MirYam In The Media: Israel ‘one of the world’s top cyber powers’

Yaakov Lappin IN CONVERSATION WITH: PROF. CHUCK FREILICH

Israel’s position as a cyber superpower places it in an exclusive club of world powers, despite having a population a little larger than New York City, according to former Israeli defense official Chuck Freilich.

Freilich, a senior research fellow at the MirYam Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies and a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, recently published a book on the subject, titled, “Israel and Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became a Global Cyber Power.”

A former senior fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School who teaches at Columbia and at Tel Aviv University, Freilich said Israel’s cyber capabilities are prominent at both the civilian and military levels. The number of cyber start-ups in Israel equals the total number of cyber start-ups in the world, excluding the United States, he noted.

“This is a stunning statistic. It’s the result of a really unique contribution to the Israeli hi-tech scene in general, and the cyber realm especially, by the defense establishment and intelligence agencies,” said Freilich.

Graduates of the Israel Defense Forces cyber units, mainly Unit 8200 and Unit 81, as well as intelligence agencies, enter the private sector and become a primary source of commercial start-ups, he explained.

This in turn acts as a driving force behind cyber innovation. The fact that the Israeli defense establishment funds incubators and technological innovation programs also contributes to this prosperity of the local cyber scene, according to Freilich.

The military units “find and train Israel’s cyber personnel, and most importantly, the really top-level personnel. In the cyber world, a few geniuses make all the difference,” he added.

Between 2011 and 2020, some 100 veterans of Unit 81, who served in the years between 2003 and 2010, went on to found 50 start-ups, with an accumulated evaluation of over $10 billion, Freilich noted. “That’s 100 veterans alone,” he said.

“Another mind blowing statistic is that the NSA [the U.S. National Security Agency] has about 40,000 personnel, while Unit 8200 [its Israeli equivalent] reportedly has a quarter of that, 10,000 people. Most of what Unit 8200 does is cyber based. Here you have little Israel on the scale of a global superpower. Each year, between a few hundred and a thousand cyber personnel are discharged in Israel. China’s 2022 graduating cyber school count was 1,300. So we have a cyber force on the scale of global superpowers,” he stated.

Pointing to compulsory military service as the core secret sauce behind this success, Freilich argues that this enables the IDF to track down the best and the brightest, with the military scouting high school databases and beginning to locate suitable youths by the 10th grade.

“One percent of the best high school graduates go to Atuda [a program that enables them to study and delay military service] and Talpiyot [a program that sends students to complete BAs in mathematics and natural sciences as part of their service]. Talpiyot looks at the top 2%, and then begins an intensive testing process. Only 10% of that 2% pass and are then further winnowed down through a grueling aptitude testing process,” said Freilich, describing the rigorous screening process.

With regard to Unit 81, while 10,000 candidates passed initial annual screening, only a few hundred went on to be selected.

“All told, the IDF trains 10,000 people a year in cyber programs. This is a huge training program, not only giving people computer skills, but also reaching the real geniuses,” he said.

Freilich added that a third of graduates of a Unit 8200 high school program that teaches university-level cyber come from peripheral areas.

He also drew attention to Israel’s national style, which he described in his book as “hutzpah gone viral.”

“Israeli society has a never-ending propensity to challenge authority and reject accepted norms, refusing to take no for an answer, and thirsting for new ways of achieving things,” said Freilich.

“Our strategic circumstances means we have a greater willingness to take risks, and we are non-hierarchical and informal,” he added. “That’s the same culture you find in R&D firms around the world. So cyber fits Israel like a glove.”

On Aug. 8, the Mayanei HaYeshua Medical Center in Bnei Brak announced that it had been struck by a cyber-attack, forcing personnel to switch to pen and paper before recovering computer networks.

Despite Israel’s cyber achievements, problems still exist in protecting the civil sector, Freilich admitted.

“There is reason to be concerned about that and critical national infrastructure, like water and communications—the type of sites that the Israel National Cyber Directorate defends the most. They get specially tailored defense packages, but there is still reason for concern,” said Freilich.

Iran, for its part, woke up to the cyber realm after sustaining the devastating 2009 Stuxnet attack, which international media reports attributed to Israel and the United States.

“Be wary of the law of unintended consequences,” said Freilich. “Until 2010, Iran wasn’t doing much in this area. By 2012, it was launching offensive attacks around the world.”

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

A U.S.-Saudi deal could bring down Israel’s government

By eitan dangot

A possible agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia that would involve Saudi- Israeli normalization, is above all a maneuver that is designed to strengthen Washington’s global strategic policy. Israel plays a minor consideration in this potential arrangement, but its results could nevertheless challenge the current Israeli government to the point of bringing about its dissolution.

The U.S.’s primary considerations are the Chinese and Russian challenges to its already degraded status in the Middle East. In this context and on the eve of an American election year, the Biden administration understands that it needs a regional agreement with the Saudis to stabilize the Middle East and give Biden a boost ahead of his bid to retain the presidency.

Moreover, Washington, as it observes the Chinese infiltration of its alliance with Saudi Arabia, does not want to be drawn into instability in the region.

Under the proposed agreement, Saudi Arabia will be formally recognized as a new and primary member of the Abraham Accords bloc, which is designed to create a check against Iran. An agreement would also create a status quo against Russian penetration, which often goes hand in hand with Chinese infiltration. As far as the U.S. is concerned, this is the ultimate goal of the agreement, and hence Israel itself is not the most important element. But as part of a deal, normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia can also boost American policy in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Israel is in the second circle of Washington’s considerations.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is looking on with obvious displeasure at the deterioration of relations between the Israeli leadership and Washington that is taking place against the background of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions, as head of the ‘all right-wing’ government.

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement is designed to boost its regional and global status. This follows a Saudi policy of continued dependence on the United States, while at the same time opening channels in the opposite direction, reflecting the lack of Saudi confidence in the U.S.

Riyadh wants a deal to affirm its place as a prestigious and valuable U.S. ally, in a reversal of the current American attitude to it. The Saudis also want a deal to include a U.S. commitment to a strategic defense alliance, similar to the U.S. commitment to NATO.

As Saudi Arabia looks a decade or two ahead at a changing world, against the backdrop of Iran's provocations, it also sees in the deal an opportunity to gain early nuclear technological know-how. And this signifies a challenge for the future Middle East.

Saudi Arabia would also receive advanced military technology platforms and capabilities that put it in the first class of powers, and through sales of F-35 and air defense systems, give it capabilities against the Iranian axis. This will also give the Saudis confidence in facing the Houthis in Yemen.

Israel will have to deal with the risk of losing regional aerial superiority due to Saudi Arabia acquiring F-35s, and Riyadh’s planned nuclear program, will also see a major erosion of Israel’s qualitative military qualitative edge.

Perhaps, as a compromise solution, the U.S. will agree to the first civilian nuclear steps over a longer timeline, with other steps put on hold. We cannot ignore the risk of an unconventional arms race developing, with additional countries following the Saudis, like Egypt and Turkey. And this dilemma is something the US and Israel will have to seriously discuss.

Yet for Riyadh, all of this will give the Kingdom the security to continue with its economic plans to become a global superpower with the confidence to navigate threats.

Israel, therefore, does not form the premise of the three-way Saudi – American – Israeli deal. It is more like a distinguished passenger who is invited to the business train car and is able to take advantage of what is on offer.

Israel’s involvement will make it easier for Biden to get the deal approved in Congress, where both Democrats and Republicans have raised objections to Saudi Arabia over human rights and extremism, issues that have prevented better U.S. ties with Riyadh.

Regionally speaking, Saudi-Israeli normalization will create a high wall and underground barrier to fortify the Abraham Accords in the coming years, creating a new bloc in the Middle East in the face of the Iranian threat.

Implications for Israeli politics

Neither Saudi Arabia nor the U.S. are happy about the political situation in Israel or about the risk of policies that could lead to a multi-arena escalation event. The common interest of the US and Saudi Arabia is regional quiet.

Saudi Arabia will demand significant changes from Israel. As the leading Muslim state, it will not be able to afford to give up the Palestinian issue. Normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia will not be served without Israeli concessions, including an Israeli commitment to a concept that falls within the space of the two-state idea.

In practice, Israel will be required to take steps such as the cessation of annexation of territories for several years in the West Bank, to make land available to the Palestinian Authority in Area C and to promote Palestinian economic projects. Saudi Arabia may demand a renewed and approved mechanism to keep the Al Aqsa Mosque quiet as well.

Israel will be required to transfer funds to the Palestinian Authority. It may also be time for Israel to request Saudi financial involvement in the development of infrastructure in the West Bank.

The Saudis can also provide jobs outside of the West Bank to Palestinian tech personnel and academics, some of whom were employed in the Gulf in the past but have returned to unemployment in the West Bank.

Therefore, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have to take critical decisions ahead of his meeting with President Biden in September. Does he want to return to being a legitimate leader on the international stage? If he accepts the terms of normalization, this could speed up the departure of the Ben Gvir-Smotrich alliance from his coalition and the demise of the full right-wing government, leading to the formation of a new government that could deal with these issues in a matter-of-fact manner.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

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Hamas and Israel’s domestic crisis

By grisha yakubovich

When it comes to the domestic political crisis raging within Israel's borders, Hamas is currently on the fence about how to react. Hamas’s leadership in Gaza has not been taken in by the Iranian-Shi’ite axises confident pronouncements that Israel is weak and that its end is nigh. Unlike Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (which are completely dependent on Iran both ideologically and economically), Hamas is aware that democracy is one of Israel's primary strengths.

We know that Hamas recognizes this strength because, in over 30 weeks of mass political demonstrations held in Israel, Hamas has not launched a single terror attack targeting these rallies. That appears to be a deliberate choice. It is based on the calculation that assaulting the protesters will backfire, and that this would be a foolish move for Hamas. This conclusion was likely reached after Hamas completed a strategic and operational examination of its options. The review concluded with a decision, for now at least, to stay on the sidelines and “let the Jews tear themselves apart.”

 At the same time, Hamas takes advantage of the Israeli divide to advance its goal of making its narrative the dominant narrative in the Palestinian arena. Confident that the actions of the Israeli Right, which are creating increased friction with the Palestinians, will assist its efforts to position itself as the leading faction in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), Hamas has doubled down on its efforts to carry out and support terrorism in the territories. The August 4 incident in Burqa, in the West Bank, in which a Palestinian man was shot dead by an Israeli settler during clashes, is just the kind of incident that Hamas is banking on to boost its status.

As the lead Palestinian organization behind terrorist attacks, Hamas can present its rival, the Palestinian Authority/Fatah, as a collaborator of Israel, and depict the PA’s security operations in Jenin, following the IDF’s operation there, as part of that collaboration.

Hamas very much hopes that far-right Israeli figures, such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, will continue to stir up trouble in the West Bank.

Meanwhile, Hamas is also pressing Israel, Egypt, and others to increase the quantity of money entering Gaza, as a form of extortion racket, and this pressure likely led to Israel’s agreement to increase Qatari funding of Gaza’s power station by an additional three million dollars a month.

Hamas-backed launches of primitive rockets in Jenin, meanwhile, are another signal to Israel that the multi-arena threat that Hamas is building – the ability to fire rockets at Israel from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria – is now being joined by the West Bank.

Hamas has a firm understanding of the Israeli psyche, with its top leaders, like Yahya Sinwar, having spent many years in Israeli prisons. That’s why in early August, Hamas released an image of the firearm it seized from IDF soldier Hadar Goldin, who was killed in action and whose body is held by the organization as a bargaining chip for a future prisoner swap.

Hamas sees that Israel is refraining from a forceful response against Hezbollah’s stepped-up provocations from Lebanon and is responding with a campaign of threats of its own.

Looking ahead, all of this places Hamas in a better position ahead of the departure of PA President Mahmoud Abbas from the scene. While Hamas is aware that Israel would not permit it to establish a regime in the West Bank as it has in Gaza, it is planning a different kind of maneuver, based on replicating the democratic claim to legitimacy that it sees in Israel.

Hamas will claim, not without justification, that most West Bank Palestinian voters want it in power. It is therefore likely to hold mass rallies and attempted takeovers of PA power centers, based on the democratic claim.

It is still unclear whether Hamas plans to plant one of its people as future president of the PA, or as a future secretary-general of the PLO, but what is highly likely is that it will choose a legal–democratic channel to try and seize power. Hamas may also try to re-establish a majority in the Palestinian parliament, much like Hezbollah has done in Lebanon. This is Hamas’s next significant objective – and it is searching for ways to exploit Israel’s moment of crisis to help advance it.

Should it succeed, the Oslo Accords would likely be scrapped, and Israel would probably go back to a military-combat posture regarding the West Bank.

As such, when Hamas views the mass protests in Israel and claims by both sides within the Israeli divide of representing a democratic majority, it sees the blueprints for its takeover plan of the West Bank. This scenario, if it plays out, places Israel in a more precarious position than an attempted Hamas armed coup would in the West Bank. It reduces Israel’s room for political maneuvering.

Ultimately, Israel’s working assumption when preparing for Hamas’s next steps should be that Hamas’s leadership knows Israelis better than we know ourselves.

When Hamas looks around the region and views the rise in power of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis and the perceived weakening of the U.S. alliance system, it draws encouragement. When it sees Israel fighting itself, it draws even greater encouragement, and this will guide Hamas as it enters the post-Abbas succession battle. 

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Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

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Israel's Defense Must Not Be Held Hostage

By jeremiah rozman

Over the past few months, hundreds of thousands of Israelis have turned out to protest judicial reform. The discourse on this issue is fraught with doomsday hyperbole. As a result, there is the potential for serious economic damage and a rift with the United States.

However, this pales in comparison to the danger represented by a movement—championed by some prominent leaders and politicians—that calls on reservists to refuse their obligation to serve: In essence, a call for mutiny.

This is not within the realm of legal protest. It cynically seeks to hold Israel’s security hostage if unelected elements do not get their way, and does so in the name of defending democracy.

Contrary to hyperbole about judicial reform being the “end of democracy,” it would, in fact, make Israel’s Supreme Court more accountable to the Knesset, Israel’s elected branch of government. Clearly, this is not the end of democracy.

The dispute over reforms is a policy dispute. In fact, it is a rather mundane one, considering that, absurdly, it remains possible for Israel’s judiciary to rule against the reforms.

Gullible people might believe that judicial reform poses an existential threat to Israel’s democracy. The cynical people driving the movement know this is false. They claim it is such a threat because only extreme danger can justify extreme actions such as soliciting mutiny.

This attempt to coerce political change by threatening to degrade Israel’s security is akin to a toxic partner threatening self-harm if they do not get their way. Supporters of the refusal movement explicitly say so.

For example, a member of the Brothers in Arms organization stated outright, “If the overhaul bills are passed, we and tens of thousands more who are with us will stop volunteering for reserve duty. … The army is disintegrating before your eyes.” Addressing Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, he stated, “We expect you to stand up and say that you will not vote for the laws.”

In a democracy, policy differences are addressed through voting. There is nothing wrong with opposing judicial reform. Peaceful protest is protected. But mutiny is criminal.

As IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi said, “Hezbollah and Hamas have one goal, and that is to destroy Israel; they do not care what kind of judiciary it has.”

Some 10,000 IDF reservists, including 1,000 Air Force reservists, have stated their refusal to serve in protest of judicial reform. Israel has a small active military. Mandatory reserves allow Israel to field a military capable of deterring and, if need be, defeating regional threats despite its small population.

Many reservists fill critical roles, especially pilots and elite soldiers like the Yahalom unit’s combat engineers. 160 such reservists recently refused to serve. These soldiers are expensive to train, meet difficult standards and conduct critical missions.

The refusal movement also threatens the active service. Defense analyst Amos Harel noted, “In brigades, they’re talking about ‘our’ units and ‘their’ units as solidarity erodes during the judicial overhaul.”

Ministers Miki Zohar and Itamar Ben Gvir stressed this point, sharing a staged video showing ground forces asking for aerial support and pilots asking them their position on judicial reform. A dying soldier then says, “My brothers, from right and left, don’t put politics in the army.” This political theater makes a valid point.

Israel won its independence because numerous identity groups worked together. There was a religious-secular divide, a socialist-capitalist divide, a Sephardi-Ashkenazi divide, a Western European-Eastern European divide and so on. But all these factions shared the goal of a secure Jewish homeland.

They almost failed to achieve it. When independence was declared, Israel had to decide whether to permit the existence of a separate military structure loyal to a separate political faction. But despite a bitter rivalry, the Etzel and the Haganah collaborated during the 1948 War of Independence.

Towards the end of the war, however, Diaspora supporters sent the Etzel a shipment of critical arms on a ship called the Altalena. The Haganah was ordered to fire on the ship if it refused to hand over those arms to the new Israel Defense Forces. It did so.

As difficult as this decision was, it is unlikely that Israel would have survived without a unified military that obeyed the lawful orders of the democratically elected government.

Imagine the precedent set by legitimizing refusal to serve on political grounds. Will soldiers serve only under governments they support?

The optimal solution to this crisis is top-down and bottom-up persuasion through an appeal to common sense and unity. 80,000 reservists have signed a petition against refusal and elite units have condemned refusal as well.

Those inclined to refuse must listen to those on their side of the political divide. Protest leaders and politicians should stress the need to protest through means that do not harm security or democracy. National Unity Party head and former IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz has done so, despite opposing Netanyahu and judicial reform.

Finally, only persuasion can retain the high-quality volunteers who serve in the reserves. A suboptimal solution is punishment, including dismissal, fines and the requirement to pay back benefits.

When soldiers refused to serve during the disengagement from Gaza, they faced military justice. Although punishment should be the last resort, it is preferable to capitulation, which legitimizes mutiny as a way to coerce policy changes. It is also better than ignoring the problem, which degrades readiness and divides the military.

In the lead-up to the destruction of the Second Temple, zealots failed to convince the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem to attack the Romans instead of waiting out the siege. They burned Jerusalem’s food and supplies stores to render that option impossible.

The resulting calamity is a warning against drastic unilateral action that harms Israel’s security. It is fine to have policy preferences and to use legal means to promote them. But Israel was established to defend the Jewish people. This defense must not be held hostage.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

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It’s time to put out Israel’s political fires

By DANIELLE ROTH-AVNERI

At a conservative estimate, around two-and-a-half months should suffice to douse the political flames engulfing Israel, which have left not a single person in Israeli society unaffected, be they on the Right or Left.    

What we have witnessed over the past few months is a quiet civil war, one that is being fought not with arrows or physical blows, but rather on social media networks and within groups of friends and families.

Meanwhile, the Knesset has just begun a two-and-a-half-month-long recess, during which time, anything can happen in Israel’s political reality. August is a time for families to go on vacation, with kids off school. In September, the High Holy Days continue the vacation mode, with an added spiritual, national, and cognitive effect created by the powerful holiday of Yom Kippur.

The Knesset will reconvene in mid-October, and by then we will know whether the recess allowed enough time for heads to cool in the aftermath of the passing of the coalition's amendment to the Basic Law: The Judiciary, also known as the reasonableness standard bill, restricting the power of the Supreme Court to use the reasonableness doctrine to review government decisions.  

Currently, the country is still at boiling point, and the gulf that separates the two sides is vast. One side believes that a very minor law was passed and that it had to be passed to demonstrate to conservative voters that the Right has not capitulated on issues pertaining to judicial reform and that the Left does not run the government.

On the other hand, for this law to pass, there needed to be a complete consensus among all members of the government because of the opposition to it within the military. The uprising within the ranks, which included threats by reservist pilots and elite reserve combat unit members not to show up for service, ended up being the driving force behind the passage of this law.

This is something the government could not have given in to: The refusal card puts the safety of the State of Israel in jeopardy. When it comes to military no-shows, the government correctly felt that if it gave in, the no-show card would be pulled out of the deck in other scenarios in the future.

Two camps have formed within the coalition. One faction within the Likud and other coalition parties believes the legislative process should be carried out in its entirety right now. This group is led by Justice Minister Yariv Levin and his confidants. After getting the law passed, some members of this hawkish and ultra-rightist group took a selfie in the Knesset that was highly insensitive; there was no need for them to rub salt in the opposition’s wound. After winning, they ought to have shown some modesty.

A second group within the Likud believes that now is the time to calm the situation before making any further moves. This group believes that it is necessary to arrive at a broad consensus on the future of judicial reform, most critically on the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee. Deciding the future of this committee, which appoints justices to the Supreme Court, is the next major milestone of the judicial reform drama. It is already clear that at this stage in the proceedings whatever happens on this count, the proposal will fall short of the coalition’s original plans.

Meanwhile, the demonstrations on Israeli streets warning of dictatorship spread all manner of libel against Israel. The claims of a dictatorship are simply baseless. Former senior politicians promoted this narrative within the protest movement, but anyone familiar with politics, strategy, and political campaigns is aware that the objective of the protest movement is to remove Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from office.

The protest campaigns began a long time before judicial reform did. Notably, politicians from the opposition are being completely excluded from the movement. This means that the movement itself is a political development in the making, which could result in the formation of a new party.

All in all, the heads of the protest movement are exploiting circumstances to promote their agenda, and many of them have fallen in love with protests for protest’s sake.

Despite their rhetoric, Israel will not transition into a dictatorship. The amendment to the reasonableness standard does not spell the end of democracy.

The State of Israel is not a perfect country, and many things need to be fixed. It is not sustainable to have a situation in which the government will conclude that it is powerless to make changes. On the other hand, with all due respect to Justice Minister Levin, the government needs to realize that there are more pressing things for it to deal with right now.  

We have an education system that is slowly disintegrating, a health system that requires an emergency transfusion, and security challenges on all fronts.

It is time to end the control over the political situation by extreme elements on the Right as well as the Left. This means moderating future government steps and ending anarchy on the streets, where, during a protest, a mother was attacked in her vehicle while children were inside, or where a driver drove into protesters.

How did we stoop to this new low? Many of Israel’s adversaries are clasping their hands with excitement at these scenes.

Regardless, in the end, it is Netanyahu who will decide what the next move is. He is watching the polls carefully and sees that his situation has deteriorated very significantly since the judicial reform began. Given the damage done so far, it is fair to assume that his motivation to continue with judicial reform is extremely low.  

Netanyahu will continue his wait-and-see approach before deciding what to do vis-à-vis the Judicial Selection Committee. He will wait to see what new developments surface before taking his next step.

In late July, Netanyahu was taken to hospital by ambulance. He claimed to be suffering from dehydration. When the most qualified cardiologists in the State of Israel were rushed to his side, everybody understood that there had been some kind of cardiac event, and he later received a pacemaker. The flames burning in Israel affect the entire country, including the heart of the prime minister.

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

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The fight for Israel’s democracy

By SHARON ROFFE OFIR

Last Saturday night, during the weekly protest against the government's judicial reform program, I met Yaron Ram. He was standing with a sign that showed a photograph of his brother, along with the text: "The late Sgt. Maj Elad Ram, may his memory be a blessing, the Second Lebanon War. Was it in vain?”

I approached Yaron and told him that I knew of his brother's story from my time working as a journalist. Elad fell at noon on the last day of combat. He was posthumously awarded with a citation of excellence from IDF Northern Command's Commanding Officer for his heroic conduct under fire.

“What frightens you?” I asked Yaron. "Everyone is sad lately, but as a bereaved brother, I am twice as sad. Elad was my younger brother, and he fought for a Jewish and democratic state. I pray that his death was not in vain.”

Yaron is not alone. The values upon which we have raised and educated our children to serve in the IDF are contradictory to the desire of every parent to protect their child. We have done so to protect the state.

The best of our sons and daughters has for years agreed to put themselves at risk and sacrifice their lives for the present and future of this country. They did so for this country and they were the silver platter on which we were given the Jewish homeland. Yet in the chaotic reality that has emerged, many are concluding -- for the first time in Israel's history -- that they can no longer serve the ‘king.’

The government rejected all compromise efforts ahead of the vote on its amendment to the Basic Law: Judiciary to narrow the reasonableness standard. The amendment (which passed July 24) can only change the rules of the political system.

This will certainly not, as MK Simcha Rotman argued, bring back the principle of separation of powers and boost democracy in the State of Israel. Nor can the amendment be described as "non-dramatic" as coalition officials claimed just before the vote.

To grasp the significance of the step, we need to go back ten months to the days when, for most of us at least, legal terms were not part and parcel of our daily lives.

Last October, as Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu fought to regain the premiership and made promises that were mainly about dealing with the cost-of-living crisis, no mention was made of a judicial override clause that would give the government the ability to restore laws that the Supreme Court had struck off, and neither was any mention made of narrowing the scope of the reasonableness standard or making changes to the judicial appointments committee, etc. These issues were simply not part of his election campaign.

We first learned about the legal coup from Justice Minister Yariv Levin's now-infamous press conference. The reaction arrived fast enough, and from there, the road was short to long weeks of protest that Netanyahu did not foresee.

Some may ask what is so dramatic about eliminating the reasonableness basis for the Supreme Court’s dismissal of government decisions. In layman's terms, I would answer that without the reasonableness standard there will be no checks and balances on government decisions, or those of the prime minister, and no one will prevent corrupt appointments.

You might say that this is fine and that the Supreme Court should not be the one to determine this or conduct policy since we are after all in a democracy, and no one elected the Supreme Court judges.

This narrative leads to the view that the elected government has a mandate to lead its policies without judicial oversight.

When it comes to policy, there is some justification to the claim that the government has a right to exercise its judgment -- which is precisely why the court has scarcely ever canceled policy decisions, except when they are extremely unreasonable, such as the failure to fortify classrooms in rocket-stricken Sderot.

But what will citizens say when the government seeks to return a convicted criminal to power -- for example, Aryeh Deri, violate the freedom of the press, subordinate the Police Investigations Department to a minister, or appoint an attorney general who has no background suitable for the position?

What will the people say when the government decides that the date of the Knesset elections is unsuitable, as happened when the elections for the chief rabbis were postponed?

Will that be reasonable? In other words, who will preserve democracy?

In states that have checks and balances, there is usually a constitution and a constitutional court. Some Western states have two houses of parliament. Israeli democracy is built on the principle of separation of powers, but the legal revolution led an entire public to wake up and realize its fragility.

In practice, there is no real separation of powers in Israel; the government controls the Knesset, and only the judiciary can check the government.

Israel is a model of semi-democracy that has led to inherent chaos over the years. Eliminating the reasonableness standard blocks the judiciary, and leaves a single power: This is known as dictatorship.

As we prepare to commemorate the destruction of the Second Temple some 2,000 years ago, history has its ways of making us open our eyes. When in the background, members of the government are engaged in making painful remarks, condemning pilots and IDF combat soldiers who decline to show up for reserve service, or when the Minister for Information Galit Distel Atbaryan writes that "a thousand pilots won't be able to extinguish me," we should cast our gaze at the moving images of the masses of Israel who in extreme heat have marched to Jerusalem. Those behind the so-called reform should internalize that just as we are ready to fight for our country, so too will we fight for our democracy.

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Israel must restore its deterrence against Hezbollah

By Shmuel Tzuker

Hezbollah’s disturbing escalation on the Lebanese-Israeli border in recent weeks and months reflects a simple truth: Israel has allowed itself to be deterred by its northern adversary.

To disguise this sobering fact, laundered words like “containment” are thrown around to justify Israel’s lack of response to these provocations.

Years ago, Israel’s defense establishment spoke of decisive victory as the goal when dealing with enemies. This was eventually phased out in favor of “deterrence.” Now the talk is of containment.

There is no doubt that Israel does not want to be dragged into a war with Hezbollah.  The terror group knows that this is Israel’s position, and calculates the risks it is willing to take accordingly.

While Israel is proactive in defending its security interests in Syria and even in Iran, as well as at sea, Israel simply does not dare to attack Lebanon. Even when earlier this year a Hezbollah terrorist infiltrated Israel and made it to Megiddo Junction in Israel’s north, where he planted an IED on a highway, Israel did not respond.

That terrorist could have reached Tel Aviv. No one knew of his existence until his bomb detonated, seriously injuring an Arab-Israeli driver. The driver’s injuries were tragic, but the attack could have ended in dozens of casualties.

Then, on Passover eve in April, a barrage of rockets was fired into Israel. The dominant narrative was that it was Palestinians who fired them, not Hezbollah. We convinced ourselves that this was the case and returned fire on an open field.

Now Israel is dealing with a Hezbollah tent planted on Israeli territory that houses armed operatives. This has become a strategic matter. In recent days, a Lebanese parliament member and eight others infiltrated Israel from Lebanon.

Nevertheless, Israel is in containment mode. This means that it doesn’t want to do anything.

If the recent comments made by opposition figure and Yisrael Beiteinu Party leader Avigdor Liberman are to be believed, the IDF has told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel’s failure to respond properly to these events is eroding its deterrence—if it even existed in the first place.

Containment is merely a tactical matter and a bigger issue is at play. Israel does not feel it can respond forcefully against Hezbollah due to the risks posed by war with it—namely thousands of rockets a day fired at the Israeli home front. Hezbollah’s arsenal includes 500 precise projectiles capable of striking every location in Israel.

Northern Israel, meanwhile, faces the scenario of evacuating tens of thousands of civilians who have nowhere to go. There is no organizational plan in place for this.

As a result, the concern is that in the event of a Third Lebanon War, the Israeli government will not be able to implement its military and civilian directives. This includes infrastructure. In particular, Israel’s offshore gas rigs may have to be shut down.

Meanwhile, factions in the Israeli-Arab sector could direct large numbers of firearms at fellow citizens. The unrest that took place during the May 2021 Operation Guardian of the Walls could be a sneak peek at what a future war might look like.

Hence, Israel seeks to avoid war. Needless to say, there is an Israeli military in this equation that is far more powerful than it was during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. But when we compare the ability of Israel to absorb losses and damage to that of Hezbollah, the conclusion that emerges is problematic: Israel, it seems, is more deterred than the terror group.

All of this raises the question of the feasibility of a preemptive Israeli strike on Hezbollah.

Due to the risks posed to the Israeli home front, which could sustain thousands of casualties (including injured) and tens of thousands of homes hit by projectiles, with dysfunctional emergency service responses and civilian services severely affected, the option of a preemptive strike must be examined.

Such a strike could significantly decrease the damage sustained by Israel in a future war with Hezbollah. Furthermore, if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear program, it is clear that Hezbollah would retaliate, leaving Israel in conflict on at least two fronts.

Fighter jets would have to deal with Iran and Lebanon, and this raises the question of whether it might not be better to first decrease Hezbollah’s capabilities, allowing Israel to focus on Iran.

Should we wait for Hezbollah to take the initiative or do we take the first step after we define what an Israeli red line looks like?

Either way, it is only a matter of time before the next escalation occurs. Hezbollah won’t be able to keep stepping on Israel’s toes as it has been doing since the summer of 2022 when it threatened Israeli offshore gas rigs. Nor can it do so now when it issues new border demands and fires an anti-tank missile at an IDF patrol.

Israel can’t keep hiding under the apron of inaction.

The question is whether the IDF should wait for Hezbollah to escalate or seize on a future Hezbollah provocation at a time when Israel is prepared to attack and deal with the consequences.

In answering this question, one can’t ignore Israel’s current unprecedented domestic crisis.

Improved social cohesion will be a necessary condition for choosing the timing of a potential preemptive strike on Hezbollah. If Israel chooses this path, it must launch a strong response to any future Hezbollah attack. If Hezbollah escalates further, Israel will have no choice but to go to war.

But this time, Israel would act from an improved position due to the preemptive strike, better preparations on the home front and no domestic political crisis threatening the ability of Israeli Air Force reservists to serve.

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Brigadier General Shmuel Tzuker is the former Deputy Director General of the Directorate of Production and Procurement in the Ministry of Defense, Israel. Read full bio here.

Israel-India defense relations should be taken to the next level

By MANGESH SAWANT

Israel and India are progressive islands of democracies situated in a sea of autocracies interspersed with nuclear unstable nations. Israel and India face similar asymmetric and symmetric threats such as terrorism and wars. Terrorism and wars are the policy instruments of hostile neighboring nations. Israel is threatened by terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran supports terrorist groups, ratchets up geopolitical tensions and is working on developing a nuclear bomb. Pakistan which is the epicenter of terrorism has been attacking targets in India through radical Islamic groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-I-Mohammad. China has fought a war with India and intermittently attacks Indian army soldiers guarding the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Israel has played a pivotal role as a trustworthy partner of the Indian military and the defense industry. The two nations have strategically fostered productive relations in the defense sector for more than three decades. Israel is the second largest supplier of weapon systems to India. In 2021 both nations signed an agreement to set up a 10-year roadmap in the arena of defense cooperation that will make India the largest importer of Israeli defense equipment. Military technology transfers, joint defense research programs and Israel's advanced weapons systems such as UAVs, missiles, and missile defense systems have enhanced India's offensive and defensive capabilities since the Kargil conflict.

The Indian army has deployed Israeli thermal imaging and night vision imaging equipment on the Line of Control and in counter-terrorism operations in Kashmir. The Indian Army has also deployed Heron drones on the LAC since the 2017 Doklam crisis. The SPICE bomb was used by the Indian Air Force to strike terrorist training camps in Pakistan. The Indian Navy’s MARCOS are equipped with the TAR-21 assault rifles and Galil sniper rifles. The Indian Navy has installed the EL/M 2248 MF-STAR and EL/M-2221 STGR radars on its frontline destroyers. Israeli defense companies such as IAI, Elbit Systems and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems have set up joint ventures with Bharat Forge, Adani Group and Tata Advanced Systems.

Though arms sales have been the primary focus of the bilateral relationship, the expansion of strategic partnership and cooperation on the military operational framework is missing. The following are the areas where India and Israel could cooperate tactically:

● A center for the study of warfare could be established at the upcoming National Defense University in New Delhi. Both nations have deep experience in fighting wars, insurgencies and terrorism. The center could facilitate interaction between the two militaries, prepare case studies and lessons learned and conduct workshops, seminars and simulations. 

● Israeli special forces could conduct asymmetric warfare courses in Indian military staff and command colleges.

● Israeli special forces units specializing in urban warfare can impart training to the Indian Army’s 4 Para (SF) and 9 Para (SF) who specialize in counter-terrorism operations in Kashmir.

● Israeli special forces training and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) could be incorporated by the Indian Army Para (SF) regiments.

● The Indian Army and Israeli Army Special Forces units operating in deserts can train together in desert warfare and exchange lessons learned.

● Close coordination between Indian and Israeli intelligence agencies at the TTP, collection and technical levels could be fostered for common threats in the Middle East and South Asia.

● Rashtriya Rifles operating in Kashmir could gain valuable insights from Israeli counter-terrorism units.

● Israeli military advisors could be embedded during the Indian special forces planning process and at the operational levels for strategic advice and tactical guidance.

● Indian intelligence agencies could gain from the technological advances made in Israeli SIGINT and IMINT collection and dissemination framework.

● Both nations could expand air, naval and army training and military exercises.

●Israeli counter-terrorism units could collaborate with the National Security Guards in the areas of TTPs, reconnaissance, training in Krav Maga and close-quarters combat (CQB) in urban areas

●Intelligence communities of both nations could actively cooperate in the areas of counter-terrorism and tactical operations against terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.

● The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and Israeli defense industries could initiate space cooperation in the areas of IMINT and SIGINT which can be used for C4ISR and border security in South Asia.

The spectrum of India-Israel relations continues to expand. Cooperation in the operational dimension will align their objectives and capabilities to deal with the common asymmetric and symmetric threats in the Middle East and South Asia. Regular exchanges between the militaries and intelligence agencies of both nations will further strengthen existing defense cooperation. The relationship should advance beyond buying weapons and setting up joint enterprises, to collaboration on military operations.

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Mangesh Sawant is the CEO and Managing Partner at an international security and geopolitical risk consulting firm. He has a Masters in International Affairs Degree from Columbia University, New York where he concentrated in international security policy.. Read full bio here.

The Future Of Judicial Reform.

By DANIELLE ROTH-AVNERI

Once again, Israel’s political system is at a moment of high drama.

Coalition and opposition are locked in conflict over the government’s plan to pass a bill that restricts the reasonableness standard; the coalition bill aims to reduce the Israeli Supreme Court’s ability to overrule government decisions based on the court’s assessment of their reasonableness (or lack thereof).

Ironically, the need to restrict the reasonableness standard has previously been an area of agreement between the coalition and opposition in Israel, and was, until recently, the least controversial aspect of the government’s judicial reform program.

The government is expected to pass its bill on Sunday, July 23, after having frozen a much broader judicial reform program in March. The reform was frozen because of threats by military and Air Force reservists to cease volunteering for service, as well as warnings by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant about the consequences of continuing with the reform.

Since then, the anti-government protest camp in Israel has engaged in a campaign of intimidation and unfounded warnings alleging that the State of Israel will become a dictatorship if the judicial reform passes. 

Large-scale protests have been held every Saturday under the banner that Israeli democracy is at mortal risk. Those viewing these images from abroad could become extremely alarmed, but those who are familiar with the Israeli political system and the forces at play are aware that this is merely an intimidation tactic.

Nevertheless, a significant number of citizens have been persuaded by the intimidation campaign, and signs are now up everywhere, including major roads and highways, warning of dictatorship. The signs state that it is necessary for citizens to resist the fall into dictatorship.

The result has been the emergence of a large anti-government camp, much of which was not previously concerned with politics. This camp has been mobilized and is backed by millions of shekels spent by advertising agencies and other elements with vested interests in the protest movement that is opposed to the Netanyahu government.

On the other side of the divide is an Israeli government that was democratically elected. Those who support it believe that the left-wing controls the country in a de facto manner, regardless of who wins the elections.

As a result, the situation in Israel is reaching boiling point. Days of rage and protests are intensifying, protesters are taking to the streets, and some are breaking the law by blocking traffic or entrances to buildings.

It is becoming impossible on these protest days for people to get to work. Meanwhile, a number of companies, particularly in the hi-tech sector, encourage their staff to go out and protest, and those employees who refrain from doing so face pressure and negative perceptions.

For its part, the government wants to push forward and pass the bill into law. Coalition leaders fear being perceived as fools by their right-wing voter base, and to avoid accusations that the government is controlled by unelected left-wing officials and activists.

The government has decided that this time around, unlike in March, it cannot give in. Doing so would send the message that the government is unable to rule because of protests and refusal to serve by reserve Air Force pilots and reservists from elite units.

Hence, the government can be expected to push forward, and, by providing a tangible achievement for its right-wing voters, put out the message that it is not capitulating. 

The idea that the bill will turn Israel into a dictatorship is laughable, but that doesn’t mean the situation isn’t dangerous.

It’s impossible to predict whether the pilots are merely issuing threats, or will make good on them, or whether we will see additional protests and broader strikes.

The government has already made its choice, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be looking at how things unfold going forward.

The Knesset will, at the end of July, head out for a long summer recess. In August, many Israelis will head for vacation with their families, and the Knesset will not return from recess until mid-October.

Two and a half months is a near eternity in the Israeli timeframe, and many transformative events could occur in that time.

Netanyahu will have until October, at the end of the Jewish High Holidays, to decide whether he will continue with the judicial reform legislation by changing the composition of the judicial selection committee, as he has said he will, or whether to ditch the entire reform program. We will have to wait until October for his decision to become clear.

After a pandemic, multiple elections, armed conflicts, and the forming and breaking of political alliances – not to mention a recent visit by Netanyahu to hospital, sparking questions about his health – it is clear that anything can happen in this country between now and October.

We might not even remember the judicial reform by then, and could instead be busy with brand new and burning issues to argue about. 

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

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Israel is Not a Racist State, in Theory or Practice

By MARK GOLDFEDER & GABRIEL GROISMAN

On Saturday, July 15 Representative Pramilla Jayapal, Chair of the 103-member Progressive Caucus publicly announced that she has been fighting hard “to make clear that Israel is a racist state.” Thankfully, the leaders of the Democratic Party responded with a strong rejection of her remarks. But because she and so many others like to make this and similar fallacious arguments, it is worth responding to and debunking it in a fuller fashion.

The assertion that the State of Israel is itself a racist endeavor is antisemitic on its face, as no one seems to have a problem with the existence of over 50 Muslim nations and over 100 Christian countries. Calling it “racist” also serves to justify and promote the delegitimization and destruction of the lone Jewish state. Of course, it is important to note that there is a difference between calling the entire existence of the State of Israel itself a “racist endeavor” and criticizing any particular Israeli government policies or practices as “racist.” One is flatly antisemitic, while the other is a criticism of Israel like that of any other country. Jayapal’s retraction openly disavowed the first, but she did not back away from the separate claim that Israel is a racist state in practice, which remains the kind of massively pernicious charge that needs to be backed up with evidence, of which she has none. The attempt to impose an American lens of race on a conflict she does not seem to understand is inexcusable in the context of an elected leader publicly maligning an entire country—and a close American ally.

The reason that she cannot present any evidence to support her position is because there is none, and calling Israel a racist state is counterfactual and ridiculous. The term “Palestinians” as it is used today includes Arabs who are Israeli citizens; Arabs residing in the Gaza Strip and the disputed territories; and Arabs who were displaced as a result of the conflicts in 1948 and 1967. Israel treats all of its citizens, including its Arab citizens, equally under the law. Israeli Arabs enjoy positions in the highest levels of every branch of government, including the legislative branch (the Knesset), the executive branch (the Israeli cabinet) and the judicial branch (the Supreme Court). In fact, in some cases, Arab citizens of Israel have more rights than Jewish citizens of Israel, including the fact that Arab citizens of Israel are not required to serve in the military.

The differential treatment of some members of these groups is demonstrably not based on their race; they all share the same ethnic and racial identity. It is, however, based on their legal status as either Israeli citizens, residents of territories under military administration, or non-citizen foreigners.  All countries in the world “discriminate” between their own citizens and non-citizens; if doing so constitutes racism, then all states are guilty of racism. But they aren’t, of course, and neither is Israel. The entire basis of Jayapal’s argument, which elides these important distinctions, is utterly wrong, and the application of a “racial” standard to questions of citizenship in one and only one instance worldwide is the kind of double standard that is dangerously problematic. If in fact you were looking for systemic racism in the area, you might ask how many Jews are living in (or even allowed to visit) Gaza or Ramallah, as compared to the 20 percent of Israeli citizens that are Arab.

Part of the problem seems to be Jayapal’s (and her friends’) complete unfamiliarity with the history of the conflict and the players involved. Forget the fact that the “progressive” caucus refuses to support the only democracy in the Middle East, and the only country in the region with full equality for women, the LGBT community, and freedom for all religions. This entire episode comes in the laughable context of her and several other progressives skipping an address by Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Congress, in an attempt to protest the policies of Prime Minister Netanyahu. None of them seem to be aware that before he was elected to his mostly ceremonial role Herzog served as the left-wing opposition leader against Netanyahu.

Her willful lack of knowledge is also clearly evident in what Jayapal’s “apology” does not say.

First, in her telling of the failures of the two-state solution there is only one party at fault: Israel. There is no mention of or accounting for the dismal leadership of the PA, which has consistently turned down numerous offers for an independent Palestinian state. For the record, Israel has repeatedly, more than 30 times, offered plans for peace and division of the land. Some of those deals, including the Clinton Peace Parameters, were even supported by Jayapal’s own party—along with much of the Arab world. Again, for the Squad’s edification, Israel (legitimately) gained a total of 26,178 square miles of territory in the defensive war of 1967. To date, it has ceded sovereignty over approximately 23,871 square miles or 87% of that territory. At various times in recent history (including deals proposed in 2000, 2008 and 2014), Israel has offered up to 99.3% of the remaining disputed territory in exchange for peace. Each time the Palestinians refused.

Second, while Jayapal’s statement contains vilification of Israel as a whole and its leaders in particular, there is no mention of the PA or its President, Mahmoud Abbas, who have repeatedly confirmed that the PA will use their very last penny if necessary to pay salaries and stipends to incentivize terrorists who kill innocent Americans and Israelis. There’s no mention of the fact that while Israeli schoolchildren are uniformly taught to yearn for peace, Arab schoolchildren in Israel, Gaza and PA controlled cities are taught to glorify war and terrorism, and that under official PA policy they stand to make more money for their families if they grow up to be killers and martyrs rather than doctors or lawyers.

Third, as she made clear in her statement, Jayapal does not understand—and seemingly does not seek to understand—the Israeli point of view on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Contrasting the Jewish people’s historical trauma from pogroms, persecution and the Holocaust with the Palestinians’ feelings of hopelessness about peace, as her statement does, creates a false framework that depicts the debate incorrectly. The suffering of the Jewish people historically has nothing to do with their legitimate claim to the land of Israel, and implying that this generational suffering is all that they bring to their “side” of the “debate”—as opposed to the Palestinians who just want the same rights as their neighbors (which, again, they have)—completely denies the Jewish people’s religious, historic and indigenous ties to the land. The Jewish people’s rightful ownership long predates the United Nations and well precedes the horrors of the Holocaust. No one ever gave Israel to the Jews—certainly not the Palestinians—and no one can ever take her away. Any two-state solution needs to begin with this fundamental understanding that somehow eludes Jayapal: The Jews are in Israel, and always have been, and will continue to be there, by right and not on sufferance.

Jayapal’s non apology concludes by turning to her own background, and she lets us know that as an immigrant woman of color, she should be excused for her own antisemitic racism because obviously she is sensitive when a people’s very existence is called into question. Except that, as a practical matter, and despite her race and gender, she continues to dehumanize and implicitly justify terror against Israelis whom she apparently feels deserve just what they get for being so darn difficult and wanting to exist in their homeland.

At bottom, Israel is not a racist state, and does not implement racist policies. Despite Japayal and her friends’ best efforts, nothing will change these truths. But it is high time that propagandists like her be relegated to the dustbin of political history, rather than voted to lead a caucus of over 100 members of Congress.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Gabriel Groisman is a partner at LSN Law in Miami, FL, a Jewish rights leader and the former Mayor of Bal Harbour, Florida.

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monthly brief: Israel On Edge As Reasonability Clause Moves Ahead.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

The State of Israel is at a boiling point as the coalition and its opponents face off over the government’s bill to erase the judicial reasonableness standard as part of its controversial judicial reform program.

Members of the Israeli protest movement have been planning further "days of resistance" to express opposition to the reforms, which they say endanger Israeli democracy. The protests include disruption of train services, marches in cities, and mass rallies on Tel Aviv’s Kaplan Street, the epicenter of weekly nation-wide demonstrations.

The coalition plans to convene the Knesset plenum on July 23 to pass the so-called "reasonableness" bill, which seeks to prevent Israeli courts from using the reasonableness standard in evaluating government decisions.

Opposition members have requested more time to submit objections to the bill.

The bill will be sent to the Knesset plenum for its final second and third readings after all committee work on it was completed in recent days, according to Knesset Member Simcha Rothman (Religious Zionist party), Chairman of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee.

Rothman’s handling of the procedure has drawn criticism from opposition legislators, who assert that the entire legislative process is flawed and being run by "messianic fanatics who shut their ears to the truth."

According to a poll published earlier this month by Israel’s public broadcaster, Kan, 43% of Israelis oppose the reasonableness bill.

Thirty one percent of respondents said they support the bill, while 25% stated they were unsure of their position. Furthermore, the poll found that 36% of Israelis believe police should act in a harsher manner against protesters blocking roads, while 24% believe police are already acting too harshly. A further 24% believe police are acting appropriately. 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking at the July 17 weekly cabinet meeting, addressed calls by a number of IDF reservists to stop volunteering for service if the bill is passed, stating, “To all those who wave the flag of democracy, I would like to say a few words about democracy: In a democracy, the military is subordinate to the elected government and not the opposite, whereas in a military regime, the government is subordinate to the military, or to be more precise, to a group within the military. This is the fundamental difference between a democracy and a military regime. Incitement to refusal to serve, and refusal to serve itself, are contrary to democracy and contrary to law. This is true in every democracy but in ours, incitement to refusal to serve, and refusal to serve, directly endanger the security of all citizens of Israel. They gnaw away at our deterrence of our enemies, and this could easily develop into aggression against us. Moreover, they undermine discipline within the military, and discipline is the foundation of the military's existence in the first place.”

The Palestinian Authority returns to Jenin

Israel watched closely as PA security forces returned to Jenin on July 10, after a two-day intensive security operation held in the northern West Bank city by the IDF on July 3 and 4. 

The operation saw a brigade-sized force of elite units enter Jenin after dozens of shooting attacks, as well as rocket and IED attacks, were carried out by terrorists from the city. The operation was aimed at making sure Jenin no longer served as a terrorist safe haven.

The IDF said it seized over a thousand terrorist weapons, including bombs, ammunition, and guns, and questioned over 300 suspects. Over 120 were detained, and the IDF destroyed command posts, hideouts, and bomb-making facilities.

Twelve Palestinian combatants and an IDF soldier were killed in the operation. Hundreds of terrorist gunmen fled Jenin, paving the path for the PA’s attempted return.

The IDF sent in elite units, including Maglan, Duvdevan, the Paratrooper Brigade Reconnaissance Unit, Nahal Reconnaissance Unit, and Egoz. The operational model employed by the IDF in Jenin may, if necessary, be applied to future raids in areas of the West Bank that experience a collapse of PA rule.

Nasrallah gambles, and wins (so far)

Israel's lack of response to a series of recent provocations by Hezbollah is a mistake and the effort to bring about a diplomatic resolution is a bad joke, said Prof. Eyal Zisser, a senior Middle East scholar at Tel Aviv University, in criticism of how Israel has handled an escalation by the Iran-backed terrorist army in Lebanon.

The 17th anniversary of the 2006 Second Lebanon War sees the prospect of another conflagration that could become the Third Lebanon War, Zisser warned. Hezbollah resolved to escalate the situation in March, sending a terrorist across the border to stage an IED attack on an Israeli highway. Israel chose not to respond and Hezbollah saw this as weakness, Zisser argued.

An April rocket attack from Lebanon, conveniently attributed to Hamas, gave Nasrallah plausible deniability. Now, Israel has to decide how to deal with a tent pitched by Hezbollah on Israeli territory and which houses armed operatives; Nasrallah has already threatened to launch kill squads into the Galilee region of Israel.

Nasrallah — who has a reputation as a gambler — is convinced that Israel is bogged down with internal strife and will not retaliate against his provocations. Zisser added that Nasrallah had upped his wager by firing an anti-tank missile at Israeli forces in early July, as well as through repeated attempts by Hezbollah operatives to sabotage the border fence with Israel.

UK MoD invests millions in Israeli active protection system

The Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom announced July 13 that it had awarded a £20 million contract to secure the hardware for the next phase of tests on a cutting-edge new rocket and missile protection system for Britain’s Challenger 3 tanks.

The system in question is the Trophy Active Protection System (APS), produced by Israel’s Rafael defense company. Trophy will be tested and integrated with Challenger 3 to provide enhanced protection against rocket and missile threats, while simultaneously finding the origin of the hostile fire for immediate response, the statement said. “The system can locate an incoming rocket or missile in less than a second, destroying it by firing back its own ammunition,” the statement added.

In 2021, Rafael completed the supply of 400 Trophy systems for four US Army Abram tank brigades.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

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The Israel Police is facing its worst-ever crisis

By Alon Levavi

The Israel Police is currently facing the most severe crisis in its history, as multiple causes converge to create a perfect storm.

The first cause is long-standing: Over the years, the issue of public security has not received the place it deserves on the national agenda. Crises are mounting – climate change, cyber-crime, pandemics, terrorism, violent crime – and it is becoming increasingly clear how vital it is in a democratic state to have a strong, effective, service-oriented police force.

Israel’s founding prime minister David Ben-Gurion once said that the military is responsible for state security, and the police for its honor. He understood deeply the role that the police play in a democratic state.

And yet, due to the ongoing Israeli security situation and years of wars against external enemies, the center of gravity has traditionally been on security and defense. This found expression in national resource investment, the police’s image, its low place in decision-making, and more.

In reality, the police have always been involved in all aspects of life, and acted as the national emergency room, investigating public officials, tackling corruption, fighting crime, and combating terrorism. Yet the police in Israel are an eternal punching bag for the public. There will always be those unhappy to get a fine, to be arrested, or face indictment. Police are easily and quickly slandered here – and this damages the organization.  

Ultimately, the ability of the police to function is based on public faith. When this faith is eroded, the public stops cooperating with it. On the flip side of the equation, criminals stop being deterred and become ever bolder about committing crimes. This sends the country into a sharp, downward slippery slope.

On top of this, the way the police force is seen from the outside seeps into the organization. Police officers want to feel motivated, but the more the media attacks the police, the harder it is for officers to find the will to stay. Growing numbers are finding reasons to leave. The fact that their salaries are ridiculously low, that they work 24-7, endanger their lives, have no extra paid hours, no union rights, and have poor employment conditions only adds to the desire of some officers to quit.

Despite public perceptions, not anyone can become a police officer. It’s a profession that requires over a year of training, followed by further on-the-job qualifications. When an officer leaves that means that major resources get thrown away.

Personnel shortages mean that qualification processes have been shortened, leading to police officers with lower professional capabilities – and creating another vicious cycle.  

Today, in the post-pandemic era, when a new generation has no hesitation about moving jobs, when police officers no longer receive budgetary pensions, but rather, cumulative ones, and when there are many tempting job opportunities in the civilian market, including comfortable work-from-home jobs, many are leaving the force, unwilling to risk their lives for low salaries and widespread contempt.

Meanwhile, public security ministers avoided appointing commissioners for years, choosing to work with acting commissioners instead, meaning that long-term planning and force build-up programs were impossible. The ministers’ refusal to appoint commissioners was also a statement on how they viewed the importance of the police. Apparently, an organization that doesn’t ‘need’ a commissioner isn’t very important.

It is against this backdrop that National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir took office.  Ben Gvir has been convicted of several offenses and has a highly aggressive policy regarding his ministerial mandate and approach to the police chief.

If someone convicted of criminal offenses becomes head of police, what does this mean? Could something similar happen to the Shin Bet or IDF? This development further suggests that the government doesn’t think the police is very important.

The coalition agreements that stipulate the National Security Minister’s right to directly activate the police, and Ben Gvir’s call to set up a national guard under his direct authority rather than that of the police, all send the same message about the force’s low standing. Worse still, they threaten to infect the police with politics, something that must never happen in a country that wants to remain democratic. Only the police commissioner should activate the police, while the minister should focus on policies.

Today, after the coronavirus pandemic, the Mount Meron stampede in 2021, Operation Guardian of the Walls in the same year that saw widespread rioting in Arab-Israeli areas, and the current political deadlock with 30 weeks of mass protests, skyrocketing Arab sector crime, and an almost full neutralization of the police’s ability to employ technology like cyber and signals intelligence, the police has hit rock bottom.

It has very few tools and abilities to deal with the challenge sit faces. It is being told to fight crime blindfolded.

Looking ahead at the next decade, bold decisions are in order. First, the police must be defined as a critical pillar in national resilience. Next, governments must allocate to police suitable financial and personnel resources -- billions of additional shekels and thousands of extra personnel.

The billions that were promised to the police currently do not appear to be materializing.

Police must also be allowed, under supervision, to employ technological means, or there will be no meaningful war against 21st-century crime. State leaders need to begin publicly backing the force, and that also means not ignoring police during the annual torch-lighting ceremony on Independence Day, for example, and promoting a new national narrative that isn’t exclusively focused on the military.

When the public receives good service from a police force that receives proper investment, when calls to the emergency hotline are answered effectively, when community police officers check in, and investigations don’t end abruptly, when patrol cars arrive within 20 minutes and not an hour, the public will naturally warm to the police.

Finally, the new Israeli national guard must operate under police command, not under a civilian ministry headed by a minister.

If Israel’s ‘ER Room’ is to start working properly again, these are the minimal steps necessary, and there isn’t much time to waste.

The commanders, officers, fighters, and volunteers in the Israel Police are dedicated and professional. At one moment, they foil terrorism, at another, they foil homicides, prevent accidents, and fight drugs. The second largest organization in Israel must receive a higher spot on the national priority list, and it must also get practical recognition as a critical pillar in national security and resilience.

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Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Jenin Operation Was Successful, But Israel needs a strategy.

By YAIR GOLAN

The two-day IDF raid on Jenin, which, unusually, began with the activation of UAV air strikes, was an operational and tactical success but strategically will change nothing so long as Israel’s government remains on its current course.

The decision to send a brigade-sized Israeli military force to deal with a security hot spot in the West Bank is not as new as it might seem; This was done regularly in 2005 (I led operations like this as commander of the Judea and Samaria Division), at the end of the Second Intifada.

Ahead of Operation Home and Garden, which took place July 3 and 4, the IDF and Shin Bet diligently collected the needed intelligence and decided to use UAVs to strike targets that were physically difficult to reach in the opening phase of the operation – representing good adjustment of munitions to challenges.

Operationally, the IDF successfully learned from recent past failures and improved its responses to security challenges. Previously, in Jenin and Nablus, IDF operations featuring ordinary infantry units in small numbers produced very high levels of friction with Palestinians, resulting in Palestinian noncombatant deaths and escalating the situation instead of stabilizing it.  

The IDF Central Command and the Judea and Samaria Division Headquarters concluded that there was a gap in their operational readiness and decided to instead send in the best of Israel’s special forces. As a result of the use of these highly skilled units, trained for this very challenge, there were no noncombatant deaths in the Jenin operation.

The terrorists of Jenin lost their motivation to confront the IDF when it sent its elite units in. Despite the tragic death of a soldier from the Egoz unit, F.-Sgt. David Yitzchak, in the operation, the elite IDF forces completed their mission of destroying extensive terrorist infrastructures in the city.

Strategically, however, a major gap exists between the sober and responsible approach taken by the heads of Israel’s defense establishment-- who understand that there is no silver bullet against terrorism and who seek greater involvement by the Palestinian Authority on the ground -- and the Israeli government, which lacks any strategy at best, and which contains elements that have messianic aspirations at worst.

While the IDF General Staff and Central Command understand that ‘mowing the lawn’ is necessary on occasion, the political echelon is marketing the operation as a paradigm shift – and in doing so is promoting a baseless claim.

The government in Israel today is paralyzed, and its approach to the West Bank cannot be clearly discerned. In 2020, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the Trump peace plan. The plan’s merits and faults can be debated legitimately, but it is a partition plan, which bypasses the painful issue of evacuating settlements and offers the Palestinians land compensation, including land from the Negev that would be annexed to the Gaza Strip.

Today, however, Netanyahu leads a coalition that is making every effort, including by elements like Finance Minister and Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich, to advance full Israeli annexation of the West Bank.

Smotrich adheres to a vision he laid out in 2017, according to which, Israel will exercise full control of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea; Palestinians who choose to live under Israeli rule will receive subject status, but not citizenship, those who decide to leave will be encouraged, and those who reject both options will be fought.

Who should we believe when it comes to West Bank policy? Netanyahu or Smotrich?

In all his years in power, Netanyahu has never made a strategic decision on this, the most sensitive of issues. Every day that Israel fails to decide, events on the ground decide for it, and the situation is drifting toward a one-state nightmare.

The overall silence in Israel over this state of affairs means that a minority on the far right has been able to force its view on the majority, leading to de facto annexation, fueled by a messianic ideology.

Those who believe Israel can annex millions of Palestinians are clueless about Israel’s international reality, dependence on the United States, and need for international trade.

Meanwhile, on the Palestinian side, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad extremists are leading Palestinians to disaster. The result is that in the absence of any change of strategy, the area is heading toward further bloodshed, regardless of how successful the Jenin operation was at the tactical and operative levels.

It was Carl von Clausewitz who said that war is “a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means.” Military achievements are supposed to serve as the basis of political achievements, but if this does not happen, their effects erode quickly.

The deep emotional ties held by Jews to the West Bank, known in Israel as Judea and Samaria, are completely understandable; the region is the cradle of Jewish civilization, and there can be no way to unlink Jews from sites like the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, or Shiloh, where the Bible tells us of seminal events in Jewish history. The land historically belongs to the Jewish people.

But this cannot translate into a reality in which Israel controls millions of Palestinians, a reality which, if unchanged, will eventually create international pressure that will lead to Israel’s collapse.

Hence, the operation in Jenin should be seen for what it is; the product of a highly competent military and intelligence community, capable of mapping out and dealing with security threats, but no substitute for real and needed strategy on the future of the West Bank. 

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Maj.-Gen. Yair Golan (ret.) is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He is a former deputy IDF chief of staff, and is Israel’s deputy minister of economics and industry. Read full bio here.

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Stop The Nonsense

By JUSTIN POZMANTER

It has now been over half a year of the ongoing fight over the judiciary in Israel. At this point, it is hard to conclude which side has lost the script to a greater degree.

 Israel is a democracy, and a very imperfect and messy one at that.

One side says there is a tyranny of the justices, the other says that if reform passes Israel will become a dictatorship. Both claims are dangerous and hyperbolic nonsense.

Israel’s judiciary does not function as it should. It is too powerful and relies on murky or undefined legal structures such as “reasonableness” to justify ruling as it pleases and to get involved in matters it shouldn’t. It is desperately in need of reform.

However, with it functioning as it has, Israelis and Israel’s supporters, across the political spectrum, have proudly stated for decades that we are the only democracy in the Middle East and touted our values and freedoms to the world…and we were correct in doing so.

Despite the need for reform of the judiciary, the reform put forward by the current coalition has been done sloppily, with a heavy hand and is a gross overreach.

But even if there is an over-correction that is democratically damaging, a legislature elected in free and fair democratic elections with too much power rather than an unelected judiciary with too much power does not a dictatorship make.

When you hear either side screaming about a coup, questioning the legitimacy of democratically elected officials, or claiming everything they don’t like is equal to a dictatorship, anarchy or a lack of loyalty to the country, it says a lot more about the speaker than it does the process of selecting judges or the precise application of legal doctrine.

It isn’t a coincidence that the very same people leading the protests were those leading the anti-Netanyahu protests years before the reform was introduced, or he was indicted. Nor is it a coincidence that those who are the most uncompromising on the reform are the same people who for years have slandered anyone to their left (which is nearly the whole country) as traitorous leftists.

It usually tells you more about how these “leaders”, a term that should be used very lightly, feel about the PEOPLE they oppose than the judicial system or legislation they support. They either don’t like those who have been in power for years (secular and Ashkenazi) or they are afraid of those who may be in power for years to come (religious, traditional, Mizrachi). Opposing, or overzealously supporting, people or personalities rather than ideas or policies is almost always a recipe for disaster.

This is not to attack on those protesting. The rights to free speech and assembly and the right to protest that flows from them are as fundamental as any rights that exist in a democracy. And I believe most protestors’ hearts are in the right place – in support or opposition. But it only takes about five minutes observing either side to see there is a sharp divide on religious/secular/Ashkenazi/Mizrachi lines which should give any sincere activist pause.

The real danger is not in the current judiciary or in potential reform. It is losing the very thing that allows Israel to survive against sometimes daunting challenges – our sense of shared purpose.

I was recently in the United States having a conversation over dinner about the dangers of social media for kids. Someone made the point that sometimes social media is positive for teenagers because it can give them a sense of community and purpose, they feel they are lacking.

I responded that may be true, but that I didn’t think it applied to Israel to the same degree. Israelis – with of course many, many individual and sectoral exceptions - generally feel a part of something larger, something to which they belong and are willing to fight to protect. That shared sense of purpose has allowed Israelis to overcome nearly constant economic, diplomatic and, of course, military and strategic challenges for years.

Later that evening in my hotel room I felt an overwhelming sense of unease that maybe what I was so sure of, what makes Israel such a special and resilient place, is nothing near a sure thing, not just long-term, but even in the immediate future.

The greatest risk of the fight over the judicial reform is that it seems to be a far more intense and comprehensive proxy battle for the other serious challenges pulling at the fabric of Israeli society. Isn’t it odd that the battle lines on this issue are so clearly drawn on religious/secular, Ashkenazi/Mizrachi, center/periphery lines?

There really should be no connection between sectors on this issue. Smart people can disagree on the relationship between branches of government, but there is no reason why where you come down on judicial power should be so directly connected to your salary, neighborhood, where or if you pray, or where your grandparents were born.  

How did we get here? Maybe the country was never as cohesive as we’d like to believe. Maybe it’s a consequence of greater polarization across the western world to which Israel isn’t immune. Or maybe Israel itself has in fact changed.

Two things are clear: 1. The blame game is pointless. There are many culprits, and nobody will admit anyone on their side is one of them; and 2. Israel won’t be the Israel that any patriotic Israeli or passionate Zionist anywhere in the world wants if we don’t find our sense of common purpose. I only hope we still can.

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Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

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Geo-political changes are challenging Israel’s strategic position

By DORON TAMIR

Israel is facing new strategic challenges as the result of international and regional geo-political developments, and events on the home front. The Israeli government should take note of these paradigm shifts and act systemically to counter them.

Globally, the Russian – Ukrainian war is increasingly a source of concern, together with challenges from China that are pulling the United States away from the Middle East, thereby negatively affecting Israel’s regional status.

With Russia escalating the war further, stability on the European continent is far from assured. The recent NATO-run multi-national air exercise is a late attempt by the West to boost deterrence against Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Disturbingly, the question of how far Putin is willing to go when pushed into a corner remains unanswered. These events have created shock waves for the global system and have also directly affected Israel’s hi-tech sector due to disruptions in supply chains.

The world’s banks and investment firms are anxiously looking at the conflict’s after-effects, coming so soon after the coronavirus pandemic.

Regionally, in the Middle East, paradigm shifts are underway: Saudi Arabia is talking to Iran, as is Egypt, and Syria’s President Bashar Assad, a mass murderer, has suddenly become a regional darling. Meanwhile, Israel is being increasingly endangered by the arsenal and actions of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon.

As the U.S. is focused on new tensions in the South China Sea and Russia, its weakness in the Middle East is the elephant in the room. The Biden administration’s successive failures in engaging with Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt plays directly into the hands of the Iranian led axis. 

In the Middle East, Israel’s traditional Arab partners – Egypt and Jordan – continue to maintain good cooperation with it, but Jordan’s ruler, King Abdullah II, is facing an increasingly difficult domestic position due to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict and sensitivities over Jerusalem.

Israel needs to be more attentive to Abdullah’s predicaments, since Jordan forms a crucial aspect of regional stability. This means ensuring the status quo remains unchallenged in the Temple Mount, for example, and avoiding irresponsible moves in this sector.

Egypt’s cooperation with Israel, despite the tragic terrorist attack launched by a rogue Egyptian border guard, remains a major strategic asset for both countries and a pillar of stability.

On the other hand, the fact that Saudi Arabia has established new ties with Iran is deeply troubling and is reflection America’s regional weakness.

Meanwhile, domestically, Israel has experienced unprecedented domestic instability and crisis over the government’s legal reform initiative. This has frightened American, European, and other investment firms.

Israel’s hi-tech sector, the main engine of the national economy, is robust, but it would be wrong to pretend that it has not suffered a major blow due to the domestic instability. Investment in Israeli hi-tech is at a five-year low.

In Europe, Israel’s situation is complex, with some countries, particularly in the center and east of the continent, supporting Israel, while others are growing increasingly critical of the Jewish state. The European Union in general is quite hostile to Israel, although Germany, the most powerful state in the EU, remains politically supportive, despite the erosion in Israel’s image there.

When taken together, a strategic deterioration is the inevitable conclusion.

To counteract these trends, the first and most important action that Israel should take is to strengthen its alliance with the United States. While ongoing cooperation in the military and intelligence spheres remain strong, political-diplomatic tensions between Washington and Jerusalem are eroding Israel’s overall strategic situation.

Bilateral defense ties can, over time, be affected by bad winds blowing from the relationship between the governments, and this is a risk that Israel should not take.

To be sure, the U.S. also gains from its military alliance with Israel, gleaning intelligence information that is supremely valuable for American security.

But the extraordinary alliance must be based not just on shared interests; it must also be based on shared values.

Be it access to world-leading F-35 jets, or to American support in the United Nations Security Council, the idea that Israel can get by without its alliance with America is simply detached from reality, despite the belief in this concept in some sections of the extreme Israeli Right.

Israel must take steps to stabilize its own political system and economy. It needs to resurrect the image of a strong, stable Israel, which knows what it wants and has clear strategic goals. To be seen again as a country with a prosperous hi-tech sector that is worthwhile allying with Israel must regain its stability. 

Moreover, Israel should pursue the goal of formalizing ties with Saudi Arabia, strengthening ties with Abraham Accord states, and decreasing tensions with Jordan.

Relations with these states are highly fragile and are subject to almost immediate changes each time significant developments occur in the Palestinian arena.

The Palestinian issue cannot, for its part, remain sidelined forever. Time is not on Israel’s side on this matter. Sooner or later, Israel will have to make strategic, fateful decisions on how it proceeds vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

The era of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is ending, and Israel must see what kind of leadership will take his place in Ramallah.

To be clear, there is no silver bullet solution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, particularly with Hamas ruling Gaza. But there are steps available to Israel and the PA that can neutralize and decrease much of the current tensions.

The Israeli government has much work at hand to reverse the current trend, and to begin improving Israel’s strategic situation.

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Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

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How Far Will Israel Go For Normalization With Saudi Arabia?

By Tomer Barak

In recent weeks, talk of progress in the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with American mediation, has resurfaced in the media.

The discourse on the subject follows two main focal points. The first is the apparent Saudi effort to show pragmatism, signaling to both the United States and Israel that 'there is something to talk about'. The goal is to score points in Washington, and as a result, receive various benefits.

The very fact that such positive Saudi voices exist, whether they have merit or not, has an impact on preparing the Arab street for some movement toward Israel in the future.

At the same time, growing voices in Israel and the U.S. are arguing that a new window of opportunity has opened for normalization.

A second media talking point focuses on the demands and conditions placed by Saudi Arabia for progress to be made. This discussion also brings to light the hurdles that stand in the way of the desired breakthrough.

This discussion focuses on four core Saudi demands:

The first is the need to complete the rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) in the U.S., as well as bring about a change in the broader American political perception of Saudi Arabia.  Both have been tarnished in Washington in recent years following the murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the war in Yemen, and more.

Mainly within the Democratic Party, Saudi Arabia is viewed as part of the problem in the Middle East, and not as part of the solution.

President Joe Biden will have to carefully consider his steps and decide whether the political achievements inherent in an Israeli-Saudi breakthrough are worth the political price he could pay in an election year.

The second challenge concerns a Saudi armament and security wish list containing advanced U.S. military capabilities and other security guarantees. In this context, the US will have to balance the preservation of Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), in accordance with American law, and with Biden's deep commitment to this principle -- as well as with the desire to strengthen an important regional partner as part of the regional campaign against Iran and the problematic Saudi track record regarding the improper use of U.S.-made weaponry in the Yemen war.

This balancing act will require a discourse with Israel, which for its part will also need to make decisions on how far it will acquiesce to Saudi expectations and refrain from objecting to arms sales to Riyadh, and whether it is prepared to make an active effort to counter objections in Congress.

The third challenge deals with Saudi aspirations to advance the Kingdom's civilian nuclear program. These aspirations include aspects of uranium enrichment on Saudi territory.

U.S. and Israeli officials have voiced over the years similar concerns regarding the proliferation of civilian nuclear technologies that could be converted into military capabilities. That is especially true in a country that has a history of hiding military capabilities and has cooperated with China on long-range surface-to-surface missile development.

The U.S. outline for an acceptable pathway for Riyadh on civilian nuclear progress, based on a limited model (like the one taken by the UAE, which gave up on uranium enrichment on its soil), is unacceptable to the Saudis.

The danger is that it will seek to develop its nuclear program via non-Western channels (China or Russia). Even if Riyadh does not create a linkage between the normalization process and progress in its civilian nuclear program, in the current situation, where China is gaining ground in the region, it makes sense for the U.S. (in coordination with Israel) to create a compromise sphere. In this sphere, Riyadh could implement its ambitions in a broader manner, but under very strict supervision mechanisms.

The final challenge is the Palestinian arena. On the surface, the escalation in recent weeks in the West Bank and the Israeli government's moves create an insurmountable obstacle for the Saudi leadership regarding any progress in the normalization process.

In the background is King Salman's traditional position, which places the issue as a main topic, unlike his son who is largely tired of the Palestinian issue and sees it as merely disruptive. Assumably, MBS would settle for a prolonged lull that would allow him to make progress in normalization.

It should be noted that the issue of the Palestinians has and continues to come up in American discourse on normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia -- though in this case, this seems to be the result of some leveraging the normalization option to pressure the Israeli government.

Some observers believe that the Palestinian issue can be placed on a lower level of prioritization and 'bypassed' through a series of relatively limited Israeli moves -- but even then, it is not certain that all members of the current Israeli government would see the moves in that way. Prime Minister Netanyahu could, however, try to market the political profit of such a maneuver and lead to their approval by his government.

So where do things stand?

There is no doubt that normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia is an important and very lucrative goal. There is good reason that it is considered the 'holy grail' of the Middle East peace process.

The process would, in theory and practice, constitute official confirmation of Israel's acceptance in the Middle East, and mark the end of the era of hostility with the Sunni bloc.

Normalization agreements would be accompanied by economic and other agreements that will create many options when it comes to regional connectivity, business cooperation, the development of interconnected infrastructure in transport and energy, joint climate crisis adaptation, and more.

In the face of the common Iranian threat, the security dimension is also of great importance. However, dangers are inherent in Saudi security and nuclear demands.

Points of balance can be found between Israel’s security needs and Saudi ambitions, as well as the common desire to build a regional system against Iran.

But it must be clear - Even if the U.S. is willing to go the extra mile toward MBS and even if the Palestinian issue is somehow set aside, Israel cannot and must not compromise on two basic demands: the preservation of its QME, and the prevention, or very tight monitoring, of any Saudi nuclear capability that could potentially enable development of military nuclear capabilities.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

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Lessons from the Ukraine war

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

Many lessons are emerging from Russia’s war on Ukraine, some of which are of much interest to Israel.

One key lesson Israel can learn at this stage is that its decision to install various defenses on armored vehicles is critical and will likely enable the success of future Israeli ground maneuvers—unlike those of Russia and Ukraine.

Before continuing, it is important to issue a disclaimer: The attempt to apply lessons from the war in Ukraine to the Middle East is by nature complex. Among other things, the two regions do not share the same geography, climate, population or adversarial forces.

At the same time, as the war in Ukraine goes on, strategists worldwide are busy taking notes and looking for tactical and strategic insights that can be applied elsewhere—and the same is true in Israel.

So, what can we learn?

During the initial stage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the war was marked by the failure of the Russian armored ground offensive, which invaded from the north towards Kyiv.

With time, we gradually learned that the offensive failed mainly due to logistical issues: Fuel and ammunition ran out and hundreds of tanks, APCs and trucks were abandoned or destroyed. Only some of these vehicles were hit and destroyed by anti-tank weapons, mainly Javelin missiles, which are devastatingly effective. It seems that armored maneuvers on long roads in dense anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) environments became too costly.

Israel, in contrast, has equipped a significant part of its armored brigades with active protection systems. This means Israeli maneuverability is relatively protected.

At the same time, using man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), the Ukrainian military brought down about 200 Russian attack helicopters and close air-support craft.

Israeli close air support relies on stand-off precision strike munitions that eliminate the need to fly low and close.

In the first three weeks of the war, Ukraine used its Turkish armed UAVs—TB-2 Bayraktars. Their effectiveness was marginal and Russian air defenses downed the entire Ukrainian fleet fairly quickly. Is this scenario currently applicable to Middle Eastern arenas? For now, the likely answer is not yet.

With Russia failing to destroy all of Ukraine’s air defenses, it resorted to using huge numbers of cruise missiles—over 5,000—and hundreds of ballistic missiles to attack deep in Ukraine. This was before Iranian-made UAVs joined in the Russian attacks.

At first, Ukraine’s air defense systems struggled to intercept the cruise missiles, giving the Russians deep-strike precision stand-off capabilities for a while. But gradually, starting at the end of 2022, Western air defenses replaced the older Ukrainian Soviet-made systems, and Kyiv could shoot cruise missiles out of the sky alongside ballistic missiles and Iranian Shahed 131/136 UAVs. The U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) 3 shot down  a few of Russia’s hypersonic Kinzhal missiles.

The arrival of the Shahed Iranian-made suicide drones, first used in Sept. 2019 against Saudi Aramco facilities, gave Russia a cheap, low-flying, precise firepower capability, which, together with the cruise missiles, are emptying out expensive Ukrainian air defense ammunition.

The warning here for Israel is clear. On the bright side, however, Israel’s Iron Dome interceptors are relatively cheap—up to 50 can be purchased for the cost of a single PAC 3 interceptor.

The bigger question for Israel stemming from the Russia-Ukraine war is whether Israel is correctly balancing its spending on armaments per million dollars as opposed to platforms. For example, should Israel purchase another squadron of F-35 fighter jets or spend the money on many more joint direct ammunition (JDAM) surface-to-air bombs, Iron Dome interceptors and 155-millimeter shells?

Meanwhile, Russia has fielded its own loitering munitions. One system, the Zala KYB, proved to be not very effective. The second, the Kalashnikov Lancet 3, has met with more success against Ukrainian targets such as radar installations, tanks, APCs and various air defense assets.

Ultimately, Russia’s long-range firepower threat remains substantial and Ukraine is using up ammunition in its air defenses at an alarming rate.

Ukraine, for its part, is missing key components in its arsenal that the United States has so far failed to deliver, such as heavy ground combat main battle tanks—the first Abrams tanks are not scheduled to arrive until the end of 2023)—aerial transport planes and long-range missiles.

However, Ukraine has made good use of anti-radiation missiles, such as high-speed radiation missiles (HARMs) that target enemy air defense radars and artillery-directing radars.

Ukraine is also heavily reliant on two types of U.S.-provided surface-to-surface guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS). There are two types: The M-142 launcher—a high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMAR)—and the M-270 guided rocket launcher.

Both of those systems provide Ukraine with a high and effective strike rate. The Russians are unable to intercept these weapons, forcing them to move their positions back from the front. This includes the relocation of key military headquarters and arms storage centers.

Ukraine has also received the Storm Shadow cruise missile from Britain, with a 250-kilometer range. The effectiveness of this weapon shows how important long-range, precision stand-off munitions are in modern warfare.

The West generally lacks precise surface-to-surface armaments that can reach targets 400 kilometers away. The U.S.’s own systems reach only around 300 kilometers, and they have yet to be delivered to Ukraine.

Israel, in contrast, has a range of high-precision long-range rockets in its inventory.

While the American weapons industry is supplying Ukraine with huge amounts of equipment and the White House keeps pumping cash into the Ukrainian war effort, it must be clear to Israel that no such precedent would be followed in its case. Israel will have to stand on its own two feet in the event of a major war.

Ukraine has 45 million people, not counting the five million refugees who have left the country. Russia's population is some 150 million. This means that both countries can put large numbers of soldiers on the ground. They have both sustained huge losses, but Ukraine has proven its long-standing fighting power, unity and national resilience.

These factors are not relevant to Israel, which can neither sustain such losses nor absorb warfare for that long without a rapid endgame due to its small geographical size and population. In Israel’s case, a ground maneuver will be essential as soon as the war begins.

The international community may condemn or even try to intervene in response to significant civilian casualties in a future Middle East war. Therefore, careful Israeli planning and strategic decision-making are crucial to executing a successful offensive while minimizing collateral damage.

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief: Terror Attack, Israel-Iran & The Economy

By Yaakov Lappin

Israel mourned four of its civilians on June 20 after they were murdered in a Palestinian shooting terror attack at a gas station near the settlement of Eli in Samaria. Armed with M-16s, two Palestinian gunmen affiliated with Hamas, but not official members of it, conducted the attack.

An armed Israeli bystander killed one of the terrorists at the scene, while the other escaped and two hour later was located and killed by a team of Israeli special forces and Shin Bet agents.

The attack is the latest escalation in what has been a long-standing deterioration of the security situation in the northern West Bank, prompting growing calls for a larger security operation.

The first signs of a new Israeli approach to security in the region emerged on June 21, when an Israeli unmanned aerial vehicle struck a vehicle carrying Palestinian gunmen on the way to carry out a terrorist attack, according to the IDF and Shin Bet.

Two days earlier, the Israel Defense Forces had to call in air assistance in the form of an Apache helicopter strike to assist stranded ground forces in Jenin on June 19

The use of air support reflects the worsening nature of the fighting in Samaria, where a routine security operation to arrest two terror suspects, one from Hamas and one from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, became entangled.

IDF and Border Police forces raided Jenin camp and engaged in intense exchanges of fire that resulted in the deaths of four to five Palestinian combatants. They, in turn, detonated powerful IEDs that caused a number of Israeli Panther armored vehicles to become stranded. Eight Israeli security personnel were injured in the incident.

When an IDF helicopter sent in to evacuate the wounded personnel came under fire, IDF commanders sent in air reinforcements, to enable the evacuation to proceed.

Looking at the bigger picture, it is clear that Jenin is out of control and that the likelihood of a large-scale IDF operation there is growing with time.

The Palestinian Authority in practice has no presence there, and it has become a major base of operations for terrorists, not only locally, but also from across the West Bank, who view it as a refuge. It seems that both terrorists and arms are flowing into the city.

The linkage between political instability and Israeli economic performance

After Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on June 18 that his coalition administration would go ahead with parts of its controversial judicial reform program, the shekel lost value, and Israeli shares were trading between losses and gains.

On June 19, a day after Netanyahu’s statement, the shekel fell as low as 3.61 to the dollar and was trading at 3.60 at the close of trade.

The blue-chip TA-35 index on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange was flat, while the benchmark TA-125 index fell 0.1%, the Times of Israel reported. The TA-5 Bank Index was down 0.4%, and the TA-Finance Index was down 0.6%.

The report cited Sabina Levy, head of research at Leader Capital Markets, as stating that volatility around trading in the exchange rate was mainly influenced by comments from Israeli government officials and reports around the plans for the judicial reform.

This is the latest unmistakable sign that Israel’s economy needs political stability and consensus politics if it is to continue to perform well, and that political instability threatens Israel’s economic future in a strategic manner.

The Israeli – Iranian arms race

On June 14th, Israeli defense company Rafael revealed that it is working on a new missile interceptor dubbed "Sky Sonic," which is specifically intended to counter the new threat of hypersonic missiles. The announcement came days after Iran announced that it is working on its first hypersonic missile, which it said is highly maneuverable and unpredictable.

Hypersonic missiles travel at high speeds like ballistic missiles do, but unlike ballistic missiles, employ high maneuverability to take unpredictable courses to their targets.

Ahead of the globally important Paris Air Show, Rafael released a statement calling its new interceptor a groundbreaking defensive response to the growing threat of hypersonic missiles.

A "major technological leap" with "exceptional maneuverability and high-speed capabilities," Sky Sonic "neutralizes hypersonic missiles, which travel at ten times the speed of sound, with unmatched precision and stealth," the company stated.

The interceptor operates above the 20-kilometer mark and below the 100-kilometer level, where hypersonic threats are active, and where current air defense systems are not.

According to the sources, the interceptor is programmed to intercept at an altitude and location that allows air defenders to avoid needing to know the precise onward trajectory of the threat, representing a breakthrough in air defenses.

A reliable source stated, "At that altitude, it doesn't matter where it [the threat] is going."

 When the system detects a hypersonic threat, the kill vehicle splits from the booster body and rapidly travels to a designated interception point.

Rafael sources further explained that the three-year development of Sky Sonic has been funded by the firm’s own research and development funds,  

According to the sources, the kill vehicle is equipped with its own sensors, but they would not elaborate on what those sensors are. The system will rely on a completely integrated "sky picture" provided by several radars, they added.

The system was presented to the US Missile Defense Agency.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Israel Tour For U.S. & Canadian Military Cadets, 2023

By ETGAR LEFKOVITS

Nearly 50 American and Canadian military cadets toured Israel and German death camps in Poland this month, in a trip that seeks to buttress the future officers’ awareness of the history and shared values at the core of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

The two-week Israel Strategy and Policy tour, which was initiated by the New York-based MirYam Institute in partnership with the U.S. Defense Department, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the Virginia Military Institute and the Royal Military College of Canada, presented past and present to the future officers.

The cadets’ trip began with a three-day tour of the Nazi death camps, followed by 12 days spent crisscrossing Israel, taking in the sights and meeting with IDF soldiers and commanders.

For the non-Jewish cadets on the tour, the country’s size, diversity, mix of modernity and ancient, and the inseparable integration of the people’s army that is the IDF, came as a revelation.

“I was surprised flying in how much smaller Israel is compared to the U.S. and how densely packed everything is,” said Ian M., 19, from Cincinnati, Ohio, a cadet at West Point. “I was struck by the mix of the modern infrastructure in such an historic place.”

Sohum A., 21, a future infantry officer from New Jersey, also attends the United States Military Academy at West Point.

“I was surprised by how in such a small country you have widely different people and cultures who through thousands of years of history maintained their own identity while simultaneously living in close proximity,” he said.

Macy H., 21, from Seattle, also a cadet at West Point, said, “I knew that the IDF was a conscripted army but it is amazing how the IDF is part of society and how society is the army, and how integrated and inseparable the two are.”

Melina B., 19, from North Carolina and the Virginia Military Institute, offered, “The passion that Israelis have for their country and maintaining this place where they seek refuge and are able to be free even though there are wars is striking.”

Mission-ready academies

The cadets came from a wide variety of backgrounds across the U.S., as well as a handful from Canada. They will be integrated across the military including, for the Americans, the Marines, the U.S. Army’s Armor and Infantry Branches, and the U.S. Navy during their multi-year service.

The trip sidestepped the Palestinian territories due to State Department-imposed security restrictions that did not allow them to enter the biblical heartland.

(Active duty officers on a separate tour that MirYam offers are provided with helicopter rides and briefings over Judea and Samaria, commonly known as the West Bank.)

“We seek to impact the leaders of today and tomorrow now,” MirYam CEO Benjamin Anthony said in a statement. “By exposing these officers to the broad array of policymaking considerations in Israel we assist the academies with their goal of building mission-ready academies.”

MirYam has brought hundreds of cadets and officers to Israel since its inception in 2017.

“The vast majority of the participants are not of the Jewish faith yet the connection they forge with Israel … is deeply rooted in shared values and common challenges to Israel, the U.S., Canada and the entire free world,” said Rozita Pnini, the MirYam Institute’s chief operating officer.

Willpower and resolve

“Seeing the sites of the biggest demonstration of antisemitism in world history showed us the power of having a Jewish state and better appreciate the willpower and resolve of the people of the State of Israel,” said Bethany J., 19, a future armor officer from Orlando, Florida, who attends West Point.

“My grandfather landed in Normandy during World War II and liberated some of the death camps,” said Alexander D., 20, a West Point cadet from Wisconsin. He recounted his grandfather’s harrowing description of seeing bulldozers pilling up bodies for mass graves.

During a visit to the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem, the group saw a video showing that same scene. “It made me realize why Israel is so important,” he said.

Ela F., 20, a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute from Gettysburg, Pennslyvania, said, “That feeling in my stomach standing in Auschwitz and at Yad Vashem will never go away.”

Not on the news

A recurring comment among the cadets was that Israel is not what you see on the news and is something you have to experience for yourself.

“The American people and the people of Israel share a lot of the same interests but from seeing the news headlines some people don’t realize this,” said Justin P., 21, from Washington, D.C., and the Virginia Military Institute. He called the trip an “eye-opening experience.”

Alexander D. added, “Standing on the Golan and hearing from the IDF soldiers makes you understand the significance of what the IDF is doing.”

Ela F. said, “You expect fear, but you see the day-to-day life of the clubs, parties, beaches and nightlife of Tel Aviv as people go on with their lives.”

Paul M., 20, also from Washington, D.C., and the Virginia Military Institute, said, “The ability to discuss things openly despite the proximity to danger and not get rebuked by your flag officer really struck me.”

Melina B. said, “These are things you can’t get from reading a book, watching a video or watching the news. You have to have your foot on the land.”

The cadets said that the news from Israel was one of rockets raining down on the country, Israeli attacks on Palestinians in Gaza, or a government in turmoil, a picture of a country constantly at war externally or internally.

“You are not getting the full story in the media,” Alexander D. said.

“They talk about the conflict but never tell you about the fundamental history,” Paul M. said.

“Israel has a PR crisis,” Ian M. said. “Remind people why the Jewish state has to exist. If people understand that they will have much more sympathy.”

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Benjamin Anthony is Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, Benjamin brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. Read full bio here.

Israel is Soft on “Soft Power”

By Chuck Freilich

“Soft power” is a function of a state’s ability to achieve its national security objectives through the appeal of its culture (arts, science, economy), the moral authority of its ideals (human rights, equality, democracy), and the quality of its domestic and foreign policy, rather than by coercive means. The more universal a state’s values, the greater its soft power.

In its early decades, Israel enjoyed great soft power. The horrors of the Holocaust created international sympathy and support for the Jewish people. Israel’s heroic early years were the subject of books, movies and song. The pioneers who reclaimed the ancient land and the kibbutz, came to epitomize Zionism’s attempt to build a new and just society.  The dramatic ingathering of the exiles is the story of legend. Israeli democracy was highly regarded and Israel was hailed as a “light unto the nations”.

Jews around the world cheered, cried and rejoiced upon Israel’s rebirth and celebrated its achievements, with the warm support of many Gentiles. Israel’s military victories were a source of international admiration and a balm for the souls of Jews worldwide, who saw in them the ultimate revenge against the Nazis. Israeli development projects, especially in agriculture and water, were deeply appreciated models in many developing countries.

The seemingly never-ending occupation, however, and especially the settlements, have fundamentally transformed Israel’s image. Israel is widely regarded today as an aggressive occupying power, bent on denying Palestinian rights. Nearly six decades after the Six-Day War, Israel has utterly failed to convince the international community of its claim to the West Bank.

Israel’s image has been further tarnished by questions relating to the quality of its domestic policies and democracy, including the recent “judicial reforms”, excessive prerogatives of the ultra-orthodox, status of Israeli Arabs, and rise of the radical right.

Over the decades, as Israel’s international standing waned, and the Arab refusal to make peace, or even negotiate, left Israel with little choice, military force came to occupy an outsized portion of its national security strategy. Moreover, force seemed to work; Egypt and Jordan made peace, and even Syria and the Palestinians conducted advanced negotiations. For a variety of reasons, however, Israel is reaching the limits to the efficacy of military force. It can continue to defend itself successfully and buy time, but there is no military solution to Palestinian nationalism, the Hezbollah and Hamas threats, or Iranian nuclear program.

In the interim, Israel has downplayed its soft power, or undermined it through some of its policies. The Palestinians, who have repeatedly rejected dramatic peace proposals, never presented a peace proposal of their own and who are governed by a dictatorship in the West Bank and a theocracy in Gaza, have wielded “soft power” very effectively and are winning the war for international opinion. 

In practice, Israel still enjoys considerable soft power. The epic story of the early decades may have faded, but diaspora Jews still harbor a deep sense of affiliation and caring for Israel. Christians around the world view Israel as the Holy Land and realization of divine scripture. Many still buy Jaffa oranges, an outdated symbol of Israeli agriculture, or fly El Al, long a fully privatized company, out of a sense of identification. Today, multinational corporations and scientists from around the world flock to the “Start-Up Nation”, seeking the technological creativity they cannot find elsewhere. Israeli arts and science enjoy an international reputation. Israel’s chaotic democracy still stands out in a dark sea of Middle Eastern authoritarianism.

These sources of soft power are the indispensable basis for much of Israel’s “hard” power, especially in the US. American support for Israel derives from three primary factors: the pro-Israel lobby and Israel’s strategic importance, but stems overwhelmingly from its soft power, the shared values that are the basis for the broad identification of the American public as a whole. Without this sense of identification, American support would not have remained as high as it has, for decades. American and European leaders’ opposition to the “judicial reforms” was so strong, precisely because they feared that Israel itself was undermining the normative basis for their countries’ relationships with it.

Soft power is of limited efficacy as a direct instrument of policy. It is hard to sway other countries just out of a sense of warmth and identification. Nevertheless, no country should be more attuned to soft power than Israel, whose right to a national homeland and subsequently to an independent state was recognized by the League of Nations and United Nations respectively and whose American support stems largely from it. Furthermore, Israel has successfully concluded many deals with foreign leaders and officials over the years, because in situations in which they could have adopted different decisions, identification with Israel was the determining factor.

Israel will not be able to fundamentally alter its international standing without resolving the West Bank issue, or at least achieving significant progress. Nevertheless, there are a number of important changes that Israel can make to improve its strategic circumstances, all of which are related to its soft power.

The use of force must be subject to clear political objectives, including the war of the narratives, which is almost as important today as the action itself, in some cases more. International standing, images and delegitimization campaigns, have a significant and even decisive impact on the outcome of policy initiatives, especially those that involve military action. Too often Israel wins the battles, but loses the war of narratives.

Israel must position itself so that it is always perceived as the side actively pursuing peace and accommodation, not the obstacle. The Jewish diaspora must come to be seen as a vital national security partner and asset, which greatly expands Israel’s capabilities beyond its indigenous ones, and treated accordingly.

Israel is a world leader in some of the primary issues of international concern today, including food security and agriculture, water, the environment and global warming, migration, poverty and entrepreneurship. Israel must do more to leverage its expertise in international organizations. Israeli aid programs (“Mashav”) are a pittance and should be increased. An Israel-diaspora “Jewish Peace Corps” would expand Israeli involvement in these areas and deepen Israeli-diaspora ties, especially between the young. Israel should also continue to provide emergency assistance in times of crisis, as it has so successfully done, notably in Haiti, Turkey and Ukraine.

The Palestinians miss virtually no opportunity to present their case in every possible international forum, with a long-term cumulative effect. Together with the US and others, Israel should target a few select and less politicized international organizations, such as the IAEA, in which a sustained effort can be made.

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.