure bodes ominously for countries promised U.S. protection. Will that protection be rescinded when there really is pressure? After the U.S. appeared to flee before its own shadow, abandoning billions of dollars of sophisticated equipment to an enemy with no air force, no satellites, and no nuclear missiles, are Taiwan and South Korea still truly confident in U.S. protection if nuclear armed dictators come knocking?

In 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry offered Israel technology and promises of international protection if it withdrew its military from the strategically important Jordan Valley to allow a Palestinian state to include that territory. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan suggests that Israel was right to rely on itself.

Both Democrat and Republican U.S. administrations promoted the “two-state solution” which in essence sought to nation build in the Middle East. The Trump administration was the first to break with that thinking which had persisted since Clinton. The Biden administration is back to the old playbook. It officially supports the creation of a Palestinian state. From Clinton’s Oslo Accords to George W. Bush’s “Roadmap” and “Disengagement,” the U.S. has reassured Israel that a future Palestinian state would not pose a security threat.

However, the U.S.’s poor track record at nation building in the Middle East is mirrored by its poor track record predicting outcomes in that region. The Oslo Accords ended in a bloody intifada; the Disengagement ended in Hamas capturing Gaza and turning it into a terror platform. De-Baathification in Iraq ended in a bloody insurgency, and the withdrawal from Afghanistan yielded a rapid Taliban victory that apparently caught the Biden administration by surprise.

The world now has one more fundamentalist Islamic state, the Taliban run Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. There is little doubt a future Palestinian state would be the same. According to recent polls, Hamas would still win Palestinian elections, but in the Middle East, more important than ballots are bullets, as the 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza clearly show. 

The U.S. military kept the Taliban at bay in Afghanistan, and the IDF keeps Hamas from taking over Judea and Samaria. While a fundamentalist Islamic victory is surely a tragedy for liberty, tolerance, and human rights, especially women's rights, it is first and foremost a security threat. A Taliban-run Afghanistan harbored Al Qaeda, resulting in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Many fear that it will once again become a safe haven for terrorists and that the next big attack is only a matter of time.

For Israel, a Hamas-run state bordering Israel's major population centers, economic centers, and international airport would pose an existential threat. All of Israel would be within range of a variety of short- and long-range rockets, mortars, and sniper fire and easily infiltrated through tunnels. In the twenty-first century, oceans are no guarantee of national security, but at least for now, the Taliban or Al Qaeda cannot fire volleys of rockets at Washington, D.C. from Afghanistan.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan tells the world’s dictators and terrorists that the U.S. is no longer interested in its post-WWII role as the military guarantor of freedom. Any country would be wise to understand that it can ultimately only rely on its own power. “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” If Israel severely weakens its ability to defend itself by withdrawing its forces to create a Palestinian state, it must understand that it will assuredly be left to suffer what it must when that state falls to Islamic fundamentalists as history and the facts on the ground strongly predict.

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

MIRYAM'S RIGHT OF REPLY: CRITIQUING BENJAMIN ANTHONY ON GAZA.

By Yochai Guiski

In his article ‘Some Democracies Can Withdraw. Israel is Not One of Them,’ Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, offers a scathing indictment of the Gaza disengagement and the subsequent inconclusive use of force in that arena, which he also sees as degrading the social fabric of Israeli society.

 I would like to respectfully offer a different approach:

1.      The disengagement from Gaza has indeed proven to be a failure. It has created a hotbed of terror and misery, while the international community still places the blame on Israel for its perceived control and security measures. But hindsight is always 20/20. If we are to harshly judge the leaders who decided on the disengagement, we should also see the threats and the benefits they saw coming.

2.      “Mowing the lawn” is meant to describe continuous and high tempo operational activity which seeks to put constant pressure on the enemy and deny it the ability to regenerate and establish new terror cells or other threats. The issue with Gaza is that the IDF did not “mow the lawn” effectively following the withdrawal and ceased almost completely after  “Operation Cast Lead” (2009). It  moved to a model of deterrence that is similar to the one used against Lebanese Hezbollah. Had we continued to pressure Hamas at every corner, our current situation might have been significantly better.

3.      The criticism should be leveled at the right target. It is not the IDF that decides how it should be employed; it is Israel’s elected officials. Blaming the IDF for not being utilized properly seems unfair.

4.      Israel’s social contract does seem unfair: In the south, people are subjected to attacks at the whim of terrorists, while other parts of Israel are not. However, this has been the reality for Israelis since the days of the British Mandate – border communities were always at the forefront, be it from Palestinian terrorism from Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, and Lebanon, until the 1980s (including rocket fire, artillery, infiltration, IEDs), to be replaced with attacks from Lebanon by Shia groups, and Palestinian terrorism all over Israel during the 1990s and 2000s. Each time it was a different Israeli group that bore the brunt of the attacks.

5.      It is not surprising therefore that Israel’s defense doctrine from Ben-Gurion to Jabotinsky has emphasized the need to accept the fact that our enemies would not relent. It dictates that we are always to be vigilant and defeat them in a cycle that will end only when they accept Israel and learn to live with it peacefully.

6.      It is a Sisyphean task, and currently Gaza is at the epicenter. However, to this day, we have not  cracked under the pressure; we endured, we persevered, and we prospered, while our enemies remain in squalor, backwardness, and poverty.

We are stronger than we seem, and we have the endurance to outlast our enemies. But in order to last for generations and centuries to come, we need to have the leadership and foresight to make tough, necessary, and prudent decisions.

The withdrawal from Gaza was not one our best moments, and possibly neither was the policy that followed, but this must not stop us from having the courage to make tough and sometimes risky decisions. Let us hope, pray, and vote for leaders who can make those decisions, and then follow through and make them work.  

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Gaza will remain a powder keg, Qatari cash or not

By David Hacham

Three months after the end of the May conflict between Israel and Hamas, it appears as if the Egyptian-mediated talks between the two sides are moving in an extremely limited manner toward the goal of reaching a post-conflict arrangement to stabilize the ceasefire and reach a long-term calm. Qatar and the United Nations are also involved in mediation efforts.

There appears to have been some progress toward finding a solution on how to inject Qatari financial assistance for the needy, with a mechanism enabling ten million dollars to reach 100,000 families per month seemingly close to being finalized.

Egyptian General Intelligence Service chief Abbas Kamel recently met with Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to push this initiative toward completion.

However, the remainder of the arrangement designed to boost Gaza’s recovery and decrease tensions hinges on the completion of a deal in which Hamas releases the remains of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 war with Israel, and two Israeli civilians who crossed into Gaza in recent years. On that front, it appears as if there is no concrete progress.

Even the issue that does appear to be making some progress, the Qatari assistance, has seen deep divisions between Hamas and Israel. Israel, fearing the money would reach Hamas’s military wing, called for the cash to be transferred to the families through the UN’s food assistance program to Gaza. Hamas rejected this call. A workaround solution appears to have been found, involving the allocation of special debit-type cards to the families, who can then withdraw the money from Gazan cash machines. Under this proposal, the money would be transferred under UN supervision.

Israel has insisted on strict supervision of this money to ensure it goes to needy families alone, and that the list of recipients does not include Hamas members, or other terror operatives.

In recent weeks, banks located in the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank rejected a proposal to get them involved in the Qatari cash’ transfers, fearing that this would expose them to legal action over terror financing violations.

Hamas, for its part, gave up on its earlier demand to be the one that allocates the assistance funds – 100 dollars per family.

The new mechanism, if finalized, would see an end to past practices of suitcases full of cash entering Gaza, carried by Qatar’s special envoy to the Strip.

Hamas is keen to reach an arrangement on this money as soon as possible, and to this end, it green lighted the release of arson balloons toward Israeli communities near Gaza in recent weeks, while threatening to repeat this action if progress remains stuck – an action that could quickly lead to an escalation.

As part of Israel’s attempts to prevent a new escalation, it recently authorized the entry of 1,000 Gazan merchants and 350 businesspeople into Israel.

The Strip’s factions however agreed to restart open demonstrations against Israel along the border starting on August 21. This decision appears aimed at sending an immediate and unequivocal message – particularly to the Egyptian mediators – to fast-track progress on the Hamas-Israel arrangement, particularly regarding the transfer of financial payments needed to rebuild civilian infrastructure destroyed during Operation Guardian of the Walls in May.

An additional signal was sent by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad during meetings held between their leaders – Ismail Haniyeh and Ziad Nakhaleh – and the new Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. The meeting symbolizes the positioning of Hamas firmly within the Iranian camp, with PIJ being a well-established Iranian proxy.

Outstanding issues

Additional issues that appear to be no closer to resolution as part of any potential arrangement include salary payments for 30,000 Hamas government employees – officials appointed by Hamas after its violent takeover of Gaza in 2007.

These officials are not recognized by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas fears that the PA could drag its feet over sending money for them.

Other central issues that the sides seem very far apart over include the critical question of a deal that would see Israel release security prisoners in exchange for the release by Hamas of its captive civilians, Avera Mengistu and Hisham Al-Sayed, and the remains of its MIA personnel, Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul.

Hamas has resolutely rejected Israel’s attempts to link financial assistance to Gaza with progress to a deal for their release, or the attempt to link an increased flow of goods into Gaza via the Kerem Shalom Crossing to progress on such a deal.

Hamas insists on separating the issues; Israel rejects that approach completely. This disagreement is blocking progress on the core pillars of any future arrangement.

Meanwhile, Hamas’s leaders are using conflict with Israel to beef up their internal political credentials. Yahya Sinwar, who was voted in March 2021 to a second term as head of Hamas’s political bureau in Gaza in internal Hamas elections, has tightened his political grip on power in the Strip following the May conflict with Israel. Sinwar accomplished this after a narrow win in the March elections, which led to previous questions about his power and support within Hamas.

Saleh Al-Arouri, who is head of Hamas’s activities in the West Bank but is based in Lebanon, and who is also the deputy of Ismael Haniyeh, head of Hamas’s overall political bureau, is working to destabilize the West Bank through terror cell activity.

At home in Gaza, Hamas faces no opposition to its regime. Despite its highly problematic track record and lack of tangible achievements in civilian matters, and despite Gaza’s distressing figures in the employment, health, and education sectors, Hamas’s position as the regime is assured.

Its security control of the Strip is unchallenged, and its rival, the Fatah movement, is almost totally restricted and inactive in Gaza.

Still, it appears as if many Gazan civilians are suspicious and distrustful of Hamas’s messaging – just as they are of Israel’s messages.

Some Gazans even suspect that Hamas and Israel exist in a state of undeclared ‘harmony,’ with undeclared coordination between them.

In actuality, Hamas and its supporters hold an extreme and uncompromising position toward Israel, are genuinely dogmatic, and claim to be marching on a path of ‘divine victory’ over Israel.

As a result, it is possible to assess with a high degree of confidence that even if partial agreements are reached between Hamas and Israel, Gaza’s problems will not vanish from the daily agenda, but instead will remain as fixed, disturbing issues, and they will continue to act as trigger points leading to potential security escalations.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

My View On The American Withdrawal From Afghanistan

BY Daniel Calbi

The events of the past two weeks in Afghanistan do not completely surprise me. The speed and swiftness with which they occurred was unforeseen. Prior to the U.S. invasion in winter 2001, the Taliban provided safe harbor to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The United States’ primary mission in Afghanistan since 2001 was counterterrorism, not nation building. My thoughts on the United States withdrawal come from the perspective of counterterrorism, not nation building.

There are many questions that appear unanswered regarding the sudden and rapid downfall of the Afghan Government. In the forefront are the following questions that need to be addressed– who were the leaders in the United States telling Donald Trump in late 2019 and early 2020, and Joe Biden in 2021 that Afghanistan was stable enough to be turned over to the Afghan Government? Was stability a concern, or was a war weary nation the driving factor in the removal of U.S. troops and their support for the Afghans? What steps prior to the U.S. withdrawal were taken to ensure that the Afghan military had the ability to supply their troops with ammunition, food, ensure wages, repair their equipment (most importantly air assets), and that they would not capitulate without a fight?  

President Biden has highlighted that the Afghan military and police are unwilling to fight for themselves, a now proven fact. In countless provinces, and specifically the major cities of Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Kabul the military did not counter the Taliban advancement. The Afghan military was underequipped and minimally supported by their government, making it nearly impossible to gain the initiative and defeat an advancing enemy. I reference my list of earlier questions – did the decision makers in the United States convey to our President that these Afghans were severely depleted of supplies, had little to no air support and little conviction to the fight? Afghan President Ashraf Ghani refused to resign, a tenet of a two-week ceasefire between GIRoA and the Taliban in early August. Yet, he fled the country as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. If the leader of a country is unwilling to lead, is it fair to expect it from his military?

It has become clear over the last few days that throughout the withdrawal process the plan of the United States was an imminent departure regardless of the situation on the ground. During the week of August 16th, 2021, there were over 7,000 troops in Afghanistan, the majority of whom were surged to the country as a response, not a planned tactical withdrawal, to accommodate the rapid exit of our remaining citizens and partners. It is possible that the United States government expected the Taliban would regain control, and simply miscalculated the timing in which it would occur. One can argue the morality of that decision, but the premier issue in the execution of the United States withdrawal is that it was not completed before the country fell. The misjudgment regarding the power of the Taliban and the fragility of the Afghan Government cannot be overlooked.

The Wall Street Journal reported on August 17th, 2021, that senior military and intelligence officials warned the Biden administration that a rapid, untimely exit from Afghanistan could have dire consequences. It seems that the reality of this exit was even more serious than they anticipated. No matter the circumstance of the discussions between senior officials and the White House the U.S. military answers to the American people, and acts at their will via elected officials.  It is unnerving that military, intelligence and other governmental agency leadership were unable to conjure a plan that met the timeline provided to them by the Biden administration or that the White House disregarded the findings of their senior leaders.

During my tenure in the country, 2015-2019, the Afghans were incapable of fighting on their own and relied heavily on logistical and military support of coalition partner nations. What was done at the strategic level to alleviate this issue or ensure that the United States had the necessary time and assets for an orderly and safe exit? I’m not confident that senior leaders of the United States can  provide a clear answer. America is beyond fortunate that we suffered no casualties from the blitzkrieg-like advancement of the Taliban. What has and will continue to suffer is the Afghan people and the greater Central Asia region.

Will this new, emboldened Taliban revert to their old ways, or will they honor their pledge to not allow Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to operate within their borders? Time will tell, but what is certain is that the manner in which the United States departed from the region is a calamitous black eye that will have repercussions for years to come.

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Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. Read full bio here.

U.S., Israel must prepare for Iran possibly not rejoining JCPOA

By Yochai Guiski

The realization that Iran under President Ebrahim Raisi may not wish to move forward with the nuclear negotiations and recommit itself to the nuclear deal (JCPOA) has dawned on decisions makers and analysts in Israel and the United States in recent weeks.

This should come as no surprise. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, never had any real interest in the deal in the first place. He was always very suspicious of the notion of a deal, as he feared it would bring the “corrupting” influence of the West to Iranian society. He has always favored perseverance and resistance to the West’s influence, even at great economic cost.

Although there are other approaches in Iran, such as the one championed by former president Hassan Rouhani, it is ultimately the Supreme Leader’s reservations that need to be addressed to get to a deal.

Any scholar in the field of decision making can explain that a deal is reached when three conditions are met – the deal itself is worthwhile (and there is a path to reach it), there are no better options for either participant, and the benefits of having a deal outweigh the prospects of not having one.

For example, reaching a deal to sell a car for 10,000$ requires that you have a buyer willing to pay; that you don’t have an alternative buyer willing to pay 11,000$; and that you are willing to part ways with the car (it would not leave you unable to work or move around).

When analyzing the JCPOA, one can see that a deal was reached because:

1.       Iran was promised economic benefits and sanctions relief, while keeping the core of the nuclear program intact, and being able to gradually grow it over time.

2.       There was no alternative to a deal with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1), and no real way to avoid dealing with the demands of the U.S. and the Europeans, since they controlled the world financial system, and China and Russia were unable and unwilling to oppose them.

3.       The option of not having a deal would have entailed more sanctions and economic hardship, and even a military escalation, which may have put the survival of the regime at stake.

The sum of these three conditions, and the Supreme Leader’s cautious nature, was great enough to overcome the supreme leader’s aversion and led him to “drink form the poisoned chalice” and accept the deal after being  persuaded by President Rouhani and his ministers.

The current situation is very different:

1.       The benefits of a deal have shrunk considerably. Six years into the JCPOA, Iran has learned it cannot trust the U.S. to live up to its end of the bargain; that the private sector is extremely risk averse regarding investment in Iran; and that a decarbonizing western economy would not be a good fit for an oil and gas exporting Iran.   

2.       China has emerged as a significant possible alternative to economic ties with the West. China is now Iran’s most important economic partner, it is hungry for oil and gas, has signed a strategic partnership agreement with Tehran and sees it as part of its “Belt and Road” initiative. Even if Beijing may view Iran as just a small part of its growing Middle East portfolio (which includes strong ties to the UAE and Saudi Arabia), the view from Tehran is different.

3.       The possibility of war because of a “no deal” situation is practically nonexistent (after no response to Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia and the downing of a U.S. spy plane, and the U.S. strategy of accepting the situation in North Korea and Afghanistan). Sanctions are still in place, but the Iranian leadership thinks the worst has passed, and Iran has been able to adjust to the sanctions.

Under these conditions it is no surprise that the Supreme Leader has been unwilling sign off on a return to the JCPOA, this even while Rouhani was still president (and supposedly pushing for it).

It seems that the Supreme Leader was looking for something else when he allowed Iranian diplomats to return to the negotiating table (while not allowing them to directly negotiate with their U.S. counterparts):

1.       Extract concessions and sanctions relief from the U.S. during the negotiations, without returning to the deal itself.

2.       Deny the U.S. the capability of applying pressure on Iran, for fear of being blamed for the failure of the negotiations and being seen as a warmonger by different political actors in the U.S.

3.       Provide time and space to advance the nuclear program, and other regional activities, while the U.S. is deterred (as bargaining chips and as tangible assets).

4.       Create the conditions to enhance Iran’s ties with China, as its economic and political future, while Tehran uses the negotiations to embarrass the U.S. and show its abuse of power.  

Up until now Iran’s logic has proven itself to be precise, as its actions have led to few consequences. The U.S. and Europe are not inclined to pressure Iran or lead to a crisis with Tehran, even as it enriches uranium to 60%, commences work on uranium metal, operates advanced centrifuges, and attacks various ships at sea and in port. All the while, China and Russia are still on Iran’s side and are calling on the U.S. to address Iran’s demands.

Going forward, one can expect Iran to continue the following trends:

1.       Dragging out the negotiations, possibly in the hopes of strong-arming their counterparts to accept the status of Iran’s program as “fait accompli” and not rolling it back much.  

2.       Aspiring to enhance its relations with China.

3.       Advancing the nuclear program: With a new hardline leadership and the understanding that no one will stop it, there is no telling when and if Iran would stop. Iran might even eventually decide to develop a nuclear device if it assesses that there is no credible U.S. military threat, and that the world might prefer to accept the situation and blame the Trump administration for the mess, instead of confronting Iran.

4.       The growing pressure on Iran’s government from the accelerating Covid outbreak (Iran now ranks third in the world in the number of newly infected individuals) may play a part in a change of heart and a return to the JCPOA, but that seems unlikely.

The belief that Iran is willing to rejoin the deal and the view that acceleration of its nuclear program is aimed at attaining bargaining chips for the negotiating table have allowed Iran to advance its program without real cost (even if actions attributed to Israel set the program back in a few areas). Thus, it is imperative to make sure that Secretary of State Blinken’s statement that “negotiations cannot go on indefinitely” is translated into plans and action both in the U.S. and Israel.

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.