By Tomer Barak
If an outsider were to analyze Israel-Jordan ties in the weeks following returning Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's election victory, he would be led to the mistaken assumption that the peace between the two countries is stable, if not good.
Following the Israeli elections on Nov. 1, Jordan's King Abdullah II and Israel's President Isaac Herzog held warm meetings (at the COP27 climate summit in Sharm el-Sheikh), and a follow-up pact was agreed upon to promote the implementation of the electricity-water project (in which Israel sends the parched Hashemite Kingdom desalinated water, and Jordan sends Israel electricity from its solar panels).
Later, the two parties signed a letter of intent as part of a collaborative endeavor to restore and improve the Jordan River's ecology.
In addition, a public phone call was held between Netanyahu and King Abdullah. Both sides described the call as favorable.
But the above does not reflect the animosity and deep distrust between Abdullah and Netanyahu. Neither does it reflect Jordan's concerns over regional security and thus the stability of the kingdom itself. These concerns have grown significantly in light of Netanyahu's election win and the coalition he is forming with far-right parties.
The fears over Netanyahu's return are crystal clear to anyone reading the Jordanian newspapers which depict him as the leader of an extremist cabinet that will include several figures seen as regional pyromaniacs, foremost among them, the designated minister of national security, Itamar Ben Gvir.
To put it simply, this Jordanian interpretation of Israel's election results draws a direct link between the radicalization of Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria, as well as in Jerusalem, with Jordan's stability, and King Abdullah's status in particular.
Jordan's elites are concerned about three main issues.
First and foremost, there is the domestic front.
For years, the king has been more or less successful in balancing the Jordanian public's deep anti-Israeli sentiment with the need to rely on Israel when it comes to stability, and the kingdom's water and energy needs. The issue of security is also important, but since most security cooperation between the two countries is conducted away from the public spotlight, it usually continues without significant challenge. Coordination between the two countries has even reached new heights in recent years, in the face of a series of shared regional threats.
Abdullah has chosen to continue purchasing gas from Israel (at a reduced price) and receives crucial water supplies for his parched state. He has also signed further deals with Israel despite strong opposition from the public and parliament, including mass demonstrations.
The Jordanians, however, are concerned that provocations on the Palestinian issue could result in widespread, fierce public protests calling for the cancellation of the peace agreement with Israel.
Such developments could well force the authorities to take steps that would undoubtedly damage ties in order to placate the Jordanian street. This might even affect the profound Israeli strategic understanding that the peace with Jordan is a strategic asset for Israel and needs to be preserved at all costs.
Another front is Jordan's status in Jerusalem.
Jordan sees its unique position in regard to the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) as one of the keys to maintaining both King Abdullah's stature as the custodian of the holy places, and the stability of the Hashemite system as a whole.
It is worth mentioning that Jordan has often been able to use its unique position as the responsible adult to 'switch off' escalating tensions on the Temple Mount before they got out of hand. The kingdom has been the subject of praise for this role.
At the same time, Jordan lives under a continuous sense that its special role in Jerusalem is under threat from Israel and from other Arab and regional powers who seek to take a leading role at its expense.
On that matter, even if Netanyahu is perceived by Jordan as being committed to the status quo, Amman sees the emerging Israeli government as a real threat to its place in the Holy City.
The ultra-right-wing government could not only accelerate a dramatic increase in the number of Jews who visit the Temple Mount and pray there but could also abolish the status quo by allowing Jewish prayer on the Mount itself, or by establishing within the compound areas for Jews only. Currently, Jews are not allowed to pray at the compound that sits on top the mount.
It is clear to many in Jordan that any change to the status quo will trigger a deadly landslide, igniting internal Jordanian instability and heightening competition in the Arab world for control of the Temple Mount and dealing a blow to Abdullah's standing.
The third front concerns Israel's actions in Judea and Samaria.
Jordan's concerns have been stoked by the possibility that the new Israeli government could take unilateral measures such as annexation of the Jordan Valley or stepping up the settlement project.
Moreover, friction and violence in the West Bank could easily escalate, particularly during the Ramadan period in March and April next year.
Jordan appears to be less concerned about a scenario involving broad Israeli annexation of Judea and Samaria, due to the severe international ramifications that this move would induce. Such a move would also constitute a breach of the Abraham Accords, the pinnacle of Netanyahu's regional-diplomatic legacy.
Moreover, the new Israeli government's approach to Gaza and belligerent comments from designated cabinet members regarding possible confrontation in the Gaza Strip are setting off alarm bells in Amman.
On the bright side, it appears that Jordan's leadership still views the peace accord with Israel as a strategic asset that provides the kingdom with significant political, economic, and security advantages, and it does not want the treaty to be weakened. In light of the above, it appears that the near future holds the potential to drastically strain—and damage—Israeli-Jordanian relations. In the best-case scenario, the two sides, under U.S. and regional encouragement, preserve the old equation: Enhanced yet low-profile security cooperation, selected areas of additional cooperation, and mutual mistrust and political tensions.
Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.