How Turkey and Israel salvaged their relationship

By Pinhas Avivi

After the Islamist AKP Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power in Turkey in 2002, Ankara’s approach to Israel began to change for the worse. There were major fears at the time that the defense ties that characterized bilateral relations would vanish and create an irreparable rupture.

Within six years, ties indeed went from friendly to hostile.

And yet, the recent Israeli humanitarian delegation sent to assist Turkey in February’s earthquake disaster is the latest reminder of the fact that these days, Jerusalem’s relations with Ankara are marked by a high degree of stability. That’s not something that should be taken for granted; it took years for the two countries to reach this stage after dealing with several major crises.  

The 2010 Mavi Marmara crisis (when Israeli Navy commandos and Turkish Islamist activists trying to reach Gaza were involved in a deadly clash) marked a low point. Yet since then, the two regional powers have found a way to restore relations and maintain them – to a degree.

This was achieved primarily through civilian cooperation, as returning to the military cooperation that existed before Erdogan’s rise to power would be very hard. Israel would have to find alternative security partners in the Mediterranean – which it did in the form of Greece.

Once in power, Erdogan wanted to be the leader of the Islamic world and navigate according to a neo-Ottoman playbook. Unlike Ataturk, who turned Turkey from an empire to a state, Erdogan wants to return his country to empire mode.

On the one hand, Erdogan tried to employ a zero-conflict policy with Turkey’s neighbors, while seeking to increase its influence in the region through soft power, based on leveraging economic and cultural ties, rather than military means.

However, Turkey's military involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya, and severe tensions that developed with Greece and Israel, put a dent in the ‘zero conflict’ approach.

In addition, Turkey’s political influence on Arab Muslim states remained extremely limited. Theoretical predictions look nice on paper, but Erdogan quickly found out that reality doesn’t always align. No one in the Arab Sunni world was willing to accept him as a regional leader – Egypt and Saudi Arabia hold that position in the Sunni bloc.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to give up its role as the leader of the Islamic world.

As a result, Turkey took up the banner of assisting the Palestinians, as part of its regional leadership bid. Yet Erdogan quickly understood that if he wants to be influential in the Arab world, he must have good ties with Israel, or he risks losing relevance.

All the Arab powers have ties with Israel, some formally like Jordan and Egypt, and, since the 2020 Abraham Accords, the UAE and Bahrain, while others, such as Saudi Arabia, maintain informal ties. As the Arab states moved forward, Erdogan was left behind. Erdogan understood that if he remained excluded, the Abraham Accords would further decrease Turkey’s influence on the region and the Arab world – and this realization also helped convince him of the need to change his attitude to Israel.

Meanwhile, Erdogan was a big disappointment to the United States, as it moved closer to Russia and created a crisis in NATO.

Israel, in Erdogan’s view, is therefore an important means for him to repair some of that damage by enabling him to forge new connections with the U.S. and open doors in Europe via improved ties with Jerusalem. Hence, Turkey has focused on promoting civilian ties with the Jewish state.

In addition, economic trade has remained consistently high. Since Erdogan took office as prime minister in 2002, trade between Israel and Turkey has increased fivefold. Furthermore, Erdogan believes that strengthening ties with Israel will benefit his country's economy and increase its global influence.

 As a result, he has made efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Jerusalem – but without giving up his ongoing effort to stress the Palestinian issue.

This is why some Hamas members are still allowed to be active on Turkish soil, though these days, this activity mostly involves Hamas’s political wing. Hamas’s Deputy Political Bureau Chief, Salah Al-Arouri, who in reality oversees West Bank terrorism efforts, is today based in Lebanon after relocating from Turkey. The AKP party views Hamas’s political wing as a sister movement.

Erdogan’s mounting problems

Erdogan’s growing problems mean that he is keener than ever to improve ties with Europe, the U.S., Sunni states, and Israel.

Kurdish autonomous zones in northern Syria have an immediate impact on southern Turkey that Ankara finds disturbing. Millions of Syrian refugees remain in Turkey, creating a serious economic problem. Iran worries Erdogan due to its ongoing attempts to change the balance of power in Syria to the determinant of Turkish-backed Sunni forces in the north of the country. Iranians are present on the Syrian Mediterranean coastline, and this Iranian entrenchment is not viewed positively by Erdogan. Sunni Turkey sees Shi’ite Islamist regional influence as a destructive force. Despite four hundred years of quiet on the Turkish – Iranian border, these are far from being brotherly states.

Erdogan also has huge economic problems and needs to attract new investments by improving ties with Europe and the U.S. He is also interested in becoming a distributor of Israeli gas to Europe.

These factors have led to a substantial change in Erdogan’s tone. When he criticizes Israel, he uses a vastly different tone from the one he used in the early years of his government rule.

The fact that Israeli and Turkish security organizations were reportedly able to cooperate closely to thwart Iranian terror cells on Turkish soil, sent to target Israelis in June 2022, is a further reflection of this change.

Erdogan has not given up his vision of establishing himself as an important Muslim leader who promotes the Palestinian cause, but he has learned that he cannot achieve this by continually bashing Israel.

Turkey also has direct potential gains it can make from its improved ties with Israel.

Israeli companies are already involved in helping Istanbul better manage its water system, with Israeli-made sensors helping to prevent water leakages from its pipes.

There is interest on both sides in further cooperation, but this will continue to be limited to the civilian sector, because Erdogan has not shed all his neo-Ottoman influences.

Greece, for its part, has no reason to feel threatened by the Israeli – Turkish thaw, precisely because it is limited to civilian issues. The good judgement of both Israeli and Turkish decision-makers has enabled ties to become stable once more, as they should be. 

Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

Ukraine-Russia War: An imminent spillover in the Middle East

By Amit Kumar

The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine is exacerbating international tensions. Apart from the critical impact the conflict has on the two engaged nations, it is also leading to wider ramifications for international security and stability, notably in the Middle East. It poses a threat to the fragile peace in the region in numerous ways including its ability to intensify current tensions, particularly between Iran and Israel, and the potential to spark new conflicts by upsetting the international power equilibrium that forces uninvolved nations to become a part of these regional tensions. Keeping these emerging situations in the backdrop, this article investigates how the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is affecting regional geopolitics in the Middle East, and how even neutral states are being forced to take sides - a development that may eventually cause ’the proxy wars between Israel and Iran to escalate into a full-fledged showdown in the near future.

First, the Russia-Ukraine conflict impacts regional stability by aggravating already-existing hostilities. The Syrian civil war, the dispute between Israel and Palestine, and the continuous confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia are just a few of the current crises in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Yemen also remain at odds, while Israel is still in conflict with some Arab nations. Lately, Qatar was also subjected to a blockade by its neighbors because of its support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. This situation is further complicated by the fact that non-state groups such as ISIS and Hamas operate with full impunity in the region.

Nonetheless, in August 2022, Israel successfully neutralized threats in drone strikes during Operation Breaking Dawn. One of these strikes even killed a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad senior commander, Taysheer Jabari. Just recently, Israel was also successful in killing several militants from the Lions’ Den and Hamas in Jenin. Based on these events, it can be deduced that the onus to keep the region’s dreadful threats in check lies on Israel. Therefore, it will be in the positive interest of the region if Israel continues to remain committed to upholding the security and stability of the Middle East rather than diverting its strategic resources toward the Ukraine-Russia war.

The situation in the Middle East is extremely precarious and prone to continuing and recurrent confrontations. The Russia-Ukraine war could potentially worsen the conflicts by providing new opportunities for intervention to the outside powers. For instance, the Syrian government’s military and manpower support to Russia, and Syria's engagement in the Ukraine crisis may prompt more Russian action in the Syrian conflict to favor Assad. Similarly, Ukraine shares good relations with several Middle Eastern governments like Israel, Kuwait and Turkey. In case the conflict escalates, the Middle Eastern countries will come under pressure to support Ukraine under US diplomatic pressure, which may result in a division into two camps, albeit not necessarily explicitly.  

Secondly, even if Russia and Israel's relationship can be said to be realpolitik, they have never really seen eye to eye on Iran. However, the evolving equation between Russia, Israel, and Iran due to the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war could hamper Israel's security. In recent years, Iran and Russia have deepened their strategic partnership. Any perception of Israel's allegiance to Ukraine might be considered a threat to Russia's geopolitical objectives. If Israel were to aid Ukraine militarily, Russia would interpret this as a provocative act and may react by enhancing Iran's military-industrial complex, disregarding Israel’s concerns. Meanwhile, from Israel's perspective, every drone and ballistic missile that Russia purchases from Iran, and every economic deal struck between them, provides Tehran with more cash that can be funneled to its proxies around Israel's sovereign territory.  Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has seen Israel as its main regional adversary, and Russia may incite Tehran to engage in a limited fashion with Israel and thus keep its involvement limited to regional affairs. Also, if the tensions between Israel and Iran escalate, there is a chance it would also intensify the arms race, further proxy conflicts, and potentially even lead to a direct military confrontation between the two countries. Israeli establishment would do well to think twice before engaging in a European war beyond providing humanitarian aid. Anything beyond humanitarian aid might worsen relations between Israel and Russia.

Lastly, the Russia-Ukraine conflict also generates fresh prospective disputes. For instance, it may entice other nations with strong links to Russia or Ukraine to support them covertly or overtly by any means. This side-picking act would eventually prolong the ongoing war while simultaneously generating new wounds and refreshing the old ones in the Middle East. This might apply to  Israel, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, and other countries.  Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that he would consider sending arms to Ukraine, and two weeks later, Israeli lawmakers were found to be encouraging him to do that. Syria has already broken diplomatic ties with Ukraine. Beirut and Jordan enjoy relatively close ties with Moscow. As many reports suggest, Lebanon-based Palestinians are recruited by Russia and deployed to the frontlines in Ukraine.

Other than geographic proximity, diplomatic mistrust, and a persistent threat to sovereign security, the Middle East is also fraught with dictators and strongmen making this region more susceptible to intensifying internal proxy conflicts among themselves based on the sides they might take in the Ukraine-Russia war. As per the western media, staying neutral in this war equates with taking Russia’s side. While it appears that the middle eastern nations have delicately handled the Ukraine-Russia war by maintaining their strategic autonomy, the truth seems to be different. Multiple fissures have surfaced leading to renewed divisions between these nations that make the situation ripe for conflicts and instability.

In conclusion, the Ukraine-Russia war is a Western war or European War and should be left there. The first step toward the Middle East being embroiled in another region's war is Iran's strategic cooperation with Russia. The second step involves Israel building consensus in the Knesset for providing military backing to Ukraine, opening the door for other countries to follow suit and escalating regional proxy wars. In order to lessen the conflict's potential effects on the Middle East, it is crucial that Middle Eastern countries refrain from any sort of military or moral engagement with Ukraine or Russia.

Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge Dale Aluf, Director of Research & Strategy at SIGNAL, Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership, and Aayushi Malhotra for investing the time and energy necessary to review the manuscript, providing insightful comments and suggestions, and editing the paper. These efforts enabled me to raise the quality of the manuscript.

Amit Kumar is a doctoral student at the Birla Institute of Technology and Science, in Pilani, India. His area of specialization is China Studies. Amit has worked as a Political Researcher for the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, India's National Political Party's youth wing. Read full bio here.

A House Divided Cannot Stand

By Chuck Freilich

 

Three months ago, Israel’s economy was booming. Israel still faced severe threats from Iran and Hezbollah, and there had been an increase in Palestinian terrorism, but overall Israel was never more secure. Its ties with states around the world were expanding and hopes for near-term normalization with the Saudis and others abounded. Israel was a vibrant democracy and viewed its approaching 75th anniversary with optimism.

Israel is now convulsed by self-inflicted divisions that are wracking its society and economy, undermining its democracy and threatening the pillars of its national security. Reservists from Israel’s most hallowed military units are in a state of near rebellion and what starts in the reserves will rapidly spill over into the regular army. Israel is on the verge of coming apart.

With international attention focused on Ukraine and the US-Chinese global rivalry, Iran is making steady progress towards a nuclear capability. In essence, it already is a nuclear threshold state, with sufficient fissile material for some five bombs and more soon. The only thing preventing Iran from weaponizing a nuclear warhead, the final hurdle to an operational capability, is its ongoing fear of the international and Israeli response. With both the international community and Israel focused elsewhere, this fear has greatly diminished and a nuclear Iran is an increasingly real possibility.

Moreover, the recent agreement between Iran and its arch-rival, Saudi Arabia, was a significant achievement for the former, that may signal an important realignment of regional forces. The agreement provides for a restoration of diplomatic relations, after a seven-year hiatus, and renewed economic and even military cooperation. Assuming that it is actually implemented - not a foregone conclusion – the agreement would give Iran three important wins: a reduction in regional tensions; a weakening of the American-led regional coalition; and, at a minimum, a blow both to Israel’s hopes of building a military alignment against Iran and for further regional normalization.

Further complicating the picture, the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement was brokered by China, not the US. For decades, China has become an increasingly important economic player in the region, buying vast quantities of oil from both the Saudis and Iran, but it had yet to turn its economic prowess into diplomatic and military might. In recent years, this has begun changing, as China deployed limited forces in the region (Djibouti), conducted repeated naval exercises with Iran and Russia, signed a 25-year strategic agreement with Iran, and now, for the first time, led a major strategic development in the region. The US still remains the preeminent power in the region, especially militarily, but the big question is whether the agreement signifies the beginning of the Chinese era in the Middle East.

The Saudis and Emirates, who also recently renewed ties with Iran, are engaging in classic hedging behavior. Driven by an ongoing loss of confidence in the US guarantee for their security, they are seeking other means of ensuring it, first by expanding ties with Israel, now by reducing hostilities with Iran. One can agree with their thinking, or not, but it is important to understand their mindset.

The Gulf and other Sunni states’ loss of faith in the US guarantee began with the Second Gulf War, in which egregious American miscalculations, in their view, greatly empowered Iran. The US then “abandoned” Egyptian President Mubarak, ostensibly its leading Arab ally. The US negotiated a flawed nuclear deal with Iran, but abruptly withdrew from it, without a Plan B, and failed to respond to a major Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities and to a subsequent attack against the UAE. Ongoing US pressure for human rights reforms, snubbing of the Saudi crown prince, and pressure to end the war in Yemen, added to the sense of animosity. Statements that the US no longer needed Mideast oil, true in a narrow sense, ignored the reality of one global energy market, further heightening Gulf insecurity.

The glitter is also off the Abraham Accords with Israel and the Arab signatories - extent and potential - are re-evaluating their positions. This dramatic breakthrough in relations, which had the potential to transform the region and Israel’s place in it, was driven first and foremost by the common fear of Iran and growing doubts about American resolve to prevent a nuclear Iran. The UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval, sought to build an undeclared alliance with Israel, signed defense cooperation agreements and even began making major purchases of Israeli weapons. The UAE warmly embraced Israel, in dramatic and heretofore unimaginable ways.

Israel could never constitute a substitute for the US, of course, but its ongoing political crisis, with five rounds of elections in three years and now almost complete meltdown, have clearly demonstrated its limitations as a reliable strategic partner for the Gulf states and led to growing disaffection. The Emiratis have reportedly already cancelled weapon sales, Prime Minister Netanyahu has pointedly not been invited to visit, and there is palpable concern among the Abraham Accords states over the directions being taken by the new government, especially regarding the Palestinians.

The breakthrough with Israel was also driven by the Abraham Accords states’ interest in access to Israeli high-tech, especially cyber, and the belief that Israel’s integration into the region would help moderate its policies towards the Palestinians. In both areas, they have been disappointed. The international uproar over Israel’s cyber exports, stemming primarily from the NSO affair, caused Israel to greatly scale back sales to nondemocratic states. The new government’s ultra-hard right composition and de facto intention to annex the West Bank, contradict the hopes of all Gulf states, as well as assurances given to the UAE at the time.

The Middle Eastern landscape is changing before our eyes. Unsurprisingly, neither friend nor foe are sitting back and graciously waiting for Israel to get its house in order. As has long been known, a house divided cannot stand. 

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Now, more than ever, Israel needs a constitution

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Winston Churchill famously coined the term "never let a good crisis go to waste."

“Good” is hardly the appropriate word to describe the current state of chaos – the likes of which the State of Israel has never known –but if we focus on Churchill's call to action then the opportunities presented are clear.

The Netanyahu government’s dangerous, in fact, unprecedented, legislative blitz will not only harm human rights, but is pushing the country toward a tipping point from which there will be no turning back.

The democratic State of Israel, which was established on the basis of the Zionist vision, is in danger of collapse. The time is ripe to put a solution on the table – a way out that was there from the outset, when the State of Israel was established, but which was ignored. Failure now to stop and take advantage of this crisis will mean that in the coming years the third Jewish commonwealth will fall. Establishing a constitution will lay out the rules of the game and fix the broken ties between us and can help us avoid this fate.

Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, foresaw the problems that would arise in due course. The Declaration of Independence stated that a constitution would be determined by the people's assembly within five months. In practice, this never happened. Seventy-five years later, there is no constitution.

Why then do we need a constitution? Some would say that we have the Declaration of Independence and for 75 years we got along just fine without a constitution. Others claim that the Basic Laws and the rulings of former Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak are part of the constitution.

The answer lies in the chaotic situation the country has now reached. After 75 years, we discovered that Israel’s social contract lacks clear boundaries.

The simplest explanation is that a constitution will create order, define national frameworks, and create checks and balances between the authorities. It will define the nature of the state, rights and obligations, and each citizen’s ability to maintain their way of life. A constitution would stabilize the system of government, boost equality, freedom of expression, and act as an unsigned contract between the citizen and the state.

The Netanyahu government, which seeks to pass the first stage of a “judicial reform,” claims its reform will strengthen democracy, restore governance, restore trust in the judicial system, and achieve balance between the three branches of government.

In practice, behind the big words, hides a forceful attempt to change the democratic regime in Israel. The reform is made up of a set of laws that would terminally violate the balance of power and give unreasonable influence to politicians who seek to escape the threat of justice and, alongside them, to the wheelers and dealers who head the ultra-Orthodox parties.

It is enough to look at the bill on the Expansion of Powers to the Rabbinical Courts, which was approved for a first reading by the Knesset Ministerial Committee on Legislation, to understand, in this context, that in the absence of a constitution, the road to a halachic state is growing ever shorter.

Take, for example, the Torah study bill, which, according to the Haredi parties who are pushing to get it passed, will solve the conscription issue.

Today there are 170,000 yeshiva students dedicated to full-time Torah study. According to the vision of Knesset Member Moshe Gafni, chairman of the United Torah Judaism party, at least half of the population will not serve in the military. Add to this the fact that today over 50% of men in the ultra-Orthodox community are not in the labor market, and you will end up with national bankruptcy.

Levin's "reform" not only fails to provide solutions to issues that need to be corrected but also legitimizes the demographic problem that is to come.

These struggles aren’t new. Take a trip back in time more than a century, and you'll find that the leaders of the Zionist movement fought hard against ultra-Orthodox Judaism.

Zionist founding father Theodor Herzl, in his book, The Jewish State, laid out his vision for the future state, including the structure of government and society, the economy, security, and the relationship between religion and state. In his vision, while faith is a bond that unites the Jewish state’s residents, priests would remain confined in the “temples of God.” They would not be involved in the leadership of affairs of state.

The contribution of Herzl's vision to the reality of our state is indisputable, yet in today’s reality, ultra-Orthodox educational institutions budgeted by the state do not include studies of Herzl or the leaders of the Zionist movement.

In an era in which history is rewritten, and in which we forget where we came from and where we are going, we must correct this.

In the absence of a vision, the nation will come undone; the slippery slope which the State of Israel is galloping down leads us to a dangerous place. The current government will, if it does not change course, alter the face of the State of Israel. There are no more checks and balances, and the vision of the Zionist state will gradually recede. The severe crisis we have found ourselves in is an opportunity to stop and create order by demanding a constitution for Israel. If not, demography will win.

Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

The IDF is being dragged into Israel’s political crisis

By Eitan Dangot

When the new IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi took over from his predecessor Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, he didn’t anticipate finding himself in his current predicament. He was sure he’d be able to concentrate on two primary objectives: Identifying the main security dangers to Israel and crafting a vision for Israel’s response. He also expected to be busy with ethical and operational messaging to the IDF’s branches and commanders.

Usually, a chief of staff oversees extensive new plans to improve IDF readiness. In this case, Halevi is focused first and foremost on the Iranian threat. It is also fair to assume that he was preparing to deal with challenges to the “people’s army” model and find new ways of keeping career officers, commanders, operational and technical staff, and NCOs in their positions, as well as boosting the number of recruits from the Israeli periphery into technological units.

Instead of all that, within just two months of Halevi’s appointment, a judicial reform program and a national crisis have thrust him into the role of a military commander navigating a national domestic crisis.

The main issues that Halevi wanted to deal with have been pushed to the side, as opponents and supporters of the judicial reform program focus on the domestic battle, which increasingly threatens to drag in the military. A refusal by reservists to serve if the judicial reform passes is a red warning light, and there are also concerns about disruptions to service by conscripts who object to the judicial reform.

The chief of staff does not want to tackle these issues. They interfere with his main role of identifying and preparing for defense threats against the State of Israel, which are growing more serious. Yet Halevi finds himself having to deal with letters to IDF commanders from reservists in strategic units declaring they will not be reporting for duty in the middle of a socio-political storm.

Such letters, sent by reservists from units that have a significant military history and vital future role in achieving IDF goals, have triggered replies from many politicians, some of whom had no prior military experience or only a brief period of IDF duty.

Halevi is wisely making every effort to avoid political declarations and keep the flames of political dispute low in the military and prevent them from spreading further. But despite those efforts, a significant change has occurred over recent weeks. The conversation has changed. It has evolved into a deep social and national argument that incorporates numerous sectors and is far broader than a dispute over democratic values.

Halevi, who had previously avoided making any public statement on the subject, joined forces with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant after realizing that his personal involvement will have a significant impact.

In response to letters written by former IAF pilots, as well as by reservists with illustrious combat histories in intelligence, technology, ground warfare, elite forces and air defense, Halevi began speaking out publicly. He spoke to members of various protest groups in the reserves, outlining his plans for not only resolving this immediate crisis, but also how to handle additional problems that could arise during his tenure and the future of the IDF.

Halevi recognized that the processes he is now seeing didn’t begin during the current political crisis. Disunity within the IDF has been brewing for years. A significant number of soldiers are graduates of religious seminaries who volunteer for combat service in the ground forces, and some of them have a far-right political orientation. Already during the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza, soldiers with ties to the evacuees discussed the possibility of refusing to serve.

The chief of staff must take all necessary measures to resolve the issue and move quickly to exclude the IDF from any further political discussions. He must be firm with several irresponsible individuals who are calling for refusal to show up for service immediately, while expressing greater understanding for others who are concerned about what may come next.

Halevi prefers to conduct a discreet and quiet conversation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government over these issues, but in this dialogue, it is vital that he and the other defense chiefs voice their opinions with as much force and courage as they displayed on the battlefield.

A discussion like this can jeopardize the chief of staff’s standing with lawmakers, but it is still necessary for someone in his position to help preserve democracy.

Halevi’s troubles don’t end there. He has also had to watch coalition agreements grant unprecedented and confusing power to the new position of Junior Minister in the Defense Ministry occupied by Bezalel Smotrich. From the ministry, Smotrich, who is also Israel’s finance minister, can interfere with the IDF’s Civil Administration, which runs Israeli civilian policies in the West Bank.

Halevi also had to witness the granting of power, at least in theory, over Border Police in Judea and Samaria to the new National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

If these ministers are allowed to implement their new powers in this way, it would be detrimental to the IDF’s ability to work in a unified, coordinated manner, especially for IDF Central Command in Judea and Samaria.

Domestic strife has harmed Israel’s readiness against the Iranian threat. Iran has enriched uranium almost to the 90% military-grade level. This is a warning siren. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is building up its arsenal.

As we approach the beginning of Ramadan, an explosive time in the Palestinian arena, the chief of staff will continue to oversee the campaign against Iranian entrenchment in Syria, build up Israeli war readiness, increase cooperation with the U.S. military regarding the potential need to confront Iran militarily, and actively contribute to Israeli resilience in the face of a potential escalation in the Palestinian arena or within Israel by Arab Israeli extremists.

It would be appropriate for Netanyahu to allow the IDF brass and security forces to concentrate and mobilize all their professional and command energies against the enemy at this time, rather than drag them into complicated situations that put them in the spotlight against their will and hinder their ability to perform their roles effectively.

Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Israel security forces face concrete terror alerts

By Yaakov Lappin

The Israeli security establishment has received dozens of concrete alerts about plots to carry out terrorist attacks, both in Judea and Samaria, commonly known as the West Bank, and within the Green Line, a former defense official tells JNS.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, a senior research associate at the MirYam Institute and a former advisor on Arab affairs to seven Israeli defense ministers, added that the March 13 roadside bombing attack by a terrorist who infiltrated Israel from Lebanon reflects an effort “to connect the arenas of conflict”—Lebanon and Judea and Samaria—likely by a coalition of Lebanese and Palestinian terrorist organizations.

“It seems the attack was initiated by elements of Hezbollah and Hamas, and perhaps by others. There is a desire here to integrate arenas of conflict against Israel. And I also link the attack to the domestic situation, the crisis gripping Israel [regarding the government’s judicial reform program]. Terrorist organizations view the crisis as an opportunity to take advantage of and attack,” said Hacham. “They see that Israel is busy now and they perceive it as weakened.”

Addressing Sunday’s regional summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, which was designed to secure a de-escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Hacham said the talks were “divorced from the reality on the ground.”

Officials from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan and the U.S. met in the Sinai resort.

Jerusalem was represented by Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) director Ronen Bar and National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi.

The Palestinian delegation was led by P.A. Civil Affairs Minister Hussein al-Sheikh and General Intelligence Service chief Majed Faraj.

Brett McGurk, National Security Council coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, represented the United States, alongside Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry.

Hacham said that despite the positive images, a large gap remains between the discussions and “the situation on the ground.”

During the summit, Israel reportedly agreed to freeze construction in Judea and Samaria for four months and to stop recognizing unauthorized outposts for six months.

The P.A. reportedly committed to implementing its “legal right” to carry out security responsibilities in Area A of Judea and Samaria, where the great majority of the Palestinian population is located.

The sides also reportedly created a forum to further discuss Palestinian demands to receive tax funds that Israel has withheld after deducting the equivalent of the monthly stipends paid to terrorists.

“The P.A. is struggling to impose its authority on the ground. The agreements reached will not be worth the paper they were written on,” Hacham assessed.

Ramadan flashpoint?

Looking ahead, Hacham warned that with Ramadan set to start on Wednesday or Thursday night, what is already an escalation in Palestinian violence could get significantly worse.

He connected the period with religious emotions as well as deliberate incitement, especially from Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip, through the media and social networks.

“When combined, these elements are an almost certain prescription for a security deterioration and escalation,” Hacham warned.

“It is important to emphasize that according to extreme scenarios, the escalation trend could spread to the Gaza Strip and the Arab sector in Israel. These problematic scenarios must be taken seriously by the senior security and political echelon, and require Israel to prepare for them,” he said.

The Ramadan month is characterized by fasting from sunrise to sunset, creating feelings of ongoing pressure for some who observe it, and this could motivate potential attackers to more easily take part in violence against Israeli targets, according to Hacham. “In this state, any incident can push potential attackers into striking,” he said.

“In practice, we are beyond the stage of escalation in the conflict with the Palestinians. Every event has a major significance; it can lead to yet more escalations.”

The Israeli Defense Ministry’s unit for Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) meanwhile announced on Monday steps to facilitate Ramadan festivities.

COGAT said the measures reflect “the recommendations of the security services and are intended to provide freedom of worship for the Palestinian public.”

The measures include approving the entry of Palestinian worshippers onto the Temple Mount for Friday prayers during the month of Ramadan, but with restrictions for security purposes. 

“Females of all ages, and boys up to the age of 12, may enter with no need for an existing permit. Men 55 years of age and older may enter without a permit, and men 45 years of age and older, but less than 55, may enter provided they have a valid permit. All permits are contingent on receipt of security approval,” said COGAT.

“Also for Ramadan, visits to family in Israel have been approved for Palestinian residents of Judea and Samaria, as well as visits to relatives in Judea and Samaria by residents of foreign countries. We emphasize that issuance of all permits is subject to security approval,” it added.

Ultimately, said Hacham, of the three options available regarding the future of Judea and Samaria: strengthening the P.A. to enable it to continue to rule there; a Hamas takeover; and a return of the area to Israeli direct control, the first is the one that is aligned with Israel’s core security interests.

Israel should manage future events with this strategic reality in mind, he said.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief, Judicial Reform, Terror Threats & Israel Dubai Defense deal

By Yaakov Lappin

Israel’s Channel 12 News reported March 17 that Justice Minister Yariv Levin and Knesset Constitution Committee Chair Simcha Rothman are considering a one-year suspension of their judicial overhaul program, except for planned changes to the judicial selection committee, which stand at the heart of the reform.

If the changes are implemented, this would give the ruling government coalition a majority in the committee and allow it to appoint three Supreme Court judges this year, while also replacing the court's president.

The report is the latest sign of efforts underway by the coalition to search for a last minute compromise to the unprecedented political and societal crisis that is gripping Israel. The coalition wishes to pass at least part of its program by the end of the Knesset's winter session on April 2.

However, if no compromise is reached and the Supreme Court rules the measures to be illegal, the Court is likely to strike down the reform leading to an unprecedented a constitutional crisis.

In the event of a constitutional crisis, who will the IDF, the Israel Police, the civil service, and others listen to — the Supreme Court or the government? If Israel’s institutions are forced to make such a choice, this could lead to scenes of chaos on the streets, which are already filled with hundreds of thousands of anti-reform demonstrators, and it is one that the government will try to avoid.

Terrorist from Lebanon plants roadside bomb in North

A roadside bomb that severely wounded a motorist in northern Israel on March 13 was planted by a terrorist who infiltrated the country from Lebanon, security forces revealed.

Authorities said Israeli forces killed the terrorist as he attempted to return to Lebanon. The IDF has not yet named who they believe dispatched the terrorist but has not ruled out the possibility he was sent by Hezbollah.

Shareef ad-Din, 21, from the Israeli Arab town of Salem, was the Arab Israeli driver wounded when the explosive device detonated around 6 a.m. on Route 65 near Megiddo Junction. The bomb was planted behind a barrier by the side of the road, some 18 miles southeast of Haifa.

The Megiddo Junction is 37 miles from the border with Lebanon. Getting there by road would add another 12.5 miles to the trip.

After the blast, the IDF, Shin Bet, and Israel Police began a joint manhunt in an effort to catch the terrorist, including the establishment of roadblocks in northern Israel.

A checkpoint near the village of Ya'ara stopped a car with a suspect inside who was armed with suicide bomb vest and a gun. Israeli security forces shot and killed him. A second man, a driver, was arrested and later released.

Security sources say that the suspect probably planned to perpetrate another attack before returning to Lebanon.

In trying to ascertain which terror organization is behind the attack, Hezbollah is the immediate suspect, due to its control over southern Lebanon, though Hamas is also a suspect. A collaboration between both – with Iranian knowledge and assistance - is also a possibility.

Could the attack be an attempt by Israel’s enemies to exploit the political crisis?  Was it a response to the recent drone attack on Iran’s weapons site in Isfahan, or strikes on Iranian targets in Syria?

Whoever launched the attack is testing Israel’s response in a deniable manner, trying to avoid the threshold of war.

Israeli defense company Rafael and Dubai police jointly taking on drone threats

Israel's Rafael defense company announced March 16 that it will cooperate with Dubai Police in addressing regional drone challenges and strengthening the anti-drone capabilities of Dubai Police.

Rafael’s Drone Dome uses electronic jammers, advanced sensors, and AI algorithms to protect threatened airspace against drone intrusions.

 The goal of the partnership is to make the Emirati city safer and stop any possible threats from unmanned aerial systems. Dubai Police and Rafael agreed to install Drone Dome for the Dubai Police's air defense needs.

Major General Mohammed Nasser Al Razzoqi , Director of the General Department of Operations at Dubai Police said in a statement that  "At Dubai Police, we recognize the importance of staying ahead of emerging threats and utilizing cutting-edge technologies to enhance the safety and security of our community. Our collaboration with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. is a testament to our commitment to addressing regional UAS [Unmanned Aerial Systems]challenges and safeguarding valued assets. Together, we are leveraging the power of multiple technologies and systems to strengthen our security and safety capabilities."

Brig. Gen. (res.) Shachar Shohat, Vice President of Strategy and Business Development, Air and Missile Defense Division at Rafael – who is also a senior research advisor at the MirYam Institute –, said, "We are proud to be standing alongside the Dubai Police and are committed to supporting the efforts to ensure that the regional threats and UAS challenges are met with the most advanced solutions. This cooperation is a step towards advancing defense capabilities and utilizing systems that have proven themselves effective in protecting an array of valued assets."

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Israel Must Balance International Standing with Domestic Policy

By Danny Ayalon

A unique synergy of regional and global trends has meant that Israel's international stance has grown stronger over the last two decades; yet, while this growth trend could continue, it is being overshadowed by the country’s judicial reform crisis.

The global market recognizes the importance of Israel's leadership in the high-tech sector, and because the future rests in the technological sector, Israel, by definition, has become a major asset, leading many countries to want to grow closer to the Jewish state.

Israel offers assets not just in the fields of AI, quantum computing, IT, or medical systems - but also in water technology, food-tech, and agro-tech, all of which can ensure global food security and water availability, particularly in the parched Middle East.

Another factor that has made Israel appealing as an asset is the discovery of Mediterranean gas fields in in its economic waters. This has turned Israeli into a regional energy supplier, sending gas to Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, as well as to Europe via Egypt.

Israel's standing was further significantly strengthened by the Abraham Accords, which have demonstrated that the country is perceived as the only force that can stand in the way of Iran's expansionist agenda, as well as Tehran’s subversion, terrorism, and its nuclear ambitions.

Furthermore, Israel has been successful in detaching the Palestinian issue from its regional and global standing and diplomatic relations with Arab states. It has maintained strategic relations with Jordan (despite routine crises in bilateral relations), Egypt, the European Union, and, of course, the United States, despite substantive divisions over the Palestinian issue.

Now, the Abraham Accord states have bypassed the Palestinians, after the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco realized they can no longer be held hostage by the Palestinian Authority’s veto power. They have instead recognized the importance of ties with Israel and cooperation on technology, food and water, counter-terrorism, and halting Iran's nuclear program. These states recognized that their own interests take precedence over the Palestinian issue, which is not a core national security issue that they share.

This recognition by Arab states has, in turn, assisted other countries, particularly those in the European Union, which have always been sensitive to the Palestinian issue, to move forward on cooperation with Israel.

On top of these factors, global changes are underway, in the form of superpower competition between China and the U.S. on one hand, and the war in Ukraine on the other, which have boosted Israel’s standing as well, adding to its importance and attractiveness.

Israeli military technology is among the most advanced in the world - whether it be precision weapons and ammunition, anti-ballistic missile defense systems, or cyber defenses. Israeli cooperation with NATO members is expanding significantly these days, due to the deterioration of the global security situation.

Germany, for example, is increasing its defense budget exponentially, and there is a good chance that some of that budget will go to Israeli military technology. This strategically binds Europe to Israel.

Another important consideration is U.S.-China competition. When the Americans speak of pivoting to the East to contain China with a ring of pro-American alliances, there is a significant concern among pro-U.S. Arab states that they will do so at the expense of Washington’s Middle Eastern presence.

But the U.S. feels it can conduct this pivot because it knows that Israel is its most reliable ally, which has the capabilities that can reassure Abraham Accord states regarding the Iranian threat. Even though America's main focus is now on China (Chinese aerostats have infiltrated American skies), and on Ukraine, Arab states and the U.S. find it convenient to have Israel around to back-up American capabilities in the Middle East, and to provide a solution to all of the regional threats – Iran and its radical terrorist axis, and its nuclear program.

As a result of these global, economic, technological, energy, and strategic trends, the attractiveness of Israel grows over time.

In this context, it almost doesn't matter which government is in power in Israel. There is sufficient international agreement on core issues like Iran among the Abraham Accords states, and on Ukraine, Russia, and China by the EU states and the US, to make it clear that Israel’s assets are essential in the new regional and global orders taking shape.

However, from here on, much will depend on Israeli policy. Israel is currently suffering a murderous wave of Palestinian terrorism. Instead of dishing out collective punishment, Israel's response has been expanding settlements and recognizing nine settlement outposts, something that has never been acceptable to the international community, including Jerusalem’s great friend the United States. However, the Americans did not go into crisis mode over this decision. Instead, Israel and the U.S. agreed to disagree.

With the exception of the Obama administration in 2016, the U.S. has always vetoed Palestinian attempts to generate UN Security Council condemnations against Israel.

This shield was recently tested once again, and found to be solid, due to the genuine friendship and shared interests and values between Israel and the U.S. It is not in America's best interests to break with Israel over the Palestinians, since Washington has enough pressing issues around the world to tend to, and it does not want to change the dynamics of this relationships.

It is also in America's interest not to internationalize the Israeli - Palestinian conflict because that will ensure there will be no progress on it.  However, a new black swan has arrived, and it is the Israeli government’s push for judicial reform. This will undoubtedly harm Israel's international standing, including relations with the U.S., even if not immediately. If a perception takes hold that the reform will make Israel less democratic, the country’s democratic image -- one of its major strengths -- will be seriously harmed.

It is impossible to overstate how important this is for the U.S., and for Israel’s ability to maintain its special ties with the world’s most powerful superpower. For Washington, the rule of law, separation of powers, and human rights are not just values in and of themselves; they are empirically proven ingredients that create democratic states that are economically stronger and more peaceful.

As a result, American officials are watching events in Israel, and sending very sharp messages, not just through quiet channels, but also in press conferences. This creates a shadow over the future of Israel’s international standing, which will only be lifted if Israel preserves its democratic character. 

Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

An outline for Israel’s new national guard

By Alon Levavi

As protests and political tensions in Israel reach large-scale proportions, the Israel Police is, once again, back in the limelight, acting as the country’s emergency room. The protests are just the latest challenge to the police’s ability to juggle its multiple and unusual responsibilities—a challenge that must be answered by the formation of an Israeli national guard.

Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are continuing steps begun by the last Israeli government to accomplish this goal. A new national guard headquarters is up and running under the command of a police lieutenant. According to reports, Ben-Gvir has been able to secure an NIS 4.5 billion addition to the National Security Ministry’s annual budget for the next two years. The Israel Police’s annual budget in 2022 was NIS 14.4 billion.

This budget addition can help reverse the trend of police officers quitting their jobs due to poor conditions, but the establishment of a national guard will also be essential to taking some of the pressure off the Israel Police.

Much of that pressure stems from the simple fact that the Israel Police’s current configuration is insufficient to meet the challenges it must take on. The entire police force is made up of some 32,000 civilian police officers and 8,000 Border Police officers. Some 5,000 officers are in headquarters and management positions.

This limited force must fight crime, traffic accidents, illegal narcotics and cyber-crime. It must also deal with public disturbances, act as a counterterrorism force and prepare for all kinds of emergency situations such as earthquakes and mass rocket attacks.

Currently, the Israel Police simply lacks the numbers it needs to do all these things—and the challenges are only growing.

Israel is not a typical state. It has numerous security challenges and social fractures, which means that each police officer must be versatile in order to handle a plethora of missions. This harms the police’s professionalism because it prevents the force from optimizing its abilities in its core functions.

Officers are deployed from one district to another—often from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv and back—as events develop, taking on Temple Mount tensions in Jerusalem, then a large parade in Tel Aviv and then mass political rallies. This prevents officers from focusing on specialist areas.

The overall erosion in the organization is significant and the low pay for starting officers—combined with the need to be on constant standby—does not help matters. Add to that the consistently negative public and media portrayal of the police, and you get a force prone to demoralization and resignations.

A case in point is the mixed Arab-Jewish city of Lod in central Israel, which went up in flames in May 2021 during Israel’s conflict with Hamas. Mass rioting, mostly by Arab-Israeli youths, and hate crimes rocked the city. Lod’s police station has an average of three to four patrol cars available to it at any given time and a maximum of 200 officers. This limited force had to deal with thousands of rioters before backup arrived.

That backup took the form of the Border Police, which is part of the Israeli National Police, a natural home for an Israeli national guard.

Originally established soon after the founding of Israel in 1948 to counter terrorist infiltrations from Arab countries, the Border Police evolved over the years into a semi-military police force with military-type unit categories (battalions and companies).

The Border Police conducts a variety of missions in rural areas, some of which are related to agricultural crime; engages in counterterrorism with special units; and provides continuous security in urban areas.

Currently, when Border Police units enter an area under the jurisdiction of a police district or station, it is activated by the local commander in a coordinated manner. This is the primary reason why a national guard must be part of the Israeli National Police: To prevent the appearance of a third force on Israeli territory that would lack clear territorial command structures. Such a scenario would, in a state about the size of New Jersey, cause chaos.

The Border Police is also well-suited to take on rioting and disturbances, since it is not attached to any police district and is free of daily missions such as investigations, traffic enforcement and combatting drug trafficking.

Once a national guard is up and running, the civilian police will be able to continue conducting its core activities even as emergency scenarios erupt, since it would fall to the guard to mobilize large forces and send them where they are needed quickly.

The future national guard should be made up of thousands of officers, including currently serving Border Police conscripts, professional Border Police officers, reserves and volunteers.

During routine times, the national guard should work daily with the civilian police force, assisting it with missions and maintaining high visibility to reassure Israeli civilians. It should also train and build up its forces. During emergencies—for example, major rioting—the guard will go into action and allow classic police duties to continue uninterrupted.

Ultimately, the opportunity to create a new and critical force has arrived and it is vital to do so without undermining or confusing the police chain of command.

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Israel Still Should Not Provide Weapons to Ukraine

By Danny Ayalon & CHUCK FREILICH

The first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an appropriate time to assess Israel’s policies toward it, chiefly its refusal to sell weapons to Ukraine. The need for this assessment is particularly acute given the close strategic relationship that has emerged between Russia and Iran and the ramifications for U.S.-Israeli relations.

Israel’s sympathies lie squarely with Ukraine. Nevertheless, its response to date has been limited to significant, but not overwhelming, humanitarian aid, including a field hospital, ambulances, protective vests, helmets, food, water purification equipment, and more. Israel has reportedly also provided Ukraine with intelligence information and voted with it in the United Nations. Conversely, Israel has steadfastly rebuffed Ukrainian requests to provide weapons, including defensive ones, such as Iron Dome.

A wounded bear is particularly dangerous and Russia can cause Israel severe harm. We thus believe that Israel’s refusal to sell Ukraine weapons remains appropriate, but that this may change depending on Russia’s actions. For now, we propose a number of semi-military measures that would be of great utility for Ukraine and position Israel firmly within the Western camp but mitigate Russia’s response.

There are seven primary reasons for our caution.

First, Iran has supplied Russia with 1,700 drones, is apparently building a factory in Russia to produce as many as 6,000 more, and may provide it with ballistic missiles. In return, Russia has reportedly agreed to supply Iran with SU-35s fighters, helicopters, and possibly the S-400 air-defense system, warships, submarines, and satellites. Russia and Iran already cooperate in the cyber realm. They also recently signed two agreements designed to promote bilateral economic ties and circumvent international sanctions: a “transportation corridor” from Russia to Iran and out to the Far East; and an alternative mechanism to the global SWIFT system. Israel must avoid measures that may lead to an even closer Russian-Iranian strategic alliance.

Second, Russia and Iran are the two primary players in Syria. At times, Russia has sought to counterbalance Iran’s efforts to expand its influence there, including the build-up of a significant military presence and use of Syria to transfer weapons to Hezbollah. Wartime needs forced Russia to withdraw some forces from Syria, but not the S-400s. If used against Israeli aircraft, Israel’s ability to counter Iran’s buildup would be greatly constrained. So far, Russia has refrained from doing so, but that could change at any time. No less than NATO countries, Israel is on the front lines with Russia today and can find itself at war at any moment with Iran, Hezbollah, and Iranian-supported Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel cannot allow this to happen.

Third, Russia is a party to the nuclear agreement with Iran and ongoing international negotiations. At times, Russia has played a constructive role in this regard, but it has been supportive of Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency recently and can be highly disruptive. A desperate Russia might even provide Iran with concrete assistance for its nuclear program. Israel cannot afford to alienate Russia too much.

Fourth, Israel is not a global power with major weapons stockpiles, does not have the spare capability, and cannot transfer critical systems to Ukraine without endangering its own security. Indeed, it has the minimum number of Iron Dome batteries necessary and a shortage of interceptor missiles. Moreover, as Ukraine’s defense minister indicated, other systems are better suited to its needs, including American ones, which the United States has abjured from supplying so far. What Ukraine really wants is to drag Israel into the conflict on its side. That is understandable, but Israel must weigh its overall interests, not just sentiments.

Fifth, some 15 percent of Israel’s population has roots in the former USSR and 600,000 Jews still live in Russia. Russia has already taken measures designed to demonstrate its ability to stop emigration. The ingathering of the exiles is Israel’s raison d’être.

Sixth, unless the United States changes the policy of partial disengagement from the Middle East pursued by four consecutive presidents, Russia will remain a critical player in the region. In addition to support for Iran, Russia is providing Turkey and Egypt with advanced weapons and nuclear power reactors that could morph into military nuclear programs, has proposed similar deals with the Saudis and others, is an important player in OPEC+ and Libya, and more.

Seventh, France, Germany, Japan, and other leading states have provided only limited aid to Ukraine, belatedly and hesitantly. South Korea has refused to provide any weapons. Even the United States has imposed strict limits on the kinds of weapons it provides, for example, aircraft, missiles, air-defense systems, and until now, tanks. Israel does not have to be at the forefront of this issue. Some question Israel’s commitment to the Western camp because they have high expectations of it; others because they wish to use this issue as part of a broader delegitimization campaign. Most understand that Israel’s strategic circumstances require painful compromises between moral and strategic considerations.

Changes to Israel’s refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine might be warranted if, for example, Russia decided to limit its freedom of aerial maneuver in Syria; supplied certain weapons systems to Iran, e.g. the S-400s; adopted a clearly obstructionist position in the nuclear talks; or provided direct assistance to Iran’s nuclear program. In each case, the details would determine the nature of Israel’s response. Russia must be made to understand that Israel has the ability to significantly harm its interests, if pushed too far.

What Israel should be doing, were it not engulfed in its domestic convulsions, is providing Ukraine with outsized humanitarian assistance. It should send the field hospital back to Ukraine, if necessary, by turning it into an Israel Defense Force (IDF) operation; dispatch IDF search and rescue teams; expand rehabilitation programs for wounded Ukrainians; and complete the transfer of the rocket alert technology promised to Ukraine, all areas in which Israel is a global frontrunner. It should again provide emergency supplies for Ukrainian civilians.

Expanded assistance such as this would be of significant benefit for Ukraine, but likely not lead to an excessive Russian response. All sides understand that there are certain rules to the game.

Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

National Day Of Hate should remind us of the limits of free speech

By Mark Goldfeder & GABRIEL GROISMAN

Law enforcement officials nationwide issued warnings to the Jewish community over the weekend after neo-Nazi groups designated Saturday a national “Day of Hate,” with organizers calling for their followers to “shock the masses.”

Sadly, this was not surprising given recent events.

Our country has experienced an alarming increase in antisemitism recently, including attacks that are reminiscent of another time and place. Jewish Americans have faced physical assaults, verbal onslaughts, and profanity-laced and ominous flyers dropped off at the doorsteps of Jewish neighborhoods around the country. A viral video this past week, for example, showed a group of bigots in Orlando, Florida, waiting outside a Jewish center to instigate and harass the members. One of the instigators shoved a megaphone in the face of a rabbi and screamed things such as: “kike,” “Heil Hitler,” “Do you think you should be put in ovens,” and “You filthy Jew.”

This incident was not isolated, and the perpetrators are not only white supremacists. By all accounts, antisemitic discrimination and hate crimes are at an all-time high in our country and are being perpetrated by multiple groups with different agendas. The time has come for a collective response.

Many might be concerned that cracking down on hateful conduct could violate Americans’ right to free speech. It is critical, however, for all elected and law enforcement officials, as well as members of the public, to better understand the outer bounds of freedom of speech under the law. The bottom line is that the offended party is not without redress in many of these cases.

To be sure, freedom of speech , even offensive and hateful speech, should be protected. But there are limits to what constitutes speech, and there are rules for when it crosses over into actionable conduct. A number of the individuals involved in organizing these antisemitic activities, for example, are convicted felons with histories of bigoted violence, and in light of their groups’ increasing hostilities and the very real threat they continue to pose, authorities must be vigilant in safeguarding potential targets.

The First Amendment does not protect any unlawful conduct, which includes trespassing, vandalism, harassment, assault, and the destruction of property. The First Amendment also does not protect someone who is making true threats, which the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black (2003) defined as “statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Nor does it protect intimidation, which is “a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”

There is no First Amendment protection for speech that involves incitement, which the court in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) explained includes speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Nor does the First Amendment protect speech that aims not to inform or persuade, but to disrupt lawful endeavors — activities such as participating in a private synagogue’s religious service. Obscenity is not protected under the First Amendment either, and violations of federal obscenity laws, which can include visual depictions, spoken words, or written text (like some of the filth on the distributed flyers), are criminal offenses.

Finally, the protections that the First Amendment puts in place are meant to protect citizens from the government abridging their speech — not to limit the rights of other private individuals. Private businesses and landowners can restrict certain speech, conduct, and demonstrations, in most cases, without triggering any constitutional issues.

It is important to be clear on these rules because the inflammatory, discriminatory antisemitic rhetoric that hate groups spread often leads directly to antisemitic violence. For example, just two weeks ago, one follower who had shared this particular network’s antisemitic propaganda was arrested on charges of shooting two Jewish men as they were leaving synagogues in Los Angeles.

The danger of incitement is real, and authorities must act quickly and decisively to immediately curb any behavior that crosses from free speech into unlawful conduct. Failing to do so will have disastrous results, not only for the Jewish community, but also for all Americans. As the late Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks once explained, “Antisemitism is the world’s most reliable early warning sign of a major threat to freedom. ... It matters to all of us. Which is why we must fight it together.”

Our leaders must make use of all the tools they have at their disposal, and this means understanding that the First Amendment is not a free pass to threaten, harass, intimidate, or otherwise violate the rights of others.

Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Juniper Oak Plus: A Mega Security Infrastructure in the Middle East

By Amit Kumar

The biggest cooperative military drill between the United States and Israel, comprising 142 aircraft, dozens of ships, and nuclear bombs, began on January 23. Preparation for this real fire drill, labelled "Juniper Oak" began after Benjamin Netanyahu reclaimed the premiership a few months ago. The drill’s timing is crucial since it coincides with a complex geopolitical dilemma including internal unrest in Iran, the reviving of the US-Iran nuclear deal, Russian aggression, and Chinese meddling in the Middle East.

Iran would be the nation most impacted by Juniper Oak. Iran is concentrating on strengthening its ties with China and Russia after anticipating such a military exercise. Iranian membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the signing of a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with China, President Ebrahim Raisi's most recent visit to China, and Iran's provision of Kamikaze drones to Russia are all indicators of how desperately Iran is attempting to assemble a network of allies to oppose Israel. The US and Israel's regional plan calls for developing a bigger, better security infrastructure incorporating regional powers like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in light of the US pulling out a significant portion of its troops from the Middle East. Due to the shifting sands in the Middle East and the constant emergence of new threats, “Juniper Oak Plus” will soon become a reality.

The U.S.-Iran relationship has been tense for a long time. Both the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and the drone attack that killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 were key events that contributed to the deterioration of relations between the two nations. Iran's economy suffered as a result of the reinstatement of U.S. sanctions. Iran responded by continuing its nuclear program and disregarding the JCPOA's provisions. Since that time, both sides have taken a number of reciprocal actions that have only damaged their relationship.

Israel, on the other hand, has always opposed Iran's political system and nuclear development. Hamas and Hezbollah are prominent Islamic extremist organizations that get ideological, financial, and lethal aid from the Iranian government. These groups are dedicated to waging jihad against Israel. Political leadership has a determination to "Vanish the government occupying Jerusalem from pages of history," which may involve developing a nuclear weapon.

The United States has a well-planned strategy to set the groundwork for creating a strong security infrastructure in the midst of this instability. A series of joint normalization statements, first between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, with effect as of September 15, 2020, were produced as a result of the Abraham Accords, which was carefully mapped out to soften ties among Arab nations with Israel. I2U2 -  grouping of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the U.S. - was created to skillfully and intricately tie Israel with the Arab world in light of the success of the above. Building a solid foundation is essential if future military cooperation between Arab countries and Israel is to take the form of anything like "Juniper Oak Plus." This military drill is a precursor to a mega security infrastructure the U.S. plans to erect to counter the threat posed by Iran and other terrorist organizations.

The majority of Arab countries disagree with Iran's adherence to Islamic principles. Major Arab nations including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain do not approve of its interpretation of Islam, aspirations to rule the Islamic world, and oil export policies.

The oil trade and Islamic domination have caused a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Previous peace negotiations between these two nations, mediated by Iraq, failed to resolve the current situation. Recent examples of hostilities between these two nations include the attack on an oil ship in the Gulf of Oman in 2018 and the raid on the Khurais oil field in Saudi Arabia’s  eastern province in 2019. The United States released intelligence in October 2022 about an imminent Iranian strike that threatened the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iraq, and Israel. According to the information, Iran planned an airstrike against Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf.

As a result, Iran's unpredictable political and military actions under the control of a radical political militia puts Arab countries at risk. This also has an impact on their sovereignty. Arab countries will be able to stand strong in the Middle East, achieve lasting peace & economic progress, and address this problem by forging a military alliance with Israel and the U.S.

Engaging Saudi Arabia and the UAE in military drills may strengthen mutual confidence and cooperation among regional allies, promote interoperability and coordination, and strengthen collective defense capabilities. Both nations are significant participants in regional security and have recently upgraded their armed forces. Expanding “Juniper Oak” to “Juniper Oak Plus” by including Saudi Arabia and the UAE would result in robust security infrastructure.

By conducting such military drills, the U.S. hopes to earn the trust of other regional powers and persuade them to collaborate with it in developing a mega security infrastructure that would enable it to lead the global campaign against Islamic terrorism. With Israel establishing friendly ties with Arab nations, the U.S. mediation has fostered a peaceful environment in the Middle East. This is a crucial step in addressing challenges like Iran's nuclear ambitions, the expansionist aspect of Iranian political philosophy, the sponsorship of terrorism through the usage of oil resources, and the expansion of Russia and China in Gulf states.

The participation of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel in the drill would signify a closer alignment between the nations and could result in more military cooperation. As a result, regional security issues may be approached more systematically, especially when it comes to containing Iran's influence. The U.S., Israel, UAE, and Saudi Arabia might cooperate militarily through participation in the Juniper Oak exercise, which could improve their defense skills and capacity to address regional threats.

Amit Kumar is a doctoral student at BITS PILANI in India. His primary study focus is China's relationship with Islam. Amit has worked as a Political Researcher for the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, India's National Political Party's youth wing. Read full bio here.