MirYam In The Media: Hamas’s al-Arouri and the Iranian connection

Yaakov Lappin IN CONVERSATION WITH: COL. DAVID HACHAM

Hamas’s deputy political bureau chief, Saleh al-Arouri, currently based in Lebanon, is interested in surrounding Israel with rocket and terror bases, and so is Iran.
That common interest has enabled al-Arouri to create new levels of cooperation between his Sunni-Islamist terror faction and the radical Shi’ite regime in Tehran.

“This is actually one of the strong people within Hamas. I would actually say that he is among the top three of the movement,” said IDF Col. (res.) Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, and a senior researcher at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Reichman University in Herzliya.

According to Milshtein, al-Arouri is responsible for the Judea and Samaria arena on behalf of Hamas, including Jerusalem. In addition, al-Arouri coordinates Hamas activity with other members of “the axis of resistance,” said Milshtein, ex-head of the Department for Palestinians Affairs in IDF Military Intelligence.

Al-Arouri is also responsible for a large portion of Hamas’s military operations abroad, said Milshtein. He “manages to direct tactical military activity but also be involved and think strategically, and basically ‘swim’ between the two worlds,” he added.

IDF Col. (res.) David Hacham, a senior research associate at the MirYam Institute and a former adviser on Arab affairs to seven Israeli defense ministers, said al-Arouri joined Hamas’s military in the early 1990s, during the First Intifada.’

“He was responsible for establishing Hamas’s military wing in the Judea and Samaria region. For his activities, he sat in an Israeli prison for 18 years. After his release, he went o to Syria, where he settled. Later, in 2012, he left Syria after the outbreak of the country’s civil war, and came to Turkey where he headed Hamas headquarters,” said Hacham.

“In 2015, after Israeli and American pressure on Turkey, he moved to Qatar along with most of Hamas’s overseas leadership. After a short stopover in Malaysia, he arrived in Lebanon where he currently operates,” Hacham said.

In 2014, the Israeli military demolished his home in the village of Aroura, near Ramallah, believing him to have been involved in the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in Judea and Samaria.

Al-Arouri, like the head of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, represents the younger generation in the Hamas leadership, according to the Israeli observers. Both have operational experience and have served lengthy prison terms, speak Hebrew and are familiar with Israel, unlike members of the older Hamas generation, such as Khaled Mashaal, said Hacham.

Milshtein described al-Arouri as a major connector between Hamas and other members of the radical Islamist camp opposed to Israel’s existence. For example, al-Arouri’s role in the launch by Hamas of 34 rockets at northern Israel from Lebanon in April this year was a prominent one, he said.

Al-Arouri’s unique role is enabled by two factors, according to Milshtein. “One is Arouri’s location in Beirut. And the other is his basic approach for vigorous promotion of jihad in several arenas. Especially in Judea and Samaria and the newer arena—Lebanon. This makes him a favorite for Tehran and Hezbollah,” said Milshtein. “In this context, he is involved in formulating strategic relations, but also in practical terms, he is involved in weapons procurement, training, organization, military cooperation and more.”

Hacham cautioned that Arouri’s objective of unifying fronts against Israel directly contradicts Israel’s essential interest of differentiating between the arenas.

“This is particularly true for Israel’s differentiation between Gaza and Judea and Samaria. Hamas, on the other hand, wants to create as close a connection as possible between the various conflict arenas—Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Jerusalem, the Arab sector in Israel and Lebanon—and to gain effective control over the power switch of escalation,” he said.

“Hamas strives to ensure its ability to ignite and activate the arenas, individually or together, at an appropriate time according to the circumstances,” he added.

According to Milshtein, Al-Arouri’s intense efforts help him greatly with regard to fortifying his status within Hamas as someone who succeeds in preserving “the jihad,” and who found a way to activate arenas against Israel.

“I would describe al-Arouri and Sinwar as two halves of the same whole. Each is responsible for another major activity area in Hamas. They share the same concept, and I believe both are strategically coordinated,” said Milshtein.

Hacham said Israel has so far avoided eliminating al-Arouri for a number of reasons.

First, he spent many of the past 15 years in sovereign countries, some of which have diplomatic ties with Israel, Hacham noted. Second, previous targeted killings have shown that leaders are quickly replaced in terror factions, and third, there is concern that his elimination would increase motivation for terrorist revenge attacks on Israeli targets, or could spark a wider escalation.

Nevertheless, said Hacham, al-Arouri could certainly become a future target for assassination.

“Targeted killings are the number one worry of the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaderships,” said Hacham, who spoke with JNS before Israel launched “Operation Shield and Arrow” on Tuesday with the assassination of three senior PIJ commanders in Gaza.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Can Israel recover from its precipitous fall?

By dan meridor

Looking back over the past four months, it is astounding to observe how quickly and in how many fields Israel has sustained damages due to the actions of the Netanyahu government.

Currently, negotiations are ongoing between representatives of the Israeli coalition government and the opposition under the banner of searching for a compromise to the ‘judicial reform’ initiative and exiting this unprecedented internal crisis.

However, any serious attempt to reevaluate the balance of power between the three branches of government would, if done correctly, involve a lengthy process lasting a year or two. It would have to involve jurists from across the board, experts from a wide spectrum of views, representatives of civil society, Jews and Arabs, trade unionists and employers – in short, it would be an enormous endeavor. This isn’t something that can be seriously concluded in a matter of weeks.

Looking back, the question of how Israel reached this crisis point in the space of just four months must be asked. Economically, Israel went from being a powerful tech-based start-up nation with a booming economy revered around the world, to a country whose economic officials warn of billions of shekels in losses.

The people issuing these warnings are Netanyahu appointees, like the Bank of Israel Governor Prof. Amir Yaron, and former Bank of Israel Governor Karnit Flug, as well as the world-renowned economist Jacob Frenkel, also a former governor of the BOI.

The economic consensus is clear: if the judicial reform goes ahead, Israel’s outlook will be catastrophic.

Investors see that the government is trying to rob the judiciary of its independence, and, from there, financial damage is quick to follow. Even if the political crisis fades and the judicial changes are stopped in their tracks, the economic damage could be long-lasting as investors may be wary of betting on Israel.

Politically, Israel was considered to be the United States’ strongest ally – and derived much of its power from this alliance. Now, U.S. President Joe Biden explicitly informs the world that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unwelcome in Washington.

Warnings about common values have been issued by other senior American administration officials, such as the secretary of state and the secretary of defense.

And what of the flagship achievement, the Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain? Suddenly, a cold breeze is blowing in Israel’s direction from the Gulf. The damaged Israeli – American alliance is part of the reason. Netanyahu’s vision of on-boarding Saudi Arabia to the Accords will have to wait.

On recent visits to European capitals, the Israeli premier was pummeled with criticism over the judicial reform crisis, albeit the style was less abrasive than Biden’s.

It’s not only relations with the U.S. administration that are on the ropes. So too are relations between the Israeli government and American Jewry. On the domestic front, several crises threaten to snowball into an avalanche. Reservists from prized army and air force units have announced they will not volunteer if the reform goes ahead and Israel is turned into a dictatorship.

All of this has eroded Israeli deterrence and challenged its security establishment –this according to none other than Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, whom Netanyahu initially fired for warning of the dangers posed by the domestic crisis, but then backtracked on his decision under pressure.

Incredibly, this can all be traced back to a single attempt to implement an extreme move to undermine the judiciary’s independence.

Israel has always known bitter disputes over policies and ideologies. Whether it was about reparations from Germany, or land and peace, Israelis have always argued intensely, but almost everyone was united around core democratic values and accepting the decisions of the courts.

In fact, the judicial reform initiative has, until now, been a marginal issue. While Justice Minister Yariv Levin has held strong views on the matter for many years, until the formation of this government, Netanyahu did not take it very seriously. Levin himself admitted in April that had the reform passed as initially presented, Israel could not fit the definition of a democratic state.

The damage hasn’t stopped at national interests – it has harmed Netanyahu politically. A series of polls have shown that the Likud party is losing altitude quickly.

What has caused Netanyahu to embark on such a destructive path? The answer can only be the attempt to weaken the legal system due to Netanyahu’s criminal trial. Although Netanyahu is innocent until proven guilty, he probably does not have an interest in seeing his trial play out and seeing whether he is convicted or not.

Netanyahu loves his country – he served in the elite Sayeret Matkal commando force and fought bravely – but he loves himself more. As a result, until now, Netanyahu has rejected any plea bargain arrangement, which would have likely meant an end to his political career, as he seeks to punish the system that ‘dared’ prosecute him.

In this manner, everyone perceived by Netanyahu as a threat has been tagged as a ‘leftist’ or someone who ‘betrayed the national interest.’ This includes the police, and its former commissioner, the religious settler Roni Alsheikh; the Yeshiva graduate and former state prosecutor, Shai Nitzan; and the religious former Attorney General and Netanyahu appointee, Avichai Mandelblit.

Suddenly, all of the above-mentioned and others are labeled by the Netanyahu lie-machine as ‘leftists’ seeking to harm the state. The worst part is that a swath of the public believes this.

As a result, in the Netanyahu narrative, the courts are now presented as a danger to democracy and to security that frames publicly appointed politicians.

The time is ripe for Netanyahu to face challenges over his conduct from within the Likud. The Likud was once a party that wasn’t afraid to criticize its leader. This was true during the days of Menachem Begin, whose peace deal with Egypt faced multiple challenges from within the party, and through to the era of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who was challenged by senior Likud figures at the time, Ariel Sharon and David Levy.

It would be appropriate for some of the Likud’s 31 Knesset Members today to speak up and tell Netanyahu that he cannot continue harming the country in this way. 

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Dan Meridor is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence in the Israeli Government from 2009-2013. Read full bio here.

To reach Israel’s 100th anniversary, we need unity

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Close your eyes for a moment and imagine it’s 2048 and final rehearsals are underway at Mount Herzl, Jerusalem, for Israel’s 100th Independence Day celebrations. In front of the tomb of Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, flags fly proudly and soldiers march in formation.

Now, open your eyes and return to the present day as we marked this year’s Remembrance and Independence Days. The scenario of Israelis celebrating the country’s 100th anniversary as one people waving their flags together, seems, unfortunately, altogether fanciful.

If we do not ensure that we have a common ethos, it is doubtful we will get there – assuming that democracy even remains in place. So, will we celebrate 100 years of our independence together? Were we to hold a referendum, it is fair to assume that the answer to the question “Do you want to reach Israel’s 100th year of independence” would be “Yes,” but the answer to the question, “Will we get there,” will likely be “I don’t know.”

How to get to a 100 years

To provide a conclusive answer to this question, one must first understand the shared identity that propels us forward together – the same identity that creates the fabric of shared life here. The legal coup and the masses who take to the streets week after week are fighting for democracy and against dictatorship.

Yet it is not only the concern that the Israel we once knew is changing its character that is driving the protesters. Those who support the reform claim that the time is ripe for Israel to change its character and that the country has had enough of rulership by elites.

An identity struggle is raging: liberalism vs conservatism, those who share the national burden vs. those who believe that Torah study is an equally valuable endeavor to military service and work. The latter camp holds that Torah study is necessary due to the very existence of Israel, as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

The stage of defining our identity characterizes democratic states and research indicates that this process often occurs in its most intense form in the last quarter of a democracy’s first 100 years. In this respect, we are no different from most of the countries in the free world.

In other words, had the legal revolution not come, another catalyst would probably have led people to the streets, after shedding light on the rift between us reminding us of the feud over how to distribute the national burden and the argument over freedom of choice on how to manage one’s individual life.

Questions we have pushed aside for years due to our fight for our security and existence are now on the national agenda. The process of defining our identity is a complex and fragile process. In Israel, it includes the added and unique tier of being a Jewish, democratic country and the question of a shared identity is one that must consider both religion and state. The result is an equation that is difficult to provide answers for.

The first Independence Day

TO BETTER understand the question of a common ethos, we need to return to the basics. The young state of Israel marked its first Independence Day following the 1949 Independence Day Law. The date was set for the fifth of the Hebrew month of Iyar, the date on which Israel had declared independence a year earlier, in 1948. The Law was passed just three weeks before the celebration.

In fact, the 1949 celebration was not the first time Israel marked its independence. Almost a year earlier, on 20 Tammuz – July 27, 1948, the anniversary of Theodor Herzl’s death, military parades were held throughout the country to mark State Day. The idea was to emphasize the connection between the newly-born state and Herzl, the thinker who envisioned it.

The military’s prominent role in the ceremonies reflects what was, at that time, an undisputed ethos. The people’s army model became an essential element in defining the Israeli identity. There was a clear link between IDF service and Israeliness. The same model stands at the heart of the current divide today and brings to the fore the question of who is an Israeli.

Those who serve vs draft dodgers, the lack of equality in the sharing of the military burden and an unnecessary conflict between Israeliness and Judaism are harming the people’s army model. This will collapse one of Israel’s most important foundational pillars, upon which our identity, as a people and as a state, stands.

In a speech to the nation on Israel’s first Independence Day in 1949, then-prime minister David Ben-Gurion said, “We stood up to serious military campaigns [against us]. We emerged from them all intact and with dignity. However, the dangers to our safety and even our existence have not been eliminated, nor will they soon disappear.”

His remarks remain relevant today, as we mark 75 years of our independence. They indicate that the people’s army model has a key role in the fabric of our shared identity.

If we wish for our soldiers to march together on Mount Herzl in 2048 when we are due to celebrate 100 years of the wonder called Israel, then we are duty-bound to strengthen our common base and to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

We won’t agree on everything, but we can create a common identity so that we can proudly say together, “We are Israelis.”

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

A quiet civil war

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

The first hundred days of the Benjamin Netanyahu government have seen Israel experience massive turmoil.

While a common Israeli saying holds that those who take office have one hundred days of grace. But this government has not been granted a single day of grace from those who oppose it. On the other hand, the government itself did not wait long before Justice Minister Yariv Levin launched his legal form program.

And that is when the snowball started to roll. It quickly picked up speed, growing larger, heavier, and eventually, unstoppable. In politics, even those with access to the best strategic advisers can experience moments in which they simply lose control.

The Netanyahu government lost control very quickly because the legal reform sparked massive resistance. Behind it was all the power, energy, and financial resources of its rival camp —the ‘just not Bibi camp,’ which is often called the center-left, but is in fact, all about opposing Netanyahu.

In previous rounds of elections, groups of anti-Netanyahu demonstrators raised black flags, telling Netanyahu to “go.”

Now, on Saturday nights, the black flag is replaced with the blue and white flag of Israel, but the protests are ultimately driven by the same message. Millions of shekels are spent on ads to support the protests -- on billboards, on social media, and with paid text messages directly to our phones.

The government froze its reform program to allow a dialogue with the opposition, but the protests continue nevertheless. It is therefore clear that legal reform was just a trigger, and it is the Netanyahu haters who continue to fuel the protests against him.

We are in highly unconventional times. Every Saturday night, Tel Aviv’s Kaplan Junction, a major traffic artery, fills with demonstrators, and a small number of them go on to block traffic on the Ayalon highway, and some of them are arrested. However one looks at it, the goal is to disrupt the routine of people's lives.

Those who front the protests are not necessarily today’s opposition leaders. They are trying to jump on the bandwagon and take the credit, but those who lead the demonstrations from behind the scenes are politicians from the past. Examples include former prime ministers Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak.

They also include the Mayor of Tel Aviv, Ron Huldai, who tried to face Netanyahu in elections and had to resign at the start of the race.

At the end of the day, there is one camp in Israel that is fighting because it was told there would be a dictatorship, while another camp feels that all these protests are merely Netanyahu hatred and an attempt to overthrow the government.

In response to these developments, the rightwing camp has initiated demonstrations in support of legal reform.

Although the ruling coalition has gained sixty-four seats in the ballot box, those who are in charge in Israel are, in fact, Netanyahu's opponents. The media, dominated by the left, the key economic actors, and the national trade union, which disabled international flights as part of the protests.

They have collectively succeeded in applying such a high degree of pressure that the reform has been halted.

There has been no significant breakthrough in talks so far, yet some observers say they are surprised that the negotiations have not yet broken down.

They should not be surprised; the dialogue appears to be, in actuality, an attempt by the government to dissolve its reform initiative.

The big question going forward is, what will the Right do? Will it go all the way with the reform, as it promised? One of its election tickets was to create a balance between the three branches of government.

The Right is unlikely to proceed because Israel is in an unprecedented state of polarization. Everyone is under pressure to take sides, and people are very quickly cataloged. Extremely tense moments occur daily among people in workplaces, family members, and friends.

It feels like Israeli society has sunk into a kind of quiet civil war. Hence, if the government succeeds in passing even a single clause of its reform, that would be considered a major achievement. The more likely scenario is a dissolution of the initiative.

The fact that the coalition is, itself, divided, also contributes to the likelihood of that scenario.

Some of the coalition’s members think the reform should be pursued to the end, others think it should be softened, and some think it should be dropped altogether.

An attempt to pass the reform without broad consensus stands a good chance of leading to the government’s collapse due to these divisions.

If the government drops the reform, the chances that it will fall will decline significantly. Polls show that support for the government has rapidly lost altitude and its members fear their political fate. That provides enough of a basis for them to remain together, even if some, like Levin, who initiated this snowball in the first place by going for large-scale reform, will be furious to see it dropped. 

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

Israel must prepare a counter-strategy against a multi-arena threat.

By Eitan Dangot

Hamas has been strengthening its cooperation with the Iran-Hezbollah axis for years and the process only seems to be accelerating. The result is the formation of six fronts of aggression against Israel—a “ring of fire” composed of radical Sunni and Shiite axes.

Previous signs of this cooperation could be found in how the Palestinian Sunni Hamas and the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah helped one another upgrade their capabilities. Hezbollah began digging cross-border tunnels into Israel from Lebanon (though these were demolished by the IDF in 2018), just as Hamas did for years from Gaza.

Hamas learned from Hezbollah how to overcome its military inferiority and set up rocket bases in civilian areas. Both terror armies have set up elite cross-border ground infiltration units—Hamas’ Nuhba force and Hezbollah’s Radwan force.

The relationship grew even closer after Saleh Al-Arouri, a senior Hamas official, was expelled from Turkey and relocated to Lebanon several years ago. He began building a Hamas headquarters in Lebanon, from which he both orchestrates terrorism in Judea and Samaria and oversees a growing Hamas presence in Lebanon.

Al-Arouri can be seen as Hamas’ own Qassem Soleimani. Like the late Iranian Quds Force unit commander—assassinated by the United States in 2020—Al-Arouri is drawing up a multi-arena attack strategy to surround the State of Israel and he is doing so with Iranian help.

The hub of Al-Arouri’s activity is Judea and Samaria, where Hamas works day and night to both incite and directly orchestrate terrorist attacks.

The fruit of Al-Arouri’s work in Lebanon became apparent on April 6, when Hamas fired 34 rockets at Israel from Lebanon, the largest such salvo since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. A day earlier, after Passover eve, Palestinian terrorists in Gaza fired some 50 rockets towards Israel.

According to the terror organizations, the rocket fire was a response to clashes between Palestinian youths and Israeli police at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, but in fact, it was a sign of something far more significant.

The attacks are the latest indication of the accelerated convergence between the Palestinian terror axis and the Iran-Hezbollah axis, creating the multi-arena threat Israel now faces with ever-growing intensity.

The common denominator that unites the Iranian-led axis is the goal of combatting Israel. In addition to Gaza and Lebanon, Israel’s enemies are striving to create a front in Syria, where Hamas could soon be sending operatives after reconciling with the Assad regime, and where Hezbollah is working with Iran-backed Shiite militias to set up offensive positions.

Hamas has become a significant partner in the Iranian quest to surround Israel with a ring of fire. The establishment of a coordinated headquarters in Lebanon with Hezbollah and Palestinian terror factions in 2021 was a milestone in this development.

Iran pours funds and weapons into its regional proxies and partners, giving them the capabilities to realize their objectives. In addition, Iran and its Lebanese and Palestinian proxies have entered a mutually-supportive deterrence framework with Hamas operating from Lebanon under the umbrella of Hezbollah’s arsenal of 160,000 projectiles.

Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Yemen are also preparing to enter the multi-arena strategy against Israel through missile and drone attacks.

Meanwhile, the notion of state responsibility over what occurs in their territory has long been irrelevant in Lebanon and Syria, and the ability of the joint Shiite-Sunni radical axes to disrupt life in Israel grows consistently.

These forces don’t need to enter into a full-scale war with Israel. All they need to do is continuously identify optimal points in time to escalate the security situation when they judge Israel to be unwilling or unable to respond forcefully, thus creating regular threats to the ability of Israelis to lead a secure life.

This is precisely what occurred, in the broadest fashion to date, during this year’s Ramadan period.

The pattern we are now witnessing is a direct continuation of the 2021 conflict fought between Hamas and Israel, when Hamas was able to activate another arena—the internal Israeli arena. Widespread violence tore through mixed Arab-Jewish cities, serving as a warning to Israel of what a future multi-front conflict could look like.

All of this serves Iran’s goal of keeping Israel distracted as Iran makes rapid progress in its nuclear program. Iran hopes its program faces fewer disruptions while Israel is busy dealing with Iran’s multi-arena strategy.

This obligates Israel to immediately formulate a counter-strategy, which should be based on high-end Israeli operational capabilities and international cooperation with the U.S. and Sunni states that seriously addresses the dilemma of preemption.

Israel needs to consider the benefits and risks of launching surprise preemptive strikes on Hezbollah targets in response to the force build-up and growing boldness of this primary Iranian regional proxy. In addition, Israel must eliminate its internal crisis as soon as possible by focusing on rapidly building its new national guard, under the command of the Israel Police.

Ultimately, Israel must prepare to operate in multiple arenas, just as its dangerous enemies do.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

Hamas’s attack from Lebanon is part of plan to take over West Bank

By David Hacham

The rocket attack against northern Israel in which Hamas fired 34 projectiles from southern Lebanon on April 6 reflects a clear attempt on the group’s part to advance a broader and highly dangerous strategic goal.

Hamas is seeking to create an offensive ring around Israel that constitutes a multi-front threat. As such, it is working to build terrorist infrastructures in Lebanon, in addition to its existing fronts against Israel – the Gaza Strip, which has been under the organization’s control since 2007, and the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority (PA), led by President Mahmoud Abbas, is growing weaker, and where Hamas is working to build a foothold.

Hamas’s grand strategy and its actions in Lebanon are ultimately aimed at boosting its quest of toppling the Fatah-run PA in the West Bank. The PA is gradually losing control there, especially in the Jenin region, and, to a partial extent, in Nablus.

Hamas exploited tensions on the Temple Mount, a highly sensitive Islamic site, to launch its attack from southern Lebanon, likely in full coordination with Hezbollah and Iran.

A Hamas rocket attack of this scope could not have occurred without coordination and a green light from Hezbollah, which is the strongest organization in the Lebanese system. At the time of the April 6 attack, Hamas Politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh was visiting Lebanon, accompanied by his deputy, Salah Arouri – and that is no coincidence.

Hamas - Gaza’s operational approval was not required for this attack, but it was notified in advance by Hamas in Lebanon.

The rocket attack carried out by Hamas from Lebanon against Israel was pre-planned, with Hamas’s intention being essentially a limited escalation.

The rockets were aimed at areas near the Lebanese border but were not intended to hit infrastructure targets of strategic significance. Given that, Hamas' rocket attack was not a declaration of war, or an attempt to deteriorate the situation in a way that would create a general escalation and bring about a renewed military confrontation with Israel on a large scale.

The Israeli response -- selected airstrikes in Gaza and southern Lebanon -- was measured and limited. It was designed to prevent an uncontrolled deterioration and overall war. Israel's limited response to the rocket fire indicates that it is not interested in war at present and that it does not want a confrontation involving several arenas simultaneously.

The internal crisis in Israel surrounding attempts by the government to promote legal reform has eroded Israel’s deterrence, and its enemies assess that it is vulnerable.

All of this is tied to Hamas’s strategic goal of toppling the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank with the end of the Mahmoud Abbas era. The April escalation boosted Hamas’s standing at Fatah’s expense.

Hamas is taking advantage of the governing vacuum in the PA, which is made worse by internal Fatah power struggles. In recent years, several potential candidates, all from Fatah, have entered into a destabilizing competition for the leadership position.

In practice, Hamas has already taken concrete steps to exploit this instability and to position itself to challenge the PA for the Palestinian leadership as soon as the opportunity arises. This has included a reshuffling of Hamas operatives in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, with an emphasis on command levels, as well as cultivating operatives from the younger generations. These operatives include organizationally affiliated Hamas members, and other more loosely affiliated individuals with close ties to Hamas, such as academics, trade unionists, and public sector figures in the West Bank, and they are active in the Islamist stream within Palestinian local councils and civil society institutions.

Hamas is focusing on two major courses of action. The first is the democratic path to power, through a voting process, and the second – a fallback position – is the military takeover of the PA using violent means if necessary. All the while, Hamas labels Fatah as a traitor to the Palestinian people due to its security coordination with Israel.

One of the most prominent operatives among Hamas ranks in the West Bank is engineer Wazan Jaber, a representative of the younger generation in the terror group. A few weeks ago, an attempt was made to assassinate him, likely by Fatah members. Jaber was not injured.

It is worth noting that Fatah is well aware of Hamas's intention to replace it. Fatah is actively engaged in an effort to limit Hamas' power in the West Bank. This includes the continued existence of security coordination with Israel – albeit in a more discreet and limited manner since the PA’s January announcement of its cessation of coordination, in protest against an IDF security operation in the Jenin refugee camp.

The PA is also working to dry up sources of financial aid to Hamas, and Abbas has taken a series of measures to prevent Hamas from gaining a foothold in the Palestinian government system, such as keeping the Palestinian parliament dissolved, thereby preventing Hamas-linked parliament speaker Aziz Dweik from being considered a legal heir to Abbas.

Instead, this power has been transferred to the Palestinian National Council and its Fatah chairman, Rawhi Fattouh (Abbas’s appointment of Hussein Al-Sheikh, the Minister for Civil Affairs, as secretary of the PLO's Executive Committee in May 2022, should not, despite initial impressions, be seen as promoting a desired heir, since Abbas can eject Al-Sheikh from that position at any time).

A Hamas military attack on Fatah positions is possible as soon as Hamas recognizes an opportunity to launch it.

As far as Israel is concerned, there is no replacement for the PA; who would rule Area A of the West Bank in the PA’s place? Should Israel once again enter the Palestinian cities and assume direct responsibility over millions of Palestinians, in addition to being responsible for water and electricity? This is a delusional concept.

As such, Israel must work to ensure the preservation of the PA in the post-Abbas era, despite the PA’s many failings.

It is likely that Israel would intervene in one way or another militarily to prevent a Hamas coup in the West Bank since this would breach an Israeli red line.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in various intelligence and political-strategic positions in the IDF, including eight years in the Gaza Strip as advisor for Arab affairs to successive commanders of the Southern Command and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief, Israel marks Memorial Day; but will it bring national unity?

By Yaakov Lappin

Yom Hazikaron, Israel’s Memorial Day for Fallen Soldiers and Victims of Hostile Acts begins at 8 p.m. on Monday, April 24, with a nationwide siren that marks the start of ceremonies across the country. President Isaac Herzog and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi will attend the opening ceremony at the Western Wall, where a memorial candle is lit.

On Tuesday, April 25, a two-minute nationwide siren will sound at 11 a.m. before the main ceremony at the Mount Herzl military cemetery commences. Bereaved family members attend military ceremonies across Israel.

Memorial Day commemorates those who fell in defense of the Israeli people, from the pre-state era to the present day. When the sirens sound, traffic on roads comes to a standstill, and members of the public stop what they are doing to stand in silence in honor of the fallen. Flags fly at half-mast throughout the day.

In an almost unfathomable shift, Memorial Day transitions into the start of celebrations of Israel's 75th Independence Day on the evening of April 25. This is a deliberately designed emotional rollercoaster to remind Israelis that their independence and security are inseparable from the ultimate sacrifices made by the fallen soldiers.  

The big question is whether these vitally important national days will succeed in alleviating to any degree the unprecedented polarization afflicting Israeli society and stemming from the political crisis over the government's judicial reform program, but now extending far beyond it.

In a sign of the times, Yair Lapid, the leader of the opposition, has announced his intention to boycott Independence Day celebrations.

With Iranian and Hezbollah assistance, Hamas tests out its multi-arena strategy.

This month, during Passover and Ramadan, Hamas made dangerous advances toward implementing its four-arena strategy against Israel. According to this doctrine, Hamas launches attacks (or encourages others to launch attacks) from the following arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Jerusalem and elsewhere within Israel.

Hamas's preference is to be able to activate the Lebanese, West Bank, and Jerusalem arenas without endangering its Gaza regime.

After Islamist students instigated clashes with the Israeli Police on the Temple Mount on April 5, some 50 rockets were fired by terrorists in Gaza at southern communities between April 5 and April 7, while 34 rockets were fired from Lebanon at northern Israel on April 6—the heaviest barrage from Lebanon since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. On April 8, three rockets were fired at the Golan Heights from Syria. Hamas is behind the Lebanese and Gazan rocket attacks.

In response, the Israeli Air Force launched airstrikes in Lebanon and mostly in Gaza, signaling to Hamas that its efforts to keep Gaza quiet would fail if the escalation continued.

All these developments contribute to Hamas's goal of promoting a violent Islamist conflict narrative with Israel. As a result, Hamas's main Palestinian competitor, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which Hamas accuses of being traitors and collaborators with Israel, sees its status diminish on the Palestinian street.

This aligns closely with the Iranian-Hezbollah axis's desire to surround Israel with a ring of fire, and it is improbable to believe that Hamas could have activated a Lebanese front at this scale without Hezbollah and Iranian approval, as well as Iranian assistance in rocket production.

The scenario of a multi-arena conflict is one that Iran is actively promoting to try and threaten and demoralize Israel and keep it busy with its borders. But this strategy can be a double-edged sword. Israel too can adopt a multi-arena logic in which, for example, it responds to Hamas in Gaza for attacks coming out of Lebanon. And it can respond to Iran anywhere in the Middle East for actions that the Islamic Republic takes to threaten Israel's security and violate its sovereignty. In other words, the multi-arena tool can be used by anyone in this conflict.

A glimpse into what Israel-Iran relations could one day be like

Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Iranian Shah, made his first visit to Israel on Monday, April 17, together with his wife Yakima.

“We are very happy to be here and are dedicated to working toward the peaceful and prosperous future that the people of our region deserve," he tweeted after landing at Ben-Gurion Airport and being received by Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel, who had helped plan his visit.

“From the children of Cyrus to the children of Israel, we will build this future together, in friendship,” he added, in reference to the Persian king who ended the Babylonian exile and facilitated the re-building of the Temple in Jerusalem

Pahlavi attended Israel’s Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day ceremony on April 17. He provided a small glimpse into the future potential relationship between the Iranian people – 80 % of whom are now opposed to their regime, according to reported Israeli intelligence assessments – and the Israeli people, if one day the radical Islamic regime in Tehran falls. 

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

How Turkey and Israel salvaged their relationship

By Pinhas Avivi

After the Islamist AKP Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power in Turkey in 2002, Ankara’s approach to Israel began to change for the worse. There were major fears at the time that the defense ties that characterized bilateral relations would vanish and create an irreparable rupture.

Within six years, ties indeed went from friendly to hostile.

And yet, the recent Israeli humanitarian delegation sent to assist Turkey in February’s earthquake disaster is the latest reminder of the fact that these days, Jerusalem’s relations with Ankara are marked by a high degree of stability. That’s not something that should be taken for granted; it took years for the two countries to reach this stage after dealing with several major crises.  

The 2010 Mavi Marmara crisis (when Israeli Navy commandos and Turkish Islamist activists trying to reach Gaza were involved in a deadly clash) marked a low point. Yet since then, the two regional powers have found a way to restore relations and maintain them – to a degree.

This was achieved primarily through civilian cooperation, as returning to the military cooperation that existed before Erdogan’s rise to power would be very hard. Israel would have to find alternative security partners in the Mediterranean – which it did in the form of Greece.

Once in power, Erdogan wanted to be the leader of the Islamic world and navigate according to a neo-Ottoman playbook. Unlike Ataturk, who turned Turkey from an empire to a state, Erdogan wants to return his country to empire mode.

On the one hand, Erdogan tried to employ a zero-conflict policy with Turkey’s neighbors, while seeking to increase its influence in the region through soft power, based on leveraging economic and cultural ties, rather than military means.

However, Turkey's military involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya, and severe tensions that developed with Greece and Israel, put a dent in the ‘zero conflict’ approach.

In addition, Turkey’s political influence on Arab Muslim states remained extremely limited. Theoretical predictions look nice on paper, but Erdogan quickly found out that reality doesn’t always align. No one in the Arab Sunni world was willing to accept him as a regional leader – Egypt and Saudi Arabia hold that position in the Sunni bloc.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to give up its role as the leader of the Islamic world.

As a result, Turkey took up the banner of assisting the Palestinians, as part of its regional leadership bid. Yet Erdogan quickly understood that if he wants to be influential in the Arab world, he must have good ties with Israel, or he risks losing relevance.

All the Arab powers have ties with Israel, some formally like Jordan and Egypt, and, since the 2020 Abraham Accords, the UAE and Bahrain, while others, such as Saudi Arabia, maintain informal ties. As the Arab states moved forward, Erdogan was left behind. Erdogan understood that if he remained excluded, the Abraham Accords would further decrease Turkey’s influence on the region and the Arab world – and this realization also helped convince him of the need to change his attitude to Israel.

Meanwhile, Erdogan was a big disappointment to the United States, as it moved closer to Russia and created a crisis in NATO.

Israel, in Erdogan’s view, is therefore an important means for him to repair some of that damage by enabling him to forge new connections with the U.S. and open doors in Europe via improved ties with Jerusalem. Hence, Turkey has focused on promoting civilian ties with the Jewish state.

In addition, economic trade has remained consistently high. Since Erdogan took office as prime minister in 2002, trade between Israel and Turkey has increased fivefold. Furthermore, Erdogan believes that strengthening ties with Israel will benefit his country's economy and increase its global influence.

 As a result, he has made efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Jerusalem – but without giving up his ongoing effort to stress the Palestinian issue.

This is why some Hamas members are still allowed to be active on Turkish soil, though these days, this activity mostly involves Hamas’s political wing. Hamas’s Deputy Political Bureau Chief, Salah Al-Arouri, who in reality oversees West Bank terrorism efforts, is today based in Lebanon after relocating from Turkey. The AKP party views Hamas’s political wing as a sister movement.

Erdogan’s mounting problems

Erdogan’s growing problems mean that he is keener than ever to improve ties with Europe, the U.S., Sunni states, and Israel.

Kurdish autonomous zones in northern Syria have an immediate impact on southern Turkey that Ankara finds disturbing. Millions of Syrian refugees remain in Turkey, creating a serious economic problem. Iran worries Erdogan due to its ongoing attempts to change the balance of power in Syria to the determinant of Turkish-backed Sunni forces in the north of the country. Iranians are present on the Syrian Mediterranean coastline, and this Iranian entrenchment is not viewed positively by Erdogan. Sunni Turkey sees Shi’ite Islamist regional influence as a destructive force. Despite four hundred years of quiet on the Turkish – Iranian border, these are far from being brotherly states.

Erdogan also has huge economic problems and needs to attract new investments by improving ties with Europe and the U.S. He is also interested in becoming a distributor of Israeli gas to Europe.

These factors have led to a substantial change in Erdogan’s tone. When he criticizes Israel, he uses a vastly different tone from the one he used in the early years of his government rule.

The fact that Israeli and Turkish security organizations were reportedly able to cooperate closely to thwart Iranian terror cells on Turkish soil, sent to target Israelis in June 2022, is a further reflection of this change.

Erdogan has not given up his vision of establishing himself as an important Muslim leader who promotes the Palestinian cause, but he has learned that he cannot achieve this by continually bashing Israel.

Turkey also has direct potential gains it can make from its improved ties with Israel.

Israeli companies are already involved in helping Istanbul better manage its water system, with Israeli-made sensors helping to prevent water leakages from its pipes.

There is interest on both sides in further cooperation, but this will continue to be limited to the civilian sector, because Erdogan has not shed all his neo-Ottoman influences.

Greece, for its part, has no reason to feel threatened by the Israeli – Turkish thaw, precisely because it is limited to civilian issues. The good judgement of both Israeli and Turkish decision-makers has enabled ties to become stable once more, as they should be. 

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

Ukraine-Russia War: An imminent spillover in the Middle East

By Amit Kumar

The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine is exacerbating international tensions. Apart from the critical impact the conflict has on the two engaged nations, it is also leading to wider ramifications for international security and stability, notably in the Middle East. It poses a threat to the fragile peace in the region in numerous ways including its ability to intensify current tensions, particularly between Iran and Israel, and the potential to spark new conflicts by upsetting the international power equilibrium that forces uninvolved nations to become a part of these regional tensions. Keeping these emerging situations in the backdrop, this article investigates how the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is affecting regional geopolitics in the Middle East, and how even neutral states are being forced to take sides - a development that may eventually cause ’the proxy wars between Israel and Iran to escalate into a full-fledged showdown in the near future.

First, the Russia-Ukraine conflict impacts regional stability by aggravating already-existing hostilities. The Syrian civil war, the dispute between Israel and Palestine, and the continuous confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia are just a few of the current crises in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Yemen also remain at odds, while Israel is still in conflict with some Arab nations. Lately, Qatar was also subjected to a blockade by its neighbors because of its support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. This situation is further complicated by the fact that non-state groups such as ISIS and Hamas operate with full impunity in the region.

Nonetheless, in August 2022, Israel successfully neutralized threats in drone strikes during Operation Breaking Dawn. One of these strikes even killed a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad senior commander, Taysheer Jabari. Just recently, Israel was also successful in killing several militants from the Lions’ Den and Hamas in Jenin. Based on these events, it can be deduced that the onus to keep the region’s dreadful threats in check lies on Israel. Therefore, it will be in the positive interest of the region if Israel continues to remain committed to upholding the security and stability of the Middle East rather than diverting its strategic resources toward the Ukraine-Russia war.

The situation in the Middle East is extremely precarious and prone to continuing and recurrent confrontations. The Russia-Ukraine war could potentially worsen the conflicts by providing new opportunities for intervention to the outside powers. For instance, the Syrian government’s military and manpower support to Russia, and Syria's engagement in the Ukraine crisis may prompt more Russian action in the Syrian conflict to favor Assad. Similarly, Ukraine shares good relations with several Middle Eastern governments like Israel, Kuwait and Turkey. In case the conflict escalates, the Middle Eastern countries will come under pressure to support Ukraine under US diplomatic pressure, which may result in a division into two camps, albeit not necessarily explicitly.  

Secondly, even if Russia and Israel's relationship can be said to be realpolitik, they have never really seen eye to eye on Iran. However, the evolving equation between Russia, Israel, and Iran due to the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war could hamper Israel's security. In recent years, Iran and Russia have deepened their strategic partnership. Any perception of Israel's allegiance to Ukraine might be considered a threat to Russia's geopolitical objectives. If Israel were to aid Ukraine militarily, Russia would interpret this as a provocative act and may react by enhancing Iran's military-industrial complex, disregarding Israel’s concerns. Meanwhile, from Israel's perspective, every drone and ballistic missile that Russia purchases from Iran, and every economic deal struck between them, provides Tehran with more cash that can be funneled to its proxies around Israel's sovereign territory.  Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has seen Israel as its main regional adversary, and Russia may incite Tehran to engage in a limited fashion with Israel and thus keep its involvement limited to regional affairs. Also, if the tensions between Israel and Iran escalate, there is a chance it would also intensify the arms race, further proxy conflicts, and potentially even lead to a direct military confrontation between the two countries. Israeli establishment would do well to think twice before engaging in a European war beyond providing humanitarian aid. Anything beyond humanitarian aid might worsen relations between Israel and Russia.

Lastly, the Russia-Ukraine conflict also generates fresh prospective disputes. For instance, it may entice other nations with strong links to Russia or Ukraine to support them covertly or overtly by any means. This side-picking act would eventually prolong the ongoing war while simultaneously generating new wounds and refreshing the old ones in the Middle East. This might apply to  Israel, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, and other countries.  Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that he would consider sending arms to Ukraine, and two weeks later, Israeli lawmakers were found to be encouraging him to do that. Syria has already broken diplomatic ties with Ukraine. Beirut and Jordan enjoy relatively close ties with Moscow. As many reports suggest, Lebanon-based Palestinians are recruited by Russia and deployed to the frontlines in Ukraine.

Other than geographic proximity, diplomatic mistrust, and a persistent threat to sovereign security, the Middle East is also fraught with dictators and strongmen making this region more susceptible to intensifying internal proxy conflicts among themselves based on the sides they might take in the Ukraine-Russia war. As per the western media, staying neutral in this war equates with taking Russia’s side. While it appears that the middle eastern nations have delicately handled the Ukraine-Russia war by maintaining their strategic autonomy, the truth seems to be different. Multiple fissures have surfaced leading to renewed divisions between these nations that make the situation ripe for conflicts and instability.

In conclusion, the Ukraine-Russia war is a Western war or European War and should be left there. The first step toward the Middle East being embroiled in another region's war is Iran's strategic cooperation with Russia. The second step involves Israel building consensus in the Knesset for providing military backing to Ukraine, opening the door for other countries to follow suit and escalating regional proxy wars. In order to lessen the conflict's potential effects on the Middle East, it is crucial that Middle Eastern countries refrain from any sort of military or moral engagement with Ukraine or Russia.

Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge Dale Aluf, Director of Research & Strategy at SIGNAL, Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership, and Aayushi Malhotra for investing the time and energy necessary to review the manuscript, providing insightful comments and suggestions, and editing the paper. These efforts enabled me to raise the quality of the manuscript.

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Amit Kumar is a doctoral student at the Birla Institute of Technology and Science, in Pilani, India. His area of specialization is China Studies. Amit has worked as a Political Researcher for the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, India's National Political Party's youth wing. Read full bio here.

A House Divided Cannot Stand

By Chuck Freilich

Three months ago, Israel’s economy was booming. Israel still faced severe threats from Iran and Hezbollah, and there had been an increase in Palestinian terrorism, but overall Israel was never more secure. Its ties with states around the world were expanding and hopes for near-term normalization with the Saudis and others abounded. Israel was a vibrant democracy and viewed its approaching 75th anniversary with optimism.

Israel is now convulsed by self-inflicted divisions that are wracking its society and economy, undermining its democracy and threatening the pillars of its national security. Reservists from Israel’s most hallowed military units are in a state of near rebellion and what starts in the reserves will rapidly spill over into the regular army. Israel is on the verge of coming apart.

With international attention focused on Ukraine and the US-Chinese global rivalry, Iran is making steady progress towards a nuclear capability. In essence, it already is a nuclear threshold state, with sufficient fissile material for some five bombs and more soon. The only thing preventing Iran from weaponizing a nuclear warhead, the final hurdle to an operational capability, is its ongoing fear of the international and Israeli response. With both the international community and Israel focused elsewhere, this fear has greatly diminished and a nuclear Iran is an increasingly real possibility.

Moreover, the recent agreement between Iran and its arch-rival, Saudi Arabia, was a significant achievement for the former, that may signal an important realignment of regional forces. The agreement provides for a restoration of diplomatic relations, after a seven-year hiatus, and renewed economic and even military cooperation. Assuming that it is actually implemented - not a foregone conclusion – the agreement would give Iran three important wins: a reduction in regional tensions; a weakening of the American-led regional coalition; and, at a minimum, a blow both to Israel’s hopes of building a military alignment against Iran and for further regional normalization.

Further complicating the picture, the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement was brokered by China, not the US. For decades, China has become an increasingly important economic player in the region, buying vast quantities of oil from both the Saudis and Iran, but it had yet to turn its economic prowess into diplomatic and military might. In recent years, this has begun changing, as China deployed limited forces in the region (Djibouti), conducted repeated naval exercises with Iran and Russia, signed a 25-year strategic agreement with Iran, and now, for the first time, led a major strategic development in the region. The US still remains the preeminent power in the region, especially militarily, but the big question is whether the agreement signifies the beginning of the Chinese era in the Middle East.

The Saudis and Emirates, who also recently renewed ties with Iran, are engaging in classic hedging behavior. Driven by an ongoing loss of confidence in the US guarantee for their security, they are seeking other means of ensuring it, first by expanding ties with Israel, now by reducing hostilities with Iran. One can agree with their thinking, or not, but it is important to understand their mindset.

The Gulf and other Sunni states’ loss of faith in the US guarantee began with the Second Gulf War, in which egregious American miscalculations, in their view, greatly empowered Iran. The US then “abandoned” Egyptian President Mubarak, ostensibly its leading Arab ally. The US negotiated a flawed nuclear deal with Iran, but abruptly withdrew from it, without a Plan B, and failed to respond to a major Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities and to a subsequent attack against the UAE. Ongoing US pressure for human rights reforms, snubbing of the Saudi crown prince, and pressure to end the war in Yemen, added to the sense of animosity. Statements that the US no longer needed Mideast oil, true in a narrow sense, ignored the reality of one global energy market, further heightening Gulf insecurity.

The glitter is also off the Abraham Accords with Israel and the Arab signatories - extent and potential - are re-evaluating their positions. This dramatic breakthrough in relations, which had the potential to transform the region and Israel’s place in it, was driven first and foremost by the common fear of Iran and growing doubts about American resolve to prevent a nuclear Iran. The UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval, sought to build an undeclared alliance with Israel, signed defense cooperation agreements and even began making major purchases of Israeli weapons. The UAE warmly embraced Israel, in dramatic and heretofore unimaginable ways.

Israel could never constitute a substitute for the US, of course, but its ongoing political crisis, with five rounds of elections in three years and now almost complete meltdown, have clearly demonstrated its limitations as a reliable strategic partner for the Gulf states and led to growing disaffection. The Emiratis have reportedly already cancelled weapon sales, Prime Minister Netanyahu has pointedly not been invited to visit, and there is palpable concern among the Abraham Accords states over the directions being taken by the new government, especially regarding the Palestinians.

The breakthrough with Israel was also driven by the Abraham Accords states’ interest in access to Israeli high-tech, especially cyber, and the belief that Israel’s integration into the region would help moderate its policies towards the Palestinians. In both areas, they have been disappointed. The international uproar over Israel’s cyber exports, stemming primarily from the NSO affair, caused Israel to greatly scale back sales to nondemocratic states. The new government’s ultra-hard right composition and de facto intention to annex the West Bank, contradict the hopes of all Gulf states, as well as assurances given to the UAE at the time.

The Middle Eastern landscape is changing before our eyes. Unsurprisingly, neither friend nor foe are sitting back and graciously waiting for Israel to get its house in order. As has long been known, a house divided cannot stand. 

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Now, more than ever, Israel needs a constitution

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Winston Churchill famously coined the term "never let a good crisis go to waste."

“Good” is hardly the appropriate word to describe the current state of chaos – the likes of which the State of Israel has never known –but if we focus on Churchill's call to action then the opportunities presented are clear.

The Netanyahu government’s dangerous, in fact, unprecedented, legislative blitz will not only harm human rights, but is pushing the country toward a tipping point from which there will be no turning back.

The democratic State of Israel, which was established on the basis of the Zionist vision, is in danger of collapse. The time is ripe to put a solution on the table – a way out that was there from the outset, when the State of Israel was established, but which was ignored. Failure now to stop and take advantage of this crisis will mean that in the coming years the third Jewish commonwealth will fall. Establishing a constitution will lay out the rules of the game and fix the broken ties between us and can help us avoid this fate.

Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, foresaw the problems that would arise in due course. The Declaration of Independence stated that a constitution would be determined by the people's assembly within five months. In practice, this never happened. Seventy-five years later, there is no constitution.

Why then do we need a constitution? Some would say that we have the Declaration of Independence and for 75 years we got along just fine without a constitution. Others claim that the Basic Laws and the rulings of former Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak are part of the constitution.

The answer lies in the chaotic situation the country has now reached. After 75 years, we discovered that Israel’s social contract lacks clear boundaries.

The simplest explanation is that a constitution will create order, define national frameworks, and create checks and balances between the authorities. It will define the nature of the state, rights and obligations, and each citizen’s ability to maintain their way of life. A constitution would stabilize the system of government, boost equality, freedom of expression, and act as an unsigned contract between the citizen and the state.

The Netanyahu government, which seeks to pass the first stage of a “judicial reform,” claims its reform will strengthen democracy, restore governance, restore trust in the judicial system, and achieve balance between the three branches of government.

In practice, behind the big words, hides a forceful attempt to change the democratic regime in Israel. The reform is made up of a set of laws that would terminally violate the balance of power and give unreasonable influence to politicians who seek to escape the threat of justice and, alongside them, to the wheelers and dealers who head the ultra-Orthodox parties.

It is enough to look at the bill on the Expansion of Powers to the Rabbinical Courts, which was approved for a first reading by the Knesset Ministerial Committee on Legislation, to understand, in this context, that in the absence of a constitution, the road to a halachic state is growing ever shorter.

Take, for example, the Torah study bill, which, according to the Haredi parties who are pushing to get it passed, will solve the conscription issue.

Today there are 170,000 yeshiva students dedicated to full-time Torah study. According to the vision of Knesset Member Moshe Gafni, chairman of the United Torah Judaism party, at least half of the population will not serve in the military. Add to this the fact that today over 50% of men in the ultra-Orthodox community are not in the labor market, and you will end up with national bankruptcy.

Levin's "reform" not only fails to provide solutions to issues that need to be corrected but also legitimizes the demographic problem that is to come.

These struggles aren’t new. Take a trip back in time more than a century, and you'll find that the leaders of the Zionist movement fought hard against ultra-Orthodox Judaism.

Zionist founding father Theodor Herzl, in his book, The Jewish State, laid out his vision for the future state, including the structure of government and society, the economy, security, and the relationship between religion and state. In his vision, while faith is a bond that unites the Jewish state’s residents, priests would remain confined in the “temples of God.” They would not be involved in the leadership of affairs of state.

The contribution of Herzl's vision to the reality of our state is indisputable, yet in today’s reality, ultra-Orthodox educational institutions budgeted by the state do not include studies of Herzl or the leaders of the Zionist movement.

In an era in which history is rewritten, and in which we forget where we came from and where we are going, we must correct this.

In the absence of a vision, the nation will come undone; the slippery slope which the State of Israel is galloping down leads us to a dangerous place. The current government will, if it does not change course, alter the face of the State of Israel. There are no more checks and balances, and the vision of the Zionist state will gradually recede. The severe crisis we have found ourselves in is an opportunity to stop and create order by demanding a constitution for Israel. If not, demography will win.

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

The IDF is being dragged into Israel’s political crisis

By Eitan Dangot

When the new IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi took over from his predecessor Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, he didn’t anticipate finding himself in his current predicament. He was sure he’d be able to concentrate on two primary objectives: Identifying the main security dangers to Israel and crafting a vision for Israel’s response. He also expected to be busy with ethical and operational messaging to the IDF’s branches and commanders.

Usually, a chief of staff oversees extensive new plans to improve IDF readiness. In this case, Halevi is focused first and foremost on the Iranian threat. It is also fair to assume that he was preparing to deal with challenges to the “people’s army” model and find new ways of keeping career officers, commanders, operational and technical staff, and NCOs in their positions, as well as boosting the number of recruits from the Israeli periphery into technological units.

Instead of all that, within just two months of Halevi’s appointment, a judicial reform program and a national crisis have thrust him into the role of a military commander navigating a national domestic crisis.

The main issues that Halevi wanted to deal with have been pushed to the side, as opponents and supporters of the judicial reform program focus on the domestic battle, which increasingly threatens to drag in the military. A refusal by reservists to serve if the judicial reform passes is a red warning light, and there are also concerns about disruptions to service by conscripts who object to the judicial reform.

The chief of staff does not want to tackle these issues. They interfere with his main role of identifying and preparing for defense threats against the State of Israel, which are growing more serious. Yet Halevi finds himself having to deal with letters to IDF commanders from reservists in strategic units declaring they will not be reporting for duty in the middle of a socio-political storm.

Such letters, sent by reservists from units that have a significant military history and vital future role in achieving IDF goals, have triggered replies from many politicians, some of whom had no prior military experience or only a brief period of IDF duty.

Halevi is wisely making every effort to avoid political declarations and keep the flames of political dispute low in the military and prevent them from spreading further. But despite those efforts, a significant change has occurred over recent weeks. The conversation has changed. It has evolved into a deep social and national argument that incorporates numerous sectors and is far broader than a dispute over democratic values.

Halevi, who had previously avoided making any public statement on the subject, joined forces with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant after realizing that his personal involvement will have a significant impact.

In response to letters written by former IAF pilots, as well as by reservists with illustrious combat histories in intelligence, technology, ground warfare, elite forces and air defense, Halevi began speaking out publicly. He spoke to members of various protest groups in the reserves, outlining his plans for not only resolving this immediate crisis, but also how to handle additional problems that could arise during his tenure and the future of the IDF.

Halevi recognized that the processes he is now seeing didn’t begin during the current political crisis. Disunity within the IDF has been brewing for years. A significant number of soldiers are graduates of religious seminaries who volunteer for combat service in the ground forces, and some of them have a far-right political orientation. Already during the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza, soldiers with ties to the evacuees discussed the possibility of refusing to serve.

The chief of staff must take all necessary measures to resolve the issue and move quickly to exclude the IDF from any further political discussions. He must be firm with several irresponsible individuals who are calling for refusal to show up for service immediately, while expressing greater understanding for others who are concerned about what may come next.

Halevi prefers to conduct a discreet and quiet conversation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government over these issues, but in this dialogue, it is vital that he and the other defense chiefs voice their opinions with as much force and courage as they displayed on the battlefield.

A discussion like this can jeopardize the chief of staff’s standing with lawmakers, but it is still necessary for someone in his position to help preserve democracy.

Halevi’s troubles don’t end there. He has also had to watch coalition agreements grant unprecedented and confusing power to the new position of Junior Minister in the Defense Ministry occupied by Bezalel Smotrich. From the ministry, Smotrich, who is also Israel’s finance minister, can interfere with the IDF’s Civil Administration, which runs Israeli civilian policies in the West Bank.

Halevi also had to witness the granting of power, at least in theory, over Border Police in Judea and Samaria to the new National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

If these ministers are allowed to implement their new powers in this way, it would be detrimental to the IDF’s ability to work in a unified, coordinated manner, especially for IDF Central Command in Judea and Samaria.

Domestic strife has harmed Israel’s readiness against the Iranian threat. Iran has enriched uranium almost to the 90% military-grade level. This is a warning siren. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is building up its arsenal.

As we approach the beginning of Ramadan, an explosive time in the Palestinian arena, the chief of staff will continue to oversee the campaign against Iranian entrenchment in Syria, build up Israeli war readiness, increase cooperation with the U.S. military regarding the potential need to confront Iran militarily, and actively contribute to Israeli resilience in the face of a potential escalation in the Palestinian arena or within Israel by Arab Israeli extremists.

It would be appropriate for Netanyahu to allow the IDF brass and security forces to concentrate and mobilize all their professional and command energies against the enemy at this time, rather than drag them into complicated situations that put them in the spotlight against their will and hinder their ability to perform their roles effectively.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Israel security forces face concrete terror alerts

By Yaakov Lappin

The Israeli security establishment has received dozens of concrete alerts about plots to carry out terrorist attacks, both in Judea and Samaria, commonly known as the West Bank, and within the Green Line, a former defense official tells JNS.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, a senior research associate at the MirYam Institute and a former advisor on Arab affairs to seven Israeli defense ministers, added that the March 13 roadside bombing attack by a terrorist who infiltrated Israel from Lebanon reflects an effort “to connect the arenas of conflict”—Lebanon and Judea and Samaria—likely by a coalition of Lebanese and Palestinian terrorist organizations.

“It seems the attack was initiated by elements of Hezbollah and Hamas, and perhaps by others. There is a desire here to integrate arenas of conflict against Israel. And I also link the attack to the domestic situation, the crisis gripping Israel [regarding the government’s judicial reform program]. Terrorist organizations view the crisis as an opportunity to take advantage of and attack,” said Hacham. “They see that Israel is busy now and they perceive it as weakened.”

Addressing Sunday’s regional summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, which was designed to secure a de-escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Hacham said the talks were “divorced from the reality on the ground.”

Officials from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan and the U.S. met in the Sinai resort.

Jerusalem was represented by Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) director Ronen Bar and National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi.

The Palestinian delegation was led by P.A. Civil Affairs Minister Hussein al-Sheikh and General Intelligence Service chief Majed Faraj.

Brett McGurk, National Security Council coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, represented the United States, alongside Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry.

Hacham said that despite the positive images, a large gap remains between the discussions and “the situation on the ground.”

During the summit, Israel reportedly agreed to freeze construction in Judea and Samaria for four months and to stop recognizing unauthorized outposts for six months.

The P.A. reportedly committed to implementing its “legal right” to carry out security responsibilities in Area A of Judea and Samaria, where the great majority of the Palestinian population is located.

The sides also reportedly created a forum to further discuss Palestinian demands to receive tax funds that Israel has withheld after deducting the equivalent of the monthly stipends paid to terrorists.

“The P.A. is struggling to impose its authority on the ground. The agreements reached will not be worth the paper they were written on,” Hacham assessed.

Ramadan flashpoint?

Looking ahead, Hacham warned that with Ramadan set to start on Wednesday or Thursday night, what is already an escalation in Palestinian violence could get significantly worse.

He connected the period with religious emotions as well as deliberate incitement, especially from Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip, through the media and social networks.

“When combined, these elements are an almost certain prescription for a security deterioration and escalation,” Hacham warned.

“It is important to emphasize that according to extreme scenarios, the escalation trend could spread to the Gaza Strip and the Arab sector in Israel. These problematic scenarios must be taken seriously by the senior security and political echelon, and require Israel to prepare for them,” he said.

The Ramadan month is characterized by fasting from sunrise to sunset, creating feelings of ongoing pressure for some who observe it, and this could motivate potential attackers to more easily take part in violence against Israeli targets, according to Hacham. “In this state, any incident can push potential attackers into striking,” he said.

“In practice, we are beyond the stage of escalation in the conflict with the Palestinians. Every event has a major significance; it can lead to yet more escalations.”

The Israeli Defense Ministry’s unit for Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) meanwhile announced on Monday steps to facilitate Ramadan festivities.

COGAT said the measures reflect “the recommendations of the security services and are intended to provide freedom of worship for the Palestinian public.”

The measures include approving the entry of Palestinian worshippers onto the Temple Mount for Friday prayers during the month of Ramadan, but with restrictions for security purposes. 

“Females of all ages, and boys up to the age of 12, may enter with no need for an existing permit. Men 55 years of age and older may enter without a permit, and men 45 years of age and older, but less than 55, may enter provided they have a valid permit. All permits are contingent on receipt of security approval,” said COGAT.

“Also for Ramadan, visits to family in Israel have been approved for Palestinian residents of Judea and Samaria, as well as visits to relatives in Judea and Samaria by residents of foreign countries. We emphasize that issuance of all permits is subject to security approval,” it added.

Ultimately, said Hacham, of the three options available regarding the future of Judea and Samaria: strengthening the P.A. to enable it to continue to rule there; a Hamas takeover; and a return of the area to Israeli direct control, the first is the one that is aligned with Israel’s core security interests.

Israel should manage future events with this strategic reality in mind, he said.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief, Judicial Reform, Terror Threats & Israel Dubai Defense deal

By Yaakov Lappin

Israel’s Channel 12 News reported March 17 that Justice Minister Yariv Levin and Knesset Constitution Committee Chair Simcha Rothman are considering a one-year suspension of their judicial overhaul program, except for planned changes to the judicial selection committee, which stand at the heart of the reform.

If the changes are implemented, this would give the ruling government coalition a majority in the committee and allow it to appoint three Supreme Court judges this year, while also replacing the court's president.

The report is the latest sign of efforts underway by the coalition to search for a last minute compromise to the unprecedented political and societal crisis that is gripping Israel. The coalition wishes to pass at least part of its program by the end of the Knesset's winter session on April 2.

However, if no compromise is reached and the Supreme Court rules the measures to be illegal, the Court is likely to strike down the reform leading to an unprecedented a constitutional crisis.

In the event of a constitutional crisis, who will the IDF, the Israel Police, the civil service, and others listen to — the Supreme Court or the government? If Israel’s institutions are forced to make such a choice, this could lead to scenes of chaos on the streets, which are already filled with hundreds of thousands of anti-reform demonstrators, and it is one that the government will try to avoid.

Terrorist from Lebanon plants roadside bomb in North

A roadside bomb that severely wounded a motorist in northern Israel on March 13 was planted by a terrorist who infiltrated the country from Lebanon, security forces revealed.

Authorities said Israeli forces killed the terrorist as he attempted to return to Lebanon. The IDF has not yet named who they believe dispatched the terrorist but has not ruled out the possibility he was sent by Hezbollah.

Shareef ad-Din, 21, from the Israeli Arab town of Salem, was the Arab Israeli driver wounded when the explosive device detonated around 6 a.m. on Route 65 near Megiddo Junction. The bomb was planted behind a barrier by the side of the road, some 18 miles southeast of Haifa.

The Megiddo Junction is 37 miles from the border with Lebanon. Getting there by road would add another 12.5 miles to the trip.

After the blast, the IDF, Shin Bet, and Israel Police began a joint manhunt in an effort to catch the terrorist, including the establishment of roadblocks in northern Israel.

A checkpoint near the village of Ya'ara stopped a car with a suspect inside who was armed with suicide bomb vest and a gun. Israeli security forces shot and killed him. A second man, a driver, was arrested and later released.

Security sources say that the suspect probably planned to perpetrate another attack before returning to Lebanon.

In trying to ascertain which terror organization is behind the attack, Hezbollah is the immediate suspect, due to its control over southern Lebanon, though Hamas is also a suspect. A collaboration between both – with Iranian knowledge and assistance - is also a possibility.

Could the attack be an attempt by Israel’s enemies to exploit the political crisis?  Was it a response to the recent drone attack on Iran’s weapons site in Isfahan, or strikes on Iranian targets in Syria?

Whoever launched the attack is testing Israel’s response in a deniable manner, trying to avoid the threshold of war.

Israeli defense company Rafael and Dubai police jointly taking on drone threats

Israel's Rafael defense company announced March 16 that it will cooperate with Dubai Police in addressing regional drone challenges and strengthening the anti-drone capabilities of Dubai Police.

Rafael’s Drone Dome uses electronic jammers, advanced sensors, and AI algorithms to protect threatened airspace against drone intrusions.

 The goal of the partnership is to make the Emirati city safer and stop any possible threats from unmanned aerial systems. Dubai Police and Rafael agreed to install Drone Dome for the Dubai Police's air defense needs.

Major General Mohammed Nasser Al Razzoqi , Director of the General Department of Operations at Dubai Police said in a statement that  "At Dubai Police, we recognize the importance of staying ahead of emerging threats and utilizing cutting-edge technologies to enhance the safety and security of our community. Our collaboration with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. is a testament to our commitment to addressing regional UAS [Unmanned Aerial Systems]challenges and safeguarding valued assets. Together, we are leveraging the power of multiple technologies and systems to strengthen our security and safety capabilities."

Brig. Gen. (res.) Shachar Shohat, Vice President of Strategy and Business Development, Air and Missile Defense Division at Rafael – who is also a senior research advisor at the MirYam Institute –, said, "We are proud to be standing alongside the Dubai Police and are committed to supporting the efforts to ensure that the regional threats and UAS challenges are met with the most advanced solutions. This cooperation is a step towards advancing defense capabilities and utilizing systems that have proven themselves effective in protecting an array of valued assets."

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Israel Must Balance International Standing with Domestic Policy

By Danny Ayalon

A unique synergy of regional and global trends has meant that Israel's international stance has grown stronger over the last two decades; yet, while this growth trend could continue, it is being overshadowed by the country’s judicial reform crisis.

The global market recognizes the importance of Israel's leadership in the high-tech sector, and because the future rests in the technological sector, Israel, by definition, has become a major asset, leading many countries to want to grow closer to the Jewish state.

Israel offers assets not just in the fields of AI, quantum computing, IT, or medical systems - but also in water technology, food-tech, and agro-tech, all of which can ensure global food security and water availability, particularly in the parched Middle East.

Another factor that has made Israel appealing as an asset is the discovery of Mediterranean gas fields in in its economic waters. This has turned Israeli into a regional energy supplier, sending gas to Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, as well as to Europe via Egypt.

Israel's standing was further significantly strengthened by the Abraham Accords, which have demonstrated that the country is perceived as the only force that can stand in the way of Iran's expansionist agenda, as well as Tehran’s subversion, terrorism, and its nuclear ambitions.

Furthermore, Israel has been successful in detaching the Palestinian issue from its regional and global standing and diplomatic relations with Arab states. It has maintained strategic relations with Jordan (despite routine crises in bilateral relations), Egypt, the European Union, and, of course, the United States, despite substantive divisions over the Palestinian issue.

Now, the Abraham Accord states have bypassed the Palestinians, after the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco realized they can no longer be held hostage by the Palestinian Authority’s veto power. They have instead recognized the importance of ties with Israel and cooperation on technology, food and water, counter-terrorism, and halting Iran's nuclear program. These states recognized that their own interests take precedence over the Palestinian issue, which is not a core national security issue that they share.

This recognition by Arab states has, in turn, assisted other countries, particularly those in the European Union, which have always been sensitive to the Palestinian issue, to move forward on cooperation with Israel.

On top of these factors, global changes are underway, in the form of superpower competition between China and the U.S. on one hand, and the war in Ukraine on the other, which have boosted Israel’s standing as well, adding to its importance and attractiveness.

Israeli military technology is among the most advanced in the world - whether it be precision weapons and ammunition, anti-ballistic missile defense systems, or cyber defenses. Israeli cooperation with NATO members is expanding significantly these days, due to the deterioration of the global security situation.

Germany, for example, is increasing its defense budget exponentially, and there is a good chance that some of that budget will go to Israeli military technology. This strategically binds Europe to Israel.

Another important consideration is U.S.-China competition. When the Americans speak of pivoting to the East to contain China with a ring of pro-American alliances, there is a significant concern among pro-U.S. Arab states that they will do so at the expense of Washington’s Middle Eastern presence.

But the U.S. feels it can conduct this pivot because it knows that Israel is its most reliable ally, which has the capabilities that can reassure Abraham Accord states regarding the Iranian threat. Even though America's main focus is now on China (Chinese aerostats have infiltrated American skies), and on Ukraine, Arab states and the U.S. find it convenient to have Israel around to back-up American capabilities in the Middle East, and to provide a solution to all of the regional threats – Iran and its radical terrorist axis, and its nuclear program.

As a result of these global, economic, technological, energy, and strategic trends, the attractiveness of Israel grows over time.

In this context, it almost doesn't matter which government is in power in Israel. There is sufficient international agreement on core issues like Iran among the Abraham Accords states, and on Ukraine, Russia, and China by the EU states and the US, to make it clear that Israel’s assets are essential in the new regional and global orders taking shape.

However, from here on, much will depend on Israeli policy. Israel is currently suffering a murderous wave of Palestinian terrorism. Instead of dishing out collective punishment, Israel's response has been expanding settlements and recognizing nine settlement outposts, something that has never been acceptable to the international community, including Jerusalem’s great friend the United States. However, the Americans did not go into crisis mode over this decision. Instead, Israel and the U.S. agreed to disagree.

With the exception of the Obama administration in 2016, the U.S. has always vetoed Palestinian attempts to generate UN Security Council condemnations against Israel.

This shield was recently tested once again, and found to be solid, due to the genuine friendship and shared interests and values between Israel and the U.S. It is not in America's best interests to break with Israel over the Palestinians, since Washington has enough pressing issues around the world to tend to, and it does not want to change the dynamics of this relationships.

It is also in America's interest not to internationalize the Israeli - Palestinian conflict because that will ensure there will be no progress on it.  However, a new black swan has arrived, and it is the Israeli government’s push for judicial reform. This will undoubtedly harm Israel's international standing, including relations with the U.S., even if not immediately. If a perception takes hold that the reform will make Israel less democratic, the country’s democratic image -- one of its major strengths -- will be seriously harmed.

It is impossible to overstate how important this is for the U.S., and for Israel’s ability to maintain its special ties with the world’s most powerful superpower. For Washington, the rule of law, separation of powers, and human rights are not just values in and of themselves; they are empirically proven ingredients that create democratic states that are economically stronger and more peaceful.

As a result, American officials are watching events in Israel, and sending very sharp messages, not just through quiet channels, but also in press conferences. This creates a shadow over the future of Israel’s international standing, which will only be lifted if Israel preserves its democratic character. 

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Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

An outline for Israel’s new national guard

By Alon Levavi

As protests and political tensions in Israel reach large-scale proportions, the Israel Police is, once again, back in the limelight, acting as the country’s emergency room. The protests are just the latest challenge to the police’s ability to juggle its multiple and unusual responsibilities—a challenge that must be answered by the formation of an Israeli national guard.

Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are continuing steps begun by the last Israeli government to accomplish this goal. A new national guard headquarters is up and running under the command of a police lieutenant. According to reports, Ben-Gvir has been able to secure an NIS 4.5 billion addition to the National Security Ministry’s annual budget for the next two years. The Israel Police’s annual budget in 2022 was NIS 14.4 billion.

This budget addition can help reverse the trend of police officers quitting their jobs due to poor conditions, but the establishment of a national guard will also be essential to taking some of the pressure off the Israel Police.

Much of that pressure stems from the simple fact that the Israel Police’s current configuration is insufficient to meet the challenges it must take on. The entire police force is made up of some 32,000 civilian police officers and 8,000 Border Police officers. Some 5,000 officers are in headquarters and management positions.

This limited force must fight crime, traffic accidents, illegal narcotics and cyber-crime. It must also deal with public disturbances, act as a counterterrorism force and prepare for all kinds of emergency situations such as earthquakes and mass rocket attacks.

Currently, the Israel Police simply lacks the numbers it needs to do all these things—and the challenges are only growing.

Israel is not a typical state. It has numerous security challenges and social fractures, which means that each police officer must be versatile in order to handle a plethora of missions. This harms the police’s professionalism because it prevents the force from optimizing its abilities in its core functions.

Officers are deployed from one district to another—often from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv and back—as events develop, taking on Temple Mount tensions in Jerusalem, then a large parade in Tel Aviv and then mass political rallies. This prevents officers from focusing on specialist areas.

The overall erosion in the organization is significant and the low pay for starting officers—combined with the need to be on constant standby—does not help matters. Add to that the consistently negative public and media portrayal of the police, and you get a force prone to demoralization and resignations.

A case in point is the mixed Arab-Jewish city of Lod in central Israel, which went up in flames in May 2021 during Israel’s conflict with Hamas. Mass rioting, mostly by Arab-Israeli youths, and hate crimes rocked the city. Lod’s police station has an average of three to four patrol cars available to it at any given time and a maximum of 200 officers. This limited force had to deal with thousands of rioters before backup arrived.

That backup took the form of the Border Police, which is part of the Israeli National Police, a natural home for an Israeli national guard.

Originally established soon after the founding of Israel in 1948 to counter terrorist infiltrations from Arab countries, the Border Police evolved over the years into a semi-military police force with military-type unit categories (battalions and companies).

The Border Police conducts a variety of missions in rural areas, some of which are related to agricultural crime; engages in counterterrorism with special units; and provides continuous security in urban areas.

Currently, when Border Police units enter an area under the jurisdiction of a police district or station, it is activated by the local commander in a coordinated manner. This is the primary reason why a national guard must be part of the Israeli National Police: To prevent the appearance of a third force on Israeli territory that would lack clear territorial command structures. Such a scenario would, in a state about the size of New Jersey, cause chaos.

The Border Police is also well-suited to take on rioting and disturbances, since it is not attached to any police district and is free of daily missions such as investigations, traffic enforcement and combatting drug trafficking.

Once a national guard is up and running, the civilian police will be able to continue conducting its core activities even as emergency scenarios erupt, since it would fall to the guard to mobilize large forces and send them where they are needed quickly.

The future national guard should be made up of thousands of officers, including currently serving Border Police conscripts, professional Border Police officers, reserves and volunteers.

During routine times, the national guard should work daily with the civilian police force, assisting it with missions and maintaining high visibility to reassure Israeli civilians. It should also train and build up its forces. During emergencies—for example, major rioting—the guard will go into action and allow classic police duties to continue uninterrupted.

Ultimately, the opportunity to create a new and critical force has arrived and it is vital to do so without undermining or confusing the police chain of command.

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Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Israel Still Should Not Provide Weapons to Ukraine

By Danny Ayalon & CHUCK FREILICH

The first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an appropriate time to assess Israel’s policies toward it, chiefly its refusal to sell weapons to Ukraine. The need for this assessment is particularly acute given the close strategic relationship that has emerged between Russia and Iran and the ramifications for U.S.-Israeli relations.

Israel’s sympathies lie squarely with Ukraine. Nevertheless, its response to date has been limited to significant, but not overwhelming, humanitarian aid, including a field hospital, ambulances, protective vests, helmets, food, water purification equipment, and more. Israel has reportedly also provided Ukraine with intelligence information and voted with it in the United Nations. Conversely, Israel has steadfastly rebuffed Ukrainian requests to provide weapons, including defensive ones, such as Iron Dome.

A wounded bear is particularly dangerous and Russia can cause Israel severe harm. We thus believe that Israel’s refusal to sell Ukraine weapons remains appropriate, but that this may change depending on Russia’s actions. For now, we propose a number of semi-military measures that would be of great utility for Ukraine and position Israel firmly within the Western camp but mitigate Russia’s response.

There are seven primary reasons for our caution.

First, Iran has supplied Russia with 1,700 drones, is apparently building a factory in Russia to produce as many as 6,000 more, and may provide it with ballistic missiles. In return, Russia has reportedly agreed to supply Iran with SU-35s fighters, helicopters, and possibly the S-400 air-defense system, warships, submarines, and satellites. Russia and Iran already cooperate in the cyber realm. They also recently signed two agreements designed to promote bilateral economic ties and circumvent international sanctions: a “transportation corridor” from Russia to Iran and out to the Far East; and an alternative mechanism to the global SWIFT system. Israel must avoid measures that may lead to an even closer Russian-Iranian strategic alliance.

Second, Russia and Iran are the two primary players in Syria. At times, Russia has sought to counterbalance Iran’s efforts to expand its influence there, including the build-up of a significant military presence and use of Syria to transfer weapons to Hezbollah. Wartime needs forced Russia to withdraw some forces from Syria, but not the S-400s. If used against Israeli aircraft, Israel’s ability to counter Iran’s buildup would be greatly constrained. So far, Russia has refrained from doing so, but that could change at any time. No less than NATO countries, Israel is on the front lines with Russia today and can find itself at war at any moment with Iran, Hezbollah, and Iranian-supported Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel cannot allow this to happen.

Third, Russia is a party to the nuclear agreement with Iran and ongoing international negotiations. At times, Russia has played a constructive role in this regard, but it has been supportive of Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency recently and can be highly disruptive. A desperate Russia might even provide Iran with concrete assistance for its nuclear program. Israel cannot afford to alienate Russia too much.

Fourth, Israel is not a global power with major weapons stockpiles, does not have the spare capability, and cannot transfer critical systems to Ukraine without endangering its own security. Indeed, it has the minimum number of Iron Dome batteries necessary and a shortage of interceptor missiles. Moreover, as Ukraine’s defense minister indicated, other systems are better suited to its needs, including American ones, which the United States has abjured from supplying so far. What Ukraine really wants is to drag Israel into the conflict on its side. That is understandable, but Israel must weigh its overall interests, not just sentiments.

Fifth, some 15 percent of Israel’s population has roots in the former USSR and 600,000 Jews still live in Russia. Russia has already taken measures designed to demonstrate its ability to stop emigration. The ingathering of the exiles is Israel’s raison d’être.

Sixth, unless the United States changes the policy of partial disengagement from the Middle East pursued by four consecutive presidents, Russia will remain a critical player in the region. In addition to support for Iran, Russia is providing Turkey and Egypt with advanced weapons and nuclear power reactors that could morph into military nuclear programs, has proposed similar deals with the Saudis and others, is an important player in OPEC+ and Libya, and more.

Seventh, France, Germany, Japan, and other leading states have provided only limited aid to Ukraine, belatedly and hesitantly. South Korea has refused to provide any weapons. Even the United States has imposed strict limits on the kinds of weapons it provides, for example, aircraft, missiles, air-defense systems, and until now, tanks. Israel does not have to be at the forefront of this issue. Some question Israel’s commitment to the Western camp because they have high expectations of it; others because they wish to use this issue as part of a broader delegitimization campaign. Most understand that Israel’s strategic circumstances require painful compromises between moral and strategic considerations.

Changes to Israel’s refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine might be warranted if, for example, Russia decided to limit its freedom of aerial maneuver in Syria; supplied certain weapons systems to Iran, e.g. the S-400s; adopted a clearly obstructionist position in the nuclear talks; or provided direct assistance to Iran’s nuclear program. In each case, the details would determine the nature of Israel’s response. Russia must be made to understand that Israel has the ability to significantly harm its interests, if pushed too far.

What Israel should be doing, were it not engulfed in its domestic convulsions, is providing Ukraine with outsized humanitarian assistance. It should send the field hospital back to Ukraine, if necessary, by turning it into an Israel Defense Force (IDF) operation; dispatch IDF search and rescue teams; expand rehabilitation programs for wounded Ukrainians; and complete the transfer of the rocket alert technology promised to Ukraine, all areas in which Israel is a global frontrunner. It should again provide emergency supplies for Ukrainian civilians.

Expanded assistance such as this would be of significant benefit for Ukraine, but likely not lead to an excessive Russian response. All sides understand that there are certain rules to the game.

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Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

National Day Of Hate should remind us of the limits of free speech

By Mark Goldfeder & GABRIEL GROISMAN

Law enforcement officials nationwide issued warnings to the Jewish community over the weekend after neo-Nazi groups designated Saturday a national “Day of Hate,” with organizers calling for their followers to “shock the masses.”

Sadly, this was not surprising given recent events.

Our country has experienced an alarming increase in antisemitism recently, including attacks that are reminiscent of another time and place. Jewish Americans have faced physical assaults, verbal onslaughts, and profanity-laced and ominous flyers dropped off at the doorsteps of Jewish neighborhoods around the country. A viral video this past week, for example, showed a group of bigots in Orlando, Florida, waiting outside a Jewish center to instigate and harass the members. One of the instigators shoved a megaphone in the face of a rabbi and screamed things such as: “kike,” “Heil Hitler,” “Do you think you should be put in ovens,” and “You filthy Jew.”

This incident was not isolated, and the perpetrators are not only white supremacists. By all accounts, antisemitic discrimination and hate crimes are at an all-time high in our country and are being perpetrated by multiple groups with different agendas. The time has come for a collective response.

Many might be concerned that cracking down on hateful conduct could violate Americans’ right to free speech. It is critical, however, for all elected and law enforcement officials, as well as members of the public, to better understand the outer bounds of freedom of speech under the law. The bottom line is that the offended party is not without redress in many of these cases.

To be sure, freedom of speech , even offensive and hateful speech, should be protected. But there are limits to what constitutes speech, and there are rules for when it crosses over into actionable conduct. A number of the individuals involved in organizing these antisemitic activities, for example, are convicted felons with histories of bigoted violence, and in light of their groups’ increasing hostilities and the very real threat they continue to pose, authorities must be vigilant in safeguarding potential targets.

The First Amendment does not protect any unlawful conduct, which includes trespassing, vandalism, harassment, assault, and the destruction of property. The First Amendment also does not protect someone who is making true threats, which the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black (2003) defined as “statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Nor does it protect intimidation, which is “a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”

There is no First Amendment protection for speech that involves incitement, which the court in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) explained includes speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Nor does the First Amendment protect speech that aims not to inform or persuade, but to disrupt lawful endeavors — activities such as participating in a private synagogue’s religious service. Obscenity is not protected under the First Amendment either, and violations of federal obscenity laws, which can include visual depictions, spoken words, or written text (like some of the filth on the distributed flyers), are criminal offenses.

Finally, the protections that the First Amendment puts in place are meant to protect citizens from the government abridging their speech — not to limit the rights of other private individuals. Private businesses and landowners can restrict certain speech, conduct, and demonstrations, in most cases, without triggering any constitutional issues.

It is important to be clear on these rules because the inflammatory, discriminatory antisemitic rhetoric that hate groups spread often leads directly to antisemitic violence. For example, just two weeks ago, one follower who had shared this particular network’s antisemitic propaganda was arrested on charges of shooting two Jewish men as they were leaving synagogues in Los Angeles.

The danger of incitement is real, and authorities must act quickly and decisively to immediately curb any behavior that crosses from free speech into unlawful conduct. Failing to do so will have disastrous results, not only for the Jewish community, but also for all Americans. As the late Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks once explained, “Antisemitism is the world’s most reliable early warning sign of a major threat to freedom. ... It matters to all of us. Which is why we must fight it together.”

Our leaders must make use of all the tools they have at their disposal, and this means understanding that the First Amendment is not a free pass to threaten, harass, intimidate, or otherwise violate the rights of others.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.