The similarities between Iranian and Russian belligerent foreign policy

By Yochai Guiski

Two separate high-stakes showdowns have been played out in recent months on the world stage: The first concerns the Iranian nuclear program, while the second is between Russia and the United States and European countries concerning Ukraine.

In the showdown over the Iranian nuclear program, Tehran has been pushing hard against U.S. and European demands to return to the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and presented (at least initially) hardline negotiating demands. All the while, Iran’s continued non-compliance with the deal and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have raised the specter of conflict arising from an attempt to delay the program by military means.

In the Ukraine, Western countries have seen Russia amass significant military forces (over 100 thousand troops and military equipment), threaten Kiev with military attack, and produce false narratives about Western aggression that requires a Russian response.

Moscow is already under sanctions for occupying and annexing the Crimean Peninsula and has received warnings from the U.S. about stiff sanctions should it initiate a military operation.

At first glance, these two issues seem unrelated: One is a multilateral nonproliferation negotiation regarding return to a nuclear deal that was abandoned by the Trump administration, and Iran’s noncompliance with the terms of the deal in response; the second is a potential war on European soil, which may lead to a crisis between two nuclear-armed great powers.

But at a closer look, the similarities begin to emerge:

1. Iran and Russia are both belligerent actors in their respective arenas:

a. The Kremlin and its allies are continuously intervening (through various tools - diplomatic, economic, covert, information, military) in the affairs of former Soviet republics, attempting to stifle pro-democracy dissent and prop up pro-Russian leaders, while supporting separatist pro-Russian groups.

b. Iran is also employing various tools to undermine the governments of Middle Eastern countries while funding and arming proxies who serve as its long arm. Iranian involvement perpetuated governance crises in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, and has exacerbated the humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria.

2. Iran and Russia have both increased their belligerence in response to sanctions that sought to deal with their behavior. They are also willing to use capabilities that are deemed unacceptable by the West such as assassinations (including using chemical agents), supporting terror groups, and developing various WMD capabilities.

3. Both Iran and Russia do not shy from sending forces to prop up authoritarian allies or from the use of force to quash popular demands, such as in Syria, Belarus, or Kazakhstan.

4. Iran and Russia see themselves as victims of the current situation or at least adopt these positions outwardly:   

a. Iran depicts itself as a victim of Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on Tehran. However, the “Nuclear Archives” showed that Iran had manifestly violated the JCPOA and the NPT by holding on to the blueprints and components of a military nuclear program, and it has violated NPT safeguards by holding and hiding enriched uranium. Iran has also leveraged the West’s interest in IAEA monitoring of its nuclear sites to prevent any meaningful investigation by the agency into its numerous violations.

b. Iran has also expanded its support for militias and terror groups around the Middle East that have targeted U.S. forces and their allies while claiming the U.S. is violating the nuclear agreement by sanctioning it for those behaviors.

c. Russia also sees itself as a victim of western interference. It sees the 20+ years of NATO enlargement to the east as an encroachment on its borders by a military alliance that primarily views Russia as its enemy. All the while remembering that the wars Russia fought in Europe were instigated by European nations.

d. It also views the development and deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe over the past decade as a significantly destabilizing development as these can reduce the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence.

e. Russia viewed the political change in Ukraine with genuine alarm, as its territory plays host to vital military installations (such as the only exit to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean) whose loss would have significant strategic implications. It reacted swiftly by seizing and annexing Crimea. Moscow also sees the NATO presence in Ukraine as an unacceptable risk to its national security (the distance between Moscow and the Ukrainian border is only about 500 Km of relatively open terrain).   

5. Conspicuously, both Iran and Russia seek guarantees from the U.S. and its allies that they would refrain from actions that could inhibit their ability to exercise their power in their respective (contested) spheres of influence (Russia provided treaty suggestions to the U.S. and Iran demands guarantees as part of the nuclear negotiations). They seek these guarantees knowing full well that their demands are near impossible to accept and even agreeing to discuss them might be interpreted as selling out U.S. partners in the region.

As the U.S. seeks to reinforce the notion of a rules-based international order, it is of paramount importance that regional bullies do not get a free pass on their behavior. Even if the U.S. and its allies might have done better in dealing with both nations, it is ultimately their aggressive policies that bear most of the responsibility for their current predicament.

Accepting the narrative that Iran or Russia are victims who just seek to have some protection from bullying U.S. policies would be counterproductive and an open invitation to aggression, which would also be closely monitored by an attentive Beijing.

Even if diplomacy is still the best road to address most of the issues between the U.S., Russia, and Iran, it would be foolhardy to attempt to kick the can down the road by acquiescing to unacceptable demands. Accepting them in diplomatic discourse with one actor would surely embolden the other to seek the same.

Even if the U.S. and Israel cannot fully agree on the nuclear negotiations with Iran, this should be a point they are united on. 

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Can Iran Stall its Way to Nuclear Weapons?

By Jeremiah Rozman

Iran wants nuclear weapons. This rational desire aims to ensure that it can pursue its interests without fearing foreign military intervention. The United States and Israel both have rational reasons for wanting Iran to never obtain nuclear weapons. Despite its vastly inferior resources, Iran is advantaged in pursuing its goals because it simply needs to stay the course, gradually enriching nuclear material, while the U.S., Israel, and other involved parties must overcome significant differences that prevent a united front capable of deterring or disrupting Iran’s nuclear weapons program. By reducing deterrence, these differences harm the diplomatic effort, making a peaceful end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions less likely.

Iran’s goal

Iran’s leaders seek regional dominance not only for ideological reasons but because being more powerful makes them less vulnerable. They saw the fate of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, both of whom suffered humiliating and violent deaths at the hands of a U.S.-led coalition after giving up their nuclear programs. Conversely, Pakistan and North Korea both succeeded in getting nuclear weapons despite U.S. protestations, threats, and diplomacy. They raced their way to nuclear weapons and their leaders remain in power. Obtaining nuclear weapons would be a major win for Iran’s leaders. Therefore, dissuading them will be difficult, even with a united opposition.

A (dis)united front

The U.S., Israel, Western powers, Russia, China, and Iran’s regional adversaries all have an interest in stopping Iran from getting nuclear weapons. But their interests are not nearly the same in terms of urgency or severity.

For Israel, a nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat. For the countries in the region, the threat is nearly as potent. Although Iran has not promised to wipe them off the map in a nuclear holocaust, post-revolution Iran has a long history of bloody warfare, military intervention, and terrorism in the Middle East. Just this week Iranian-backed Houthis launched armed drones into Saudi Arabia.

For the U.S., a nuclear-armed Iran threatens some of its interests, but not its survival. These threats include: increased instability in a decreasingly important region, increased terrorism, threats to deployed military assets, and threats to European allies.

The European powers appear ambivalent to the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons that would likely be able to strike their soil. They are happy to see sanctions removed and to resume trading with Iran and purchasing its oil. Finally, Russia and China would love to see the U.S. fail to achieve a much-heralded foreign policy objective.

Paths to stopping Iran

There are three main approaches to thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions: 1. deterrence, 2. military action, and 3. diplomacy. These paths complement each other. Military action makes deterrent threats more credible and diplomacy can make denuclearization more palatable. Coercive diplomacy is nothing new. Negotiating with someone while holding a gun to their head is still negotiating, it is just more likely to succeed.

The deterrence disconnect

Fully destroying Iran’s nuclear program is likely to be difficult and costly. Successful diplomacy requires deterrence because Iran’s strong preference is to get nuclear weapons. Deterrence has two components. The opponent must perceive a country or coalition as having both the necessary capabilities and resolve. Neither is sufficient on its own. The fundamental problem to deterring Iran is the absence of a unified entity with both. The U.S. has the capabilities. Israel and regional countries have the resolve. However, these players are currently incapable of conveying a unified purpose.

Israel has high resolve and moderate capabilities

Iran sees Israel as having abundant resolve, but limited capabilities and potency, while  Iran has a deterrent of its own. Israel would face difficulties refueling and penetrating Iran’s deep fortifications, and whether its attack succeeds or fails, it will likely face Hezbollah and perhaps also Hamas in a multi-front war with massive damage, casualties, and unabating rocket fire that can target the entire country, hit sensitive sites and overwhelm its Iron Dome missile-defense system.

The U.S. has warned Israel over military action as it negotiates with Iran. An Israeli strike could ruin its relationship with its most important partner. The U.S. might refuse to replenish Iron Dome. Israel failed to significantly reduce the rate of fire from Gaza in its most recent altercation. Israel expects thousands of rockets a day in a war with Hezbollah, many times more than Gazan terrorists were able to launch.

As is always the case with preemptive action, it is difficult to justify casualties today to prevent potentially greater casualties in the future. However, Israel has shown on several occasions that it is willing to strike to prevent future catastrophe, even against strong U.S. opposition.

Finally, if Iran thinks that its nuclear program can survive an Israeli strike, it is unlikely to be deterred. Iran also sees regional powers like the Saudis who can barely contend with the Houthis, as lacking the capability to threaten Iran’s nuclear program.

The U.S. has high capabilities and moderate resolve

Conversely, the U.S. has the capabilities portion of the equation, but perhaps not the resolve. The U.S. and Israel have discussed military options should all other initiatives fail. However, the Biden administration has shown reluctance to risk military altercation in the Middle East and its disorganized and rushed exit from Afghanistan does not lend credibility to threats against Iran.

Complete the deterrence equation for diplomacy to prevail

There are three ways to complete the deterrence equation. The first is to boost Israel’s capabilities. Some congressmen and analysts have suggested giving Israel refueling planes and “bunker buster” bombs. The second is to boost perceived U.S. resolve by moving military assets to the region and making public threats should Iran pass a specified red-line. The best way is to marry U.S. capabilities with Israel’s resolve through joint statements and war games – the  more official and public, the more credible. This is the best shot to boost deterrence and enhance diplomacy. However, unless the U.S. and Israel can close the policy gap, this is unlikely to succeed and Iran could stall its way to a bomb.

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Can Israel Defeat Iran’s Precision Guided Missile Threat?

By Yaakov Lappin

BRIG. GEN. ZVIKA HAIMOVICH (IDF, RET.)

BRIG. GEN. SHACHAR SHOHAT (IDF, RET.)

Hezbollah’s precision-guided missile (PGM) arsenal is Israel’s leading conventional security threat, surpassed only by Iran’s nuclear program.

While Hezbollah is not believed to have crossed Israel’s red line on this issue—a threshold that could trigger a preemptive attack on stockpiles of PGMs on Lebanese soil—it is continually taking steps towards it.

With Iran’s help, Hezbollah has recently explored ways to manufacture PGMs in Lebanon to avoid Israel’s effective grey zone campaign to disrupt the proliferation of advanced weapons from Iran to its regional proxies.

The ability to set up an indigenous PGM production capability in Lebanon—in which Hezbollah would merely receive components and independently assemble them, rather than rely on Iran for fully-built imports—represents a truly dangerous situation that Israel cannot tolerate in light of the instability that this scenario would cause.

“We have to go back in time and ask ourselves, how did we get to this stage?” says Brig. Gen. (ret.) Zvika Haimovich, former commander of the Air Defense Forces in the Israeli Air Force and a senior research fellow at the MirYam Institute.

Haimovich notes two processes that have led to the current situation. The first is a learning process by Iran and Hezbollah. Tehran and its proxy examined the estimated 20,000 projectiles fired at Israel—most of them by Hamas in Gaza—over the past fifteen years and found that only minimal damage was caused.

“Statistical (unguided) weapons had a big cognitive effect on the public but little practical effect,” says Haimovich. The second factor he notes is the revolution in standoff guided weapons technology. Whether rocket, missile, or drone, the latest technology enables these weapons to be fired from the ground, air, or sea to accurately strike targets, creating major damage, Haimovich says.

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shachar Shohat, former Air Defense Forces Commander in the Israeli Air Force, describes PGMs as “the air force of terror organizations.”

To illustrate the difference between the threat of guided and unguided projectiles, he states: “Until now, around 25% of statistical, unguided weapons fired at populated areas were on course to their targeted areas. The entry of precision-guided munitions changes these parameters.”

Given that Iron Dome has intercepted approximately one-quarter of all incoming rockets from Gaza and is programmed to shoot down only threats heading for built up areas, the accuracy level of unguided rocket barrages is fairly clear, Shohat says, adding that “This strike level for statistical rockets of around 25% hasn’t changed since the 2006 Second Lebanon War.”

In contrast, PGMs can not only ensure that areas of interest are hit but can fire projectiles at an accuracy of between five to ten meters from the target, representing a completely new level of precision strike capability.

“If a simple rocket with a 20-kilogram warhead lands 20 meters from a building, it causes heavy damage to it. When a 250-kilogram warhead rocket accurately hits a building, it will take it apart and topple it. A 250-kilogram warhead can destroy multiple buildings,” Shohat cautions.

“What was once the reserve of a trained air force with pilots—the ability to hit precise targets, like a power station or a research center, can now be done with PGMs,” says Shohat.  “If an adversary had to fire four munitions to hit one target, today one munition is enough.”

These conclusions became clear to Iran and Hezbollah, Haimovich says, and in the decade that followed the Second Lebanon War, the shift to PGMs became apparent.

“Hamas is also trying to get PGMs into its inventory,” Haimovich warns.

“In the end, it all comes from a single catalyst—Iran. The Iranians provide the knowledge and the technology. In the past, they went for the “easy” option of transferring the missiles pre-assembled. Then they understood that these smuggling runs are discovered easily by Israel, and that Israel’s intelligence community had become far too adept at recognizing missile convoys, cargo flights, or shipments,” he adds.

“So, in the past ten years, they started with the idea of transferring knowledge to local proxies,” continues Haimovich.

Israeli officials have in past years warned about “suitcases” containing guidance kits that can be placed on unguided rockets, turning them into guided rockets. The guidance kits, complete with navigation fins, can turn powerful yet unguided rockets into precision-guided missiles.

Iran and Hezbollah have made multiple efforts to get such GPS guidance kits into Lebanon. Israel has made it abundantly clear to its enemies that if its red line on this type of proliferation is crossed, action will follow.

The reason, Haimovich explains, is because even an ability to hit a small number of key strategic targets in a war will change the course of the conflict to Israel’s considerable detriment. And that means only a small number of PGMs are sufficient to pose an intolerable threat.

“If Hezbollah decides to only hit five strategic targets with a projectile that has a 10 square meter radius accuracy in one day, that’s enough to change the picture,” notes Haimovich. “This is a changing reality. As a state, we can’t tolerate the other side having accurate weapons in big scopes that can threaten strategic assets.”

Shohat states that even if Hezbollah gets hold of the Iranian guidance kits, “we will defeat them.” However, he says, “we do not want this ‘grass’ to grow and create problems. This is a good example of Israel drawing clear red lines and doing it seriously—not just at the rhetorical level.”

Although the Iran-Hezbollah axis is continuing its efforts to create a PGM arsenal, it is doing this “much less than it would want to,” says Shohat.

And in places like Syria, used as a conduit to smuggle the weapons, “each time something gets ‘lost’ on the way” to its destination, he adds. “Most importantly, this gives Israel a better opening position on the day that a war begins. This is cutting the grass. It doesn’t mean that the grass isn’t growing, but when the war starts, the grass will be as low as possible.”

Haimovich explains that Israel’s red lines are designed to prevent two intolerable threats from materializing. The first is allowing Hezbollah to possess large numbers of accurate weapons that can threaten strategic assets such as oil refineries and power stations. “Even if these sites recover from attacks within days, the cognitive effect will be major,” he warns.

The second is the ability of Hezbollah to disrupt the IDF’s own continuous functionality. “If Hezbollah strikes air force bases, and even if it only takes five to six hours to repair the runaways, that would create a very significant effect nevertheless,” he says. “Hence, we cannot accept a reality in which the other side can impact civilian and military continuous functions. Israel must do everything that it can to reduce these enemy capabilities.”

Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles are also part of the precision strike club, explains Haimovich, regardless of whether they carry five kilograms of explosives like a UAV, or 300 kilograms like a Scud B missile.

Hezbollah is not the only nearby threat possessing these capabilities. “Hamas also has a precision project,” he adds.

Expanding Air Defenses and Preparing Preemptive Options

With PGMs giving attackers a far higher chance of destroying a selected target, the obligation for more advanced air defenses is paramount, compared to previous levels of defenses, says Shohat.

“We need more interceptors. The ‘quarter principle,’ in which we only needed to shoot down around 25% of statistics projectiles, no longer holds against PGMs,” he says. “With PGMs, we need to be able to intercept everything.”

That, in turn, has economic consequences, Shohat adds. “While the cost of air defenses should be measured in terms of the damage and losses that they prevent, not just the cost of the interception itself, it is undeniable that air defenses against PGMs are more expensive than defenses against statistical weapons,” he says.

Haimovich explains the threat of accurate weaponry “obligates us to prepare differently. Systems must be able to examine threats selectively and focus on those that form strategic threats, while still also acting as area-based defenses to protect populated areas,” he says. “This calls for a robust concept, which integrates both specific site protection with regional defense—and mutual coordination between them.”

Another challenge for air defense systems posed by PGMs, notes Haimovich, is being able to recognize and distinguish PGMs from inaccurate projectiles in a crowded sky.

“Israel has highly advanced capabilities that enable a high-level performance. Still, this is a major challenge, to pick the right threats out of a barrage of rockets, to find the needle in the haystack,” he says.

Asked to discuss the option of a preemptive attack on PGM stockpiles, Haimovich says this would be a cabinet decision and that the topic constitutes a “legitimate decision on the table of the political echelon.”

He adds that questions about what would trigger such an attack remain open, pointing to potential thresholds such as the quantity of PGMs amassed by Hezbollah. In any case, Israel is “acting all of the time to delay the need to deal with this” in the form of its grey zone campaign in Syria to disrupt weapons smuggling.

“I think that every day that passes brings us closer to the stage where we will have to deal with this threat in one way or another,” he adds.

Multiple disclosures by senior Israeli officials of PGM production sites in Beirut are part of the “cognitive” struggle by Israel to expose the other side, reveal that its activities are visible, and create both an Israeli and global consensus against PGM force build-up, he explains.

Shohat agrees that the question of a preemptive strike is very difficult to answer. Like Haimovich, he points to Israel’s preemptive campaign in Syria as “putting us in a better opening position” for the next war, meaning that the PGM threat is “less severe than it would be otherwise.”

“While no campaign delivers 100% success, I believe there have been successes here, and there is no doubt that Israel reduced the threat, in relation to its potential, in a dramatic manner,” says Shohat.

The campaign is about how much the threat can be delayed and reduced, he says, before concluding: “It prevented a very bad picture from forming, which we otherwise would have had to face. To a certain extent, the preemptive campaign is an application of the lesson that the IDF learned between 2000 to 2006, when Hezbollah was allowed to build up a large arsenal without challenge.”

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Zvika Haimovich served as Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces from 2015-2018. He was Active Defense Wing Commander during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). Read full bio here.

Shachar Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Fractured but stable: Israel’s coalition ends the year intact and strong

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

When MK Shirly Pinto (Yamina), was forced to go to the Knesset with her six-day-old baby in mid-December to enable the coalition to pass a vote, it was a defining moment. It was truly a scene to behold. Pinto, a deaf social activist, was mobilized by the coalition because it feared the opposition would not withhold a vote from its ranks in her absence.  

The scene showed just how low relations between the coalition and opposition have stooped. The sides continuously threaten to refuse to offset votes when a Member of Knesset is absent. The entire Knesset has been consumed by this out-of-control feud, which has even seen a refusal to offset votes for hospitalized MKs or those in mourning.

To see Pinto’s arrival from the journalist’s stand in the Knesset was remarkable. Naturally, a desire to hug her was awakened.

On the other hand, when events are subjected to further analysis, what transpires is that there is more to the story than meets the eye. Firstly, Pinto did not have to make the journey to the Knesset, she chose to do so to avoid a defeat for the coalition. Additionally, her arrival boosted the coalition’s image significantly. Here is a politician who is prepared to come to the plenum with her young baby; here is solidarity among the coalition’s members.

In other words, the opposition’s refusal to offset votes ended up playing to the advantage of the coalition’s image.

Technically, the entire drama ended up being superfluous as MK Mansour Abbas, leader of the Ra’am (United Arab List) party, which is part of the coalition, ended up voting by accident with the opposition, sending it to defeat in any case.

The legislation being voted on has assumed a backseat in this battle. The real issue is the clash between coalition and opposition. Neither side is prepared to support any legislation put forward by the other.

The absurd result is that, seven months after the formation of the coalition, beyond feuding, there is no real agenda in place.

A recent exclusive interview that I published in Israel Hayom with Knesset Chairman Mickey Levy (Yesh Atid), summarized the past seven months, and Levy asserted that the opposition has fallen in love with its position, at the expense of any national interest.

Levy lamented how difficult it is to work in this manner, noting that the opposition refuses to be part of any Knesset Committees.

The opposition boycott of all Knesset committees puts the coalition in a very strong position as the opposition is thus unable to receive the committee appointments that it desired.

With such a boycott in place, the coalition has absolute power in these committees, which decide policy on matters such as how to combat the coronavirus pandemic. The opposition is, therefore, the only loser from this boycott

On the other hand, the coalition is feeling the weight of ongoing attempts by the opposition to subject it to a ‘war of attrition’ that sees it come under attack every time a coalition member heads to the podium to make a speech.

Levy, in his interview, said one of the most difficult aspects of his job was being called ‘a thug’ or ‘a floor cloth.’ Levy feels that the respect that was once afforded to the coalition by the opposition in the past has been run over crudely.

Despite the united front that the coalition attempts to portray, it suffers from many cracks.

One demonstration of such a fissure came from Public Security Minister Omer Bar-Lev who comes from a left-wing party, Meretz.  After posting on social media that he held a meeting in December with the United States Undersecretary of State Victoria Noland and that the topic of “settler violence” had been a key feature of their conversation, the coalition “exploded.”

The coalition’s right-wing parties had a meltdown. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett responded harshly, as did his partner, Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked (Yamina). The sense is that Bar-Lev’s tweet led to a watershed moment.

Ultimately, Bar-Lev’s timing was also very poor, coming as it did amid a wave of Palestinian terrorism, and lacking any sense of proportion.

Bennett and Shaked, who appear to have lost many of their core supporters by forming the current government, seemed to have spotted an opportunity to bring back some of the votes they may have lost. If so, Bar-Lev’s tweet served their agenda.

We have now come to the end of a year condensed with political action, including a fourth round of elections since 2019, the swearing-in of a new Knesset, the swearing-in of a government, and the passing of a budget in November - which was perhaps the most difficult test of all for the new government.

The coalition, while managing the pandemic throughout, is surviving. No matter how many internal divides it suffers from, and how much the opposition aggrieves it, there is no denying that this government has proven its ability to survive in a fairly impressive manner.

Still, the glue holding this coalition together is the threat of a return to power by the leader of the opposition, Benjamin Netanyahu. So long as he continues to cast his shadow over the coalition, its motivation to remain together and survive remains very high.

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a journalist and reporter on political matters, as well as an editor for the Israel Hayom/Israel Todaynewspaper, the most widely circulated publication in Israel. Read full bio here.

Converging interests: The Israeli-Jordanian-Emirati infrastructure deal

By Tomer Barak

Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates signed two Memoranda of Understanding for economic projects on November 22, and while it is still unclear when and how they will be implemented, the agreements send a bright signal regarding a new era in regional cooperation.

The first agreement includes the construction of a solar power plant and storage facility in Jordan that will produce up to 600 megawatts per year of green electricity that will be sold to Israel and incorporated into its power grid.

The second agreement deals with the setting up of a desalination plant on the Israeli coastline, with the potable water it generates exported to Jordan at a scope of 200 million cubes per year - on top of the existing water deals in place between the two countries, which recently were expanded due to growing Jordanian needs.

Companies from the United Arab Emirates will be involved in building the projects, according to the agreements, which are only at the MOU stage thus far. In the coming year, the final details are scheduled to be finalized, as well concrete feasibility checks prior to implementation. The American special presidential envoy for climate, John Kerry, was involved in securing the two agreements.

Three processes came together to create the new agreements: The Abraham Accords, the thawing of Israeli-Jordanian relations in the past six months, which included visits by senior officials, and the growing engagement with the climate crisis along with Jordan’s growing water crisis.

For Jordan, the current and past water agreements provide solutions for what is an existential need. Jordan today suffers from a water shortage of 500 million cubic meters per year. The annual per capita water availability in Jordan is under 80 cubic meters, much lower than the global water poverty line, which stands at 500 cubic meters.

If this was not bad enough, the trend is going from bad to worse by the year. Current reserves, particularly the Disi Reserve on the Saudi border, will thin out in the coming years, and demographic growth coupled with accelerated dehydration linked to climate change will intensify Jordan’s water stress, leaving Jordanian soil parched, its agriculture in a state of collapse, and its residents thirsty. The amount of water to be provided under the terms of the MOU will not solve these problems but will certainly help Jordan improve its situation.

Alongside this essential need, the ability to attract foreign investments is a priority for King Abdullah. Environmental initiatives are a lucrative new means to attract funds for investment in the Jordanian economy. To that end, multinational-regional projects are a concept that western countries and international funds are willing to invest in.

For Israel, the agreement, if implemented, might help to achieve a governmental goal of boosting  renewable energy production (the target is 30% by 2030). In addition, there is the obvious strategic benefit that comes from strengthening Jordan’s durability and stability, and the peace between the two countries, which is highly significant for Israel’s security, and for strengthening cooperation with the UAE in the context of the Abraham Accords.

The picture is not totally rosy

The MOUs will face some challenges.

First and foremost, as with previous public agreements with Israel, there has been pushback from the Jordanian public and from parliament, both of which are characterized by strong anti-Israeli sentiments.

From the moment that news of the MOU signings surfaced, demonstrations broke out against the agreements. After Friday prayers following news of the agreements, demonstrators took to the streets of Amman under the leadership of youths affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and some Jordanian tribal leaders. As in previous Israeli-oriented protests, there were voices calling for dissolution of the peace accords, although these were only on the margins of the protest. In line with Jordanian political tradition, accusatory public fingers were pointed at the government and at normalization steps with Israel, but not against King Abdullah himself.

At the same time, the Jordanian Parliament, with whom the government didn’t consult prior to the signing of the MOUs, held a meeting on the subject, in which several MPs attacked government normalization steps with Israel, and even called for a vote of no confidence.

In order to enable the agreement, the Jordanian prime minister was sent in to reduce opposition and ‘usher’ in the agreements,  and, at the same time, initiated dialogue with the tribes.

A month into the signing, it seems that protests have  calmed down, but previous cases demonstrate that it is just a matter of time before the opposition will pick up on an issue as a means to once again attack the government.

Unfortunately, there will be ample opportunities for renewed protests during the coming year, when the sides will need to formulate the details of the agreements, and afterwards, while construction  of infrastructure for the projects is ongoing. King Abdullah and his government will have to continue to market the agreement as vital, and to employ tools to calm protests. One of those tools will need to be outside support, in the form of American and Emirati assistance, as well as keeping relations with Israel relatively free of crises over regional and Palestinian matters. 

There are ample potential challenges to this new cooperation. According to media reports, the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, who is already in complex relations with King Abdullah (after alleged Saudi involvement in Jordanian royal family feuds), was angered by the MOUs, which left him ‘outside of the picture,’ including in terms of relations with the U.S.

The Palestinian Authority was not part of the agreement despite being at the center of the Israeli-Jordanian-Emirati triangle.

Technical, financial, and environmental issues could also emerge along the way that could complicate implementation of the projects.  

In summary, if this process goes ahead successfully, it could pave the path for additional Middle Eastern multilateral agreements in the sectors of energy, infrastructure, climate, health, and other issues. It is of great importance that policymakers around the Middle East and in the U.S. be creative and enterprising, while displaying goodwill and adequate resources to shape and implement a needed regional integration and cooperation, which will benefit countries struggling with common challenges ranging from Iran to the climate crisis.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

This is what would happen if Israel strikes Iran

By Chuck Freilich

As the prospects for a renewed nuclear deal with Iran fade, at least for now, the international and Israeli media have been replete with reports of Israel’s inability to destroy the Iranian nuclear program and ostensible lack of a military option. Various experts, including former and current Israeli officials, have all opined.

By framing the issue as the ability or inability to achieve a "knockout blow," one that puts an end to Iran's nuclear program, these reports miss the point. That would probably not be Israel's objective.

Up until around 2010, probably earlier, this might have still been possible, but Iran now has the necessary knowledge to reconstitute the program after an attack and even the U.S. can no longer simply put an end to it by military means. A successful attack could aspire today, at most, to achieve a significant delay, and even that is probably something that only the U.S. could do.

Given its more modest capabilities, Israel’s national security strategy has always focused on a combination of deterrence and limited military victories designed to play for time, in the hope that the problem of the hour would somehow resolve itself in the future. This strategy proved successful in the conventional wars against the Arab states in the early decades, and is still being put to the test in the repeated rounds of asymmetric warfare with Hezbollah and Hamas, in the more recent ones.

Rather than a long-term postponement of Iran’s nuclear program, an Israeli attack would likely have more limited ambitions. The objective would not be, as some have speculated, to draw the U.S. into a military conflict, but to gain additional time and to create a situation in which the international community, led by the U.S., would be constrained to finally take decisive diplomatic and economic measures, especially given the possibility of further Israeli action. For that, Israel's limited capabilities are more than sufficient.

Western media reports typically conclude, with little if any analytical substantiation, that an Israeli attack would lead to a regional conflagration. That is certainly a possibility that planners must take into account, but it is also a classic case of the worst possible scenario being portrayed as the most likely one.

Most Western journalists today lack familiarity with military thinking and recoil from it instinctually, without the expertise necessary to analyze the ramifications of an application of force in a given situation. This is not to commend military action as the preferred option – it is not – but analyses such as these must be based on expertise in military affairs and deep familiarity with the specific country and situation in question.

In practice, decades of experience with Iran suggest that its response would probably be much more narrowly focused than these reports suggest. To be sure, Iran would have to respond, but there is every reason to believe that the response would be directed primarily against Israel, via a massive Hezbollah attack.

This is precisely the scenario for which Iran built Hezbollah’s mammoth arsenal of some 150,000 rockets, numerous UAVs (drones) and other advanced capabilities. Israel’s home front will face a level of destruction such as it has never experienced before and Israel may even find itself in a multi-front war, not only against Hezbollah, but Iran itself, Iranian-affiliated forces in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, Hamas and more.

There is no denying that Iran may also launch limited attacks against American allies in the region (e.g. the Saudis) and even against some American-affiliated targets, whether U.S. forces in the region, or a U.S. embassy or McDonald’s somewhere in the world, if only to make it look good. Iran, too, has a self-image to maintain and domestic opinion to assuage.

abroad, especially since Iran would claim to be conducting what many would consider a justified response to Israeli "aggression."

Seven Israeli premiers (Rabin, Peres, Barak, Sharon, Olmert, Netanyahu and Bennett) have dreamed of an American military strike that would put an end to Iran’s nuclear program. Five American presidents (Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden), Democrat and Republican alike, have refrained from doing so. Any realistic assessment today must conclude that this might change only in extraordinary and highly unlikely circumstances.

In reality, only a diplomatic agreement, even a flawed one, holds out the possibility of a long-term postponement of Iran’s nuclear program.

If and when the moment of truth comes, when all other options have been exhausted, Israel will likely find itself facing Iran alone. We have been there before: Facing the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear programs, among other critical occasions.

At that time, Israel will have no alternative but to launch a strike and let the pieces fall where they may. That is what the IDF is preparing for today. Bad as this option may be, allowing Iran to go nuclear would be intolerable.

Those who are totally averse to any risk of retaliation should, indeed, oppose military action. They should also prepare to live in a world in which Iran and other rogue states are essentially free to acquire nuclear weapons.

There is, however, little reason to believe that things will go beyond this limited escalation. In a situation in which Iran is already embroiled in a nearly all-out conflict with Israel and in which the latter is likely to strike regime and other strategic targets in Iran itself, logic and experience strongly suggest that Iran would want to put a lid on things.

Indeed, a true military confrontation with the U.S. would appear to be the last thing that Iran would want. Iran may be homicidal, but it is not suicidal, and it is painfully aware of the true balance of power.

A conflict limited primarily to Israel would be far more suited to Iran's size, capabilities and generally cautious temperament. It would also play better both at home, to Iran’s domestic audience, and

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

West Bank terror is a reminder of Gaza’s ‘deceptive calm’

By David Hacham

After arresting four terror suspects on suspicion of carrying out the deadly attack near Homesh, in which Israeli civilian Yehuda Dimentman, 25, was murdered, Israel Defense Forces spokesman Ran Kochav said on Sunday that the attack was likely orchestrated from the Gaza Strip.

It has since transpired that the terror cell belonged to Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, a former Arab-affairs adviser to seven Israeli defense ministers and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, told JNS such incidents are the latest reminder of just how deceptively calm the Gaza Strip really is.

While Hamas and PIJ maintains calm in Gaza, it works around the clock to set the West Bank and Jerusalem alight with violence and terrorism.

“The calm in Gaza does not come from a dramatic change in Hamas’s fundamental stance or ideology towards Israel, but rather, from a sober assessment by Hamas, based on the needs of the hour and a need to create economic assistance for Gaza,” he stated.

“What stands out is Hamas’s double game. In Gaza, Hamas safeguards quiet and continues indirect talks with Israel on a larger arrangement for the Strip. Hamas is also negotiating for a swap deal in which Israel would release many security prisoners and receive in exchange the bodies of two IDF personnel killed in action, and two civilians being held captive. At the same time, Hamas and PIJ are working to escalate the situation in the West Bank and Jerusalem,” said Hacham.

These attempts include both directly orchestrating large-scale terror cells and glorifying the recent series of knife and gun attacks on Israeli civilians. “Hamas hugs the terrorists and hands out candy when they attack. They often rush to take credit for attacks,” he said.

The ability of security forces to kill or capture terrorists soon after the attack helps douse the flames of motivation to carry out further attacks, said Hacham, but only up to a certain point.

“Hamas is operating this double game because it is less deterred by Israel than before. It allows itself to play this game because it feels it has more room for maneuver,” said Hacham. “The resulting situation is highly unusual. Israel keeps opening up more resources for Gaza and assists the Gaza economy, receiving quiet from Gaza. At the same time, Hamas and PIJ keep exploiting the situation to ignite the West Bank and Jerusalem.”

Hacham called on Israel to reject this situation and to send a message to the Hamas leadership in Gaza, “telling them that they are playing with fire, and that over time, Israel will lose its patience or that its future steps will be different.”

A recent visit by Foreign Minister Yair Lapid to Egypt may have been used by Israel to send just such a message. Egypt, for its part, is continuing is mediating role between Israel and Hamas in order to enable a prisoner swap deal and the wider Gazan arrangement. To that end, a delegation of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate arrived in Gaza on Sunday in order to promote these efforts.

Egypt’s efforts are occurring against the background of an IDF exercise in southern Israel, simulating escalation scenarios with Hamas in Gaza. Hamas, for its part, is planning a parallel exercise in its own territory. Both sides are applying operational lessons learned during the May conflict between Hamas and Israel in their war exercises.

Egypt has pledged $500 million for Gaza, but this money has yet to be transferred, creating tensions with Hamas.

Rebuilding the military wing

Since the end of the May conflict between Israel and Hamas, the terror organization has spent months rebuilding its armed wing in Gaza, consolidating the movement’s position while building terror infrastructure in the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem.

This has seen large-scale rocket building, said Hacham, since the May conflict showed Hamas that it can use rocket launches to consolidate its position as “guardian” of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, and to beef up its position in Lebanon and other areas.

Hacham named Salah Al-Arouri, the deputy Hamas political bureau chief and the head of a headquarters dedicated to launching terrorism from the West Bank, as a central figure, saying “he works from Lebanon and from Turkey to oversee West Bank terror.”

“Hamas works according to a planned out assessment, but sometimes it stretches the rope too far, and this can lead to uncontrolled escalations,” he cautioned.

On Dec. 14, Hamas marked the 34th year since its founding. This year the commemoration was held against the background of an escalating security situation in eastern Jerusalem and the West Bank, said Hacham.

Still, the ongoing security coordination in place between the IDF and Shin Bet intelligence agency on the one hand, and the Palestinian Authority security forces on the other continues to help prevent attacks from going ahead, he said.

“The P.A. also has an interest in restricting the steps of Hamas in the West Bank and stopping it from lifting its head. When two Israeli youths entered Ramallah [on Dec. 1], it was P.A. forces that saved them and stopped a lynching from happening. Had this not have occurred, the incident could have turned out to be extremely significant,” said Hacham.

Aid from Egypt and Qatar

Meanwhile, the Hamas armed infrastructure taken apart by the Shin Bet in October represents a major attempt by the terror faction to regain its foothold in the West Bank, he cautioned.

Ultimately, Hacham said, Hamas has not and will not budge by a millimeter from its religious ideology to launch an “uncompromising fight against Israel until its destruction.”

To that end, Hamas is also maneuvering in such a way that it can exploit the post-May conflict time frame to rebuild Gaza. Israel, which has an interest in keeping Gaza quiet, has opened up the Kerem Shalom goods crossing and allowing thousands of trucks per day to inject basic supplies into Gaza.

Egypt is sending industrial construction equipment and building vehicles through the Rafah border crossing, and Qatar is sending Hamas $350 million per year.

To help pay Hamas’s estimated 30,000-strong civilian regime employees, Qatar has begun paying $10 million to Egypt to purchase fuel, and Hamas receives it free of charge, selling it to the Gaza power station.

Qatar sends $10 million per month through banks to 100,000 needy Gazan families under U.N. supervision and sends another $10 million to Gaza’s power plant directly.

This arrangement enables Gaza to “keep its head above water,” said Hacham. It allows Qatar to market itself as a supporter of Hamas, Palestinians and the Muslim Brotherhood. “Qatar wants a place under the sun, to have influence,” he explained.

Despite all of the above, Hamas is still threatening a new escalation if its demands for the gradual lifting of the “blockade” are not met. This means more Gazan workers allowed into Israel, the entry of more goods into Gaza, promoting the reconstruction of Gaza after “Operation Guardian of the Walls” in May and progress on the prisoner-swap deal.

Since August, “like magic,” all arson balloons, shooting attacks and other security incidents from Gaza have stopped, said Hacham, “once again illustrating Hamas’s exclusive control of the situation in the Strip and over other armed factions. Hamas decides whether there will be quiet or not, and if not, the scope of violence.”

By definition, Hacham warned, this situation is temporary, and Israel should avoid any delusions that this can go on for years.

“It can reverse itself immediately because of tactical, unplanned incidents or because of a decision to initiate conflict by Hamas,” said Hacham. “Israel cannot rest on its laurels. The IDF has to monitor the situation closely all of the time and prepare for every scenario.”

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Israelis are not Americans

By Justin Pozmanter

When I moved to Israel four years ago, I assumed I would have fewer conversations about the President of the United States. I couldn’t have been more wrong. I almost never initiate the conversations, and they are almost always with Americans who have an unfavorable view of President Trump. The discussions generally start with a question along the lines of, “How can Israelis like Trump? Don’t they see he’s such a ____?” The questions are certainly normal, but their premise ignores a critical fact – Israelis are not Americans. Trying to understand Israeli views of the President, any President, by applying an American standard just doesn’t work.

Recently, inflammatory statements made by former President Trump in an interview with Israeli journalist Barak Ravid have made headlines. The statements have triggered the same questions, but really, they reinforce the basic fact that it is folly to try and connect Israeli views on a President to party, personality, or even their general competence as President. It is all about what they do in relation to Israel.

When it comes to a foreign leader, Israelis care first and foremost, if not exclusively, about how that leader’s policies impact Israel, and whether their actions and words demonstrate that they have Israel’s best interests at heart. Even more so, when the leader in question has more impact on Israel than any political leader other than the Israeli Prime Minister.

Most of what inspires or embarrasses Americans about a President’s conduct doesn’t have the same impact on Israelis, or the citizens of any other country, to the extent they are even aware of the issues. It can be dizzying for an American to try and follow the minute-by-minute outrages on broadcast, cable, and social media. To expect an Israeli to follow it all is completely unrealistic. While this should not come as a great shock, sometimes it still does.

Were an American to ask the average Israeli whether they like Obamacare, or if they think the debt ceiling should be raised, they would be as likely to get a comprehensive answer as if the Israeli asked them which Health Maintenance Organization they prefer, or whether they think buses should run on Saturdays. It isn’t that Israelis don’t care about the real human impact of immigration, health care or social policy in the United States; it is that they, like all people, are generally immersed in their own lives and the issues facing their family, community, and country. It is unfair to expect more.

This is not a blanket statement that covers all Israelis. For instance, it doesn’t apply to most American immigrants, people who have spent years working or studying in the United States, or those seriously engaged in foreign affairs. For each of these relatively small groups there is a reasonable expectation that they will have a greater interest and knowledge of internal American issues and politics. The fact that these are also the groups within Israeli society most likely to be in regular contact with American family, friends and colleagues only reinforces the false premise that most Israelis are immersed in American political discourse.

However, most Israelis, like the citizens of every country, really don’t follow the domestic minutiae of any other country. While many Israelis have an impressive command of English, most do not follow American news in detail. Current events in the United States do elicit more interest in Israel than events from just about any other country, but the debates that consume Americans still don’t register at nearly the same level.

Therefore, when asked if they approve or disapprove of the President in an opinion poll, Israelis don’t see the question the same way an American would see Presidential approval. They see it through an Israeli-specific lens. Most Israelis believe Jerusalem is the capital of the country, that the Golan Heights must remain part of Israel forever, that the JCPOA was a terrible deal and that normalization with Arab states is a very positive step. On each of those issues, most Israelis saw President Trump’s policies as more supportive than President Obama’s policies. That doesn’t necessarily mean they think President Trump was a better President, or that they would be more likely to agree with him on any other policy, if they were American citizens. It simply means they believe he was more supportive on the issues he dealt with that they directly care about.

This is not a phenomenon that will change. And it is not tied to American partisan politics. Israelis care if someone is a Likudnik or Laborite, they don’t care if someone is a Democrat or Republican. Bill Clinton was popular in Israel because Israelis felt he genuinely cared about their welfare, not because he was a Democrat. His utterance of a single Hebrew phrase at Yitzhak Rabin’s funeral, and the emotion he showed, meant more to most Israelis than his personal scandals or stewardship of a strong economy. Donald Trump was popular in Israel because Israelis believed his policies advanced Israel’s national interests, and therefore their welfare and that of their families. His partisan identification, and his controversial statements and actions were far less relevant.

To be clear, this is about Israeli citizens, not the Israeli government. The United States is unquestionably Israel’s most important ally, and any Israeli official engaged in foreign policy should be familiar with American partisan politics and domestic priorities.

But when it comes to the average Israeli doctor, business owner, cab driver, engineer or teacher, their opinion will be based on Israel and Israel alone. Just like anyone else, their opinions will vary based on their political leanings and personal experiences. But they won’t like or dislike a US President because of what they do domestically. They will form their opinion based on whether the President’s policies meet their view of what is best for Israel. 

Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

The Messenger Matters

By Mark Goldfeder

Last Wednesday, the House passed the Combating International Islamophobia Act, which would create an office within the State Department to monitor and report on violence, harassment, and abuse against Muslim people, schools, and religious centers.

A number of Republican lawmakers opposed the bill, worried that it might distract from, or even hinder, the fight against antisemitism. In theory, this should not be an issue. Islamophobia is dangerous and intolerable, religious freedom is a fundamental value, and we can and should monitor the spread of both diseases. As Rep. Scott Perry noted during the floor debate, we all agree that no one should be persecuted for his or her faith. But Republicans are not wrong to worry about specific ways that this new position might be abused given the sponsor of the bill, and if Democrats are surprised by this reaction, they have only themselves to blame.

The act was drafted by Rep. Ilhan Omar, a hatemonger who works to mainstream antisemitism. To date, she has avoided any real censure from the leaders of her party, who seem content to let her get away with it. As it relates to this bill, Omar has a personal history of making vile antisemitic comments and then victim-blaming her Jewish critics with false accusations of Islamophobia. This is true even when those critics are her own Democratic colleagues.

Perry was lambasted for claiming that Omar associates herself with terrorist organizations. He was not entirely wrong though, and context definitely matters. Omar is closely associated with the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the organization Perry referenced. She has keynoted its fundraisers and just this year was honored as its “American Muslim Public Servant of 2021.” CAIR has a long and problematic history of affiliation with Hamas, which the United States has designated a terrorist organization, as well as Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood. CAIR was designated a terror organization in its own right by the United Arab Emirates, and as Perry pointed out in his comments, it was also an unindicted co-conspirator in the largest terrorist financing case in U.S. history.

Zahra Billoo, a senior executive at CAIR, recently gave a public address in which she smeared Jewish Zionist organizations and synagogues as “enemies” that are part of a “conspiracy” behind Islamophobia. She specifically called out organizations that want to have a good relationship with the Muslim community, rallying hard against the idea of cooperation and interfaith understanding. She also, quite insanely, blamed everything from issues at the border to police brutality on Jews and the Jewish state. CAIR pulled a page out of its honoree Omar’s playbook by predictably refusing to apologize, calling the outraged response to Billoo’s antisemitic comments a “smear campaign.” A few years earlier, when Billoo was voted off the board of the Women’s March for antisemitic tweets, she likewise responded by labeling anyone who opposed her “Islamophobic.”

In 2019, after Omar sparked outrage by first claiming that her colleagues who support Israel only do so for money, then accusing them of dual loyalty, two classic antisemitic tropes, Billoo breathlessly praised her friend for "broadening the conversation" about ways that people can criticize the Jewish state. Billoo and Omar’s CAIR relationship goes back several years, and just last month, they once again shared a stage at a CAIR event .

To be clear, Islamophobia is always wrong, no matter who it is directed against. But it is not, as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has described it, an attack on Omar’s faith for a member of Congress to point out that she is associated with CAIR — the same way Omar insisted it was not antisemitic when she called a Jewish member of the Trump Organization a “white nationalist.” More importantly, it is not irrelevant to a debate about monitoring Islamophobia, when both Omar and CAIR, an enthusiastic endorser of the bill, have been known to weaponize false charges of Islamophobia as a sword and a shield against their “enemies” — and specifically to further antisemitic hate. Perry’s comments were made after Democrats called him “Islamophobic” for offering amendments that would prevent U.S. tax dollars from going to organizations with ties to terrorism. In that context, and given the author of the bill, his concerns are not unfounded.

Monitoring Islamophobia is important, but Republicans are right to be wary of Omar’s involvement and worried about any influence she might have on how the “monitoring” gets done. No one wants to hear a lecture about the evils of racism from an unrepentant racist. In her speech in support of the bill, Omar derided “cynics who would rather see us divided” instead of “standing united against all forms of bigotry.” If only she and her friends at CAIR really meant those things, perhaps this bill might have bipartisan support as it moves to the Senate.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

How Israeli Police Counters Lone Wolf Attacks Despite Intel Shortfalls

By Alon Levavi

The recent escalation in terrorist incidents in Israel has shed light on the critical role of the overstretched Israel Police and Border Police.

The number of terrorist attacks in Israel has been on the up since the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza in May. Many of the attacks have occurred in Jerusalem, and this is no coincidence, due to the centrality of the city in fanatical Islamist rhetoric – rhetoric that is at odds with traditional Islam.

Armed with knives or firearms, many of the terrorists perpetrating the latest attacks have pounced on their victims in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah Region, as well as the Damascus Gate area of the Old City.

The dynamics of this latest trend are not complicated. Intense online incitement falls on attentive ears, and some of the audience, often in mental and sometimes economic distress, decide to act.

They have been promised 72 virgins in paradise if they become martyrs, and they decide on their own to stab or shoot civilians.

Instead of an organized system of terror cells being activated, individuals get up in the morning and say to themselves that the time has come to kill Jews. They use the simplest of weapons – and due to these factors, preventing their actions becomes very complicated for security forces.

Still, most of these incidents end with the attackers neutralized in little time, with civilians injured in some cases, and killed in others. The speed of the reaction of security forces means civilian deaths and injuries are minimized.

When intelligence is lacking, readiness, alertness, and rapid response abilities are what is left to deal with terrorists.

Police saturate known hot-spots, such as the Old City and Sheikh Jarrah with forces, and as a result, those forces are not available for crime-fighting and other missions elsewhere.

The officers’ determination to bravely engage terrorists saves lives. They must operate under difficult, crowded conditions, where civilians could easily be hit.

On Dec. 4, Border Police officers engaged a terrorist armed with a knife, who had stabbed an Israeli civilian, shooting him before he was able to carry out his murderous intentions. A public storm has since raged over that incident, as the two officers involved were immediately called in for questioning by the Justice Ministry’s Police Investigations Division, and their weapons confiscated. Ultimately, the right decision prevailed, and the investigation ended quickly without any rebuke of the officers. The Police Investigations Division will need to rethink its protocol for cases in which police acted heroically to save lives, and its decision to confiscate weapons automatically was fully unnecessary.

The officers should have been given a little time to process the incident, to meet with commanders, and if necessary, to receive psychological care, after just having prevented a terror attack.

The backing that they received from police command and the government was fully appropriate in this case.

The Israel Police’s unique and difficult mission

The Israel Police, and the Border Police, which is a part of it, face challenges unlike those faced by their counterparts in many other countries.

In the State of Israel, the police have officially been responsible for domestic security and counterterrorism since 1974, in addition to classic policing missions, from crime-fighting to traffic enforcement.

There are no other police forces in the world that within a period of just one month neutralized six terror attacks on the streets. This demands resources and attention that takes away from other sectors, such as personnel availability and training.

The Border Police is at the forefront of this mission. While the regular blue police also play a role, each police district has Border Police companies operating with it, and these units have a semi-military orientation.  

The green Border Police include both conscripts and career officers, and it is subject to the commands of police district chiefs under whom they operate.

Thus, the Border Police can receive specialized missions, such as controlling riots, tracking down Palestinians who have entered the country illegally, or protecting farmland from theft.

These units can go from one district to another, and this is in fact what they are forced to do because the police force suffers from chronic personnel shortages. When police send thousands of reinforcements to the Jerusalem District, the Tel Aviv District is left exposed.

One question that has arisen over the years is whether this modus operandi is the right one. Instead of splitting up thousands of Border Police personnel, perhaps focusing them en masse on a single mission would lead to its rapid completion. For example, sending thousands of Border Police to take on illegal marijuana farms run by Bedouin in the Negev region could stamp out the issue in a single swoop.

Aside from such specialized missions, the Border Police could also be assigned to the role of being uniquely responsible for emergencies, freeing up the Israel Police for its classic missions. This would follow the model of the National Guard in the United States, or the Gendarmerie in Italy – a military force with law enforcement powers.

In the West Bank, the Border Police play a critical role in riot control as it is better trained than the IDF to deal with such incidents. The military’s focus is on defeating enemies with firepower, and not on breaking up rioting in the streets. 

Israel is in a tough neighborhood, surrounded by Hezbollah, Syria, Hamas in Gaza, ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula, and threatened by Iran to the east. The Iranian axis’s threat to the Israeli home front is considerable, and it is on the home front and not along the country’s borders that the next war will be fought.

This means that the Israel Police and the IDF Home Front Command are at the forefront of dealing with this threat.

With this being the situation, Israel’s national resilience – and not only its national security – becomes paramount. Israel’s ability to win the next war will not just depend on buying more F-35s and missiles, but also on investing more in the police, in firefighters, hospitals, the ability of authorities to communicate effectively with the public, and the entire collective resilience system.

The role of the police, the Home Front Command, the National Security Council, the National Emergency Authority, and others must be clearly defined now so that when the emergency arrives, the nation’s resilience will be optimal.

As part of that new clarity, the place of the Israel Police in the national agenda must be strengthened and enlarged significantly, including through greater allocation of resources, as part of a new balance between defending the nation’s borders and building up internal resilience.

N.B. Just before publication, we received news about a murderous shooting attack in the northern West Bank, in which Palestinian terrorists shot dead Israeli citizen Yehuda Dimentman and wounded two others. The incident makes clear that what begins with a wave of lone attacks does not end with sporadic incidents, and that Hamas's incitement to hate, together with the 'inspiration effect,' continues to nourish terrorists. 

The resilience of a country is based on the resilience of the individual, the society, the community, and the local authority. The ability of a country to continue onwards is based on its resilience and not only on its tactical capability.  

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Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Stop saving UNRWA from itself

By Mark Goldfeder

On Tuesday the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the UN group which is (theoretically) responsible for handling the welfare of Palestinian refugees, announced that the organization is facing a financial crisis and is “on the brink of collapse.” The statement came on the heels of an international fundraising conference that failed to come anywhere close to its goal of covering UNRWA’s annual shortfall, and a day after Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini appeared before the agency’s Advisory Commission expressing shock and indignation at the fact that he had to “beg” for money to meet his bloated budget.

Lazzarini should not be so surprised that the world is reluctant to continue bailing out his ever-sinking ship. It is high time that countries stop using periodic financial interventions to gloss over the very valid reasons why the organization is failing in the first place. For the sake of the Palestinian people that it was originally intended to serve, UNRWA deserves to be put out of its misery.

The original idea behind UNRWA was sound. It was founded in 1949 for “the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees” from the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War. From the beginning, the agency defined Palestinian refugees as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period of June 1, 1946 to May 15, 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” But in 1965, UNRWA unilaterally changed the eligibility requirements to include third-generation descendants. It did so again in 1982, this time redefining “refugees” to include all descendants of Palestine refugee males, regardless of whether they had been granted citizenship elsewhere.

UNRWA’s current definition is utterly inconsistent with how all other refugees are classified, including by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the agency responsible for every other (non-Palestinian) refugee on the planet. For example, under Article I(c)(3) of the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, a person is no longer a refugee if he or she has “acquired a new nationality.” UNRWA’s definition, which is not anchored in treaty but was invented by the organization itself, contains no similar provision. According to one expert, 99% of UNRWA’s 5.7 million “refugees” are not actually refugees at all under the standard definition of that term, while others put that number even higher.

And the differences in agencies are not just definitional. Since its inception, UNHCR has managed to resettle tens of millions of people globally, while UNRWA has resettled – no one. In fact, (using their own numbers) the problem of Palestinian refugees has grown exponentially worse on UNRWA’s watch, despite the fact that they spend roughly four times the amount per refugee that UNHCR does, with over 30,000 personnel (nearly double UNHCR) and a $1.4 billion budget that is almost four times UNHCR’s. Of course those numbers are less surprising when you consider the serious abuses of power, including sexual misconduct, nepotism, bullying and retaliation, that its leadership have been accused of.

UNRWA claims to advocate for a just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but in practice the agency has overlooked terrorist group activity in some of its camps, allowed its schools to be used as human shields for Hamas military tunnels, allowed members of Hamas and other terrorist groups to hold UNRWA staff positions, falsely presented images that stir up hatred against Israel and continues to teach children to demonize and delegitimize Israel using violent propaganda. In short, UNRWA spends more to do less, while perpetuating a problem it was meant to resolve and undermining the peace process itself. That is why some countries, like Germany and the UK, have cut their funding in the first place.

The UN is often, and deservedly, criticized for singling out the State of Israel. But if the nations of the world want to actually help solve the Middle East conflict, they need to stop singling out the Palestinians as well.

Perhaps the UN should support the resettlement of Palestinian refugees – but they should do so only within a framework that would: a) not falsely blame the situation entirely on Israel, and b) involve even trying to accomplish the goal of resettling actual refugees from the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948, using the internationally recognized definition of refugees that applies in every other instance. Doing so is far from impossible. As an example of how this might realistically look, take the 2000 Clinton Peace Parameters in which Israel agreed to allow 100,000 refugees to return – more than three times the estimated number of actual refugees under the definition, but still a reasonable amount. All other “refugees” were to be resettled in their present places of residence, the future Palestinian state, or in third-party countries, with Israel contributing $30b. to fund their resettlement.

In the meantime, it’s not surprising that it’s becoming more difficult to raise money for a corrupt agency whose culture the Palestinians themselves consider “highly problematic” and full of “entitlement and abuse.” A policy of support without accountability for an organization that has long done nothing but disservice to the very population it was meant to protect helps exactly the same amount of people that UNRWA itself does – no one.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Down on his luck at home, Erdogan shows his claws, again

By Tomer Barak

In recent months, Turkey`s foreign policy has swung wildly between threats to its neighbors, to outreach to rivals, including a willingness to receive a warm embrace from the UAE.

Don’t let this apparent incoherence fool you: Both policies derive from the same acute domestic challenges faced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who is concerned about the stability of his regime.

First and foremost, Turkey’s economic crisis seems to be getting worse from month to month: The Turkish Lira slumped 40% against the dollar in November, and some observers believe the currency could drop even further.

In Erdogan’s propaganda world, this devastating economic development derives from foreign intervention that is ‘undermining his regime.’ But this crisis in reality stems from Erdogan’s economic policy of growth at any price, and his ensuant demand to lower the Turkish Central Bank’s interest rate. This has occurred alongside substantial government interventions in decisions by the Bank, and an erosion of the Bank’s independence, leading to a decrease in the willingness of many international actors to invest in the country. All of this, two years into the pandemic crisis, which itself resulted in severe economic fallout in Turkey.

One surprising outcome of this crisis has been the renewal of ties between Turkey and the UAE, who have been regional rivals in recent years.

The UAE’s de facto ruler, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed, paid a visit to Turkey and pledged to establish a $10 billion fund for strategic investments in the country. What price Turkey will be required to pay for this generosity is not yet clear, but time will tell what Erdogan pledged in return with regard to regional policies.

Whether this injection of funds will help kickstart the Turkish economy is another question, with the country facing so many economic challenges.

Elsewhere, Turkey is still struggling to flatten the coronavirus curve, even before the outbreak of the new Omicron variant. The Government`s vaccine campaign is based on China’s Sinovac vaccine, but this campaign is faltering, and the public is not rushing to put its faith in it. This is disabling Turkey’s ability to quickly lift coronavirus restrictions, and increases negative domestic sentiment towards the ruling AKP party.

All of the above is occurring against a background of several disasters in recent months, such as the huge forest fires in western Turkey, which claimed a political toll on Erdogan. According to recent public opinion polls, in the event of elections, Erdogan will be unable, for the first time in his 18-year rule, to lead his party to victory, even if his party joins other parties in a coalition. The far-off date for elections (2023) does not ease Erdogan’s fears regarding this front, while some opposition parties have already called for early elections and rare protests over the economic situation were seen in Ankara and Istanbul.

Some spectators have observed that Erdogan, once again, has looked tired and languid in several public appearances, such as the Glasgow climate summit.

Under the weight of the above strains, Turkey’s regional foreign policy has once again become aggressive. This is a deliberate show of force designed to bolster Erdogan’s public image, but one that falls short of sparking a real regional clash, due to his understanding of the difficult situation faced by Turkey.

Meanwhile, Washington once again finds itself struggling to rein in the Sultan from Istanbul.

The United States has already ejected Ankara from the F-35 program after Erdogan opted to purchase advanced Russian-made S-400 air defense systems. American sanctions on Turkey, anchored by Congressional legislation, were put into place by the Trump administration, despite the relatively warm relationship that existed between the two presidents at that time.

President Biden’s less enthusiastic approach to Turkey and Erdogan hardly decreased tensions. Despite bilateral meetings held between the two leaders, most recently at the G-20 Summit in Rome in October, Erdogan chose to launch a new campaign to ‘retrieve Turkish funds’ paid in the past into the F-35 project, and which the U.S. refuses to return. The Turkish president even presented an alternative solution, in the form of supplying forty new F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, and upgrading the remaining Turkish air force fleet as a substitute for reimbursement.

Congress, it seems safe to assume, will not take a positive view of this offer. Erdogan has warned that a failure to meet his demands for compensation will lead him to further tighten relations with Russia, and to purchase additional Russian defense products, such as more S-400 batteries, advanced fighter jet platforms, and more. Such a maneuver would pose an even greater significant challenge for NATO, of which Turkey is a member.

Moreover, The US is intensifying its military presence in Greece, potentially at the expense of Its Turkish bases, a move that is obviously not viewed favorably in Turkey.

On the diplomatic front, Turkey has been involved in several highly publicized quarrels. Erdogan declared that he would eject ten foreign ambassadors – including the American ambassador – following a joint statement by them calling for the release of a jailed Turkish businessman. This diplomatic crisis was quickly resolved, and Erdogan backed down after most of the countries clarified that they did not mean to intervene in Turkey’s internal affairs. But the affair illustrates Erdogan’s new willingness to take punitive action –  even against the U.S.

The other quarrel was with Israel after an Israeli tourist couple was arrested for taking a photograph of the presidential palace – an act forbidden by law. Talks leading to their release were slow and grueling, and some observers claim that Erdogan exploited this civil incident in order to bolster his public image, by showing how he ‘stood up to Israel.’ In the aftermath of this incident, new lines of communication were set in place, including between Israel’s president and prime minister, and Erdogan. Yet this is no detente in the relations. It is merely a mechanism to prevent future tensions.  

In addition, reports of arrests of supposed spy networks belonging to Israel, Iran, and Russia surfaced, designed to signal to the region that Turkey is ‘determined’ to defend its national interests.

On the military front, Turkey has returned to a pattern of issuing military threats and taking action in its own regional environment. Examples include northern Syria, where Turkey threatened a new military operation to broaden its influence, undermining American and Russian interests. The threats were withdrawn after a stern message from Moscow, and it seems that for the time being Turkey’s appetite for a new conquest in northern Syria has faded.

In northern Iraq as well, Turkey has broadened its operations against “Kurdish terrorism”, but with no risk of a clash with any superpower in the area.

At the same time, Turkey has gone back to threatening Greece and Cyprus in the context of competition for natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey takes a poor view of growing cooperation between Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel within the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum group, and is seeking to torpedo its activities. To that end, after several months of quiet, Turkey has reactivated its gas research ships off the northern Cypriot coast, an act that is tantamount to marking out maritime territory.

At the same time, Turkey is increasing the presence of its military forces in Northern Cyprus, and has upgraded its airbases on the island, enabling them to launch drones. 

Alongside these developments, reports have surfaced over Turkey’s intentions to boost its forces deployed in Libya, on the eve of planned elections in that country.

At the same time, a Turkish ‘campaign of smiles’ has surfaced with the purpose of attracting foreign funds. It is marked by a willingness to swallow some pride and embrace the UAE’s funds, alongside a push for de-escalation of tensions with Egypt, Israel and even Saudi Arabia. This is joined by an attempt by Turkey to show a positive image on the global stage regarding climate change and other issues.

So long as Erdogan is consumed by domestic troubles, he can be expected to continue to show his claws. His occasional demonstration of pragmatism is intended solely to attract funds, and does not fool anyone that he has had a change of heart or that he is willing to let go of his neo-Ottoman aspirations.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

Solidarity with the Palestinian People Includes Honesty

By Mark Goldfeder

On November 29, the United Nations celebrates its International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. Established in 1977, it commemorates the anniversary of the General Assembly passing Resolution 181, the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, which called for the area to be divided into two independent States: one Arab and one Jewish.

In his official message, Secretary General Antonio Guterres noted that the situation in Palestine “remains a challenge to international peace and security,” and called for the international community to “reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the Palestinian people in their quest to achieve their inalienable rights.” He also referred to the “Occupied Palestinian Territories” and called for a two-state solution “based on the 1967 lines.”

It is incredibly odd but unfortunately telling that neither his nor any of the other UN statements commemorating the day even mentioned the very relevant fact that on Nov. 29, 1947, the Arab world rejected the UN’s Partition Plan.

Rather than declare a peaceful Palestinian State, the Arabs chose to instead declare a genocidal war—which they then lost. The rejection of the Partition Plan (and the ensuing decision to attack) is one of the main reasons why the Palestinian question remains unresolved.

Real solidarity with the Palestinian cause would include being honest about the full history of Nov. 29, and acknowledging the real-world consequences of decisions made that still affect the Middle East today. At the time, the UN blamed the Arabs for the violence and aggression that was clearly meant to undermine the Resolution and forcefully take land. Two of the five armies that invaded Israel, Jordan (in the West Bank) and Egypt (in Gaza), illegally occupied territory that they had taken through aggressive action expressly forbidden under international law. In 1967, Israel regained those territories in a defensive war under Article 51 of the UN charter. Ironically, to give meaning to the “1967 lines,” as the Secretary’s statement does, is to retroactively ratify aggression against the UN’s mandate and support illegal occupation.

The United Nations fails the Palestinian people every time it emptily reaffirms its commitment to their national aspirations while ignoring the missteps their leaders have taken on the path to its achievement. Today should be a time to take serious stock and recognize what is and is not possible. It is not possible to turn back the clock to November 29, 1947, and to completely erase the bloody effects of some very bad decisions. But it is still possible to fulfill the spirit of the UN Partition Plan—two nations, Israel and Palestine, living peacefully side by side.

To that end, Israel has repeatedly offered plans for division of the land, some of which were even supported by much of the Arab world. Israel has already given back over 87 percent of the territory it regained in 1967, and at various times in recent history has offered up to 99.3 percent of the remaining disputed territory, plus tens of billions of dollars, all in exchange for peace. Some of the Israeli plans even called for the division of Jerusalem. Each time, however the Palestinians refused, for the same reasons they rejected the Partition Plan—they do not recognize Israel’s legitimate and historical claims to these same areas, and they are thus unwilling to share.

Part of that unwillingness relates to a fundamental misunderstanding that many people have about Israel, the Mandate, and the events of November 29. To be clear Israel’s legitimacy is not rooted in the beneficence of others. The Jewish people’s rightful claims predate the League of Nations, and precede the horrors of the Holocaust. In the early 20th century Jewish people came from around the world to buy and cultivate land in order to further expand the existing Jewish communities that had remained in Israel as a continuous presence since Biblical times and throughout all their exiles. As Winston Churchill, then secretary of state for the colonies, explained, “When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine … but the further development of the existing Jewish community … [I]n order that this community should have the best prospect of free development … it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance.”

This year, November 29 also happens to fall on the first day of Hanukkah, when Jewish people around the world commemorate the Maccabean victory over the Seleucid Empire in 164 BCE and the rededication of the Temple in Jerusalem. Later, when Antioch VII demanded the return of land the Maccabees had won back in their defensive conquest, Simon, the last remaining brother of Judah Maccabee, responded: “We have not taken strange lands, nor are we ruling over foreign territory. We have returned to our ancestral inheritance.” (1 Maccabees 15).

As King Solomon, the Jewish king who ruled that same territory roughly 700 years before the Hannukah story, famously said, there is nothing new under the sun. While Jewish leaders celebrated Nov. 29, 1947 as the day that the world again recognized those claims, no one gave Israel to the Jews, and therefore no one has the right to ever take her away.

The real lesson of November 29th is that the Arab world made a critical mistake in rejecting the UN’s Partition Plan and ignoring the Jewish people’s legitimate and indigenous claims. But that does not mean there cannot be hope for a better future. Standing with the Palestinian people does not mean offering empty platitudes. Real solidarity requires being honest about hard truths and competing but legitimate claims, so that the same mistakes are not repeated over and over again.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

PODCAST: Jonny Gould Interviews UK Ambassador To Israel, Neil Wigan

MirYam Institute Adjunct Jonny Gould Interviews UK Ambassador To Israel, Neil Wigan In His “Jonny Gould's Jewish State Podcast”

PODCAST: President Isaac Herzog meets Prime Minister Boris Johnson

MirYam Institute Adjunct Jonny Gould Coverage of President Isaac Herzog meeting Prime Minister Boris Johnson and the UK’s Jewish leadership In His “Jonny Gould's Jewish State Podcast”

PODCAST: The Legacy of Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin

Ambassadors Arthur Koll & Danny Ayalon Look Back.

Proud to have served the IDF and the U.S. Army

By Jeremiah Rozman

As Veteran’s Day approaches, I feel inclined to reflect upon my privilege to have served in the armies of the world’s most important guardians of freedom. As a Jew, I see the IDF as my people’s most important defensive institution: Israel’s military might ensures that Jews will “never again” be defenseless. Israel has a global role in terms of protecting Jewry, but its military is primarily concerned with its immediate region. The United States has a global role as the leader of a broad coalition in defense of global freedom. It has an expeditionary military to match this mission. Although both militaries face common challenges, they are designed and postured for different missions. This reflection is not intended to critique either military;  I simply offer my story and what I consider to be an interesting comparison of certain aspects of my service in each of them.

In 2005, I immigrated to Israel with the dream of fighting for Jewish liberation. My father risked his life to teach Hebrew and keep Judaism alive in the Soviet Union. His father fought the Nazis in the Soviet Army. I was also strongly influenced by stories of partisans and Jews who fought the Nazis and fought to secure Jewish self-determination in Eretz Israel. I see modern Israel as a direct continuation of Jewish history; a new chapter from the biblical era. I could not pass up the opportunity to serve in what I consider to be the direct legacy of the army of King David. My three younger siblings each made aliya and served in the IDF as well. 

In 2006, Israel sent me to a military ulpan where I spent three months in immersive study of Hebrew and Israel’s culture, history, geography etc. with motivated immigrants from several countries. In 2007, I joined the Golani infantry brigade and served all over the country. I saw combat in Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip.

My other grandfather was a Washington D.C. native who served in the U.S. Army during WWII. The U.S. was the haven where my family built a successful and dignified life. Having served in Israel’s military, I felt the duty to serve the U.S. as well. After two years of working as a national security analyst, I joined the U.S. Army and earned my commission in July 2021. I served as an enlisted combat soldier in the IDF in my teens and early twenties. Now in my thirties, I am a combat support officer in the U.S. Army's Chemical Corps. My service in each army has been rewarding in quite different ways. Nearly everyone inevitably asks me how these two armies compare.

One major difference, especially important for me, is religious life. Being Jewish in the IDF was easy. Being an observant Jew in the U.S. Army has been more spiritually challenging. However, the U.S. Army has always done its best to accommodate my religious needs. While I have certainly encountered much good-natured curiosity, especially as I prayed in my Jewish religious garb after breakfast in formation on each day of basic training, I never experienced even a shred of antisemitism. Isolation from a Jewish community has been my biggest challenge thus far. Chaplains and organizations like the Aleph Institute have been extremely helpful.

The IDF and the U.S. Army have some interesting training differences. In the IDF, non-combat basic trainees undergo brief training that can last as little as two weeks. All U.S. Army soldiers undergo 10 weeks of basic combat training due to the U.S. military’s expeditionary mission which deploys support components into combat zones.

Naturally, basic training in an all-male infantry unit in the IDF was more physically demanding than the basic training that I went through for non-infantry soldiers in the U.S. Army. IDF infantry basic training is probably more similar to U.S. Army infantry training at Fort Benning. Basic training in the U.S. Army is more difficult in other ways. For instance, U.S. Army trainees have their phones locked away and do not leave post until the 10 weeks are through. Trainees in the U.S. Army were more than slightly jealous that in the IDF you usually get your phone for an hour at night, go home on many weekends and can even smoke cigarettes if so inclined.

Another major difference is how IDF infantry trainees conduct all of their training in battle-ready kit, while the U.S. Army strictly regulates access to live ammunition. Having loaded magazines in the barracks in basic training strikes U.S. soldiers as inconceivable. Even more shocking is that IDF soldiers, even in basic training, take their weapons home with them.

Another major difference is the commissioning process. In the U.S. Army, receiving a commission requires a college education. In the IDF, soldiers that prove themselves capable leaders are selected at an early point in their career to go to the IDF’s officer academy and earn their commission without a college degree.

In my experience, without exception, the IDF has a reputation for professionalism and skill. I have heard this from U.S. soldiers of all ranks, from non-commissioned officer (NCO) professionals to high ranking officers. I can say from my time in the IDF that the respect is mutual. 

The U.S. Army and the IDF have much to teach each other. The IDF excels in urban operations, counterterrorism, linking industry to defense needs, and military intelligence. The U.S. Army has vast expeditionary combat experience, unparalleled logistics and an NCO corps that sets the gold standard for professionalism. Both countries’ soldiers share the warrior ethos of bravery, resilience, intelligent initiative and ethical conduct in combat. 

I intend to serve as defense attaché to Israel. My deep familiarity with Israel and the IDF gives me a unique ability to enhance the working relationship between two countries that I believe are forces on the side of good in the world. I am proud to have served both the IDF and the U.S. Army. 

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Cyber-attacks show Israel’s need for cyber defense directives

By Doron Tamir

The recent cyber-attack by the Black Shadow hacking group on Israeli websites – among them the LGBT dating application Atraf which was subject to  a ransom demand and then a leak of account usernames when that demand wasn’t met – could be part of a larger Iranian cyber attrition campaign.

 It is important to clarify what precisely was targeted in this attack, and why the lack of an official cyber law in Israel is generating  confusion over the division of labor regarding data protection in the vulnerable private sector.

In the cyber world, internet service providers (ISPs) like NetVision, whose servers are used by the company that created Atraf’s website, are similar to a hotel or pizza franchise: The ISP ‘rents’ out its servers, enabling others to host their websites on them to create a logistical communications infrastructure.

Next in the cyber chain are the companies that create websites and applications – in this case, a company called CyberServe.

CyberServe was, in fact, the target of Black Shadow’s attack. These types of companies build websites according to the tailored needs of clients and hosts them on its servers.

Clients who request such websites, – be they dating websites or motorcycle stores –  often don’t understand the cyber world and therefore turn to companies to outsource their online needs.

Black Shadow conducted a double infiltration in this incident: Firstly, of CyberServe’s servers, and secondly of Atraf’s apps and websites (as well as other Israeli websites).

CyberServe provided the ‘structure’ for Atraf, and it was CyberServe’s servers that were infiltrated, meaning that the internet service provider, NetVision, is not responsible for the situation.

This, then highlights, a real problem when it comes to cyber security in Israel at this time. Despite Israel being the ‘start-up nation,’ and a world leader in cyber technology, the country’s private sector lacks clear directives over how to set up fortified cyber defense.

Just as a dentist can’t legally obligate someone to brush their teeth or to be vaccinated, the same is true regarding private sector entities and cyber defense. When Israel set up its National Cyber Security Authority, it began supplying lots of advisory material to the private sector, but none of it was binding.

Similarly, the Justice Ministry’s Law, Information and Technology Authority, which even has the power to raid homes in connection with cyber-crime investigations, does not have enforcement capability when it comes to cyber defenses.

Ultimately, this means that chaos characterizes private sector cyber defenses in Israel and, and only a cyber law can address this problem adequately.

Currently, only a few states like Singapore and the United States have such cyber laws, which delegate explicit cyber defense responsibilities to various actors.

In Israel, cyber security is more in oral law format than written law. As a result, it is not totally clear who is responsible for enforcing cyber security standards. The Israeli National Cyber Security Authority can define strategy, policy, budgets, objectives, and desirable levels of protection. But it cannot deal with each individual company or business organization. This creates gaps that can be exploited by malicious actors.

The ability to break into tens of thousands of private accounts on a dating site is a terrible breach of privacy. It does not require hugely sophisticated capabilities, but rather, the ability to exploit standard weak locations.

Unlike the cyber-attack on Israel’s Hillel Yaffe hospital, which involved the encryption of the hospital’s website, and an attack on the option to cancel the encryption, this latest attack was much less sophisticated.

Attackers breached a company whose job is to defend its customers. Now, CyberServe is facing collective legal action, and its chances of winning in court are not high.

Still, CyberServe could argue, based on the absence of a cyber security law, that the company is not legally responsible for security.

As for the perpetrators, it is reasonable to assume that Black Shadow is an Iranian cyber group, which, like other such groups, operates under Iranian supervision.

It is safe to assess that the groups divide up attacking roles among themselves, with the overall goal being to harass the State of Israel as much as possible. This won’t lead to a collapse of the state, but it will disturb it.

Such incidents also harm Israel’s image as a cyber power.

Now, the most important mission is to track the incident back forensically and identify the attackers. This is a difficult process with its own operational doctrine. It is, simply put, a major headache, and one that not all companies have the ability to undertake.

The incident ultimately underscores the conclusion that the time has come to beef up Israel’s current, and partial, cyber defense regulations.  

Clear legislation will stipulate what web service providers must deliver for their clients, and will make it more difficult for groups like Black Shadow to exploit indifference to the issue of cyber defense.

Not every company needs nuclear power plant-level cyber defenses, but between that and having no defense in place there is a large spectrum of security solutions.

The question of how much each company is willing to pay for this capability boils down to a question of cost-benefit considerations.

As time goes by, increasing numbers of companies will realize, as banks already have, that a percentage of their income must go into cyber security, because the cost of failure is far higher.

The latest attack on an LGBT dating application is not the attack that can bring down a state. But it is another razor cut, in a wider Iranian strategy of ‘a thousand cuts,’ that is designed to harm Israel.

On the other hand, when compared to the cyber strike on gas stations around Iran, which some reports have attributed to Israel, it would seem that the two countries do not have equal cyber offensive capabilities, are not even in the same league.

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Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

Reflections on Veterans Day

By Micah Jones

This Veterans Day has a particular weight that I have not felt in years past. Normally a day for me to think of my relatives’, friends’, and my own service to the country, this Veterans Day is particularly significant for two reasons: (1) it marks the first year in which I have been a Veteran longer than I have been on active duty; and (2) it has viscerally reminded me of the importance of what it means to serve in the wake of the United States’ catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan and our betrayal of our Afghan and NATO allies.

I was honorably discharged as a Captain in June 2016, having served just over five years as an active-duty U.S. Army military intelligence branch detail infantry officer. I loved my time in the Army and I truly appreciated the opportunity to serve. Following in the footsteps of my grandfathers and father, I was proud to continue the family lineage of military service to the United States of America. In serving in the Army, I learned what it was like to be humbled, to suffer, and to overcome challenges that I would have previously viewed as unconquerable. In truly internalizing what it meant to put my fellow soldiers before myself, my military service made me a better civilian, a better husband, a better son, and a better man. To now have been a civilian longer than I was an active-duty soldier is a reminder that I will always carry those hard-earned lessons with me, no matter what my future endeavors may be.

This Veterans Day is also a reminder that one’s service does not cease when he takes off the uniform. The mindset of selfless service – and the importance of helping others – that so many other Veterans and I forged during our time in the military, is one that I will keep with me for the rest of my life. For the last two months, countless other Veterans and I have put that mindset to the test as we have been actively involved in helping our former Afghan allies and their families escape horrific fates from the Taliban. As I am still actively assisting a former Afghan colleague, I cannot go into much detail about my own personal involvement, but I can say that I have been working since mid-August in the Veterans’ network helping Afghan refugees. 

Never have I been so simultaneously disappointed in my country and so proud of my fellow Veterans as I have been since the United States of America’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. I believe that there was an unfathomable failure of leadership at the highest levels of the Pentagon, Department of State, and the White House, as we abandoned hundreds of Americans, deserted our Afghan allies, sold nearly 20 million Afghan women into lives of sexual slavery, and caused 13 U.S. service members to be murdered by ISIS-K.  But the Veterans network that I was so fortunate to be a part of demonstrated the warrior ethos of doing our best to not leave anyone behind.  From group chats providing the latest reports of what was happening on the ground in Kabul, to consoling each other during 3:00 a.m. phone calls when the horror of what was transpiring was too much to bear, the Veterans’ network was united in its mutual support and strength. 

No matter the branch of service, and no matter whether we all agreed on the nuances of the issues, the collective Veterans’ network was there for each other because we all shared a mutual understanding of what it was like to have served.  We knew that we were doing what we had been trained to do: to help those less fortunate and to represent the best values of our country. 

As I reflect on this Veterans Day, I will think of my family, friends, and fellow service members who have donned the uniform of one of the branches of the U.S. military in service to the nation.  Most of all, I will think of the Veterans who have continued to do everything they can in order to help Afghans and allies in need, as well as each other.  At a time in which the country can feel like it is at an inflection point, and coming apart at the seams, my fellow Veterans give me hope in the future of America because they know that no matter our differences, it is our common strength and identity as a nation that will carry the day.

So to my fellow Veterans on this Veterans Day 2021, thank you for your service to the country we love.

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Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. Read full bio here.

The Common Bond of Soldiering

By Geoffrey Corn

PROFESSOR OF LAW, SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW. US ARMY (RET.)

The eleventh hour, of the eleventh day, of the eleventh month: the guns fell silent on the Western Front. On Veteran’s Day we honor all those who wore a military uniform of our nation, but in fact the significance of the day is rooted in a much deeper recognition of the common bond of service that connects all veterans.

The armistice that silenced the guns on the Western Front in 1918 brought to an end the most destructive war mankind had ever experienced. Soldiers on all sides made enormous sacrifice, with millions killed or permanently scarred by the experience. These men did not choose to fight and almost never influenced the decisions that imposed such an immense burden they were required to bear. But they bore that burden as servants of their respective nations. While the nature of warfare has certainly changed dramatically since then, bearing this burden is a thread that connects veterans throughout history.

It is this devotion to duty and willingness to face immense mortal risk at the call of political leaders who decide when, where, and often how to fight that we honor on Veteran’s Day. And that is a common bond among all soldiers. Indeed, most veterans will tell you that the greatest reward of their service – often the thing that kept them in uniform – was being part of an organization with a common and unquestioned commitment to selfless service.

This bond transcends national borders; soldiers who serve together in coalition operations see first-hand that there while their uniforms and equipment may look different, the core ethos of service is indeed a common foundation of respect. Even former enemies often forge bonds of respect that grow from the one thing that connected both friend and foe in war: devotion to duty.

When I reflect on the many bonds that defined my 21 years of experience in uniform, my mind goes to many friends and colleagues whose uniforms bore the flags of different countries. Indeed, I was often in awe of the professionalism of soldiers I encountered who served other political masters. This has always been especially true of my many friends and colleagues who served or continue to serve as military legal advisors. My respect for these veterans resulted from much more than the professional excellence I came to expect in my encounters. It was the moral courage they consistently displayed and how this ethos enabled them to speak proverbial “truth to power” in relation to the myriad of complex legal compliance issues they routinely encountered when advising commanders faced with the unenviable task of leading troops in combat.

It might seem odd that my reflection on selfless service would gravitate toward law and lawyers, but in fact the responsibility of such uniformed public servants is increasingly central to the legitimacy of the causes their armed forces are asked to fight for. It is also a foundation for the common respect forged among veterans, even if it may be imperceptible to many. War, or more specifically participation in war, involves the use of immense destructive power and the infliction of undeniable human suffering.

But the authority to inflict that suffering is not unlimited, a principle of war at the very foundation of the legal regulation of war. As noted by one of the great commentaries on law in war, for soldiers this means that war does not provide a license to kill. But it also means that war, and the obligation of duty, involves a duty to kill. And, as another author and veteran of close combat in Vietnam noted so eloquently,

“War gives the appearance of condoning almost everything, but men must live with their actions for a long time afterward. A leader has to help them understand that there are lines they must not cross. He is their link to normalcy, to order, to humanity”.

Understanding and respecting those lines is the essence of duty; of selfless service; of professionalism in arms. Our collective respect for all veterans presumes, or so I believe, that their service was a manifestation of the complex responsibility to answer the call to arms but to also respect these lines. And when men and women are thrust into mortal combat, their ability to do so is indeed worthy of respect.

Like the origin of Veteran’s Day itself, the honor this day reflects extends beyond just those of us who served in the U.S. armed forces. Military duty is, ultimately, far more complex than merely obeying orders; it is the requirement to retain an innate sense of morality in an inherently immoral endeavor. Every man and woman who has been called to walk this complex tightrope that requires balance between violence and constraint is worthy of the respect central to this national holiday.

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Geoffrey S. Corn is the Gary A Kuiper distinguished professor of National Security Law, at South Texas College of Law, Houston, and a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Read full bio here.