Deciphering Hezbollah’s decision-making

By Yochai Guiski

Contrary to frequent statements made of late in both Israel and Lebanon, it is far from clear that Israel and Hezbollah are entering a period characterized by heightened risk of miscalculation.

Rather, the current period appears to be marked by a more intense exchange of warning signals between the two adversaries – particularly in Syria, where Israel has reportedly been highly active.

Hezbollah, for its part, has also initiated maneuvers, such as the March cross-border Megiddo highway terror bombing, although these have not succeeded in causing Israel to lose its balance. In April, Hamas in Lebanon fired 34 rockets at northern Israel, sparking Israeli retaliatory airstrikes.

Last year, Hezbollah threatened Israeli offshore gas rigs in the Mediterranean in the lead-up to the Lebanese – Israeli maritime border agreement and sent unmanned aerial vehicles in the direction of one of the rigs.

Together, such incidents could collectively suggest that we are in an era of heightened tensions in which any miscalculation could drag the region into conflict, much like the period leading up to the 2006 Second Lebanon War.

But another way of seeing things is that the situation is far from being on a slippery slope and that it is far from being a repeat of 2006.

It is true that Hezbollah seems to feel freer to launch tactical attacks and also more capable of doing so. And that Israel feels the need to reset the dynamics, returning to a situation in which Hezbollah was more restrained. But this does not mean that either side is likely to make a gross miscalculation any time soon.

The last decade has demonstrated that both Israel and Hezbollah can de-escalate – even when one or both of the sides sustain casualties. Both sides have learned too much from the 2006 war to blindly repeat those actions.

Is Hezbollah wrongly judging reality due to internal tensions in Israel? So far, Hezbollah has shown that it does understand the Israeli system well. However, there is a joker in the pack that could still upset the situation: Iran.

If Israel concludes that it must take action because the Iranian nuclear program is advancing too far, then it may, potentially, also feel the need to take Hezbollah out of the equation in parallel military actions. If the Iranian arena stabilizes, however, and the U.S. reaches some sort of arrangement with Tehran, that will neutralize the above scenario.

Despite all of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's bravado in his speeches, he is, in practice, very cautious and understands the fragility of his situation. 

Hezbollah’s decision-making vis-à-vis Iran

First and foremost, Hezbollah is an independent entity, both in its decision-making and in choosing how to respond to Iranian calls to action.  Of course, Iran has a very significant dialogue with Hezbollah, but in the end, Hezbollah is independent.

Does that mean Hezbollah will turn Iran down on the day of the order to go into combat with Israel? Most likely, it will not do that, but it could decide to limit the intensity of the action, and the scope of the action that it takes.

There is also the question of how other players figure into Hezbollah’s decisions. Hamas is not really an influence. Hamas leaders will not decide if Hezbollah or Iran escalate. On the flip side, however, Hamas’s leaders may decide that they will join in a future Israel – Hezbollah conflict.

Would Hezbollah be the initiator of conflict, like Egypt was in 1967? That scenario seems highly unlikely at this time. At the very least, Syria would have to stabilize first, much more than it currently is.

Would Hezbollah be willing to consider “lying on the fence” for Iran? It may choose to do that to a certain extent, and that is why Hezbollah is always preparing for war.

Hezbollah lives in dissonance between its Shi'ite Islamist messianic vision of destroying Israel and its day-to-day realpolitik considerations, which very much guide it and dominate its actual decision-making.

An Iranian nuclear umbrella is certainly an event that could change the situation, boosting Hezbollah’s tolerance for clashes. But this scenario is far down the road.

For the most part, and on a daily basis, Hezbollah’s decisions are guided by very rational calculations, much like those of its benefactor, Iran.

One often repeated question about Hezbollah’s decision-making is the role played by Israeli deterrence. But a more precise way of analyzing this aspect is to inquire about Hezbollah’s overall balance of interests.

Deterrence is too imprecise a concept to measure decisions by since it reduces all actions to binary dos or don’ts. Deterrence is by definition the power to dissuade an adversary from acting. In reality, Hezbollah is building up force and does initiate some hostile actions, but its overall balance of interests prevents it from initiating war with Israel.

Hezbollah has a concept of defense and attack, and it is keenly aware that it has a powerful enemy located to the south with many capabilities that are dangerous to it. Part of its war readiness against Israel is tied to its ideological values and affiliation with Iran. These all factor into Hezbollah’s complex balance of interests.

Lebanese domestic interests greatly affect Nasrallah’s decisions too – more than is often given credit for.

The interests of Lebanese Shiites themselves within Lebanon, the dynamics within the Lebanese government, relations with non-Shi’ite Lebanese allies, external relationships between outside players and the Lebanese state, the involvement of foreign powers in the region, all play a role, adding another layer of complexity to Hezbollah’s decision-making process.

It is a process that requires in-depth study, and one that cannot be reduced to pure ideology or to merely following Iranian directives.

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Gaza operation won’t stop next escalation

By Zvika Haimovich

The latest conflict between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Israel in early May has changed nothing when it comes to the basic strategic equation in place between Israel and the Gazan terror factions.

The fact that Hamas stayed out of this latest campaign means that the stop clock has begun to the next escalation involving Gaza’s ruling faction.

It is time for Israelis to ask themselves what the government’s strategy is for dealing with Palestinian terror factions in Gaza. They should do so immediately and not wait again passively for the next escalation to occur to raise this question.

Public comments by government representatives who claim that Israel has changed the equation in Gaza are simply false. The basic equation in Gaza remains identical to the situation that existed before Operation Shield and Arrow, just as it has before and after every previous round of fighting between Israel and Gazan terror factions over the past 15 years.

The question that should be guiding Israel’s strategy is how to delay the next break out of violence from Gaza for many years, not months. The first step in moving in that direction is to create political leverage on top of Israel’s military achievements, rather than relying on the IDF’s capabilities alone to buy a little more quiet.

One answer for shaping a new Israeli strategy should involve the recruitment of a regional coalition of powerful actors, involving Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and others, who would be significantly more involved in Gazan affairs. The goal of such a coalition would be to push for a long-term political arrangement between Hamas and Israel that would produce years of quiet.

As part of such an arrangement, Israel must also present to the world its legitimate demand that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad cease their continuous production of projectiles, whose sole intention is to terrorize, kill and injure Israeli civilians, while using Gazan civilians as human shields.

While Gaza won’t disarm tomorrow, it is important to begin delegitimizing the war crimes of Gazan terror factions on the world stage and to counter the trend of normalizing such actions, which has become all too common in recent years.

The escalation was ultimately a highly limited campaign, which must not be confused with the main combat scenario that Israel needs to prepare for.

During the five-day escalation, Israeli air defenses performed well, intercepting more than 95% of projectiles heading for built-up areas – but not providing a hermetic defense, a fact that took on a tragic form in the killings of two civilians in Rehovot and the western Negev during the fighting.

This is another reminder that no hermetic air defense solution exists, despite the advanced technology, sensors, and interceptors that take on Gazan-made projectiles. These rockets can follow unusual trajectories, presenting real challenges for air defenses.

Iron Dome has undergone continuous upgrades over the years, meaning that today’s system can cover far larger areas, deal with larger barrages and deal with more threatening projectiles. It is only the same system as the one first unveiled in 2011 in name, not in substance or capabilities; its evolution has been dramatic. No other air defense system in the world can even compare with Iron Dome’s performance.

Iron Dome forms one layer in Israel’s multi-layered air defense system, which also includes David’s Sling, the intermediate altitude system successfully employed for the first time during the May clashes, and the Arrow 2 and 3 systems against long-range ballistic missiles.

When the Iron Beam laser system becomes operational, an added layer of interception will become available to Israel’s air defenders.

If the Israeli Air Force can establish that terror rockets are repeatedly destroyed before entering Israeli air space, this could have an eventual effect on the IDF’s policy of sounding sirens for every rocket launch, enabling Israel to decrease such sirens potentially.

For this change to take place, it will be necessary to prove that the laser system – at first the ground-based interceptors, which will take around two years to be fully operational, and later, the aerial version placed on drones – can truly make some of the sirens redundant.

Israel is not yet at this stage, however, and even the laser system does not offer the guarantee of hermetic defenses.

Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind that the significant military threat facing Israel is the prospect of a multi-arena conflict involving Iran and its array of ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs, Hezbollah, with its mammoth projectile arsenal, Hamas in Gaza, and others.

Such a scenario, which would be a completely different challenge to the Israeli home front, compared to the most recent escalation, needs to be placed on the Israeli public agenda now; it is the threat that Israel needs to focus on.

The danger of public complacency based on the misunderstanding that this conflict is indicative of all of Israel’s future wars is real.

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Zvika Haimovich served as Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces from 2015-2018. He was Active Defense Wing Commander during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). Read full bio here.

The state budget is Irresponsible

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

If all goes well for the government and things proceed according to plan, by the time this column is published, the state budget for 2023 - 2024 will have passed. Beyond the disputes within the coalition, the tendency of each party to pull in its direction and try and get a bigger slice of the cake, beyond the numbers and charts, beyond the headlines, the budget book tells a story, one in which numbers, unlike words, cannot lie, and the story does not have a happy ending.

To simplify the picture without having to dive into the numbers, imagine that you have a sum of money in the bank today that you would like to use for investment. After you look carefully over your bank statement, which includes your expenses and revenues, you search for the investment options that can deliver a maximum return. Your goal is to take care of your children’s future; their education, weddings, or helping them buy an apartment. At the same time, you want to make sure that your retirement is also taken care of.

It sounds simple, but if we seek to apply this same logic to the state budget presented to the Knesset, we will see that the current government has its own rules. If the train continues at high speed down the current route, we will all end up in the abyss. Or to put it differently, everyone gets wet when it rains.

The planned state budget for 2023 is NIS 484 billion and NIS 514 billion in 2024. Before we look at where the money is going, and who the state has chosen to invest in, let's recollect where the money comes from.

The bulk of the state budget comes from us, the citizens who work and carry the burden on our shoulders, with about 300 billion NIS in state revenues coming from taxes. The equation is simple -- the less economic ability Israel’s citizens have, the greater the harm to the State of Israel -- and that is without even addressing the issue of risk-averse investors, who have identified problematic trends and are pulling their money out.

The Chief Economist at the Finance Ministry, Shira Greenberg, recently released a report warning of the dire consequences for the Israeli economy resulting from the way the budget is being distributed. Among other things, she wrote that these decisions would increase the gaps in Israeli society and discourage people from joining the labor market. Greenberg referred to the fact that growth in Israel is expected to fall by 3.1% in 2023 and that state revenues are expected to be NIS 5.3 billion short of the original forecast. The loss of GDP resulting from the failure to employ the ultra-Orthodox will hit NIS 6.7 trillion over the coming decades, inflation will exceed the annual target, and the uncertainty produced by the judicial reform may also exacerbate the current situation.

Greenberg is a professional appointment, and she is looking at the numbers with great concern, while asking the government to bring the train to a stop. Yet instead of pulling the brakes, it is rushing ahead. The ultra-Orthodox party leaders who have become accustomed over the years to the patent of someone else carrying the economic burden are insatiable. Appetite comes with eating.

Where is the money going? Torah-study institutions will receive an additional seven billion shekels, about four billion will be allocated for benefits for married religious scholars, NIS 125 million will go to support ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture, NIS 600 million for family purity programs, half a billion to religious state education budgets, NIS 279 million to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, of which NIS 67 million will be used to hire more rabbis. Four million shekels will go to paying for religious legal rulings for overseas communities (yes, you read that correctly). Religious institutions that are exempt from teaching the core curriculum will also receive millions of shekels in additional budgets.

What about the middle class, you may ask? Where has the promise of free education from the age of 0-3 gone, what about the cost of living, investment in the geographic and economic periphery, strengthening the Negev and Galilee regions, reinforcing border communities against rocket threats, domestic security, providing for the elderly, students, directing resources to economic growth engines such as high tech and artificial intelligence? The answer will surely be that Israel is a Jewish state and that without its wise religious scholars, we have no right to exist.

Those who provide that answer, however, will forget to mention that an economy that lacks bread will also have no Torah.

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Israel lacks a coordinated public diplomacy system.

By Arthur Koll

The five-day escalation between Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and Israel in early May produced a mixed diplomatic result for Israel, and, above all, underlined the lack of a long-term Israeli strategy regarding the Hamas-controlled enclave as well as an ineffective Israeli public diplomacy system.

On the positive side, the escalation demonstrated that despite President Joe Biden’s negative perception of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu following the latter’s attempt to reform Israel’s judicial system, the American commitment to Israel remains strong.  This vital commitment continues to extend into international organizations, as demonstrated by Washington’s blockage of an attempt to pass an anti-Israel decision at the United Nations Security Council.

During this last escalation, the international media and the international community’s criticism of Israel’s actions was not extraordinarily voluminous. This resulted from the fact that the escalation was short-lived with a relatively low number of casualties and limited destruction in Gaza, when compared to previous rounds of fighting against Hamas.

At the tactical-military level, Israel achieved its goal in the first few seconds of Operation Shield and Arrow, when it simultaneously hit three senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad )PIJ( commanders in Gaza, in three different locations. At this point, after regaining at least some of its lost deterrence power vis-à-vis the terror organizations, Israel would have preferred a swift end of hostilities.

However, the operation dragged on for five more days, due to the absence of an effective completion mechanism to bring it to a halt. Iran, which finances and trains the PIJ, encouraged its proxy to continue firing on Israel.

In addition, the operation exposed a gaping hole in Israel’s ability to coordinate a unified public messaging campaign that involves various components, such as the Prime Minister’s office, the Foreign Ministry, the IDF Spokesperson Unit, and others.

To this day, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has failed to appoint a head of the public diplomacy division, which is stationed in his own office and is answerable to him directly. Nor has he yet appointed a spokesperson to the international media. Luckily, this last Gaza operation ended before international pressure started to mount.  Israel cannot however afford the luxury of lacking a functioning professional public diplomacy apparatus.

To make things worse, The Israeli Minister for Public Diplomacy, Galit Distel Atbaryan, lacks any experience in this line of activity. She appeared to be caught off guard by the military operation and released amateur and ineffective video messages during the escalation, which appeared to be a diversion from her focus of acting as a divisive internal Israeli voice that attacks protesters against the judicial reform.

Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has always given great attention to public diplomacy should urgently pay attention to this matter and repair what is now clearly a dysfunctional structure -- before a much more serious regional or international challenge erupts.

During this minor escalation with the relatively marginal PIJ terror organization, Israel did not pay a heavy price for this governmental chaos. But future, larger conflicts, will surely extract heavier prices from Israel on the international stage.

This latest round, therefore, is a clear warning that the prime minister must take significant steps to put his house in order.

Israel’s diplomatic standing is also harmed by the fact that Jerusalem lacks a strategy for Gaza, and the Palestinian issue in general. This lack of strategy has a knock-on effect on all other aspects of the state’s performance in this context, including public diplomacy. Rather than looking for an arrangement, or at least some sort of long-term agreement, it seems that Israel is dragged into endless bursts of violent eruptions against Hamas, PIJ, or both. And it seems that the intervals between these rounds are getting shorter.

The lack of any new strategic concept that can fundamentally chip away at the old Gaza equation is taking a toll, internally, regionally, and in the wider international arena. Thus, it is clear that the next round is around the corner.

The world is preoccupied with burning global issues, like Russia’s assault on Ukraine and economic challenges, and is getting tired of repetitious clashes between Gazan terror factions and Israel.

This is not welcome news for Israel, which needs active international attention directed to Iran's nuclear advances and its network of terror.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a small part of the Iranian web of client terror organizations that constantly threaten to destabilize the region. Much more significant members of this network are Hamas and, of course, Hezbollah. The likelihood of simultaneous attacks on Israel by Iranian proxies on more than one front is growing.

The IDF is preparing for such developments. It is essential that Prime Minister Netanyahu also uses this time to put his public diplomacy structure in order. It may be needed sooner rather than later. 

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Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

Israel Has Lost Its Deterrence

BY Grisha Yakubovich

Despite often repeated statements in Israel made in recent days that the five-day escalation between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the IDF in early May changed the situation in the Gaza Strip to Hamas’s detriment, the militant Islamic group that rules the Strip has in fact emerged as the biggest victor from the clash.

This is due to two primary factors. The first is that Israel officially set itself the goal of keeping Hamas out of the conflict – Israeli commentators celebrated the fact that Hamas indeed stayed out of the fighting – signifying the fact that Hamas has figured out how to deter Israel, rather than the other way around.

The second factor is PIJ’s relatively poor performance against Israel, which, on the Palestinian street, enabled Hamas to once again market itself as the most effective “resistance” force in the Palestinian arena. The implicit message is that only Hamas knows when and how to fight Israel.

This operation alerts us to the fact that Israel will have to deal not only with the Hamas threat triangle on three fronts – Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon, but also with the larger threat triangle made up of all factions in Lebanon/Syria, Gaza, and Iran – a double triangle of threats.

As a result of this “double triple catch,” Hamas believes that Israel is reluctant to attack it. This is the third time that Israel has struck PIJ alone while leaving Hamas out of the fighting, a decision that serves Hamas’s deterrence – even if the Israeli narrative is different.

Meanwhile, Hamas has identified an opportunity, with the expected departure – sooner or later –of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, to topple the Fatah-run entity, which it portrays as weak and as collaborating with Israel.

To be sure, not all is smooth sailing for Hamas. The latest escalation has enabled PIJ to challenge, to a certain degree, Hamas’s narrative of being the lead combat force against Israel, and the fury of the PIJ leadership over Hamas’s refusal to join the fighting could be seen in the way that the organization’s leader, Ziad al-Nakhalah, failed to thank Hamas in his speech summarizing the escalation (while thanking Iran and Hezbollah).

Just as Hamas, over the years, undermined Fatah’s rule and initiated escalations with Israel, so too is PIJ now doing the same to Hamas – with Iranian encouragement.

Still, Hamas has been able to respond to this challenge with sophistication and success.

On the one hand, it openly welcomed and backed PIJ’s escalatory steps, thereby promoting the message of ‘Palestinian unity’ – a useful ticket for it, up ahead of its goal of taking over the West Bank. On the other hand, it did not lift a finger as Israel’s considerable air power and intelligence pummeled PIJ in one strike after another in Gaza.

Hamas not only made it clear that it would not be dragged into wars by PIJ and Iran – it has also discreetly signaled to Iran that Hamas needed to be taken into consideration before escalations are embarked upon.

Meanwhile, on the flip side of the equation, the Israeli sigh of relief over Hamas’s non-involvement topped up Hamas’s deterrence and promoted its ability to threaten future escalation against Israel and call upon Iran for assistance as a member of the Iranian axis, which can activate multiple arenas.

Thus, in the final score, Hamas came out on top, despite the minor damage it incurred to its ‘street credibility’ by failing to go into battle alongside PIJ.

Even PIJ, despite its heavy losses, gained long-term points in this conflict, due to its ability to fight Israel, a major regional military power, on equal footing, sending millions of Israelis running for shelter with projectile attacks and air raid sirens.

In PIJ’s worldview, that in itself is a victory – regardless of how this is viewed in Israel or the West.

It is therefore vital to understand how Israel’s adversaries truly understand and interpret Operation Shield and Arrow, and to avoid the temptation of being enamored with one’s own military prowess and tactical achievements. As impressive as these are, strategically, the Gaza operation brings little good news for Israel because there is no long-term Israeli strategy for countering Hamas’s own calculated and sophisticated maneuvers.

One thing that Israel should consider is responding to the strategic Hamas challenge by formulating a well-thought-out strategy, which could involve weakening Hamas’s future ability to pursue terrorism and armed conflict by saddling it even further with the responsibilities and the privilege of power.

In effect, this would mean pushing for Gaza’s independence, giving it a port, full control over its borders, and major economic assets – giving the Gazan population, and the Hamas regime, a great deal to lose in a future war against Israel.

The status quo of a Gaza dependent on Israel for its economic needs, such as the sending of 17,000 workers from the Strip into Israel, the hundreds of trucks that deliver basic supplies via Israeli crossings every day, and Israel’s role in arranging electricity and fuel means that Gaza remains interlinked and dependent on Israel. Hamas and Gazans feel they have much to lose.

The more independent and prosperous Gaza is, the more targets Israel will have in a future conflict, the more Hamas and Gaza will have to lose, and the weaker Hamas becomes. In addition, Egypt should be given as much influence as possible over events in the Strip, freeing Israel from this painful geo-strategic bone that has been struck in its throat for too many years.

As counter-intuitive as it may seem, turning Gaza into a de facto independent Palestinian state is one of the most effective ways of neutralizing Hamas’s ability to wage war, and terrorize Israel’s civilians.

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Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

Washington Is Key To Saudi-Israel Normalization

By Henrique Cymerman

The Middle East is currently undergoing its largest geo-strategic revolution in decades, and Israel is at the heart of it.

From being a country surrounded by enemies calling for its elimination, the Jewish state has become a potential strategic partner for the most powerful Sunni-Arab state in the region, Saudi Arabia.

Saudi officials give four reasons when asked why they changed their mind about Israel:

The two states have common enemies, the 1973 Yom Kippur War demonstrated once and for all that the Arabs have no military option, Israel has blossomed into the start-up nation, and could help jump-start a start-up region, and finally, 70% of Saudis are under 30, and are not bogged down by 20th-century historical baggage.

In May, I visited the Saudi capital of Riyadh to meet with senior Saudi officials, just as a new escalation erupted between Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and Israel.

My concerns that the meeting would be canceled in light of the escalation were unfounded. The opposite occurred, and the meeting went ahead.

At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the Palestinian issue is an elephant in the room of Israeli – Saudi relations, casting a shadow.

When Jake Sullivan, the United States National Security Advisor, asked the Saudis what conditions are needed for normalizing relations with Israel, most of what he was told by Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, related to obtaining sophisticated American weapons, resuming that strategic Saudi alliance with the US, obtaining nuclear power for civilian purposes, and for the US to stop condemning Saudi Arabia on human rights issues, or to keep bringing up the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

This shows that the Palestinian issue is a factor in normalization, but not a main one. For Saudi Arabia, Jerusalem and the future of the Haram Al-Sharif (the Temple Mount) is paramount.

It is an important issue for nearly two billion Muslims – and it also forms an opportunity for the Saudis to play a role in Jerusalem.

Most critically, however, any future normalization agreement between Riyadh and Jerusalem will have to run through Washington, not Gaza.

Furthermore, the Saudis make clear that the recent Iranian – Saudi normalization agreement does not come at the expense of normalization with Israel.

“Not everything happens through you the Israelis. The fact that 7 years after the break with Tehran we reopen the embassy, has to do with various national interests. The UK, Spain, Germany, France, they all have an embassy in Tehran,” a Saudi minister explained with a smile.

The Saudis are insulted when they are compared with smaller Gulf states, through the question of whether they will follow the UAE and Bahrain in joining the Abraham Accords.

This is due to the fact that the Saudis are the custodians of Mecca and Medina, the holiest sites of Islam, and where Islam was born, as well as being the world's main oil producer.

“With all the respect to our neighbors, we Saudi Arabia are the Israeli gateway to the Arab and Muslim world,” said one official.

And he is right. Unofficial normalization has long been underway. Security cooperation appears to be occurring in the Red Sea, for example.

Saudi officials point out that it is no coincidence that the phenomenal futuristic city of Neom is being built only 350 km from the Israeli border.

They are also happy that there are currently about five hundred monthly flights between the UAE and Israel, all full, and that a million Israelis have visited that country in the last year.

The danger to this trend comes from "spoilers" being plotted by Iran, which supports Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories. This axis wants nothing more than to spoil the party of agreements between Israel and the pragmatic Arab countries.

For Israel, a new chance is emerging for a type of second independence. The new geopolitical situation, despite the dangers of a confrontation on several fronts between Israel and Iran's proxies, forces decision-makers in the region, in many capitals, to reevaluate all the previous paradigms.

While tensions and doubts exist in some Arab countries due to the presence of extreme right elements in the current Israeli government coalition, the chances of a new coalition in Israel gives those rooting for normalization in the Arab world some hope.

Despite the risks and potential traps along the way, Israel and Saudi Arabia are only in the opening chapter of a long book.

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Henrique Cymerman is a journalist of global renown whose writings regularly appear in media publications in Europe, the USA, Latin America and Israel. He lectures in five languages. Henrique has covered current affairs in the Middle East for over 30 years and has been nominated "Comendador," a title of nobility, by the King of Spain and the President of Portugal. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief, Has Israel Strengthened Its Deterrence?

By Yaakov Lappin

Israel and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror faction in Gaza were embroiled in a five-day conflict, which ended on May 12, dubbed Operation Shield and Arrow by the Israel Defense Forces. At the time of this writing, the truce between the sides had entered its first day with a projectile fired from Gaza violating the ceasefire less than 24 hours after it was reached. The IDF responded by striking two Hamas military posts, representing a return to the Israeli policy of holding Hamas responsible for attacks out of Gaza.

These events may seem eerily similar to the security situation that existed before the launch of Shield and Arrow on May 9, but appearances can be deceptive.

At the strategic level, the operation was not designed to change the basic equation in Gaza. It is still ruled over by Hamas, a terrorist Islamist regime, with its own Iranian-funded army and rocket arsenal. It is still home to other, smaller, factions that do not have government responsibilities, but are just as murderous as Hamas, if not more so – with one Iranian proxy, PIJ, standing out.

After PIJ terrorized the residents of Sderot with a 102-rocket barrage on May 2, to ‘avenge’ the suicide of its hunger-striking prisoner in an Israeli prison, the Israeli defense establishment felt the time had come to stabilize the Southern and Gazan arena and to knock PIJ back down to size or face a broader escalation scenario involving Hamas.

As a result, on May 9, after days of intricate intelligence tracking, and waiting for operational opportunities to arise, within the space of three seconds, simultaneous Israeli airstrikes in three separate locations eliminated three of PIJ’s senior military commanders.

PIJ then set out to terrorize Israeli civilians for the next five days and thereby exposed its operatives and assets to accurate and devastating Israeli firepower, guided by the highest quality intelligence.

When the smoke cleared, PIJ had lost twenty-one of its operatives, including the decapitation of its entire operational command level – with six senior commanders killed. Many of its rocket launchers and weapons bases, as well as command and control centers, were destroyed. PIJ’s leader, Ziad al-Nakhalah, sitting comfortably on the Iranian payroll in Beirut, and under Iranian pressure to keep going, could no longer ignore the calls from his own embattled operatives to accept the truce. Israel had proven that it is prepared to launch surprise attacks, to overcome terrorist tactics of human shielding, and to employ precision air power anywhere it needed to. The obvious message reverberated among larger enemies, Hamas and Hezbollah. Their operatives aren’t immune either.

Air defenses

In five days of conflict, PIJ fired 1,469 rockets at Israel, of which 1,139 crossed into Israeli air space, while 291 misfired and fell in Gaza. Three Palestinian civilians were killed by PIJ rockets falling in Gaza.

More than 95% of projectiles aimed at inhabited areas were intercepted by Iron Dome. The system offers a very high – but not hermetic level of defense. The approximate 5 percent gap in defenses stopped being a dry statistic and took on tragic real-life form when a rocket slammed into a residential building in Rehovot, south of Tel Aviv, killing an 80-year-old woman in her living room. A Gazan worker was the second civilian killed in Israel by PIJ rockets, in the western Negev region.

David’s Sling, the intermediate altitude defense system, made its first operationally successful appearance since going online in 2017. The Israeli Air Force used it to intercept two projectiles, testing its capabilities.

In the coming year, Israel is expected to begin deploying its Iron Beam laser interceptor, first on the ground, and later, on-board UAVs, which will be used to intercept rockets, mortars, and drones at the speed of light, and at a fraction of the cost of kinetic interceptors.

With Hamas’s cross-border tunnels cut off by Israel’s underground barrier, and Israeli air defenses improving by the year, the growing technological gap gives Israeli decision-makers hope that they can contain the threats from Gaza, and even significantly reduce the number of sirens in the Israeli home front in the future with the help of the laser interception technology, which can destroy some of the rockets over Gaza before they enter Israeli airspace.  

Offense

The IDF struck 371 PIJ targets, including apartments used by PIJ for command and control, weapons storage facilities, rocket launchers, and bases.

Israeli aircraft, both manned and unmanned – jets, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles – were nourished with intelligence from a range of sources. The IDF Southern Command, Military Intelligence, and the Shin Bet intelligence agency worked hand-in-hand to locate targets and ensure they were free of large numbers of civilians. All of this, in dense difficult urban conditions, with PIJ cynically employing human shielding tactics, which are a core aspect of the doctrine of the region’s terror armies.

IDF officials shared accounts of watching PIJ commanders issue orders to rocket launching squads as they stood in apartments and drove in vehicles surrounded by their children. The IDF waited patiently for better opportunities and struck when they presented.

Looking ahead

The Gaza ceasefire seems likely to hold. On May 18, Israel will mark Jerusalem Day, celebrating the reunification of the city during the 1967 Six-Day War. This is always a period of high tension in Jerusalem, but one that Israel can manage in a manner that does not necessarily lead to new escalations in the capital or the West Bank.

Israel’s goal of stabilizing Gaza, without being drawn into a costly and major war, will be put to the test in the coming weeks. Other arenas are far more urgent: Iran is approaching dangerous nuclear thresholds, Hezbollah in Lebanon has amassed a monstrous arsenal of projectiles, including precision-guided missiles, and Iran is continuously trying to smuggle offensive capabilities into Syria, where it would like to build a second Hezbollah.

Israel’s multi-arena challenges mean that Gaza is but one arena among many.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

It is Time for Israel to Act Decisively

By Jeremiah Rozman

Let me start with a controversial proposition: Iron Dome has thus far done Israel no favors. The technologically brilliant missile defense system is praised as a shining exemplar of Israeli ingenuity, a point of pride. Indeed, criticizing Iron Dome to an Israeli or someone in the pro-Israel community is akin to speaking ill of Israel's latest Eurovision finalist. However, I stand by my assertion. This latest round with Gaza shows why. 

The problem with Iron Dome is not its technology. Its capabilities have impressed to the point that even the world's preeminent arms exporter, the United States has purchased batteries, as have several other advanced European militaries. Its technology can save lives if used in a strategically wise manner. But, to say it has would be an unprovable counterfactual. Indeed, the evidence suggests otherwise. Since Iron Dome became a mainstay in Israel's arsenal, conflicts with Gaza have been longer, more destructive, and resulted in more Israeli casualties. 

A weapon is only as good as how it is used. To quote Knesset Member Yoni Chetboun from 2019, Iron Dome has become a “sleeping pill” for the Israeli government. It has allowed Israel to manage the conflict with Gaza without having to seriously degrade the threat. Instead, despite a few flare-ups each year where Israel claims each time to have dealt a "severe blow" or "changed the equation," or something along those lines, each time Gazan militants rebuild and emerge with greater launch capabilities and new leadership.

The truth is that Iron Dome has allowed Israel’s government to avoid decisions that require unity and stability. It does this by enabling Israel to manage this conflict through what I call a greater skew toward defensive vs offensive denial. Denial means blocking an enemy from hitting you. Deterrence means persuading an enemy not to hit you through the threat of hitting them back to the point that they calculate that it is not worth it. As I argue in my book Socializing Militants, How States End Conflict with Non-State Militants, terrorist entities that are willing to die to carry out an absolutist agenda cannot be deterred and cannot be negotiated with to end the conflict. Israel cannot agree to cease to exist on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) exist to fight Israel or die trying. You cannot deter a group of people willing to die by threatening them with death. At best Israel can achieve a strategic pause where they recover and prepare for their next aggression. This is precisely the pattern we see. Hamas is rearming while PIJ provides a shield as the current magnet for Israel's strikes. Either Hamas will join in when it deems the time right, or PIJ will become the new big player in Gaza and the West Bank, this is already becoming the case, with PIJ increasingly getting a larger share of Iranian support. With deterrence off the table, Israel needs to effectively deny its enemies the ability to attack. Israel’s periodic strikes do not inflict anything close to a mortal wound. Within a few months, PIJ and Hamas will be better prepared than before this last round and Israel will have better intelligence, precision, and missile defense. So where does this go? The answer is… a continuation of the same dynamic. 

For Israel, this is a loss. It is an abnegation of the duties of a government for Israel to allow its south and increasingly its center to become war zones every few months. Israel must realize that effective denial requires offense, seriously degrading its enemies’ capabilities instead of relying on defensive capabilities that allow it to become increasingly comfortable with an ever-growing threat. Some call this strategy "mowing the lawn." To effectively mow the lawn, Israel needs to use its army, not just its air force and missile defense. It requires ground forces to do more than take out tunnels. It requires a prolonged operation to kill off thousands of terrorists and destroy their arsenals. Israel has the capability. But does it have the will?

Israel paid with the lives of one percent of its population to emerge as a sovereign state in 1948. If in the past, Israel had been unwilling to take casualties to prevent a noose tightening around its neck, it never would have been able to score its strategically crucial victories over its adversaries in 1948, 1956, and 1967. If Israel is no longer willing to pay the butcher’s bill, it will never have security.

Some ask why Israel needs to strike Gaza at all since it has Iron Dome. I heard a senior IDF officer answer: "Just because I'm wearing a cup doesn't mean I will let you kick me in the groin all day." For nearly-two decades Israel has allowed its southern communities to be pummeled and abused, its children growing up under fire. Israel should use Iron Dome not to forestall military action but to defend the home front while it cleans house. Israel’s government must be willing to take risks. This requires the government, the media, and the people to stop filtering every action or inaction through the lens of domestic politics. National security must supersede political bickering. 

The Zionist ideal was a Jewish state willing and able to defend itself, not a state that is a punching bag for jihadists. Using Iron Dome to avoid risking IDF casualties and to put off tough decisions is not working. It is time to use the IDF for its intended purpose. Every soldier understands their duty to risk their lives to defend their civilians. If given the order, Israeli soldiers will bravely take the fight to these terrorist organizations instead of allowing communities to be bombarded. This decision lies with the government. If Israel does not wish to retake control over Gaza, it must at least mow the lawn, and thoroughly this time. Iron Dome should enable this, not prevent it.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Speaker McCarthy Certainly Got This One Right

By Mark Goldfeder

On Tuesday evening House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) canceled an event that Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) was set to host today at the U.S. Capitol with the purpose of mainstreaming her antisemitic historical revisionist views. Tlaib may yet find another (less prestigious) venue and, of course, she has the right to say whatever she wants, however abhorrent, about Jews and the Jewish State. But the public should hold her accountable for the lies she is now spreading; they have been used to justify the murders of Americans and Israelis.

Tlaib's "Nakbah Day" commemoration was designed to "educate members of Congress and their staff" with a falsified Middle East narrative. But the modern history of Israel is not lost in the shrouds of time, and there are clear contemporaneous records that give the lie to Tlaib's words.

In 1922, the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine officially established an area in the Middle East to be a national home for the Jewish People and entrusted it to Great Britain. Jewish people came from around the world to buy and cultivate land to further expand the existing Jewish communities that had remained in Israel as a continuous presence since Biblical times. As Winston Churchill, then secretary of state for the colonies, explained,

"When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine... but the further development of the existing Jewish community... [I]n order that this community should have the best prospect of free development... it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection."

Britain was allowed to change the terms in the territory east of the Jordan: it did so, and gave 77 percent of the original area to what is now Jordan. When the United Nations was formed, it proposed a partition plan for the remaining 23 percent: Resolution 181 would have created two states, an independent Israel and an independent Palestine. The Jewish community accepted those terms, and declared the State of Israel. The Arab community refused, and launched a genocidal war that they then lost.

Over time, Palestinians developed the "Nakba" myth, in which the would-be ethnic-cleansing Arab armies (who had failed in their stated mission to kill all the Jews) are reimagined as the helpless victims of a horrible catastrophe (or "nakba," in Arabic). The Nakbah legend—that the Jews came in and violently expelled the majority of Arabs from their homes—fuels much of modern anti-Zionism. And it is also worth noting that the 'Nakbah' commemoration is not even ostensibly about any kind of settlement or post-1967 occupation claims: this is nakedly a demonstration against Israel's very existence.

It is important to correct the record, for two reasons:

First, because truth matters. Primary sources from around the world describe how the vast majority of Arabs who left their homes did so either voluntarily, or under orders from the invading Arab armies—not from the Israelis.

Just read the Jordanian daily Ad Difaa (September 6, 1954), for example: "The Arab governments told us: Get out so that we can get in. So, we got out, but they did not get in." Or just look at the UN Security Council Official Records (Third Year N. 62, April 23, 1948, p. 14), in which Jamal Bey Husseini, representative of the Arab Higher Committee, explained that "The Arabs did not want to submit to a truce . . . they rather preferred to abandon their homes, their belongings and everything they possessed in the world and leave the town. This is in fact what they did."

Oddly enough, and almost as if to reinforce what the real disaster was, the official 'Nakbah Day' is May 15—the anniversary of the day on which the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq all invaded Israel in their doomed attempt to destroy it.

The second reason to correct the record is because this lie in particular has deadly consequences for both Americans and Israelis.

In March 1976, in a column for Falastin a-Thaura (the PLO's weekly), Mahmoud Abbas noted that "The Arab armies entered Palestine to protect the Palestinians from the Zionist tyranny but, instead, they abandoned them, forced them to emigrate and to leave their homeland, and threw them into prisons similar to the ghettos in which the Jews used to live."

Then 'Nakbah Day' was invented by Yasser Arafat in 1998, and by 2011 Abbas' memory had faded in direct proportion to its rising popularity. Abbas, now president of the Palestinian Authority, rewrote history in a New York Times op-ed claiming that "Zionist forces expelled Palestinian Arabs to ensure a decisive Jewish majority in the future state of Israel, and Arab armies intervened." But even that was not enough.

Just last year, in 2022, Abbas used the annual commemoration of the nakba—the same events Tlaib was to be marking at the Capitol—as an excuse to reaffirm his government's ongoing commitment to "pay for slay," the Palestinian Authority policy under which terrorists who kill Israeli or American citizens are celebrated as heroes and financially rewarded.

Of course, it was a disaster for the Arabs to reject the U.N.'s Partition Plan; ignore the Jewish people's legitimate and indigenous claims; and resort to deadly violence. But that does not mean there cannot be hope for a better future. The continuing disaster is the 'leadership' of people like Abbas and Tlaib who engage in the same delegitimization and denial that led to the mistakes of 1948, and think that this time, somehow, their results might be different. Hopefully that will change, but in the meantime kudos to the speaker for not letting Tlaib share her ahistorical, antisemitic views under the false imprimatur and borrowed respectability of a congressional event.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Hamas’s al-Arouri and the Iranian connection

Yaakov Lappin IN CONVERSATION WITH: COL. DAVID HACHAM

Hamas’s deputy political bureau chief, Saleh al-Arouri, currently based in Lebanon, is interested in surrounding Israel with rocket and terror bases, and so is Iran.
That common interest has enabled al-Arouri to create new levels of cooperation between his Sunni-Islamist terror faction and the radical Shi’ite regime in Tehran.

“This is actually one of the strong people within Hamas. I would actually say that he is among the top three of the movement,” said IDF Col. (res.) Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, and a senior researcher at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Reichman University in Herzliya.

According to Milshtein, al-Arouri is responsible for the Judea and Samaria arena on behalf of Hamas, including Jerusalem. In addition, al-Arouri coordinates Hamas activity with other members of “the axis of resistance,” said Milshtein, ex-head of the Department for Palestinians Affairs in IDF Military Intelligence.

Al-Arouri is also responsible for a large portion of Hamas’s military operations abroad, said Milshtein. He “manages to direct tactical military activity but also be involved and think strategically, and basically ‘swim’ between the two worlds,” he added.

IDF Col. (res.) David Hacham, a senior research associate at the MirYam Institute and a former adviser on Arab affairs to seven Israeli defense ministers, said al-Arouri joined Hamas’s military in the early 1990s, during the First Intifada.’

“He was responsible for establishing Hamas’s military wing in the Judea and Samaria region. For his activities, he sat in an Israeli prison for 18 years. After his release, he went o to Syria, where he settled. Later, in 2012, he left Syria after the outbreak of the country’s civil war, and came to Turkey where he headed Hamas headquarters,” said Hacham.

“In 2015, after Israeli and American pressure on Turkey, he moved to Qatar along with most of Hamas’s overseas leadership. After a short stopover in Malaysia, he arrived in Lebanon where he currently operates,” Hacham said.

In 2014, the Israeli military demolished his home in the village of Aroura, near Ramallah, believing him to have been involved in the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in Judea and Samaria.

Al-Arouri, like the head of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, represents the younger generation in the Hamas leadership, according to the Israeli observers. Both have operational experience and have served lengthy prison terms, speak Hebrew and are familiar with Israel, unlike members of the older Hamas generation, such as Khaled Mashaal, said Hacham.

Milshtein described al-Arouri as a major connector between Hamas and other members of the radical Islamist camp opposed to Israel’s existence. For example, al-Arouri’s role in the launch by Hamas of 34 rockets at northern Israel from Lebanon in April this year was a prominent one, he said.

Al-Arouri’s unique role is enabled by two factors, according to Milshtein. “One is Arouri’s location in Beirut. And the other is his basic approach for vigorous promotion of jihad in several arenas. Especially in Judea and Samaria and the newer arena—Lebanon. This makes him a favorite for Tehran and Hezbollah,” said Milshtein. “In this context, he is involved in formulating strategic relations, but also in practical terms, he is involved in weapons procurement, training, organization, military cooperation and more.”

Hacham cautioned that Arouri’s objective of unifying fronts against Israel directly contradicts Israel’s essential interest of differentiating between the arenas.

“This is particularly true for Israel’s differentiation between Gaza and Judea and Samaria. Hamas, on the other hand, wants to create as close a connection as possible between the various conflict arenas—Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Jerusalem, the Arab sector in Israel and Lebanon—and to gain effective control over the power switch of escalation,” he said.

“Hamas strives to ensure its ability to ignite and activate the arenas, individually or together, at an appropriate time according to the circumstances,” he added.

According to Milshtein, Al-Arouri’s intense efforts help him greatly with regard to fortifying his status within Hamas as someone who succeeds in preserving “the jihad,” and who found a way to activate arenas against Israel.

“I would describe al-Arouri and Sinwar as two halves of the same whole. Each is responsible for another major activity area in Hamas. They share the same concept, and I believe both are strategically coordinated,” said Milshtein.

Hacham said Israel has so far avoided eliminating al-Arouri for a number of reasons.

First, he spent many of the past 15 years in sovereign countries, some of which have diplomatic ties with Israel, Hacham noted. Second, previous targeted killings have shown that leaders are quickly replaced in terror factions, and third, there is concern that his elimination would increase motivation for terrorist revenge attacks on Israeli targets, or could spark a wider escalation.

Nevertheless, said Hacham, al-Arouri could certainly become a future target for assassination.

“Targeted killings are the number one worry of the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaderships,” said Hacham, who spoke with JNS before Israel launched “Operation Shield and Arrow” on Tuesday with the assassination of three senior PIJ commanders in Gaza.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Can Israel recover from its precipitous fall?

By dan meridor

Looking back over the past four months, it is astounding to observe how quickly and in how many fields Israel has sustained damages due to the actions of the Netanyahu government.

Currently, negotiations are ongoing between representatives of the Israeli coalition government and the opposition under the banner of searching for a compromise to the ‘judicial reform’ initiative and exiting this unprecedented internal crisis.

However, any serious attempt to reevaluate the balance of power between the three branches of government would, if done correctly, involve a lengthy process lasting a year or two. It would have to involve jurists from across the board, experts from a wide spectrum of views, representatives of civil society, Jews and Arabs, trade unionists and employers – in short, it would be an enormous endeavor. This isn’t something that can be seriously concluded in a matter of weeks.

Looking back, the question of how Israel reached this crisis point in the space of just four months must be asked. Economically, Israel went from being a powerful tech-based start-up nation with a booming economy revered around the world, to a country whose economic officials warn of billions of shekels in losses.

The people issuing these warnings are Netanyahu appointees, like the Bank of Israel Governor Prof. Amir Yaron, and former Bank of Israel Governor Karnit Flug, as well as the world-renowned economist Jacob Frenkel, also a former governor of the BOI.

The economic consensus is clear: if the judicial reform goes ahead, Israel’s outlook will be catastrophic.

Investors see that the government is trying to rob the judiciary of its independence, and, from there, financial damage is quick to follow. Even if the political crisis fades and the judicial changes are stopped in their tracks, the economic damage could be long-lasting as investors may be wary of betting on Israel.

Politically, Israel was considered to be the United States’ strongest ally – and derived much of its power from this alliance. Now, U.S. President Joe Biden explicitly informs the world that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unwelcome in Washington.

Warnings about common values have been issued by other senior American administration officials, such as the secretary of state and the secretary of defense.

And what of the flagship achievement, the Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain? Suddenly, a cold breeze is blowing in Israel’s direction from the Gulf. The damaged Israeli – American alliance is part of the reason. Netanyahu’s vision of on-boarding Saudi Arabia to the Accords will have to wait.

On recent visits to European capitals, the Israeli premier was pummeled with criticism over the judicial reform crisis, albeit the style was less abrasive than Biden’s.

It’s not only relations with the U.S. administration that are on the ropes. So too are relations between the Israeli government and American Jewry. On the domestic front, several crises threaten to snowball into an avalanche. Reservists from prized army and air force units have announced they will not volunteer if the reform goes ahead and Israel is turned into a dictatorship.

All of this has eroded Israeli deterrence and challenged its security establishment –this according to none other than Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, whom Netanyahu initially fired for warning of the dangers posed by the domestic crisis, but then backtracked on his decision under pressure.

Incredibly, this can all be traced back to a single attempt to implement an extreme move to undermine the judiciary’s independence.

Israel has always known bitter disputes over policies and ideologies. Whether it was about reparations from Germany, or land and peace, Israelis have always argued intensely, but almost everyone was united around core democratic values and accepting the decisions of the courts.

In fact, the judicial reform initiative has, until now, been a marginal issue. While Justice Minister Yariv Levin has held strong views on the matter for many years, until the formation of this government, Netanyahu did not take it very seriously. Levin himself admitted in April that had the reform passed as initially presented, Israel could not fit the definition of a democratic state.

The damage hasn’t stopped at national interests – it has harmed Netanyahu politically. A series of polls have shown that the Likud party is losing altitude quickly.

What has caused Netanyahu to embark on such a destructive path? The answer can only be the attempt to weaken the legal system due to Netanyahu’s criminal trial. Although Netanyahu is innocent until proven guilty, he probably does not have an interest in seeing his trial play out and seeing whether he is convicted or not.

Netanyahu loves his country – he served in the elite Sayeret Matkal commando force and fought bravely – but he loves himself more. As a result, until now, Netanyahu has rejected any plea bargain arrangement, which would have likely meant an end to his political career, as he seeks to punish the system that ‘dared’ prosecute him.

In this manner, everyone perceived by Netanyahu as a threat has been tagged as a ‘leftist’ or someone who ‘betrayed the national interest.’ This includes the police, and its former commissioner, the religious settler Roni Alsheikh; the Yeshiva graduate and former state prosecutor, Shai Nitzan; and the religious former Attorney General and Netanyahu appointee, Avichai Mandelblit.

Suddenly, all of the above-mentioned and others are labeled by the Netanyahu lie-machine as ‘leftists’ seeking to harm the state. The worst part is that a swath of the public believes this.

As a result, in the Netanyahu narrative, the courts are now presented as a danger to democracy and to security that frames publicly appointed politicians.

The time is ripe for Netanyahu to face challenges over his conduct from within the Likud. The Likud was once a party that wasn’t afraid to criticize its leader. This was true during the days of Menachem Begin, whose peace deal with Egypt faced multiple challenges from within the party, and through to the era of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who was challenged by senior Likud figures at the time, Ariel Sharon and David Levy.

It would be appropriate for some of the Likud’s 31 Knesset Members today to speak up and tell Netanyahu that he cannot continue harming the country in this way. 

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Dan Meridor is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence in the Israeli Government from 2009-2013. Read full bio here.

To reach Israel’s 100th anniversary, we need unity

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Close your eyes for a moment and imagine it’s 2048 and final rehearsals are underway at Mount Herzl, Jerusalem, for Israel’s 100th Independence Day celebrations. In front of the tomb of Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, flags fly proudly and soldiers march in formation.

Now, open your eyes and return to the present day as we marked this year’s Remembrance and Independence Days. The scenario of Israelis celebrating the country’s 100th anniversary as one people waving their flags together, seems, unfortunately, altogether fanciful.

If we do not ensure that we have a common ethos, it is doubtful we will get there – assuming that democracy even remains in place. So, will we celebrate 100 years of our independence together? Were we to hold a referendum, it is fair to assume that the answer to the question “Do you want to reach Israel’s 100th year of independence” would be “Yes,” but the answer to the question, “Will we get there,” will likely be “I don’t know.”

How to get to a 100 years

To provide a conclusive answer to this question, one must first understand the shared identity that propels us forward together – the same identity that creates the fabric of shared life here. The legal coup and the masses who take to the streets week after week are fighting for democracy and against dictatorship.

Yet it is not only the concern that the Israel we once knew is changing its character that is driving the protesters. Those who support the reform claim that the time is ripe for Israel to change its character and that the country has had enough of rulership by elites.

An identity struggle is raging: liberalism vs conservatism, those who share the national burden vs. those who believe that Torah study is an equally valuable endeavor to military service and work. The latter camp holds that Torah study is necessary due to the very existence of Israel, as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

The stage of defining our identity characterizes democratic states and research indicates that this process often occurs in its most intense form in the last quarter of a democracy’s first 100 years. In this respect, we are no different from most of the countries in the free world.

In other words, had the legal revolution not come, another catalyst would probably have led people to the streets, after shedding light on the rift between us reminding us of the feud over how to distribute the national burden and the argument over freedom of choice on how to manage one’s individual life.

Questions we have pushed aside for years due to our fight for our security and existence are now on the national agenda. The process of defining our identity is a complex and fragile process. In Israel, it includes the added and unique tier of being a Jewish, democratic country and the question of a shared identity is one that must consider both religion and state. The result is an equation that is difficult to provide answers for.

The first Independence Day

TO BETTER understand the question of a common ethos, we need to return to the basics. The young state of Israel marked its first Independence Day following the 1949 Independence Day Law. The date was set for the fifth of the Hebrew month of Iyar, the date on which Israel had declared independence a year earlier, in 1948. The Law was passed just three weeks before the celebration.

In fact, the 1949 celebration was not the first time Israel marked its independence. Almost a year earlier, on 20 Tammuz – July 27, 1948, the anniversary of Theodor Herzl’s death, military parades were held throughout the country to mark State Day. The idea was to emphasize the connection between the newly-born state and Herzl, the thinker who envisioned it.

The military’s prominent role in the ceremonies reflects what was, at that time, an undisputed ethos. The people’s army model became an essential element in defining the Israeli identity. There was a clear link between IDF service and Israeliness. The same model stands at the heart of the current divide today and brings to the fore the question of who is an Israeli.

Those who serve vs draft dodgers, the lack of equality in the sharing of the military burden and an unnecessary conflict between Israeliness and Judaism are harming the people’s army model. This will collapse one of Israel’s most important foundational pillars, upon which our identity, as a people and as a state, stands.

In a speech to the nation on Israel’s first Independence Day in 1949, then-prime minister David Ben-Gurion said, “We stood up to serious military campaigns [against us]. We emerged from them all intact and with dignity. However, the dangers to our safety and even our existence have not been eliminated, nor will they soon disappear.”

His remarks remain relevant today, as we mark 75 years of our independence. They indicate that the people’s army model has a key role in the fabric of our shared identity.

If we wish for our soldiers to march together on Mount Herzl in 2048 when we are due to celebrate 100 years of the wonder called Israel, then we are duty-bound to strengthen our common base and to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

We won’t agree on everything, but we can create a common identity so that we can proudly say together, “We are Israelis.”

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

A quiet civil war

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

The first hundred days of the Benjamin Netanyahu government have seen Israel experience massive turmoil.

While a common Israeli saying holds that those who take office have one hundred days of grace. But this government has not been granted a single day of grace from those who oppose it. On the other hand, the government itself did not wait long before Justice Minister Yariv Levin launched his legal form program.

And that is when the snowball started to roll. It quickly picked up speed, growing larger, heavier, and eventually, unstoppable. In politics, even those with access to the best strategic advisers can experience moments in which they simply lose control.

The Netanyahu government lost control very quickly because the legal reform sparked massive resistance. Behind it was all the power, energy, and financial resources of its rival camp —the ‘just not Bibi camp,’ which is often called the center-left, but is in fact, all about opposing Netanyahu.

In previous rounds of elections, groups of anti-Netanyahu demonstrators raised black flags, telling Netanyahu to “go.”

Now, on Saturday nights, the black flag is replaced with the blue and white flag of Israel, but the protests are ultimately driven by the same message. Millions of shekels are spent on ads to support the protests -- on billboards, on social media, and with paid text messages directly to our phones.

The government froze its reform program to allow a dialogue with the opposition, but the protests continue nevertheless. It is therefore clear that legal reform was just a trigger, and it is the Netanyahu haters who continue to fuel the protests against him.

We are in highly unconventional times. Every Saturday night, Tel Aviv’s Kaplan Junction, a major traffic artery, fills with demonstrators, and a small number of them go on to block traffic on the Ayalon highway, and some of them are arrested. However one looks at it, the goal is to disrupt the routine of people's lives.

Those who front the protests are not necessarily today’s opposition leaders. They are trying to jump on the bandwagon and take the credit, but those who lead the demonstrations from behind the scenes are politicians from the past. Examples include former prime ministers Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak.

They also include the Mayor of Tel Aviv, Ron Huldai, who tried to face Netanyahu in elections and had to resign at the start of the race.

At the end of the day, there is one camp in Israel that is fighting because it was told there would be a dictatorship, while another camp feels that all these protests are merely Netanyahu hatred and an attempt to overthrow the government.

In response to these developments, the rightwing camp has initiated demonstrations in support of legal reform.

Although the ruling coalition has gained sixty-four seats in the ballot box, those who are in charge in Israel are, in fact, Netanyahu's opponents. The media, dominated by the left, the key economic actors, and the national trade union, which disabled international flights as part of the protests.

They have collectively succeeded in applying such a high degree of pressure that the reform has been halted.

There has been no significant breakthrough in talks so far, yet some observers say they are surprised that the negotiations have not yet broken down.

They should not be surprised; the dialogue appears to be, in actuality, an attempt by the government to dissolve its reform initiative.

The big question going forward is, what will the Right do? Will it go all the way with the reform, as it promised? One of its election tickets was to create a balance between the three branches of government.

The Right is unlikely to proceed because Israel is in an unprecedented state of polarization. Everyone is under pressure to take sides, and people are very quickly cataloged. Extremely tense moments occur daily among people in workplaces, family members, and friends.

It feels like Israeli society has sunk into a kind of quiet civil war. Hence, if the government succeeds in passing even a single clause of its reform, that would be considered a major achievement. The more likely scenario is a dissolution of the initiative.

The fact that the coalition is, itself, divided, also contributes to the likelihood of that scenario.

Some of the coalition’s members think the reform should be pursued to the end, others think it should be softened, and some think it should be dropped altogether.

An attempt to pass the reform without broad consensus stands a good chance of leading to the government’s collapse due to these divisions.

If the government drops the reform, the chances that it will fall will decline significantly. Polls show that support for the government has rapidly lost altitude and its members fear their political fate. That provides enough of a basis for them to remain together, even if some, like Levin, who initiated this snowball in the first place by going for large-scale reform, will be furious to see it dropped. 

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

Israel must prepare a counter-strategy against a multi-arena threat.

By Eitan Dangot

Hamas has been strengthening its cooperation with the Iran-Hezbollah axis for years and the process only seems to be accelerating. The result is the formation of six fronts of aggression against Israel—a “ring of fire” composed of radical Sunni and Shiite axes.

Previous signs of this cooperation could be found in how the Palestinian Sunni Hamas and the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah helped one another upgrade their capabilities. Hezbollah began digging cross-border tunnels into Israel from Lebanon (though these were demolished by the IDF in 2018), just as Hamas did for years from Gaza.

Hamas learned from Hezbollah how to overcome its military inferiority and set up rocket bases in civilian areas. Both terror armies have set up elite cross-border ground infiltration units—Hamas’ Nuhba force and Hezbollah’s Radwan force.

The relationship grew even closer after Saleh Al-Arouri, a senior Hamas official, was expelled from Turkey and relocated to Lebanon several years ago. He began building a Hamas headquarters in Lebanon, from which he both orchestrates terrorism in Judea and Samaria and oversees a growing Hamas presence in Lebanon.

Al-Arouri can be seen as Hamas’ own Qassem Soleimani. Like the late Iranian Quds Force unit commander—assassinated by the United States in 2020—Al-Arouri is drawing up a multi-arena attack strategy to surround the State of Israel and he is doing so with Iranian help.

The hub of Al-Arouri’s activity is Judea and Samaria, where Hamas works day and night to both incite and directly orchestrate terrorist attacks.

The fruit of Al-Arouri’s work in Lebanon became apparent on April 6, when Hamas fired 34 rockets at Israel from Lebanon, the largest such salvo since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. A day earlier, after Passover eve, Palestinian terrorists in Gaza fired some 50 rockets towards Israel.

According to the terror organizations, the rocket fire was a response to clashes between Palestinian youths and Israeli police at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, but in fact, it was a sign of something far more significant.

The attacks are the latest indication of the accelerated convergence between the Palestinian terror axis and the Iran-Hezbollah axis, creating the multi-arena threat Israel now faces with ever-growing intensity.

The common denominator that unites the Iranian-led axis is the goal of combatting Israel. In addition to Gaza and Lebanon, Israel’s enemies are striving to create a front in Syria, where Hamas could soon be sending operatives after reconciling with the Assad regime, and where Hezbollah is working with Iran-backed Shiite militias to set up offensive positions.

Hamas has become a significant partner in the Iranian quest to surround Israel with a ring of fire. The establishment of a coordinated headquarters in Lebanon with Hezbollah and Palestinian terror factions in 2021 was a milestone in this development.

Iran pours funds and weapons into its regional proxies and partners, giving them the capabilities to realize their objectives. In addition, Iran and its Lebanese and Palestinian proxies have entered a mutually-supportive deterrence framework with Hamas operating from Lebanon under the umbrella of Hezbollah’s arsenal of 160,000 projectiles.

Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Yemen are also preparing to enter the multi-arena strategy against Israel through missile and drone attacks.

Meanwhile, the notion of state responsibility over what occurs in their territory has long been irrelevant in Lebanon and Syria, and the ability of the joint Shiite-Sunni radical axes to disrupt life in Israel grows consistently.

These forces don’t need to enter into a full-scale war with Israel. All they need to do is continuously identify optimal points in time to escalate the security situation when they judge Israel to be unwilling or unable to respond forcefully, thus creating regular threats to the ability of Israelis to lead a secure life.

This is precisely what occurred, in the broadest fashion to date, during this year’s Ramadan period.

The pattern we are now witnessing is a direct continuation of the 2021 conflict fought between Hamas and Israel, when Hamas was able to activate another arena—the internal Israeli arena. Widespread violence tore through mixed Arab-Jewish cities, serving as a warning to Israel of what a future multi-front conflict could look like.

All of this serves Iran’s goal of keeping Israel distracted as Iran makes rapid progress in its nuclear program. Iran hopes its program faces fewer disruptions while Israel is busy dealing with Iran’s multi-arena strategy.

This obligates Israel to immediately formulate a counter-strategy, which should be based on high-end Israeli operational capabilities and international cooperation with the U.S. and Sunni states that seriously addresses the dilemma of preemption.

Israel needs to consider the benefits and risks of launching surprise preemptive strikes on Hezbollah targets in response to the force build-up and growing boldness of this primary Iranian regional proxy. In addition, Israel must eliminate its internal crisis as soon as possible by focusing on rapidly building its new national guard, under the command of the Israel Police.

Ultimately, Israel must prepare to operate in multiple arenas, just as its dangerous enemies do.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

Hamas’s attack from Lebanon is part of plan to take over West Bank

By David Hacham

The rocket attack against northern Israel in which Hamas fired 34 projectiles from southern Lebanon on April 6 reflects a clear attempt on the group’s part to advance a broader and highly dangerous strategic goal.

Hamas is seeking to create an offensive ring around Israel that constitutes a multi-front threat. As such, it is working to build terrorist infrastructures in Lebanon, in addition to its existing fronts against Israel – the Gaza Strip, which has been under the organization’s control since 2007, and the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority (PA), led by President Mahmoud Abbas, is growing weaker, and where Hamas is working to build a foothold.

Hamas’s grand strategy and its actions in Lebanon are ultimately aimed at boosting its quest of toppling the Fatah-run PA in the West Bank. The PA is gradually losing control there, especially in the Jenin region, and, to a partial extent, in Nablus.

Hamas exploited tensions on the Temple Mount, a highly sensitive Islamic site, to launch its attack from southern Lebanon, likely in full coordination with Hezbollah and Iran.

A Hamas rocket attack of this scope could not have occurred without coordination and a green light from Hezbollah, which is the strongest organization in the Lebanese system. At the time of the April 6 attack, Hamas Politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh was visiting Lebanon, accompanied by his deputy, Salah Arouri – and that is no coincidence.

Hamas - Gaza’s operational approval was not required for this attack, but it was notified in advance by Hamas in Lebanon.

The rocket attack carried out by Hamas from Lebanon against Israel was pre-planned, with Hamas’s intention being essentially a limited escalation.

The rockets were aimed at areas near the Lebanese border but were not intended to hit infrastructure targets of strategic significance. Given that, Hamas' rocket attack was not a declaration of war, or an attempt to deteriorate the situation in a way that would create a general escalation and bring about a renewed military confrontation with Israel on a large scale.

The Israeli response -- selected airstrikes in Gaza and southern Lebanon -- was measured and limited. It was designed to prevent an uncontrolled deterioration and overall war. Israel's limited response to the rocket fire indicates that it is not interested in war at present and that it does not want a confrontation involving several arenas simultaneously.

The internal crisis in Israel surrounding attempts by the government to promote legal reform has eroded Israel’s deterrence, and its enemies assess that it is vulnerable.

All of this is tied to Hamas’s strategic goal of toppling the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank with the end of the Mahmoud Abbas era. The April escalation boosted Hamas’s standing at Fatah’s expense.

Hamas is taking advantage of the governing vacuum in the PA, which is made worse by internal Fatah power struggles. In recent years, several potential candidates, all from Fatah, have entered into a destabilizing competition for the leadership position.

In practice, Hamas has already taken concrete steps to exploit this instability and to position itself to challenge the PA for the Palestinian leadership as soon as the opportunity arises. This has included a reshuffling of Hamas operatives in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, with an emphasis on command levels, as well as cultivating operatives from the younger generations. These operatives include organizationally affiliated Hamas members, and other more loosely affiliated individuals with close ties to Hamas, such as academics, trade unionists, and public sector figures in the West Bank, and they are active in the Islamist stream within Palestinian local councils and civil society institutions.

Hamas is focusing on two major courses of action. The first is the democratic path to power, through a voting process, and the second – a fallback position – is the military takeover of the PA using violent means if necessary. All the while, Hamas labels Fatah as a traitor to the Palestinian people due to its security coordination with Israel.

One of the most prominent operatives among Hamas ranks in the West Bank is engineer Wazan Jaber, a representative of the younger generation in the terror group. A few weeks ago, an attempt was made to assassinate him, likely by Fatah members. Jaber was not injured.

It is worth noting that Fatah is well aware of Hamas's intention to replace it. Fatah is actively engaged in an effort to limit Hamas' power in the West Bank. This includes the continued existence of security coordination with Israel – albeit in a more discreet and limited manner since the PA’s January announcement of its cessation of coordination, in protest against an IDF security operation in the Jenin refugee camp.

The PA is also working to dry up sources of financial aid to Hamas, and Abbas has taken a series of measures to prevent Hamas from gaining a foothold in the Palestinian government system, such as keeping the Palestinian parliament dissolved, thereby preventing Hamas-linked parliament speaker Aziz Dweik from being considered a legal heir to Abbas.

Instead, this power has been transferred to the Palestinian National Council and its Fatah chairman, Rawhi Fattouh (Abbas’s appointment of Hussein Al-Sheikh, the Minister for Civil Affairs, as secretary of the PLO's Executive Committee in May 2022, should not, despite initial impressions, be seen as promoting a desired heir, since Abbas can eject Al-Sheikh from that position at any time).

A Hamas military attack on Fatah positions is possible as soon as Hamas recognizes an opportunity to launch it.

As far as Israel is concerned, there is no replacement for the PA; who would rule Area A of the West Bank in the PA’s place? Should Israel once again enter the Palestinian cities and assume direct responsibility over millions of Palestinians, in addition to being responsible for water and electricity? This is a delusional concept.

As such, Israel must work to ensure the preservation of the PA in the post-Abbas era, despite the PA’s many failings.

It is likely that Israel would intervene in one way or another militarily to prevent a Hamas coup in the West Bank since this would breach an Israeli red line.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in various intelligence and political-strategic positions in the IDF, including eight years in the Gaza Strip as advisor for Arab affairs to successive commanders of the Southern Command and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief, Israel marks Memorial Day; but will it bring national unity?

By Yaakov Lappin

Yom Hazikaron, Israel’s Memorial Day for Fallen Soldiers and Victims of Hostile Acts begins at 8 p.m. on Monday, April 24, with a nationwide siren that marks the start of ceremonies across the country. President Isaac Herzog and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi will attend the opening ceremony at the Western Wall, where a memorial candle is lit.

On Tuesday, April 25, a two-minute nationwide siren will sound at 11 a.m. before the main ceremony at the Mount Herzl military cemetery commences. Bereaved family members attend military ceremonies across Israel.

Memorial Day commemorates those who fell in defense of the Israeli people, from the pre-state era to the present day. When the sirens sound, traffic on roads comes to a standstill, and members of the public stop what they are doing to stand in silence in honor of the fallen. Flags fly at half-mast throughout the day.

In an almost unfathomable shift, Memorial Day transitions into the start of celebrations of Israel's 75th Independence Day on the evening of April 25. This is a deliberately designed emotional rollercoaster to remind Israelis that their independence and security are inseparable from the ultimate sacrifices made by the fallen soldiers.  

The big question is whether these vitally important national days will succeed in alleviating to any degree the unprecedented polarization afflicting Israeli society and stemming from the political crisis over the government's judicial reform program, but now extending far beyond it.

In a sign of the times, Yair Lapid, the leader of the opposition, has announced his intention to boycott Independence Day celebrations.

With Iranian and Hezbollah assistance, Hamas tests out its multi-arena strategy.

This month, during Passover and Ramadan, Hamas made dangerous advances toward implementing its four-arena strategy against Israel. According to this doctrine, Hamas launches attacks (or encourages others to launch attacks) from the following arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Jerusalem and elsewhere within Israel.

Hamas's preference is to be able to activate the Lebanese, West Bank, and Jerusalem arenas without endangering its Gaza regime.

After Islamist students instigated clashes with the Israeli Police on the Temple Mount on April 5, some 50 rockets were fired by terrorists in Gaza at southern communities between April 5 and April 7, while 34 rockets were fired from Lebanon at northern Israel on April 6—the heaviest barrage from Lebanon since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. On April 8, three rockets were fired at the Golan Heights from Syria. Hamas is behind the Lebanese and Gazan rocket attacks.

In response, the Israeli Air Force launched airstrikes in Lebanon and mostly in Gaza, signaling to Hamas that its efforts to keep Gaza quiet would fail if the escalation continued.

All these developments contribute to Hamas's goal of promoting a violent Islamist conflict narrative with Israel. As a result, Hamas's main Palestinian competitor, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which Hamas accuses of being traitors and collaborators with Israel, sees its status diminish on the Palestinian street.

This aligns closely with the Iranian-Hezbollah axis's desire to surround Israel with a ring of fire, and it is improbable to believe that Hamas could have activated a Lebanese front at this scale without Hezbollah and Iranian approval, as well as Iranian assistance in rocket production.

The scenario of a multi-arena conflict is one that Iran is actively promoting to try and threaten and demoralize Israel and keep it busy with its borders. But this strategy can be a double-edged sword. Israel too can adopt a multi-arena logic in which, for example, it responds to Hamas in Gaza for attacks coming out of Lebanon. And it can respond to Iran anywhere in the Middle East for actions that the Islamic Republic takes to threaten Israel's security and violate its sovereignty. In other words, the multi-arena tool can be used by anyone in this conflict.

A glimpse into what Israel-Iran relations could one day be like

Reza Pahlavi, the son of the ousted Iranian Shah, made his first visit to Israel on Monday, April 17, together with his wife Yakima.

“We are very happy to be here and are dedicated to working toward the peaceful and prosperous future that the people of our region deserve," he tweeted after landing at Ben-Gurion Airport and being received by Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel, who had helped plan his visit.

“From the children of Cyrus to the children of Israel, we will build this future together, in friendship,” he added, in reference to the Persian king who ended the Babylonian exile and facilitated the re-building of the Temple in Jerusalem

Pahlavi attended Israel’s Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day ceremony on April 17. He provided a small glimpse into the future potential relationship between the Iranian people – 80 % of whom are now opposed to their regime, according to reported Israeli intelligence assessments – and the Israeli people, if one day the radical Islamic regime in Tehran falls. 

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

How Turkey and Israel salvaged their relationship

By Pinhas Avivi

After the Islamist AKP Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power in Turkey in 2002, Ankara’s approach to Israel began to change for the worse. There were major fears at the time that the defense ties that characterized bilateral relations would vanish and create an irreparable rupture.

Within six years, ties indeed went from friendly to hostile.

And yet, the recent Israeli humanitarian delegation sent to assist Turkey in February’s earthquake disaster is the latest reminder of the fact that these days, Jerusalem’s relations with Ankara are marked by a high degree of stability. That’s not something that should be taken for granted; it took years for the two countries to reach this stage after dealing with several major crises.  

The 2010 Mavi Marmara crisis (when Israeli Navy commandos and Turkish Islamist activists trying to reach Gaza were involved in a deadly clash) marked a low point. Yet since then, the two regional powers have found a way to restore relations and maintain them – to a degree.

This was achieved primarily through civilian cooperation, as returning to the military cooperation that existed before Erdogan’s rise to power would be very hard. Israel would have to find alternative security partners in the Mediterranean – which it did in the form of Greece.

Once in power, Erdogan wanted to be the leader of the Islamic world and navigate according to a neo-Ottoman playbook. Unlike Ataturk, who turned Turkey from an empire to a state, Erdogan wants to return his country to empire mode.

On the one hand, Erdogan tried to employ a zero-conflict policy with Turkey’s neighbors, while seeking to increase its influence in the region through soft power, based on leveraging economic and cultural ties, rather than military means.

However, Turkey's military involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya, and severe tensions that developed with Greece and Israel, put a dent in the ‘zero conflict’ approach.

In addition, Turkey’s political influence on Arab Muslim states remained extremely limited. Theoretical predictions look nice on paper, but Erdogan quickly found out that reality doesn’t always align. No one in the Arab Sunni world was willing to accept him as a regional leader – Egypt and Saudi Arabia hold that position in the Sunni bloc.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to give up its role as the leader of the Islamic world.

As a result, Turkey took up the banner of assisting the Palestinians, as part of its regional leadership bid. Yet Erdogan quickly understood that if he wants to be influential in the Arab world, he must have good ties with Israel, or he risks losing relevance.

All the Arab powers have ties with Israel, some formally like Jordan and Egypt, and, since the 2020 Abraham Accords, the UAE and Bahrain, while others, such as Saudi Arabia, maintain informal ties. As the Arab states moved forward, Erdogan was left behind. Erdogan understood that if he remained excluded, the Abraham Accords would further decrease Turkey’s influence on the region and the Arab world – and this realization also helped convince him of the need to change his attitude to Israel.

Meanwhile, Erdogan was a big disappointment to the United States, as it moved closer to Russia and created a crisis in NATO.

Israel, in Erdogan’s view, is therefore an important means for him to repair some of that damage by enabling him to forge new connections with the U.S. and open doors in Europe via improved ties with Jerusalem. Hence, Turkey has focused on promoting civilian ties with the Jewish state.

In addition, economic trade has remained consistently high. Since Erdogan took office as prime minister in 2002, trade between Israel and Turkey has increased fivefold. Furthermore, Erdogan believes that strengthening ties with Israel will benefit his country's economy and increase its global influence.

 As a result, he has made efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Jerusalem – but without giving up his ongoing effort to stress the Palestinian issue.

This is why some Hamas members are still allowed to be active on Turkish soil, though these days, this activity mostly involves Hamas’s political wing. Hamas’s Deputy Political Bureau Chief, Salah Al-Arouri, who in reality oversees West Bank terrorism efforts, is today based in Lebanon after relocating from Turkey. The AKP party views Hamas’s political wing as a sister movement.

Erdogan’s mounting problems

Erdogan’s growing problems mean that he is keener than ever to improve ties with Europe, the U.S., Sunni states, and Israel.

Kurdish autonomous zones in northern Syria have an immediate impact on southern Turkey that Ankara finds disturbing. Millions of Syrian refugees remain in Turkey, creating a serious economic problem. Iran worries Erdogan due to its ongoing attempts to change the balance of power in Syria to the determinant of Turkish-backed Sunni forces in the north of the country. Iranians are present on the Syrian Mediterranean coastline, and this Iranian entrenchment is not viewed positively by Erdogan. Sunni Turkey sees Shi’ite Islamist regional influence as a destructive force. Despite four hundred years of quiet on the Turkish – Iranian border, these are far from being brotherly states.

Erdogan also has huge economic problems and needs to attract new investments by improving ties with Europe and the U.S. He is also interested in becoming a distributor of Israeli gas to Europe.

These factors have led to a substantial change in Erdogan’s tone. When he criticizes Israel, he uses a vastly different tone from the one he used in the early years of his government rule.

The fact that Israeli and Turkish security organizations were reportedly able to cooperate closely to thwart Iranian terror cells on Turkish soil, sent to target Israelis in June 2022, is a further reflection of this change.

Erdogan has not given up his vision of establishing himself as an important Muslim leader who promotes the Palestinian cause, but he has learned that he cannot achieve this by continually bashing Israel.

Turkey also has direct potential gains it can make from its improved ties with Israel.

Israeli companies are already involved in helping Istanbul better manage its water system, with Israeli-made sensors helping to prevent water leakages from its pipes.

There is interest on both sides in further cooperation, but this will continue to be limited to the civilian sector, because Erdogan has not shed all his neo-Ottoman influences.

Greece, for its part, has no reason to feel threatened by the Israeli – Turkish thaw, precisely because it is limited to civilian issues. The good judgement of both Israeli and Turkish decision-makers has enabled ties to become stable once more, as they should be. 

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

Ukraine-Russia War: An imminent spillover in the Middle East

By Amit Kumar

The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine is exacerbating international tensions. Apart from the critical impact the conflict has on the two engaged nations, it is also leading to wider ramifications for international security and stability, notably in the Middle East. It poses a threat to the fragile peace in the region in numerous ways including its ability to intensify current tensions, particularly between Iran and Israel, and the potential to spark new conflicts by upsetting the international power equilibrium that forces uninvolved nations to become a part of these regional tensions. Keeping these emerging situations in the backdrop, this article investigates how the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is affecting regional geopolitics in the Middle East, and how even neutral states are being forced to take sides - a development that may eventually cause ’the proxy wars between Israel and Iran to escalate into a full-fledged showdown in the near future.

First, the Russia-Ukraine conflict impacts regional stability by aggravating already-existing hostilities. The Syrian civil war, the dispute between Israel and Palestine, and the continuous confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia are just a few of the current crises in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Yemen also remain at odds, while Israel is still in conflict with some Arab nations. Lately, Qatar was also subjected to a blockade by its neighbors because of its support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. This situation is further complicated by the fact that non-state groups such as ISIS and Hamas operate with full impunity in the region.

Nonetheless, in August 2022, Israel successfully neutralized threats in drone strikes during Operation Breaking Dawn. One of these strikes even killed a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad senior commander, Taysheer Jabari. Just recently, Israel was also successful in killing several militants from the Lions’ Den and Hamas in Jenin. Based on these events, it can be deduced that the onus to keep the region’s dreadful threats in check lies on Israel. Therefore, it will be in the positive interest of the region if Israel continues to remain committed to upholding the security and stability of the Middle East rather than diverting its strategic resources toward the Ukraine-Russia war.

The situation in the Middle East is extremely precarious and prone to continuing and recurrent confrontations. The Russia-Ukraine war could potentially worsen the conflicts by providing new opportunities for intervention to the outside powers. For instance, the Syrian government’s military and manpower support to Russia, and Syria's engagement in the Ukraine crisis may prompt more Russian action in the Syrian conflict to favor Assad. Similarly, Ukraine shares good relations with several Middle Eastern governments like Israel, Kuwait and Turkey. In case the conflict escalates, the Middle Eastern countries will come under pressure to support Ukraine under US diplomatic pressure, which may result in a division into two camps, albeit not necessarily explicitly.  

Secondly, even if Russia and Israel's relationship can be said to be realpolitik, they have never really seen eye to eye on Iran. However, the evolving equation between Russia, Israel, and Iran due to the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war could hamper Israel's security. In recent years, Iran and Russia have deepened their strategic partnership. Any perception of Israel's allegiance to Ukraine might be considered a threat to Russia's geopolitical objectives. If Israel were to aid Ukraine militarily, Russia would interpret this as a provocative act and may react by enhancing Iran's military-industrial complex, disregarding Israel’s concerns. Meanwhile, from Israel's perspective, every drone and ballistic missile that Russia purchases from Iran, and every economic deal struck between them, provides Tehran with more cash that can be funneled to its proxies around Israel's sovereign territory.  Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has seen Israel as its main regional adversary, and Russia may incite Tehran to engage in a limited fashion with Israel and thus keep its involvement limited to regional affairs. Also, if the tensions between Israel and Iran escalate, there is a chance it would also intensify the arms race, further proxy conflicts, and potentially even lead to a direct military confrontation between the two countries. Israeli establishment would do well to think twice before engaging in a European war beyond providing humanitarian aid. Anything beyond humanitarian aid might worsen relations between Israel and Russia.

Lastly, the Russia-Ukraine conflict also generates fresh prospective disputes. For instance, it may entice other nations with strong links to Russia or Ukraine to support them covertly or overtly by any means. This side-picking act would eventually prolong the ongoing war while simultaneously generating new wounds and refreshing the old ones in the Middle East. This might apply to  Israel, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, and other countries.  Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has said that he would consider sending arms to Ukraine, and two weeks later, Israeli lawmakers were found to be encouraging him to do that. Syria has already broken diplomatic ties with Ukraine. Beirut and Jordan enjoy relatively close ties with Moscow. As many reports suggest, Lebanon-based Palestinians are recruited by Russia and deployed to the frontlines in Ukraine.

Other than geographic proximity, diplomatic mistrust, and a persistent threat to sovereign security, the Middle East is also fraught with dictators and strongmen making this region more susceptible to intensifying internal proxy conflicts among themselves based on the sides they might take in the Ukraine-Russia war. As per the western media, staying neutral in this war equates with taking Russia’s side. While it appears that the middle eastern nations have delicately handled the Ukraine-Russia war by maintaining their strategic autonomy, the truth seems to be different. Multiple fissures have surfaced leading to renewed divisions between these nations that make the situation ripe for conflicts and instability.

In conclusion, the Ukraine-Russia war is a Western war or European War and should be left there. The first step toward the Middle East being embroiled in another region's war is Iran's strategic cooperation with Russia. The second step involves Israel building consensus in the Knesset for providing military backing to Ukraine, opening the door for other countries to follow suit and escalating regional proxy wars. In order to lessen the conflict's potential effects on the Middle East, it is crucial that Middle Eastern countries refrain from any sort of military or moral engagement with Ukraine or Russia.

Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge Dale Aluf, Director of Research & Strategy at SIGNAL, Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership, and Aayushi Malhotra for investing the time and energy necessary to review the manuscript, providing insightful comments and suggestions, and editing the paper. These efforts enabled me to raise the quality of the manuscript.

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Amit Kumar is a doctoral student at the Birla Institute of Technology and Science, in Pilani, India. His area of specialization is China Studies. Amit has worked as a Political Researcher for the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, India's National Political Party's youth wing. Read full bio here.

A House Divided Cannot Stand

By Chuck Freilich

Three months ago, Israel’s economy was booming. Israel still faced severe threats from Iran and Hezbollah, and there had been an increase in Palestinian terrorism, but overall Israel was never more secure. Its ties with states around the world were expanding and hopes for near-term normalization with the Saudis and others abounded. Israel was a vibrant democracy and viewed its approaching 75th anniversary with optimism.

Israel is now convulsed by self-inflicted divisions that are wracking its society and economy, undermining its democracy and threatening the pillars of its national security. Reservists from Israel’s most hallowed military units are in a state of near rebellion and what starts in the reserves will rapidly spill over into the regular army. Israel is on the verge of coming apart.

With international attention focused on Ukraine and the US-Chinese global rivalry, Iran is making steady progress towards a nuclear capability. In essence, it already is a nuclear threshold state, with sufficient fissile material for some five bombs and more soon. The only thing preventing Iran from weaponizing a nuclear warhead, the final hurdle to an operational capability, is its ongoing fear of the international and Israeli response. With both the international community and Israel focused elsewhere, this fear has greatly diminished and a nuclear Iran is an increasingly real possibility.

Moreover, the recent agreement between Iran and its arch-rival, Saudi Arabia, was a significant achievement for the former, that may signal an important realignment of regional forces. The agreement provides for a restoration of diplomatic relations, after a seven-year hiatus, and renewed economic and even military cooperation. Assuming that it is actually implemented - not a foregone conclusion – the agreement would give Iran three important wins: a reduction in regional tensions; a weakening of the American-led regional coalition; and, at a minimum, a blow both to Israel’s hopes of building a military alignment against Iran and for further regional normalization.

Further complicating the picture, the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement was brokered by China, not the US. For decades, China has become an increasingly important economic player in the region, buying vast quantities of oil from both the Saudis and Iran, but it had yet to turn its economic prowess into diplomatic and military might. In recent years, this has begun changing, as China deployed limited forces in the region (Djibouti), conducted repeated naval exercises with Iran and Russia, signed a 25-year strategic agreement with Iran, and now, for the first time, led a major strategic development in the region. The US still remains the preeminent power in the region, especially militarily, but the big question is whether the agreement signifies the beginning of the Chinese era in the Middle East.

The Saudis and Emirates, who also recently renewed ties with Iran, are engaging in classic hedging behavior. Driven by an ongoing loss of confidence in the US guarantee for their security, they are seeking other means of ensuring it, first by expanding ties with Israel, now by reducing hostilities with Iran. One can agree with their thinking, or not, but it is important to understand their mindset.

The Gulf and other Sunni states’ loss of faith in the US guarantee began with the Second Gulf War, in which egregious American miscalculations, in their view, greatly empowered Iran. The US then “abandoned” Egyptian President Mubarak, ostensibly its leading Arab ally. The US negotiated a flawed nuclear deal with Iran, but abruptly withdrew from it, without a Plan B, and failed to respond to a major Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities and to a subsequent attack against the UAE. Ongoing US pressure for human rights reforms, snubbing of the Saudi crown prince, and pressure to end the war in Yemen, added to the sense of animosity. Statements that the US no longer needed Mideast oil, true in a narrow sense, ignored the reality of one global energy market, further heightening Gulf insecurity.

The glitter is also off the Abraham Accords with Israel and the Arab signatories - extent and potential - are re-evaluating their positions. This dramatic breakthrough in relations, which had the potential to transform the region and Israel’s place in it, was driven first and foremost by the common fear of Iran and growing doubts about American resolve to prevent a nuclear Iran. The UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval, sought to build an undeclared alliance with Israel, signed defense cooperation agreements and even began making major purchases of Israeli weapons. The UAE warmly embraced Israel, in dramatic and heretofore unimaginable ways.

Israel could never constitute a substitute for the US, of course, but its ongoing political crisis, with five rounds of elections in three years and now almost complete meltdown, have clearly demonstrated its limitations as a reliable strategic partner for the Gulf states and led to growing disaffection. The Emiratis have reportedly already cancelled weapon sales, Prime Minister Netanyahu has pointedly not been invited to visit, and there is palpable concern among the Abraham Accords states over the directions being taken by the new government, especially regarding the Palestinians.

The breakthrough with Israel was also driven by the Abraham Accords states’ interest in access to Israeli high-tech, especially cyber, and the belief that Israel’s integration into the region would help moderate its policies towards the Palestinians. In both areas, they have been disappointed. The international uproar over Israel’s cyber exports, stemming primarily from the NSO affair, caused Israel to greatly scale back sales to nondemocratic states. The new government’s ultra-hard right composition and de facto intention to annex the West Bank, contradict the hopes of all Gulf states, as well as assurances given to the UAE at the time.

The Middle Eastern landscape is changing before our eyes. Unsurprisingly, neither friend nor foe are sitting back and graciously waiting for Israel to get its house in order. As has long been known, a house divided cannot stand. 

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.