U.S. Deterrence Failed in Ukraine

By FRANK Sobchak & LIAM COLLINS

A great deal of praise has been heaped on Europe and the United States for their sustained and determined response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with much of the congratulatory talk centered on the damage being done to Russia. Kyiv’s Western allies have provided the fledgling Ukrainian military with Javelin and Stinger missiles, rocket artillery, and, most recently, modern tanks. Yet, until Feb. 24, 2022, the United States made little effort to deter Russia, despite ample evidence that it intended to invade.

From President George W. Bush’s tepid response to the 2008 invasion of Georgia to the Biden administration’s antebellum halfhearted gestures of support for Ukraine, U.S. policies left the perception that the United States was not willing to make a renewed assault painful for Russia. The result was yet another war and a tremendously costly one at that.

It is often difficult to determine when deterrence works because, almost by definition, it is the proverbial dog that does not bark. Absent being in the room when leaders remark that they are not carrying out an action due to a threat, it is difficult to assign the cause to deterrence.

When it comes to war, realist scholars such as John Mearsheimer have noted that for deterrence to succeed, the state seeking war should perceive that the chances of success would be low and the costs high. Part of altering a state’s calculus is simple numbers: how many tanks, missiles, aircraft, and other weapons the defending state possesses. In his seminal work Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling artfully puts it, “The power to hurt is bargaining power.”

This created the central failure of U.S. policy. Refusing to send sophisticated weapons to Ukraine failed to signal to Russian leaders that an invasion of Ukraine would hurt—and potentially even fail.

In the run-up to the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin thought that his forces would march into Kyiv in a matter of days with few losses. After all, the international community did little when he annexed Crimea in 2014. Washington’s muted reaction to previous Russian provocations signaled an unwillingness to incur any costs to prevent Russia from doing what it wanted. U.S. intransigence toward providing lethal aid seemed to confirm that Ukraine lacked the capacity to resist, further reinforcing the Russian belief that the invasion would likely be easy and quick. The recent war in Ukraine is, therefore, a direct result of the West’s lack of resolve and failure to credibly deter Russia. Moscow thought it could get away with murder—as it had in the past.

Recall the aftermath of the 2008 invasion of Georgia. The Bush administration airlifted Georgian soldiers serving in Iraq back to Georgia to fight, provided a humanitarian aid package, and offered tersely worded denouncements and demarches. But it categorically rejected providing Georgia with serious military assistance in the form of anti-tank missiles and air defense missiles and even refrained from implementing punishing economic sanctions against Russia. The United States’ lack of resolve to punish Russia for its gross violation of international law was underscored when U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley’s remark “Are we prepared to go to war with Russia over Georgia?”—made during a National Security Council meeting after the war started—was later released to the media.

When the Obama administration took office, his team sought to reset relations with Russia. In short order, the United States abandoned Bush administration plans to build a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, canceled sanctions against Russian arms sector, and reduced the U.S. presence in Europe. By 2013, there were no U.S. tanks on German soil, a historic end to a deterrent force that had been in place for nearly seven decades. U.S. Army troops across Europe shrunk to a historic low of 30,000, just one-tenth of the commitment during the Cold War.

The United States did little to prevent or respond to the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Rejecting calls from within the administration and a bipartisan coalition in Congress, the Obama White House outright refused to provide any form of lethal aid to embattled Ukrainian defenders.

President Barack Obama, encouraged by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, was worried that providing even defensive weapons could result in an uncontrollable escalation. Ukraine also suffered from significant corruption, and there was fear that the weapons might fall into the wrong hands—a consideration that hadn’t come into play in far more corrupt states like Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, Ukrainian pleas for Javelin anti-tank missiles, Apache attack helicopters, and other weapons were ignored. Instead, the administration rapidly provided $120 million in security assistance and another $75 million in military equipment such as night vision goggles, medical supplies, Humvees, and unarmed unmanned aerial systems. During Obama’s tenure, total military assistance amounted to $600 million—but never included weapons.

For its primary response to the 2014 invasion, the administration banked on punishing sanctions to alter Russian behavior. These amounted to travel bans levied on senior Russian political, military, and economic leaders; frozen assets; and economic restrictions. Key business leaders and cronies of Putin were targeted, and entire industries were banned from doing business with the United States. Many allies followed suit.

Such actions were seen as “smart sanctions” that focused, like precision-guided munitions, on hitting critical industries or individuals involved in the conduct of the war. The hope was to minimize the damage to common Russians. But without making the public pay a price for war, the economic pain was inherently limited. Russia simply devalued the ruble and cashed out the reserves it had built up in its central bank from a decade of high energy prices to weather the sanctions-induced recession—a cost it felt worth paying in return for the seizure of Crimea.

The shootdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in July 2014 by Russian-controlled separatists was also met with a muted response from Washington. The U.S. response was limited to assisting the investigation and calling on Russia to end the war against Ukraine. While some additional sanctions were levied against Russia, particularly by Europe, the attack actually served to harden Obama’s resolve against providing weapons to Ukraine, reflecting his worries about further escalation.

Instead, to improve deterrence against Russia, the administration pushed for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. The new defense posture consisted of four multinational battalion-sized units deployed to areas—the Baltic states and Poland—most likely to be attacked. However, these measures were meant to deter Russian aggression only against NATO states and had no bearing on the danger of future conflict in Ukraine.

Next, the Obama administration established the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine in 2015 with the mission of training, equipping, training center development, and doctrinal assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces. The group included hundreds of trainers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Lithuania. Notably, U.S. trainers were limited to providing only “nonlethal training” to the Ukrainians, producing a muddled and incoherent set of rules. For example, U.S. trainers could train Ukrainians on small unit tactics that involved “shooting, moving, and communicating” but were prohibited from teaching sniper skills because these were considered “lethal.” That lack of commitment signaled, yet again, that the United States was not willing to give Ukraine the training or firepower it would need to repel Russia.

The Trump administration aimed to make a clean break with its predecessor and demonstrate strength. But in reality, President Donald Trump’s approach differed little from the previous two administrations. He reversed the prohibition on providing lethal aid to Ukraine and agreed to ship the much-desired Javelin missiles. Still, only 210 were delivered along with a paltry 37 launchers. More importantly, they were banned from being used in combat and instead were required to be locked up in a storage facility to serve as a “strategic deterrent.”

The amount of security assistance saw similar cosmetic changes, with a modest bump up to $350 million in the administration’s first year. But those unexceptional annual increases came with caveats and considerable drama. In 2019, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked Trump for more Javelins, he demurred and blocked the delivery of nearly $400 million in assistance unless Zelensky agreed to investigate former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden—his opponent in the 2020 election—and his son. Trump held up the assistance for 55 days, only releasing it when his actions became public, eventually leading to Trump’s first impeachment.

Even though Trump begrudgingly allowed the Javelins and more aid, his administration was unwilling to send a general officer to serve as the senior defense official in Ukraine. The Obama administration had appointed retired Gen. John Abizaid to be the senior defense advisor to Ukraine, but he was only a part-time consultant and no longer on active duty. Abizaid supported assigning an active-duty general to Ukraine to coordinate the U.S. effort and made this known to U.S. European Command and the Defense Department. The response was that the U.S. military did not have a general it could dedicate to the mission.

Previously, when the priority was great enough, the U.S. miliary has assigned generals or admirals to serve in the U.S. embassies in Israel, the U.K., Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq—yet could not spare even one of its 620 generals or admirals for Ukraine.

Further weakening the U.S. deterrent posture, Trump began questioning the United States’ commitment to NATO and even declined to affirm NATO’s Article 5, its most important mutual defense clause. Worse, in 2018, Trump employed heavy-handed tactics more suited for a transactional relationship than an alliance, explicitly threatening member states that he would not come to their aid in the event of a Russian attack unless they paid up. Trump described NATO as “obsolete” and, like a 1940s union boss, harshly decried its European members for not paying their dues.

By some accounts, Trump was even considering the nuclear option: leaving NATO altogether. The message to Russia from such fratricidal melees was clear: If the United States would not protect fellow NATO states that it was treaty-bound to defend, then the United States would definitely not defend a non-NATO country in Russia’s backyard.

The poor signaling only continued with the Biden administration. Even as it became clearer that Russia was considering an attack, the United States drastically limited the supply of weapons that it provided to Ukraine. In November 2021, U.S. officials snubbed Ukrainian requests for shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles—a purely defensive weapon.

Then, in December, barely two months before the invasion, the White House hesitated approving a package of “lethal and nonlethal assistance” that included Javelins, counter-artillery radars, sniper rifles, small arms, and other equipment because it worried that the assistance would be “too provocative to Russia.”

Only when it became clear that the invasion was imminent did the United States provide a modicum of uptick in aid, consisting of a limited number of Javelin and Stinger missiles, with the latter coming from U.S. allies as opposed to from the United States itself. Useful as those proved, they did not alter Russia’s cost-benefit analysis. And with little talk of additional aid, this was a clear signal to Russia that the United States’ commitment would hardly be different from what it was in 2014.

Most of all, the United States seemed to be convinced, as Moscow was, that Ukrainian resistance would rapidly crumble in the face of a Russian assault. Given the United States’ paltry efforts to build Ukraine’s military into one that could credibly deter Russia, it should not be surprising that both nations made this miscalculation. On Feb. 14, 2022, just prior to the invasion, the United States sent another important signal that further communicated a lack of commitment to Ukraine and a resignation that the war was already lost: It announced it was closing its embassy in Kyiv. By comparison, the United States refused to close its embassy in Paris even as Nazi Germany threatened France and maintained an embassy in Vichy after the surrender and occupation. The closure of the Kyiv embassy echoed moves by the U.S. military to withdraw the vast majority of military advisors days earlier.

Both actions conveyed clearly that the United States had little stake in Ukraine and was not willing to risk American lives. In many ways, it gave a green light for the Russian assault that Moscow anticipated to be a fait accompli repeat of Crimea. To the Ukrainians, it sent the message that instead of fighting, they should pursue a diplomatic solution as they had done, unsuccessfully, for Crimea in 2014.

In the final weeks before the invasion, there was some debate in Washington as to whether to impose withering sanctions in an attempt to deter Russia or afterward as a punishment and future deterrent. But Russia had already amassed more than 100,000 troops at Ukraine’s border, a momentous strategic move that bore considerable costs. Barring a significant deterrent act by the United States and its allies, the die had already been cast. Sanctions could possibly have inflicted enough of a cost to deter the invasion, but one of Russia’s key lessons from 2014 was that it could weather any new measures that the United States and its allies were likely to implement.

When the invasion came, U.S. actions spoke louder than words. Officials in the Biden administration believed that Ukraine could not win and that Kyiv would fall within days. The United States even offered to evacuate Zelensky, to which he famously replied, “I need ammunition, not a ride.” Publicly communicating an expectation that the invasion would be over quickly only undermined deterrence by signaling the cost would be minimal to Russia. It was only after Ukraine demonstrated capability and resolve that significant military assistance began flowing and punishing sanctions were enacted—actions that, ironically, might have deterred Russia in the first place.

The sad irony is that U.S. leaders, of both parties, chose to avoid deterrence for fear of escalating conflict—only to find themselves continually escalating their support once conflict started. Time after time, the United States chose the option that was perceived as the least provocative but that instead led to the Russians becoming convinced that they were safe to carry out the most provocative action of all: a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The United States ignored the eternal wisdom of the Latin phrase Si vis pacem, para bellum (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) and instead hoped that half-steps and compromise would suffice. While so far those decisions have prevented direct conflict between two nuclear-armed superpowers, they have caused Russia and the West to be locked in a continuing series of escalations with an increasing danger of a miscalculation that could lead to exactly that scenario.

The authors would like to thank Steven Pifer, Lionel Beehner, Alexander Lanoszka, and Michael Hunzeker for their thoughtful feedback.

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Col. Frank Sobchak (Ret.), PhD is an adjunct professor at the Joint Special Operations University and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University and a PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Read full bio here.

Col. Liam Collins is the Executive Director of the Viola Foundation and the Madison Policy Forum and a permanent member with the Council on Foreign Relations. A retired Special Forces Colonel, Liam served in a variety of special operations assignments and conducted operational deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa and South America. Read full bio here.

Hamas Is Planning the Next War; Is Israel’s Government Ready?

BY Grisha Yakubovich

For the past year, Israel and the Palestinians have been in escalation mode, a phase that began under the previous Israeli government.

The sparks that lit the current escalation are unrelated to whether a right-wing or center-left government is in power, but Hamas is prepared to use the new right-wing Israeli government as justification for further conflict and violence if it finds it necessary to do so.

The escalation originates in a calculated strategy by Hamas, which envisioned, with considerable foresight, a Palestinian civil war — a scenario that appears to be around the corner — and a new opportunity to both weaken its rival, Fatah, in the West Bank, and ignite a regional explosion against Israel.

While some observers have attributed the deterioration in the security situation to the power vacuum in the northern West Bank, where the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority (PA) is indeed losing control, the more significant catalyst driving it is the clash between the narratives promoted by Hamas and the PA, led by Mahmoud Abbas.

Both Hamas and Fatah ultimately seek to rule the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, yet both are realistic in understanding that Israel will not vanish any time soon — and neither for that matter will the Palestinians. While Hamas believes that in the long run, it will succeed in destroying Israel, it still needs to answer the question of how it envisions the Palestinians living alongside Israel in the same land in this current phase of history.

Hamas’ answer to this question is, first, to reject any possibility of a peace treaty. Due to this position, Abbas’ PA has felt unable to enter into any real substantial diplomatic process with Israel over the years, and Abbas has rejected Israeli two-state offers made in the past, such as the one put forward by former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2008.

Abbas realizes that he will never be able to defeat Hamas. While Israel is powerful enough to deal with any threat posed by Hamas, Fatah’s existence as a ruling party is under direct threat from it, as the Hamas coup against Fatah in Gaza 2007 so clearly demonstrated.

As a result, Abbas has settled for the vision of seeking a more comfortable existence for Palestinians in the West Bank. At the same time, he is resigned to the division of Palestinians between Gaza and the West Bank, and to the idea that he is not strong enough to reach an agreement with Israel.

Hamas, for its part, promotes the Mukawama, the Arabic word for resistance, a word often misunderstood in the international community to mean resistance against occupation, when in fact it is resistance to acceptance of Israel — and the promotion of terrorism.

Since Ismail Haniyeh left Gaza to become the head of Hamas’s political bureau (he is now based in Qatar), the organization has decided that it wishes to be the legitimate representative of all Palestinians at the global level.

As Hamas navigates the region, reaching tense understandings with Egypt, while also moving closer once again to Syria’s Bashar Assad — after years in which it backed the anti-Assad rebels in Syria — it continually maintains its resistance narrative, claiming that it is leading Palestinians on the path to the destruction of Israel.

To market this narrative further, Hamas sparked an intense conflict in May 2021 in order to present itself as the defender of Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Yet a little over a year later, in July 2022, it cleverly sat out a clash between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), as the IDF pulverized PIJ operatives and positions. Hamas was able to get the message across to Palestinians: Only Hamas can challenge Israel, fire rockets at Jerusalem, incite riots among Israeli Arabs, and create Palestinian unity. Only it can lead the fight against “the Zionist enemy.”

Abbas sees the ground underneath his feet shaking, and he is gradually enabling the PA to join the fight against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). These days, it’s not just Hamas — but also Fatah and the PA — that post “martyr” posters glorifying terrorists. The dead terrorists receive PA state burials, and this is accompanied by declarations by the PA of ending security coordination with Israel.

Ironically, this dynamic has created an opportunity for Hamas to present itself as the new “responsible adult,” and thereby gain regional and international credit. Despite the escalation in Jerusalem and the West Bank, Hamas has not directly joined in hostilities, and it is only the PIJ that has fired rockets, before being “stopped” by Hamas in a manner that is convenient to its current positioning.

After building itself up as the ruler of Gaza and protector of Jerusalem, Hamas is, in a highly calculated manner, proceeding towards its next goal — taking over the West Bank, and consolidating itself as the legitimate Palestinian representative.

Hamas will also seek to find ways to escape the terrorism designation that the Western world has correctly placed it under, without compromising on its “resistance” credentials.

Ultimately, as Hamas moves towards its next objectives, it is walking a tightrope. While it wishes to take over the West Bank without exposing its Gazan base to a new round of fighting with Israel, a high casualty dynamic or major incident could compel Hamas to act and lead it into a new round of fighting with Israel.

Hamas has made it clear that if this scenario comes to pass, it will use Israel’s new right-wing government to justify such actions, and for leveraging future achievements.

As a result, any action taken by Israel, perceived by Palestinians to be radical, will serve as justification by Hamas for opening fire.

The more that Israel’s government markets its steps vis-à-vis the Palestinians as vengeful, or stemming from a far-right ideology, the more that could potentially serve Hamas as legitimization for it to use violence against Israel.

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Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief, Judicial Reform Divides Israeli Public

By Yaakov Lappin

The Israeli people and the country’s political system faced a level of division and polarization many observers were calling unprecedented on February 21, after the government led by the Likud and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu voted to approve the first reading of a judicial overhaul package introduced by Justice Minister Yariv Levin.

Tens of thousands of demonstrators arrived in Jerusalem on February 20 to protest the bills, and over 130,000 protesters amassed in Tel Aviv on February 19 to express their opposition.

President Isaac Herzog said swaths of the country were in "mourning” the day after the Knesset vote, adding that the onus is on the right-wing governing coalition to reach out and negotiate with the opposition. Netanyahu, for his part, described the vote as “a great day and a great night.”

The big question going forward is whether the government and opposition will find a way, in the coming weeks, to water down the draft passed in the first reading in order to reach a compromise based on a formula offered by Herzog earlier in February.  

The legislation aims to amend Basic Law: The Judiciary to cement government control over judicial appointments and revoke the High Court's ability to review Basic Laws. The next planned stage of the overhaul is a judicial override law that would enable a simple Knesset majority to override the Supreme Court if it rules a law as being illegal. 

Iran found to be enriching uranium to highest level to date

Israel’s ongoing domestic political crisis overshadowed dramatic news out of Iran in recent days.  Bloomberg reported on February 20 that the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency is attempting to determine how Iran obtained uranium enriched to 84% purity — the highest level discovered by UN inspectors in the country to date, only 6% below the level of military-grade uranium that is required to produce a nuclear weapon.

It is important to note that according to Israeli military assessments, Iran remains around two years from the construction of a fully functional nuclear warhead, but that enriching to 90% represents a significant and alarming milestone on the path to becoming a nuclear-armed state.

Bloomberg cited two senior diplomats in its report. Iran previously informed the IAEA that its centrifuges were designed to enrich uranium to 60% purity. It has been enriching uranium to the 20% and 60% levels and is believed to have enough uranium, which, if enriched further to 90%, would be sufficient for four to five nuclear bombs.

The development comes a month after the United States Military and the Israel Defense Forces held a large-scale joint war drill that practiced scenarios of combat against an enemy that closely resembled Iran.

New level of Israeli – Emirati defense cooperation unveiled

As the shadow of Iran’s threatening activities continues to fall on Israel and Gulf Arab Sunni states, Israeli and Emirati companies unveiled on February 20 a jointly developed unmanned sea vessel in Abu Dhabi, in what is being described as a historic first. The system was unveiled at the biennial IDEX exhibition, which is attracting over 1,300 companies from 65 countries for the Middle East's largest defense conference.

State-owned Israeli Aerospace Industries, the Edge Group – a consortium of 25 Emirati defense companies –  and the Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB) shipyard unveiled the vessel at the IDEX naval exhibition.

According to an IAI statement, the jointly produced autonomous vessel is outfitted with sensors, sonar, and imaging systems that are integrated into a remotely operated unified command and control system that does not require human intervention.

While ADSB designed the platform and is integrating the on-board sensors and control systems, IAI is designing the autonomous control system and the variety of dedicated sensors.

The unmanned sea vessel can be used for Intelligence gathering, tracking, observation, border and coastal surveillance, mine detection, submarine detection, anti-submarine warfare, and the deployment of drones.

The move represents another step toward the formation of an Israeli-Gulf-Sunni-Arab bloc committed to mutual cooperation, capability sharing, and defense against Iran.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Israel, Gulf states have yet to fulfill potential of defense sales

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

Israel and most of the Sunni Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (made up of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar) have yet to utilize the full potential that exists for future defense and technology cooperation.

Israel maintains official ties with some GCC states but not others, and each relationship has a  unique nature. Oman is known as the Switzerland of the Middle East, and while it flirted with the idea of becoming an Abraham Accords state, it recently bowed to Iranian pressure and criminalized ties with Israel. The most significant milestone will occur when Israel and Saudi Arabia are able to initiate a more intensive and open relationship, which goes far beyond mutual normalization, and expands into technological and defense cooperation.

Diplomatically, this might strain the positions of Jordan (which appears to be in competition with Saudi Arabia over influence on the Temple Mount) and the Palestinian Authority, which could be upset by an Israeli–Saudi thaw before a breakthrough in attempts to reach a new Israeli–PA arrangement.

From a defense cooperation perspective, however, Israeli cooperation with the Gulf states in general, and Israeli – Saudi cooperation specifically, has a large potential that has yet to be fulfilled. Examples include the sharing of data from various defense sensors possessed by multiple countries to provide early alerts of Iranian threats, cooperation on intercepting common threats like Iranian missile and UAV attacks, and the sale of Israeli military capabilities to Gulf partners, like radars and surface to air missile interceptors, as well as modern laser systems. Such sales could even decrease the Gulf states dependence on American technology, creating a further motivation for them.

Israel’s September 2021 entry into the US’s CENTCOM framework, which covers the Middle East, can act as a useful platform for American-orchestrated Israeli–Gulf defense cooperation. While this will not amount to a Middle Eastern NATO with its own mutual assistance clause, it can still fundamentally transform the dynamics of the Middle East in the long run.

If Israel is able to break the official ice with Saudi Arabia, this would constitute a paradigm shift in the region compared with the current geo-political situation. Already, the 2020 Abraham Accords, signed between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain, helped create knock-on shifts, such as Turkey’s change of attitude and a subsequent reduction in Ankara’s hostility toward Israel and Gulf states. A Saudi–Israeli accord would change the entire regional map.

An expansion of Israeli–Gulf ties would be powered to a major degree by the threat posed by Iran to the entire region, as well as the spread of Iranian-made weapons to the Tehran-led radical axis, and the expected arrival of Russian technology, such as Sukhoi SU-35 fighter jets, into Iran’s possessions.

Each of the six GCC countries is unique, and Israel has diverse types of relations with them. Kuwait, for example, has no formal ties with Israel, but low-profile business relationships do exist. Bahrain is economically weaker than other, wealthier GCC members, but Manama enjoys long standing good ties with Jerusalem, including defense ties. Qatar, for its part, is a problematic GCC member that plays double games with Israel and its adversaries – but eventually, Israel will need to learn how to maneuver among conflicting interests, and how to ‘dance’ with this state too.

Saudi Arabia remains the undisputed holy grail as far as Israel is concerned. One reason that this is the case is because the kingdom, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), is preparing to swap its large and powerful oil-based economy for a technology-based economy. This creates enormous potential for Israeli–Saudi cooperation. In addition, the Saudis are hungry for military capabilities to defend themselves against Iranian aggression. Riyadh has been purchasing ballistic weapons, guns, and drones from China, and recently attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Turkey.

These realities create a need for Israel and the US to reassess their total commitment to enforcing every clause of the traditional Qualitative Military Edge policy, which is backed by Congressional law that obligates the US not to sell any military capabilities to Middle Eastern clients if the sales can theoretically challenge Israeli military superiority.

Adherence to the QME has become almost religious in sections of some Israeli defense establishment, to the point where the most marginal of risks are exaggerated.

Assisting a Gulf ally like the UAE in acquiring F-35s is more important, for example, than enforcing every letter of the QME. The benefit of seeing a new regional partner emerge with capabilities that can challenge Iran outweighs the miniscule risk of such aircraft falling into hostile hands

In the coming years, Israel and its new Gulf partners, as well as future ones, have a historical opportunity to build new alliances, based not only on normalization, but also on putting advanced capabilities in the hands of Gulf partners who have good reason to prepare together for the threat posed by Iran. 

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.

Ramadan to 75th Independence Day: A challenging period ahead

By Eitan Dangot

The murderous terrorist attack that tore through Jerusalem last Friday evening served as a stark reminder of the terrorism challenges faced by Israel. The shooting, in which seven civilians were murdered, was the latest and worst of several gun attacks over the past year and marks a peak in the latest round of the struggle between Israel and terrorist factions.

The arenas generating terrorism against Israel today are Judea and Samaria, eastern Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and from within Israel itself. A secondary front in this context of Palestinian terrorism is the Lebanese front, which stretches from Rosh Hanikra to the tri-border region where Israel, Lebanon and Syria meet, and where Hamas has operated in the past two years.

Globally, Israeli and Jewish overseas targets remain under threat, mainly from Iranian elements, Hezbollah and ISIS.

Judea and Samaria form the core of the terrorist escalation that Israel faces. The region is saturated with firearm attacks of the type seen in the deadly attack in Jerusalem’s Neveh Ya’acov neighborhood and bands together localized terrorist elements and lone attackers. It is filled with terrorists who are not affiliated to any one faction, thereby constituting a new trend.

Terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria include shootings, stabbings and car rammings perpetrated by lone or localized groups of attackers. This forms an escalation from the wave of lone-wolf attackers in 2015, which was largely based on stabbings and car-ramming incidents.

A primary engine for encouraging and inciting terrorism is provided by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hezbollah, who operate out of Gaza and Lebanon. It is they who orchestrate the modern terrorism model of 2022-2023.

New kinds of armed groups

In Judea and Samaria, a new kind of armed group has emerged that is defined by local geography and includes the participation of elements from PIJ, Hamas and Fatah. This model of terrorism is prominent in Jenin, where the Palestinian Authority lost control, along with control of the Jenin refugee camp, more than four years ago. On the ground, the Jenin terror model has served as an inspiration for others, as seen in Nablus and to a certain degree in Ramallah and its surroundings.

The PA’s loss of control over events in its territory, alongside the Palestinian population’s hatred and lack of faith in the Authority, due to its corruption and disdain for its people as well as deep national frustration, converge to create a precipitous decline in the security situation.

On the other hand, the majority of Palestinians in Judea and Samaria vote with their feet every morning by not taking part in terrorism and instead, going out to work – including over 130,000 of whom work in Israel or in the settlements. The economy is restraining mass terrorism and is distancing us from scenarios of a full-blown third intifada.

Such an intifada is still, however, on the horizon and could take the form of large numbers of shooting attacks and members of Fatah joining the cycle of violence.

Following the significant security operation in Jenin last Thursday, January 26, in which several terrorists were killed, resulting in a major blow to PIJ, which is leading the terrorism on the ground, the spotlight turned to the core threat: eastern Jerusalem.

For years, east Jerusalem has been a target for terrorist inciters. Over 300,000 east Jerusalem Palestinian residents are targeted with messages designed to generate hatred and promote attacks in the lone attacker format, as seen in neighboring Judea and Samaria.

In this context, the eastern Jerusalem population has advantages, as it is an intrinsic part of the fabric of Israeli life with unrestricted entry to greater Jerusalem thanks to Israeli residency cards, though not citizenship, out of their choice.

THE SITUATION of the eastern Jerusalem neighborhoods contributes to resentment against Israel. Many do not view themselves as part of Israel and the religious hatred that burns there is the core of the fire that is driving the current escalation. Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount is a frequent theme in the growing terror activities, which endanger Jewish civilians throughout the city and country.

Future mass casualty incidents are certainly a possibility. Security on this front is under the control of the Israel Police since Jerusalem is a domestic security zone.

Last Saturday’s shooting attack on an Israeli father and his son, perpetrated by a 13-year-old Palestinian boy in eastern Jerusalem armed with a handgun and resulting in serious injuries to both of them, testifies to the severity of the risk posed by the eastern Jerusalem population, the incitement and the deeds some members of this community are prepared to commit. A culture of hate is implanted in these youths from a young age.

Contact between eastern Jerusalem Palestinians and Israelis has not brought them closer together and even though many work in Israel, when they return home, they switch from economy mode to hatred mode.

Two central incitement elements are behind this trend: Hamas and the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, headed by Raed Saleh. Social media, mosques and even official channels are used to spread the hate.

In response, Israel’s government and security cabinet must immediately formulate a strategy and policy for the short-term and medium-term regarding eastern Jerusalem. In the first stage, a thickening and reinforcement of the security presence are required in areas bordering eastern Jerusalem and for the protection of sites that are prone to attacks.

Flooding the streets with security forces in sensitive areas will enable a rapid response to shooting attacks, potentially saving tens of lives in each attack.

To that end, the organizational structure and the technological and intelligence means used by the Israel Police must be upgraded, with more resources allocated and legal backing for the deployment of advanced capabilities used by the defense establishment in other arenas.

This will be a long process but it must begin now, in time for the sensitive period of Ramadan (beginning in March), Passover and Independence Day, a period in which Israel is committed to flattening the curb of terrorism.

The rapid demolition and sealing of homes used by terrorists, economic punishment against terrorist elements in eastern Jerusalem and examining the option of expelling family members of terrorists – a problematic legal procedure – should be on the table.

In Gaza, the situation is more clear-cut. Some 17,000 Gazans head out to work in Israel every day, the two million-strong Gazan population is behind a border and security barrier, the Iron Dome air defense batteries protect Israel from rocket fire and the threat that Hamas will pay a heavy price if it decides to escalate the situation all act as a deterrent.

Israel must decide on an offensive policy against those leading terrorist incitement from Hamas, PIJ and others, whether they live in Gaza or Lebanon. This will certainly lead to escalation but they are necessary in order to foil and deter terrorism.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

Will Gantz Join BIBI And Be Israel's Responsible Adult

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

When National Unity Party chairman Benny Gantz remarked that “in democracy, one must know how to respect others,” he was alluding to his fellow opposition members. They were busy heckling incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he delivered his swearing-in speech at the Knesset.

Since then, several weeks have passed, during which time, the new government has already managed to spark firestorms of controversy, but his comment still offers clues as to his future intentions.

In April 2020, during the corona pandemic, Gantz chose to set up a government with Netanyahu, describing the maneuver as a metaphorical ‘leap on a grenade’ on behalf of the national interest.

It didn’t take very long for Netanyahu to backstab Gantz, and for that government to disintegrate, leading to new elections. This time, Gantz believes he can dance at two weddings.

In July 2022, Gantz joined forces with former justice minister Gideon Sa’ar, and was quick to declare that his objective was to set up a national unity government of mainstream parties without representation of the political fringes. He also stressed that he had no intention of joining Netanyahu, by whom he had already been burned in the past.

Gantz’s dream of political unity had support even before the rise of the current right-wing government. Among its proponents was President Isaac Herzog, who understood that an extremist government could tear the country apart and take a wrecking ball to democracy.

Benny Gantz, judicial reform and Israeli democracy: Will he join with Netanyahu?

Following his election victory and during coalition negotiations, Netanyahu stated that this time around, he would form a fully right-wing government. Nevertheless, Netanyahu understands full well that his coalition faces many potential pitfalls, and he is searching for a figure he can pin responsibility on – and that is where Gantz comes in.

Despite unequivocal denials from Netanyahu’s confidantes, talks with Gantz are ongoing, with the goal of getting him to join the government when the right opportunity arrives.

Gantz seeks to obfuscate his intentions by issuing contradicting declarations. His previous slogan of “the country above all else” was accompanied by a speech he delivered during the swearing-in of the current government, as well as a social media post on that same weekend, in which he wrote, “We will be here to warn, and to assist where possible.”

Gantz went on to address those who voted for the Netanyahu camp, saying, “We will offer them a stately path, one that is matter-of-fact, and Zionist. We will offer them hope for unity, and not a civil war.”

These comments were further strengthened in media interviews that he gave, in which he said that the government can be supported from the outside. When asked if he would join the Netanyahu government, Gantz ruled out the possibility in an unequivocal manner, calling such a scenario science fiction.

A few days later, when Justice Minister Yariv Levin presented his proposed judicial revolution to the public, Gantz – despite his protestations – rushed to offer Netanyahu a cross-party committee to examine the burning issue on the agenda. He explained this proposal by saying that the issue of judicial reform was too substantial for Israel’s future to be left to political division, and that a broad agreement is necessary. In other words, what he was saying to Netanyahu was, “here is a responsible adult.”

GANTZ’S PLACATORY tone changed very quickly when he called for the public to “rock the country” by heading out to demonstrate, if broad agreements on judicial reform were not achieved. “We will take to the streets,” he warned. He also issued a veiled threat to Netanyahu, saying that if he continues along his current path, responsibility for the consequences would rest entirely with him. 

Gantz then turned to Likud voters and said, “You, the people of the liberal right, those who love the state, should be the first to head out and protest – not against Netanyahu, but against the dismantling of democracy.”

Benny Gantz's partners: Members of the Israeli Right

To fully analyze Gantz’s politics, it is important to look at his partners. Sa’ar, the former justice minister and chairman of the New Hope Party, who views Netanyahu as a bull views a red flag, is a Right winger whom Gantz had hoped would attract Likud voters to the National Unity Party.

Matan Kahana is a member of the religious Zionist camp, and was elected to serve on the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee (Law Committee) which will likely authorize Levin’s revolution. Kahana supports most of the reforms placed on the table – unlike his fellow faction members. 

The National Unity Party also includes former IDF chief of staff Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Gadi Eisenkot, who leads a more hawkish line regarding the Netanyahu government and stated that there is not even a one-in-a-million chance that he would join it.

Eisenkot opposes Levin’s judicial revolution and describes it as a change to the nature of the state’s governing system. He has called for a million Israelis to march against it on the streets, vowing to be among them.

When Gantz chose to arrive at the second demonstration against the judicial reform program in Tel Aviv held in January, it was Eisenkot who he met there. Gantz walked around the protesters holding a megaphone, as if to say, “I am the real leader that you are seeking.”

But do not be fooled. A short media report told of a meeting between a member of Gantz’s party, MK Chili Tropper, and Justice Minister Levin. This tells us that along with protesting, Gantz is also operating along a parallel axis as well. He is seeking to build a bridge over stormy waters in the hope that the moment will come when liberal Likud supporters will wake up and demand his entry into the government.

In the meantime, he is straddling two worlds. The idea of him joining the Netanyahu government is not science fiction. Gantz has done it in the past, when he enabled Netanyahu to serve as prime minister despite the indictments against him, and it is not beyond the realms of possibility that he will cross that bridge once again. If he does so, he will be forgetting his promises to his voters and will likely excuse this by saying, “Israel is above all else.”

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Monthly Brief, Israel reels from deadliest terror attack in over a decade

By Yaakov Lappin

Israelis are reeling from the deadliest terrorist attack experienced by the country since 2011. Armed with a handgun, an East Jerusalem resident opened fire indiscriminately on civilians he randomly encountered outside a synagogue in Jerusalem's Neve Yaakov neighborhood on Friday night (January 27).

Seven innocent civilians were murdered in cold blood, before the terrorist was shot dead by police. A day later, on January 28, a startlingly young terrorist, only 13-years-old, also from East Jerusalem, opened fire on a group of people in the City of David (Silwan) neighborhood, injuring a father and son. The son, an IDF Paratrooper officer on leave, returned fire, injuring the young assailant, despite having sustained severe injuries himself.

These developments occurred days after a large-scale gun battle that erupted in Jenin on Thursday (January 26), in which an Israeli security operation stopped a Palestinian Islamic Jihad cell from carrying out a planned, imminent terror assault on Israeli targets, according to the Israeli military.

Nine Palestinians were killed in a fierce exchange of fire with Israeli forces in broad daylight. Eight of the dead were gunmen, according to Israeli security sources, The daylight timing of the operation is an indication of its urgent necessity, said the IDF, as usually such operations are scheduled for nighttime.

These events have pushed the security situation to the top of the national agenda once again. There is no avoiding the fact that Palestinian society mainstreams and glorifies indiscriminate murder of Israeli civilians, as seen in the widespread celebrations that followed the Jerusalem attack.

When it comes to dealing with unorganized terrorism, the initial government response, as laid out in a series of cabinet actions, appears be a continuation of the previous security policy pursued by the Bennett – Lapid government.

The dilemma of how far to go in the use of force against terrorism is one that every Israeli cabinet faces, no matter which government is in charge. While an iron fist is necessary against terrorists and those who dispatch them, the defense establishment often advises the government to pursue a balancing act, and, where possible, to avoid taking steps that could further inflame the situation. This balancing act includes a recognition of the Israeli interest in avoiding a collapse of the Palestinian Authority and of avoiding harm to the fabric of life among Palestinians who are not involved in terrorism.

Meanwhile, Hamas maintains its usual double game, inciting terrorism through its official channels and social media presence and promoting atrocities against Israeli in Jerusalem and the West Bank, while maintaining the truce and advancing an economic improvement plan in Gaza. How long will Israel allow Hamas to play this double game? This is one of the questions that the new government will have to answer.

Intriguing developments in Iran

On Saturday night, reports began arriving from Iran regarding a suicide drone strike on a weapons production center in the Iranian city of Isfahan. There were contrasting accounts of who was responsible. According to the Saudi Al-Hadath newspaper, the United States and a second, undisclosed country – not Israel according to the Saudi account – hit a ballistic missile storage center in the strike. In contrast, The Wall Street Journal claimed Israel was behind the attack, and the picture remains far from clear.

The WSJ carries the more credible account, but it is also possible to believe that the U.S. supported or even assisted in the strike.

There has been an increase in attacks by the Iranian-led axis against American military posts in Syria. Suicide UAV and rocket attacks targeted American bases in Syria in January. In addition, given Iran's major role in becoming Russia's primary long-range weapon supplier in Moscow’s war on Ukraine, the U.S. has good reason to want to see Iran’s weapons production and storage centers disrupted.

Iran's choice to equip Russia with suicide UAVs, and, potentially, ballistic missiles in the near future, has internationalized and created linkages between combat zones in Europe and the Middle East. This development generates new risks, but also creates opportunities.

Iran is expanding its weapons supply network far beyond the borders of the Middle East, a disturbing development. Yet Israel could, as a result, find it easier to recruit new powerful partners in the campaign to interfere with and disrupt Iran’s destabilizing weapons production and smuggling network.

The long-term struggle over Israel’s character rages

Despite the security agenda's dominance in recent days, tens of thousands of Israelis demonstrated against the government’s plans for far-reaching judicial reform on Saturday evening in Tel Aviv and other cities. While the turnout was lower than rallies last week, the fact that tens of thousands attended (and observed a minute of silence in honor of the victims of terrorism) shows that the Israeli opposition movement is firm in its resolve to continue protest activities - despite the security escalation.

According to police estimates, some 40,000 people arrived in Tel Aviv for the demonstration there, down from 100,000 who attended in the previous week. Around 13,000 demonstrators participated in a parallel rally in Haifa. These protests reflect fact that the long-term domestic struggle over the nature and character of the Jewish state, as well as the bitter dispute over the balance of power between the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature, will remain in place for years to come. A fundamental question is whether the two major camps in Israeli society - the pro and anti-Netanyahu camps - will reach any kind of compromise on these deeply conflicting visions of Israel’s future.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Dangerous adversaries are targeting critical financial infrastructure

By Doron Tamir

One of the most neglected strategic cyber threats existing today is the ability of attackers to target financial systems, central banks, stock exchanges, and financial clients.

The Russia-Ukraine war has served as an urgent reminder of this developing capability. Russia has said that it will target the West’s economic assets in response to Western sanctions on Kremlin-connected individuals and oligarchs.

When it comes to the cyber realm, there are three ways that attackers can do this.

The first involves the advanced persistent threat model, which can be used to strike targets such as a country’s central bank or stock exchange.

As of yet, no stock market has collapsed, but such attacks can be exceedingly destructive in the future due to the role played by stock exchanges as central financial pillars.

According to media reports, Russia created a list of hostile threats, and prioritized them – this could form a list of future cyber strikes. Countries in Western Europe led by Germany, as well as in the East - Poland, the Baltic States, Estonia and Finland, are prominent on the list.

Russia could be planning a major cyberattack against banking systems in these countries.

To build up such offensive cyber capabilities, Russia is boosting its cyber strike systems, while also recruiting as many people as possible to assault Western banking and military digital networks -- a lesson it has learned from past failures.

These developments mean that banks, stock exchanges, and civilian finances must today be considered as strategic and essential infrastructures.

If a stock exchange in a country that relies on it fails, trade and the economy will greatly suffer, potentially resulting in billions of dollars in losses.

Cyber attackers can reach stock exchanges through ‘back door’ access – via large and small banking online systems.

Another way to achieve such damage is through social engineering attacks, which involve manipulating people into allowing harmful actors access to online systems.

Phishing is another way to achieve this, targeting not only those who work at financial organizations but also their customers. Everyone needs to learn how to identify false requests for information or attempts to get hold of account information.

Many have fallen for such traps already. In order to reduce risks, many banks today encourage customers to access their accounts through mobile applications. This makes the attacker's job more difficult, but it does not entirely defend against the threat.

Banks in Singapore, for example, offer a good model of how to build active defenses. Banks in the east Asian country were compelled by the government to create backups of their customers' accounts to prepare for the event of a cyber-attack.

That’s because in the event of such attacks, all banks, digital payments, and credit card use can be suspended, much like pulling the plug out of the socket. If backup systems are in place, financial losses during such an incident will be low, assuming the assault is identified immediately. 

Among other safety measures put in place by Singapore is limiting electronic transactions to 5,000 dollars without a two-factor authentication by clients.

Credit card transactions are limited to 5,000 dollars under the new safety measures and banks must seek client approval twice before responding to inquiries. The banks are also required to perform coordination activity with an anti-fraud center.

These steps should serve as a model for the world.

Hundreds of millions of dollars or even billions could be at stake. Cyber attacks can paralyze massive clearance processes that require for vast sums to be transferred by a specific time. Any disturbance of this system can inflict enormous damage.

An adequate cyber-attack detection system can freeze processes as soon as an alert is sounded, preventing ransom attacks as well as making them unprofitable for attackers.

Russia, for its part, has been sorely disappointed with the outcome of its cyber strikes on Ukraine, but it has no intention to abandon this project. Russia is determined to exact revenge and achieve a “victory image.” In that context, it wishes to show the West, particularly Germany, that a price will be paid for its “treachery” against Russia.

Russia serves as a source of inspiration for Israel's adversaries and Israel has already experienced similar attempts to strike its financial system. Hackers from Malaysia launched cyber assaults in recent months targeting Israeli financial systems, though these were distributed denial of service type attacks that caused minor disruption.

They did, however, demonstrate how a few hundred hackers can band together and launch coordinated attacks against a single target. Israel’s defensive systems were good in this case to repel the incident. Nevertheless, the attack serves as a cautionary tale.

Every time there is an escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or any circumstance in which antagonism toward Israel spreads across parts of the Islamic world, cyber-attacks are launched against various Israeli civilian, government and military networks. 

Defacement-type incidents do not pose a severe risk. However, the infiltration of CCTV cameras in Jerusalem by Iranian hackers and the subsequent release of footage from a deadly November bus station bombing in the city was troubling and should have been prevented.

Israel must respond by beefing up defenses on all of its networks, including its central banking system, with the effort coordinated by its National Cyber Directorate.

These days, cyber defenders can also enjoy the added benefits of Artificial Intelligence, which is gradually taking increasing control over defenses of digital communications and network infrastructure. AI systems can learn on their own, issue recommendations, and prevent attacks, while investigating all aspects of hostile activity.

Israel became a major cyber power in part thanks to the Israeli government's investments in this field over the years.  The time has now come for the Israeli government to make similar investments in AI development and to link this field to cyber defenses – the sooner the better. 

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Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

Will Temple Mount Tensions Spark Another Arab-Israeli Crisis?

By Eitan Dangot

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Temple Mount has served as a narrative that Palestinians and extremists from the Arab-Israeli community have used to institutionalize the culture of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. This is a culture that arouses the masses, is emotional, and can mobilize the Arab-Israeli street and the Palestinians, as well as the Arab street in other Sunni countries.

Events surrounding the Temple Mount can pour fuel on the fire of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and ignite an inferno, literally, within hours.

On the Israeli-Jewish side, the issue also serves as a detonator for extremist radical elements, who preach incessantly for the establishment of a Jewish foothold on the Temple Mount and wish to fly a red flag in front of the bull. Activities of this nature can upend Israeli government policies and the State of Israel’s ability to maintain law and order in Jerusalem.

In Benjamin Netanyahu’s new cabinet, several parties have full-fledged right-wing lawmakers coming to power for the first time. The Temple Mount is part of the political hardcore environment that they grew up in.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s ascension to the Temple Mount on January 3 has far-reaching implications as it threatens the delicate security balance in Jerusalem, in the territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority, and in Gaza. His decision to ascend the Temple Mount in one of his first acts as a minister was a deliberate provocation against Arab citizens of the State of Israel, Palestinians, and the Arab states of the region. It is clear that from now on, every move and every statement made by Ben Gvir and some of his colleagues will come under scrutiny and in the near future will trigger a response, perhaps in words but also possibly in actions.

Before ascending to the Temple Mount, Ben Gvir should have adopted the maxim, “think first, act later.” Still, it is important to clarify that the status quo on the Temple Mount has not changed, and there is no plan to change it.

Netanyahu had the option—one that he has adopted in the past—to instruct his ministers to refrain from visiting the Temple Mount and allow only rank-and-file ministers of the Knesset to do so. So far, he has yet to implement such a policy this time around.

At the same time, Hamas has good reasons to avoid going to war over this issue. The current situation (where Gaza is quiet, but the West Bank is witnessing an increase in terrorist attacks and clashes between Palestinians and Israeli forces), together with the declining status of the Palestinian Authority, serves Hamas’s strategy well. This has been the case since May 2021 when Hamas initiated a conflict with Israel to portray itself as the protector of Al Aqsa.

Hamas is currently hard at work rehabilitating its military force in Gaza, while at the same time exploiting opportunities to improve the strip’s economy and alleviate some of the pressure on it.

Israel has granted some 20,000 work visas for Gazans, who bring much-needed cash into the Gazan economy. Meanwhile, Hamas is strengthening its collaboration with Hezbollah, Iran, and regional terror elements to optimize its position on the day the ceasefire is called off.

In the near future, the Islamic holiday of Ramadan, which begins on March 26, could have game-changing potential in the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel. And the Temple Mount’s role could be critical here.

The month preceding Ramadan is historically associated with an increase in hatred and religious agitation. This is when it will be easiest to spark an explosion among Palestinians and Arab Israelis on the streets of East Jerusalem and in Israel. Israel’s strategy, particularly that of this new government, must be aimed at preventing this scenario wherever possible. 

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

The government’s reforms risk politicizing the Israel Police

By Shaul Gordon

Over recent weeks we have witnessed bitter arguments in the Israeli media and in public discourse over reforms demanded by the new public security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who has renamed his position to national security minister.

Before assessing the value and possible ramifications of these reforms – among them are the powers to govern the Israel Police and outline its general principles of action – we should first examine the status quo.

According to Clause 8A of the Police Ordinance, 1971, the commissioner of police is appointed by the government following the recommendation of the public security minister.

According to Clause 9 of the ordinance, which can be traced back to the British Mandate period, the role of the commissioner is to “supervise the Israel Police, its management orders, activation and all of the expenses tied to it, and the supplies at its disposal.”

In both practice and theory, the minister recommends to the government his or her preferred candidate for commissioner and the government accepts the recommendation. There is no precedent for the recommendation being rejected.

The minister also authorizes all of the appointments of senior police officers – officers from the rank of deputy commander and up – after examining their professional and ethical suitability to their proposed positions. The minister can reject the appointment of a specific officer but cannot decide to appoint an officer who has not been recommended by the police chief.

On all matters pertaining to ongoing police activities, up until now, no public security minister has ever intervened in the commissioner’s work by issuing orders on how and where to deploy and operate the various police units. The minister’s involvement has usually been limited to the general guidance of the police.

Thus, for example, the minister can instruct the commissioner to prepare for certain events but cannot instruct him on how to deploy forces, in which locations or how many offices to deploy.

The role of the minister and the ministry is to represent the police to the government and to secure suitable budgets and personnel. The internal distribution of the police budget is presented to the minister but it is not subject to his approval.

How will Ben-Gvir change Israel's police?

Ben-Gvir’s coalition agreement with the Likud involves far-reaching changes to the law. These changes will enable him to determine policies that will govern the police and which will in effect subordinate the police to the minister, including the ability to alter the police’s rules of engagement.

In addition, the Border Police in Judea and Samaria, today, subordinate to the IDF’s Central Command but will be subordinate to Ben-Gvir.

To justify these steps, the new minister has sought to give the police equal standing to that of the IDF. Ben-Gvir has claimed that just as the IDF is subordinate to the defense minister and his policies, so too should the police be subordinate to the national security minister and his policies.

At face value, this argument is appealing since the minister has been voted in by the public in democratic elections to promote certain agendas. If the minister cannot determine the policies and priorities that guide the police and only the commissioner can decide in these areas, then how can the minister fulfill his obligations to the public?

YET THESE demands not only create significant legal and constitutional difficulties, they could also lead directly to the politicization of the police, to severe harm to human rights and potentially, to violent incidents that could claim lives, as well as harm the international status of Israel.

The claim that the police’s stance needs to be equal to the IDF is baseless since the legal basis governing the military – Clause 2 (A) of the Basic Law: The Military states that “the military is subject to the authority of the government,” and not to the defense minister.

According to Clause 3(B) of the aforementioned Basic Law, “the chief of the general staff is subject to the authority of the government and subordinate to the defense minister.” – means that the military cannot be ordered by the defense minister on his own and without a government decision, to go to war. As such, there is no basis for the claim that the military is subordinate to the defense minister and no basis for the claim that the police should be subordinate to the public security minister.

Beyond legal arguments, the comparison of the police to the military is wrong for reasons of substance, too. Unlike the IDF, the police is designed to serve and protect the Israeli public from domestic threats. The police must act on the basis of equality without the victim of the crime or the offender’s religion, race or gender playing any part in its actions.

Therefore, the decision to place the minister – not just Ben-Gvir, but any minister – as being in charge of police policies in dealing with offenses or rioting is an opening for the politicization of the police and could lead to the alarming scenario of over or under-policing of one sector or another depending on its identity.

Imagine a situation in which a minority seeks to protest against the prime minister or a public body and that the decision on whether to allow the protest is taken by a political element. Could the minister truly ignore his political beliefs and the political affiliation of the protesters? Those pushing the reforms seek to calm critics by saying that the minister will have no ability to intervene in investigations and that the police will remain sovereign in its ability to investigate any individual on suspicion of any offense.

While this position is important and necessary, it is not sufficient. The minister can, under the reforms, set budgets for investigating units whose activities he does not view in a favorable light.

In addition, the minister will, under the reforms, be able to dictate how police respond to disturbances, as well as set policies in classic policing missions among the various sectors of Israeli society, including minorities. This represents a slippery slope that could easily lead to drastic future changes.

Similarly, Ben-Gvir’s demand to command Border Police forces in Judea and Samaria is extremely problematic. From the perspective of international law, Judea and Samaria are classed as zones under belligerent control, meaning that a military commander – in this case the head of the IDF’s Central Command – is sovereign there. Subordinating them to the minister is not only contrary to international law and could be interpreted as an act of annexation but could create chaos on the ground by creating multiple chains of command in the same area.

These steps appear, therefore, to form a real revolution and can lead to disturbing consequences on Israel’s standing, image and values, which have been shaped by generations.

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Brigadier General Shaul Gordon has extensive experience serving in a legal capacity within the Israel National Police (INP) and the Israel Defense Forces, including holding the position of Senior Legal Advisor to the INP from 2006-2016. Read full bio here.

Survivors’ Courage: Educate and Empower

By Michael B. Snyder

It has not been difficult for the majority of American Jews to “pass.” That is, other than physical stereotypes, Jews who did not identify by wearing religious items (e.g., head coverings), especially light-skinned Ashkenazim, physically could pass for white Americans and thus may have escaped being the target of antisemitism; this could and cannot however reasonably disavow knowledge of the problem. 

Jewish-American Pulitzer Prize winner Bernard Malamud whose fiction work included survivor trauma “before the Holocaust was integrated into the American historical or cultural imaginary,” was acting as a historian and a prescience when he said, “If you ever forget you're a Jew, a Gentile will remind you.” American Jews have always been sufficiently reminded but an effective response is elusive perhaps because the comparison is most often to the lack of pre-Holocaust remedies. The appropriate response to American antisemitism today however should be based upon following heroic survivors’ and Israeli historians’ principles to a Judeo-centric model.

By way of background, Hitler in Mein Kampf credited Jews with a backhanded compliment worth noting: “[The Jews] apparently great sense of solidarity is based on the very primitive herd instinct that … leads to mutual support … as long as a common danger makes this seem useful or inevitable.” Yet survivors arriving in pre-state Palestine or the newly created Israel were met with the feeling, if not the direct accusation, that they had acted, as the biblical analogy goes, like “sheep to slaughter,” by having lined up passively for deportation, selection, and death, without sufficient resistance.  Many Jews preparing for and fighting existential wars on the new land finally recognized their bravery and heroism when fighting side by side with these heroes who had worked their way through the destruction still blamed on Jews and around British blockades knowing they faced immediate savage combat. 

Even Israeli studies of the Holocaust beginning at the end of WWII had these victims’ experiences as a side-narrative in a Nazi-centric historiography until the topic evolved to a systemized historical field with the norm becoming a focus on reconstructing the “internal life” of Jews under the Nazis. Thus, in retrospect, it is not surprising that historians in the early study of the Holocaust analyzed the end result without a full examination of the Jewish perspective of, for example, considering the creation of a partisan resistance group, as did those nationalists who came together as countrymen. Historians’ full examination revealed the virtual impossibility of such a large-scale Jewish partisan movement, revealing instead that Jews consciously deliberated the potential impact on family and community who would suffer from group retribution.

These Jews either in hiding or ghettos also were operating without benefit of reliable information regarding concentration and subsequently death camps, as opposed to the premature conjecture of historians concluding that both Germans and European Jews were aware of what was the true definition of “deportation.” Predating the Yad Vashem memorial’s opening in 1953, Israeli historians began acquiring personal testimonies of survivors thereby beginning to bring the Jews’ experience to full light, a revolutionary academic evolution that eventually led to global initiatives including but certainly not limited to Stephen Spielberg leading a gathering of 54,000 personal testimonies. 

Appropriately researching and collecting data constructing the appropriate narrative to more accurately define today’s continued and mainstream American antisemitism must rely on these past mistakes and subsequent recalibration. Despite that antisemitic tropes claiming that Jews control the government, banks, Hollywood – in fact the entire world and outer space – there is not yet a sufficient response to what is being called an “outbreak” by traditional media. To the contrary, it is well-documented that antisemitism has been the norm throughout history, including in the quiet parts of America, and the outlier here is the attempt to frame today’s recognition as unique or somewhat of an unsuspected rally against a cultural norm.  

To borrow a phrase from those who lived under the Nazi regime, American Jews may be operating under the “if this is as bad as it gets, we will be fine” and/or “we are loyal citizens and this is only temporary” illusion. This is not to assign blame to those under attack, but a necessary question as to whether those are reasonable responses by those living in a country where (outside of Israel) the adage is, “Jews have never been as accepted or successful.”  Unfortunately, that phrase is exactly how the unsuspecting Jews in Nazi Germany appropriately described themselves pre-1933 and the advent of Hitler’s Nuremberg Laws began the rape of Jews’ humanity.

We must return to the lessons of the Holocaust without the unworthy comparison of the German government and the potential for an American parallel.  Instead, the heroic movement of survivors to educate the world about the personal impact of antisemitism and its generational trauma must be brought to the forefront if the phrase “never again” is to be considered something to work towards rather than a hopeful bumper sticker.  It is time to approach antisemitism from the Jews’ point of view, utilizing testimonies describing the impact on individuals from today’s burgeoning attacks.  Like survivors’ testimonies, this will broadcast the personal trauma with factual accounts and, if nothing else, create community among Jews against the common enemy of antisemitism.  It reverses the apparent trend of generations in America being unable or unwilling to pass down personal experiences with antisemitism, including being refused employment at professional firms and corporations, subjected to quotas both as professors and students, systematically barred from country clubs, banned from buying homes in “white” neighborhoods (both officially by deed restrictions and unofficially through sellers rebuffing Jews).  Historical data shows clearly that while American antisemitism took a break during WWII (when it was un-American to side with the enemy Nazis by disparaging Jews), antisemitism until today is as much a part of Jewish-American history as Nobel prizes and Pulitzers. 

Just as survivors overcame well-documented trauma and tragedy, unable to tell their stories even to their closest family members, their bravery in coming forward is the ideal model that not only ties Jews to their past but could possibly accomplish the original goal of the survivors’ testimonies: educate to empower. It is time to, as the testimony of each survivor did, change the narrative from antisemitism as an attack against Jews as a group to each instance being a crime against a person, e.g., a child in middle school, a senior citizen, or a religious person going to pray. When a target is an innocent person with a voice and face instead of a maligned, disdained faceless entity, those who might otherwise turn away may find compassion and Jews may begin to take down established walls within communities.  At the very least, it will place the problem squarely in front of all Jews in an impactful way thus making it more difficult to turn aside from something which the viewer may believe is not that troubling, or not happening in his or her neighborhood.

Relying upon teachings from the past has sustained Jews since Biblical times, and learning from survivors recognizes and utilizes that tradition. Unleashing Judaism’s most effective weapon – the continued yearning of return to the collective path -- can be accomplished by utilizing a successful model that once again could bring redemption from a villainous enemy.

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Michael B. Snyder is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute, he is an attorney with over 35 years of experience in the areas of children’s rights, human rights and Non-Government Organizations in the United States, Israel and Africa. Read full bio here.

Welcome to the new Netanyahu era

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

After five tumultuous election cycles held in the space of three-and-a-half years, and a government that lasted not much more than a year, the sixth Netanyahu government has reached the runaway and is ready to take off and deliver political stability for the State of Israel.

Political stability will be this government’s first goal since that is precisely what has been lacking in Israel. As in any country, instability causes citizens to suffer, so wherever one may be on the political map, political stability will be a positive development.

The current mood among sections of the Israeli public is reminiscent of the 1970s, when, in 1977, Menachem Begin and his Likud party were elected for the first time, triggering hysteria.

Then, as now, some Israelis are overjoyed that they got the government they voted for. The pro-Netanyahu camp is also happy that a prime minister from the largest political party formed the government, unlike the former setup, which was based on a government led by a prime minister (Naftali Bennett) at the head of a party with just six Knesset seats.   

Fueled by the largely left-wing Israeli media, the anti-Netanyahu camp is frightened to the point that some of its members believe that the LGBT community is facing Iranian-style repression.

This fear is completely baseless. There are always extremist views in any government, right or left, but these are generally fringe voices. National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, for example, was a volatile hilltop youth activist who came from the extreme fringes of the political map in the past. Yet today, Israelis elected him to restore their sense of personal security. While many issues compete for the Israeli voter’s attention, personal security is a fundamental one that wins elections and places people in positions of power in this country.

Now, the State of Israel has a full-on right-wing government, reflecting the majority of the voters’ will. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, is still distributing roles – and already, he has unhappy campers in his party to deal with.

Likud Knesset Members Eli Cohen and Yisrael Katz will alternate as foreign ministers. This isn't the most sensible setup; will international leaders have to go online to find out who Israel’s foreign minister is on any given day?

Netanyahu also named close confidante Ron Dermer as minister for strategic affairs. This is truly an unusual move. Dermer was not elected, yet now is in a cabinet position. Only time will reveal whether the appointment will pay off and whether it will set a precedent for future professional appointments.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu implemented a brilliant maneuver by appointing the only gay Likud Knesset Member, Amir Ohana, as Knesset Speaker.

This position is one of the seven official symbols of state sovereignty. While political observers were waiting to see whether Netanyahu would appoint the moderate Likud figure of Ofir Akunis, or the firebrand politician Dudi Amsalem as Speaker, Netanyahu surprised everyone and selected Ohana, thereby contradicting the claims that his new government will be homophobic.

Several MKs have been designated ministers without portfolios, which is a shame since the government should be prioritizing its civilians over the needs of politicians.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s inauguration ceremony on December 29 was both stormy and jubilant, depending on where one sat in the Knesset.

Unlike prior governments, which relied on strained, artificial political arrangements and the narrowest of majorities, Netanyahu has a comfortable majority this time and has more room to maneuver. Even if he is pressed by the more extreme elements in his government, he has the margin to deal with that pressure.

Shas chairman Aryeh Deri who was convicted of criminal tax misconduct will serve as both health and interior minister in this government, two important positions, begging the question of just how far Netanyahu is prepared to go to placate his coalition partners.

Ultimately, the real showdown now is between Netanyahu and the Israeli media.

In each of the five election rounds so far, pro- and anti-Netanyahu camps battled it out, and this time, the Netanyahu camp triumphed.

Netanyahu was always certain that he would win. He went out into the “wilderness” of the opposition, patiently bided his time, and returned.

This government is facing an avalanche of criticism before it has even got to work. But it is important to keep in mind that it also had a lot of public support in Israel.

The big question now is how will it perform. Will it fail as its detractors predict? Or will it follow in the footsteps of Begin, who went on to sign a peace treaty with Egypt and disproved the fears that dominated sections of the country in the 1970s?

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

Israel's new government braces for Palestinian escalation

By David Hacham

With Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu forming his new government, the Palestinian Authority has little to no expectation that the diplomatic process with Israel will be resumed in the near future. Since Netanyahu’s victory in the November 1 election, Palestinian rhetoric toward Israel has been radical and antagonistic.

From the Palestinian perspective, the new Netanyahu government with its overtly right-wing coalition partners places a breakthrough with Israel in the realm of the impossible. In late December, the Fatah Revolutionary Council led by Palestinian Authority head Mahmoud Abbas described the incoming government as “a gang of murderers who will prove beyond question that Israel is an apartheid state.”

The council added that the government’s planned agenda for the future of the West Bank will trigger a major explosion if the international community does not intervene “and prevent Israel from realizing its bloody ambitions.” The council also endorsed Palestinian resistance measures, noting that these should be conducted in accordance with international law.

Abbas addressed the council meeting in Ramallah and offered his pessimistic outlook. Radical figures have risen to power in Israel, he said, obligating Palestinians to oppose the fascist new government.

Of the many, potentially unacceptable decisions, from the Palestinian perspective, that are likely to be made by Israel, legalizing outposts in the West Bank and paving new byroads for settlers are some of the most immediate concerns. The PA states such moves will make a future Palestinian independent state essentially unattainable.

Netanyahu will act responsibly, but the Palestinian arena is volatile

Netanyahu is clearly aware of these worries, which exist not only on the Palestinian side but also among pragmatic Sunni Arab states, including the Gulf States that are now in open partnership with Israel under the Abraham Accords.

Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf States, the United States administration, and European Union members have all recently declared their unwavering support for the goal of an independent Palestinian state.

As a result of these pressures, Netanyahu will likely act as a responsible adult and support a balanced, pragmatic approach toward the Palestinians while reigning in his government’s more radical elements. In addition, Netanyahu’s stated goal of broadening the normalization circle to include Saudi Arabia will depend on the adoption of such a pragmatic approach.

In the meantime, the Palestinian arena is volatile, with escalating security incidents reaching near-boiling points. The determination of terrorist organizations and individuals operating outside of organized frameworks to conduct attacks against Israeli targets is currently sky-high, as is planning for the execution of such attacks.

The significant spike in tensions and security incidents in the West Bank, the continued protests by Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails, particularly around the issue of administrative detention, combined with growing fears about the Israeli government’s capacity to manage radical ideological elements within its ranks could set the stage for a third intifada.

EARLY SIGNS of such a scenario are already visible. Frequent violent clashes occur regularly between the IDF and Palestinian terrorists, as well as between Israeli civilians living in the West Bank and Palestinian civilians.

Attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians by Palestinian gunmen who have a clear organizational affiliation, as well as those with no such affiliation, have risen starkly this past year. Clashes are also taking place in known flashpoints between the IDF and Palestinian rioters, as well as between Israeli and Palestinian civilians.

Meanwhile, there have been numerous incidents of firebombings, rock throwing, and the planting of explosives by terrorists along West Bank roads and at other flashpoints in the territory. According to figures from various sources, some 170 Palestinians have been killed in clashes with the IDF since the start of the year, with most of them, although not all, involving armed combatants and terrorists.

As a result, the PA leadership is attempting to take advantage of the large number of Palestinian casualties in order to destroy Israel’s credibility, undermine its worldwide reputation and rally the international community against the incoming Netanyahu government.

Abbas voiced this escalatory and adversarial strategy in his comments to the Fatah Revolutionary Council when he vowed that the PA would expand political and popular protests, though he did not go into details regarding what those protests would look like.

Abbas has long-held a dual approach to the issue of Palestinian violence, condemning armed terror attacks on Israelis in the past but also supporting all recent terrorists, irrespective of whether they opened fire, stabbed or threw explosives at Israelis.

It is worth noting that in a recent media interview, Abbas stated that he had previously opposed armed conflict with Israel but warned that his opinion could change in light of Israel’s behavior. Such comments reflect the stress and frustration that Abbas and the PA are currently experiencing. Nevertheless, security coordination between Israel and the PA is continuing at this stage.

Under these circumstances, Palestinians continue to stand still, failing to move toward any of their political and strategic objectives. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of increased tensions and violence in the West Bank, the relative calm in Gaza stands in stark contrast.

From its vantage point in Gaza, Hamas will keep a close eye on events at sensitive ignition points, particularly the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, and on the escalating situation in the West Bank, searching for new ways to boost its foothold there.

Hamas is exploiting the current escalation, planning its next moves and marketing itself as the future leadership of the entire Palestinian people in place of the PA and Fatah.

In light of this, PA security forces have begun a campaign of arrests of Hamas operatives and it is fair to assume that Israeli intelligence is enabling some of these arrests.

Under these conditions, Israel must project the message that the political process has not been removed from the table, as part of an effort to prevent escalatory patterns that could quickly spin out of control.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Israel Is Preparing For A Third Lebanon War

By Avishai Levi

Quietly, the Israel Defense Forces is preparing intensively for its main war scenario – a potential Third Lebanon War against Hezbollah.

The primary threat posed by Hezbollah is its mammoth rocket and missile arsenal, which includes long-range and precision weapons.

In the event of war, the Israeli Air Force together with the Israeli ground forces will have to deal with this grave threat to the home front.

In the opening phase of a war, the IDF will need to be able to launch air and ground strikes of various types to target Hezbollah’s long-range projectiles.

If necessary, the ground forces will, parallel to these strikes, have to move into Lebanon in order to reach launch zones and suppress fire against the Israeli home front.

The IAF has a strong ability to operate under fire, even with Hezbollah targeting its airbases. Israel possesses the most advanced air defense systems in the world.

These defense systems will defend the State of Israel, including critical civilian infrastructure, and they will also be able to defend themselves in the face of expected Hezbollah attempts to harm Israel’s air defense batteries.

The IDF has an entire combat doctrine for operating under this type of threat and is fully aware that it would be a major target of Hezbollah’s firepower in a future conflict.

Offensively, the IDF has built up a large database of different types of targets. This is the product of hard intelligence work, aimed at enabling the IDF to strike during the opening phase, as combat progresses, and through to the end of the war.

Israel must be able to target Hezbollah’s precision and statistical projectile launchers, as well as its array of unmanned aerial vehicles, themselves part of Hezbollah’s precision strike capabilities.

One of the IAF’s main objectives in such a scenario will be to shorten the length of the war. This can be done by targeting Hezbollah’s leadership, its command centers, and other pressure points, including targets belonging to the Lebanese state.

The IDF’s meticulous preparations include such operational planning.

The IAF is able to strike thousands of targets per 24 hours and knows the precise coordinates for its targets. All it needs to do is prioritize which targets to hit first, and those priorities will guide the IAF’s actions on the given days.

In addition, the IAF will be able to gather information on new emerging targets in real-time. Even without such new targets, the IDF has sufficient numbers of targets in its databases to operate effectively for weeks.

In addition, in such a scenario, the IDF must be able to deal with disruptive activities from Syria, such as electronic warfare incidents. While the IDF has an interest in isolating the Lebanese arena during a future war, it must also be prepared for scenarios such as Syrian and Russian interference operations, though these are unlikely to be kinetic.

During a war, Iran can be expected to attempt to resupply Hezbollah with weapons through cross-border smuggling from Syria to Lebanon. This means that the IDF must be able to detect and interrupt these resupply efforts, just as it does during routine times in its campaign between the wars.

Russia’s presence in Syria cannot be discounted. Russia remains a major power with the ability to influence what Israel can and cannot do in the northern arenas.

This means that Israel will have to coordinate with Russia in the event of a war with Hezbollah in terms of communicating to it what Israel is doing, where and when, and to make it clear that this does not contradict Russia’s strategic interests. Doing so will minimize Russian interference operations.

If Israel reaches a situation during a war in Lebanon in which it must attack targets in Syria, such as in Damascus, Aleppo, or along the Syrian-Lebanese border, due to Iranian weapons supply efforts, its air platforms may face disruptive measures from Russia.

Israel will need to tread carefully in this kind of scenario.

A ground maneuver component in Lebanon will be critical to winning the war rapidly and effectively. This means being able to deceive the enemy and to land ground forces in ways that surprise it, while deploying forces to where they are needed.

The Lebanese state will also end up paying a price for being Hezbollah’s host. At the same time, the IDF will make every effort to avoid harming civilians.

Messaging the Lebanese population will be an important IDF goal, which will communicate to the Lebanese why they are being evacuated from Hezbollah-held areas, and explaining to them that Lebanese skies will be closed for a certain period of time.

The IDF will also communicate to the Lebanese people that Hezbollah is threatening Lebanon’s most critical infrastructure, and disrupting ordinary peoples’ daily lives.

As a result, communications will be a necessary part of the Israeli strategy, so that Hezbollah is held accountable for suffering caused to Lebanese civilians.

Communications with partners like the United States and United Kingdom will also be vital, and Israel is already preparing its Western friends for these scenarios

Israel’s current campaign between the wars, a shadow campaign to keep Iranian entrenchment out of Syria, contributes substantially to Israeli deterrence, and it is deterrence that may just be able to postpone a Third Lebanon War -- for the time being. 

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Brigadier General Avishai Levi served for 30 years in the Israeli Air Force (IAF), a career that culminated as the Head of Intelligence and Reconnaissance for the IAF from 2007-2010. It was during his tenure that the Israeli Air Force successfully detonated the Syrian nuclear reactor. Read full bio here.

Is Israel's Incoming PM Selling Out Israel?

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

Soon after the ballots were counted and Benjamin Netanyahu had sealed an election win that was set to see him return to the premiership for a sixth term, he set his next goal: swearing in his new government around the same time that the Knesset would be sworn in. 

Even veteran political commentators believed that forming a coalition between the ruling bloc parties would be a walk in the park, and that before long the new ministers would be comfortably settled into their new bureaus.

But reality has a tendency to catch everyone by surprise and it appears that the time elapsed since the November 1 elections, during which Netanyahu has been forced to walk a rocky path, contains plenty of clues about his government’s future.

In this theater of the absurd, there is one lead performer, Netanyahu, who is being coerced and has become a hostage in the hands of his tormentors, who smell his weakness. The citizens of Israel are caught in the crossfire, and some of them have yet to realize the price they are going to pay.

The world’s attention, particularly that of the US, which is closely monitoring developments, is now focused on Israel. According to media reports, American officials have warned their Israeli counterparts that they will find it difficult to work with extremist elements appointed as ministers in the next government. Netanyahu is aware of the cost the State of Israel is likely to pay for this coalition, but he has persisted in forging ahead nonetheless.
Netanyahu’s ambition has been to swear in a government as quickly as possible. He reasoned that, as opposed to the previous government comprising disparate parties with little in common, in this incoming coalition, the parties speak the same language. 

And yet, the reality on the ground quickly disproved this theory. The cracks rapidly emerged, with Netanyahu’s partners demanding that all agreements be anchored in written documents prior to the government being sworn in. Their demands were fueled by the realization that they are dealing with a designated prime minister who is weak, vulnerable to extortion, and willing to sell out the country. 

Under such conditions, they reasoned, why not raise the costs they demand for joining the government?

Negotiations began on November 5 with the first visitors to Netanyahu’s office – representatives of the Shas Party. They set the stage for the surreal demands that have piled up on Netanyahu’s table – demands that will change the face of Israel, and which carry a combined price tag of 100 billion shekels.

These demands include: A doubling of stipends for married religious seminary students; discounts in public transportation subsidies for yeshiva students, matching those received by university students; a shift to “kosher” electricity production; a bill defining Torah study as a means to avoid military enlistment for yeshiva students; forcing school pupils to study Talmud; reducing housing costs for ultra-Orthodox citizens; and splitting various government ministries and rotations in government roles. The above make up just some of the demands.

In a government where everything is justified as serving a national cause, the head of the Otzma Yehudit party, Itamar Ben-Gvir, insisted that he be referred to as the “National Security Minister” instead of the traditional Public Security Minister. Ben-Gvir raced to draft a new law stating that an array of police powers and budgets will be subordinated directly to him, as well as giving himself veto rights in the important ministerial legislative committee.

Meanwhile, Avi Maoz, the chairman of the far-Right Noam Party, will be appointed as a Deputy Minister in charge of the Jewish National Identity Authority, and he will now oversee educational programs. Moshe Gafni, chairman of the Degel Hatorah party, stated unequivocally that under his vision for the future, half of the people would study Torah and the other half would serve in the military.

The leader of the Religious Zionist party, Bezalel Smotrich, demanded and received the Finance Ministry and declared that if we follow the Torah we will be rewarded with economic prosperity. He also demanded, and was granted, responsibility over the IDF Civil Administration and powers over the Defense Ministry unit, known as the Coordinator of Government Activity in the Territories.

Orit Struck, a member of Smotrich’s Religious Zionist Party, will serve as a “Minister for National Missions,” while Arye Deri, chairman of the Shas Party, has paved a path to return to power as Interior Minister and, as a bonus, also received the Health Ministry – despite his rich criminal history.

These looting campaigns by Netanyahu’s coalition partners were met with official silence by Likud Knesset members, but internal divisions and political turmoil rapidly followed. Netanyahu recognized that he was walking across a minefield; he has since attempted to avoid domestic conflict or the resignation of members of the Knesset from his party.

To avoid such gaffes, he immediately approved a measure increasing the minimum number of MKs who can break off from a party, as part of a flurry of new legislation placed on the Knesset’s desk even before the government was sworn in.

What will happen next? Likud MKs will not likely respond to this perceived insult, but their bitterness will not go away, and the lack of trust among coalition members will only grow, as will friction between them.

In its 75th year of independence, Israel stands at a fateful crossroads. Ironically, it was Likud MK, David Bitan who once said that “the start does not bode well for the future.”

May God help us all.

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Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Monthly Israel Brief

By Yaakov Lappin

Israel’s political system and its public remain deeply divided as the designated right-wing coalition headed by Benjamin Netanyahu headed into the final stretch of difficult negotiations between the majority Likud party and its future partners in government.

The negotiations contain multiple signs that the incoming government will break from the status quo that has defined decades of Israeli politics in terms of its determination to redefine the balance of power between the government, the legislative branch (Knesset), and the judiciary in unprecedented ways – and giving unprecedented powers to government.

On December 19, the avalanche of legislative reform planned by the coalition took the form of a bill brought to vote in the Knesset plenum after clearing a special Knesset committee. The law is designed to remove authority from the Israel Police Inspector General and place it in the hands of designated National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, head of the Jewish Strength party.

These powers include the ability to set direct, specific policing policies, make decisions on investigations and on budgetary matters which have direct consequences of police prioritization. Ben Gvir claims that his version of the bill includes compromises with its critics, since it includes a commitment to consult with the Attorney General about such decisions. While it does include a clause giving Ben Gvir power to make decisions about prosecutions, the latest version of the bill states that this will be done in consultation with the Attorney General and the police chief.

During the committee meeting, Ben Gvir clashed with Deputy Attorney General Gil Limon, who stated that the bill is “unbalanced.” Limon said that in a democratic state the authorities in question have dramatic consequences on issues such as freedom of protest and handling investigation files. Limon warned that great caution is needed when passing reforms in such areas and that the professional echelon should receive an influential role. “This process is too fast for such a complex issue,” Limon cautioned, adding that there are too many vague statements in the bill that leave much room for interpretation.

Such reforms join other changes being instigated by the incoming government, such as giving designated Finance Minister and Religious Zionism party head Bezalel Smotrich powers over the IDF Civil Administration’s policies in the West Bank, and inventing a new position for the far-right designated deputy minister Avi Maoz over extracurricular educational programs – a move that triggered a wave of commitments by secular Israeli municipalities to disregard Maoz’s authority and decisions.

West Bank warning lights are blinking red

Meanwhile, as political instability and tensions mount domestically, the security situation in the West Bank has deteriorated significantly over the past year.

On Sunday, Israeli security forces arrested a 47-year-old suspected Palestinian gunman for conducting a drive-by shooting attack on an Israeli vehicle north of Ariel. According to MirYam Institute senior research associate Maj. Gen. (res.) Eitan Dangot, who is former head of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit, the fact that a growing number of terrorists over 40 are getting involved in violence, and that some have ties to Fatah, is a warning signal.

“A growing number of Fatah or Tanzim (a faction of Fatah) members are joining the cycle of terrorism – warning signs of an escalation and the shift to an intifada of terrorism,” Dangot tweeted.

Figures possessed by the IDF back up this warning. In the past year, there has been a major increase in the number of terror attacks in the West Bank and Israel – nearly 300 such attacks - compared to 91 in all of 2021.

The IDF’s Operation Break the Wave launched on March 31 2022 in response to a spate of murderous terror attacks in Israeli cities has foiled hundreds of terror plots and quashed localized terror groups in the northern West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority has lost its ability to govern.

But the ongoing operation has not diminished the motivation of Palestinians to join the violence – a sign of trouble up ahead in the coming year. The volatile situation in the West Bank and in Jerusalem, the potential of the Temple Mount to ignite new violence, the ongoing attempts and incitement by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and others to add fuel to the fire, and future potential decisions by the new government could all see delicate attempts by the Israeli defense establishment to prevent a new intifada fall by the wayside. These attempts include promoting economic prosperity among Palestinians and granting them work visas – 150,000 Palestinians from the West Bank (representing 30% of the PA’s GDP in their earnings) and 17,000 Gazans have received such permits.

Since January 2022, 32 Israeli civilians and members of the security forces were killed in Palestinian attacks, and some 160 Palestinians, most of them armed terrorists and combatants, were killed by Israeli forces in the West Bank. A further 50 Palestinians were killed in Gaza during Operation Breaking Dawn, half of whom have been identified by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center as terrorists.

Israel to become first Western state to have aerial drone medical supply network

In late November, Israeli aero-logistics firm Gadfin and the Netanya-based Sarel medical purchasing and logistics company made history, when they announced that Israel will become the first Western country to receive a working drone medical delivery network linking all major hospitals.

The Rehovot-based Gadfin company will deploy its Spirit One unmanned aerial vehicle that takes off and lands vertically, and folds out its wings to fly like a plane after using rotors to take off. 

Scenes that not long ago would have been considered science fiction will shortly become reality as the drone network picks up critical deliveries from Sarel’s logistics center in Netanya to fly them to Israeli hospitals within a 200-kilometer range.

“This will make Israel the first Western country in the world to have an automatic, on-demand medical delivery aerial grid,” the companies said in a joint statement. The drones will transport medicines, medical equipment, blood, serum, lab samples, vaccines and more in frozen containers when necessary, saving critical time and lives.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

The Palestinian issue is about supremacy, not justice

By Yochai Guiski

Two weeks ago, we marked, as we do every year, November 29, the date of the historic United Nations decision to partition the British Mandate of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. It has also come to be designated by the UN as “International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.” But even as the Palestinians and their supporters seek to rebrand the day and to cast Israel as a colonial, apartheid state, and an unscrupulous violator of human rights, one must point out the unflattering truth -- the Palestinian campaign is about privilege and supremacy of the Arabs and Palestinians and not about justice. 

Many readers will be scratching their heads at this point as privilege and supremacy are usually associated with white Europeans and Americans and not the seemingly poor and oppressed Palestinians. But they would be missing the obvious truth -- privilege and supremacy are not exclusively white but are borne of deep-seated perceptions of superiority by those groups who are in power, especially if they have held power for a long time. Some societies manifest it in a caste system, others do so by formally making religious or ethnic minorities into second-class citizens.

Jews were second-class citizens in the areas controlled by the various incarnations of Arab or Islamic rule over the centuries, and this only ended after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. This happened all over the Middle East including in the Holy Land, where Jews have been living for centuries in holy cities such as Jerusalem, Tiberias, Hebron and Safed.

Jews were taxed for being non-Muslims; ofttimes they were persecuted (although less than in “enlightened” Europe), and were treated, as one Egyptian Jew described it, as “guests in their own home.” For most of that time, Jews were unable to own land, were confined to live in certain areas, and were subject to random acts of violence from their neighbors.

It is no wonder that when the “second-class” Jews were suddenly equal rights citizens under the British mandate, the Arabs chafed under what seemed sacrilegious -- a Jew enjoying the same rights as an Arab. No land was confiscated from Arabs and no houses were demolished; mostly uninhabited lands were bought and developed, but the anger simmered.

Even as the British tore away parts of the land destined for the Jewish homeland and created the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jews were building hamlets and prospering by the fruit of their labor without depriving the local Arab population. Yet, the Arab anger continued to grow. It was “unjust” and “unnatural” and the “good Arab boys” indeed took matters into their hands -- Jewish homes, businesses and hamlets were the targets of brazen criminal behavior and outright racist attacks, especially during “the Great Revolt” (1936-1939) against the British that saw Arabs destroy Jewish communities in Hebron, Jerusalem, the Galilee, and the Negev, killing over 400 Jews (though Arab casualties were far more severe, over 5,000 dead).

Palestinian apologists try to explain it away as budding nationalism and anger at the demographic changes, but this happened all over the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) – it was far from confined to the Holy Land. In Iraq, the notorious Farhud in 1941 saw Iraqis kill at least 180 Jews, wound over 2,000 and ransack the homes and properties of thousands. In Egypt, attacks on Jews in Cairo occurred in 1938 and 1945. The racist treatment intensified to a crescendo of violence against Jews as Israel was established – attacks on Jews were the norm, their properties were confiscated, and many were arrested or detained in camps. Around nine hundred thousand Jews were thus forced to migrate and leave most of their property behind. Second-class residents indeed.

Why is this about racism and privilege and not mere discord between nations? First, it was widespread and commonplace throughout the MENA region; there was not a single Arab or Middle Eastern country that didn’t see its Jewish community decimated and abused -- in the same way that no state in the American Confederacy treated blacks as nothing but slaves, and less than whites, after the civil war.

Second, the rejection of the right of Jews to self-determination in their ancient homeland is pervasive. The notion of Zionism, the national movement of the Jewish people, is described in the most derogatory terms – colonialism, racism, Apartheid, crimes against humanity. The rejection of the right to be an Israeli or a Zionist is evident in academia, sports (including harassing Israeli journalists in the “safe environment” of the soccer World Cup in Qatar), culture, and literature, just for the crime of supporting Jewish self-determination in the Holy Land.

Third, the Palestinians and their supporters are out to redefine history as part of denying Jewish claims to the Holy Land. In the Palestinian version of reality (which was adopted by UNESCO, in a controversy that led the US to exit the agency), only Muslims have a sacred connection to the Temple Mount (known to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif). Make no mistake about it, this is racist to the core.

Fourth, when the Palestinians rose against the British, they did so after rejecting the idea of a pluralist country with a common parliament for Jews and Arabs. They were not fighting to get more rights -- their rights were never compromised -- but to return to the “good old system” where Jews “knew their place” and were kept nicely under the boot of the Arabs. Even if one accepts the notion of a local nationalist awakening, one must reject its racist elements against the Jewish minority.

Fifth, the utter rejection of the notion of Jewish indigenousness. Not only were the ties between Jews and their homeland denied, Palestinians and their supporters also deny Jews of Arab descent their hard-earned heritage. They harass Jews for cooking their traditional Middle Eastern foods or singing in Arabic and accuse them of cultural appropriation from the Palestinians, even though these are part of their centuries-old Middle Eastern heritage.

Sixth, Palestinians maintained their privilege through the decades. They are the only refugees that have their own agency, which has received tens of billions of dollars over the years, and their refugee status is permanent and passed on to their descendants. They also have two other dedicated UN agencies.

If you do not believe me, you can just look at the signs the Palestinian supporters carry. They do not hide their racist agenda and they yearn openly for the “good old days” – just look at the sign with several maps depicting the shrinking of Palestine, and you will see a pristine map showing 100% ownership of land by Palestinians prior to 1917 (though many signs now remove that map and only show the situation during 1917).

Stating this is not a defense of the wrongdoings that occur (way too often) as Israel continues to occupy the West Bank. One can, and should, criticize Israel for actions that fall outside appropriate and lawful action to defend its citizens from attacks, and for the unjust seizure of lands owned by Palestinians. Israel’s legal system is largely attentive to such issues and attempts to correct them (if not always in a timely or satisfactory manner in the eyes of its detractors). This very system is now besieged by those who find it too lenient toward the Palestinians.

But none of it matters to Palestinian supporters. They continue to proudly put these vile maps on signs, to contrast the “evil” Israeli occupation, with the seemingly natural and “good” status before 1917. Yet, we all know which system creates such “pristine” maps -- it is called Apartheid. The centuries of Apartheid that Jews had to endure under the Arab control of the Holy Land. Are the maps and those who proudly hold the aloft racist or not? You be the judge.

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Military Aid to Israel Must Remain Unconditional

By Danny Ayalon & CHUCK FREILICH

Israel’s new hard-right government has yet to be inaugurated and a crisis is already brewing in United States-Israeli relations. Unsurprisingly, it is starting with the Jewish community.

Aaron Miller and Dan Kurtzer, highly respected former administration officials, argued in The Washington Post that the US should continue to support Israel’s legitimate security needs, but should not provide offensive weapons or other assistance for malign Israeli actions in Jerusalem or the occupied territories.

Tom Friedman bemoaned the demise of Israel that we once knew, which probably existed more in his fond imagination than in reality. Abe Foxman, the grand doyen of American Jewish leaders, whose support for Israel was always emphatically unconditional, now says that it is and that he will be unable to support an Israel that is not an open democracy.

Statements such as these, by prominent and mainstream American Jews, should terrify any Israeli premier. As Benjamin Netanyahu understands better than most, little is more important for Israel’s national security than the special relationship with the US. Netanyahu, however, has far more important strategic considerations today: how to stay out of jail.

The anguish over the new government’s impending policies could not be more appropriate. Netanyahu has already demonstrated that there is no outrage, no damage to Israel’s democracy and legal system, that is too great, to secure the support of his nationalist, ultra-religious and even racist coalition partners. The Likud itself is no longer just a nationalist party, but a radical and corrupt one.

Israeli society will undergo unprecedented stress, including to the already fraught relations between Jews and between Jews and Arabs. The IDF chain of command and its organizational unity are already under strain. The final opportunity to curtail the runaway Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) population explosion has probably now been missed and by 2060 they will constitute fully one-third of Israel’s Jewish population.

They already present a growing burden to Israel’s society, economy, democracy and national security. Israel’s secular plurality, the phenomenally creative population that has long provided for its scientific and high-tech prowess, and carried the defense burden, is severely demoralized. Many will emigrate.

Netanyahu’s dependence on his coalition partners means that massive settlement and at least de facto annexation will soon be underway. A two-states solution, or some other means of separating from the Palestinians, are likely now things of the past. Israel’s critically important ties with the Abraham Accords states (UAE, Bahrain and Morocco) cannot but be badly affected.

The special relationship with the US, including the Jewish community, the world’s second-largest and critical pillar of the relationship, may also be severely damaged. The relationship is far more than just military assistance and includes a de facto security guarantee, joint strategic planning, intelligence cooperation, support for Israel’s negotiating positions and the US veto in the Security Council, which has shielded Israel from sanctions for decades, including over its purported nuclear capabilities. It also includes deep economic, scientific and cultural ties.

Will Netanyahu straining Israel-Diaspora Jewry ties impact military aid?

NO ONE in Israel is more deeply concerned than the IDF, which fully understands the critical importance of Israel’s dependence on the US. It will take years to undo the damage. Some will prove irreversible.

There is a fundamental difference, however, between alienation and even fury towards specific Israeli policies and governments, and Israel. That is where Foxman and others go too far. It took the Jewish people 2,000 years to restore our national sovereignty. It is far too early, after a mere 75 years, to distance oneself from Israel. Sorry, it’s unacceptable. Support for the state must remain unconditional and inviolate.

It might also behoove Jewish critics to demonstrate greater humility nowadays; American democracy has not been at its best. In Israel, transfers of power have been unchallenged. Israel’s Supreme Court remains a beacon of moderate jurisprudence.

The US dodged a bullet in the recent elections, barely. Israel was less fortunate, but only due to electoral hubris and miscalculation by the Labor Party. The pro-Netanyahu camp actually won by just a few thousand votes, a majority magnified in the Knesset by a quirk of the electoral system.

Moreover, antisemitism in the US is rampant in a way that most American Jews probably thought could never happen. Israel, for all its myriad faults, remains the ultimate haven. We have your backs.

Although JStreet and others tend to blithely ignore this, Israel is far more than the Palestinian issue, critical though it is, and it continues to face dire threats. Iran’s advancing nuclear program may once again pose an existential threat to the Jewish people. Hezbollah’s mammoth rocket arsenal threatens unprecedented destruction to Israel’s home front. Hamas is a growing threat.

In this light, Miller’s and Kurtzer’s words cannot but feed into the growing calls on the Democratic Left for a dangerous change to US policy, that would condition military aid to Israel on the nature of its policies. Even if they were careful to limit conditionality to a specific policy area, it is the principle that is so troublesome. In the real world, distinctions between offensive and defensive weapons are rarely truly feasible and those between legitimate and malign actions are entirely in the changing mind of the beholder. Military aid must remain unconditional.

It may be hard to remember, but the US-Israeli relationship was quite limited until the late 1960s and even many American Jews had little to do with Israel until its dramatic victory in the Six Day War suddenly made them proud to be Jewish. Now, many are sincerely distressed, others merely ashamed. Tough. Israel never promised the Diaspora a Jewish Disneyland, or a rose garden, and the level of knowledge most American Jews have of Israel’s complex society and security is embarrassingly superficial.

Those of us who live in Israel and who are trying to build a vibrant Jewish state, society and culture, do not have the luxury of hand wringing or ill-advised expressions of conditionality. We still have to send the kids to school and defend Israel’s borders until conditions improve.

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Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

The Flawed U.S. Middle East Policy Establishment

By Jeremiah Rozman

In a presupposition-laden Washington Post article entitled Biden Should Respond Boldly to a Radical Netanyahu Government, former State Department negotiator Aaron David Miller and former U.S. ambassador to Israel Daniel Kurtzer espoused numerous falsehoods and provided unsubstantiated and logically flawed policy advice at a level that should be beneath the standards of publication in a serious outlet. Every paragraph is filled with blatantly false statements and shoddy logic. This article demonstrates exactly why the U.S. Middle East policy establishment has failed so abysmally in recent decades.

The authors advise the Biden administration to cut offensive arms sales to Israel, cut diplomatic ties with Israeli ministers, pressure Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians, pressure the Abraham Accords countries to rethink their positions that led them to make peace with Israel, and support measures against Israel in biased international institutions. They make no attempt to explain how or why their desired “bold” response to Netanyahu’s future government would serve U.S. interests.

The authors begin by claiming that Netanyahu’s future government possesses “antidemocratic values inimical to U.S. interests.” They do not define what interests these values are “inimical to.” Some argue that a strong relationship with a secure and technologically advanced democracy at peace with its neighbors and collaborating with them and the U.S. on security, research and development and intelligence sharing precisely serves U.S. interests. While there certainly may be valid counterarguments, the authors fail to provide any.

The title presupposes that Netanyahu’s future government is “radical” while the authors fail throughout the article to mention that relative to the governments of its neighbors with which the U.S. has solid diplomatic and security relations, Israel’s government is among the most moderate by any metric. Indeed, it is the only democracy with liberal protections and free elections in the entire region.

Perhaps the authors are confused about the democratic process. They state that “Benjamin Netanyahu has midwifed the most extreme government in the history of the state.” In fact, Israel’s democratic parliamentary government was not “midwifed” whatever that means. Rather, it was elected by voters. Had they voted differently, this government would not exist. Perhaps the authors should be asking why Israel’s population chose a right-wing government?

The authors go on to attack Minister Avi Maoz, whom they claim, “espouses a fierce anti-LGBTQ agenda.” They might note that Israel is the only country in the entire region where it is legal to be LGBTQ. Its neighbors, many of whom have strong diplomatic and military relationships with the U.S., have punishments for homosexuality ranging from public beatings to imprisonment to death.

Miller and Kurtzer then warn that under this future government “Palestinian terrorist groups are likely to intensify their attacks against Israelis.” Israelis are painfully aware that Palestinian violence preceded this government and indeed any Israeli government. If outcome Y predates treatment X, clearly treatment X did not cause it. Perhaps the authors should dig deeper?

Netanyahu’s new government, the authors also argue, may “trigger another serious round of fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.” They fail to note that for nearly two decades there have been continuous attacks from Gaza and intense episodes of fighting every couple of years. Hamas’s charter calls to kill all Jews and fight until Israel is replaced with an Islamic theocracy. I am unfamiliar with the Article in its charter that states that it will continue violence until Israel elects a left-wing LGBTQ-friendly government.

The authors go on to warn that the new government might “change the status quo by legitimizing Jewish prayer on the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount.” They do not explain why allowing Jewish prayer in a Jewish holy site alongside Muslim prayer in a Muslim holy site is something the Biden administration should oppose. They also do not explain why they are calling to single out the only country with religious freedom in the region.

The authors ask Biden to “make it clear to Israel that his administration will have no dealings with Ben Gvir, Smotrich or their ministries if they continue to espouse racist policies and actions.” They also think that “Israel should know that the Biden administration will be on the alert for Israeli actions that deserve to be called out and condemned.” This follows on the heels of the Biden administration proposing full immunity to Saudi leader Mohammed Bin Salman over the Khashoggi killings and continuing to deal with many of its Arab partners with deeply entrenched racism, and homophobic and misogynistic laws.

Shockingly, the authors want the Biden administration “to inform the Abraham Accord countries that their evident lack of interest in the plight of the Palestinians will undermine their relationship with Israel and damage their credibility in advancing other regional objectives with the United States.” This makes very little sense—why would lack of interest in the Palestinians undermine their relationship with Israel? The authors give no explanation. Nor do they explain what regional objectives with the U.S. would be harmed or how.

Perhaps the most blatant falsehood in this entire article is the authors’ assertion that “for a U.S. president to put pressure on a democratically elected Israeli government would be unprecedented and controversial.” Every U.S. administration, since Israel’s independence, including even the Trump administration, has put significant and well-documented pressure on democratically elected Israeli governments.

The authors do offer a single sentence regarding the Palestinians. They argue that “the Palestinian leadership, for its part, should be plainly told that U.S. support depends on its willingness to hold elections, build a responsible democratic government and curb violence and terrorism.” The authors surely know that this has never been the case and is unlikely to come about anytime soon.

This article is so inaccurate, unsubstantiated, and flawed that it likely would not have been published absent the outlet’s agreement with its tone and absent the authors’ credentials. It reads more like a temper tantrum that Israel elected a government that the Beltway foreign policy establishment does not like, than a thoughtful analysis or sound policy advice.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.