Israel Police key to Jerusalem security, regional security

By Alon Levavi

In the wake of a deadly wave of terrorism that hit Israeli cities beginning in March 2022, the IDF launched Operation Break the Wave to reduce the threat and it has been ongoing since then.

Operations focused at first on the northern West Bank city of Jenin and later Nablus, where the core hubs of Palestinian terror activities are presently located.

Throughout the security escalation, it seemed reasonable to believe that mixed Jewish – Arab cities including Ramle, Lod, Jerusalem and Acre could, from one moment to the next, erupt in violence just as they did so dramatically and disturbingly in May 2021, as Israel fought Hamas in Gaza in Operation Guardian of the Walls.

The spark for that conflict was lit in Jerusalem, where clashes between Palestinians and the Israel Police on the Temple Mount, together with subsequent incidents of violence, provided Hamas with the pretense to fire rockets from Gaza. Islamist agitators used the violence to incite unrest among Arab-Israelis.

In mid-October, violence once again tore through eastern Jerusalem, only this time it was rapidly quelled by police without spreading to new arenas. While it has resurfaced on occasion as the month progressed, police have so far kept the flames low, preventing them from spreading out of control.

That development is a reminder of a core principle that underlines regional stability: the key lies in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem has always been the issue that could blow up the region. It’s the volcano that’s always smoldering and the Israel Police is the lid on that volcano. If the volcano blows, it takes the West Bank with it and as recent events have shown, Gaza and Arab areas inside Israel, as well.

Jerusalem is under the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the Israel Police, meaning that it and no other agency has the main say on how to respond to the daily challenges that arise there.

Policing Jerusalem is a constant balancing act between the need to be forceful in the face of Palestinian aggression and attacks on Israeli police and Jewish residents of eastern Jerusalem, and the need to pull back and push for calm. Much is at stake and depends on the good judgment of police commanders on the ground who are always walking a tightrope.

The Israel Police achieves this balance by deploying top-level commanders to the front lines to take direct charge of policing operations. These commanders do not leave the Border Police and other units on their own to deal with the difficult issues that land at their doorstep.

This means directly overseeing orders on when to open fire in cases where lives are at risk and when to deploy non-lethal crowd control means, including smoke bombs and stun grenades to deal with disturbances in a controlled manner.

During October’s rioting, Palestinian youths hurled firebombs and rocks and launched fireworks directly at security forces, as well as at buildings in which Jews reside. Such attacks are potentially lethal but police nevertheless employ careful consideration when responding.

Equipping riot police with the most advanced protective gear makes personnel feel safer and prevents them from choosing the fiercest responses in such situations, police have learned.

Dealing with such intense rioting and dispersing the rioters is a full profession, and the Border Police and the special patrol units excel in it.

The fact that there are members of Knesset who knowingly come to the area to take part in provocations only makes life more complicated for the police, which must deploy larger numbers of forces to the scene to prevent such situations from spinning out of control or being further inflamed.

Intelligence plays a critical role in both containing and thwarting such incidents. In 2021, the police, the Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency and the IDF discovered that intelligence coordination between them was lacking. Since then, they have taken steps to optimize intelligence-sharing and have significantly improved their capabilities not just in Jerusalem but throughout Israel.

Police made dozens of arrests in mid-October and were able to significantly calm the situation down, reflecting a satisfactory performance and one that has improved from past years.

The eastern Jerusalem neighborhood of Shuafat, where a terrorist gunman exited a vehicle and shot dead an Israeli Border Policewoman on October 8, represents a unique operational challenge.

The terrorist (who was later killed after opening fire outside another Israeli community in the West Bank) fled the scene, compelling police to place the area under a local, temporary closure to facilitate the search for the gunman.

Despite these incidents, prayers at the Western Wall went on as normal and visitors continued to ascend the Temple Mount. Tens of thousands of Jews prayed at the Western Wall and tens of thousands of Muslims worshiped at al-Aqsa Mosque. The police’s ability to enable such mass religious activities, while proactively tackling rioting in neighborhoods a stone’s throw away from the religious sites is an exceptional achievement that cannot be taken for granted.

During this month of unrest, the Border Police flexed a new muscle that it received as part of the lessons learned from the events of 2021. Known as the Israeli National Guard, the Border Police called up reserve companies as means to help deal with personnel requirements. These forces are heavily focused on counter-rioting and counter-terrorism missions, and this is their specialty.

Throughout the month, police followed up on intelligence to thwart attacks, swarmed hot spots in large numbers, made arrests based on accurate information, and were able to home in on inciters and rioters. This included fishing out the main agitators on social media and arresting those using online platforms to instigate violence. All of these actions helped create deterrence.

Frequent situational assessments are carried out by the Jerusalem District of the Israel Police to keep its organizational finger on the pulse of events, together with the Shin Bet and the IDF. These assessments resulted in decisions such as placing police officers along the streets of the Old City just tens of meters apart, creating a high degree of security.

The Israel Police finds itself facing the most sensitive decisions regarding Jerusalem, including those that touch on the Temple Mount. The area’s sensitivity, especially around the Mount, is so great that many of these decisions are brought to the attention of the government and the prime minister.

The past two years have demonstrated beyond any doubt how internal security is critical. While external threats are major, Israel has invested far more in dealing with them than it has in domestic security. Yet the threat within is clear to all.

Adding a few hundred extra police officers to the force won’t solve the problem. Police must receive additional support from the government, such as increasing the size of the force substantially, equipping it with better technology and boosting its presence in the Arab sector, where police can provide a better service, and enforce sovereignty and law enforcement. Failure to implement these steps will have dire future consequences for the entire country.

---

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

How Israel and Lebanon Settled Their Maritime Borders

By Arthur Koll

Last week, Israel and Lebanon, two countries that officially designate each other as enemy states, signed an agreement settling a long-standing maritime border dispute. While definitely not as important as Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt or Jordan or the Abraham Accords, which normalized Israeli’s ties with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, this latest agreement reduces tensions in the region and provides an opportunity for Lebanon to break out of its economic collapse and political mayhem. 

In order to make sense of the agreement, it is important to differentiate between two types of maritime zones as far as international law is concerned.

The first category covers territorial-sovereign waters, which stretch from the coast to the 12-mile mark. States have the same level of sovereignty over these types of waters as they do on land.

The second category is exclusive economic zones (EEZ), which begin 12 nautical miles from a country’s coastline and extend up to 200 miles away from the coast (unless an EEZ encounters that of another country).

The concept of economic waters developed in international maritime law as a group of principles for states to divide exploration rights and benefit from resources found in or under the waters, such as fishing zones, energy resources, and minerals.

Until the first decade of this century, no urgency was felt by the eastern Mediterranean states to mark out their EEZs. However, discoveries of large natural gas fields under the waters of Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus, and most likely in Lebanon, made matters more pressing.

In 2007, Israel unilaterally marked out, with floats, its territorial maritime border with Lebanon, based on its understanding of international maritime law. Lebanon, for its part, declared its own wish list on maritime borders, which consisted of its maximalist positions.

Later, in 2010, Israel and Cyprus, which also discovered a very large natural gas field in its waters, reached an agreement to demarcate their EEZs. Similarly, Cyprus and Lebanon reached their own agreement earlier in 2007 (though Lebanon has yet to ratify it).

These hasty diplomatic developments were a direct result of the understanding that hiding under the waters of the eastern Mediterranean are significant hydrocarbon resources, and that to fully benefit from them it is necessary to settle border issues.

After Cyprus and Israel, on the one hand, and Cyprus and Lebanon, on the other, settled their maritime borders, the one unresolved dispute left open in this Mediterranean triangle was the border between Israel and Lebanon. Over the last twelve years, the two countries engaged in indirect negotiations led by the United States.

For over a decade, Israel and Lebanon were unable to reach an agreement on this boundary. What made it possible now? The answer to this question seems to involve three critical elements falling in place at the right time.

The first involves the preliminary testing that has occurred in recent years north of the now-established boundary, revealing a significant gas field, mostly on the Lebanese side. While Lebanon made no headway in developing its gas resources, Israel made dramatic progress, building offshore platforms and benefiting from multiple fields within its EEZ.

Secondly, Lebanon’s economy is in complete shambles and the country’s political paralysis prevents the formation of a government capable of providing for the basic needs of its citizens. Blackouts are the norm rather than the exception, there is a chronic shortage of basic products such as food and oil, and the banking system is dysfunctional. These ills are joined by the destructive role played by Hezbollah, the Iran-backed terror organization.

It is no wonder, therefore, that Lebanon is eager to begin exploiting the natural resources it hopes lie waiting for it under the sea. This would be a game changer for both Lebanon’s economy and its volatile internal and regional political situation.

Thirdly, the Biden administration appointed a new energy envoy to the region, Amos Hochstein, who invested significant efforts into kickstarting talks. He earned the trust of both the Lebanese and Israeli sides and was able to break a ten-year freeze, conducting shuttle diplomacy between Beirut, Jerusalem, and Washington.

Hochstein created an American compromise formula, which on the one hand followed the Israeli position regarding sovereign waters and answered its security needs, but on the other hand relies on the Lebanese position regarding EEZs, thus making it possible for Beirut to make progress and hopefully produce and profit from its field, dubbed Qanna.

From a security perspective, Israel gained what it desired: The demarcation of a border with Lebanon that recognizes Israel’s territorial-sovereign waters.

From an economic perspective, the deal is consistent with Lebanon’s desire to gain possession of the waters up to a boundary known as Line 23.

Additionally, Israel will be compensated, if and when natural gas is produced from the mostly Lebanese field, a field where the existence of commercial-scale gas reserves has yet to be verified. The scope and terms of this compensation have yet to be negotiated between Israel and Total, the French company that has the exploration rights for the Lebanese gas field.

Within Israel, challenges to the deal from the political Right were rejected by the Israeli Supreme Court and the signing took place as planned.

The current agreement is not a peace treaty—far from it. Hezbollah will continue to threaten regional stability. However, not wanting to be perceived as being the force that quashed hope for a better economic future for the Lebanese people, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that he would honor any agreement reached by Lebanon. 

Ultimately, settling the maritime boundaries is a win-win for both Jerusalem and Beirut. Israel reduced the threat to a major economic asset (the Karish natural gas field) and signed a bilateral agreement with an enemy state—a diplomatic achievement in its own right. Lebanon can act on the hope of dramatically improving the fate of its people. A stable Lebanon is in the best interest of Israel too.  

The increased role of the United States and France in the Lebanese arena is also a positive development and is preferable to leaving Lebanon under the sole grip of Hezbollah and Iran, which led that country to misery. And who knows, now that the precedent of a maritime border agreement has been set and the ice has been broken, perhaps there is increased potential for a future agreement on the land border between Israel and Lebanon. That, however, still seems far away.

---

Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

Iran in Ukraine: Lessons for Israel

By Jeremiah Rozman

Israel’s security establishment sees a nuclear-armed Iran as its greatest “intolerable” threat. Iran crossing the nuclear threshold changes Israel’s security position from one where it faces the threat of violence from many enemies but total destruction from none, to one where Iran holds the capability to destroy Israel in a nuclear holocaust, with Israel left guessing under what circumstances it would resolve to do so. This dynamic leaves Israel not only vulnerable to a perhaps unlikely nuclear attack but also to very likely nuclear blackmail, severely constraining Israel’s ability to act against its enemies including Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel considers a nuclear Iran an unacceptable strategic outcome. What this means is that if negotiations on a return to the nuclear deal between Iran and the powers fail, as they very likely might, Israel may be faced with two options, launch a risky and potentially unsuccessful kinetic strike against Iran’s nuclear program or accept a nuclear Iran. Since Israel has maintained that the latter is not an option, the former–a kinetic strike–is a very real possibility. In that event, Israel will almost certainly find itself in a kinetic war with Iran and its proxies, including the formidably armed and strategically positioned Hezbollah. To face this possibility Israel needs to understand how Iran will fight. Iran’s involvement in Russia’s war on Ukraine provides a glimpse into what very well might be Iran’s strategic calculus if it faces Israel.

Since Ukraine launched a rather successful counteroffensive, Russia has shifted strategies in Ukraine. Russia’s shift to targeting Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure through mass precision strikes marks its third strategy in this conflict. Each phase of the conflict can be understood as Russia targeting a different Center of Gravity (CoG). This term originating with Carl von Clausewitz has been slippery to define. In essence, it denotes a defeat mechanism. Knock out a CoG and you defeat the opponent’s “freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.” 

First Russia went for a swift knockout blow against what it thought was a reachable CoG with the best cost-benefit payoff -- Ukraine’s government. President Vladimir Putin sought to achieve this by killing or capturing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and installing a pro-Russian puppet. When this failed, Putin attacked another CoG, Ukraine’s military. It reckoned that with Zelensky out of reach, Russia needed to defeat Ukraine's military to achieve his desired policy outcome without appearing to blatantly target Ukraine’s civilians. Prior to air power, if an attacker could not pull off a governmental coup, defeating a nation's armed forces was a necessary step to forcing capitulation. In the age of air power, especially precision air power, this is no longer the case. Herein we find Putin's latest strategic shift.

The Ukrainian military proved a tougher CoG than anticipated, too tough for Putin to defeat. At best Putin has secured a military stalemate, capturing some territory at enormous cost. While Ukraine may or may not be able to completely drive Putin out of Ukrainian territory, it is clear now that Putin cannot rapidly defeat Ukraine’s military.

Over the past few weeks Putin has shifted towards attacking what he must consider to be Ukraine’s last tenable CoG. While some have dubbed Putin’s new actions ‘vengeful’ there is a strategic calculus to them. Putin believes that Ukraine's critical civilian infrastructure is also a CoG, meaning that by knocking it out, it can force Ukraine to capitulate even if it cannot defeat its armed forces. Using precision air power with Iranian drones playing a central role, Russia has been able to deal enormous damage to Ukraine's water and power grid in advance of the upcoming harsh Ukrainian winter, this despite Ukraine being able to intercept a majority of these munitions. Iran must be drawing important lessons from this battlefield testing. Its advisors are on the ground helping Russia integrate these drones into its arsenal. It is likely that Iran is taking notes for a future conflict with Israel.

Combined with Hezbollah, Iran has enough precision munitions to truly threaten Israel by a similar targeting of critical infrastructure tested by Russia in Ukraine. Iron Dome and Israel’s other air defenses have never been tested against precision munitions or against the type of precision combined drone and cruise missile attack that Iran conducted against Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil refineries. While Israel is certainly better able to strike targets in enemy territory than Ukraine has been thus far, it also has far less strategic depth than Ukraine, meaning it has fewer targets that Iran and its proxies must hit and they are less dispersed.

Because it is highly unlikely that Iran and its proxies can defeat Israel’s armed forces or capture its seat of government, Iran might determine that Israel’s only vulnerable CoG is its civilian critical infrastructure as well as its population. If Iran believes that it can defeat Israel by inflicting enough damage on these targets, any future kinetic conflict with Iran would likely see the targeting of Israel’s power and water facilities. Iran has already targeted these with cyber attacks. Iran has successfully tested complex precision targeting against Saudi Arabia, defeating U.S. provided Patriot air and missile defenses. It is currently honing this form of warfare in Ukraine.

Israel must learn from Ukraine as Iran surely is. In order to deter Iran by threatening a military response to it crossing the nuclear threshold, Israel must demonstrate that it can defend itself to the point where Iran no longer sees Israel’s critical infrastructure as a defeatable CoG. This would make the threat of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program far more credible, potentially preventing war. Israel’s next best option if deterrence fails is to win in conflict. Israel must harden its critical infrastructure and improve its ability to rapidly target Iran and its proxies’ precision fires if it is either to deter Iran or defeat it if deterrence fails. Therefore, Israel should rapidly integrate lessons learned from Russia’s new Iran-backed strategy in Ukraine and pay close attention to how Ukraine contends with this new strategy.

---

The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

No More Excuses—Time for Berkeley to Act

By Mark Goldfeder

Ever since some student groups at Berkeley Law School signed a pledge to exclude anyone that supports the existence of a Jewish state, there has been a very public debate about the legality of these so-called “Jew-Free” zones. In response to widespread criticism, the groups, led by Students for Justice in Palestine, issued a statement claiming that the bylaw was not antisemitic because it “does not attack Jewish people or faith.” 

The dean of the law school chose to ignore what the statement actually said, accepting this fairly thin excuse and writing that: “[A]t this stage, all some student groups have done is express their strong disagreement with Israel’s policies.” 

From a legal perspective, the dean (and the school) gave undo credence to the mischaracterization of the decision to exclude all Zionists as based on political viewpoint discrimination as opposed to anti-Jewish sentiment. Too bad the antisemites’ own attorney couldn’t help herself from saying more, thereby blowing that flimsy excuse completely out of the water.

Liz Jackson, a senior staff attorney at Palestine Legal, which represents SJP, recently clarified the position of the groups she represents, explaining that she knows “Some students say that their Jewish identity is so deeply identified with Zionism that this effectively discriminates against them, but that’s their subjective view and choice about how they understand their own Jewish identity.”

Here is the problem with that statement: Jewish people, and only Jewish people, get to define what is and is not part of their Jewish identity—not antisemitic groups like Palestine Legal or SJP. And for the vast majority of Jewish people across time and space, Zionism is and always has been an integral part of their Jewish, often their religious, identities. That does, in fact, transform that particular kind of Zionism into a category protected by state and federal civil rights law, whether SJP likes it or not. 

Discriminating against a Jewish person or group just because they are Zionist is illegal because Zionism is demonstrably not just a political movement. For thousands of years, Jews across the world have prayed to God at least three times a day (and often more) for a safe return to Zion. The Pentateuch itself references this ancient Jewish hope while the Prophets and Writings repeatedly record this ambition. More than half of the biblical commandments are specifically tied to the land of Israel, and doctrinally, belief in and hope for the return to Zion is part of the 13 Principles of Jewish Faith. 

Jews were Zionists before there were Muslims, and even before there were Christians. In multiple places throughout the New Testament, the yearning for redemption is expressed in terms of the by-then-already-classic formulation of Jewish Zionism (see e.g., Matthew 21:5 and John 12:15), while the Quran itself is quite clear about the long history of Jews in the Holy Land—and especially in Jerusalem. (See, for example, Surah Bani Isra’il, verses 1-7). While it is true that the Jews were twice expelled from their ancient kingdom of Israel, it is also true that they never fully left: Despite the fairly recent antisemitic lie casting Jews as colonialist outsiders, since biblical times there has always been an indigenous Jewish community living in the eternal Jewish homeland. In the late-19th and early-20th centuries, Jews from around the world came to buy and cultivate land to further expand those existing Jewish communities that had remained in Israel as a continuous presence throughout all of the exiles.

Today, support for Zionism can take multiple forms, and mere political Zionism may not be protected, like any other political belief. Not all Zionists are Jews, and not all Jews are Zionists. But for those Jews for whom Zionism is a part of their Jewish ethnic heritage and identity, it absolutely is protected and they cannot be excluded on the basis of holding that belief. Anti-Zionism that allows for discrimination against Jewish people because of their affiliation with, affinity for, or support of the biblical/prophetic/historical/ethnic/cultural/Jewish ideal of Zionism is antisemitism. So is telling Jews what they can and can’t believe.

To be clear, it is the openly stated, on the record view of Palestine Legal and of SJP that they get to define what “Jewish identity” can include for Jewish people. And, if they feel that one or another Jewish belief should not be part of a Jewish person’s identity, they may freely discriminate against people for holding that belief, and that cannot be considered antisemitism. Should Palestine Legal, for example, decide tomorrow that keeping Shabbat or kosher observance is not really part of Jewish belief, just some Jews’ “subjective view and choice about how they understand their own Jewish identity,” then they can and should be free to discriminate against Jewish people who do observe Shabbat or keep kosher. Likewise, should they decide that taking mass is just something that some Catholics subjectively like to do but is not really part of their religion, they can freely discriminate against those Catholics who do practice the ritual.   

Nor was this a one-time accidental admission. When Jewish student leaders, the people who are ostensibly being excluded for their views, clarified that “When we say ‘Zionism,’ we mean the Jewish right to self-determination in their ancestral homeland, which is Israel … This does not say anything about the self-determination of Palestinians,” Jackson doubled-down and “expressed disagreement with that definition of Zionism.” 

Here is the bottom line: Anti-Zionists do not get to define a Jewish person’s Zionism for them, cast it as merely political, and then discriminate against them for it. 

Berkeley made clear that if this was about Jewish identity, then they would step in. Palestine Legal just said the quiet part out loud: It was always about Jewish identity, and they were always aware of it. They just don’t like that part of Judaism. Consequently, they feel they should have the right to tell the vast majority of Jews that they are wrong about their own Jewish identity, and that they better purge themselves of those beliefs or they will be discriminated against.  

There goes that “political viewpoint” excuse. Your move Berkeley.

---

Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Not The Start-Up Nation

By Benjamin Anthony

In 2009, Saul Singer and Dan Senor co-authored a fabulous best-seller brilliantly entitled Start-Up Nation. Lamentably, from then on many of Israel’s lovers and leaders adopted and adapted that title to promote Israel to the world to the exclusion of the foundational reason for Israel’s establishment and existence. That order of prioritization must be righted.

Israel is variously marketed as the innovation nation, the guarantor of never again, the sole democracy in the Middle East and a bastion of Western values.

While Israel can wear such labels with pride, those descriptions do not encapsulate what the state is at its core, explain the essence of why Israel exists or assure its future standing internationally.

Israel’s technological status is laudable. Apple, Microsoft and more have robust Israeli presence. But if an existential threat were to befall Israel tomorrow, those same companies would withdraw quicker than one can say “silicon wadi.”

Israel did not fight its many wars out of allegiance to the microchip.

Pre-state, the forebears of Israel’s citizenry yearned to return to the land that is now the modern state. They did so not when that land was at the forefront of technological advancement but when it was a series of swamps and deserts riddled with disease.

Thus, Israel’s reconstitution must have been powered by something beyond its technological prowess.

What is the basis of Israel?

Contrary to the beliefs of many, Israel was not founded in response to the Holocaust. Its existence surely serves as a bulwark against another Holocaust but the Holocaust is not the reason for Israel’s existence. Opening the door to such a narrative is an error.

The forebears of today’s Israeli soldiers yearned for Zion centuries before the names Auschwitz, Goebbels, Goring or Adolf Hitler were etched into infamy.

Tragically, with the passage of time and the passing of survivors, there will soon rise a generation of society with a vastly reduced memory of the Holocaust. Predicating Israel’s existence upon a phenomenon so fleeting within the memory of mankind would be misguided, therefore. Neither Israel’s past nor future can be reduced down to the horrific actions of another people.

Promoting Israel’s status as the sole democracy in the Middle East overlooks the deeply socialist roots that Israel had at the time of its founding.

Our Jewish antecedents yearned for Israel when it was most likely to be born a socialist state. Still, they yearned for this land and discounted all others. It was not democracy that they sought. Their yearning for statehood was in no way misguided.

Joseph Stalin voted to recognize the state, confident that a socialist Israel would broaden the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. That man was not powered by a deep love for the Jewish people.

THAT ISRAEL is a democracy is wonderful. May it forever remain so. But curiously, a commitment to democracy doesn’t typically move the Jewish people to fight and die in the defense of the countries in which they reside. If it did, diaspora Jewry would surely be storming the military recruiting offices of Britain, France and America. Some do so but most do not.

Safeguarding the democratic character of a country rarely animates Jewish communities to the point where they stand ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause. Not in Britain, France, America or Israel. It is not for the sake of democracy that the Jewish people repeatedly stare down death to protect the state.

And with regard to Israel being a bastion of Western values, in this era of increasing societal wimpishness, outrage culture, cancel culture and ever-growing self-loathing in the West, Western values are about as dependably formed and fashioned as a piece of masticated chewing gum. They should be relied upon about as much as one would a chocolate fire-guard. With antisemitism back in vogue in much of the West and Western values weakening daily, Israel cannot afford to follow suit.

Into and beyond all of these narratives, Israel must reinject the only quintessential reason for its founding and existence.

In the final analysis, the reason for the state’s founding and daily renewal is that with all of the challenges and opportunities that stand before it, this tiny strip of land just happens to be the Homeland of the Jewish people.

Jewish peoplehood and Jewish liturgy believe this land to have been sworn unto our forefathers by God, stated to have been so at the genesis of the Jewish origin story. That connection is undeniable and must not be downplayed. Israel’s story was forged in the twin furnaces of history and faith. From there, this singular, fundamental narrative was drawn out. It must be told above all others. Absent that truth, all narratives are fleeting.

Those who claim that the world won’t accept such a narrative must be challenged to furnish the narrative in a way in which the world will accept Israel’s presence. But take heed, no matter the branding Israel chooses, to its foes and friends alike, this land is the Jewish state, a reality that begets sinister and celebratory reactions, respectively. How Israel responds to that reality is its own choice. It should do so with a stiffened spine and iron-clad conviction.

It is from this land that the Jewish people stem and around this land that the Jewish people are inextricably tied. If Israel the country thrives, Israel the people will thrive, wherever they may reside.

The United States Marines chant a credo when presented with their weapons during basic training: “This is my rifle. There are many like it but this one is mine.”

Israel’s lovers and leaders should adopt and adapt that narrative: “This is my land. There are many like it but this land is mine.”

Judaism is the basis for the past, present and future Jewish state. All else is a mere outgrowth of what occurs when a land is reconciled with its people and a people is finally reconciled with its land. Centrally stating that truth will ensure that it remains a force for good and strength universally.

---

Benjamin Anthony is Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, Benjamin brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. Read full bio here.

Hezbollah’s role in the Israeli-Lebanese maritime agreement

By Yochai Guiski

Israel and Lebanon have reached an agreement that will alter how the world views their maritime borders. The agreement is designed to demarcate each country’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ), as well as the majority of their territorial waters.

The U.S.-mediated agreement has sparked a firestorm of controversy in the final weeks before Israel’s November 1 elections.

While viewed favorably by the coalition parties and the majority of Israel’s security establishment, opposition parties see it as a shameful capitulation to pressure from Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the United States and have even said they may not honor it if they come to power.

Defining maritime boundaries is more of an art than a science. There are some common methods, but they vary depending on the contours of the shoreline, near-shore islands and rocks, continental shelves, and other factors. As a result, many countries that are geographically close have unresolved maritime disputes (39 percent of all sea borders are contested).

Israel’s original claim regarding its EEZ, made in 2011, was an overreach that could not be justified under international law. The Lebanese position, claiming ownership of the gas field known as Karish, which is located in Israel’s EEZ, went even further and was far more irrational. Both positions could be described as starting points for future discussions. Since 2011, Israel and Lebanon have been negotiating a solution with the assistance of a U.S. mediator.

Lebanon’s original offer stemming from those discussions has now been accepted by Israel, with a few changes concerning security in territorial waters. As a result, Israel has relinquished its original claim to maritime boundaries.

It is important to clarify that EEZs are not sovereign areas. Instead, they are managed by states for economic and environmental reasons. They are part of the global commons, and any vessel can move through them.

Hezbollah has occasionally threatened to attack Israel’s rigs in recent years, but it has increased its threats significantly in past months, prior to and following the arrival of the Karish floating gas rig off the northern Israeli coastline. Hezbollah even sent unmanned aerial vehicles in the direction of the rig before they were shot down by the IDF.

After the agreement was made public, Hezbollah stated that Israel had agreed to Lebanon’s position and chalked this up to its tough stance. The group vowed to “keep an eye” on Israel to see if it followed through with the agreement.   

As the debate over the agreement played out in Israel, two leading schools of thought emerged.

One camp sees it as a reasonable compromise that reduces the likelihood of a security escalation in the short and long term. The threat of losing the benefit of gas exploration and production would, according to this line of reasoning, constrain Hezbollah while allowing the Lebanese state to stabilize its economy, and potentially, its political situation, without the need for assistance from Iran and Russia. This, in turn, would strengthen its internal position vis-à-vis Hezbollah. It would also strengthen the American and Western positions in Lebanon and the Middle East, as well as boost Israel’s image, while sacrificing nothing of real value.

The other side sees the agreement as a dishonorable capitulation that would set a dangerous precedent—a full Israeli territorial concession under threat of violence in exchange for almost nothing concrete.

This view holds that the current agreement boosts Hezbollah and humiliates Israel, with the gas rigs becoming the focal point of future extortion attempts by Hezbollah or other radical actors. Critics of the deal regard the idea of the agreement restraining Hezbollah as unrealistic, and they see Israel’s weakness as a potential trigger for escalation. They also see a potential economic windfall for Iran and Hezbollah because they can influence Lebanon’s decision-making.

According to the Israeli business daily Globes, the dispute between the parties took place within the Israeli security establishment and resulted in the resignation of the head of the Israeli negotiation team.

It is too soon to tell which side is correct. Yet it is clear that Israel can make some early gains from the agreement, while Lebanon’s gains will take several years to materialize.

In the short term, a real threat of escalation has been removed, and Israel can begin producing gas from the Karish gas field—while exporting some of it to an energy-starved Europe.

In addition, while Hezbollah will likely receive credit for the agreement in the short term, Lebanon will need to avoid escalation with Israel in order to reap economic benefits in the long run.

Lebanon could build its Kana-Sidon undersea gas field in a few years, improving its ability to generate electricity and its finances, which could also benefit Hezbollah.

The agreement’s success may put pressure on Hamas and the Palestinian Authority to reach a similar agreement to develop the gas reservoir off the Gaza coast.

These developments can be considered stabilizing factors in a vacuum, but things change if one brings Iran into the picture.

If a nuclear deal is reached between Tehran and the world powers, Iran will seize the opportunity to explore and develop gas and oil fields in the Lebanese EEZ in the Mediterranean Sea. This would strengthen Iran’s and Hezbollah’s overall influence over the country, while weakening the Lebanese state.

If the current standoff with Iran persists or worsens, the prospects for stability in Lebanon are also likely to be dashed. The risk of Hezbollah targeting Israeli rigs would, in this scenario, increase, making a symmetrical response by Israel impossible because it would need to attack the Lebanese rig—an asset of a European company.

Meanwhile, Israel’s concessions to Lebanon would remain binding.

It is therefore critical that Israel, the United States, and their European partners devise a strategy to prevent Iran from abusing the agreement, and that they maintain regional stability. If the escalation scenario ends up playing out, Israel would likely be much less willing to make peace and opt for diplomatic means in the future.

---

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

For Israel’s political players, election day is only the halfway point

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

As far as Israeli voters are concerned, national elections are what shapes Israel’s political system, but for Israel’s politicians, they only mark the halfway point.

The reason for this is deeply tied to the structure and nature of Israel’s political system. To form a government, a party chairperson must be able to take to Israel’s President the recommendation of at least 61 Members of Knesset. But with multiple parties in the arena, that is no simple matter.

All experienced political players in Israel know that only when the exit polls come through, usually at 10 p.m. on election day, can the real calculations begin.

In the upcoming November 1 elections, the fifth in three-and-a-half years, the two main blocs are, once again, divided into the “Bibi” and “Just not Bibi” camps. This is essentially the only political game in town.

It is remarkable to take stock of how long Israel’s political system has been gridlocked. Teenagers who were aged 15-and-a-half when the first of those five elections marking the beginning of the current cycle of political paralysis was held are now eligible to vote. Many things have changed, but one constant remains: The presence of Opposition Chairman and Likud head Benjamin Netanyahu.

In one corner is an entire political camp determined to boycott him. It refuses to accept him in any manner, claiming it would be impossible to do so since he is on trial on corruption charges. This camp repeatedly calls for Netanyahu’s resignation. Netanyahu however refuses to succumb to these calls and has continued to dominate the political scene while at the same time mounting a legal defense in court. The current threshold for enabling a party to enter the Knesset is four seats. Parties that fail to reach the threshold remain outside of parliament and votes cast for them are wasted.

This is especially a concern for the anti-Netanyahu camp, which features a number of parties on the verge of the threshold. Among them are Labor and Meretz, which, based on the final polls, are likely to gain four to five seats each.

The Arab Joint List split up in this election season, and its three component parties are each fighting to get over the line. The elections may, in the end, be decided by the Arab-Israeli sector, where wasted votes could end up boosting the Netanyahu camp if one of the parties currently polling four seats fail to get past the threshold.  

The Arab Israeli street is well known for punishing its leaders when they split up into smaller parties. Voting percentages are consistently higher when the Arab parties join forces to run under a separate list.

As a result, Prime Minister Yair Lapid has made an effort to encourage Arab-Israelis to go out and vote.  

Lapid cannot become the next prime minister if one of the Arab parties fails to get into the Knesset. However, if Netanyahu also fails to gain the 61 votes he needs to form a government, Lapid will stay on as prime minister of a transitional government. Another spell as premier would boost his image, which is already strengthened by the fact that he has been in charge of military campaigns, international affairs, and the maritime border agreement with Lebanon – an agreement that many Israelis, including Netanyahu, regard as scandalous, but which is well regarded by others.

The Netanyahu camp has been strengthened, meanwhile, by the ability of right-wing religious nationalist politicians Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir to unite into a joint Religious Zionist list.

 Within this bloc, the Likud’s power has been eroded by the rise of Ben Gvir, who, according to polls, has convinced many young voters, including from Likud, to give him their ballot. If the polling proves to be correct, the Religious Zionist list will demand many ministries when it enters the government.

Meanwhile, Ayelet Shaked, the former number two in Yamina, a highly capable political player who now leads her own party, the Jewish Home, is running despite polls showing that she will not get past the threshold.

Netanyahu has attempted to remove her from the race to ensure that the two seats she is worth will go to him – so far with no success.

In the unlikely event that Shaked does get past the threshold, Netanyahu will find himself completely dependent on her to form a government, due to the expected tight results between the two political blocs.

If neither camp is able to form a government, a third option exists – namely that Benny Gantz, chairman of the National Unity party, does so. Gantz, a former partner of Lapid turned competitor-rival, believes he could get the needed 61 votes, though it is difficult to see how with the current math.

One option is that Gantz becomes prime minister with Likud entering a rotation government under his lead with Gantz receiving the first rotation and Netanyahu the second.

Another is that Gantz is able to somehow reel in the ultra-Orthodox parties to his government, though this looks improbable.

In the past several days, the television political campaigns have begun, and the election season has awoken from its slumber after the High Holidays.

The mudslinging is in full throttle, as it has been in past elections. Those who deliver the most devastating knockouts have the best chance of winning. Netanyahu, Lapid, Gantz, Shaked, and others will all be in the ring, slugging it out. 

At the end of the day, however, voting patterns are not likely to change much from the past round of elections. It is not possible to change the people. With every election costing over a billion shekels and wasting so much time, Israel’s politicians are beginning to appear ridiculous.

Israeli voters are asking how they can entrust them to lead, when they cannot get along with one another.

---

Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

Israel’s character is on the line in the upcoming elections

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

At the start of September, a delegation of American senators landed in Israel. During one of the delegation’s meetings with opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu, Senator Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, expressed resentment over the possible integration of Itamar Ben-Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit party in any future government, should Netanyahu win Israel’s November 1 election.

According to sources present at the meeting, Menendez warned that if extremist right-wing elements, such as MK Ben-Gvir, become part of the next Israeli government, this would have a detrimental impact on American-Israeli ties.

Naturally, Menendez sees the danger from his perspective but the warning he sounded is much broader: If Ben-Gvir is included in government, 74 years after the establishment of Israel, its future as a democratic, liberal state will be cast in doubt.

Netanyahu expressed annoyance to Menendez over his comment but this was quickly forgotten when the opposition leader encountered Ben-Gvir during a Sukkot event at the Chabad Village in central Israel. In order to avoid being photographed on the same stage, Netanyahu refused to go up until Ben-Gvir had descended from the stage.

While a photo op was missed, the scenario of a Netanyahu-Ben-Gvir government is realistic.

What won’t Netanyahu do to flee the wheels of justice? He’s prepared to do anything and everything.

The law and justice plan presented by Ben-Gvir’s running partner in the joint Religious Zionist list, Bezalel Smotrich, has been tailored to Netanyahu’s size and needs. They call it reform and say it is needed to return public faith in the legal system, when in fact, the purpose is to destroy the legal system and remove its independence.

Ben-Gvir has also presented his own security call to action, which Netanyahu knows is hot air and would not restore public security but, on the contrary, would set the country on fire. For Netanyahu, everything is fair game. The laws of the game are clear: he either is on top or, as his wife once said, the country burns.

Rabbi Yitzhak Goldknopf, the new chairman of the United Torah Judaism (UTJ) ultra-Orthodox bloc, is another senior partner of Netanyahu. Goldknopf has produced several notable quotes, such as “the State of Israel belongs to two nations: to the ultra-Orthodox and to all the others,” and, “I haven’t seen that mathematics or English advanced the Israeli economy.”

He also claimed that he was sure that studying Torah intensively is more difficult than being a soldier serving on the frontlines – a statement made during a week in which two IDF soldiers, Sgt. Noa Lazar and Staff. Sgt. Ido Baruch, were killed by terrorists while defending the country.

Goldknopf is Netanyahu’s natural partner and the former and perhaps future prime minister has already promised him that he would match the budgets of ultra-Orthodox educational institutions that do not teach core curriculum subjects to those allocated to schools in the state system.

HOWEVER, IT’S not only Netanyahu that is chasing after Goldknopf, Benny Gantz, chairman of the National Unity Party, and Prime Minister Yair Lapid and his Yesh Atid party are also courting UTJ.

This comes at a time when, according to Bank of Israel figures, if the ultra-Orthodox public continues to leave core studies out of its curriculum and does not integrate more deeply into the job market, Israel will eventually experience economic collapse.

The public that serves the state, works and pays taxes will not be able to deal with the tax burden. Taxes will rise by 16% if this nightmare scenario materializes. Instead of core curriculum subjects, Israel will receive ignorance and poverty. One can forget about a free country and economy.

Netanyahu, who is fond of quoting the doctrine of Likud’s ideological forefather Ze’ev Jabotinsky, which includes the tenets of economic liberalism, has long forgotten the way.

Recently, The Washington Post published an article praising the Israeli economy. It said, among other things, that Israel is an economic powerhouse with the highest growth rate among developed economies and one of the lowest rates of unemployment and inflation but judging by his campaign promises, Netanyahu, it seems, has no use for a free economy. Deficits, unemployment and inflation are terms that will apparently vanish from the world.

Instead, Israel would receive a freeze on mortgage repayments and somehow this will be used to fund a Free Education Act for ages zero to three. One does not need to be an economics maven to understand that these ideas are dangerous for the future of Israel.

After surrendering to lobbyists for the past 12 years, strengthening the committees and councils that raised the cost of living, and distributing funds to ultra-Orthodox parties, Netanyahu will march ahead in the same fashion.” After all, making promises doesn’t cost Netanyahu any money. Mr. Economy will reverse the achievements of Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman, the only minister to stand up and say he would not be part of a government that did not insist that all state-funded educational institutions teach core studies.

On November 1, the nation will once again head to the ballot box. Five election campaigns in three-and-a-half years have created confusion and chaos. To know which vote to cast, we must return to basics and recall the values with which we established Israel.

---

Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

Israel isn’t just counting on Lebanon deal to secure gas rigs

By Yaakov Lappin

In the coming days, Israel and Lebanon are expected to sign a U.S.-mediated agreement that regulates their maritime border, and respective rights to extract natural gas reserves from under the Mediterranean Sea.

The agreement has attracted intense debate in Israel over its advantages or disadvantages – of which it has both. It carries strategic value, in enabling Israel to immediately begin accessing profitable gas resources and de-escalating tensions with Hezbollah, which has threatened to attack the Israeli Karish offshore gas rig off the northern Israeli coast if Jerusalem begins gas extraction before a deal is reached.

But it also strengthens Hezbollah’s ability to market itself inside Lebanon, and particularly to its Shi’ite Lebanese base, as ‘protector’ of Lebanon’s interests, and as a violent entity that is able to use the threat of its missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to force Israel into an agreement, under terms and at a pace that would not have otherwise happened.

Whichever way one may view the deal, it is important to note that over the past several years, the Israeli defense establishment has invested heavily in cutting edge military technology in order to defend Israel’s offshore rigs. And that Israel is far from relying only an agreement with a state like Lebanon, whose actual sovereignty is very much in doubt due to the dominance of Hezbollah and Iran in it, in order to protect its strategic maritime energy assets that are a major source of national income and have become all the more important in view of recent export deals to the European Union, which is looking for alternatives to Russian gas sources.

The most significant step that Israel took to protect its strategic new energy assets took shape in December 2020, when INS Magen (Defender), the first of Israel’s new Sa’ar 6 corvettes, arrived at Haifa Naval Base.  The second ship in the Sa’ar 6 series, the INS Oz (Strength), arrived in June 2021, while the INS Nitzhahon (Victory) and Atzmaut (Independence) arrived in July of that year.

Built by German shipyard builders  ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems in close cooperation with Israel Navy engineers and planners, the ships are fitted with Israeli-made weapons that include the Rafael-made C-Dome air defense system – the sea version of Iron Dome, and the Israel Aerospace Industries-made Barak 8 air and missile defense system.

The C-Dome will be designed to intercept a range of threats, including rockets, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles – of the type that that Hezbollah is in possession of, while the Barak system can take on longer-range threats such as  supersonic anti-ship missiles –another weapons system reportedly in Hezbollah’s arsenal.

The ships have on-board electronic warfare systems, which could be used to jam the guidance systems of incoming threats. They also come with advanced multi-mission radars made by IAI-Elta, and command-and-control systems; they can detect, track, and intercept threats from over 200 kilometers away.

Also taking part in the defensive effort are the Israel Navy’s older Sa’ar 5 missile vessels, like the INS Eilat, which shot down Hezbollah unmanned aerial vehicles that the Iranian-backed terror organization launched toward Israel’s Karish platform on July 2, as a warning message.

But it is the Sa’ar 6s that are the designated offshore gas defenders, protecting rigs that can be targeted by both Hezbollah from Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

According to media reports, Hezbollah is in possession of the Russian-made Yakhont supersonic cruise missile, which has a range of up to 300 kilometers, which it is believed to have obtained from the Syrian military.

Hezbollah is consistently trying to obtain and develop other land-to-sea missiles and rockets. In 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, it fired a C-802 Chinese designed anti-ship missile, striking the INS Hanit and killing four sailors. It was the first time that an Israeli ship was hit by a shore-to-sea missile, and represented a painful wake up call for Israel’s Navy.

Today, Hezbollah is likely in possession of more advanced threats, meaning that powerful radars are vital in detecting them.

As a navy source stated in 2020, "The issue with gas rigs is that it only takes one hit to achieve the potential damage that you want. As a navy, we cannot allow any missiles, ballistic threats, cruise missiles, or UAVs to get through us and strike any gas rig. It's like building an iron wall."

The Sa’ar 6s will patrol Israel’s economic exclusive zones. They can stay out at sea longer than their predecessors, and cover longer distances.

It seems fair to assume that the rigs also have underwater sonar systems installed on them, to sound alerts against Hezbollah divers. Naval threats are also developing to the south, where Hamas is trying to build ‘sea tunnels’ that enable its commando diver forces to head out to sea, or to launch mini unmanned submerged explosive vehicles without being noticed. There too, Israel is building a network of sensors and obstacles to prevent this from happening.

Unmanned sea vessels such as the Elbit-made Seagull which can patrol autonomously and detect threats using sensors and fire weapons will also play a key role in protecting rigs.

In any future conflict, the Israel Navy will also take on offensive duties, striking enemy targets on land with its firepower.

The navy’s new role in protecting Israeli national assets at sea, both during routine times and in times of  war, is a new strategic responsibility  and compels it to cover distances that are larger than any it has defended in the past.

Taken together, these developments collectively create a new Israeli naval doctrine, based on recognition that Israel’s economy flows through the sea.

It’s not only the gas – Israel is often compared to an island, despite not technically being one. Its longest border is with the sea. Half of Israel’s fresh water comes from the sea via desalination plants, the communication cables that run under the sea connect it to the world, 70% of Israel’s electrical consumption comes from gas rigs out at sea, and 90% of Israel’s wheat is imported via the sea, as are vehicles and most raw materials.

Israel must be able to protect its waters if it is to protect its basic ability to function. As Israel’s enemies conduct an arms race to attack the country’s sea assets, the Israeli Navy has fashioned an entire new strategy to counteract the threat and stay a step ahead.

---

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Antisemitism Finds a Home With the A.B.I.L.A

By Mark Goldfeder

The prominent American Branch of the International Law Association (ABILA) has apparently been hijacked by the advocates of modern antisemitism. Sadly, illustrious New York law firms, the New York Bar Association, and Fordham Law School are among their unwitting enablers.

From October 20 to October 22, 2022 the ILA’s American Branch will hold its annual meeting in New York City. This year, the program includes a panel dedicated to the demonstrable lie that the Jewish state is racist, guilty of the crime against humanity of apartheid, and therefore deserving of criminal prosecution and economic ruin.

For the past month, the online program described the annual meeting on “Racism and the Crime of Apartheid in International Law” this way: “Today, in contexts across the world, from Myanmar’s abuses of Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State, to the Israeli authorities’ systematic oppression of Palestinians, to the Chinese government’s actions in Xinxiang against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, human rights organizations, UN bodies, experts, and scholars have concluded that the crime of apartheid is being committed with impunity.” In just one paragraph, the authors did their very best to casually lump Israel in with some of the worst human rights abusers in the world.

According to the official program, the Opening Plenary and Reception is taking place at the New York City Bar Association. The Centennial Gala is hosted by the law firm of White & Case LLP, the Opening Reception by Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, and the panel itself by Fordham Law School. The panel’s list of participants is a who’s who of Israel-bashing advocates and nobody from the other side. This stands in marked contrast to the promise of the ILA to exemplify a “diverse and inclusive community of individuals working or interested in international law,” the promise of legal practitioners to hear and evaluate all sides fairly, and the promise of the legal academy to ensure students and faculty are educated, not brainwashed.

Brainwashed they will be, however. The panel includes a UN official, E. Tendayi Achiume who charges Israel with vaguely defined international crimes at every chance she gets—sometimes working with an Israeli-designated terrorist organization to do so. Her UN anti-racism mission has a well-documented blind spot when it comes to advocating for racial and ethnic justice for Jews, and in 2021 Achiume herself signed a wildly antisemitic letter expressing outrage that UCLA dared to condemn antisemitic attacks in the United States (during a massive uptick of such incidents) without also condemning “Jewish supremacists” in Israel.

The panel also includes an academic, Victor Kattan, who claims that only the non-existent State of Palestine has sovereign title over Jerusalem, and has encouraged the Palestinians to file claims against the United States at the International Criminal Court for daring to move the U.S. Embassy to Israel’s capital city. But the highlight is probably Omar Shakir, an NGO activist and extremistwho has publicly supported and defended murderous terrorists and antisemites. For years he advocated and worked for the antisemitic Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, and then, when Israel revoked his work visa for engaging in boycott activities, lied and claimed that he had not done so. Since then, he has worked hard to mainstream the thoroughly debunked Human Rights Watch report that denied Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state, dismissed its security concerns, and accused Israel of apartheid.

Lest you be concerned that a neutral moderator might ask these folks some hard-hitting questions for the benefit of those watching who may not know better, rest assured that the rabid anti-Israel spell will not be broken. The moderator is Mai el Sadany, a human rights attorney who, among other things, has demanded that the NY Bar Association rescind an invitation to Dani Dayan, the former Consul General of Israel in New York, falsely accusing him of racism, apartheid and other criminal activity. She has also accused the United States of collaborating with Israel to cover up human rights violations.

Lest you be concerned that a neutral moderator might ask these folks some hard-hitting questions for the benefit of those watching who may not know better, rest assured that the rabid anti-Israel spell will not be broken.

For the record, because facts matter, apartheid involves an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups committed with the intention of maintaining that regime. Israeli Arabs enjoy full equal rights, and hold positions in the highest levels of every branch of government. Israel does distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, as does every country, but that has nothing to do with race, which is why when Amnesty International made the same claim of apartheid a few months back, they had to literally invent a new definition that was not based on race in order to play a game of antisemitic double standard “gotcha” with the Jewish state.

It is dangerous when antisemites use the imprimatur and gravitas of once-respectable institutions to mainstream hate and lies. This is particularly so in a dangerous environment of rising antisemitic hated and the inextricable bond between accusing Israel of apartheid and antisemitism. We let these claims go unchallenged at our peril because study after study has shown that this kind of inflammatory, discriminatory, antisemitic, anti-Zionist rhetoric is actually dangerous, and leads directly to the kinds of antisemitic attacks against innocent Jewish people and institutions that we are seeing around the world.

Late last week, the law firms in question and Fordham Law School began to receive inquiries about why they would host and celebrate such a gathering. In response, the ABILA did two things: First, the program description in the online brochure was reworded so it did not explicitly accuse Israel of international crimes. Second, they added an additional speaker, ostensibly to bring balance to the panel. The speaker they added, however, Mia Swart, is an Al Jazeera reporter who has done fawning interviews with Omar Shakir “calling out Israeli apartheid,” and just last week tweeted in support of another event in which the leader of an Israeli-designated terror organization gave a talk on “Apartheid and Israel’s Assault on Palestinian Civil Society.” So much for offering a different perspective.

These changes were clearly made so that the hosts could have plausible deniability. They don’t have it. They know exactly what is going on—at their expense, and at the expense of all the attendees who deserve better.

---

Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Israel must prepare for a nuclear Iran

By Danny Ayalon

Israel is pursuing a delicate balancing act as it seeks to preserve and strengthen its alliance with its number one ally, the US, while at the same time objecting to the revival of the 2015 nuclear deal. To understand the intricacies of this diplomatic maneuver, it is worth first examining the origins of the US-Israeli special relationship.

While no formal defense treaty exists between the two countries, there are numerous strategic formal and informal agreements on energy, technology, defense, intelligence cooperation, economy and trade. The bilateral bonds are strong, wide-ranging, and deep. Additionally, Israel is more than simply another ally or a recipient of generous American assistance; it actively assists the US.

American financial military funds for Israel, amounting to $3.9 billion a year, are invested in American defense industries. Israeli battlefield experience and technology directly assist American ballistic missile defense development, cyber defense and more. At the community level, in the US, Jewish and evangelical communities both treasure Israel’s welfare and security.

This is the foundation for some extremely significant principles that characterize bilateral relations. The first principle is complete transparency, meaning no concealment, and mutual respect.

The second principle is that of no surprises. This applies less to the tactical-military level and more to the grand strategic and political level. Neither side wants to catch the other off guard when making a significant move. This also suggests that both parties would know in advance about any US failure to veto a UN Security Council resolution against Israel.

The third principle is bipartisan American support for Israel. This is one of the three golden rules, and according to it, Israel is above any political debate in the US. Today, with extreme polarization underway in the US – something that has been in place throughout both the Obama and Trump administrations – this principle has been eroded.

Today, Israel deals with a new US president, one who is not necessarily a trailblazer, but who maintains fair ties with Israel. This is an administration that is well versed – as is the current Israeli government – in knowing how to agree to disagree. This means that relations are not undermined by a lack of agreement.

Can Washington revive the Iran deal?

INTO THIS framework enters the effort by Washington to revive the Iranian nuclear deal, which was scrapped in 2015. Back when the nuclear deal was first passed seven years ago, Israel bet on going to Congress to torpedo it, but this was a total failure, and as a result, the US excluded Israel from the talks. Back then, Jerusalem found itself without any control or up-to-date knowledge regarding the specifics of the agreement.

Based on the bitter experience of 2015, Israel should avoid public fights with the US, or any move that can be regarded as meddling in internal American politics. It should avoid crossing the known boundaries – but without giving up on any of its principled objections to the would-be deal, and the dangers that it could bring.

It is not necessary for Israel to align itself with all American policies; rather, it must communicate discreetly with members of Congress. This isn’t about self-censorship, but rather, about how the message is delivered.

Israel is still obligated to exert every effort that it can, without harming ties, to object to the proposed nuclear agreement. If the US still decides to sign the deal in the end, Israel will have the ability to reserve its right to announce that it is not a party to the agreement and that it retains its freedom of action.

In such a scenario, Israel’s government should switch to a “Plan B” – a compensation package for Israel that would better position it to strike Iran’s nuclear program in the future. American officials, including the Ambassador to Israel Thomas R. Nides, have openly stated that they would not restrict Israel from acting if it felt compelled to do so.

This means that if Israel felt it needed to strike the nuclear program in the future, Jerusalem would have to alert Washington (in a way that would not jeopardize the information’s security). This has precedent.

I was a political adviser to ex-Israeli premier Ariel Sharon, when the Americans first arrived in Afghanistan in 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11. We received a call from then-president George W. Bush to warn us that the attack was coming and that there could be regional repercussions from Islamists. In 2003, a similar scenario played out prior to the American attack on the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.   

In assessing the Israeli government’s performance in its dealings with the US administration over the current Iran nuclear negotiations, the government receives a good grade. Both prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid have been able to strike the balance described above.

It must also be noted that Israel’s influence on this issue is limited. The US is driven by global economic and military interests, such as bringing down energy prices – something Iranian oil and gas can certainly help to do if sanctions are lifted – and prioritizing great power competition with China and Russia.

These are factors Israel must comprehend, even if it does not like them.

Israel will now have to make preparations for “Plan C” – defending itself against the threat posed by a nuclear Iran. It must fully utilize the delivery of military platforms that it can secure from the US to do so. 

---

Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

How Intelligence Diplomacy Strengthened Israel-Egypt Ties

By Yaakov Peri

At the end of August, reports emerged in Hebrew media that Ronen Bar, the director of Israel’s Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency had traveled to Egypt for a meeting with his counterpart, Abbas Kamel, the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate.

The purpose of the meeting was reportedly to overcome a crisis in bilateral relations following the end of the three-day Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Operation Breaking Dawn against Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza.

The diplomatic tensions stemmed from the IDF’s continued actions against PIJ operatives in the West Bank, contrary to the Egyptian belief that under the ceasefire they had brokered between Israel and PIJ to end Operation Breaking Dawn, the IDF would ease military pressure on the terror organization in the territories. The Egyptians also demanded the release of PIJ prisoners to consolidate the truce.

But Israel did not release the prisoners, and increased pressure on PIJ, acting contrary to Egyptian expectations. Immediately after the operation, Israel conducted a series of arrests of PIJ members in the West Bank, during which several Palestinians were killed in clashes with the IDF in Nablus.

Egypt acted as the key intermediary to bring about the truce after three days of conflict, and Cairo perceived these developments as an affront.

Signs of tension were visible when Kamel canceled a planned trip to Israel after the Gaza operation. Political and security sources assessed that this was a mid-level crisis that would not be difficult to resolve.

During talks with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid said that “Egypt has a most significant role to play in preserving the stability of regional security.” This statement reflects an important fact: recently, Egypt has been practically the only political element that can act as an intermediary and is able to secure ceasefires between Hamas, as well as other armed organizations in the Gaza Strip, and Israel.

It is clear that the reason Egypt took offense was Israel’s lack of cooperation with its understanding of the ceasefire agreement. Cairo saw this as a blow to Egypt’s honor and status, in line with Egypt’s self-perception in the region and its important role in Gaza.

For many years, Egypt has invested greatly in preserving its status as the leading power in the Arab world—a role Turkey has attempted to infringe upon in recent years with varying degrees of success. After some erosion, Egypt has begun to recover its predominance. This recovery is mainly attributable to Sisi’s calm and moderate leadership.

Egypt also perceives itself as a state able to resolve regional issues, including the never-ending confrontation between Israel and Gazan terror factions, primarily Hamas and PIJ.

Cairo is keen on preserving this role, and to that end, it regularly dispatches intelligence delegations to Gaza, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

Israeli and Egyptian intelligence communities enjoy excellent relations, both at the personal and professional levels.

Egypt also regards good ties with Israel as critical for ensuring proper relations with the United States and the West, particularly after being greatly disappointed in its history of dealings with the Soviet Union.

All of these factors have helped propel Egypt to the forefront of the region, a position it wishes to maintain. 

It seeks to do this despite its conflict with Hamas’s Egyptian sister movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has harmed state security. In order to avoid inflaming clear tensions with Hamas, Egypt busies itself with dealing with political and diplomatic issues and stays clear of theological disputes with Gaza’s rulers.

Egypt is wary of Islamist forces, and combats extreme Islamic terrorists in Sinai on a non-stop basis, including losing many members of its security forces in the fight against ISIS in recent years.

A History of Intelligence Diplomacy

The dispatch of Israeli intelligence chiefs to defuse diplomatic tensions has a good precedent.

In the past, heads of the Shin Bet also set out for political missions to resolve crises with states and organizations. But this was usually done covertly and did not attract headlines. Conditions have changed, however, and the journey of a Shin Bet chief today attracts both media coverage and analysis.

Meetings between intelligence chiefs are routine and acceptable worldwide. Often, government cabinets feel that the head of an intelligence agency is optimally positioned to carry out diplomatic missions, and, as such, entrust them with confidence and credibility.

Intelligence cooperation brings states together, and requires a high degree of trust and intimacy. Hence, both sides often trust the “messengers” more than the average politician. Intelligence chiefs are apolitical figures, despite being appointed by the highest political echelons. They enable unique and very close relations between intelligence services.

When a government sends the head of an intelligence agency to handle what appears to be a diplomatic-political issue, it is sending a figure that is often free of political baggage. This approach has proven itself over time. For example, when Israel was able to patch up relations with Jordan following the botched assassination attempt of senior Hamas member Khaled Mashaal on Jordanian territory, and ongoing contacts between Israeli intelligence chiefs and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Similarly, intelligence diplomacy played a central role in growing relationships between Israel and Gulf Arab governments prior to the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords. Whole foundations for relations were founded on contacts between the states’ intelligence agencies. Each agency received instructions and guidance from the highest levels of government during such contacts.

Ultimately, the Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic affair appears to be of mediocre severity, neither very serious nor trivial. It is not difficult to overcome such an issue, and it seems likely that bilateral relations between the two state systems will continue without harm.

---

Mr. Yaakov Peri concluded his distinguished career as Director of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Service). He served in that position from 1988-1995. Prior to that role he held the position of Head of the Shin Bet Northern Command and the Judea & Samaria Command. In 2013 he joined the Yesh Atid party, was elected to the Knesset and was appointed Minister of Science, Technology and Space.

The Palestinian Tragedy Is Israel's Too

By Chuck Freilich

In his recent speech at the United Nations, Israeli prime minister Yair Lapid breathed some life back into the long-dormant two-state solution process. Some believe that it is too late and that the point of no return has already been crossed. There is certainly not much time left before the Palestinians permanently reject themselves out of having any state and Israel settles itself out of a Jewish and fully democratic future.

Since 2009, when Benjamin Netanyahu returned to office, the number of settlers in the West Bank has grown by 60 percent, to over 475,000, gradually but inexorably creating a binational reality. Moreover, the land available for potential territorial swaps is increasingly being used for other purposes. The status quo is an illusion.

The Palestinians have similarly contributed to the emerging binational reality. They repeatedly rejected dramatic proposals that would have given them a state on essentially all of the contested territory and remain paralyzed by a seemingly immutable adherence to an all-or-nothing approach that has, indeed, left the Palestinians with nothing—and deep internal divisions. No end is in sight to the split between the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas is in the twilight of his reign, the Palestinian Authority is tottering, and Hamas remains implacably opposed to any accommodation with Israel. Indeed, a Hamas take-over of the West Bank may be the most likely end to the ongoing rupture.

The Palestinians are thus in dire danger of missing a historic opportunity to have a state of their own. That is their tragedy. Unfortunately, it is also Israel’s. The fate of the Zionist movement, one of history’s most successful national movements, is inextricably linked to that of the Palestinians, who have one of history’s most dysfunctional national movements.

Lapid’s resurrection of the two-state solution notwithstanding, the Palestinian issue will play virtually no role in the upcoming elections, much like all elections since 2015. For most Israelis, the Palestinian issue has little bearing on their lives, seemingly played out in a distant country that they have never visited and which only penetrates their consciousness after particularly heinous acts of terrorism. Israel has become a global high-tech power, its economy is booming, and the Abraham Accords demonstrated that regional normalization is possible without the Palestinians. More pressing issues present themselves.

Today, however, just 60 percent of the combined populations of Israel and the West Bank are Jewish—hardly a Jewish state—and a majority would have been Arab had Israel not withdrawn from Gaza. Most Israelis are cognizant of the long-term demographic threat to the nation’s character, but they believe there is nothing Israel can do to change Palestinian rejectionism in any event. Thus, they have adopted Israel’s tried and true approach of yehiye beseder (“things will work out”) and simply moved on.

Binational states, as exemplified by Syria and Iraq, are often a recipe for disaster, and a nearly wall-to-wall consensus in Israel opposes an outcome of this nature. The never-ending violence that plays out on Israel’s TV screens, along with the repeated rounds of conflict with Hamas, should be proof enough of what a binational future holds in store. Remarkably, however, right-wing voters continue to vote for parties whose policies will lead directly to this. A disconnect between voter preferences and voting patterns is hardly unique to Israel, but rarely is it so pronounced.

A revitalized peace process should build off the Abraham Accords. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, along with Egypt, Jordan, the European Union, and others, should be invited to help broker the talks, under the auspices of the United States. Inclusion among the “conveners” would be based on a number of principles.

First, Israel’s final borders, as stated in President George Bush’s 2004 letter, will reflect “demographic realities” (i.e. the settlement blocs). In practice, this means that Israel will retain 4 to 6 percent of the West Bank, in which nearly 80 percent of the settlers live, in exchange for land swaps, but will withdraw from the rest. The United States and the EU have long accepted the need for land swaps, as, in fact, have some Arab states and even the Palestinians.

Second, Palestinian refugees would be offered a choice between a “return” to the Palestinian state, remaining in situ, or moving elsewhere with compensation, but not to Israel itself (with the exception of limited numbers). In effect, this would result in a de facto international disavowal of the Palestinian claim to an unlimited “right of return,” which together with Jerusalem, constitutes the two ultimate issues dividing the sides.

On Jerusalem, the most feasible solution would likely be akin to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s 2008 proposal: the division of the city along its national lines, with an international body to govern the “holy basin” (the Old City and additional holy sites), pending final resolution of the issue. Whereas Olmert had proposed that the international body include the United States, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Palestinians, an updated proposal would add the Abraham Accords states.

Finally, the conveners would reaffirm that the Oslo Accords, contrary to the public image, never predetermined the negotiations’ final outcome and that the possible establishment of a Palestinian state remains contingent on the successful completion of two critical tests, at which the Palestinians have so far failed abysmally: the establishment of effective self-governance and the prevention of terrorism. The conveners would be expected to finally hold the Palestinians to these conditions. Israel, for its part, would be expected to cease settlement activity beyond the fence line during the negotiations.

Should attempts to reach a negotiated agreement along these lines fail to achieve rapid progress, Israel should act unilaterally to determine its boundaries, renounce sovereignty over the 90 percent of the West Bank beyond the security fence, and begin a phased withdrawal of settlers. The thousands of rockets fired into Israel from Gaza demonstrate the need for ongoing Israel Defense Forces deployments throughout the West Bank for defensive purposes.

Disengagement from the West Bank, as in Gaza, would be unilateral vis-a-vis the Palestinians, but it should be coordinated this time with all of the conveners, not just the United States. It should also be made contingent on a significant quid pro quo —on the refugee issue, for instance—and public recognition that Israel had fulfilled most of the measures expected of it. The actual extent of Israel’s withdrawal might serve as an inducement to do so.

U.S. leverage over Israel is, and should remain, constrained both by the fundamental closeness of the relationship and Israel’s ongoing need for assistance in the face of the threats of Iran and Hezbollah. Even limited American pressure, however, has major resonance in Israel and, if applied in conjunction with the other conveners, the impact would be magnified. Overall, a “carrot” approach would be most effective, including even greater American assistance for missile defense and potentially even a defense treaty; an upgrade of EU ties with Israel, just short of membership; open formalization of ties with Saudi Arabia and others; and a significant expansion of regional cooperation. The impact on Israel’s strategic circumstances and public opinion would be dramatic.

With the Palestinians, American and convener leverage is more straightforward, and the demands must be stark: abandon the rejectionist all-or-nothing approach, agree to a state on almost all of the territory, but not all, and compromise on refugees and Jerusalem, as proposed above, or lose outside support for a Palestinian state. In addition to what should be the ultimate inducement for the Palestinians, the prospect of finally having a state, the conveners would also offer major development aid.

Both Israel and the Palestinians are past masters at stonewalling and derailing unwanted peace initiatives. A breakthrough should only be attempted if and when the appropriate political circumstances prevail on both sides, and even then, only if Washington is truly willing to apply pressure and offer significant inducements.

Bitter experiences with the corrupt dictatorship established by the Palestinians in the West Bank and the radical theocracy in Gaza indicate that a future Palestinian state is more likely than not to be another failed, authoritarian, unstable, and irredentist Arab state. This, then, begs the question of why one would continue to pursue a two-state solution. The answer is simple. The alternative, a binational state, is far worse.

---

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

The Long-Term Competition doctrine – Israel’s theory of victory vs Iran

By Yaakov Lappin

In May this year, Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the former deputy chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, published an important paper that provides a glimpse into a new doctrine increasingly shaping the Israeli defense establishment’s view on how to deal with Iran.

In the paper, published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Zamir, laid out a concept known as Long-Term Competition (LTC), and, specifically, how Israel should apply it to take on the threat posed by Iran.

Iran, Zamir pointed out, is dedicated to the long-term goal of destroying Israel and becoming the regional hegemonic power. It seeks to achieve this by creating heavily-armed proxies and partners, surrounding Israel with rings of rocket and missile bases, and placing a nuclear umbrella over this tightening noose.

Citing the American foreign policy scholar Hal Brands, Zamir noted that any LTC doctrine must include a theory of victory – meaning defining a state’s long-term strategic goal and how it plans to achieve it.

Other key tenets of an LTC include leveraging one’s asymmetric advantage, embracing ideological competition, competing comprehensively and holistically, operating multilaterally, and exploiting “the strategic importance of time.”

Ultimately, a country engaged in an LTC against an adversary must pace itself for the long haul.

Zamir proposed that Israel’s LTC against Iran apply seven core principles, which are as follows:

·         A multilateral, long-term campaign organized regionally in which roles and players (meaning other states in the Middle East also threatened by Iran) are clearly defined.

·         Targeting the Iranian Islamic Republican Guards Corps, in Iran and throughout the Middle East. The IRGC was defined by Zamir as Iran’s “center of gravity,” and weakening it means undermining Tehran’s regional influence

·         Denying the ability of Iran to operate indirectly, through proxies, by responding to such actions with direct deterrent reprisals – meaning targeting Iran directly for the actions of its proxies.

·         Hitting targets belonging to Iran’s proxies continuously.

·         Applying direct pressure on the Iranian regime due to its terrorist actions whether a nuclear agreement is signed or not.

·         Expanding Israel’s deniable shadow war actions, currently active against Iranian interests in Syria, to target the whole of the Iranian regime, the IRGC, and regional Iranian assets.

·         And waging an “ideological cultural” campaign to win over Middle Eastern hearts and minds among sects, tribes, and other populations to highlight the advantages of moderate Islam and democracy, with Shi’ite communities being the prime target audience.

Signs that this doctrine is increasingly shaping the Israel defense establishment’s thinking have been emerging steadily over the last few years. In 2021, Maj. Gen. Tal Kelman, head of the IDF’s Strategy and Third Circle Directorate (a reference to countries in Israel's third-circle periphery with Iran being the focal point), which was founded in June 2020, told the Hebrew daily Maariv newspaper, “The Shi’ite axis is expanding, and Iran is engaged in a long-term strategic competition with us. The incredible thing is that despite the heavy prices paid by Iranian citizens… the internal-economic low, which is perhaps the worst in Iran since its war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran continues to strive to implement its strategy.” 

Thus, Iran is engaged in a long-term campaign aimed at Israel’s eventual demise, and the response by Israel’s defense establishment is an Israeli long-term campaign designed to thwart all of the Iranian regime’s strategic goals and to contribute to its weakness, with the end goal being defined by Zamir as “the extended isolation and weakening of the enemy until its surrender, where surrender equals the defeated camp being forced to accept its enemy’s terms and losing its motivation to continue fighting given the high cost of the campaign.”

This view was echoed by Kelman, who stated last year, “The significance of the campaign against Iran is not that, in the end, I conquer Tehran and plant a flag there, but a campaign in which I cause Iran to pay very heavy prices, harm its centers of gravity, military capabilities, force it to pay a significant economic price for its aggressive conduct against the State of Israel,” he stated.

Such an Israeli campaign needs to play out across multiple sectors simultaneously, such as Syria, Iran itself, and other locations, and it must become Israel’s top priority, Kelman argued. “Part of the reason that for the past ten years we have been engaged in a campaign between wars in Syria [to roll back Iran’s entrenchment there] and not allowing Iran to build a Hezbollah-like organization there is exactly this,” he stated.

Previous conversations this author held with sources from the IDF’s Strategy and Third Circle Directorate found that the IDF has adopted a comprehensive, holistic view of developing challenges to Israel from Iran, and is assembling ‘puzzle pieces’ that were once seen separately to form a complete picture of threat. The picture begins on Iranian soil and reaches the borders of Israel (in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza) through an integrated lens, rather than viewing each incident or sector isolation.

"Against this, we have to develop a range of capabilities – both to be ready at any minute for any development and also for the other side to be sufficiently deterred – and to know that Israel has the ability to respond unequivocally to any action or desire by the enemy," a source from the Directorate told me in 2020.

Zamir’s paper published in May this year seeks to take this LTC doctrine to the next stage and to bring moderate Sunni powers on board this struggle.

“More than ever before, the anti-Iran nations of the Middle East together with the United States must formulate a joint smart strategy to confront the geopolitical and regional changes appropriately,” Zamir stated. The fact that China and Russia are engaged in intense great power competition with the United States over the global order will also directly influence the Middle East and the long-term struggle in the region between the Islamic Republic’s radical axis and the anti-Iran bloc, he argued.

“The United States is the enemy of the Iranian regime, which views it as the Great Satan. The regime plans to seize control of the Middle East; the global power it intends to partner with is China. The strengthening of this strategic partnership was signaled in March 2021 when China and Iran signed an agreement of economic and security cooperation agreement that includes significant Chinese investments in Iran in exchange for a twenty-five-year supply of oil, which is so critical to the Chinese economy,” said Zamir.

He added that in the military field, China-Iran cooperation is growing, including the transfer of military technologies and advanced Chinese weapons deals, while at the same time, Iran’s navy holds joint exercises and maneuvers with the navies of China and Russia.

Zamir called on Israel to set itself the target of weakening Iran and its deterrence capabilities, denying it the ability to use its forces and resources to destabilize the region, and curbing its expansion to regional states, before forcing it to withdraw.

The contours of the Iranian and Israeli long-term competition doctrines are becoming clear; and while Israel’s campaign is motivated entirely by defensive requirements, the campaign will likely increasingly focus on the need to go on the attack beyond Syria, and to onboard new allies wherever possible.

---

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Beyond Killer Robots: How AI impacts security, military affairs

By Daphne Richemond Barak

For too long, the conversation on AI and militaries has been narrowly focused on autonomous weapons and the ethical issues that come with them. The time is ripe to take stock of the myriad of other ways that AI will impact security and military affairs.

Just as AI is dramatically changing a range of sectors in the civilian world, improving efficiency, reducing costs, and automating processes, there is no reason to believe that militaries, too, will not be joining the AI revolution.

Israel is a world leader in developing autonomous military capabilities, from Iron Dome interceptors to unmanned aerial vehicles to ground-based platforms – though all currently rely on human approval before kinetic firepower can be activated, in line with the values of the Israeli defense establishment.

The question of what will happen when adversaries deploy autonomous weapons that do not seek a person in the loop for approval to use lethal firepower looms on the horizon for all militaries defending democratic states.

It seems reasonable to believe that even those states that have set some limits on AI capabilities will encounter adversaries who have no qualms about doing so, putting the states that limit integrating AI for national security at a considerable disadvantage. Thus, it’s imperative for states to understand the full extent of what AI can do.

While autonomous weapons attract a lot of attention, much of the conversation about this technology is negative, causing analysts to overlook the positive application of AI in areas such as force protection and the reduction of civilian casualties.

The many benefits of artificial intelligence

Other AI functions – including optimizing chain-of-command communications, human-machine teaming in areas like logistics, and predicting adversary maneuvers – offer equally promising avenues. Many are already being developed by western militaries, including by the Israel Defense Forces.

As time goes by, military commanders will feel increasingly comfortable relying on this technology, just as consumers have in the civilian world. Whether AI is introduced in the civilian or military realm does not mean suspending human involvement or judgment, but rather, receiving a new tool to boost performance.

Military commanders will use AI to minimize the fog of war. While they will continue to make maneuver decisions, AI capabilities will augment their decision-making capabilities during battle by providing a more accurate picture of the reality on the ground and keeping to the speed of modern warfare, thanks to continuously updated sensor data.

AI technologies will also help decision-makers and analysts combat the effects of information overload, and to better organize and process growing data pools on enemy behavior. AI will not only alleviate this information clutter, but it will allow for forces to make predictions about future events and outcomes, allowing states to better prepare for war.

The use of AI to better understand an adversary is shaping up to be one of the most promising and fascinating aspects of this tool. This will enable faster, real-time gathering of information, detecting patterns, mapping out communication networks, and even better understanding of how the enemy ‘feels,’ in terms of its morale, by analyzing its language on social media and other platforms. These new AI capabilities amount to intelligence gathering 2.0.

This type of analysis can be extended to both military communications and social media activities by civilians in adversarial states, to better understand a nation’s will to fight based on societal trends on any given day. The will to fight remains the most critical factor in human warfare, and being able to identify when this will decrease, in real time, could prove enormously beneficial for decision-makers in the civilian and military worlds.

In the area of military logistics and maintenance, AI can create revolutionary cost-saving efficiency, which is why most militaries are prioritizing making progress on this front. Typically considered a more technical aspect, logistics will probably lead to the most radical changes in how militaries “do business.”

AI systems can also optimize the procurement process and automate supply chains. They can forecast the need to repair equipment and order resupplies while minimizing costs. They can also be used in personnel allocation by helping militaries figure out which soldier is best suited to what unit. And unlike other aspects of AI, these applications are unlikely to raise any significant legal or ethical issues.

AI-based technologies can also enhance the capabilities of individual soldiers, and this should not be seen as unethical or dangerous across the board. In the past, amphetamines and caffeine have been handed out to soldiers for similar purposes.

What are the applications for AI in defense?

Just as limiting blood loss and boosting resistance to extreme conditions are worthy goals to help soldiers, providing them with new situational awareness and command capabilities are equally legitimate objectives. Human enhancement calls for certain limits – but those have yet to be (publicly) set. Such limits should consider force protection and the preservation of a soldier’s autonomy to choose to undergo a given enhancement, whether it can be reversed, and if it poses long-term health risks.

At the strategic level, AI can boost the capabilities of air defense systems. Emerging weapons, such as hypersonic missiles, can avoid detection from defense systems due to their speed. Air defense systems integrated with AI processing capabilities will be able to properly detect and intercept these incoming missiles.

In the area of information warfare, AI can, of course, help fabricate deep fakes and spread misinformation. Ironically, it can also help governments quickly verify information or recognize efforts by a hostile actor at shaping public perception in a harmful or disruptive manner.

This could give NATO states an ability to know, in real-time, if Russia is trying to use fake news to destabilize its security environment and threaten the alliance.

Ultimately, such capabilities extend far beyond the area of autonomous weapons and fears of ‘killer robots.’ The security community must broaden its grasp of AI capabilities and acknowledge positive as well as disruptive AI applications.

---

Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Israel's core curriculum failure

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

The comprehensive investigative report by the New York Times into the issue of the teaching of core curriculum in New York State ultra-Orthodox schools did not cause anyone in Israel to fall off their chair.

In little Israel, there is no need for an investigative piece to understand the reality of ultra-Orthodox school systems. If the New York Times had just called, we would have been happy to tell them.

According to the report, ultra-Orthodox schools in New York receive billions from state budgets, and yet, even though they are supposed to teach basic core subjects to give pupils tools to deal with the modern world, these institutions function as if they were an autonomy.

In New York, that’s a legal offense, but here in Israel, there is no equivalent law. Despite oceans separating the two places, there are, however, certain parallels, such as the intervention of wheelers and dealers in politics, and the harm that this causes to the economy. In both places, children are left behind and coerced into ignorance.

Why is it that important to learn core subjects?

The answer lies in the symbolic date of 9/11 when the American newspaper chose to publish its piece. The ultra-Orthodox community claims that the publication date symbolizes a kind of terror attack against them in New York, though the newspaper apparently chose this date to underline the view that children who do not acquire basic tools grow up ignorant and live in poverty, leading to social disaster if not stopped.

The day that this reality knocks on our door isn’t far away. In Israel, the percentage of ultra-Orthodox men in employment is around 50%, while among secular men, the employment rate stands at over 80%.

If the ultra-Orthodox male employment rate ever matches the secular one, the Israeli economy would, every year, receive another 29 billion shekels. In effect,  billions of shekels would enter the collective fund of Israeli citizens, through which the state finances its defense budget, police, education, health infrastructure, and more.

If a change does not occur, the State of Israel will not be able to continue to fund these vital systems, and the burden will fall on the shoulders of working people, who will have to pay higher taxes: National bankruptcy won’t be far behind.

And what about Torah studies, some will surely ask? There is no contradiction between religious studies and teaching core curriculum. The only ones exploiting the situation are politicians who hold an entire public hostage. In Israel, like in the state of New York, a community that does not support itself, and lives in poverty, is a community that needs economic assistance and support, and it is easier to manage such a community. The stipend comes with a voting ballot.

To grasp the full picture, let’s zoom out of the present day, and go back in time by a  year to 2021 when Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman issued a call to ensure core curriculum by conditioning budgets to ultra-Orthodox institutions that taught it. This was done to strengthen the Israeli economy and increase the cycle of employment among ultra-Orthodox men (a similar push is needed regarding Arab Israeli women).

It did not take long for positive momentum to build. The Belz Hassidic community took the initiative, and in a bold move, the community’s rebbe announced that he would insert core curriculum into the education system in the coming year. The firestorm quickly appeared too, with critics claiming that such a move would harm religious studies. Ultra-Orthodox Members of Knesset demanded to know why the government thought it had the right to intervene in children’s curriculum.

The investigative report published overseas encountered an Israeli political reality that has been hit by storms over exactly the same issue. Opposition Chairman Benjamin Netanyahu understood that he had to prevent a split between the Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael parties (who jointly form the United Torah Judaism list) since this could damage his chances of returning to power. So he promised to match the funding for institutions that do not teach core curriculum subjects to the budgets of the state education system.

The promise worked, and the political parties again merged into a single list. It is clear to all that if ultra-Orthodox politicians Aryeh Deri and Moshe Gafni are partners in the next government, Liberman’s historical achievement will begin to fade.

Meanwhile, New York State decided that in December 2023, budgets will be denied to educational institutions that fail to teach core curriculum. In Israel, if a government headed by Netanyahu is formed, not only will the situation be the opposite of that in New York, but rather, educational institutions will receive a special bonus for failing to teach basic subjects.

This would be the case even if the current Defense Minister Benny Gantz or Prime Minister Yair Lapid join a coalition including ultra-Orthodox parties.  In such a scenario, core curriculum subjects would also be thrown under the bus, and this would constitute a disaster for the Zionist vision and the Israeli economy.

---

Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

Democratic norms and the rule of law at stake in Israel’s elections

By Dan Meridor

The upcoming November 1 Israeli national elections, the fifth in three years, are not merely another electoral contest, or just the latest effort to break out of political deadlock.

Rather, they represent a key junction for Israeli society, which will have to make fateful decisions about the kind of ethical and legal systems that will govern the State of Israel in the near and distant future.

Two factors are converging to threaten Israel’s democratic norms and rule of law. The first is the likely attempt by Opposition Leader Benjamin Netanyahu to disrupt the trials underway against him, and the second is the rise of authoritarian political forces that wish to undermine the system of checks and balances and make the Knesset the all-powerful branch of state. These two elements are joining forces.

Until now, the rule of law in Israel has been based on a critical moral foundation of ethical values, which have underpinned Israel’s democratic – Jewish nature. These values are what enable the balance that Israeli democracy has successfully maintained between the Jewish national cause and adhering to liberal democratic norms.

Such norms include equality of all citizens, freedom of expression, and ensuring individual citizen rights. Israelis have relied on state mechanisms like legislation, the police, state prosecutors, attorney generals, and the High Court to ensure these values.

Now, unfortunately, this system is in jeopardy.

Since Israel’s inception in 1948, there have always been substantial disputes between political camps, and in that context, between Herut (the pre-Likud party) and Mapai (the pre-Labor democratic socialist party) over multiple issues. These ranged from whether or not to accept German Holocaust reparation offers in 1952, or decades of dispute over the land-for-peace formula, as well as bitter arguments over whether a free-market economy or deep government-involved socialism should govern the Israeli social-economic sphere.

Over the years, the electorate made its decisions, and Israel continued as a functioning state and society despite these serious divisions. What enabled this to happen was a national consensus on the need for a fundamental ethical framework, which was universally accepted. Institutions made their decisions and society accepted these decisions whether people agreed with them or not.

Until now.

For the first time in Israel, the High Court’s authority, or respect for legal institutions and legal rulings, are under attack. This flies in the face of the national–liberal tradition of the Herut party, which was always committed to upholding the rule of law.

The late prime minister Menachem Begin consistently argued that the High Court should have the authority to overturn Knesset legislation if it violates human rights. I am proud to have been the Justice Minister for the Likud when we initiated legislation to guard basic human rights (known as the constitutional revolution).

In 1953, the High Court told Ben Gurion that he could not decide the balance between freedom of speech and security, and overturned his decision to close the Kol Ha’am newspaper – not very long after the 1948 War of Independence.

The legal system has not changed. The same judges, now accused of being “leftists” by the pro-Netanyahu camp, ruled against Ben Gurion. In 1977, Aharon Barak, the Attorney General at the time, was about to indict former Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, prompting his resignation. He then indicted a number of senior members of the Labor camp.  

This is what the separation of powers looks like, and this is how the judicial branch applies checks and balances on the government and the Knesset – just as it was designed to do – to prevent unchecked power or tyrannical rule.

Liberal democracy has never advocated for unchecked majority rule, and while the majority certainly can select the identity of the government and influence critical policies, it cannot decide who is guilty or innocent. A court has the legitimate and legal powers to also cancel rules that violate democratic norms.

In 1988, we in the Likud led the unusual initiative to ban the racist Kach party from running in the elections. We gathered public information about its activities and delivered it to the National Elections Committee. That is because racism has no place in a Jewish democratic state, whether one is on the Right or Left, Jewish or Arab -- according to the Basic Law, which was changed in 1985 by the national unity Likud – Labor government. The change we introduced banned racist parties.

Today, Itamar Ben-Gvir, a student of the late racist Meir Kahane -- the founder of the Kach party -- who until recently had a photograph of Jewish terrorist Baruch Goldstein in his living room, and who was convicted in the past of support for a terror organization, has gained, to our dismay, legitimacy in the political system. Netanyahu brought Ben-Gvir into the political sphere in order to reach a parliamentary majority.

This is the clearest demonstration of how values once taken for granted are now being questioned. Israel is a Jewish state because it has a Jewish majority, not because it discriminates individually against Arab citizens. The value of equality is now under assault.

The pro-Netanyahu bloc seeks to actively weaken the judicial system because it has identified it as the gatekeeper. The courts, the state comptroller (who has the power to expose corruption and who was weakened), and the police chief have all been targeted by rhetoric designed to delegitimize these institutions and to personally attack those who head them. This includes anyone who does not fall in line with the pro-Netanyahu agenda, such as the former settler police commissioner, Ronnie Alsheikh, the former religious attorney general, Avichai Mandelblit, and the former chief prosecutor and yeshiva graduate, Shai Nitzan. None have been spared from the wrath of the Netanyahu camp or dodged charges of being “leftist” conspirators seeking to dislodge Netanyahu from power in a nefarious plot.

Such unprecedented attacks are, essentially, attacks on the state as we know it. A state cannot exist without agreed-upon methods for resolving disputes.

Now that the trials have already begun, Netanyahu, who has already accused the judges of being ‘leftists,’ is probably examining options to stop them. The past four elections held in Israel since 2019 were about one issue: The likely effort by Netanyahu to gain legal immunity and prevent criminal trials against him from starting.

A weakened court system, which could then be passed to cancel the trial using a step like the ‘French Law,’ is one such scenario that Netanyahu may hope to achieve.

While Netanyahu has the right to be assumed innocent until proven otherwise, a failure to complete his legal process would constitute a significant blow to the concept of equality in the face of the law.

Zionism is a just cause. Justice is critical to it.  Today, those that espouse values like democracy, human rights, and rule of law, are tagged as ‘leftwing,’ although these are the precise values that were espoused by Begin, Herut, and the older version of the Likud party.

Ultimately, all of these developments project onto the core of the Zionist movement. Zionism holds that after 2,000 years of not employing sovereignty or force – with disastrous consequences – the time for the Jewish people to return to statehood has arrived. However, the right to use force comes with the responsibility to preserve righteousness, and that, in turn, is based on the preservation of democratic rights and values.

It is this mix of national and liberal values that the old Herut party once championed, and which the current pro-Netanyahu bloc is threatening to weaken and largely disable.

---

Dan Meridor is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence in the Israeli Government from 2009-2013. Read full bio here.

Israel's political merry go round must stop

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

In Israel, elections have become a new Olympic sport. One round of elections after another has cost the country roughly NIS 12 billion over the past five years, not to mention the economic losses caused by the absence of a national budget for government ministries, the direct damage to our personal finances, and the persistent turmoil that has damaged every national institution.

The political merry-go-round makes it harder to govern and run the state effectively. In the absence of a clear planning agenda, combating the rising cost of living, addressing the housing supply shortage, building a stable national health system, combating crime, reducing road deaths, and implementing comprehensive infrastructure plans become a challenge, to say the least.

What could have been accomplished with NIS 2.4 billion (the cost of each round of elections)? Numerous institutions in Israel would benefit substantially from a fraction of that sum.

Political instability in Israel is nothing new: Calls for a change in Israel’s electoral and governing systems have been around since the days of Mapai. Few Israeli governments have completed their full term, but the past four years have seen Israel’s political instability hit new lows.

Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu has mastered the game of rewriting the rules of the political system. From his perspective, securing his future, evading justice, and paving the path for his return to the Prime Minister’s Office are the most crucial objectives to pursue.

As far as Netanyahu is concerned, governmental stability should only occur after he accomplishes these objectives. In the meantime, Netanyahu has violated unwritten political norms, among them his refusal to resign after being indicted on corruption charges – a far cry from his insistence that former prime minister Ehud Olmert step down when he was indicted.

The current state of affairs endangers the State of Israel and generates a crisis of confidence between the people and their elected officials that worsens with each election cycle.

Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman recently noted that politicians are dragging the Israeli people through a fifth round of elections, and that, looking ahead, it is therefore essential to secure governmental stability in the simplest and most straightforward way possible.

Liberman proposed passing new legislation to boost governmental stability. According to his proposal, the new legislation would adopt the model of the existing Knesset Chairperson Law. According to Liberman’s proposal, instead of the current setup, in which 61 votes are needed to both swear in a Knesset and disperse it, 90 votes would be required to disperse a future Knesset, after the Knesset passes a two-year budget. This legislation would adopt an existing formula and apply it in the Knesset to boost governmental stability. By linking the legislation to the passing of a two-year budget, this maneuver would introduce at least two years of government stability.

This is now the story of these elections. The time has come to stop the merry-go-round.

---

Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.