As Russia – Ukraine standoff escalates, Israel must tread carefully

By Pinhas Avivi

In recent days Ukraine has been pressing Israel to take a clear stand over escalating tensions between Kyiv and Moscow. But it is important to clarify that this is something Israel cannot do.

As tensions between Russia and Ukraine continue to escalate, Israel has no choice but to tread extremely carefully, and to avoid making statements in support of either side.

Doing so could cause severe harm to relations with the United States on the one hand, or with Russia on the other. Israel’s security in the Middle East relies to a large extent on maintaining proper relations with both superpowers, even though the U.S. is of course Israel’s number one strategic ally.

Israel has been able to roll back Iranian entrenchment efforts in Syria, in part through its ability to maintain good relations with Russia. Israel therefore cannot allow itself to enter into this divide– and it must hope that nothing happens that will end up forcing Israel to take sides.

Beyond Israel’s considerations, it is also important to note that troubled relations between Russia and Ukraine stretch back centuries. Ukraine was never just another country for Russia, and conflict is no stranger to that part of the world.

In the 20th century, Ukraine was Russia’s wheat basket, and its agriculture helped feed the whole of the Soviet Union. In 1932 and 33, Stalin caused mass starvation that killed millions of Ukrainians as part of a deliberate policy to punish attempts by Ukrainian farmers to gain some independence.

In addition, Ukraine’s position on the Black Sea and its Crimean Peninsula represents a hugely important strategic asset for Russia, due to its position as a passageway to warm waters further south. Russia cannot access warm waters from the north, or to the west, where the Baltic Sea freezes in winter, and its eastern coast is near Japan. Hence Russia attaches great importance to its ability to move ships to the Black Sea and from there south to the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, as well as the Indian Ocean, to defend itself in case of a global war with the West.

Russia has always worked to secure warm water bases for itself, including in the Suez Canal under the Soviet era and the Horn Africa, and from 2015 onwards, on the Syrian coastline.

After invading Crimea, Russia is now consolidating its position in this regard.

For Moscow, Ukraine is also a passage zone of energy from Russia to all of Europe. In 2014, when Ukraine underwent a revolution that toppled a pro-Russian government, the Russians froze gas exports to Ukraine, and all of Western Europe suffered shortages as a result.

Many in Europe had to buy electric stoves to heat their homes in place of Russian gas that ran dry.

Within Ukraine itself, the eastern section is filled with mostly Russian-speaking people who support close ties with Moscow, while the western half is made up mostly of Ukrainian speakers.

Russia views the Ukraine as a safety ‘brake zone’ for perceived Western threats. During a 2018 NATO meeting in Bucharest, Romania, the alliance said it would positively consider requests to join it from Ukraine and Georgia. Upon hearing about this, several Israeli diplomats felt this would undoubtedly cause Russia to end up doing all that it could to prevent NATO’s borders from reaching Ukraine itself.

One possible outcome is Russia seeking to take control of these countries. This view was strengthened further when Russia came out against the West’s support for Kosovan independence, with the claim that minority self-determination must occur only in agreement from the state in which the minority exists.

Russia justified its invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which have Russian-speaking majorities, during the 2008 war with Georgia, by claiming that if Kosovo deserves independence, so do both of those territories.

Against this background, it is clear that Russia will not permit in any way for NATO to expand eastwards to Ukraine or northwards to Georgia. Hence, it has focused its forces on the border with Ukraine to twist the arm of the Americans on this issue.

The question of whether Russia will end up invading soon can only be answered by prophets. But what can be said is that an arm-wrestling match is underway and that Russia views Europe as weak, while it also sees that the U.S. is refusing to take responsibility for events outside of its borders. It notes that Washington has no interest in conflict in Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East. Hence, it feels that the situation is in Russia’s favor and that it can flex its muscles.

Russia’s decision to attack or not largely depends on what the U.S. is willing to do. The more muscles that the U.S. flexes, the less willing Russia will be to invade, and vice versa. 

The Russian threat to freeze gas supplies to and via Ukraine is a double-edged sword since Russia needs to sell this gas.

Ultimately, if Russia senses a real willingness by the West – militarily (less likely) or economically (more likely) to go full force in its response, this would reduce the chance of an invasion, or limit it to Ukraine’s eastern side, which in any event supports Russia. 

When the U.S. is unwilling to take bold steps, this impacts all of America’s allies, including Israel, but at the same time, there are limits to this effect – since Israel never expected anyone to fight with it or for it against its adversaries.

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

A Russian Invasion of Ukraine: A Game Changer, but Unlikely

By Liam Collins

The number of nations in the world has more than doubled since the conclusion of World War II, yet the incidence of interstate war has declined. Nowhere has that trend been more evident than in Europe. Once the epicenter of interstate war, the relative peace on the continent in recent decades has led to debate as to whether interstate war in Europe is obsolete.

Yet Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its subsequent seizure of Crimea and active support for separatists in Ukraine’s east in 2014 has led some to question whether interstate war in Europe is truly dead. Today, Russia has amassed some 100,000 troops along its nearly 1,200-mile land border with Ukraine, leading to speculation that a Russian invasion could be imminent.

A Russian invasion in 2022 while likely to be a game-changer and fundamentally different from its previous incursions, is however unlikely.

Why it would be a game-changer

A Russian invasion today would be game-changing because it would represent the first undeniable and telegraphed invasion in Europe since the end of World War II when Russia gobbled up Eastern Europe. Vladimir Putin tried to convince the world that he was protecting Ossetians from Georgian “genocide”  to justify his 2008 invasion under the pretense of the international norm of the responsibility to protect. The evidence, however, indicated that the war was “premeditated” and Georgia acted preemptively, similar to what Israel did in 1967’s Six-Day War. Thus, the international community did not buy Putin’s justification.

Learning from this experience, Putin avoided using overt military forces in Ukraine in 2014. Instead, he used “Little Green Men” and other hybrid means to seize and ultimately annex Crimea without firing a shot. After Ukraine had Russian-backed separatist forces on the ropes, Putin was forced to send smaller formations into Ukraine’s east, but he continued to deny Russian support.

What makes an invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally different from Russia’s previous invasions is that this one is being telegraphed by Moscow. Russia’s invasion of Georgia came as a complete surprise, as did its seizure of Crimea. A second major difference is that Russia lacks even an implausible justification for the invasion. In both previous wars, Russia attempted to justify its interventions under the responsibility to protect.

Neither of these conditions exist in 2022. While Putin has yet to directly threaten “invasion,” his words—he has threatened “appropriate retaliatory military-technical measures” if the West’s aggressive approach continues—and actions—the troop buildup—portend a potential invasion. Likewise, Putin lacks even the feeblest pretense for invasion. There is no population that Putin can claim that he needs to defend. Quite the contrary. Ukrainians have seen the devastation and the lack of opportunity in the Donbas and want no part of it.

Thus, if Russia were to invade, it would be a game-changer — an invasion within Europe that has been telegraphed in advance with no justification. It would be an unequivocal declaration of war. It would demonstrate the weakness of the international system that was unable to deter. It would also erode confidence in various international institutions and the West in general. Russia, no doubt, would pay a steep political price, but in a battle of relative gains, it is not clear that Russia’s price would be any higher than the West’s price — a clear demonstration of the West’s impotence.  

Why an invasion is unlikely

Nevertheless, an invasion is also unlikely. Putin is calculated and behaves fairly rationally, even if he routinely operates outside of widely accepted international norms. He recognizes that he would pay a high economic cost for an invasion. Sanctions against Russia following its seizure of Crimea in 2014 have been estimated to have cost Russia roughly $50 billion per year. With President Joe Biden signaling to Russia that it would “pay a heavy price” for any invasion, Putin knows that sanctions would be swift and severe if it were to invade.

Likewise, Putin knows that any invasion would come at a significant military cost. In its five-day war with Georgia, Russia lost as many as 22 aircraft. A price that Russia seemed unwilling to pay because it caused Russia to significantly decrease its air support after losing so many aircraft in the opening days. With Stinger missiles being transferred to Ukraine from Lithuania and Latvia, Putin realizes that he would likely lose a significant number of aircraft with any invasion.

When Putin sent T-90 tanks across the border in 2014, they were almost “impenetrable.” Since then, the United States has provided Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles, with additional missiles arriving from Estonia. Since 2014, the United States has also invested nearly $2.7 billion in training and equipment to reform Ukraine’s defense establishment. Putin, thus, recognizes that he would face a much tougher enemy than he did in 2014.

Putin also realizes he would likely pay a domestic cost for the victory. Russian mothers do not like their sons coming home in body bags any more than Western mothers. And while Putin is likely confident that he would score an initial victory, albeit at heavy costs, he also has to recognize that he would likely face a costly insurgency. Ukraine recently adopted a law enshrining civilian resistance as part of Ukraine’s national defense and these volunteers have been training.

Finally, an invasion would seem to accomplish little in terms of likely policy objectives. Crimea was unique; it was “strategic territory”, it provided Russia access to the Black Sea and housed its Naval Base in Sevastopol. Russia could have attempted to annex Georgia’s South Ossetia or Ukraine’s Donbas, but it did not. Russia’s objective was not about capturing territory, instead, it was about control: preventing both from joining NATO.

NATO is unlikely to let any nation that does not control its territory join. With no end in sight for the current status quo in Ukraine’s Donbas, it would appear that Russia is achieving its strategic objective at a fairly low cost. An invasion would only increase the cost, with no additional gain. And if the occupation became costly, as it likely would, the domestic repercussions could lead to his demise. Thus, invasion, though still possible, seems unlikely.

What an invasion could mean for Israel

An invasion could weaken international norms, but that seems unlikely to have any effect on Israel given that none of its immediate neighbors have the desire or capability to invade at present. A Russian invasion, however, would demonstrate the weakness of the international community at deterring action, which could embolden terrorist actors in the Middle East. It might also embolden Israel to be freer with its actions.

Regardless, an invasion does not appear in anyone’s best interest, especially Ukrainians and Russians.

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Col. Liam Collins is the Executive Director of the Viola Foundation and the Madison Policy Forum and a permanent member with the Council on Foreign Relations. A retired Special Forces Colonel, Liam served in a variety of special operations assignments and conducted operational deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa and South America. Read full bio here.

Ukraine is not the most important square on the chessboard

By Jeremiah Rozman

The Cold War was the last time that the United States faced real competition from a peer adversary. It was the formative crisis for most of the current U.S. policy establishment and much of the politically engaged adult population. Furthermore, American trade, culture, and treaties tie it strongly to Europe. Therefore, it is understandable that a crisis in Europe involving Russia is currently consuming the bulk of U.S. attention. However, today China is the only country with the potential to contest U.S. global leadership and Europe is not the most important arena for Sino-U.S. competition. Nor is Ukraine the most likely flashpoint for a potentially catastrophic great power showdown. The U.S. has recently sought to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. The crisis in Ukraine threatens to defer, if not derail, this necessary re-posturing, but effective compromise with Russia could turn this crisis into an opportunity.

Keeping Ukraine in context

Keeping Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence is not a vital U.S. interest. Defending Ukraine’s ability to preserve its self-determination is ethical. However, as has always been the case in global affairs, power trumps ethics, institutions, and often even strongly-worded threats, condemnations, and sanctions. The U.S. is no longer the undisputed hegemon that it was at the end of the Cold War. In Europe, power and resolve have shifted in Russia’s favor.

Allowing Ukraine to fall into the Russian sphere does not threaten the integrity of NATO, nor the security of its members. Disputing the strategic importance of Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Emma Ashford noted that “during the Cold War, the line was a thousand miles further West.” Yet, the U.S. emerged victorious against a true global competitor. Today, Russia does not pose the same peer threat that the Soviet Union did. That role is filled by China. Unlike China, Russia does not have the economic potential nor the stated desire to compete with the U.S. for global leadership. Rather, it wants a buffer zone from NATO military hardware and European Union political and economic encroachment. This is understandable. The U.S. Monroe Doctrine has long held the Western hemisphere as its sphere of influence. When the Soviet Union brought Cuba into its sphere and militarized it, the U.S. considered it to be intolerable.

It’s no longer 1992

In the heady years after the U.S. emerged victorious from the Cold War – from which Russia emerged in shambles – more sanguine voices that anticipated the need to consider Russian interests in a future European security paradigm lost out to advocates for rapid NATO enlargement. The ghosts of this decision would come back to haunt European peace in 2008, 2014, and now. Boris Yeltsin’s drunken ravings over NATO expansion in 1994 have been echoed many times by the eminently sober Vladimir Putin. While the U.S. would prefer to continue in its unfettered dominance, it has explicitly stated that it is unwilling to risk U.S. troops in defense of Ukraine. Conversely, Russia has signaled that it sees Ukraine as a vital interest, one that it is willing to go to war over. If Russia is willing to pay the price of sanctions and an estimated 3,000 to 10,000 troop deaths, what will stop it from invading?

If Russia is determined to invade, the more the U.S. protests and invests, the more reputation and resources it stands to lose when it happens. Some prominent voices are pushing the U.S. to take a strong stance, even risking military conflict because “China is watching.” Russia invading Ukraine would not invite China to invade Taiwan if the U.S. articulates that it sees Taiwan’s defense as non-negotiable, on par with defending actual NATO members while distancing itself from promises to defend Ukraine. However, putting the U.S. reputation on the line over Ukraine and losing, while shifting resources to Europe that otherwise would have gone to the Indo-Pacific, could make it more likely that China invades Taiwan. Therein lies the greatest strategic risk of the Ukraine crisis; it threatens to derail the urgently needed U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan is not just more important to U.S. interests because it produces over 92 percent of the world’s semiconductors critical to all forms of modern technology, but mainly because unlike Russia, China is a peer threat.

Economic and military options?

The U.S. and its allies have limited economic and military options to deter Russia. At best, these would postpone the next crisis. Economic options that would have the sharpest impact are likely to also harm the countries imposing them. For example, removing Russia from the international banking SWIFT system would “really sting,” but the U.S. and European allies might have already rejected this option due to the potential for major economic harm.

Another strong economic policy would be to block the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. President Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have explicitly threatened Russia that it will be rendered non-operational if Russia invades Ukraine. However, European reliance on Russian oil and high gas prices in the U.S., blunt the West’s ability to harm Russia’s heavily oil-dependent economy without harming itself. Furthermore, China appears inclined to undermine any U.S. imposed sanctions.

Alongside economic options, the U.S. could arm Ukraine to “bleed Russia.” Skeptics note that no conceivable amount of Western military support will enable Ukraine to defeat a determined Russian offensive. Russian regular units are not the separatist irregulars that Ukrainian nationalists have been fighting in Donbas. Russian regular units made mincemeat of Ukrainian armored battalions in a matter of minutes in 2015. Highly successful Russian use of force could showcase a new “revolution in military affairs,” a modern version of what the U.S. succeeded in doing when it showed the world the effectiveness of its new military capabilities in the Gulf War. Putin might even prefer this to achieving his goals without bloodshed.

Detente with Russia aids competition with China

Areas for compromise and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia abound, from counterterrorism to arms control. Effective detente would undercut the growing Sino-Russian relationship which poses a significant threat. In the Ukraine crisis, China backs Russia due to a shared interest in revising the international order through force. Coordination with Russia over European security could pull Russia away from China, a country with which it shares a long and historically disputed border. Good relations with Russia would help the U.S. to compete with China, while enduring crisis with Russia would tie up U.S. resources in Europe.

In Ukraine, compromise is clearly the best option, although conceding to Putin goes against America’s long-held policy of liberal internationalism. This crisis can be an opportunity to finally develop what U.S. preponderance has allowed it to put off for nearly three decades, a durable European security structure that takes into account the needs (not wants) of NATO and Russia. This would enable the U.S. to more effectively compete where it matters most.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

The genius of Dubai’s EXPO: A lesson in nation-branding.

By Daphne Richemond Barak

With the Dubai EXPO 2020 event, the United Arab Emirates has once again displayed its innovative approach to nation-branding – one that other countries can learn from.

Every four years, a different country is selected to showcase national achievements as part of world expositions. Unlike past expos, which quickly faded from collective memory, the Dubai expo is likely to continue radiating its aura well into the future.

Thanks to sophisticated targeted messaging on traditional media platforms and social media, smart design, and high visibility, EXPO 2020 has reached a wide audience, within and outside the UAE. One hundred and ninety-two pavilions were set up to highlight national achievements and narratives. 

The Dubai EXPO features quality family entertainment, leisure outings, and ample opportunities to educate about regional and global challenges. As many as 5.6 million people had visited EXPO by the end of 2021, and many more wished they could drop by.

EXPO 2020 is built as a place of learning for adults and children alike.

Through the EXPO School Program, children can take a virtual cartoon trip around EXPO; teachers can find teaching material – and even teach the “universal language of music” thanks to the official EXPO song. Top students serve as EXPO ambassadors, contributing social media content on a regular basis.

UAE government employees were given six extra vacation days to visit the event, and entrance to EXPO was free on the UAE’s 50th National Day. EXPO is clearly the product of a highly coordinated effort by various government agencies and private organizations to create an unparalleled experience combining education, learning, culture, multiculturalism, and – as it turns out – diplomacy.

Rather unexpectedly, Dubai’s EXPO has come to function as a dynamic diplomatic platform, where decision-makers and leading thinkers regularly meet. It has become an essential stop in any official visit to the UAE, including by heads of state.

Twenty-six heads of states and presidents, including the presidents of France, Pakistan, Latvia, Turkmenistan, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and the King of the Netherlands, visited their country’s pavilion at EXPO before heading for the capital. The fact that they land at Dubai’s airport makes such a visit all the more appealing.

THIS REPRESENTS a certain shift in attention from Abu Dhabi to Dubai. When Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the main two emirates, decided to unite in 1971 and establish the UAE, the meeting took place in the middle of the desert to convey the message that no emirate would dominate the other.

Since that time, Abu Dhabi has been the place where government officials and diplomats converge, while Dubai serves as the business hub of the country – a reflection of the careful equilibrium achieved between the two most influential emirates in the UAE. EXPO 2020 has – willfully or not – afforded Dubai some appeal in the diplomatic and political arena.

As such, EXPO Dubai has become a central element of the UAE’s innovative nation-branding efforts. It is part and parcel of the UAE’s efforts to position itself as a central actor in the Arab world and a key global hub.

EXPO DUBAI opened in October 2021 – following a postponement due to the COVID-19 pandemic – and is set to run until March 2022, but it will likely turn into a permanent fixture, and fulfill its out-of-the-ordinary role, in one way or another, going forward.

Its main themes – Opportunity, Mobility and Sustainability – crafted around the UN’s Sustainability Development Goals, were chosen with this long-term vision in mind. They provide some insight into EXPO’s ambitions, as well as the UAE’s worldview and priorities.

Beyond the spotlight on sustainable development goals, the UN’s presence at EXPO can be felt via the countless opportunities that EXPO offers for informal diplomacy.

The UN has created a special website for the event, and UN diplomats regularly visit the various pavilions. A model UN conference (simulating real UN work and activities) will be held during the closing week of EXPO in March 2022.

Until then, the “UN Hub” – like all other pavilions – has put together impressive programming, including cultural and diplomatic events, and workshops on UN- related issues.

Clearly, the UN has seized a unique opportunity to share its message and make itself relevant. The UN’s unprecedented engagement at EXPO has amplified and strengthened the UAE’s own forward-looking and inclusive message. 

EXPO 2020 has turned the UAE into the center of the world, the place where everything is possible – where Palestine, Iran and Israel each have a pavilion within a few meters of each other, and where Qatar (a nation subject to an embargo by Saudi Arabia and the UAE until early 2021) was able to join at the last minute.

EXPO 2020 has been shaped into a tool of nation-branding. It has helped the UAE to market itself as a nation of tolerance, and one that connects people and cultures. This is how the Gulf state colored its EXPO with its unique brush. In the midst of a worldwide pandemic, it has also succeeded in showing the world that in-person events are not only possible – they also have an irreplaceable value.

There is no doubt that EXPO Dubai will continue to make waves, and that the UAE will continue to reap the benefits of its well-thought-out nation-branding strategy.

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Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Preparations For A Possible Strike On Iran Leave IAF Better Prepared.

By Avishai Levi

The year 2022 has been designated as the year that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) prioritizes its readiness to deal with Iran and its nuclear program. This directive carries with it significant influences on the entire IAF.

At the organizational level, the IAF knows well how to direct itself and all of its internal units around a new order from headquarters.

Once the order is received to prepare long-range strike capabilities for Iran, a clear working plan is formulated and implemented. This means synchronizing the preparation efforts both internally and externally, with other branches of the military to ensure that this unusual directive results in new operational capabilities.

The ability to refocus around a new directive has existed in the IAF for many years, but when a new mission is defined, one that falls outside of the annual and multi-year working plan, this requires special new measures.

Creating new operational readiness against Iran obligates the IAF to make significant changes to its current working plan. This includes changes to operational capabilities, force build-up processes, weapons systems, ammunition, and intelligence – both within the IAF and in the wider Israeli intelligence community, which must be well synchronized with the IAF’s intelligence units.

Personnel resources and budgetary prioritization are all significantly affected by this directive.

All of these elements have to be oriented toward the mission of building a working plan that allows a suitable level of readiness within a given schedule.

Iran falls under the 1,000-mile mission range – a very long flight range that requires myriad steps in various domains. This means that the IAF has to stretch its abilities to the maximum in terms of intelligence, flights, the ability to deal with threats on the way, and weather forecasts – the length of the journey to Iran means that the weather can change by the time aircraft arrive at their destinations.

Intimate knowledge of Iran’s weather in all four seasons and the months and days of the year are factored into the hours that could ultimately be selected for the attack time.

Listening to Iranian television weather forecasts isn’t enough – being familiar with the weather conditions throughout the entire flight there and the duration of the activity is necessary. In addition, Iran is a big geographic country with varying weather conditions.

On the intelligence front, the entire intelligence community must be activated to ensure a good understanding of the relevant sites and threats, and the many changing conditions, including Iran’s air defense systems, and the nuclear sites themselves.

Such a mission means that aircraft will be operating on the edge of their fuel capacity – an observation that helps explain the complexity of the mission. The aircraft will always be on limited fuel supplies on such a mission.

Meanwhile, flight crews and their supporting arrays, including flight controllers, have to build a deep understanding and drill the potential scenarios and responses to them, including the ability to amend situations. All of this represents stretching the IAF to the limits of its capacity.

Deciding which munitions to take and knowing what their abilities and limitations are forms another critical part of the planning.

In addition, flying to such ranges is not a matter of being in the air for an hour – meaning that adversaries will have likely opportunities to detect the attack and prepare accordingly. This means that the IAF must not assume that it can conduct a surprise attack.

The question of whether one wave of aircraft or two will be used is a key factor. If the answer is more than one, the element of surprise would become irrelevant for any subsequent wave of aircraft.

Enemies that are prepared for attack form a much more complex challenge, compared to a successful surprise mission, such as the morning strike waves conducted by the IAF at the outset of the 1967 Six Day War on Egypt.

All of this means that the most meticulous planning and drilling are required, including the ability to adapt the plan during its design phase to reflect changes in enemy capabilities, and in Israel’s own capabilities, such as new weapons coming online.

The challenges are great.

In addition, the IAF’s directive of being ready for Iran also impacts its day-to-day grey zone campaign against Iranian entrenchment in the Middle East and its readiness against existing adversaries such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian terror factions in Gaza.

Building readiness for Iran inevitably creates a certain decrease in the depth of the readiness for other arenas that the IAF prepares for on an ongoing basis. However, it is fair to assume that when the IAF prepares for Iran, it does not prepare only for the Islamic Republic.

Modular, phased planning is designed to safeguard immediate readiness to defend Israel’s skies and to ensure they are not abandoned for a single minute.

In addition, preparing such capabilities – platforms, ammunition, intelligence-gathering, the most accurate weather forecasting, and maintenance – improve the IAF to a great extent.

Ongoing training and sharpening of dilemmas at the longest range mean that the IAF will be better for every kind of mission, and will further optimize its ability to find solutions to operational and intelligence questions.

The IAF’s core abilities in other arenas, be it in Gaza, Lebanon, or the gray zone campaign between the wars, are subsequently adapted and improved, and the IAF’s muscle memory gets stronger.

Hence, from the moment that the directive was received by the IAF, it began a process that improved its basic readiness significantly and improved its ongoing operations.

Ultimately, the complexity involved in planning for such a challenging long-range mission and synchronizing all of the required efforts is enormous, yet fully within the IAF's scope. The IAF will be planning the mission and drilling it, becoming better as a whole organization, while also not abandoning its continuous missions.

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Brigadier General Avishai Levi served for 30 years in the Israeli Air Force (IAF), a career that culminated as the Head of Intelligence and Reconnaissance for the IAF from 2007-2010. It was during his tenure that the Israeli Air Force successfully detonated the Syrian nuclear reactor. Read full bio here.

When it comes to Iran, Israel’s defense policy can’t be based on panic

By Gershon Hacohen

There is no doubting the existence of an objective Iranian threat to Israeli security, but how severe that threat is and what risks Israel should take in dealing with it are issues that are more complex than meets the eye.

Iran is marching toward nuclear weapons, although Israel reserves the option of striking Tehran’s nuclear program.

Nuclear weapons are not new, and obtaining them is far from impossible for a regional power like Iran. Public vows by Israeli defense officials that Iran will “never” get nuclear weapons are irresponsible.

Yes, Israel should and will try very hard to prevent Iran from going nuclear. But the Iranian nuclear program is unlike the Iraqi and Syrian programs. These were focused on single sites that were attacked and destroyed by the Israeli Air Force. After studying Israel’s modus operandi for years, the Iranians spread out their nuclear sites and dug them deep underground.

In addition, Iran’s nuclear knowledge is based on local capabilities. In light of the fact that Iran is a developed nation, with highly educated scientists, mathematicians, and engineers, killing some members of its nuclear weapons group will only result in their substitution with others. It is not possible to assassinate knowledge once a country has obtained it.

A more important question is why Iran wants nuclear weapons in the first place. Why is possessing this 20th-century weapon so important for Tehran?

Addressing this question is an intelligence challenge that goes beyond modern data processing systems and artificial intelligence tools that some in the intelligence community are so infatuated with today.  

It is a question that is also tied to another key question – is it inevitable that Iran will always be our biggest enemy?

Such strategic intelligence is vital for knowing which general direction to take. Israel’s founder, David Ben-Gurion, relied on human intelligence sources to figure out the intentions of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria before the 1948 War of Independence, and this is the definition of strategic intelligence – the type of knowledge we now need on Iran.

Even if Iran wants to destroy Israel, this does not mean it would be prepared to pay any price to do so. It is not clear that Iran is prepared to destroy itself in order to destroy Israel. Yet when Israelis think about the Iranian threat, existential threats immediately surface, and Holocaust associations rise in the collective subconscious.

This is too simplistic. Israel cannot manage its defense policy based on deterministic concepts about its enemies.

Iran is not a monolithic country, and ongoing power struggles between the conservative camp and the reformists are a fixture of political life in that country.

Holocaust traumas do not make sound policy guides for a sovereign nation. The year is not 1942 when Jews could not retaliate or exact prices. Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s flagship messaging to Israelis was that he would not allow an ‘Auschwitz 2.0’ in the form of a nuclear Iran.

But the security of a state cannot be based on panic.

It was easy for Netanyahu to unite the people behind the need to fight this threat, which is uncontroversial and is not subject to the ideological divisions that plague Israeli society.

Netanyahu presented the issue in ‘no choice war’ terms and was able to get the people behind him. He was able to achieve this unity on Iran in ways that he could not do on other fateful, ideological questions closer to home, such as guaranteeing that Jerusalem would never be divided.

This is because ideological positions have lost their legitimacy – yet fighting against a nuclear Iran is not an ideological position, it is purely a security matter.

As a result, Netanyahu was far more vocal on Iran than on issues such as defending Israel’s rights in Area C of Judea and Samaria, or when an Arab uprising over Jerusalem erupted within the State of Israel in May 2021.

In addition, a commitment to stopping Iran’s nuclear program at all costs increases Israel’s dependence on the United States, since any objective analysis cannot avoid the conclusion that Israel needs the U.S. to deal with Iran.

Israel alone cannot fight a war against the Iranians, and this means Israel enslaving its other interests to American directives in many areas. This is particularly true of Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria. The fact that Israel is in fact doing this is already a major achievement for Iran.

From a physical perspective, the nuclear weapon involves launching the weapon and its detonation upon impact, but from a wider strategic-holistic perspective, the Iranian nuclear project has already for years been generating a highly significant process that requires recognition. This process has led Israeli policy to focus its resources and attention on the Iranian bomb, to make its interests subservient to American interests, and to act with containment and restraint in other arenas, while giving up on active operative initiatives. This represents an unprecedented achievement for the Iranian bomb – an achievement that has been entirely overlooked in Israel and one that has not been taken into consideration in the map of policy calculations.

Furthermore, the level of preparations that the Israeli defense establishment must undertake to prepare for a strike on Iran harms the ability of the IDF Ground Forces to prepare for other, closer threats in Israel’s environment, by taking resources away from those preparations.

 Ultimately, the State of Israel must be prepared for the Iranian threat, and it must reserve the option of attacking. But it cannot completely devote itself to this threat at the expense of all other interests and preparations for other threats that it faces.

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Major General Gershon Hacohen served as Commander of the Northern Corps of the IDF. He previously held various positions, including Commander of the IDF Colleges, Head of Training & Doctrine Division in the General Staff, Reserve Division Commander of the Northern Command and Commander of the 7th Brigade of the IDF Armor Division. Read full bio here.

Jews must take responsibility for their own security

By Micah Jones

Thankfully, the January 15 hostage situation at Congregation Beth Israel in Colleyville, Texas, ended as it should have: With terrorist Malik Faisal Akram killed and all hostages, including Rabbi Charlie Cytron-Walker, freed unharmed. Akram was demanding the release of Aafia Siddiqui, colloquially known as “Lady Al Qaeda,” a Pakistani neuroscientist who is currently serving an 86-year sentence for the attempted murder of FBI and US Army personnel.  Siddiqui is a notorious antisemite, who declared that she did not want anyone with a “Zionist or Israeli background,” on her jury. Following her conviction, she stated that “this is a verdict coming from Israel and not from America. That’s where the anger belongs.”

Despite the FBI’s initial reluctance to clearly describe the Congregation Beth Israel hostage situation as a deliberate attack on Jews, Akram’s evil intent was obvious to Jews the world over. Akram chose to attack Congregation Beth Israel, on Shabbat, because he knew that he would encounter Jews. And despite many recent efforts by American Jews to distance themselves from Israel, Akram did not make such a distinction.  He, like violent extremists the world over, views Jews as a collective scourge that must be eliminated. In the minds of terrorists like Akram and Siddiqi,  Jews are Jews regardless of their political beliefs or where they live.

Although thankfully ending without the murder of innocent Jews, Saturday’s events in Colleyville were a grim reminder of the increased antisemitic events that have taken place over the last few years here in America and abroad.  According to the Anti-Defamation League’s (“ADL”) “Audit of Antisemitic Incidents,” the most recent data from 2020 details that there were “2,024 reported antisemitic incidents throughout the country.” Moreover, this was the “third-highest year on record since ADL began tracking antisemitic incidents in 1979.” From Pittsburgh to Poway, the last few years have involved horrific acts of violence against the American Jewish community. And, of course, the ADL’s report does not include the terrible attacks against Israeli Jews who, this past May 2021, endured nearly two weeks of incessant rocket fire from the radical terrorist group Hamas.  

The ADL’s data demonstrates that Jews are a hated people. This is a fact that, thankfully, has been allowed to be momentarily forgotten in such philosemitic societies such as the modern-day United States. But antisemitism is a pernicious and insidious force that rears its ugly head in every generation. No amount of education and advocacy will ever eliminate antisemitism, such hatred is too entrenched. Therefore, Saturday’s events, and the ADL’s data, reinforce the mindset that I have long believed: Jews must be responsible for their own safety and security.

Jewish places of worship and community must make themselves hard targets. This means that they should have both armed security, as well as encourage those congregation members with the appropriate training and credentials to be a part of that security apparatus. This may include congregation members with the appropriate state-issued licenses to conceal carry firearms during services or to participate in emergency preparedness drills with the security team. 

Communication and planning are paramount to ensure that all members of the congregation or community understand what to do in an emergency.  This takes more than lip service. It requires rehearsals. Most of all, there must be a mindset change and a realization that law enforcement response time will likely be slow. The Jewish community or congregation must assume that no one will come to rescue them, and must be prepared to protect themselves at all costs.

Such a mindset change does not eliminate the ability for the Jewish congregation or community to be welcoming and loving to the outside world.  So much of what makes Judaism special — the rich community ties, the tradition, and the hope to improve the world — can still exist, and perhaps increase more, through a congregation or community that knows how to protect itself. Through increased training and readiness, Jewish communities and congregations ensure that they will be able to react quickly and effectively if an emergency arises. By changing their mindset to one of preparedness, Jewish communities and congregations ensure that they will continue to be there for future generations and not become the next Poway, Pittsburgh, or Colleyville. 

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Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. Read full bio here.

The Time Has Come For Zionism 2.0

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Of all the end-of-year headlines and images, one photo in particular caught my eye. Two days before 2021 came to an end, a planeload of olim landed in Israel – the last such flight of the year. Perhaps those watching from the sidelines will struggle to understand how in the midst of a pandemic, economic difficulties, tragedies, security threats and other issues, there are those who choose to move to Israel.

Yet, some 30,000 new immigrants made Israel their home in 2021. It is this picture of the last flight of olim in 2021 that encapsulates our story. For me, it is the photo of the year.

Most Israelis probably won’t agree with my choice of photo of the year. It is equally unlikely that many would agree that this photo represents the DNA of the story that we continue to create in Israel every day.

In December, 1947, the poet Natan Alterman wrote his immortal “The Silver Platter”, sealing his poem with the words:

“Then a nation in tears and amazement

will ask: ‘Who are you?’

And they will answer quietly

‘We are the silver platter on which the Jewish State was given.’

Thus, they will say and fall back in shadows

And the rest will be told

In the chronicles and generations of Israel.”

SINCE THAT time, we have told and created the Israeli story anew every day. The chronicles of Israel are a Zionist and democratic story, intertwined with laughter and tears, building and renewal, as well as a story scorched with blood and pain. The story is embroidered like golden stones from pieces of this land.

Our roots, which brought us here from East and West, are what created this unique human fabric that formed Israeli society. The State of Israel is an explicit miracle given to us on a silver platter. Over the years, it took shape, but instead of turning into one human fabric, the spirit of division and the focus on others has taken hold of our society: Religious vs secular, residents of central cities vs those who live in the periphery, Ashkenazi vs Mizrahi, and so on. Phrases such as, “First Israel” (a political attitude: that of the old Ashkenazi elites, who wish to see Netanyahu convicted and kicked out of the political arena, and represent only half of Israel) and “Second Israel” (representing Israel’s predominantly non-Ashkenazi population in the periphery) that were said by Dr. Avishay Ben Haim, Channel 13, have come to dominate the public discourse.

We have grown used to coming together in unity during moments of pain – we are all aware of the unsigned contract that exists between Israelis: If one runs into danger the other will rise to protect him.

Yosef Trumpeldor’s famous phrase, “It is good to die for our country,” has become part of our cultural heritage, but the time has now come to plant the phrase that should characterize the next stage of Zionism: “It is good to live for our country.”

On the 74th year of existence of the miracle that Alterman wrote about in his poem, the time has come to outline the foundations of Zionism 2.0.

The Zionist movement succeeded in bringing us to this land, but its conceptual basis is no longer a given in the 21st century. We must now turn our attention to defining the meaning of Zionism today.

An intrinsic part of the answer is how we characterize the Israeli experience taking shape in the modern era. And how this modern experience can be linked to a path that, looking back, runs through the apocalyptic memory of the Holocaust and the rebirth of Israel. It leaves the Diaspora experience behind, opening a new chapter in the chronicles of Israel.

Zionism 2.0 remains affixed to the legacy of the past, while being in tune with the present Israeli experience, and turns its eyes to our own future. As a society, this is the Zionism that we should pass on to our children: a contemporary Zionism that speaks to our youth - who are, after all, the future generation.

These fundamental questions engage me on a daily basis, and shape my outlook and the education I give to my children, the next link in the chain. They are, quite likely, the central reason that brought me to the Knesset.

One of the answers to these questions came to me during a visit to Yad Vashem – The World Holocaust Remembrance Center. After visiting the Hall of Names and looking at the photographs of my murdered people, where binders commemorate the testimonies of some six million victims, I walked out of Yad Vashem and toward the hills of Jerusalem, which appeared out of the madness.

I knew that from here we must take another step, since “a country is not only known for its actions, but also for what it is willing to carry with it,” as a German Jewish Holocaust victim once wrote. This is their will. We must take another step, this time out of power and confidence in the Israeli story that we have created.

My mother’s parents arrived in Israel exactly a century ago and brought with them 100 olim, my late father’s family arrived here at the end of the 14th century, and I proudly carry the name Roffe as the twentieth generation of that family in this land.

As a child, when I was asked what my background was, I found myself shyly trying to explain the roots of a family that moved from Germany to Padua, Italy and from there to the Greek island of Crete. Today, I proudly testify that I am an Israeli mix, my children are too and so are yours.

Our roots will always form the previous chapters in our story and will remind us of a reality of persecution and antisemitism that accompanied, and still does, so many Jews. However, the path ahead will be united and glow with the precious light of Israel.

The State of Israel is larger than the sum of its parts. The Zionist project has not reached its conclusion, and never will. Its path runs through the building of Israel – here and in the Diaspora. The project that began with the founding of the Zionist movement at the end of the 19th century is still being built in Israeli homes every day.

The writer is an MK and a publishing expert at the MirYam Institute. She was elected to the 24th Knesset on behalf of the Yisrael Beytenu party. She has served as a deputy local council head, and worked as a journalist and senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years.

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MK Sharon Roffe Ofir was elected to the 24th Knesset on behalf of the Yisrael Beitenu Party. She has previously served as deputy council head, and worked as a journalist and senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years.. Read full bio here.

Gantz-Abbas meeting strengthens PA ahead of ‘changing of the guard’

By David Hacham

The meeting between Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas at Gantz’s home in Rosh Ha’ayin on December 28 was undoubtedly an important event, but exaggerations of its significance should be avoided.

The meeting – the second between Gantz and Abbas since August, when they met in Ramallah – was held with the full knowledge and approval of Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. The meeting also paved the way for Gantz’s subsequent meeting with Jordan’s King Abdullah in Amman.

The two meetings were the first between the PA leader and a senior Israeli minister for over a decade. They occurred after teams from both sides smoothed over and clarified positions before the discussions, including attempts from Abbas’s office to get Gantz to weigh in on violence by some Israeli settlers, and Israel’s decision to ban six Palestinian NGOs in October that are tied to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorist organization.

These preparations and exchanges of messages mean that the meeting was far more than just a technical discussion on daily affairs.

Still, for a number of reasons, the meeting was of only limited significance. In Israel, the coalition government that has been in place for the past six months is paralyzed and unable to make dramatic decisions on the Palestinian issue, due to its composition. On the Palestinian side, Abbas is in the twilight zone of his rule, and power struggles are already raging under the surface over who among Fatah’s senior ranks will succeed him.

The positions that each side put forward before the meeting accurately reflect the true nature of the gap between their respective expectations. The Palestinian side stressed ‘on the ground’ issues, civilian-economic affairs, and the importance of diplomatic progress on the horizon to promote a political solution that grants the Palestinians statehood.

In a tweet, the PA’s Civilian Affairs Minister Hussein El-Sheikh said the meeting represents the last opportunity “before the explosion” that will result from a dead end. He described a “serious attempt” to open a political path based on “international legitimacy that will end escalatory steps against Palestinians.”

During the talks, it is fair to assume that Abbas took advantage of the fact that Gantz is in charge of ties with the PA to flag potentially explosive developments on the ground that can lead to a security escalation, as well as arguing for the necessity of taking steps to restart political talks between the PA and Israel.

Abbas also likely related the message that despite the covert battle to succeed him, he remains the only authorized representative of the Palestinian people capable of working with Israel to promote a political process and prevent an uncontrollable security deterioration. However, even if the political process came up, it is also fair to assume that it was discussed in a shallow manner.

From Abbas’s perspective, arriving at Gantz’s home and risking harm to his image on the Palestinian street looks like the right call, since he was able to send a message to Israel warning of an escalation around the corner. 

Gantz, who was IDF chief of staff during the 2014 conflict between Hamas and Israel, is perceived among Palestinians as a war criminal who killed thousands – yet Abbas still chose to visit him at his home.

In Israel, efforts to minimize the importance of the meeting were clearly made by the government, as well as the claim that no political dialogue took place, and that only civilian-security matters were discussed.

Gantz’s office said that the two-and-a-half-hour meeting saw talks on strengthening security coordination, boosting stability, and preventing terrorism and violence. According to this narrative, the political dialogue, if it occurred, was marginal.

Still, it seems unlikely that Abbas would have left Ramallah and entered the Israeli defense minister’s home only to talk about civilian-humanitarian issues.

The Palestinian public holds tense expectations for changes on the ground, particularly in reining in provocative steps by some settlers, limiting settlement construction, promoting Palestinian construction in Area C of the West Bank, and promoting economic projects.

Palestinian sources also said that Abbas called on Gantz to reverse the decision to ban the Palestinian NGOs, reduce tensions in both east Jerusalem and the West Bank, and return the bodies of Palestinian terrorists killed carrying out attacks.

And indeed, the meeting saw Israeli steps taken subsequently to reduce tensions, including the decision to allow 6,000 West Bank residents and 3,500 Gazan residents into the Palestinian population census, thereby assisting people who had no defined resident status until now.

Israel also agreed to facilitate early payment of taxes it collects for the PA, to the tune of NIS 100 million, and to provide 600 entry permits to Palestinian businesspeople. Senior PA officials have been promised VIP permits granting them free travel.

The PA is also set to benefit from a new Israeli pilot program that allows shipping containers to enter from Jordan via the Allenby Crossing and the creation of an online platform for Israeli employers to pay Palestinian employees.

The online system will lead to a rise in bank transfers, and the PA is expected to make some NIS 40 million per month in taxes from this.

Palestinian opposition elements, meanwhile, fiercely criticized Abbas since they perceived the meeting as a tool for tightening security coordination with Israel.

Hamas operatives published a cartoon that showed Abbas as a pathetic, mocked, surrendering figure, shining Gantz’s shoes. A Hamas spokesperson described the meeting as a knife in the back of the Palestinians, while a Palestinian Islamic Jihad figure said the meeting demonstrates that Abbas is a “contractor” for Israel.

In the broad historical perspective, Abbas’s meeting with Gantz is not unusual – past Israeli prime ministers such as Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak met with the late PLO chief leader Yasser Arafat in their own homes too.  Yet unlike past meetings, the current meeting was held under conditions of Israeli government paralysis on the Palestinian issue.

From the Israeli perspective, the meeting was useful in further boosting security coordination, mutual confidence-building, and strengthening the PA’s position while weakening Hamas and its goal of increasing its influence in the West Bank, before going on to take over the entire Palestinian government system.   

It is reasonable to assume that Israel will continue to pursue its interests in the Palestinian arena overtly and covertly in the post-Abbas era, and that means not allowing Hamas to take over, while working with both Abbas and whoever replaces him.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

The similarities between Iranian and Russian belligerent foreign policy

By Yochai Guiski

Two separate high-stakes showdowns have been played out in recent months on the world stage: The first concerns the Iranian nuclear program, while the second is between Russia and the United States and European countries concerning Ukraine.

In the showdown over the Iranian nuclear program, Tehran has been pushing hard against U.S. and European demands to return to the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and presented (at least initially) hardline negotiating demands. All the while, Iran’s continued non-compliance with the deal and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have raised the specter of conflict arising from an attempt to delay the program by military means.

In the Ukraine, Western countries have seen Russia amass significant military forces (over 100 thousand troops and military equipment), threaten Kiev with military attack, and produce false narratives about Western aggression that requires a Russian response.

Moscow is already under sanctions for occupying and annexing the Crimean Peninsula and has received warnings from the U.S. about stiff sanctions should it initiate a military operation.

At first glance, these two issues seem unrelated: One is a multilateral nonproliferation negotiation regarding return to a nuclear deal that was abandoned by the Trump administration, and Iran’s noncompliance with the terms of the deal in response; the second is a potential war on European soil, which may lead to a crisis between two nuclear-armed great powers.

But at a closer look, the similarities begin to emerge:

1. Iran and Russia are both belligerent actors in their respective arenas:

a. The Kremlin and its allies are continuously intervening (through various tools - diplomatic, economic, covert, information, military) in the affairs of former Soviet republics, attempting to stifle pro-democracy dissent and prop up pro-Russian leaders, while supporting separatist pro-Russian groups.

b. Iran is also employing various tools to undermine the governments of Middle Eastern countries while funding and arming proxies who serve as its long arm. Iranian involvement perpetuated governance crises in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, and has exacerbated the humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria.

2. Iran and Russia have both increased their belligerence in response to sanctions that sought to deal with their behavior. They are also willing to use capabilities that are deemed unacceptable by the West such as assassinations (including using chemical agents), supporting terror groups, and developing various WMD capabilities.

3. Both Iran and Russia do not shy from sending forces to prop up authoritarian allies or from the use of force to quash popular demands, such as in Syria, Belarus, or Kazakhstan.

4. Iran and Russia see themselves as victims of the current situation or at least adopt these positions outwardly:   

a. Iran depicts itself as a victim of Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on Tehran. However, the “Nuclear Archives” showed that Iran had manifestly violated the JCPOA and the NPT by holding on to the blueprints and components of a military nuclear program, and it has violated NPT safeguards by holding and hiding enriched uranium. Iran has also leveraged the West’s interest in IAEA monitoring of its nuclear sites to prevent any meaningful investigation by the agency into its numerous violations.

b. Iran has also expanded its support for militias and terror groups around the Middle East that have targeted U.S. forces and their allies while claiming the U.S. is violating the nuclear agreement by sanctioning it for those behaviors.

c. Russia also sees itself as a victim of western interference. It sees the 20+ years of NATO enlargement to the east as an encroachment on its borders by a military alliance that primarily views Russia as its enemy. All the while remembering that the wars Russia fought in Europe were instigated by European nations.

d. It also views the development and deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe over the past decade as a significantly destabilizing development as these can reduce the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence.

e. Russia viewed the political change in Ukraine with genuine alarm, as its territory plays host to vital military installations (such as the only exit to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean) whose loss would have significant strategic implications. It reacted swiftly by seizing and annexing Crimea. Moscow also sees the NATO presence in Ukraine as an unacceptable risk to its national security (the distance between Moscow and the Ukrainian border is only about 500 Km of relatively open terrain).   

5. Conspicuously, both Iran and Russia seek guarantees from the U.S. and its allies that they would refrain from actions that could inhibit their ability to exercise their power in their respective (contested) spheres of influence (Russia provided treaty suggestions to the U.S. and Iran demands guarantees as part of the nuclear negotiations). They seek these guarantees knowing full well that their demands are near impossible to accept and even agreeing to discuss them might be interpreted as selling out U.S. partners in the region.

As the U.S. seeks to reinforce the notion of a rules-based international order, it is of paramount importance that regional bullies do not get a free pass on their behavior. Even if the U.S. and its allies might have done better in dealing with both nations, it is ultimately their aggressive policies that bear most of the responsibility for their current predicament.

Accepting the narrative that Iran or Russia are victims who just seek to have some protection from bullying U.S. policies would be counterproductive and an open invitation to aggression, which would also be closely monitored by an attentive Beijing.

Even if diplomacy is still the best road to address most of the issues between the U.S., Russia, and Iran, it would be foolhardy to attempt to kick the can down the road by acquiescing to unacceptable demands. Accepting them in diplomatic discourse with one actor would surely embolden the other to seek the same.

Even if the U.S. and Israel cannot fully agree on the nuclear negotiations with Iran, this should be a point they are united on. 

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Can Iran Stall its Way to Nuclear Weapons?

By Jeremiah Rozman

Iran wants nuclear weapons. This rational desire aims to ensure that it can pursue its interests without fearing foreign military intervention. The United States and Israel both have rational reasons for wanting Iran to never obtain nuclear weapons. Despite its vastly inferior resources, Iran is advantaged in pursuing its goals because it simply needs to stay the course, gradually enriching nuclear material, while the U.S., Israel, and other involved parties must overcome significant differences that prevent a united front capable of deterring or disrupting Iran’s nuclear weapons program. By reducing deterrence, these differences harm the diplomatic effort, making a peaceful end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions less likely.

Iran’s goal

Iran’s leaders seek regional dominance not only for ideological reasons but because being more powerful makes them less vulnerable. They saw the fate of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, both of whom suffered humiliating and violent deaths at the hands of a U.S.-led coalition after giving up their nuclear programs. Conversely, Pakistan and North Korea both succeeded in getting nuclear weapons despite U.S. protestations, threats, and diplomacy. They raced their way to nuclear weapons and their leaders remain in power. Obtaining nuclear weapons would be a major win for Iran’s leaders. Therefore, dissuading them will be difficult, even with a united opposition.

A (dis)united front

The U.S., Israel, Western powers, Russia, China, and Iran’s regional adversaries all have an interest in stopping Iran from getting nuclear weapons. But their interests are not nearly the same in terms of urgency or severity.

For Israel, a nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat. For the countries in the region, the threat is nearly as potent. Although Iran has not promised to wipe them off the map in a nuclear holocaust, post-revolution Iran has a long history of bloody warfare, military intervention, and terrorism in the Middle East. Just this week Iranian-backed Houthis launched armed drones into Saudi Arabia.

For the U.S., a nuclear-armed Iran threatens some of its interests, but not its survival. These threats include: increased instability in a decreasingly important region, increased terrorism, threats to deployed military assets, and threats to European allies.

The European powers appear ambivalent to the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons that would likely be able to strike their soil. They are happy to see sanctions removed and to resume trading with Iran and purchasing its oil. Finally, Russia and China would love to see the U.S. fail to achieve a much-heralded foreign policy objective.

Paths to stopping Iran

There are three main approaches to thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions: 1. deterrence, 2. military action, and 3. diplomacy. These paths complement each other. Military action makes deterrent threats more credible and diplomacy can make denuclearization more palatable. Coercive diplomacy is nothing new. Negotiating with someone while holding a gun to their head is still negotiating, it is just more likely to succeed.

The deterrence disconnect

Fully destroying Iran’s nuclear program is likely to be difficult and costly. Successful diplomacy requires deterrence because Iran’s strong preference is to get nuclear weapons. Deterrence has two components. The opponent must perceive a country or coalition as having both the necessary capabilities and resolve. Neither is sufficient on its own. The fundamental problem to deterring Iran is the absence of a unified entity with both. The U.S. has the capabilities. Israel and regional countries have the resolve. However, these players are currently incapable of conveying a unified purpose.

Israel has high resolve and moderate capabilities

Iran sees Israel as having abundant resolve, but limited capabilities and potency, while  Iran has a deterrent of its own. Israel would face difficulties refueling and penetrating Iran’s deep fortifications, and whether its attack succeeds or fails, it will likely face Hezbollah and perhaps also Hamas in a multi-front war with massive damage, casualties, and unabating rocket fire that can target the entire country, hit sensitive sites and overwhelm its Iron Dome missile-defense system.

The U.S. has warned Israel over military action as it negotiates with Iran. An Israeli strike could ruin its relationship with its most important partner. The U.S. might refuse to replenish Iron Dome. Israel failed to significantly reduce the rate of fire from Gaza in its most recent altercation. Israel expects thousands of rockets a day in a war with Hezbollah, many times more than Gazan terrorists were able to launch.

As is always the case with preemptive action, it is difficult to justify casualties today to prevent potentially greater casualties in the future. However, Israel has shown on several occasions that it is willing to strike to prevent future catastrophe, even against strong U.S. opposition.

Finally, if Iran thinks that its nuclear program can survive an Israeli strike, it is unlikely to be deterred. Iran also sees regional powers like the Saudis who can barely contend with the Houthis, as lacking the capability to threaten Iran’s nuclear program.

The U.S. has high capabilities and moderate resolve

Conversely, the U.S. has the capabilities portion of the equation, but perhaps not the resolve. The U.S. and Israel have discussed military options should all other initiatives fail. However, the Biden administration has shown reluctance to risk military altercation in the Middle East and its disorganized and rushed exit from Afghanistan does not lend credibility to threats against Iran.

Complete the deterrence equation for diplomacy to prevail

There are three ways to complete the deterrence equation. The first is to boost Israel’s capabilities. Some congressmen and analysts have suggested giving Israel refueling planes and “bunker buster” bombs. The second is to boost perceived U.S. resolve by moving military assets to the region and making public threats should Iran pass a specified red-line. The best way is to marry U.S. capabilities with Israel’s resolve through joint statements and war games – the  more official and public, the more credible. This is the best shot to boost deterrence and enhance diplomacy. However, unless the U.S. and Israel can close the policy gap, this is unlikely to succeed and Iran could stall its way to a bomb.

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Can Israel Defeat Iran’s Precision Guided Missile Threat?

By Yaakov Lappin

BRIG. GEN. ZVIKA HAIMOVICH (IDF, RET.)

BRIG. GEN. SHACHAR SHOHAT (IDF, RET.)

Hezbollah’s precision-guided missile (PGM) arsenal is Israel’s leading conventional security threat, surpassed only by Iran’s nuclear program.

While Hezbollah is not believed to have crossed Israel’s red line on this issue—a threshold that could trigger a preemptive attack on stockpiles of PGMs on Lebanese soil—it is continually taking steps towards it.

With Iran’s help, Hezbollah has recently explored ways to manufacture PGMs in Lebanon to avoid Israel’s effective grey zone campaign to disrupt the proliferation of advanced weapons from Iran to its regional proxies.

The ability to set up an indigenous PGM production capability in Lebanon—in which Hezbollah would merely receive components and independently assemble them, rather than rely on Iran for fully-built imports—represents a truly dangerous situation that Israel cannot tolerate in light of the instability that this scenario would cause.

“We have to go back in time and ask ourselves, how did we get to this stage?” says Brig. Gen. (ret.) Zvika Haimovich, former commander of the Air Defense Forces in the Israeli Air Force and a senior research fellow at the MirYam Institute.

Haimovich notes two processes that have led to the current situation. The first is a learning process by Iran and Hezbollah. Tehran and its proxy examined the estimated 20,000 projectiles fired at Israel—most of them by Hamas in Gaza—over the past fifteen years and found that only minimal damage was caused.

“Statistical (unguided) weapons had a big cognitive effect on the public but little practical effect,” says Haimovich. The second factor he notes is the revolution in standoff guided weapons technology. Whether rocket, missile, or drone, the latest technology enables these weapons to be fired from the ground, air, or sea to accurately strike targets, creating major damage, Haimovich says.

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shachar Shohat, former Air Defense Forces Commander in the Israeli Air Force, describes PGMs as “the air force of terror organizations.”

To illustrate the difference between the threat of guided and unguided projectiles, he states: “Until now, around 25% of statistical, unguided weapons fired at populated areas were on course to their targeted areas. The entry of precision-guided munitions changes these parameters.”

Given that Iron Dome has intercepted approximately one-quarter of all incoming rockets from Gaza and is programmed to shoot down only threats heading for built up areas, the accuracy level of unguided rocket barrages is fairly clear, Shohat says, adding that “This strike level for statistical rockets of around 25% hasn’t changed since the 2006 Second Lebanon War.”

In contrast, PGMs can not only ensure that areas of interest are hit but can fire projectiles at an accuracy of between five to ten meters from the target, representing a completely new level of precision strike capability.

“If a simple rocket with a 20-kilogram warhead lands 20 meters from a building, it causes heavy damage to it. When a 250-kilogram warhead rocket accurately hits a building, it will take it apart and topple it. A 250-kilogram warhead can destroy multiple buildings,” Shohat cautions.

“What was once the reserve of a trained air force with pilots—the ability to hit precise targets, like a power station or a research center, can now be done with PGMs,” says Shohat.  “If an adversary had to fire four munitions to hit one target, today one munition is enough.”

These conclusions became clear to Iran and Hezbollah, Haimovich says, and in the decade that followed the Second Lebanon War, the shift to PGMs became apparent.

“Hamas is also trying to get PGMs into its inventory,” Haimovich warns.

“In the end, it all comes from a single catalyst—Iran. The Iranians provide the knowledge and the technology. In the past, they went for the “easy” option of transferring the missiles pre-assembled. Then they understood that these smuggling runs are discovered easily by Israel, and that Israel’s intelligence community had become far too adept at recognizing missile convoys, cargo flights, or shipments,” he adds.

“So, in the past ten years, they started with the idea of transferring knowledge to local proxies,” continues Haimovich.

Israeli officials have in past years warned about “suitcases” containing guidance kits that can be placed on unguided rockets, turning them into guided rockets. The guidance kits, complete with navigation fins, can turn powerful yet unguided rockets into precision-guided missiles.

Iran and Hezbollah have made multiple efforts to get such GPS guidance kits into Lebanon. Israel has made it abundantly clear to its enemies that if its red line on this type of proliferation is crossed, action will follow.

The reason, Haimovich explains, is because even an ability to hit a small number of key strategic targets in a war will change the course of the conflict to Israel’s considerable detriment. And that means only a small number of PGMs are sufficient to pose an intolerable threat.

“If Hezbollah decides to only hit five strategic targets with a projectile that has a 10 square meter radius accuracy in one day, that’s enough to change the picture,” notes Haimovich. “This is a changing reality. As a state, we can’t tolerate the other side having accurate weapons in big scopes that can threaten strategic assets.”

Shohat states that even if Hezbollah gets hold of the Iranian guidance kits, “we will defeat them.” However, he says, “we do not want this ‘grass’ to grow and create problems. This is a good example of Israel drawing clear red lines and doing it seriously—not just at the rhetorical level.”

Although the Iran-Hezbollah axis is continuing its efforts to create a PGM arsenal, it is doing this “much less than it would want to,” says Shohat.

And in places like Syria, used as a conduit to smuggle the weapons, “each time something gets ‘lost’ on the way” to its destination, he adds. “Most importantly, this gives Israel a better opening position on the day that a war begins. This is cutting the grass. It doesn’t mean that the grass isn’t growing, but when the war starts, the grass will be as low as possible.”

Haimovich explains that Israel’s red lines are designed to prevent two intolerable threats from materializing. The first is allowing Hezbollah to possess large numbers of accurate weapons that can threaten strategic assets such as oil refineries and power stations. “Even if these sites recover from attacks within days, the cognitive effect will be major,” he warns.

The second is the ability of Hezbollah to disrupt the IDF’s own continuous functionality. “If Hezbollah strikes air force bases, and even if it only takes five to six hours to repair the runaways, that would create a very significant effect nevertheless,” he says. “Hence, we cannot accept a reality in which the other side can impact civilian and military continuous functions. Israel must do everything that it can to reduce these enemy capabilities.”

Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles are also part of the precision strike club, explains Haimovich, regardless of whether they carry five kilograms of explosives like a UAV, or 300 kilograms like a Scud B missile.

Hezbollah is not the only nearby threat possessing these capabilities. “Hamas also has a precision project,” he adds.

Expanding Air Defenses and Preparing Preemptive Options

With PGMs giving attackers a far higher chance of destroying a selected target, the obligation for more advanced air defenses is paramount, compared to previous levels of defenses, says Shohat.

“We need more interceptors. The ‘quarter principle,’ in which we only needed to shoot down around 25% of statistics projectiles, no longer holds against PGMs,” he says. “With PGMs, we need to be able to intercept everything.”

That, in turn, has economic consequences, Shohat adds. “While the cost of air defenses should be measured in terms of the damage and losses that they prevent, not just the cost of the interception itself, it is undeniable that air defenses against PGMs are more expensive than defenses against statistical weapons,” he says.

Haimovich explains the threat of accurate weaponry “obligates us to prepare differently. Systems must be able to examine threats selectively and focus on those that form strategic threats, while still also acting as area-based defenses to protect populated areas,” he says. “This calls for a robust concept, which integrates both specific site protection with regional defense—and mutual coordination between them.”

Another challenge for air defense systems posed by PGMs, notes Haimovich, is being able to recognize and distinguish PGMs from inaccurate projectiles in a crowded sky.

“Israel has highly advanced capabilities that enable a high-level performance. Still, this is a major challenge, to pick the right threats out of a barrage of rockets, to find the needle in the haystack,” he says.

Asked to discuss the option of a preemptive attack on PGM stockpiles, Haimovich says this would be a cabinet decision and that the topic constitutes a “legitimate decision on the table of the political echelon.”

He adds that questions about what would trigger such an attack remain open, pointing to potential thresholds such as the quantity of PGMs amassed by Hezbollah. In any case, Israel is “acting all of the time to delay the need to deal with this” in the form of its grey zone campaign in Syria to disrupt weapons smuggling.

“I think that every day that passes brings us closer to the stage where we will have to deal with this threat in one way or another,” he adds.

Multiple disclosures by senior Israeli officials of PGM production sites in Beirut are part of the “cognitive” struggle by Israel to expose the other side, reveal that its activities are visible, and create both an Israeli and global consensus against PGM force build-up, he explains.

Shohat agrees that the question of a preemptive strike is very difficult to answer. Like Haimovich, he points to Israel’s preemptive campaign in Syria as “putting us in a better opening position” for the next war, meaning that the PGM threat is “less severe than it would be otherwise.”

“While no campaign delivers 100% success, I believe there have been successes here, and there is no doubt that Israel reduced the threat, in relation to its potential, in a dramatic manner,” says Shohat.

The campaign is about how much the threat can be delayed and reduced, he says, before concluding: “It prevented a very bad picture from forming, which we otherwise would have had to face. To a certain extent, the preemptive campaign is an application of the lesson that the IDF learned between 2000 to 2006, when Hezbollah was allowed to build up a large arsenal without challenge.”

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Zvika Haimovich served as Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces from 2015-2018. He was Active Defense Wing Commander during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). Read full bio here.

Shachar Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Fractured but stable: Israel’s coalition ends the year intact and strong

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

When MK Shirly Pinto (Yamina), was forced to go to the Knesset with her six-day-old baby in mid-December to enable the coalition to pass a vote, it was a defining moment. It was truly a scene to behold. Pinto, a deaf social activist, was mobilized by the coalition because it feared the opposition would not withhold a vote from its ranks in her absence.  

The scene showed just how low relations between the coalition and opposition have stooped. The sides continuously threaten to refuse to offset votes when a Member of Knesset is absent. The entire Knesset has been consumed by this out-of-control feud, which has even seen a refusal to offset votes for hospitalized MKs or those in mourning.

To see Pinto’s arrival from the journalist’s stand in the Knesset was remarkable. Naturally, a desire to hug her was awakened.

On the other hand, when events are subjected to further analysis, what transpires is that there is more to the story than meets the eye. Firstly, Pinto did not have to make the journey to the Knesset, she chose to do so to avoid a defeat for the coalition. Additionally, her arrival boosted the coalition’s image significantly. Here is a politician who is prepared to come to the plenum with her young baby; here is solidarity among the coalition’s members.

In other words, the opposition’s refusal to offset votes ended up playing to the advantage of the coalition’s image.

Technically, the entire drama ended up being superfluous as MK Mansour Abbas, leader of the Ra’am (United Arab List) party, which is part of the coalition, ended up voting by accident with the opposition, sending it to defeat in any case.

The legislation being voted on has assumed a backseat in this battle. The real issue is the clash between coalition and opposition. Neither side is prepared to support any legislation put forward by the other.

The absurd result is that, seven months after the formation of the coalition, beyond feuding, there is no real agenda in place.

A recent exclusive interview that I published in Israel Hayom with Knesset Chairman Mickey Levy (Yesh Atid), summarized the past seven months, and Levy asserted that the opposition has fallen in love with its position, at the expense of any national interest.

Levy lamented how difficult it is to work in this manner, noting that the opposition refuses to be part of any Knesset Committees.

The opposition boycott of all Knesset committees puts the coalition in a very strong position as the opposition is thus unable to receive the committee appointments that it desired.

With such a boycott in place, the coalition has absolute power in these committees, which decide policy on matters such as how to combat the coronavirus pandemic. The opposition is, therefore, the only loser from this boycott

On the other hand, the coalition is feeling the weight of ongoing attempts by the opposition to subject it to a ‘war of attrition’ that sees it come under attack every time a coalition member heads to the podium to make a speech.

Levy, in his interview, said one of the most difficult aspects of his job was being called ‘a thug’ or ‘a floor cloth.’ Levy feels that the respect that was once afforded to the coalition by the opposition in the past has been run over crudely.

Despite the united front that the coalition attempts to portray, it suffers from many cracks.

One demonstration of such a fissure came from Public Security Minister Omer Bar-Lev who comes from a left-wing party, Meretz.  After posting on social media that he held a meeting in December with the United States Undersecretary of State Victoria Noland and that the topic of “settler violence” had been a key feature of their conversation, the coalition “exploded.”

The coalition’s right-wing parties had a meltdown. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett responded harshly, as did his partner, Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked (Yamina). The sense is that Bar-Lev’s tweet led to a watershed moment.

Ultimately, Bar-Lev’s timing was also very poor, coming as it did amid a wave of Palestinian terrorism, and lacking any sense of proportion.

Bennett and Shaked, who appear to have lost many of their core supporters by forming the current government, seemed to have spotted an opportunity to bring back some of the votes they may have lost. If so, Bar-Lev’s tweet served their agenda.

We have now come to the end of a year condensed with political action, including a fourth round of elections since 2019, the swearing-in of a new Knesset, the swearing-in of a government, and the passing of a budget in November - which was perhaps the most difficult test of all for the new government.

The coalition, while managing the pandemic throughout, is surviving. No matter how many internal divides it suffers from, and how much the opposition aggrieves it, there is no denying that this government has proven its ability to survive in a fairly impressive manner.

Still, the glue holding this coalition together is the threat of a return to power by the leader of the opposition, Benjamin Netanyahu. So long as he continues to cast his shadow over the coalition, its motivation to remain together and survive remains very high.

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a journalist and reporter on political matters, as well as an editor for the Israel Hayom/Israel Todaynewspaper, the most widely circulated publication in Israel. Read full bio here.

Converging interests: The Israeli-Jordanian-Emirati infrastructure deal

By Tomer Barak

Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates signed two Memoranda of Understanding for economic projects on November 22, and while it is still unclear when and how they will be implemented, the agreements send a bright signal regarding a new era in regional cooperation.

The first agreement includes the construction of a solar power plant and storage facility in Jordan that will produce up to 600 megawatts per year of green electricity that will be sold to Israel and incorporated into its power grid.

The second agreement deals with the setting up of a desalination plant on the Israeli coastline, with the potable water it generates exported to Jordan at a scope of 200 million cubes per year - on top of the existing water deals in place between the two countries, which recently were expanded due to growing Jordanian needs.

Companies from the United Arab Emirates will be involved in building the projects, according to the agreements, which are only at the MOU stage thus far. In the coming year, the final details are scheduled to be finalized, as well concrete feasibility checks prior to implementation. The American special presidential envoy for climate, John Kerry, was involved in securing the two agreements.

Three processes came together to create the new agreements: The Abraham Accords, the thawing of Israeli-Jordanian relations in the past six months, which included visits by senior officials, and the growing engagement with the climate crisis along with Jordan’s growing water crisis.

For Jordan, the current and past water agreements provide solutions for what is an existential need. Jordan today suffers from a water shortage of 500 million cubic meters per year. The annual per capita water availability in Jordan is under 80 cubic meters, much lower than the global water poverty line, which stands at 500 cubic meters.

If this was not bad enough, the trend is going from bad to worse by the year. Current reserves, particularly the Disi Reserve on the Saudi border, will thin out in the coming years, and demographic growth coupled with accelerated dehydration linked to climate change will intensify Jordan’s water stress, leaving Jordanian soil parched, its agriculture in a state of collapse, and its residents thirsty. The amount of water to be provided under the terms of the MOU will not solve these problems but will certainly help Jordan improve its situation.

Alongside this essential need, the ability to attract foreign investments is a priority for King Abdullah. Environmental initiatives are a lucrative new means to attract funds for investment in the Jordanian economy. To that end, multinational-regional projects are a concept that western countries and international funds are willing to invest in.

For Israel, the agreement, if implemented, might help to achieve a governmental goal of boosting  renewable energy production (the target is 30% by 2030). In addition, there is the obvious strategic benefit that comes from strengthening Jordan’s durability and stability, and the peace between the two countries, which is highly significant for Israel’s security, and for strengthening cooperation with the UAE in the context of the Abraham Accords.

The picture is not totally rosy

The MOUs will face some challenges.

First and foremost, as with previous public agreements with Israel, there has been pushback from the Jordanian public and from parliament, both of which are characterized by strong anti-Israeli sentiments.

From the moment that news of the MOU signings surfaced, demonstrations broke out against the agreements. After Friday prayers following news of the agreements, demonstrators took to the streets of Amman under the leadership of youths affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and some Jordanian tribal leaders. As in previous Israeli-oriented protests, there were voices calling for dissolution of the peace accords, although these were only on the margins of the protest. In line with Jordanian political tradition, accusatory public fingers were pointed at the government and at normalization steps with Israel, but not against King Abdullah himself.

At the same time, the Jordanian Parliament, with whom the government didn’t consult prior to the signing of the MOUs, held a meeting on the subject, in which several MPs attacked government normalization steps with Israel, and even called for a vote of no confidence.

In order to enable the agreement, the Jordanian prime minister was sent in to reduce opposition and ‘usher’ in the agreements,  and, at the same time, initiated dialogue with the tribes.

A month into the signing, it seems that protests have  calmed down, but previous cases demonstrate that it is just a matter of time before the opposition will pick up on an issue as a means to once again attack the government.

Unfortunately, there will be ample opportunities for renewed protests during the coming year, when the sides will need to formulate the details of the agreements, and afterwards, while construction  of infrastructure for the projects is ongoing. King Abdullah and his government will have to continue to market the agreement as vital, and to employ tools to calm protests. One of those tools will need to be outside support, in the form of American and Emirati assistance, as well as keeping relations with Israel relatively free of crises over regional and Palestinian matters. 

There are ample potential challenges to this new cooperation. According to media reports, the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, who is already in complex relations with King Abdullah (after alleged Saudi involvement in Jordanian royal family feuds), was angered by the MOUs, which left him ‘outside of the picture,’ including in terms of relations with the U.S.

The Palestinian Authority was not part of the agreement despite being at the center of the Israeli-Jordanian-Emirati triangle.

Technical, financial, and environmental issues could also emerge along the way that could complicate implementation of the projects.  

In summary, if this process goes ahead successfully, it could pave the path for additional Middle Eastern multilateral agreements in the sectors of energy, infrastructure, climate, health, and other issues. It is of great importance that policymakers around the Middle East and in the U.S. be creative and enterprising, while displaying goodwill and adequate resources to shape and implement a needed regional integration and cooperation, which will benefit countries struggling with common challenges ranging from Iran to the climate crisis.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

This is what would happen if Israel strikes Iran

By Chuck Freilich

As the prospects for a renewed nuclear deal with Iran fade, at least for now, the international and Israeli media have been replete with reports of Israel’s inability to destroy the Iranian nuclear program and ostensible lack of a military option. Various experts, including former and current Israeli officials, have all opined.

By framing the issue as the ability or inability to achieve a "knockout blow," one that puts an end to Iran's nuclear program, these reports miss the point. That would probably not be Israel's objective.

Up until around 2010, probably earlier, this might have still been possible, but Iran now has the necessary knowledge to reconstitute the program after an attack and even the U.S. can no longer simply put an end to it by military means. A successful attack could aspire today, at most, to achieve a significant delay, and even that is probably something that only the U.S. could do.

Given its more modest capabilities, Israel’s national security strategy has always focused on a combination of deterrence and limited military victories designed to play for time, in the hope that the problem of the hour would somehow resolve itself in the future. This strategy proved successful in the conventional wars against the Arab states in the early decades, and is still being put to the test in the repeated rounds of asymmetric warfare with Hezbollah and Hamas, in the more recent ones.

Rather than a long-term postponement of Iran’s nuclear program, an Israeli attack would likely have more limited ambitions. The objective would not be, as some have speculated, to draw the U.S. into a military conflict, but to gain additional time and to create a situation in which the international community, led by the U.S., would be constrained to finally take decisive diplomatic and economic measures, especially given the possibility of further Israeli action. For that, Israel's limited capabilities are more than sufficient.

Western media reports typically conclude, with little if any analytical substantiation, that an Israeli attack would lead to a regional conflagration. That is certainly a possibility that planners must take into account, but it is also a classic case of the worst possible scenario being portrayed as the most likely one.

Most Western journalists today lack familiarity with military thinking and recoil from it instinctually, without the expertise necessary to analyze the ramifications of an application of force in a given situation. This is not to commend military action as the preferred option – it is not – but analyses such as these must be based on expertise in military affairs and deep familiarity with the specific country and situation in question.

In practice, decades of experience with Iran suggest that its response would probably be much more narrowly focused than these reports suggest. To be sure, Iran would have to respond, but there is every reason to believe that the response would be directed primarily against Israel, via a massive Hezbollah attack.

This is precisely the scenario for which Iran built Hezbollah’s mammoth arsenal of some 150,000 rockets, numerous UAVs (drones) and other advanced capabilities. Israel’s home front will face a level of destruction such as it has never experienced before and Israel may even find itself in a multi-front war, not only against Hezbollah, but Iran itself, Iranian-affiliated forces in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, Hamas and more.

There is no denying that Iran may also launch limited attacks against American allies in the region (e.g. the Saudis) and even against some American-affiliated targets, whether U.S. forces in the region, or a U.S. embassy or McDonald’s somewhere in the world, if only to make it look good. Iran, too, has a self-image to maintain and domestic opinion to assuage.

abroad, especially since Iran would claim to be conducting what many would consider a justified response to Israeli "aggression."

Seven Israeli premiers (Rabin, Peres, Barak, Sharon, Olmert, Netanyahu and Bennett) have dreamed of an American military strike that would put an end to Iran’s nuclear program. Five American presidents (Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden), Democrat and Republican alike, have refrained from doing so. Any realistic assessment today must conclude that this might change only in extraordinary and highly unlikely circumstances.

In reality, only a diplomatic agreement, even a flawed one, holds out the possibility of a long-term postponement of Iran’s nuclear program.

If and when the moment of truth comes, when all other options have been exhausted, Israel will likely find itself facing Iran alone. We have been there before: Facing the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear programs, among other critical occasions.

At that time, Israel will have no alternative but to launch a strike and let the pieces fall where they may. That is what the IDF is preparing for today. Bad as this option may be, allowing Iran to go nuclear would be intolerable.

Those who are totally averse to any risk of retaliation should, indeed, oppose military action. They should also prepare to live in a world in which Iran and other rogue states are essentially free to acquire nuclear weapons.

There is, however, little reason to believe that things will go beyond this limited escalation. In a situation in which Iran is already embroiled in a nearly all-out conflict with Israel and in which the latter is likely to strike regime and other strategic targets in Iran itself, logic and experience strongly suggest that Iran would want to put a lid on things.

Indeed, a true military confrontation with the U.S. would appear to be the last thing that Iran would want. Iran may be homicidal, but it is not suicidal, and it is painfully aware of the true balance of power.

A conflict limited primarily to Israel would be far more suited to Iran's size, capabilities and generally cautious temperament. It would also play better both at home, to Iran’s domestic audience, and

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

West Bank terror is a reminder of Gaza’s ‘deceptive calm’

By David Hacham

After arresting four terror suspects on suspicion of carrying out the deadly attack near Homesh, in which Israeli civilian Yehuda Dimentman, 25, was murdered, Israel Defense Forces spokesman Ran Kochav said on Sunday that the attack was likely orchestrated from the Gaza Strip.

It has since transpired that the terror cell belonged to Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, a former Arab-affairs adviser to seven Israeli defense ministers and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, told JNS such incidents are the latest reminder of just how deceptively calm the Gaza Strip really is.

While Hamas and PIJ maintains calm in Gaza, it works around the clock to set the West Bank and Jerusalem alight with violence and terrorism.

“The calm in Gaza does not come from a dramatic change in Hamas’s fundamental stance or ideology towards Israel, but rather, from a sober assessment by Hamas, based on the needs of the hour and a need to create economic assistance for Gaza,” he stated.

“What stands out is Hamas’s double game. In Gaza, Hamas safeguards quiet and continues indirect talks with Israel on a larger arrangement for the Strip. Hamas is also negotiating for a swap deal in which Israel would release many security prisoners and receive in exchange the bodies of two IDF personnel killed in action, and two civilians being held captive. At the same time, Hamas and PIJ are working to escalate the situation in the West Bank and Jerusalem,” said Hacham.

These attempts include both directly orchestrating large-scale terror cells and glorifying the recent series of knife and gun attacks on Israeli civilians. “Hamas hugs the terrorists and hands out candy when they attack. They often rush to take credit for attacks,” he said.

The ability of security forces to kill or capture terrorists soon after the attack helps douse the flames of motivation to carry out further attacks, said Hacham, but only up to a certain point.

“Hamas is operating this double game because it is less deterred by Israel than before. It allows itself to play this game because it feels it has more room for maneuver,” said Hacham. “The resulting situation is highly unusual. Israel keeps opening up more resources for Gaza and assists the Gaza economy, receiving quiet from Gaza. At the same time, Hamas and PIJ keep exploiting the situation to ignite the West Bank and Jerusalem.”

Hacham called on Israel to reject this situation and to send a message to the Hamas leadership in Gaza, “telling them that they are playing with fire, and that over time, Israel will lose its patience or that its future steps will be different.”

A recent visit by Foreign Minister Yair Lapid to Egypt may have been used by Israel to send just such a message. Egypt, for its part, is continuing is mediating role between Israel and Hamas in order to enable a prisoner swap deal and the wider Gazan arrangement. To that end, a delegation of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate arrived in Gaza on Sunday in order to promote these efforts.

Egypt’s efforts are occurring against the background of an IDF exercise in southern Israel, simulating escalation scenarios with Hamas in Gaza. Hamas, for its part, is planning a parallel exercise in its own territory. Both sides are applying operational lessons learned during the May conflict between Hamas and Israel in their war exercises.

Egypt has pledged $500 million for Gaza, but this money has yet to be transferred, creating tensions with Hamas.

Rebuilding the military wing

Since the end of the May conflict between Israel and Hamas, the terror organization has spent months rebuilding its armed wing in Gaza, consolidating the movement’s position while building terror infrastructure in the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem.

This has seen large-scale rocket building, said Hacham, since the May conflict showed Hamas that it can use rocket launches to consolidate its position as “guardian” of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, and to beef up its position in Lebanon and other areas.

Hacham named Salah Al-Arouri, the deputy Hamas political bureau chief and the head of a headquarters dedicated to launching terrorism from the West Bank, as a central figure, saying “he works from Lebanon and from Turkey to oversee West Bank terror.”

“Hamas works according to a planned out assessment, but sometimes it stretches the rope too far, and this can lead to uncontrolled escalations,” he cautioned.

On Dec. 14, Hamas marked the 34th year since its founding. This year the commemoration was held against the background of an escalating security situation in eastern Jerusalem and the West Bank, said Hacham.

Still, the ongoing security coordination in place between the IDF and Shin Bet intelligence agency on the one hand, and the Palestinian Authority security forces on the other continues to help prevent attacks from going ahead, he said.

“The P.A. also has an interest in restricting the steps of Hamas in the West Bank and stopping it from lifting its head. When two Israeli youths entered Ramallah [on Dec. 1], it was P.A. forces that saved them and stopped a lynching from happening. Had this not have occurred, the incident could have turned out to be extremely significant,” said Hacham.

Aid from Egypt and Qatar

Meanwhile, the Hamas armed infrastructure taken apart by the Shin Bet in October represents a major attempt by the terror faction to regain its foothold in the West Bank, he cautioned.

Ultimately, Hacham said, Hamas has not and will not budge by a millimeter from its religious ideology to launch an “uncompromising fight against Israel until its destruction.”

To that end, Hamas is also maneuvering in such a way that it can exploit the post-May conflict time frame to rebuild Gaza. Israel, which has an interest in keeping Gaza quiet, has opened up the Kerem Shalom goods crossing and allowing thousands of trucks per day to inject basic supplies into Gaza.

Egypt is sending industrial construction equipment and building vehicles through the Rafah border crossing, and Qatar is sending Hamas $350 million per year.

To help pay Hamas’s estimated 30,000-strong civilian regime employees, Qatar has begun paying $10 million to Egypt to purchase fuel, and Hamas receives it free of charge, selling it to the Gaza power station.

Qatar sends $10 million per month through banks to 100,000 needy Gazan families under U.N. supervision and sends another $10 million to Gaza’s power plant directly.

This arrangement enables Gaza to “keep its head above water,” said Hacham. It allows Qatar to market itself as a supporter of Hamas, Palestinians and the Muslim Brotherhood. “Qatar wants a place under the sun, to have influence,” he explained.

Despite all of the above, Hamas is still threatening a new escalation if its demands for the gradual lifting of the “blockade” are not met. This means more Gazan workers allowed into Israel, the entry of more goods into Gaza, promoting the reconstruction of Gaza after “Operation Guardian of the Walls” in May and progress on the prisoner-swap deal.

Since August, “like magic,” all arson balloons, shooting attacks and other security incidents from Gaza have stopped, said Hacham, “once again illustrating Hamas’s exclusive control of the situation in the Strip and over other armed factions. Hamas decides whether there will be quiet or not, and if not, the scope of violence.”

By definition, Hacham warned, this situation is temporary, and Israel should avoid any delusions that this can go on for years.

“It can reverse itself immediately because of tactical, unplanned incidents or because of a decision to initiate conflict by Hamas,” said Hacham. “Israel cannot rest on its laurels. The IDF has to monitor the situation closely all of the time and prepare for every scenario.”

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Israelis are not Americans

By Justin Pozmanter

When I moved to Israel four years ago, I assumed I would have fewer conversations about the President of the United States. I couldn’t have been more wrong. I almost never initiate the conversations, and they are almost always with Americans who have an unfavorable view of President Trump. The discussions generally start with a question along the lines of, “How can Israelis like Trump? Don’t they see he’s such a ____?” The questions are certainly normal, but their premise ignores a critical fact – Israelis are not Americans. Trying to understand Israeli views of the President, any President, by applying an American standard just doesn’t work.

Recently, inflammatory statements made by former President Trump in an interview with Israeli journalist Barak Ravid have made headlines. The statements have triggered the same questions, but really, they reinforce the basic fact that it is folly to try and connect Israeli views on a President to party, personality, or even their general competence as President. It is all about what they do in relation to Israel.

When it comes to a foreign leader, Israelis care first and foremost, if not exclusively, about how that leader’s policies impact Israel, and whether their actions and words demonstrate that they have Israel’s best interests at heart. Even more so, when the leader in question has more impact on Israel than any political leader other than the Israeli Prime Minister.

Most of what inspires or embarrasses Americans about a President’s conduct doesn’t have the same impact on Israelis, or the citizens of any other country, to the extent they are even aware of the issues. It can be dizzying for an American to try and follow the minute-by-minute outrages on broadcast, cable, and social media. To expect an Israeli to follow it all is completely unrealistic. While this should not come as a great shock, sometimes it still does.

Were an American to ask the average Israeli whether they like Obamacare, or if they think the debt ceiling should be raised, they would be as likely to get a comprehensive answer as if the Israeli asked them which Health Maintenance Organization they prefer, or whether they think buses should run on Saturdays. It isn’t that Israelis don’t care about the real human impact of immigration, health care or social policy in the United States; it is that they, like all people, are generally immersed in their own lives and the issues facing their family, community, and country. It is unfair to expect more.

This is not a blanket statement that covers all Israelis. For instance, it doesn’t apply to most American immigrants, people who have spent years working or studying in the United States, or those seriously engaged in foreign affairs. For each of these relatively small groups there is a reasonable expectation that they will have a greater interest and knowledge of internal American issues and politics. The fact that these are also the groups within Israeli society most likely to be in regular contact with American family, friends and colleagues only reinforces the false premise that most Israelis are immersed in American political discourse.

However, most Israelis, like the citizens of every country, really don’t follow the domestic minutiae of any other country. While many Israelis have an impressive command of English, most do not follow American news in detail. Current events in the United States do elicit more interest in Israel than events from just about any other country, but the debates that consume Americans still don’t register at nearly the same level.

Therefore, when asked if they approve or disapprove of the President in an opinion poll, Israelis don’t see the question the same way an American would see Presidential approval. They see it through an Israeli-specific lens. Most Israelis believe Jerusalem is the capital of the country, that the Golan Heights must remain part of Israel forever, that the JCPOA was a terrible deal and that normalization with Arab states is a very positive step. On each of those issues, most Israelis saw President Trump’s policies as more supportive than President Obama’s policies. That doesn’t necessarily mean they think President Trump was a better President, or that they would be more likely to agree with him on any other policy, if they were American citizens. It simply means they believe he was more supportive on the issues he dealt with that they directly care about.

This is not a phenomenon that will change. And it is not tied to American partisan politics. Israelis care if someone is a Likudnik or Laborite, they don’t care if someone is a Democrat or Republican. Bill Clinton was popular in Israel because Israelis felt he genuinely cared about their welfare, not because he was a Democrat. His utterance of a single Hebrew phrase at Yitzhak Rabin’s funeral, and the emotion he showed, meant more to most Israelis than his personal scandals or stewardship of a strong economy. Donald Trump was popular in Israel because Israelis believed his policies advanced Israel’s national interests, and therefore their welfare and that of their families. His partisan identification, and his controversial statements and actions were far less relevant.

To be clear, this is about Israeli citizens, not the Israeli government. The United States is unquestionably Israel’s most important ally, and any Israeli official engaged in foreign policy should be familiar with American partisan politics and domestic priorities.

But when it comes to the average Israeli doctor, business owner, cab driver, engineer or teacher, their opinion will be based on Israel and Israel alone. Just like anyone else, their opinions will vary based on their political leanings and personal experiences. But they won’t like or dislike a US President because of what they do domestically. They will form their opinion based on whether the President’s policies meet their view of what is best for Israel. 

Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

The Messenger Matters

By Mark Goldfeder

Last Wednesday, the House passed the Combating International Islamophobia Act, which would create an office within the State Department to monitor and report on violence, harassment, and abuse against Muslim people, schools, and religious centers.

A number of Republican lawmakers opposed the bill, worried that it might distract from, or even hinder, the fight against antisemitism. In theory, this should not be an issue. Islamophobia is dangerous and intolerable, religious freedom is a fundamental value, and we can and should monitor the spread of both diseases. As Rep. Scott Perry noted during the floor debate, we all agree that no one should be persecuted for his or her faith. But Republicans are not wrong to worry about specific ways that this new position might be abused given the sponsor of the bill, and if Democrats are surprised by this reaction, they have only themselves to blame.

The act was drafted by Rep. Ilhan Omar, a hatemonger who works to mainstream antisemitism. To date, she has avoided any real censure from the leaders of her party, who seem content to let her get away with it. As it relates to this bill, Omar has a personal history of making vile antisemitic comments and then victim-blaming her Jewish critics with false accusations of Islamophobia. This is true even when those critics are her own Democratic colleagues.

Perry was lambasted for claiming that Omar associates herself with terrorist organizations. He was not entirely wrong though, and context definitely matters. Omar is closely associated with the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the organization Perry referenced. She has keynoted its fundraisers and just this year was honored as its “American Muslim Public Servant of 2021.” CAIR has a long and problematic history of affiliation with Hamas, which the United States has designated a terrorist organization, as well as Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood. CAIR was designated a terror organization in its own right by the United Arab Emirates, and as Perry pointed out in his comments, it was also an unindicted co-conspirator in the largest terrorist financing case in U.S. history.

Zahra Billoo, a senior executive at CAIR, recently gave a public address in which she smeared Jewish Zionist organizations and synagogues as “enemies” that are part of a “conspiracy” behind Islamophobia. She specifically called out organizations that want to have a good relationship with the Muslim community, rallying hard against the idea of cooperation and interfaith understanding. She also, quite insanely, blamed everything from issues at the border to police brutality on Jews and the Jewish state. CAIR pulled a page out of its honoree Omar’s playbook by predictably refusing to apologize, calling the outraged response to Billoo’s antisemitic comments a “smear campaign.” A few years earlier, when Billoo was voted off the board of the Women’s March for antisemitic tweets, she likewise responded by labeling anyone who opposed her “Islamophobic.”

In 2019, after Omar sparked outrage by first claiming that her colleagues who support Israel only do so for money, then accusing them of dual loyalty, two classic antisemitic tropes, Billoo breathlessly praised her friend for "broadening the conversation" about ways that people can criticize the Jewish state. Billoo and Omar’s CAIR relationship goes back several years, and just last month, they once again shared a stage at a CAIR event .

To be clear, Islamophobia is always wrong, no matter who it is directed against. But it is not, as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has described it, an attack on Omar’s faith for a member of Congress to point out that she is associated with CAIR — the same way Omar insisted it was not antisemitic when she called a Jewish member of the Trump Organization a “white nationalist.” More importantly, it is not irrelevant to a debate about monitoring Islamophobia, when both Omar and CAIR, an enthusiastic endorser of the bill, have been known to weaponize false charges of Islamophobia as a sword and a shield against their “enemies” — and specifically to further antisemitic hate. Perry’s comments were made after Democrats called him “Islamophobic” for offering amendments that would prevent U.S. tax dollars from going to organizations with ties to terrorism. In that context, and given the author of the bill, his concerns are not unfounded.

Monitoring Islamophobia is important, but Republicans are right to be wary of Omar’s involvement and worried about any influence she might have on how the “monitoring” gets done. No one wants to hear a lecture about the evils of racism from an unrepentant racist. In her speech in support of the bill, Omar derided “cynics who would rather see us divided” instead of “standing united against all forms of bigotry.” If only she and her friends at CAIR really meant those things, perhaps this bill might have bipartisan support as it moves to the Senate.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

How Israeli Police Counters Lone Wolf Attacks Despite Intel Shortfalls

By Alon Levavi

The recent escalation in terrorist incidents in Israel has shed light on the critical role of the overstretched Israel Police and Border Police.

The number of terrorist attacks in Israel has been on the up since the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza in May. Many of the attacks have occurred in Jerusalem, and this is no coincidence, due to the centrality of the city in fanatical Islamist rhetoric – rhetoric that is at odds with traditional Islam.

Armed with knives or firearms, many of the terrorists perpetrating the latest attacks have pounced on their victims in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah Region, as well as the Damascus Gate area of the Old City.

The dynamics of this latest trend are not complicated. Intense online incitement falls on attentive ears, and some of the audience, often in mental and sometimes economic distress, decide to act.

They have been promised 72 virgins in paradise if they become martyrs, and they decide on their own to stab or shoot civilians.

Instead of an organized system of terror cells being activated, individuals get up in the morning and say to themselves that the time has come to kill Jews. They use the simplest of weapons – and due to these factors, preventing their actions becomes very complicated for security forces.

Still, most of these incidents end with the attackers neutralized in little time, with civilians injured in some cases, and killed in others. The speed of the reaction of security forces means civilian deaths and injuries are minimized.

When intelligence is lacking, readiness, alertness, and rapid response abilities are what is left to deal with terrorists.

Police saturate known hot-spots, such as the Old City and Sheikh Jarrah with forces, and as a result, those forces are not available for crime-fighting and other missions elsewhere.

The officers’ determination to bravely engage terrorists saves lives. They must operate under difficult, crowded conditions, where civilians could easily be hit.

On Dec. 4, Border Police officers engaged a terrorist armed with a knife, who had stabbed an Israeli civilian, shooting him before he was able to carry out his murderous intentions. A public storm has since raged over that incident, as the two officers involved were immediately called in for questioning by the Justice Ministry’s Police Investigations Division, and their weapons confiscated. Ultimately, the right decision prevailed, and the investigation ended quickly without any rebuke of the officers. The Police Investigations Division will need to rethink its protocol for cases in which police acted heroically to save lives, and its decision to confiscate weapons automatically was fully unnecessary.

The officers should have been given a little time to process the incident, to meet with commanders, and if necessary, to receive psychological care, after just having prevented a terror attack.

The backing that they received from police command and the government was fully appropriate in this case.

The Israel Police’s unique and difficult mission

The Israel Police, and the Border Police, which is a part of it, face challenges unlike those faced by their counterparts in many other countries.

In the State of Israel, the police have officially been responsible for domestic security and counterterrorism since 1974, in addition to classic policing missions, from crime-fighting to traffic enforcement.

There are no other police forces in the world that within a period of just one month neutralized six terror attacks on the streets. This demands resources and attention that takes away from other sectors, such as personnel availability and training.

The Border Police is at the forefront of this mission. While the regular blue police also play a role, each police district has Border Police companies operating with it, and these units have a semi-military orientation.  

The green Border Police include both conscripts and career officers, and it is subject to the commands of police district chiefs under whom they operate.

Thus, the Border Police can receive specialized missions, such as controlling riots, tracking down Palestinians who have entered the country illegally, or protecting farmland from theft.

These units can go from one district to another, and this is in fact what they are forced to do because the police force suffers from chronic personnel shortages. When police send thousands of reinforcements to the Jerusalem District, the Tel Aviv District is left exposed.

One question that has arisen over the years is whether this modus operandi is the right one. Instead of splitting up thousands of Border Police personnel, perhaps focusing them en masse on a single mission would lead to its rapid completion. For example, sending thousands of Border Police to take on illegal marijuana farms run by Bedouin in the Negev region could stamp out the issue in a single swoop.

Aside from such specialized missions, the Border Police could also be assigned to the role of being uniquely responsible for emergencies, freeing up the Israel Police for its classic missions. This would follow the model of the National Guard in the United States, or the Gendarmerie in Italy – a military force with law enforcement powers.

In the West Bank, the Border Police play a critical role in riot control as it is better trained than the IDF to deal with such incidents. The military’s focus is on defeating enemies with firepower, and not on breaking up rioting in the streets. 

Israel is in a tough neighborhood, surrounded by Hezbollah, Syria, Hamas in Gaza, ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula, and threatened by Iran to the east. The Iranian axis’s threat to the Israeli home front is considerable, and it is on the home front and not along the country’s borders that the next war will be fought.

This means that the Israel Police and the IDF Home Front Command are at the forefront of dealing with this threat.

With this being the situation, Israel’s national resilience – and not only its national security – becomes paramount. Israel’s ability to win the next war will not just depend on buying more F-35s and missiles, but also on investing more in the police, in firefighters, hospitals, the ability of authorities to communicate effectively with the public, and the entire collective resilience system.

The role of the police, the Home Front Command, the National Security Council, the National Emergency Authority, and others must be clearly defined now so that when the emergency arrives, the nation’s resilience will be optimal.

As part of that new clarity, the place of the Israel Police in the national agenda must be strengthened and enlarged significantly, including through greater allocation of resources, as part of a new balance between defending the nation’s borders and building up internal resilience.

N.B. Just before publication, we received news about a murderous shooting attack in the northern West Bank, in which Palestinian terrorists shot dead Israeli citizen Yehuda Dimentman and wounded two others. The incident makes clear that what begins with a wave of lone attacks does not end with sporadic incidents, and that Hamas's incitement to hate, together with the 'inspiration effect,' continues to nourish terrorists. 

The resilience of a country is based on the resilience of the individual, the society, the community, and the local authority. The ability of a country to continue onwards is based on its resilience and not only on its tactical capability.  

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Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.