Jerusalem will determine the course of this wave of violence

By David Hacham

There is a reason the latest Palestinian terror wave in Israel proper and the West Bank has coincided with Ramadan: The Muslim holy month is an occasion for religious fervor and for some can serve as motivation for launching attacks.  

The current wave of terror has been characterized by a new generation of Palestinian assailants: young, acting alone or in small cells, lacking clear organizational affiliation, and working independently without receiving instructions from any established Palestinian organization.

From a broader perspective, it appears to be occurring as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict shifts to the margins after decades in which it topped the priorities and captured the attention of the Arab regional system since the establishment of the State of Israel.

This is a direct result of the process in which Israel and the moderate Arab camp are growing closer, as expressed by normalization agreements signed between Israel and Arab Gulf states – the UAE and Bahrain – and Morocco, and by the military-security cooperation that is being forged with Sudan.

Against this background, the Palestinian problem has been shoved into the corner. The Israeli government, with its political paralysis, is unable to take any political steps vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority, and the conflict has been pushed into a deep freeze as a result.

Another feature of this wave of terror is Arab-Israeli operatives subscribing to the ideology of ISIS. This was the case in attacks in Beersheba and Hadera in recent weeks. The involvement of attackers subscribing to this ideology exposed a basic weakness in the detection capability of Israel’s security forces, which rely on Shin Bet intelligence monitoring, exposure, and identification of suspicious elements to prevent attacks in time.

The attacks have also shined a fresh spotlight on the ideology of ISIS, which, unlike Hamas, strives to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate here and now.   

Hamas, in contrast, a Muslim Brotherhood branch that rules Gaza, strives in the first stage of its plan to set up a Palestinian Islamic state on the ruins of Israel, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, and only in the future to create the conditions for an Islamic caliphate.

The terrorist attack in Tel Aviv earlier this month is unusual and deserves special attention for another reason. It was carried out by the son of a senior Palestinian Authority security officer, whose organization holds coordination meetings with Israeli counterparts, and works with Israel to foil attacks.

Yet the terrorists’ father praised the atrocity committed by his son, telling crowds gathered outside of his Jenin home, “You will see the victory with Allah’s help in the coming weeks and months. And your eyes will enjoy the change. You will win freedom and will win with Allah’s help and liberate Al Aqsa’s Mosque.”

The IDF and Shin Bet have focused on Jenin and the town’s refugee camp in a series of counter-terror operations. Search and arrest operations have been taking place daily and have sparked exchanges of fire with Palestinian gunmen.

Dozens of Palestinians have been arrested on suspicion of terror activities in Jenin and its environment, as well as other areas across the West Bank.

Further fueling the flames have been ongoing incitement on social media, as well as on Palestinian television and radio. These messages express hostility and hatred to Israel in a way that can increase motivation to attack, among those who consume such content.

At the same time, incitement is surging against the security coordination in place between Israel and PA, not only among left-wing Palestinian terror organizations or Hamas but also within Fatah -- the ruling party in the Palestinian Authority. 

And yet, despite the above, the Gaza Strip has maintained almost absolute quiet for the past year.   The quiet in the Gazan arena derives first and foremost from a decision taken by the Hamas leadership to avoid border fence disturbances or attacks on Israeli targets with ballistic rockets or mortars.  

This is part of a clear trend by Hamas to secure and maintain quiet and prevent scenarios of escalation.

This is a direct result of clear priorities set by Gaza’s rulers, who are prioritizing the recovery and development of Hamas’s military-operational capabilities after the severe blows it absorbed in Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021.

Hamas is also advancing the rehabilitation of civilian infrastructure, with a focus on building roads and setting up new residential neighborhoods in northern Gaza, which are being built by Egypt. Gaza continues to receive monthly payments from Qatar for needy families and for subsidizing the entry of fuels from Egypt that nourish Gaza’s power station.

Hamas under current conditions has no interest currently in launching a new military conflict with Israel. In addition, the Hamas regime in Gaza is even using force in stopping Palestinian Islamic Jihad from firing rockets at Israel in response to PIJ casualties inflicted by Israeli security forces on its members in the West Bank.

Hamas’s reluctance to launch new attacks against Israel from Gaza does not stop senior Hamas members from calling for terrorist attacks against Israel and encouraging attackers to pounce in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

According to media reports, Israel sent warnings messages to Hamas via the Egyptian General Intelligence Service telling the group to restrain itself or face severe consequences.

To further consolidate the security calm in Gaza Israel is continuing to allow 12,000 Gazan workers into Israel for daily work trips. In addition, Israel is weighing the option of increasing the Gaza work permit quota to 20,000.

At the same time, any significant deterioration in clashes, particularly in the Temple Mount and Jerusalem during the sensitive period of Ramadan would increase the chances of a scenario in which Hamas joins in the clashes with Israel.

That would see a renewal of violence along the Gaza- Israel border fence, rocket attacks on southern Israeli communities and cities beyond, and infiltration attempts from Gaza via land and sea routes into Israeli territory to carry out terror attacks.

Despite the above, it is possible to cautiously conclude that at this current time there is no sign that the region is on the brink of a new intifada. Still, further lone-wolf attacks and IDF counter-measures can increase the violent dynamics to the point where the Palestinian side takes on an organized and planned dimension. Under these circumstances, the Israeli defense establishment will do well if it continues in its efforts to prevent collective punishment of Palestinians, thereby avoiding the risk of spreading the unrest and the integration of new, currently uninvolved sectors of Palestinian society into the terrorist circle.  

The military must also work rapidly to block the gaps in the security fence.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Enlarging the Israeli Police is critical for national resilience

By Alon Levavi

The current challenging security situation in Israel reflects a key fact: National resilience and domestic security are just as important as the ability to defend borders against external threats.

Add the ongoing terrorism threat faced by Israeli cities to the threat from projectiles from Lebanon and Gaza and it becomes clear that the Israel Police is simply too small to carry out its many missions.

Since 1991, the State of Israel has doubled its population, yet the police force has increased by a mere 20%. The officer-to-civilian ratio in Israel is one of the worst in the West.

To fill the gaps, the Israel Police has grown used to improvising solutions, through measures such as temporarily deploying backup forces from one district to another.

This is now occurring in the Jerusalem District, the center of friction and disturbances during the Ramadan holiday period. The technique of moving police units from place to place has plenty of costs as well. It generates organizational demoralization and creates endless logistical headaches.

Temporary measures will not enable the government to evade the need to make a decision. If the government wants to seriously boost national resilience, it would be well advised to go beyond seat-of-the-pants ‘solutions,’ like getting IDF units to go on patrol with police. It needs to strengthen the police during routine times too.

The Israel Police is the only force of its kind in the West that is responsible for both classic policing missions and emergency security situations. A life-affirming state that seeks democracy, law and order, public discipline, and the rule of law has to therefore strengthen its police force during routine.

Civilians want to see police on the streets in order to regain their sense of security. They want rapid response times to security and criminal incidents. But the resources for those expectations are simply not currently in place.

The Israel Police’s personnel are highly motivated. Recent terror attacks have, once again, demonstrated their willingness to sacrifice their own lives to protect the public’s lives and safety. Police officers ask no questions before jumping on motorbikes and taking on terrorist gunmen on city streets.

Yet the dominant narrative in Israeli society during quieter times is that the police force is ‘no good,’ incapable of providing decent service, and is of poor quality.

This narrative does not take into account the fact that the police force receives eight million calls per year, and that a million of those turn into police field responses.

When terrorism is inactive, the police becomes the public’s favorite punching bag. Only when officers go out and get killed as they tackle terrorists does the force begin to receive public credit for its dedication. This narrative harms the police’s morale in a significant manner.

This can help explain why 600 police officers quit their positions in the past year alone. If Israel wants to achieve domestic stability and prosperity, it will have to save its police, and reshape the public narrative – and not only during emergencies.

There are also many bright spots when it comes to the police’s development. Its ability to cooperate with the Shin Bet intelligence agency and the IDF is stronger than ever. Together, they form the three pillars for quashing terrorism that emanates from Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and from within Israel.

This cooperation is critical going forward.

While security forces will have to investigate how the latest string of attacks occurred, for every four or five attacks that take place, literally hundreds of terror plots have been foiled. This is accomplished through close cooperation on a daily basis between the civilian police, the Border Police’s Counter-Terrorism Unit, the Border Police, the Shin Bet, and the IDF.

Years of relative security quiet have always been deceptive. Every day, these units thwart murderous terrorist attacks.

Yet it is only when waves of attack occur that the police’s neglect comes into public focus. As such, there is no way around the need to increase the police’s budget, currently NIS 11 billion. All told, this budget is absurd in light of the quantity of missions faced by the police force.

After money is spent on salaries and pensions, barely one percent of the police budget is left for development. Fortunately, police salaries were recently raised after being intolerably low for years. But funds for development are still lacking.

In addition, building a reserves model for the Border Police can also go a long way to building a new emergency response force for domestic crises. Such a system could also retain knowledge that would otherwise get lost when Border Police officers leave their positions.

Another tool that can enable police to conduct large-scale security campaigns is the volunteer force. At its peak, the police’s volunteer force totaled 70,000. Today, it is less than half of that due to the decreased age requirements, and more stringent operational security and professional standards in place for approving new volunteers.

Volunteers act as a key bridge between the community and the police. They can help shift the toxic narrative while boosting the public’s sense of security.

In addition, it is time to examine the need to free up resources by turning some uniformed policing roles into civilian roles, particularly in office positions. There is no reason why civilians cannot fulfill some of these roles, and this is an accepted norm in other forces in the Western world. That could help increase the police’s size.

At the end of the day, if the size of the police force is not increased, the country will not be able to escape the vicious cycle of inadequate domestic security response capabilities.

A police force that is too small cannot afford the luxury of allowing officers to train, study, and gain new tools, thus creating additional harm. Afterward, complaints become common about unprofessional officers.

It is difficult to send officers for more training when they spend 24-7 dealing with crime, terrorism, and traffic. All of this stems from a lack of personnel.

The current wave of terrorism in Israel crashes on civilians, who are the intended target. The goal of terrorism is always to spread fear. To counteract this evil, building national domestic resilience during routine times is necessary. That can only be done by police, acting as the ceramic vest of the state. The time to invest is when things are quiet, rather than remembering to take improvised action during emergencies.

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Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Cyberattacks don’t win wars

By Doron Tamir

As Russia’s war on Ukraine enters a new phase, Western countries are on heightened alert for Russian state-sponsored hacking attacks. Yet, while Moscow is capable of unleashing considerable disruption and damage through the cybersphere against Ukraine and its Western adversaries, there is no evidence to suggest that current cyber capabilities, as possessed by any state, can win wars.

Russia has developed its cyber capabilities over decades, using its large concentration of high-quality mathematicians and physicists. It only takes 20 to 30 top-level cyber attackers to build up advanced, persistent cyberattack capabilities. Russia has a tradition of doing this well — as well as it excels in the related fields of signals intelligence, encryption, and electronic intelligence.

The Russian private cyber sector is also well known around the world. The cyber capabilities of the Russian military feature one of the most advanced technological arrays of its kind. The Ukrainians are also good at cyberwarfare, due to their access to high-quality, advanced personnel, who have been “leased” by companies all over the world in recent years.

And yet, despite the above, the war in Ukraine has made clear a simple fact: Cyberwarfare won’t decide the conflict. Russia’s less-than-sweeping achievements on this front may have helped encourage it to rely increasingly on devastating conventional firepower.

It is important to address what cyber domain activities can do during a war. During Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia, the Russians disrupted their adversary’s ability to function by attacking communications systems. These systems can be blocked, but when an attacker does this, they are also blocking their own intelligence units’ ability to eavesdrop on the enemy, which can no longer communicate.

This represents a fixed dilemma when it comes to cyberattacks on communications systems. It is usually resolved by finding a balance — through the right “dosage” between cyberattacks and eavesdropping — to avoid harming the interests of those initiating the attack.

Other targets for cyberwarfare during conflicts are a state’s critical infrastructure, such as electricity networks and other sensitive core systems. Harming these targets disrupts the enemy’s ability to function and supply itself.

Transport forms another attractive target in the cyber domain. The long Russian military convoys traveling great distances in Ukraine could form a cyber target, particularly when it comes to vehicles built in the past 20 years, which have many computers onboard. Modern vehicles come with 30 to 40 computers onboard, making them highly vulnerable to cyber disruption, which in turn can significantly damage an adversary.

During wartime, states are more likely to activate state-level attacks, which require deeper technological, analytical and research capabilities than those possessed by ordinary groups of hackers. And yet the conflict in Europe demonstrates that the ability of militaries to conduct ground maneuvers remains the most influential factor in deciding the outcome of wars. Cyberattacks can disrupt and harm, but alone, they cannot win, much like an air force cannot win a war by itself, although it can play a significant role. Ultimately, even in 2022, boots on the ground are what decides armed conflicts.

There is a substantial difference between pulling a trigger and pushing “Enter.” Without the trigger, concepts of battlefield victory remain disconnected from reality. The Ukraine war has taught us that wars for territory are not a thing of the past.

One of the key lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine for other militaries is to not abandon land-maneuvering capabilities in favor of investing too much in technology. Both abilities are needed, but not at the expense of one or the other.

The fact of the matter is that until today, we have not seen dramatic, historic, game-changing use of cyberwarfare. No cyberattacks have sparked comparisons with the 1917 deployment of tanks by the British Army at the Battle of the Somme in World War I, or the appearance of fighter jets in 20th century combat decades later.

Rather, the cybersphere has become an additional domain together with another new domain: space. These have joined the three traditional domains of land, air and sea. Each domain requires intelligent use of tool kits, and a suitable command structure, to prove effective.

Just as there are no easy wars, there is no easy cyberattack solution that shuts down an enemy overnight.

When it comes to the West, heightened alert and readiness are certainly necessary at this time. Russian cyberattacks can target banks, hospitals and other key civilian infrastructures. But simple, basic preventative actions can solve some 70% of these problems. Basic steps, like changing passwords and software, can create real hurdles for attackers. This is particularly true if a large number of defenders change their passwords and software at the same time.

Another key lesson rapidly emerging from the war in Europe is the centrality of the cognitive struggle — or as it is more commonly known, psychological warfare. Such campaigns have very significant value in war and are easier than ever to conduct today in the digital age of social media networks.

As a result, many units from Russia and Ukraine are engaged in this struggle. It is a parallel effort to the cyber campaigns currently raging, and its significance on the battlefield, the motivation of soldiers and the understanding of each side of the general picture should not be underestimated.

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Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

Handling of COVID-19 in Africa was a failure

By Daphne Richemond Barak

According to leading epidemiologists, getting vaccines out to the world on time, including to Africa, could prevent future mutations in the next pandemic. 

Although it might be too late now to make much of a difference given how many people have already been infected, the effort to get vaccines to the African continent on time has been a massive failure.

It’s true that many countries donated vaccines, including Israel, which despite its small size sent a million doses to African nations in December 2021. Still, according to the World Health Organization, just 11% of the population of the continent is fully vaccinated. 

The WHO said the vaccination rate needs to increase six times if Africa is to meet the 70% target set for the middle of this year. To achieve this goal, it has set up a vaccine production facility in Africa to make copies of Moderna and distribute doses across the continent. 

According to official figures, there have been 11.1 million confirmed COVID cases on the continent and 246,000 deaths. The case figures from African countries have badly underreported the full impact of the pandemic, however, as have the recorded deaths attributed to the coronavirus and its mutations. This has led some observers to claim that there was little COVID in Africa, that the continent is more resilient, or that COVID did not kill as much in Africa as it did elsewhere. 

Claims that Africa has not been affected by COVID could not be further from the truth – and we should be careful that they don’t serve as an excuse for inaction when it comes to vaccination.

ALREADY, PRIOR to the pandemic, the African continent suffered enormous vulnerabilities: climate change, armed conflict, food insecurity and health emergencies like Ebola or malaria. The pandemic has exacerbated these preexisting, often structural, vulnerabilities, adding unemployment and impeding access to humanitarian aid. The virus undoubtedly harmed efforts by humanitarian aid organizations to reach people and placed aid delivery programs on hold.

In countries like Cameroon, under-nourishment affects 10% of the population, while in Zambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe, swaths of the population suffer from lack of access to food. In Ethiopia, less than half of the population receives basic drinking water services. Levels of extreme poverty, meanwhile, remain dire in sub-Saharan Africa.

Finally, the negative effects of a pandemic are typically compounded by conflict. Ebola has shown that armed conflict makes it more difficult for any government to respond to a pandemic effectively by, for example, impeding access to affected populations and the delivery of personal protective equipment.

It is clear that the COVID pandemic has exacerbated these problems and stretched the already limited resources and capacity of some African countries. Its impact is felt beyond the health sector, magnifying existing vulnerabilities and undermining already economically unstable situations.

So whatever it is that scientists cannot understand about COVID’s impact in Africa should not come at the expense of what comes next.

With only about 11% of Africa’s population vaccinated, it is not surprising that one of the biggest mutations in the coronavirus pandemic emerged from the continent. While Omicron proved to be a less dangerous mutation, new ones are already emerging, some of which might cause higher mortality.

To put it simply, the next mutation may have different results if the world once again neglects to get vaccines to the African continent on time. In recognition of this, the WHO is taking unprecedented steps to establish vaccine production facilities in African countries. These are known as “technology transfer hubs,” and they’ve been made possible by Moderna’s tacit commitment not to enforce its patent in Africa.

SOME WILL argue that it is too late for such efforts to make much of a difference now. Serological testing in Africa has indicated that massive infection of populations already exists. For example, in Nigeria, a recent sample found that for every person who had no antibodies to the virus, 958 people did.

But learning the correct lessons now can save the world tremendous suffering in the next stages of this pandemic, or whenever the world faces the next medical challenge.

A key part of this lesson means giving technological vaccine production capacity now to countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and Egypt. That will allow them to scale up production and rapidly distribute to the rest of the continent. Having the infrastructure in place can make a big difference when the next mutation or the next pandemic comes about.

Even if immunity fades following vaccination, vaccination still plays a role in containing mutations. Building vaccination capacity is something else altogether, as it enables the allocation of resources toward the creation of dedicated infrastructure. And it can be a game-changer later.

Global action and cooperation are needed to make sure that both vaccination and efforts at building vaccination capacity continue unabated in Africa. Israel’s voice is important here: it can help with research, technology and a general understanding of what it means to plan for the next hit and enhance preparedness. Israel could also take the lead in getting states to donate vaccines to the continent in a more centralized fashion and on a grander scale. Africa needs it. 

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Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Israel’s delicate navigation options in the face of Russia’s war

By Arthur Koll

When considering Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering options in the face of Russia’s war on Ukraine, it is important to first take stock of the fundamental, relevant facts.

The first of these is that Russia shares a common border with Israel. In northwest Syria, Russia is present in large air and naval bases and maintains a significant military presence. This forms a central consideration for Israel.

Russia has been a strategic pillar for Assad’s political (and physical) survival. Without Russian-provided military equipment and air power, the Assad regime could not have won its civil war.

Russian surface-to-air missile batteries – the most advanced in the world – are on Syrian soil, including the S-300 battery that Syria received from Russia, and the S-400, the peak of Russian air defense capabilities, operated by Russian forces in the country.

These assets could potentially form a major threat, not only to Israel’s military freedom of action in the crowded Syrian skies but also to civil aviation in Israeli airspace. As a result, Israel places enormous weight on the dialogue with Russia.

This dialogue occurs as Israel works to prevent the entrenchment of Iran in Syria. Understandings with Russia play a hugely important role in this context, and undermining these understandings could have significant consequences.

In addition, Israel is dealing with a two-dimensional Iranian threat. The first is the Iranian nuclear program. The Russian war on Ukraine has led to a delay of the signature on the revived Iranian nuclear program, despite America’s desire to fast-forward completion of the talks so that it can focus on Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the world has developed a new thirst for oil after disruption to Russia’s exports, and a post-nuclear deal Iran can help quench some of that thirst, particularly if the West upgrades the sanctions on Russia to include import of oil.

Surprisingly, while both the Iranians and the West have exhibited willingness to complete the deal, it has been Russia that introduced a new clause demanding exception from sanctions placed on it when it comes to its ties with Iran.

This has led to a return to consultations, which took several days to resolve until Russia said it received the necessary guarantees from Washington.

Whatever happens with the nuclear agreement, from the Israeli perspective, it is vital that it remains free to deal with the second dimension of the Iranian threat, namely its regional military-terrorist entrenchment program, particularly in Syria.

These factors form Israel’s principal considerations, which do not vanish as Russia mercilessly pounds Ukraine. While Israeli public opinion is firmly on the side of the Ukrainian people, Israel’s government does not have the luxury of ignoring key national security calculations.

Thus, Israel has adopted a policy that condemns the aggression by Moscow. It co-sponsored the UN General Assembly condemning the Russian invasion, provides humanitarian and medical aid, and has also made clear that it will not become a route to bypass economic sanctions on Russia. However, Israel has declined Ukraine’s request for Israeli military equipment.

To date, the United States has a full understanding of Israel’s array of considerations and its careful maneuvering.

Furthermore, Washington has found Israel’s role as a mediator between Kyiv and Moscow useful, although, so far, both sides remain too far apart for compromise solutions at this time.

There is no doubt that Israel’s stance and the practical steps are being tested and examined every day by decision-makers in Jerusalem. This is not a ‘fire and forget’ policy, and it may not remain static if the war drags on for months longer.

As warnings of chemical attacks by Russia continue to hover in the background, they serve as a reminder of the fact that critical changes in the situation in Europe, such as a WMD attack, or continued unrestrained Russian shelling, will obligate Israel to reassess its current position.

This would lead Israel to lose its position of mediator, but this is less important compared to the fact that it could lead to undesired elevated tension between Israel and Russia in the Middle East, should Russia choose to escalate.

In addition, should the situation change, the US could demand more categorical statements and actions from Israel as part of an alignment with Washington.

Israel is after all a part of the Western camp and enjoys a special alliance with the US. American support for Israel, past, present, and future, is of strategic vitality that cannot be exaggerated. This is backed by shared Israeli – American values. Hence, if the US demands a stronger Israeli posture on the European war, Israel will not be able to remain aloof.

Lastly, Israel’s handling of the Ukrainian refugee crisis began poorly but has improved steadily with time. Many of the Ukrainians headed for Israel are eligible for automatic citizenship under the Right of Return.

Should tens of thousands arrive, this will present a considerable event for a state the size of Israel.

At the same time, unforced and morally inappropriate errors were made by Israel in the initial reception of non-Jewish refugees. As Jews, we remember the dark days of the 1930s when the world shut its doors to us, and we could not escape the inferno of the Holocaust. As a nation that experienced this, we can’t turn away the small number of Ukrainian refugees who knock on our door. Most of them do not view Israel as their final destination.

Fortunately, on March 13, the Israeli government improved its policy and enabled thousands of additional Ukrainian refugees to claim asylum in Israel.

With no end to the crisis in sight at this time, Israel must prepare to keep adapting its policies as the situation evolves.

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Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

Will the UAE bring change to the UN Security Council?

By Daphne Richemond Barak

The United Arab Emirates became a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in January and will hold the position for the next two years.

For a country that perceives itself as a world leader in multiple areas and a key regional player, the UAE’s ascension to the Security Council fits neatly with its vision of promoting innovation, inclusion, resilience and peace.

Other UAE initiatives, like sending a probe to Mars, cleverly promote the same kind of ambitions, this time on behalf of the Arab world.

The UAE’s election to the Security Council happened around the same time as the signing of the Abraham Accords in August 2020. Like the Abraham Accords, this was the result of lengthy, successful planning by Emirati leaders. Arab states seeking endorsements as nonpermanent members have traditionally sought the support of the Arab League. The UAE received this endorsement in 2012, once again showing that achieving this position was a long time in the making and not an overnight move.

This is the second time that the UAE serves on the Security Council (the last time was in 1986-87), and this represents no small achievement for the rather small state, amid over 190 UN member states.

Ambassador Lana Nusseibeh, who has been the UAE’s representative at the UN since 2013, has been a vocal promoter of women’s empowerment in diplomacy, peace and security. She has vowed to make two-thirds of her office staff women, and she is certainly a nonconformist and an interesting character, while aligning her activities closely to the UAE’s political elite. She will no doubt lead initiatives at the Security Council and influence its agenda.

This is also an opportunity for the UAE to play a more prominent role vis-à-vis other international institutions: Nusseibeh recently met with the new prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim Khan, to engage on regional and global issues.

From a geopolitical perspective, the UAE’s presence on the Security Council could be influential.

On the one hand, the UAE cannot veto resolutions, but on the other, for a resolution to pass at the council, four out of 10 nonpermanent members need to vote in favor (in addition to the concurring votes of the five permanent members, Russia, China, the UK, the US and France).

This means that the nonpermanent members have a distinct influence on the passage of resolutions.

The UAE now has an opportunity to further push the issue of the Iranian-backed Houthis, who have recently been behind a series of UAV and missile attacks on the UAE, and to seek recognition of the Houthis as a terrorist organization.

Tensions between the US and Russia can spill over into the Security Council, and the UAE may be forced to take a position on Ukraine-related issues, placing it in the spotlight. Voting on these “hot” issues could potentially embarrass Russia and China – two superpowers with which the UAE is keen to maintain proper relations. Russia is an important player in the Middle East, and the UAE will likely tread carefully on any votes regarding the evolving situation in Europe.

Ultimately, although the position on the Council affords the UAE influence, it can also be a trap when votes are called for on difficult topics that can alienate world powers.

The UAE could also use its privileged position on the Security Council to advance Palestinian issues, and perhaps to urge Israel and the Palestinian Authority to kick-start negotiations in the future.

But here, too, the UAE could face tricky situations. A resolution on Israel or on Palestinian membership at the UN, even if an unlikely scenario, would require the UAE to vote – and any vote it casts could upset fellow council members. Even abstaining, in a situation like this, is a statement.

FOR ISRAEL, the question of whether it has a new ally on the powerful Security Council is a valid one to ask. The other nine nonpermanent members include countries friendly to Israel, such as Albania, Kenya and India. Importantly, Israel has diplomatic relations with all countries currently serving on the council.

Whether or not the UAE’s position on the Security Council will alter the council’s dynamics remains to be seen, but what can be stated with more confidence is that the current composition of the council is quite favorable to Israel.

Opportunities could arise for Israel to work with the UAE on issues of common interest at the UN, from climate change to international security and pandemic readiness. Israel could also use this opportunity to share its concerns on the buildup of Hezbollah’s military capabilities in Lebanon, and the inaction of Lebanese authorities.

The big question going forward is whether the UAE’s new influence at the Security Council will, over the next two years, trickle down to the rest of the United Nations.

With three new Arab countries normalizing ties with Israel, the traditional tendency of Arab countries to vote with one another as a bloc might fade over time.

Greater sub-bloc cooperation between the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, as well as possibly Saudi Arabia, could become a feature, and not only on issues related to Israel. The arrival of the UAE on the Security Council could help kick-start this process.

There is also the possibility that this process of change could affect the infamous UN Human Rights Council.

In November 2021, a joint statement was issued at the Human Rights Council on the role of women in peace and security as part of a joint initiative of the UAE, Bahrain, Israel and Morocco. Another 51 states signed on to this historic statement. Is this a small sign of change? Quite possibly.

At the same time, it is important to remember that the UAE is highly skilled at cultivating and maintaining good relations with everyone – including Turkey and Iran. The UAE does not cut off dialogue with anyone.

The UAE can be expected to figure out how to balance opposing pressures, whether at the regional or global levels, while promoting its interests. This could make for an interesting two years at the Security Council and the General Assembly.

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Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

True Equality Is Far Off

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

In late February, I represented the Knesset at the annual open hearing of the United Nations General Assembly and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Among the issues on the agenda was advancing gender equality as a foundation for government stability.

The list of speakers wishing to address this important issue was the largest among the conference sessions – everyone wanted to talk about the importance of gender equality. When my turn to speak arrived, I sought to place reality on the table and to collectively examine how words can change reality. In my address, I stated, “I hear big, moving words here that touch on the importance of gender quality to the stability of the world in which we all live.”

In my speech, I compared the words spoken at the conference to a beautiful photograph, in which women who make up half the world population hold central positions, lead processes and are decision-makers. In reality, the picture is very different. While women indeed work in every sector of life and most of us believe in advancing gender equality as an important factor for government stability – I have placed bills before the 24th Israeli Knesset on this very issue – the reality is that the more senior the position, the fewer women there are.

I told the conference that even at the General Assembly hall that hosted us, even at the UN, a woman has never served as secretary-general. My observation drew applause from the plenum.

The post-COVID-19 world has to recover as it marches forward and our role as parliament members from around the world is to work together toward this recovery. The goal of gender equality to boost the level of government worldwide is a common mission.

Israel has indeed had a woman prime minister in the 1970s, but at the same time, due to the ultra-Orthodox political parties that have banned women from their ranks, Israel is currently listed 64th in the global gender equality index. We must not accept that.

On March 8, International Women’s Day was marked in Israel and around the world. As they do every year, voices surfaced claiming that this is an unnecessary event. International Women’s Day was first marked in the US in 1908. Two years later, in Copenhagen, Denmark, a strategy was set to promote women’s equality, including the right to vote.

While this right has been secured and the lives we lead today are different from those of our mothers and grandmothers, there is still a long way to go. We have yet to complete the journey to full gender equality. We live in a reality in which there are income gaps, glass ceilings, jobs that are not staffed by women and severe violence against women that sometimes ends in murder.

We live in a reality in which women struggle in rabbinical courts to achieve full freedom, in which women can be denied divorce and in which young women still have to fight in court for the right to be able to fulfill certain roles in the Israel Defense Forces. We live in a reality in which only once has a woman served as head of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

In this reality, we must continue to mark International Women’s Day to remind ourselves that the obligation to create change applies to us all. The path to gender equality needs to be walked by men and women together, as it passes through legislative reform, education and adapting the job market to parenthood and family life.

We women who have dared and achieved must also continue to walk on this path, and to declare loudly and clearly to other women: Yes we can!

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MK Sharon Roffe Ofir was elected to the 24th Knesset on behalf of the Yisrael Beitenu Party. She has previously served as deputy council head, and worked as a journalist and senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years.. Read full bio here.

PM Bennett must mediate Russia Ukraine conflict

By Yochai Guiski

As events in Ukraine unfolded over the past few weeks we witnessed a Russian ground invasion, a valiant Ukrainian defensive effort, thousands of deaths, over a million refugees, and heavy sanctions by the United States and Europe on Russia.  Israel for its part tried to stay out of the fray and avoid taking a harsh tone with Russia.

As a result, Jerusalem’s partners in the United States and Europe, as well as journalists in the Israeli and international media, pushed it to adopt a more vocal and unambiguous tone regarding Russia’s assault on Ukraine.

Reports suggested that U.S. officials, and even President Biden himself, were critical of Israel’s stance, expecting it to be “on the right side of history” and to join the chorus of condemnation of Russia’s aggression, at least at the United Nations. If U.S. anger with the policies of India and the United Arab Emirates is any indication, the pressure on Jerusalem must have been intense.

As Israel tried to stay the course, Washington pushed harder and a few days into the war, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid condemned Russia’s attack on Ukraine, supported Ukrainian territorial integrity, and voiced Israel’s commitment to humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine.

Even these steps were seen as insufficient and expectations of Israel to provide additional support, including weapon systems were expressed by Ukrainian officials and by U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham. Although at least, the nonsensical idea of providing Iron Dome systems to Ukraine, which has been circulated by the media, was rightfully rejected by Ukrainian defense officials.

But Israel’s boldest move came over the weekend when Prime Minister Bennett secretly flew to Moscow to meet with President Vladimir Putin and then on to Berlin to meet with Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The prime minister was also in contact with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during his journey. Israel also sought to coordinate the effort with the U.S. by reportedly conferring with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan before the flights.

The reactions to the prime minister’s initiative ranged from lukewarm support to dismissal and outright criticism of his actions.

But was Israel right to forge ahead with its mediation effort or should its leaders have toed the line, adopted a forceful approach toward Russia, and let other nations tend to the conflict? I believe the Prime Minister made the right call.

Even now, millions are in harm’s way or fleeing their homes in Ukraine to become refugees, and many millions more may suffer the same or much worse, as the crisis in Ukraine is set to intensify. The direct human toll could be extremely heavy, and the indirect costs of the conflict may be just as bad.

Shortages in grain supplies from major producers Russia and Ukraine, as well as the skyrocketing prices of wheat, may bring famine and instability to many countries including in the volatile Middle East.  

In these circumstances, Israel is one of the very few countries that are still on good terms with Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., and Europe. Should Israel walk away from its unique position and simply join the litany of states that forcefully criticize Russia (but do little else), or should it attempt to use its position to do some good?

There are several ways Israel can make positive use of its position vis-à-vis Russia:

1. Provide a secure and discreet back channel between the West and Russia. As the conflict in Ukraine intensifies and the specter of nuclear escalation looms, there would be value in such channels.

2. Allow for indirect communication between Russian and Ukrainian leadership, through Israel.

3. Communicate the need for humanitarian consideration to be incorporated into the Russian operations in Ukraine, as well as specific humanitarian requests.

4.  Assist the U.S. in understating Putin’s state of mind, and potentially help the U.S. develop and execute an exit strategy from the conflict and provide an “off-ramp” for the Russian leadership to de-escalate the situation.  

The value inherent in these possibilities is already being partly realized, as both President Putin and President Zelenskyy and other leaders conduct talks with Prime Minster Bennett, while the Ukrainian ambassador has commended his mediation effort, and even suggested that Jerusalem might be a venue for high-level negotiations.

The strategic and moral imperative dictates that Israel tries to use its influence to prevent more loss of life and alleviate the suffering of those who are still caught in the fighting, instead of joining the Western efforts to exact a toll from Russia for its actions.

Hundreds of thousands of Jews living in Ukraine and Russia would be part of the suffering, and as history teaches us, there are always dark forces of antisemitism at play in times of strife, who would seek to scapegoat and attack these communities.

There has been enough death and bloodshed in Ukraine, including the brutal murders of countless Jews during the Holocaust. The ground is already quenched with the blood of innocents - it need not get any more.

The Jewish Talmud teaches us a moral lesson - whoever saves one life saves the whole world. Israel must rise to the challenge and seize the moment to help save as many people as possible.

Doing so will not be achieved by joining the group of countries cutting ties with Russia and imposing sanctions on it, as the Israeli contribution to the overall effort would be negligible. Israel should focus on using the relations between Moscow and Jerusalem to help save lives.   

In his famous poem “The road not taken,” Robert Frost describes the contemplation of a person between two roads in the forest.  Like the choice made in the poem, Israel should also take the road less traveled, and hope that it makes all the difference.    

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Babyn Yar: Re-Burying the Holocaust by Bullets

By Michael B. Snyder

Russian dissident poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko’s famous 1961 poem “Babyy Yar” begins: “Over Babyy Yar, there are no monuments.” Resulting in what can be fairly termed the most attention ever paid to the largest mass shootings of Jews in German-occupied Europe, Russian aggression causing unspecified damage to the still-under-construction Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center is symbolic of unfinished business: the decades it took for recognition of the Holocaust by bullets in Soviet killing fields and the constant antisemitic attacks against the Shoah.  The site has become a rallying point for Jewish outrage against Russia; reasons for outrage, however, have long existed.

Before the Wannsee Conference that decided that the answer to the “Jewish Question” was the total destruction of European Jewry, and also prior to the German invasion of its then ally the Soviet Union during “Operation Barbarossa” in June 1941, there were 160,000 Jews living in Kyiv, thought to be about 20 percent of its population.  Approximately 100,000 Jews immediately fled or were already absent serving in the Soviet army. 

As part of German advances following this surprise attack, Einsatzgruppen (mobile groups of Nazis killing largely by bullets) pushed west, slaughtering 4200 Jews in Kamenetz-Podolsk, 6000 in Lomzha, Poland, 25,000 in Odessa, then 33,771 (along with 19,000 non-Jews) just outside Kyiv in the Babyn Yar ravine.  Jews died “by systematic, merciless executions” that were first considered random murders due to infrequent reports and accounts of other Jews dying from starvation, disease, or as part of other groups.  It was an ominous sign that the political affairs director for the World Jewish Congress said that many Jews “complain now as a sheer matter of habit....” in response to American Jews grumbling over the disinterest shown by the Allies.

The post-war history of the site is rife with significant controversy encased within political intrigue as a memorial was sought.  In March 1945, the Ukrainian government and Communist Party agreed to build a monument in the form of an abstract large black granite form that would not recognize Jewish victims.  The Soviet Ukrainian Ministry of Culture halted the program due to its refusal to build any monument at all, hoping to sweep away the atrocities altogether. 

During the 1950s, attempts to physically erase Babyn Yar occurred under the guise of “residential planning.” Liquid mud waste dumped over the mass grave as a primary weapon to bury the past proved so heavy that the dam abutting the land collapsed under its weight. The subsequent surge of water killed 145 people and destroyed 70 buildings in the area. A Jewish cemetery adjacent to the flood was paved over shortly thereafter to build a sports complex. 

The Ministry of Culture of Soviet Ukraine continued to control decisions in the 1960s, initiating a “closed competition” for monuments in memory of Soviet citizens and soldiers who perished during the Nazi occupation of Kyiv.  In response, a memorial park to be built on bridges over the Babyn Yar ravine, along with other entries that would memorialize Jews, were rejected as “Zionist.” The location became a person-made memorial with no official recognition when Russian and Ukrainian writers, many of whom were jailed, gave impassioned speeches (including the unveiling of the above “Babiyy Yar” poem) to 1,000 people decrying the suffering of the Jewish people and the necessity of the struggle against antisemitism.

On August 24, 1991, Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence was approved. Jews looked to it with the hope that it would mark the end of state-sponsored antisemitism.  Finally, 50 years after the Babyn Yar massacre, authorities for the first time admitted publicly that most of the victims were Jews. The man who would become the first President of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, delivered a speech that stressed Jews were killed in Babyn Yar only because they were Jews.

Despite the continued Russian threat, the Ukraine government moved forward with reforms.  It was in Israel where the dam was broken: then-President Poroshenko spoke to the Knesset in 2015, emphasizing that Babyn Yar is a shared, open wound of Ukrainians and Jews, that 1.5 million Ukrainian Jews perished during the Holocaust, and apologizing to the children and grandchildren of Holocaust victims for the Ukrainian “collaborationists.” 

Finally, on the evening of October 6, 2021, the sacred ground saw the opening of the memorial that is not just for the memory of Nazi horror but also to symbolize continued repression of and antisemitism against Jews by the Soviet Union, Russia, and the Ukrainian collaborationists. With Ukraine’s Jewish president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a witness, the chair of the memorial’s advisory board and former refusenik and MK Natan Sharansky said, “Babyn Yar is not only the symbol of the Holocaust by bullets but it is the symbol of the efforts of Soviet communist regime to raze the Holocaust memory.” 

And now, the symbol comes full circle. With Purim’s own form of memorial approaching, the Jewish world pivots. Trending globally from Ukraine and Babyn Yar includes Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett undertaking at least temporary leadership in shuttle diplomacy; two Jews and Israel surging to front and center leadership in a conflict that includes the bombing of a Holocaust memorial. Israel opened its border to welcome home what could be ten thousand Ukrainian Jews making Aliyah (becoming Israeli citizens), along with increasing the number of non-Jewish refugees it will absorb for the coming year. 

At the same time, antisemitism and antizionism roar, fully integrated with political correctness. Israel is being compared to Russia, memorializing six million Jews remains under attack against charges of denial and distortion, and conspiracy theorists blame Jews for their own and Arab genocide without evidence.  Yet Israel and world Jewry is leading by showing and not telling, by acting and not pontificating. There is no reason to expect or desire credit as Israel shows the world and diaspora Jews what is possible despite the never-ending denunciation. 

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Michael B. Snyder is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute, he is an attorney with over 35 years of experience in the areas of children’s rights, human rights and Non-Government Organizations in the United States, Israel and Africa. Read full bio here.

Does the Abu Dhabi attack signal the budding of a Middle East NATO?

By Henrique Cymerman

The January 17 missile and UAV attacks on Abu Dhabi carried out by the Houthis in Yemen were a kind of ultimatum.

The message from the Iranian-backed Houthis to the UAE was: Stop attacks on us in Yemen or deal with our attacks. The deadly strike claimed three innocent lives, but also caused extensive damage to the UAE’s image, psychology, and economy that goes beyond the incident itself.

The UAE and Dubai’s stock market are seen as an island of stability and sanity unlike other states in the Middle East. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia all ceased existing as we previously knew them as the Middle East declared war on itself over the past decade. Yet investors always saw Dubai and Abu Dhabi as safe zone emirates for tourism, real estate, business, and shopping.

Twenty-two million tourists visited the UAE in 2019. Undoubtedly, every new Houthi attack can harm the UAE’s brand as a safe place for business and investment.

The Houthi spokesman even threatened to target Dubai’s Expo, which opened in October and has attracted 13 million visitors so far. Such an attack would be a game-changer for Dubai’s tourism and business hub perception.

After seven years of fighting stronger armies, the Houthis are acting as if they’ve already won their war. Despite accounting for just 35% of Yemen’s population, they control an area that is home to most of the country’s 30 million people and are in the process of strengthening their regime under the influence of the Iranian political model – the same Iran that arms them.

 On January 31, the Houthis fired again on Abu Dhabi, just when Israeli President Isaac Herzog was visiting the UAE. An Iranian message here was carried by the missiles – punishment for joining the Abraham Accords.

These events represent the seeds for a new regional defense arrangement, NATO-style, which could take shape in the coming years.

The pact between Israel and several Sunni states could begin with a joint effort to deal with suicide UAVs.

A dialogue underway between Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other countries could lead to a situation in which every state that identifies the threat of a UAV attack on another state will alert it and assist in preventing the attack. The same cooperation could be extended to deal collectively with ballistic missile threats.

Such an arrangement would be hugely significant. It would have been difficult to imagine two years ago, and yet now it is approaching reality.

Israel’s February 3 defense agreement with Bahrain is, similarly, all about dealing with Iran and its partner.

The shock that residents of Abu Dhabi experienced last month – which I saw firsthand as I was visiting the emirate when the attack occurred – signifies the change underway in the region.

Authorities could not deny the attack as images of the damage spread like wildfire on social media.

Saudi Arabia, in contrast, has grown accustomed to these attacks from Yemen, and to intercept them.

The Abraham Accords present moderate states in the Middle East with the ideal platform on which to plan out the response to their collective security. Currently involving Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, many more countries could join. The Accords are the most significant development for Israel concerning its regional status since the signing of the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan.

They do not cancel out the big danger of a de facto war between Israel and Iran, but they do solidify cooperation against the common threat posed by the radical regime in Tehran.

Russia, a military neighbor of Israel, may change its attitude toward Israeli operations against Iranian targets in Syria – another key unknown – following the war in Ukraine.

But Israel can be counted on to continue its surgical strikes against Tehran, whether in Syria or by covert means in Iran itself, where it targets nuclear threats, likely with the assistance of other states.

Iran’s proxies and partners, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, occasionally remind Israel that they can harm it.

Now, the Houthis have joined this map of threats from the distant south. Can they target Eilat, the Israeli popular resort at the northern tip of the Red Sea? Are their threats to hit Israel credible? Although attacking Israel has always been popular among public opinion across the region, no one knows yet.

Is Israel now facing a new ‘southern Hezbollah’? It seems that Jerusalem is getting used to that possibility and that it has begun to gather intelligence on the Houthis, despite having no connection to Yemen in the past, as opposed to Lebanon, where Israel’s intelligence coverage of Hezbollah is phenomenal.

As the war in Yemen drags on, its horrific proportions seem lost on an indifferent world. An estimated 400,000 casualties of war, starvation, and disease have led the UN to declare Yemen the worst humanitarian disaster since the Second World War. Yet the international community is aloof.

The Houthis are clearly on an upward trajectory since taking over the Yemeni capital of Sanaa in 2014. They have yet to attack Israel, 2000 kilometers away, as this is low down on their priority list and prefer to rely on hostile rhetoric instead. But their attack from eastern Yemen on the UAE – 1600 kilometers away – with precise weapons, is an indication of just how much the Houthi offensive capability has grown.

 In contrast, the Houthi attack on Saudi oil targets in 2019 covered 650 kilometers. 

The Houthis’ proximity to the Straits of Hormuz and Bab El-Mandeb waterways means they can also threaten strategic sea routes for the transfer of a sizable portion of the world’s energy and fuels.

These conditions set the stage for the gradual evolution of a new regional NATO. Israel has been assisting Saudi Arabia, sharing its knowledge and experience, and since the attacks on Abu Dhabi, dozens of Israeli private companies have offered Abu Dhabi their technology.

In October 2021, the commander of the UAE's Air Force made a historic visit to Israel's Blue Flag international air drill, which involved seven countries. In the following month, the navies of Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain took part in a naval drill in the Red Sea, led by the United States.

The region is only at the start of this event. The Houthis are going nowhere, and Iran’s backing is steadfast. Whether or not they direct their fire at Israel remains to be seen.

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Henrique Cymerman is a journalist of global renown whose writings regularly appear in media publications in Europe, the USA, Latin America and Israel. He lectures in five languages. Henrique has covered current affairs in the Middle East for over 30 years and has been nominated "Comendador," a title of nobility, by the King of Spain and the President of Portugal. Read full bio here.

How Israel can fight political-legal wars waged against it

By Danny Ayalon

Unlike the peace treaties that Israel signed with Egypt and Jordan, its conflict with the Palestinians is not about changes to territorial borders and cannot be resolved in this manner.

While exchanging territory for peace worked with Jordan and Egypt, with the Palestinians this would not lead to the same result. The Palestinian aspiration remains to replace all of Israel with an Arab-Muslim state. This is illustrated in textbooks in Palestinian Authority schools that make no differentiation between Judea and Samaria, Gaza, Tel Aviv, Ashkelon, Jaffa, or Haifa. Hamas relays this ideology day and night.

 As a result, the conflict spans military, terrorist, and economic arenas. It includes actions such as the organization of boycott movements, a weapon that the Palestinians have sought to employ against Israel.

The political-legal arena is a vital dimension in this conflict and is used to ram Israel in international institutions. The Palestinians would, if they could, eject Israel from all international institutions, and place it under sanctions.

This political-legal war is being waged at the Hague, the United Nations, UNICEF, and UNESCO. All of these efforts are part of the political war to combat Israel, isolate it politically, and create opportunities for a future economic or military assault against it when conditions are ripe.

On this front, unfortunately, there is no daylight between the PA and Hamas. The PA is in comfortable agreement with Hamas on the need to wage political-legal war on Israel, even though IDF protects the PA from being toppled by Hamas in the territories, as it was in Gaza in 2007.

Without Israel’s security presence in areas B and C of the territories, the PA would have vanished long ago, and PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas would have been thrown out of power in Ramallah by Hamas in little time.

Hence, the security coordination between Israel and the PA is very convenient for Abbas, serving the PA and him personally. On the other hand, Abbas and the PA continue with a systematic campaign of delegitimization against Israel, and they shed no tears when Hamas fires rockets on Israeli cities. This way, the PA can dance at two weddings.

When talking about international institutions, it is vital to understand that the Palestinians enjoy a relative advantage over Israel, as opposed to the economic, military, and technological arenas, where Israel has the upper hand.

This is because the Palestinians have an automatic majority in international organizations. Two-thirds of the UN’s 193 member states are non-democratic states. Dozens are members of the Organization of Islamic States or are dependent on Arab oil.

Before even placing a condemnation resolution on the table, the Palestinian Authority already has a majority to utilize. It receives on-demand anti-Israel resolutions whenever it so chooses.  

When UNESCO condemned Israel and denied the link between the Jewish people and the Temple Mount, affirming that only the PA has a link to this holy site, this was an example of the exploitation of that majority.

The only reason Israel has not been kicked out of the UN or placed under sanctions is that the UN Security Council is the only authority with weight in the UN, and it is there that the US has a veto. As a result, Palestinian initiatives against Israel do not succeed.

But the wider diplomatic campaign against Israel has been very successful. Despite lacking any operative significance, this campaign has public significance. When pupils in a school in, say Germany, learn about the UN and its importance, and then see that most of its decisions are against Israel, they will reach the assumption that those decisions must be justified.

Hence Israel’s image absorbs massive damage in many countries.

In Europe, as a result, Israel’s image is severely tarnished.

A poll taken among respondents in European countries by the BBC in 2013 found that Israel came fourth from the bottom in country popularity. Only Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea fared worse. This is the direct result of the political warfare that Israel is subject to.

The same model of delegitimizing Israel is now being exported from Europe to the United States, with great effect.

So, what can Israel do in response? The first thing to do is expose how anti-Israel decisions are taken in international institutions. This is an uphill, Sisyphean task.

To secure assistance, Israel must build a supporting network of organizations, made up of NGOs, which can be Jewish or Christian, and hi-tech companies who have an interest in acting as a counter-weight in this political struggle.

With all due respect to Israeli diplomacy, when university students in Brussels hear from an Israeli ambassador, they’re naturally skeptical and often can dismiss claims with the explanation that it is the ambassador’s job to defend his country. So non-Israeli ambassadors are key in this effort.

Recruiting ambassadors in trade unions, engineering committees, and businesses, is an extremely effective approach.

Additionally, it is important to campaign in the United States for the defunding of organizations that adopt virulent anti-Israel positions. This effort becomes far more effective when it receives support from the White House.

When it comes to the struggle in the Hague, Israel has multiple allies since a conviction could have a significant negative impact on the U.S., Britain, and NATO countries too. These countries also fight low-intensity wars in which regular armies take on terror entities embedded in civilian regions. Israel is not alone in facing this situation.

The U.S. and British militaries fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, meaning that any prosecutions of Israeli soldiers or officers will pave a path for the prosecution of U.S. and British armed forces too.

Thus, recruiting their support is easy.

When the ICC was created at the end of the 1990s, Israel and the U.S. remained as non-members precisely for this reason –  concern that a lofty goal could soon be abused by terrorist countries.

Despite what many believe, the tide of global public opinion is not moving dramatically against Israel,  but neither is it moving in Israel’s favor. The tide however could turn rapidly to Israel’s detriment. The most important thing is to keep fighting the good fight and to use the right tools in arenas where Israel suffers from a disadvantage.

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Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

Ga. Legislature should act on new antisemitism bill

By Mark Goldfeder

On Monday, State Rep. Mike Wilensky, D-Dunwoody, and State Rep. John Carson, R-Marietta, filed a bill that will fill a gap in Georgia’s existing antidiscrimination laws by providing officials with a standard definition of antisemitism -- the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition -- to be considered when assessing facially discriminatory conduct.

Wilensky’s bill comes as antisemitism is surging around the country, and the Peach State has not been immune.  Over the last five years Georgia has had 188 reported incidents of antisemitism, and in 2018 it had the highest number of incidents in the Southeast. Officials have a responsibility to protect their citizens from acts of hate and bigotry, and must be given the proper tools to do so.

Valid monitoring, informed analysis and effective policymaking all require uniform definitions. To that end, the IHRA definition is already used by the U.S. federal government, the 31 member countries of IHRA, the European Union, Serbia, Bahrain, and Albania, among others. It has been endorsed by a growing number of world leaders, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres. The Georgia bill does not revise any anti-discrimination policy; it just clarifies a term with an accepted definition to ensure that the laws will be administered properly.

There are two reasons why this bill is important, and why the IHRA definition is appropriate for a state like Georgia to use when considering the motivation behind discriminatory acts. (Full disclosure --- the bill is heavily based on a model law that I drafted). The first reason relates to the practical difficulty of defining antisemitism, and the second to the legal standard of objectivity required whenever assessing intent.

The practical problem in defining antisemitism is that it is a mutating virus; Jews are often condemned for being whatever a society, or a particular part of society, dislikes at the moment. Depending on which antisemite you ask, Jews can be simultaneously too liberal and too conservative, too rich and a drain on the society. They are at once too strong and too weak, too influential and too parasitical.

A definition of antisemitism that can encompass all of these possibilities and more needs to be able to cut through the timely rationales given for this timeless hatred. In order to actually protect people, we need a definition that focuses not on the reasons why people hate but rather on the actions taken by those expressing hatred; a conduct-based definition. The definition that best serves this goal is the IHRA definition, precisely because the examples it gives focus on the modern manifestations of antisemitism, meaning what antisemites do, as opposed to why they do it.

Critics have challenged IHRA’s use in policymaking on two grounds. First, they claim that it conflates political speech against Israel with antisemitism. That part is simply not true; there is a safe harbor provision in IHRA itself which says that “criticism for Israel similar to that leveled against any other country” is not antisemitism, as well as an express caveat that all of the examples given, including the ones about Israel, “could, taking into account the overall context,” be antisemitic. The reason the specific examples are provided (and are important) is explicitly not because all criticism of Israel is antisemitic, but because there are those who falsely claim that no criticism of Israel can ever cross the line, and use their anti-Zionism as a thinly-veiled excuse for antisemitic action. For example, on campuses across the country, and even in Georgia, Jewish students routinely hear antisemitic comments, and when they complain are told that it’s fine because it was “merely anti-Zionism.” IHRA will help to objectively clarify that line, as it already does for Title VI complaints.

The second objection to using the IHRA definition in a policy context is that in the wrong hands, it could theoretically be used to stifle speech. That argument is a red herring. Of course, free speech is a core aspect of democracy; that is why such bills cannot and do not take the form of a speech code. But discriminatory harassment and criminal conduct are not just speech, even if words are sometimes used. Unlike speech, such conduct is absolutely subject to government regulation. Well-established Supreme Court precedent requires behavior to be “objectively offensive” to fall under the category of discriminatory harassment. To meet this “objectively offensive” standard, the definition used in the discriminatory antisemitism motivational analysis must be objectively well-accepted. The IHRA definition is once again the obvious choice.

The new Georgia bill already has bipartisan support, and in theory it should be a no-brainer for every legislator to sign on. But it was still an act of bravery for Wilensky, the only Jewish representative in the entire state, to shoulder the burden of ushering it through the Gold Dome when no one else had. For their courage in actually taking a stand and trying to make the world better, Wilensky and Carson deserve all of our thanks – and of course our political support.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

American Jewry’s PTSD and its Cure

By Michael B. Snyder

Physical and psychological antisemitic violence has again become the daily news narrative, with the Diaspora responding with a clear desire to be accepted, liked, or at the very least to distinguish their Judaism from Zionism. Rather than making this mistake again, it is time to adopt a different strategy, based on the fact that American Judaism has fallen into a pattern of accepting or even joining with organizations that either reject Jews outright (i.e., the Women’s March, Black Lives Matter, BDS, Students for Justice in Palestine, Jewish Voice for Peace, etc.), otherwise distance themselves from being Jewish, religiously and culturally, and reject Israel’s right to self-defense. As antisemitism has again come out of the closet, it has never been clearer that regardless of how Jews view themselves and attempt to be part of the American melting pot, they are used and discarded, depending upon the always-changing political landscape. 

Truth be told, Jewish suffering continues, as reflected in American psychoanalytic psychiatrist

Elvin Semrad’s blunt assessment that, “The greatest sources of our suffering are the lies we tell ourselves.” Just two examples of the countless difficult truths: America’s beloved President Franklin Roosevelt famously kept the borders closed and allowed his bombers to ignore the railroad tracks delivering Auschwitz victims, yet 90% of Jews gave him their vote despite the acknowledgment that the Final Solution had been successfully implemented.  Just this year, within days after International Holocaust Remembrance Day (invented by the proudly antisemitic United Nations) commemorating the “liberation” of Auschwitz after the death of close to one million Jews, America released $29 billion to the Iranian regime vowing to destroy Israel. Examples abound as America perpetrates against the same Jews that believe they will be accepted and welcomed as equals if only they clear the unattainable, undefined next hurdle. The collective with closed eyes and impeccable placement thereby ignores the Torah creed not to place a stumbling block before the blind.

Bessel Van der Kolk, a second-generation survivor, and a psychiatrist who is considered the “father of PTSD” wrote extensively of generational Shoah responses. He formulated the accepted credo that victims either seek to join with the perpetrators or continue to reengineer scenarios in order to remain close to trauma. If one considers the incessant antisemitic drumbeat a form of chronic, wear-‘em-down victimization, it is not surprising that American Jews have done both.  Further, there is evidence that intergenerational trauma passes generationally through genetic changes to DNA. 

Regardless, Jewish history is steeped in brave leaders literally and figuratively splitting the waters while forging freedom. While some believe another historical flood has commenced, revisiting hope and taking responsibility to break the cycle must begin with bitter realities that cause American Jews to turn those whose words can lead change.  

Emerging from President Woodrow Wilson’s fear presents an appropriate starting point for healing: Jews, he declared, were “forced to frame excuses for their birth” in an ingrained morality that failed to recognize the possibility of self-determination.  Freedom’s path opens with Jewish values becoming public and steadfast, with the boldness that others’ judgments can neither define nor victimize.  After thousands of years of continued reliance on others’ messaging and definitions that continue to place the so-called victims of antisemitism in retreat, Hannah Arendt’s chilling words must act as a creed: “If one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a German or a world citizen, or an upholder of human rights.” The inevitable “dual loyalties” response to this sentiment must be appropriately ignored, replaced by the realization that “crypto-Judaism” – an ancient term describing the practice of Jews who hid their Judaism to survive – be placed under the Never Again heading. To paraphrase Israel’s Foreign Minister Abba Eban regarding the 1967 war, the choice is to live or perish; to defend existence or to forfeit it for all time. Paraphrasing Eban, Jews are too large to be dominated, too self-reliant to be confined by tutelage, and too ferociously resistant to be thwarted. As David Ben Gurion said in his declaration of independence: it “... is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate... .”

Rather than accepting or aligning with those that flaunt antisemitism as a platform while operating generally free from real consequence, the harsh truth of American Jewry’s collective failure must be accepted in order to stop victimization. Rather than supporting antisemitism through joining with other minority groups who fight for their own civil rights while denying those of the Jews, Theodor Herzl’s impassioned plea for alliance should be the siren, his lament that without unity Jews achieve nothing.  As he said when the Jews of Russia walked out of the Sixth Zionist Congress, “These people have a rope around their necks, and still refuse!” The Jewish collective today must answer the question of why such a failed chasing of those who would harm us is still pursued.  Craving self-determination, not the forever-elusive acceptance, creates space for, rather than retreats from, Jews’ historical need, if not their clear desire.

When Israel was transformed from David into Goliath overnight by overcoming the existential attacks in 1967, Eban foresaw the future in the past when he said that Israel “had committed the dark sin of survival.”  Debate of legitimacy will end by overcoming the American Jewish form of PTSD when French philosopher and historian Ernest Renan’s definition is met: “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. To have a common glory in the past, a common will in the present.  To have done great things together, to want to do them again -- these are the conditions for the existence of a nation.”  As long as diaspora Jews frame excuses for their birth, seek approval from others to be who they are, and hold on to the essence of crypto-Judaism, Jews will not be safe or be one... and victimhood will be self-perpetuated, again. 

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Michael B. Snyder is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute, he is an attorney with over 35 years of experience in the areas of children’s rights, human rights and Non-Government Organizations in the United States, Israel and Africa. Read full bio here.

How Israeli technology can bolster Gulf air defenses

By Yaakov Lappin

With the world firmly fixed on the Ukraine crisis and a deeply problematic nuclear agreement with Iran taking shape, there is added importance to tightening the alliance between Israel and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Recent cruise and ballistic missile, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen on Abu Dhabi, have acted as a critical reminder of the need for the UAE to bolster its air defenses. The same likely applies to other members of the GCC, mainly Saudi Arabia.

Since Israel faces a similar threat profile, its systems could significantly bolster the air defense capabilities of the GCC countries.

The UAE’s decision to purchase South Korea’s M-SAM air defense system, valued at around $3.5 billion, decreases the chances of it buying the Israeli-made, Rafael-produced, Iron Dome system, though it does not rule it out completely.

According to a Western source, Saudi Arabia and the UAE not only have the largest defense budgets, but also have the most urgent need for air defense systems.

The source said Israel could theoretically supply three types of air and missile defense systems.

 The first is Rafael’s David’s Sling air defense system. “One variation of this option is providing Rafael-made SkyCeptor interceptor missiles that can be fired from Patriot batteries,” the source explained. Patriot batteries are already in the service of Saudi and Emirati air defenses.

Israel has already offered this option to Poland in the past.   

A second option is to supply Gulf partners like the UAE with Israel Aerospace Industries’ Barak family of air defense systems, which also represent high-quality products in their long, medium, and short-range configurations, against various threats: Ballistic and cruise missiles, and attack UAVs.

The final option is Rafael’s Spyder family of short, medium, and long-range systems. Spyder is in service around the world with several clients.

It is also possible to create hybrid options between the two companies, Rafael and IAI, or other Emirati or Saudi air defense assets, by combining Spyder and Barak systems of various ranges, according to the source.

The above represents the spectrum of available interception systems that can effectively handle the new air threats posed by Iran and its proxies.

The next step would presumably involve supplying detection systems. The principal limitation in detecting low-flying attacking UAVs and cruise missiles is their detection.

Israel can sell a wide array of radars and electro-optic detection systems. It can place them on aerostats, such as IAI’s Dew of the Sky High Availability Aerostat System (HAAS), which was unveiled last year by the Israeli Defense Ministry in northern Israel.

The HAAS was developed by IAI-subsidiary Elta and was made and inflated by the US company TCOM.  Its unique radar has an outstanding performance against low-flying objects.

“This type of airship could cover the whole of the UAE’s territory,” said the Western source.

Air-based radars would certainly compliment the UAE’s existing American-made Patriot and future Korean M-Sam systems. Korean-made radars are ground-based, but tracking cruise missiles and attacking UAVs is best achieved with ‘an eye in the sky.’

The Israeli interest in supplying such systems is significantly broader than mere business interests. “Israel has a clear interest in strengthening the air defense capabilities of the UAE, Bahrain, and others in the GCC, as a fruit of the Abraham Accords,” said the source.

In general, such contracts today require not only a procurement agreement but also a willingness to work with local industries, which have evolved in Gulf countries. This type of technology transfer creates a win-win situation for both sides, the source argued.

 If Israel wishes to cooperate with the GCC states on defense, there is no doubt that focusing on air defense systems is the most comfortable way of doing this, he affirmed. Hi-tech military systems are most advanced in the areas of intelligence and air defense, the source noted.

Currently, the UAE operates American-made THAAD air defense systems, PAC (Patriot advanced capability) 2 and PAC 3 systems, and Swiss-made Sky Guard radar-directed guns. The Saudis similarly possess PAC 2 and PAC 3, THAAD, and Sky Guard 104 mm guns. The latter have reasonable capabilities but without the appropriate detection abilities are not effective against modern low-altitude threats, said the source.  

“We saw this was the case in the 2019 UAV attacks on Saudi Aramco oil sites that temporarily took out half of Riyadh’s oil export capabilities,” he noted.

 Point defense short-range air defense systems that rely on electronic jamming and laser can be suitable for defending sensitive targets.

For a city, however, it is necessary to have defense systems that can intercept at ranges of at least 10 to 20 kilometers.

The advent of long-range slow-moving UAVs with engines about as powerful as scooter motors, which nevertheless have very precise strike capabilities, represents a revolution in military attack capabilities by adversaries, said the source.

Israel, for its part, will be closely analyzing the recent attacks in the Gulf and drawing the most detailed conclusions to learn from the incidents.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Fewer Israelis are serving in the IDF - this needs to be fixed

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

A few weeks ago, my eldest daughter was drafted into the IDF. With feelings of pride, anxiety and motherly concern, I accompanied her to the draft office. Other parents were there with their children, as well. Some, like me, shed a tear. There was one certainty that united us all: The knowledge that our child had to report for the military draft.

The Israeli draft station forms an important stage on the journey of Israelis. It forms a key stop in our common lives as a people and society, and shapes our identity. The knowledge that our children will serve in the military has been with me, as a mother, since the time I was pregnant.

For my generation, being drafted into the IDF and being Israeli are one and the same – an unchallenged equation. That same equation, so obvious to my generation, is eroding now. It is sufficient to glance at the draft figures to see a consistently downward trend.

In Israel’s history, one primal sin established the norm according to which not all sons and daughters of the land are subject to the mandatory draft. It was Israel’s first prime minister David Ben-Gurion who led the concept of a people’s army, viewing it as a necessary melting pot – a military that provides a protective shield and security, and leads societal and educational processes. The IDF wields together all of Israeli society’s unique sectors.

On the other hand, Ben-Gurion also agreed to exempt a few hundred ultra-Orthodox Jews, based on their religious beliefs to pursue religious studies over military service, all Arab youths and a growing number of young women, due to their religious beliefs. Those few hundred exemptions turned into many thousands as the years passed.

The need for a new draft law is an issue that has surfaced repeatedly in recent years, provoking numerous coalition crises. The national draft law built Israeli identity over the years, but something that should have been a given has turned into a political bargaining chip. Those who call for a mandatory draft are expressing opposition to the idea that one sector of society or another can be exempt from bearing its share of the national burden.

Should a call for equality in bearing that burden become a bone of contention against specific groups? Perhaps, it is possible to turn it into a unifying call? In 2012, Yisrael Beytenu proposed a universal draft law. The bill failed to pass its initial reading, with 74 Knesset members voting against it.

“What the law will not do, reality will,” Yisrael Beytenu chairman Avigdor Liberman said at the time. A decade later, here we are, with reality knocking on the nation’s door. In 2005, 77% of Jewish men served in the IDF, a figure that dropped to 69% in 2019. The percentage of women serving in 2005 was 59%, dropping to 56% in 2019.

If this trend is not stopped, in a few years we will find ourselves in a reality in which the number of conscripts will not be sufficient to meet the country’s security needs. As well, the resilience and unity of Israeli society will sustain significant damage. The people’s army will turn into half the people’s army.

In January, the Knesset held a vote on a new draft bill, which calls for cutting the exemption age for yeshiva students from age 23 to age 21. The bill, which passed its first reading, is the first step of a process that will lead to a comprehensive reform of the draft.

Israel cannot afford for the slogan “equality of burden” to be empty of content. It must be part of a broad process, based on the assumption that everyone is in favor of Israeli security, the military, and equality of rights and duties. The Yisrael Beytenu party led a clear policy over the years, which states that not only the ultra-Orthodox, but also Israel’s Arab population must contribute to the state in which they live.

There is simply no reason for an ultra-Orthodox or Arab-Israeli youth to avoid such responsibilities – if not in the context of military service, than in other ways, such as serving in the IDF Home Front Command or a civilian national service program. If lone soldiers that arrive in Israel seek to do this for the country, there is no good reason that mandatory drafts should not apply to all citizens of the state.

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MK Sharon Roffe Ofir was elected to the 24th Knesset on behalf of the Yisrael Beitenu Party. She has previously served as deputy council head, and worked as a journalist and senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years.. Read full bio here.

As Russia – Ukraine standoff escalates, Israel must tread carefully

By Pinhas Avivi

In recent days Ukraine has been pressing Israel to take a clear stand over escalating tensions between Kyiv and Moscow. But it is important to clarify that this is something Israel cannot do.

As tensions between Russia and Ukraine continue to escalate, Israel has no choice but to tread extremely carefully, and to avoid making statements in support of either side.

Doing so could cause severe harm to relations with the United States on the one hand, or with Russia on the other. Israel’s security in the Middle East relies to a large extent on maintaining proper relations with both superpowers, even though the U.S. is of course Israel’s number one strategic ally.

Israel has been able to roll back Iranian entrenchment efforts in Syria, in part through its ability to maintain good relations with Russia. Israel therefore cannot allow itself to enter into this divide– and it must hope that nothing happens that will end up forcing Israel to take sides.

Beyond Israel’s considerations, it is also important to note that troubled relations between Russia and Ukraine stretch back centuries. Ukraine was never just another country for Russia, and conflict is no stranger to that part of the world.

In the 20th century, Ukraine was Russia’s wheat basket, and its agriculture helped feed the whole of the Soviet Union. In 1932 and 33, Stalin caused mass starvation that killed millions of Ukrainians as part of a deliberate policy to punish attempts by Ukrainian farmers to gain some independence.

In addition, Ukraine’s position on the Black Sea and its Crimean Peninsula represents a hugely important strategic asset for Russia, due to its position as a passageway to warm waters further south. Russia cannot access warm waters from the north, or to the west, where the Baltic Sea freezes in winter, and its eastern coast is near Japan. Hence Russia attaches great importance to its ability to move ships to the Black Sea and from there south to the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, as well as the Indian Ocean, to defend itself in case of a global war with the West.

Russia has always worked to secure warm water bases for itself, including in the Suez Canal under the Soviet era and the Horn Africa, and from 2015 onwards, on the Syrian coastline.

After invading Crimea, Russia is now consolidating its position in this regard.

For Moscow, Ukraine is also a passage zone of energy from Russia to all of Europe. In 2014, when Ukraine underwent a revolution that toppled a pro-Russian government, the Russians froze gas exports to Ukraine, and all of Western Europe suffered shortages as a result.

Many in Europe had to buy electric stoves to heat their homes in place of Russian gas that ran dry.

Within Ukraine itself, the eastern section is filled with mostly Russian-speaking people who support close ties with Moscow, while the western half is made up mostly of Ukrainian speakers.

Russia views the Ukraine as a safety ‘brake zone’ for perceived Western threats. During a 2018 NATO meeting in Bucharest, Romania, the alliance said it would positively consider requests to join it from Ukraine and Georgia. Upon hearing about this, several Israeli diplomats felt this would undoubtedly cause Russia to end up doing all that it could to prevent NATO’s borders from reaching Ukraine itself.

One possible outcome is Russia seeking to take control of these countries. This view was strengthened further when Russia came out against the West’s support for Kosovan independence, with the claim that minority self-determination must occur only in agreement from the state in which the minority exists.

Russia justified its invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which have Russian-speaking majorities, during the 2008 war with Georgia, by claiming that if Kosovo deserves independence, so do both of those territories.

Against this background, it is clear that Russia will not permit in any way for NATO to expand eastwards to Ukraine or northwards to Georgia. Hence, it has focused its forces on the border with Ukraine to twist the arm of the Americans on this issue.

The question of whether Russia will end up invading soon can only be answered by prophets. But what can be said is that an arm-wrestling match is underway and that Russia views Europe as weak, while it also sees that the U.S. is refusing to take responsibility for events outside of its borders. It notes that Washington has no interest in conflict in Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East. Hence, it feels that the situation is in Russia’s favor and that it can flex its muscles.

Russia’s decision to attack or not largely depends on what the U.S. is willing to do. The more muscles that the U.S. flexes, the less willing Russia will be to invade, and vice versa. 

The Russian threat to freeze gas supplies to and via Ukraine is a double-edged sword since Russia needs to sell this gas.

Ultimately, if Russia senses a real willingness by the West – militarily (less likely) or economically (more likely) to go full force in its response, this would reduce the chance of an invasion, or limit it to Ukraine’s eastern side, which in any event supports Russia. 

When the U.S. is unwilling to take bold steps, this impacts all of America’s allies, including Israel, but at the same time, there are limits to this effect – since Israel never expected anyone to fight with it or for it against its adversaries.

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

A Russian Invasion of Ukraine: A Game Changer, but Unlikely

By Liam Collins

The number of nations in the world has more than doubled since the conclusion of World War II, yet the incidence of interstate war has declined. Nowhere has that trend been more evident than in Europe. Once the epicenter of interstate war, the relative peace on the continent in recent decades has led to debate as to whether interstate war in Europe is obsolete.

Yet Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its subsequent seizure of Crimea and active support for separatists in Ukraine’s east in 2014 has led some to question whether interstate war in Europe is truly dead. Today, Russia has amassed some 100,000 troops along its nearly 1,200-mile land border with Ukraine, leading to speculation that a Russian invasion could be imminent.

A Russian invasion in 2022 while likely to be a game-changer and fundamentally different from its previous incursions, is however unlikely.

Why it would be a game-changer

A Russian invasion today would be game-changing because it would represent the first undeniable and telegraphed invasion in Europe since the end of World War II when Russia gobbled up Eastern Europe. Vladimir Putin tried to convince the world that he was protecting Ossetians from Georgian “genocide”  to justify his 2008 invasion under the pretense of the international norm of the responsibility to protect. The evidence, however, indicated that the war was “premeditated” and Georgia acted preemptively, similar to what Israel did in 1967’s Six-Day War. Thus, the international community did not buy Putin’s justification.

Learning from this experience, Putin avoided using overt military forces in Ukraine in 2014. Instead, he used “Little Green Men” and other hybrid means to seize and ultimately annex Crimea without firing a shot. After Ukraine had Russian-backed separatist forces on the ropes, Putin was forced to send smaller formations into Ukraine’s east, but he continued to deny Russian support.

What makes an invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally different from Russia’s previous invasions is that this one is being telegraphed by Moscow. Russia’s invasion of Georgia came as a complete surprise, as did its seizure of Crimea. A second major difference is that Russia lacks even an implausible justification for the invasion. In both previous wars, Russia attempted to justify its interventions under the responsibility to protect.

Neither of these conditions exist in 2022. While Putin has yet to directly threaten “invasion,” his words—he has threatened “appropriate retaliatory military-technical measures” if the West’s aggressive approach continues—and actions—the troop buildup—portend a potential invasion. Likewise, Putin lacks even the feeblest pretense for invasion. There is no population that Putin can claim that he needs to defend. Quite the contrary. Ukrainians have seen the devastation and the lack of opportunity in the Donbas and want no part of it.

Thus, if Russia were to invade, it would be a game-changer — an invasion within Europe that has been telegraphed in advance with no justification. It would be an unequivocal declaration of war. It would demonstrate the weakness of the international system that was unable to deter. It would also erode confidence in various international institutions and the West in general. Russia, no doubt, would pay a steep political price, but in a battle of relative gains, it is not clear that Russia’s price would be any higher than the West’s price — a clear demonstration of the West’s impotence.  

Why an invasion is unlikely

Nevertheless, an invasion is also unlikely. Putin is calculated and behaves fairly rationally, even if he routinely operates outside of widely accepted international norms. He recognizes that he would pay a high economic cost for an invasion. Sanctions against Russia following its seizure of Crimea in 2014 have been estimated to have cost Russia roughly $50 billion per year. With President Joe Biden signaling to Russia that it would “pay a heavy price” for any invasion, Putin knows that sanctions would be swift and severe if it were to invade.

Likewise, Putin knows that any invasion would come at a significant military cost. In its five-day war with Georgia, Russia lost as many as 22 aircraft. A price that Russia seemed unwilling to pay because it caused Russia to significantly decrease its air support after losing so many aircraft in the opening days. With Stinger missiles being transferred to Ukraine from Lithuania and Latvia, Putin realizes that he would likely lose a significant number of aircraft with any invasion.

When Putin sent T-90 tanks across the border in 2014, they were almost “impenetrable.” Since then, the United States has provided Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles, with additional missiles arriving from Estonia. Since 2014, the United States has also invested nearly $2.7 billion in training and equipment to reform Ukraine’s defense establishment. Putin, thus, recognizes that he would face a much tougher enemy than he did in 2014.

Putin also realizes he would likely pay a domestic cost for the victory. Russian mothers do not like their sons coming home in body bags any more than Western mothers. And while Putin is likely confident that he would score an initial victory, albeit at heavy costs, he also has to recognize that he would likely face a costly insurgency. Ukraine recently adopted a law enshrining civilian resistance as part of Ukraine’s national defense and these volunteers have been training.

Finally, an invasion would seem to accomplish little in terms of likely policy objectives. Crimea was unique; it was “strategic territory”, it provided Russia access to the Black Sea and housed its Naval Base in Sevastopol. Russia could have attempted to annex Georgia’s South Ossetia or Ukraine’s Donbas, but it did not. Russia’s objective was not about capturing territory, instead, it was about control: preventing both from joining NATO.

NATO is unlikely to let any nation that does not control its territory join. With no end in sight for the current status quo in Ukraine’s Donbas, it would appear that Russia is achieving its strategic objective at a fairly low cost. An invasion would only increase the cost, with no additional gain. And if the occupation became costly, as it likely would, the domestic repercussions could lead to his demise. Thus, invasion, though still possible, seems unlikely.

What an invasion could mean for Israel

An invasion could weaken international norms, but that seems unlikely to have any effect on Israel given that none of its immediate neighbors have the desire or capability to invade at present. A Russian invasion, however, would demonstrate the weakness of the international community at deterring action, which could embolden terrorist actors in the Middle East. It might also embolden Israel to be freer with its actions.

Regardless, an invasion does not appear in anyone’s best interest, especially Ukrainians and Russians.

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Col. Liam Collins is the Executive Director of the Viola Foundation and the Madison Policy Forum and a permanent member with the Council on Foreign Relations. A retired Special Forces Colonel, Liam served in a variety of special operations assignments and conducted operational deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa and South America. Read full bio here.

Ukraine is not the most important square on the chessboard

By Jeremiah Rozman

The Cold War was the last time that the United States faced real competition from a peer adversary. It was the formative crisis for most of the current U.S. policy establishment and much of the politically engaged adult population. Furthermore, American trade, culture, and treaties tie it strongly to Europe. Therefore, it is understandable that a crisis in Europe involving Russia is currently consuming the bulk of U.S. attention. However, today China is the only country with the potential to contest U.S. global leadership and Europe is not the most important arena for Sino-U.S. competition. Nor is Ukraine the most likely flashpoint for a potentially catastrophic great power showdown. The U.S. has recently sought to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. The crisis in Ukraine threatens to defer, if not derail, this necessary re-posturing, but effective compromise with Russia could turn this crisis into an opportunity.

Keeping Ukraine in context

Keeping Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence is not a vital U.S. interest. Defending Ukraine’s ability to preserve its self-determination is ethical. However, as has always been the case in global affairs, power trumps ethics, institutions, and often even strongly-worded threats, condemnations, and sanctions. The U.S. is no longer the undisputed hegemon that it was at the end of the Cold War. In Europe, power and resolve have shifted in Russia’s favor.

Allowing Ukraine to fall into the Russian sphere does not threaten the integrity of NATO, nor the security of its members. Disputing the strategic importance of Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Emma Ashford noted that “during the Cold War, the line was a thousand miles further West.” Yet, the U.S. emerged victorious against a true global competitor. Today, Russia does not pose the same peer threat that the Soviet Union did. That role is filled by China. Unlike China, Russia does not have the economic potential nor the stated desire to compete with the U.S. for global leadership. Rather, it wants a buffer zone from NATO military hardware and European Union political and economic encroachment. This is understandable. The U.S. Monroe Doctrine has long held the Western hemisphere as its sphere of influence. When the Soviet Union brought Cuba into its sphere and militarized it, the U.S. considered it to be intolerable.

It’s no longer 1992

In the heady years after the U.S. emerged victorious from the Cold War – from which Russia emerged in shambles – more sanguine voices that anticipated the need to consider Russian interests in a future European security paradigm lost out to advocates for rapid NATO enlargement. The ghosts of this decision would come back to haunt European peace in 2008, 2014, and now. Boris Yeltsin’s drunken ravings over NATO expansion in 1994 have been echoed many times by the eminently sober Vladimir Putin. While the U.S. would prefer to continue in its unfettered dominance, it has explicitly stated that it is unwilling to risk U.S. troops in defense of Ukraine. Conversely, Russia has signaled that it sees Ukraine as a vital interest, one that it is willing to go to war over. If Russia is willing to pay the price of sanctions and an estimated 3,000 to 10,000 troop deaths, what will stop it from invading?

If Russia is determined to invade, the more the U.S. protests and invests, the more reputation and resources it stands to lose when it happens. Some prominent voices are pushing the U.S. to take a strong stance, even risking military conflict because “China is watching.” Russia invading Ukraine would not invite China to invade Taiwan if the U.S. articulates that it sees Taiwan’s defense as non-negotiable, on par with defending actual NATO members while distancing itself from promises to defend Ukraine. However, putting the U.S. reputation on the line over Ukraine and losing, while shifting resources to Europe that otherwise would have gone to the Indo-Pacific, could make it more likely that China invades Taiwan. Therein lies the greatest strategic risk of the Ukraine crisis; it threatens to derail the urgently needed U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan is not just more important to U.S. interests because it produces over 92 percent of the world’s semiconductors critical to all forms of modern technology, but mainly because unlike Russia, China is a peer threat.

Economic and military options?

The U.S. and its allies have limited economic and military options to deter Russia. At best, these would postpone the next crisis. Economic options that would have the sharpest impact are likely to also harm the countries imposing them. For example, removing Russia from the international banking SWIFT system would “really sting,” but the U.S. and European allies might have already rejected this option due to the potential for major economic harm.

Another strong economic policy would be to block the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. President Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have explicitly threatened Russia that it will be rendered non-operational if Russia invades Ukraine. However, European reliance on Russian oil and high gas prices in the U.S., blunt the West’s ability to harm Russia’s heavily oil-dependent economy without harming itself. Furthermore, China appears inclined to undermine any U.S. imposed sanctions.

Alongside economic options, the U.S. could arm Ukraine to “bleed Russia.” Skeptics note that no conceivable amount of Western military support will enable Ukraine to defeat a determined Russian offensive. Russian regular units are not the separatist irregulars that Ukrainian nationalists have been fighting in Donbas. Russian regular units made mincemeat of Ukrainian armored battalions in a matter of minutes in 2015. Highly successful Russian use of force could showcase a new “revolution in military affairs,” a modern version of what the U.S. succeeded in doing when it showed the world the effectiveness of its new military capabilities in the Gulf War. Putin might even prefer this to achieving his goals without bloodshed.

Detente with Russia aids competition with China

Areas for compromise and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia abound, from counterterrorism to arms control. Effective detente would undercut the growing Sino-Russian relationship which poses a significant threat. In the Ukraine crisis, China backs Russia due to a shared interest in revising the international order through force. Coordination with Russia over European security could pull Russia away from China, a country with which it shares a long and historically disputed border. Good relations with Russia would help the U.S. to compete with China, while enduring crisis with Russia would tie up U.S. resources in Europe.

In Ukraine, compromise is clearly the best option, although conceding to Putin goes against America’s long-held policy of liberal internationalism. This crisis can be an opportunity to finally develop what U.S. preponderance has allowed it to put off for nearly three decades, a durable European security structure that takes into account the needs (not wants) of NATO and Russia. This would enable the U.S. to more effectively compete where it matters most.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.