Jerusalem violence and cancellation of P.A. elections are closely linked

By David Hacham

Some of the recent violence seen in Jerusalem and the West Bank can be traced back to the fallout from the recent cancellation of the Palestinian elections, and more trouble could be on the way.

The Palestinian elections train entered its final station earlier then officially planned, when Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on April 21 ‘delaying’ them.

Abbas conveniently blamed the decision on Israel’s refusal to allow elections to be held in East Jerusalem. His decree was signed by the PLO’s Executive Committee, the Fatah Central Committee, and heads of Palestinian factions.

With his announcement, Abbas deliberately avoided promoting a creative workaround solution to the issue of East Jerusalem, such as online voting, or the placement of ballots in mosques, churches, foreign consulates, postal voting (as was done in the 2006 elections, with Israeli approval) or Palestinian neighborhoods beyond the security fence in East Jerusalem.

His de facto cancellation of the elections was highly predictable, despite the advanced stage that the elections process was in.

The writing had been on the wall for a long time. Abbas had been searching for an escape hatchet and a ladder to climb down from elections, since going ahead would have placed his ruling Fatah movement at great risk.

The last time a vote was held in the Palestinian arena was in January 2006, when Hamas won a majority of parliamentary seats. A repetition of this scenario was highly likely had the elections taken place.

The Palestinians are likely to wait for a long time for elections, if they occur at all. In its statement, the PA categorically stated that elections must include all Palestinians, including East Jerusalem residents, and that campaigning must be held without restrictions in any location.

Abbas stressed in his announcement that "we will not give up on Jerusalem and we won’t give up on the right of our people in Jerusalem to exercise their democratic rights."

He called on the international community to pressure Israel to uphold its obligations to signed agreements with the Palestinians – including their right to take part in elections. Abbas also called for national unity, reconciliation, and continued, non-violent ‘popular resistance,’ as well as for the formation of a national unity government that is committed to international agreements, namely the Oslo Peace Accords.

Behind the scenes, however, senior Fatah elements had been signaling for weeks that Abbas was likely to suspend the elections.

Senior Fatah elements were deeply concerned by the prospect of failing to win a majority in the Palestinian parliament, meaning that its chances of being the ruling government in the West Bank would have been in jeopardy had the vote gone ahead.

This is due to the fact that Fatah was headed to elections from a clearly inferior position. It was running under three separate party lists, headed by Abbas; the imprisoned terrorist, Marwan Barghouti; and the exiled former senior Fatah member, Mohammed Dahlan, who is based in the UAE.  

It is highly likely that the entire elections initiative was in fact a push by Abbas to showcase his democratic credentials for the international community and especially the Biden administration.

But Abbas did not want to go through with the process, and found the right excuse just in time to call it off. He sent messages to Hamas to try and reach an agreement over the delay, and to avoid a major new Fatah – Hamas clash.

At the same time, Abbas is facing resistance to the cancellation at home too. Jibril Rajoub, Secretary General of the Fatah Central Committee, has established himself as a central candidate to succeed Abbas, and he has expressed a genuine interest in holding the elections.

The same is true of the Deputy Chairman of the Fatah movement, Mahmoud al-Aloul, who has described the issue of holding elections in East Jerusalem as a political, sovereign, and religious matter, and not a technical or administrative hurdle.

Hamas, for its part, threw its full weight in favor of holding the elections in general, and in Jerusalem specifically. It objected to their cancellation because the elections represented a platform for consolidating its power in the West Bank, and a necessary step for taking over the Palestinian Authority.

Hamas released unequivocal statements that Jerusalem is a “red line” and that no elections could go ahead without it.

It added that it rejects any delay or cancellation of the elections, and that a national ‘day of confrontation’ should be held to force Israel to allow the vote to take place in East Jerusalem.

The elections represented an attractive opportunity for Hamas to broaden its control over the Palestinian arena, under near optimal conditions, at the twilight of Abbas’s rule.

The deputy chief of the Hamas political bureau, Saleh al-Arouri, said the cancellation of the elections would deepen divisions in the Palestinian arena, and signs of his forecast have already been bubbling up to the surface in the latest security escalation.

Hamas holds Israel responsible for giving Abbas a comfortable exit lane, thereby saving him from defeat, and has vowed to make Israel pay a price.

The United States appears to understand the delay. Egypt and Jordan, for their part, had deep reservations about the elections to begin with, and stressed to Abbas the need to suspend the process. The chiefs of Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence drove this point home during meetings with PA officials, warning that allowing the elections to go ahead would lead to the rise of radical Islam in the West Bank, at the expense of Fatah and the PA.

Against this explosive background, and following Ramadan riots in Jerusalem, additional loaded days lie ahead on the calendar this month. The marking of Nakba Day on May 15 could form a new trigger for violence.

A dynamic of escalation has already set in following the cancellation, and it could continue. The motivation by Hamas and other Palestinian terror factions to escalate the situation with acts of violence and terror in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza, has risen.

Israel has chosen to try contain the escalation to Jerusalem and to limit its spread in the West Bank, while seeking to prevent a new conflict with Gazan armed factions.

Hamas, for its part, is also interested in preventing a new head-on clash with Israel, as this would draw Israeli firepower to its infrastructure in Gaza, and make Gaza’s already dire humanitarian situation even worse. In the background, the coronavirus situation remains far from resolved in the Strip.

The remainder of May holds the potential for major escalation, but Israel will do all that it can to try and inject calm into the Palestinian arena.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

A change is needed in the U.S. approach to the Yemen war

By Tomer Barak

A brutal war has been raging in recent years in Yemen between Iranian-backed Houthi rebels (also known as Ansar Allah) and a Saudi-led coalition. Recent attempts by the UN and the U.S. to achieve a cease fire between the two sides have so far failed, and unfortunately have also emboldened the radical Iranian axis.

As a result of the war, Yemen is suffering from the most severe humanitarian crises in the world today. The number of casualties is staggering. Some 230,000 people have been killed (more than 100,000 as a result of the fighting and some 130,000 from indirect causes such as famine and poor health services), and some 4 million have become refugees and IDPs (Internally displaced people).

The conflict in Yemen has a long history. The last six years of intense fighting have led to a stalemate. Each side has dug into its positions, and the country is divided between the two parties (with other parts controlled by Jihadi groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and ISIS). Clashes are a daily affair, and the two sides fire projectiles at each other’s civilian population centers and infrastructure (airports and energy sectors).

Moreover, it seems that the conflict is growing in intensity, as the Shi’ite Houthis are engaged in a force build-up process that is accelerating, with high-quality know-how, technology, and capabilities delivered to them by Iran.

UN reports have indicated that Iran is providing the Houthis with sophisticated drones, anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles.

The Houthis of Yemen are a social and political tribal power who lived in the peripheral regions of Yemen’s mountainous northern region for years and attempted to gain political capital (with little success) during Yemen’s Sunni ruling government after the country unified in 1991. 

After 2011, when the wave of revolutions and insurgencies spread throughout the region, the Houthis saw an opportunity to gain control of further territory. They took advantage of Iran’s willingness to provide aid, and began stocking up on more advanced weapons. In late 2014 they marched south and managed to seize the capital, Sana`a. Since then, Iran’s willingness to provide support has allowed the Houthis to leap ahead in their military capabilities. 

Today, the Houthis control a third of Yemeni territory, which covers more than 10 million people, and they run a full government that includes components of a healthcare system, education, tax collection, and other state functions. Houthi diplomatic missions are active in Iran, among Iraqi militia areas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other locations.

The Houthis area local organization with localized Yemeni interests, but they also adhere to a virulent anti-Western and anti-Israel ideology. The Houthi flag expresses this radicalism succinctly through its slogans of ‘Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, and Victory for Islam”.

The Houthi-run ‘state’ possesses an organized military with structured command and control, including a general headquarters that is responsible for future force build-up, and which features combat commands. The Houthi army includes an air wing that operates long-range cruise missiles, attack drones, and ballistic missiles.

The Houthis have proven long-range firepower, including unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles that can reach over 1,700 kilometers, with high levels of precision. Attacks on Riyadh and the UAE from Yemen have demonstrated such capabilities.

Alongside aerial power, the Houthis are in possession of advanced maritime capabilities and can interrupt the freedom of navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. In recent years, they have demonstrated their willingness to target oil tankers (using UAVs, shore-to-sea missiles, and naval mines).

It must be assumed that the Houthis are continuing to develop long-range strike capabilities. Houthi leaders have threatened to strike Israel in the event of a future military conflict and are believed to be working diligently to acquire the ability to strike targets in Israel, more than 2,200 kilometers from their bases in Yemen.

The Biden administration led a rapid review of U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen. In this context, Washington canceled the Trump administration’s categorization of the Houthis as a terrorist entity (to allow NGOs access to Houthi-run areas), put a temporary hold on offensive weapons deals with Saudi Arabia, and doubled down on its diplomatic efforts to achieve an end to the conflict in Yemen.

However, this approach is only part of a larger U.S. campaign in the region, focusing in bringing Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table.

In that regard, The U.S. is trying to achieve a combination of several short-term goals: Reducing potential escalation that will harm the talks with Iran; managing the humanitarian crisis; helping Saudi Arabia to exit the quagmire in Yemen; and focusing U.S. military efforts to downsize Washington’s deployment in the greater Middle East.

However, past reconciliation attempts and ceasefire periods allowed the Houthis comfort zones for significant force build-ups, which they used to independently build their armed force with good manufacturing skills (contrary to common perceptions) and by receiving Iranian support. The result was always an intense escalation.

A premature ceasefire without a major pushback against the Houthis will likely counter American goals in the long run, and assist Iran in gaining a foothold in a sensitive area, allowing the Shi’ite axis to threaten regional, U.S., and Israeli interests. 

Instead, the U.S. should consider changing its approach based on an understanding that it has a window of opportunity to show firmness on Yemen together with its partners in the Gulf - Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman.

The U.S. has the means to play a dominant role in the campaign, employing air power and intelligence resources while pressuring the Houthis extensively in their areas of control, possibly to the point of defeating them, and at the same time, to better supervise coalition efforts in order to make sure that armed conflict standards are being maintained.

This would send a clear message of U.S. determination throughout the region, and possibly be beneficial even to the nuclear talks with Iran.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

PODCAST: Biden Administration: 100 Day Review

Fmr. Israeli Deputy Natl. Security Advisor, Chuck Freilich Weighs In

The Bennet riddle

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

One week before the deadline expires for Benjamin Netanyahu to either form a new government or return the mandate to President Rivlin, the prime minister appears to be at a dead end. While seven days is time enough for a last-minute breakthrough, Netanyahu’s path to forming a government appears to be obstructed by the very bloc he put together before the elections.

Prior to the March vote, Netanyahu worked to strengthen the position of the Religious Zionist Party, headed by Bezalel Smotrich. Netanyahu helped the party push through the electoral threshold  on the understanding that Smotrich  would help him form a right-wing government.

But Smotrich is unwilling to hear of any coalition that would lean on the support of the Islamist movement affiliated United Arab List and its leader, Mansour Abbas. The UAL, which squeezed past the post to gain four seats, has become the smallest party to date to become kingmaker – and is now a decisive factor in whether a coalition can arise or whether the country will go to fifth elections.

On Saturday evening, Smotrich, outraged by Netanyahu’s call for all sides to cool tensions after violent events in Jerusalem, went as far as to say that it might be time to replace the prime minister, triggering return fire from Netanyahu.

All eyes are now on Yamina party leader Naftali Bennett, who finds himself facing an acute dilemma.

Should he form a government with center and left-wing parties, he would, at the tender age of 49, become prime minister of Israel. But he would be a prime minister of compromise in a government that would not be right- wing. It would be a government ‘of change’ – that change being the expulsion of Netanyahu from the political scene.

It would also include Gideon Sa’ar’s Tikva Hadasha (‘New Hope’) party, which, while right-wing like Bennett, has vowed never to sit under Netanyahu.

Yamina’s name reflects its ideology – it literally means “rightward”. And yet it is now considering entering into a government of compromise. Herein lies the Bennett riddle. Will he give up his right-wing values and realize a one-time opportunity to become prime minister?

If he does enter into a rotation agreement with Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, Bennett will go down in history as the man who ended Netanyahu’s long reign in power. There are many political forces in Israel who want to see this happen, as well as several media organizations in Israel.

Yet Bennett’s voters cast their ballot for a right-wing government. Prior to the elections, Bennett appeared on Channel 20 and signed a document before viewers vowing not to sit in a Lapid government.  

He is now facing pushback from people in his own party. Bennett is facing the dilemma of his life. He could make history if he becomes prime minister, but if, due to its internal tensions and delicate nature, the compromise government falls soon after being born, it could end Bennett’s political career.

On the other hand, should Bennett enter the fifth round of elections since 2019 as the incumbent prime minister, this might strengthen his chances of gaining broader support for Yamina.

The parties examining the possibility of forming a government without Netanyahu are marketing the potential coalition as a unity government. But this government would be boycotting Netanyahu, so the badge of ‘unity’ appears somewhat out of place.

Rather, it would be made up of an assortment of elements, many of which have nothing in common. Nevertheless, negotiations are firmly under way over who would get what role in such a government.

All of the potential party members of the anti-Netanyahu coalition have appointed representatives to take part. Their central objective is to reach the goal of being able to tell President Rivlin that they are capable of forming a government if, as seems likely, Netanyahu returns the mandate to form a government he received from the president. If they obtain this objective, they will receive a shot at forming the next government.

According to sources in Yesh Atid, the second largest party in in parliament after Likud, Lapid is acting as the responsible adult, promoting the message that what  matters most is to form a government and not who gets which portfolio.t. This is a message that is particularly aimed at Bennett. It comes as negotiations about distributing roles enter an intense phase.

Disputes are already arising. According to Channel 12 News, Sa’ar has marked out the position of defense minister – a development that caused Gantz to clarify that he will not take part in the compromise government if he does not continue in the role he holds in the current government.

This threat raises the question of whether the assumption that Gantz is automatically in the pocket of the anti-Netanyahu bloc is in fact correct. It even raises speculation that Netanyahu might again be able to entice Gantz back into a government with him, by offering him to be prime minister first in a new rotation agreement.

While in theory this scenario seems unlikely, in the end Gantz has already made such a U-turn in the past, so it could potentially happen again.

As the political press monitors negotiations over future positions, it remains possible that Netanyahu is cooking up a new ‘magic trick’ to find a way out of the dead end.

As with all good magicians, Netanyahu has proven adept at getting the media to look at one ‘show,’ while preparing to pull a surprise far from where the public’s attention is focused. He might well be doing it again.

As for the idea that Netanyahu become a candidate for the next president, this seems to be more of a concept conjured up by the media than a real initiative. As a defendant in a trial that is just getting started, Netanyahu will get better treatment as a sitting prime minister. He therefore has a clear interest in hanging on to his position for as long as he can as the trial moves forward.

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a journalist and reporter on political matters, as well as an editor for the Israel Hayom/Israel Todaynewspaper, the most widely circulated publication in Israel. Read full bio here.

PODCAST: Rebuilding Israel's Political Left, With Member of Knesset, M.G. Yair Golan (IDF, Ret.)

Benjamin Anthony In conversation with M.G. Yair Golan (IDF, Ret.)

PODCAST: Post Election Analysis, 4th Time's A Charm?

Amb. Danny Ayalon & Dr Nachman Shai Weigh In

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Erdogan faces his most severe challenge since coming to power

By Pinhas Avivi

Recent signs indicate that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been very keen to score foreign policy achievements. Ultimately, Erdogan’s efforts can be tied to the poor state of the Turkish economy, multiple domestic crises, and his resounding foreign policy failures. 

Turkey’s economic situation can be described as an ongoing avalanche, and this situation is made worse by Ankara’s failure to gain control of the coronavirus. Turkey’s struggle to get hold of sufficient numbers of vaccines, despite its agreement with China, is a major source of concern for Erdogan.

Unlike his first four years in power, when Erdogan was able to create a sense of economic stability, and continuity from his predecessors, using the same tools they employed to try and turn traditional central Turkey into a more prosperous region, today Erdogan is far removed from such visions. 

The Turkish lira is down by 12 percent since mid-March, over four million people are unemployed, and traditional Muslim sectors of Turkish society are losing out economically, thereby jeopardizing their support for Erdogan. Significant migration from Turkey is underway. 

Prior to the Justice and Development Party coming to power in 2002, Turkey ran a secular, free economy, but it was Turkey’s inner cities and their traditional communities that rejected the secular approach and helped elect Erdogan. 

Now that they too are part of the economic problem, Erdogan’s base, and his political situation, are under threat.  

Erdogan has little to be happy about foreign policy-wise either. Regional dynamics have seen a crystallization of an Israeli- Sunni bloc, which firmly excludes Turkey. 

Erdogan does not have many good foreign policy options and has no achievements whatsoever to point to. He has remained locked in diplomatic conflict with Europe since the failed 2016 coup and is embroiled in a long-term diplomatic crisis with the U.S., due to his purchase of S-400 missile defense systems from Russia. The latter move has seen Turkey’s role in NATO placed under a troubling question mark – a far cry from NATO’s traditional view of Turkey as a key component of its front against threats from the East. 

When taken together, such factors can explain why Erdogan has been sending out feelers to Israel, in a bid to rekindle the badly damaged bilateral relationship. 

Erdogan understands that without a connection to Israel, he will not be able to influence the Middle East. He also views ties with Jerusalem as his best bet to influence the new Biden administration – despite diplomatic tensions between President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu. 

As a result, Turkey’s feelers should be seen as a serious attempt to improve ties. 

The same factors have led Erdogan to attempt to salvage Turkey’s damaged relations with Egypt. 

A common interest in resolving the situation in Libya, which affects both Cairo and Ankara, has formed a backdrop to fresh Turkish-Egyptian talks, although Cairo has shown less motivation than Ankara in pursuing this channel. 

And despite agreements with Moscow, Russian forces are acting with a greater degree of freedom on Turkey’s border with Syria. 

Despite the common assumption that Iran is a partner of Turkey, the two countries are in fact in conflict. Iran is busy trying to build its hegemonic axis across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. 

Meanwhile, at home, troubles keep mounting. Not only is Turkey suffering a serious unemployment problem, but it is also now facing a student revolt. 

Navy reserve officers are apparently turning against the Erdogan government as well, as seen in a series of arrests and investigations conducted against them by Turkish security forces. 

Erdogan has pulled Turkey out of a European women’s rights treaty and has proven himself incapable of accepting LGBT rights. 

Without a doubt, Erdogan is facing one of his most difficult moments since rising to power. He has failed to achieve a single objective that he set for himself – foreign or domestic, and is in a weak position. 

The question arises,  how can Erdogan maintain an Islamist ideology and his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, while still sending feelers out to Israel and Egypt?  

In Erdogan’s mind, it is possible to support the Muslim Brotherhood’s social welfare and religious agendas without being seen as a terror supporter. But that hasn’t stopped Erdogan from hosting Hamas’s terrorist headquarters on Turkish soil. 

These factors can act as major stumbling blocks when it comes to thawing relations with Israel. 

Still, Erdogan views Israel as a good bet to improve his situation vis-à-vis the U.S. and Europe. 

Turkey’s announcement at the end of March that it is ready to officially exchange ambassadors with Israel after a deep freeze is highly significant. 

This is an important offer, and Israel should examine the best way to accept it. While defense relations will never go back to what they were prior to Erdogan’s appearance, economic relations between Israel and Turkey are continuing to do well and flourish.

Turkey’s geostrategic weight and trade ties with Israel mean that maintaining ties with it that are as good as possible under present conditions is a serious Israeli interest. 

As a result, Jerusalem should consider Turkey’s offer to exchange ambassadors with interest, without playing ‘public honor games.’ Israeli conditions for such an exchange should be sent privately, through diplomatic channels, while publicly, proper diplomatic relations should be reinstated. 

Those same private channels are the place to address Turkey’s relations with Hamas, rather than in newspaper headlines. 

Additionally, none of the above should harm Israel’s prospering alliance with Greece and Cyprus, which includes military cooperation and working together on natural gas, as well as bilateral tourism agreements. 

Going some way to repairing established relations with Turkey is not a zero-sum game when it comes to Israel’s strategic alliance with Greece. Both interests should be pursued simultaneously. 

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

Israel and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): The COVID-19 Pandemic as a Golden Opportunity

By Eitan Barak

The Covid-19 pandemic and allegations that the virus was engineered in China before spreading globally, even if inadvertently, have made clear to all the inherent danger of biological weapons )BW) use.  This category of weapons has been declared illegal under international law due to the inherit inability to use them while simultaneously maintaining the required distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Even the most lethal agents require substantial time (“a latency period”) before the victims are aware of their fate. Undoubtedly, in the modern era, even several hours is sufficient for infected combatants to travel to populated areas and infect masses of innocent civilians.

Therefore, by the 1970s, the international community had drafted a treaty (commonly referred to as “The Biological Weapons Convention” or BWC) with the intent of eliminating all BWs. By joining (through ratification or accession) the Convention, the member states committed themselves to never develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, or retain these weapons, alongside fulfilling their obligation to destroy or divert existing BWs in their arsenals to peaceful use within nine months of joining,

Indeed, on March 26, 2020, while the world was celebrating the BWC’s 45th anniversary, [IE1] the pandemic reverberated throughout in all the respective addresses, including that of the U.S. representative, ironically the state which is the main culprit for the Convention’s intrinsic flaw: the absence of an effective verification regime. Thus, despite various significant steps introduced during the years to strengthen BW verification, many perceived the BWC’s main function to be the symbolic declaration of a universal moral stance. 

Nevertheless, the Convention’s universal acceptance has steadily spread, with 183 member states currently counted. Four additional states (Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, and Syria) have only signed the treaty.

Unfortunately, Israel, together with the r island states of the Comoro Islands, Kiribati, Micronesia, and Tuvalu, as well as five African nations (Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Namibia, and South Sudan) has kept itself completely outside the Convention. Furthermore, according to UN reports, in addition to Haiti, which is under process of ratification, initial procedures (or final ones in the cases of Micronesia and South Sudan) to join the Convention have started in all nine states except the Comoro Islands and Eritrea.

In short, Israel finds itself belonging to a club of only five states (Egypt, Syria, Somalia, the Comoro Islands and Eritrea) having no intent of joining the Convention. Given the other members’ identities, Israel has surely gained little prestige by its membership.

As such, the question of Israel’s refusal remains prickly. After all, in 1969, Israel joined the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, banning the use of chemical and “bacteriological methods of warfare”. Although Israel has reserved the right to retaliate in kind, it is clear that even if Israel does possess such abhorrent weapons, they simply won’t be used, even within the context of retaliation. For a democratic state seeking to be part of the West and being dependent, to some extent, on the U.S., the moral taboo on using such weapons and the expected harsh reaction of the international community effectively rules out any such action.

A serious explanation of this refusal is not to be found in the official statements where Israel has justified its longstanding refusal to accede to the BWC by making the somehow traditional claim that BW disarmament requires regional negotiations aimed at establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ), including the elimination of ballistic missiles. 

Given that such weapons provide Israel with no valuable strategic military benefits, we must turn to the political setting for an answer. However, the treaty’s absence of penetrating means of verification, assured that Israel’s historic concerns over abuse of these means by its foes are irrelevant. Instead, it appears that the main reason for its refusal is hard to formally articulate: the dangers aroused by the “slippery slope” scenario. 

According to this reasoning, Israel’s joining the BWC will broaden and accelerate the efforts of the Arab states and their supporters in the international community to force Israel to relinquish its alleged nuclear arsenal. Formally, this can be done either by forcing accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Israel can join only as non-nuclear weapons state, or by extracting its consent to the establishment of a regional WMDFZ. The latter means overruling Israel’s preconditions for such a zone – mainly the signing of peace agreements with all its neighbor states, including Iraq and Iran, and the elapse of a two-year period following the signing of these agreements to ensure that they are indeed lasting. Armament, according to the contested Israeli view, is not the “disease” to be cured; rather, it is the main symptom. Therefore, if an appropriate response to the real “disease” (the absence of lasting peace agreements in the region) is to be found, the symptom must first, naturally, be resolved.

 In fact, some argue that the anticipated pressures on Israel to disarm its alleged nuclear arsenal may come only after an “intermediate phase” in the process: an attempt made to force Israel to ratify its 1993 signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Due to the strong link in the international community between these two categories of weapons – well-reflected in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol – this scenario is quite plausible.

In light of this troublesome situation and the isolation in which Israel finds itself, it is worthwhile viewing the COVID-19 pandemic as a unique window of opportunity in which to do “the right thing” and join the BWC. The pandemic provides Israel with the framework as well as the valuable justification for taking such a step while making it very difficult for her adversaries to misrepresent her joining. Should it join the BWC, Israel can be portrayed as a nation that, by virtue of the current unique circumstances, knows how to set aside the trivial political considerations belonging to a pre-Coronavirus world. Any abusive attempt to realize the “slippery slope” would then be perceived very negatively.    

Eighteen years ago, Avner Cohen wrote with respect to the BWC that: “The time has come” for Israel “to [finally-EB] put itself squarely on the ‘right’ side, that of Western civilization”. If this was a call for action in the pre-COVID world, it is surely a cry for action in its wake.

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Dr. Eitan Barak is a senior researcher at the International Relations Department, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Prior to joining the Department, Dr. Barak was a Fulbright postdoctoral grantee in the International Security Program at Harvard. Read full bio here.

PODCAST: Priority Iran: Nuclear Program Or Terror Proxies?

Prof. Chuck Freilich & MG Eitan Dangot Analyze.

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On Israeli Independence and Modern Antisemitism

By Mark Goldfeder

As we celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel it is worth reflecting on the connection between the Jewish people and their state; why anti-Zionism can sometimes function as a thinly veiled form of antisemitism, and why the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition provides an excellent tool to demarcate the difference between political discussion and discriminatory hatred.

Zionism is the movement for the re-establishment - and today, for the development and protection - of a Jewish nation in its ancestral homeland.  Zionism is not just a political movement; for the vast majority of Jewish people across time and space, Zionism is and always has been an integral part of their Jewish, often their religious, identities. Zionism and Judaism are indelibly intertwined, for the better, and sadly (when bad actors are involved,) also for the worse.

As the late Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks z”tl noted, antisemitism often looks at Jews as a collective, the idea being that while individual Jews might be tolerable, Jews as a separate collective identity should not be allowed to exist with the same rights as other groups. That is why the majority of antisemitism in any given era tends to focus on the primary form of collective Jewish identity at that point in history.  Throughout the Middle Ages Jews were for the most part a religious community and so they were hated for their religion. As many Jews became secularized in the 19th and 20th centuries, the primary unifying collective identity of the Jewish people was their ethnicity, and so the hatred mutated to focus on race. Today when the primary collective embodiment of Jewish people on the world stage is the people of Israel in their national homeland, Jews around the world are hated and held accountable for ‘their’ state. It is a new focus, but not a new form, of antisemitism.

Sometimes the “new” antisemitism is easy to spot. All too often when people are complaining about Israel it is obvious that their “anti-Zionist” rhetoric is really merely code for “anti-Jewish.” This happens, for example, when people use classic antisemitic images and stereotypes to discuss the “collective Jew among the nations,” as a proxy for how antisemites historically would talk about Jewish individuals. It can include accusations of Jewish conspiracies, blood libels, and the portrayal of Jews (usually caricatures of religious Jews) as demonic and evil. When that happens, consciously or unconsciously, the symbols and language used easily break through the anti-Israel veil and belie the underlying antisemitic intent.

Of course, Israel is not perfect, and it is absolutely fine to criticize the country and her leaders. But when ‘criticism’ of Israel is done in a discriminatory manner, i.e., when the world’s only Jewish state is singled out for disparate treatment, not for what it does but simply for what it is, that is antisemitism.

At other times the antisemitism involved in anti-Zionism might not be as obvious to a casual observer. That is exactly why there needs to be an objective definition of the phenomena, and that is also why antisemites do not like the IHRA definition- because it takes away their freedom to push past the line and feign ignorance.

As IHRA explains, denying world history to claim that the Jews are not indigenous to Israel; denying (only) the Jewish people their right to self-determination; calling for the elimination of the world’s only Jewish state; and implicitly or explicitly advocating for the ethnic cleansing of the region, and/or the genocidal extermination of the millions of Jewish people who live there, are all common examples contemporary manifestations of antisemitism- even without a plainly obvious resort to classic tropes.

Per the European Commission’s Practical Handbook for IHRA, “Denying the Jewish people the right to self- determination and a national homeland is antisemitic because it denies the religious and historic ties of Jews to the land of Israel.” 

That is a particularly important lesson for everyone, Jewish people included, to remember as we once again celebrate Israel’s Independence.

Israel’s legitimacy is not rooted in the beneficence of others; the Jewish people’s rightful claims to the land predate the United Nations, and precede the horrors of the Holocaust. While we joyfully celebrate Yom Ha’atzmaut as the day that the world recognized those claims, no one gave Israel to the Jews, and no one has the right to ever take her away.  

Israel’s modern re-birthday is an important time to celebrate her overwhelming accomplishments. As the only democracy in the Middle East that protects the rights of all peoples and all religions, Israel has a tremendous amount to offer as a prism through which the world can learn about the dignity of difference, the power of coexistence, and the strength that comes from tolerance. But coming as it does directly on the heels of Yom Hazikaron, Israel’s Memorial Day for all of those heroes who have fallen to defend her, it is also an important time to reaffirm the unequivocal truth - that Israelis have the right to be a sovereign people in their own land and to sustain an existence that is free from the threats of violence, force, or coercion.

Last year marked an unprecedented stride forward in terms of the greater Arab world’s recognition of this axiomatic principle. The signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain celebrated the normalization of relations between Israel and those countries, complete with treaties of cooperation, plans for collaboration, and the genuine hope of future partners and co-signers.  May this be the year in which that hope is fulfilled, and Israel’s unapologetic need for guaranteed national security, alongside her undeterred optimism for an everlasting peace with all her neighbors are both finally fully realized. 

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

We Remember

By Justin Pozmanter

Today, Israel remembers those who gave their lives so that we may live. Yom Hazikaron is a powerfully emotional day. I wasn’t fully prepared for the feelings this day evokes when I moved here.

Yesterday, driving down the main street in Raanana with my children, we saw every single street sign covered with black, and inscribed with the name of someone who died for the state of Israel and their age when they fell. Below is a picture of just one of the hundreds of street signs covered in this way:

For 10 minutes down Ahuza Street, we looked at them, knowing they represent just a tiny fraction of the horrible cost Israel has paid to exist. Most of the signs showed men and women far younger than I am now, taken from their parents, siblings and friends, and robbed of the opportunity to build families of their own, or watch their children grow.

Then the siren sounded. The siren is piercing, it fills your mind, you feel it in your heart, your bones, your very soul. Many thoughts and emotions run through my head every time I hear it. The first is sadness for those we all lost. Israel is tiny. It is always striking how much of a familial feel exists here. I didn’t personally know any of the those who perished, but in some way, I feel as if I did.

The second thing you simply can’t shake is the knowledge that the same siren blaring at any other time would send us rushing to a safe room for cover.

However, the emotion that overwhelms me is gratitude. Gratitude to those who made the ultimate sacrifice for Israel, for the Jewish people, for me and my family.

Yom Hazikaron comes shortly after another day of remembrance when the siren sounds in Israel, Yom HaShoah, Holocaust Remembrance Day. On Yom Hazikaron this year, we mourn 23,928 fallen (God willing, that number will not change before next year). On Yom HaShoah, we remember 6,000,000.

23,928 is far too many, and for anyone who has lost a loved one, even that single loss is devastating, but the difference in the magnitude of those numbers has profound meaning. In less than ten years preceding the birth of the state of Israel in 1948, 6,000,000 Jews lost their lives because they had no place to go. In the pre-state Yishuv, plus the 73 years since the state’s founding, 23,928 heroes have given their lives so we will never again have no place to go. Their sacrifice is why over 6,000,000 Jews can now live in the state of Israel.

The world has not changed all that much. Evil still exists. Iran has nearly the same designs on the Middle East and the Jews living here as the Nazis had for Europe and the Jews living there. The difference is Israel.

So amidst the sadness and mourning of Yom Hazikaron, I also feel an overwhelming sense of gratitude to those who have made the ultimate sacrifice for the rest of us as well as those currently serving in the IDF, border police and security agencies. And I am so thankful to live at a time when there is a robust, strong and thriving Jewish state.  

Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

Israel-Jordan Peace Remains Strong Despite Political Clashes

By Tomer Barak

The peace between Israel and Jordan forms one of the essential pillars of Middle East stability. In both Jerusalem and Amman, as well as in Washington, the accords, in addition to the basic stability of the Hashemite Kingdom, are viewed as a top priority strategic asset.

Yet, 26 years after the signing of the treaty, the peace remains “cold” and animosity toward Israel among the Jordanian public  is still high. Moreover, political clashes erupt from time to time.

In recent years, mutual relations have been shaped by two contrary directions:

On the upside, common security challenges, from ISIS to Iran, saw the countries maintain extensive security cooperation. The main element of which is defending the border (and common strategic interests) from criminal organizations and other radical elements aiming to harm both countries as well as the peace. Such cooperation has prospered even during periods of diplomatic tensions.

At the same time, non-security initiatives were introduced in support of Jordan’s economic needs. Usually, with low publicity to soften public pressures. Top examples are the supply of Israeli natural gas to the Kingdom, and the export of Jordanian goods through Haifa port.

 On the downside, despite the abovementioned mutual interests, in the political and public dimensions, Jordanian-Israeli relations are in a poor state.

Relations hit an all-time low in 2017 following Jordanian fury over the perception of how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu managed the Israeli embassy shooting crisis, in which an Israeli security guard was attacked and shot dead two Jordanian men.

The public embrace of the guard by Netanyahu fueled anti-Israeli sentiment, endangered the gas agreement, and lead finally to King Abdullah`s decision (2018) not to extend the land lease agreement that gave Israeli farmers access to land in the Tzofar and Naharaim enclaves. A year later, a move by Jordan to flex its muscles at the Al-Aqsa Mosque (a push to change the status-quo at the Bab-Al Rahma gate), put the countries on another political collision course.

Moreover, the fact that Jordan did not play a role in the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords, and the Israeli government’s announcement of its intention to apply sovereignty to parts of the West Bank placed the king in an uncomfortable position. This state of affairs left Jordan as second choice for the United States behind the Gulf states, threatened  Jordan’s regional role regarding the Palestinian issue and its precedence over the Al-Aqsa Mosque site in Jerusalem.

The hostility was fueled further by Jordanian fears that Israel could try to ‘dump’ the Palestinian question at Jordan’s doorstep, by encouraging the idea that Jordan is a Palestinian state.

This was the baseline of the relationship, but in recent weeks new faultlines have emerged. The current crisis began with the cancellation of Jordanian Crown Prince, Hussein Bin Abdullah’s visit to Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in March (allegedly, due to disagreements over security arrangements), and the subsequent last-minute calling off of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s flight to the Gulf through Jordanian airspace.

In recent weeks, an alleged coup attempt by the King`s half-brother, Prince Hamza bin Hussain, has rocked the kingdom’s stability. Whether this was mere frustration that was portrayed too publicly, or a real move designed to strengthen Hamza’s role, it seems that the current incident is over and the family understands the need to show some unity in order to maintain stability.

Jordan navigates through many other basic challenges: severe economic challenges, a refugee problem, radical jihadist terrorism, and external threats.

The Covid-19 pandemic is taking a great toll on the Kingdom. The country is struggling to cope with a second and severe wave of the virus, and public frustration and mistrust toward the government is on the rise.

Yet King Abdullah, after more than 21 years on the throne, is skilled at conducting a balancing act and reinventing Jordan time and again. The king succeeded in attracting highly needed foreign aid to support Jordan’s  economy.  A third of the Kingdom’s  state budget comes from foreign aid, mostly from the West (U.S., IMF, World Bank and Europe), though Gulf states inject cash during crises.

The fact that multiple powerful players have a vested interest in keeping Abdullah’s rule stable is of high significance.

Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz recently stated that Israel has a clear interest to safeguard its peace treaty with Jordan, which is a strategic asset. A stable and prosperous Jordan is an explicit Israeli interest.

In light of Israel’s interest in keeping its longest border stable, there are some steps Jerusalem can take to promote this objective. This includes extending the existing gas deal; creating new cooperation on the supply of water –for example hosting Jordanian desalination plants on Israel’s Mediterranean coastline that would nourish Jordan’s water supply system; assistance in the field of desert agriculture; further employment of Jordanians in the tourist sector in Eilat, and more.

Such initiatives should be placed on the table despite the current climate, since Jordan’s economic development is an Israeli interest. One way to get around Jordanian public opposition to such cooperation is to offer it in the form of multi-lateral frameworks with the involvement of third parties such as a Gulf state.

But it takes two to tango. There is a need to educate the Jordanian people about the benefits of peace. Embracing the Abraham Accords and showing a willingness to publicly join the regional winds of change could stimulate public criticism, but in the long run, it will have beneficial impact. Israel and the U.S. must do more to show that the way forward includes a better acceptance of Israel as an integral, constructive, and essential part of the region.

Israel, Jordan and the U.S. have an obligation to work together to bolster relations and to add layers of civil cooperation on top the security dimension. The way to move forward in a bilateral manner will be slow and will face political and public friction. A quicker path is through multilateral-regional initiatives with international support. Our policy makers should seek out both paths at the same time.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

We Have A Responsibility to Talk to Our Children about Antisemitism

By Jennifer Shulkin

Many articles are published on how to talk to children about antisemitism, but nobody has explained why doing so is so important.

Some 88% of American Jewish adults surveyed in 2020 by the American Jewish Committee believe that antisemitism is a problem in the United States, and 82% feel that it has increased in the past five years. Approximately 37% reported personally being the victim of antisemitism over the past five years. Jewish American adults seem well aware of the intensifying problem.

For Jewish American children, however, who may not yet have social media or may be shielded from current events, much of today’s antisemitism is not so visible. This is especially true for conservative, reform, and secular Jews who have assimilated into mainstream American culture and display no outward indicators of their religion. American Jews are no longer limited to living in certain neighborhoods or attending certain universities. The rising rate of interfaith marriage is yet another indicator of assimilation and acceptance.

Like many others raised near a major metropolitan city, I personally observed little antisemitism growing up. At school, I fearlessly chatted about my bat mitzvah and Hebrew school. I, like many of my peers, extrapolated that the whole country – if not the world – was similarly accepting of Jews.

Antisemitism is Like a Riptide

Even if antisemitism is not so visible in everyday life, its danger is like that of a riptide. A riptide appears far less deadly than it actually is, gaining strength quickly and unpredictably when the waters still before dragging victims away from shore and potentially drowning them. We talk to children about riptides. We teach them to not fight directly against them but rather to swim parallel to the shore until out of the current and then back to shore at an angle.

Just like with riptides, I worry about Jewish American children being unaware and unprepared for unexpected waves and undercurrents of antisemitism. It is our responsibility – primarily parents’, mentors’, and teachers’ – to begin a dialogue about antisemitism and prepare them before they are in over their heads.

Striking the Balance Between Reality and Fear

Early conversations about antisemitism should strive for preparation and familiarity, not creating fear and anxiety. Conversations must be age-appropriate and tailored to the unique characteristics of the child. Discussing gas chambers with a five-year-old is irresponsible.

I believe that my parents struck the right balance of imparting the reality of antisemitism without disrupting the sense of safety I felt in my school, neighborhood, and synagogue.  

At age six, I understood vaguely that antisemitism was the reason both sides of my family came to the United States; Nazis drove my grandfather from Hamburg in 1939 and my father’s great-grandparents fled threats of physical harm in Russia. My parents made sure I knew that antisemitism was not just a remnant of the past, though, especially outside of America. They explained that many of Israel’s neighbors and people elsewhere in the world feel that Israel as a Jewish state has no right to exist. Similarly, if my family was traveling abroad and visiting a synagogue, they explained why we gave the taxi driver an address nearby rather than the synagogue’s name.

My parents clarified why nobody in my family wore Jewish star necklaces or displayed outward religious symbols. In general, they discouraged me from advertising my Judaism among unfamiliar people. The reason was twofold: first, to personally avoid any unpleasantness or animosity a stranger might feel toward Jews, and second – just in case – to spare myself any risk of physical harm (especially when traveling).  

Through multiple conversations that increased in complexity and specificity as I matured, my parents taught me to navigate various situations, assess probabilities of danger and animosity, and respond appropriately when personally encountering or witnessing antisemitism. This preparation proved to be necessary.

As one of the only Jewish competitors on the national junior squash circuit, I understood that my family could not join certain country clubs because of their reluctance to accept Jewish members. Additionally, as a college and law student at east coast universities, I was able to recognize anti-Zionism demonstrations on campus for what they were: veiled antisemitic criticisms. And after law school, as a Manhattan Assistant District Attorney, I recognized one defendant’s antisemitic slurs as not separate from, but rather the motivator of, a physical assault; despite resistance from my superiors, I advocated to prosecute the attack as a felony hate crime rather than a simple misdemeanor. Had it not been for the ongoing dialogue with my parents throughout my childhood, I would have been shocked by or perhaps ignorant to these incidents of antisemitism occurring all around me.

Filling in the Gaps

American schools teach very little about antisemitism – usually limited to a few paragraphs on the Holocaust in a history textbook or reading Elie Wiesel’s Night. Attempts at reform are underway, but new curriculums on inclusion and prejudice threaten to exclude the study of antisemitism.

Social media and online media are another major source of information, and we have little control over what children view on these platforms. Jewish American parents and mentors can help fill in the gaps in knowledge and understanding that schools and the internet create.

A good place to start is asking children what they already know – about both current and past events. Encourage them to read books and watch movies that explain and add context to complicated issues like the Holocaust and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Review the same materials yourself and unpack them together. Make clear that you will serve as a reference point and want to begin an ongoing discussion. Opening the door for conversations about these difficult topics will make children more comfortable asking questions about what they see, read, and listen to as they mature.

An Opportunity to Instill Pride in Being Jewish and Condemn Prejudice at Large

Children not yet exposed to the topic of antisemitism may at first have trouble understanding how anyone can despise Jews simply for being Jewish. Just as problematic may be explaining that despite some people hating Jews for being Jewish, Jewish heritage is indeed something to be proud of. Trusted adults must help navigate these confusing identity questions.

It would be a missed opportunity if these conversations were limited to just antisemitism and did not also discuss prejudice more broadly. Underscore that centuries of antisemitism have made Jews more sensitive toward, and fiercer advocates against, other forms of prejudice, as evidenced by the mass numbers of Jews walking side-by-side with black Americans in the civil rights movement and today’s BLM movement. Especially in light of America’s recent racial reckoning, we have a responsibility to discuss societal injustice beyond just antisemitism. Discussing antisemitism will open the door to these other difficult conversations.

By teaching Jewish American children from an early age about antisemitism and prejudice, we can ensure that they will be better equipped to tackle the ugly realities confronting this generation and the next.

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Jennifer Shulkin is a graduate of Harvard Law School and the University of Pennsylvania. She has served as a former judicial law clerk in the Eastern District of New York and an assistant district attorney in Manhattan. She currently works as a white-collar criminal defense attorney in Washington, DC. Read full bio here.

CAN DEMOCRACIES defeat terrorist organizations?

BY Daniel Calbi and Abdulsalam Kako

During a live Zoom debate presented by the MirYam Institute in March, Professor Alan Dershowitz, Professor Michel Paradis, Colonel Eli Baron and Colonel Richard Kemp, the authors had the opportunity to assess the struggle that democracies face in the war against terrorism. Although each of the speakers listed above expressed differences in their beliefs about whether or not democracies can win the war against terrorism, there were many areas of mutual agreement that we believe help to clarify a path forward in this effort.

Overall, the participants were adamant that the majority of the electorate within a democracy must not only support the effort against terrorism over the long run, but that it must also perceive terrorism as an existential threat. However, it was clear to the authors that one of the greatest impediments democracies face against terrorism, is a lack of shared understanding of the problem between government and allies, as well as a failure to establish a clear and defined path to victory.

Terrorism is often defined by an overly broad description that includes individual actors devout to a cause, non-state actors, and state actors. The authors view terrorism as any action(s) by any group or person(s) with the intent to cause fear and harm for a cause. Under this definition, the Iraq was not a war against terrorism. Unfortunately, the repercussions of poor decisions and unclear objectives converted this conventional war into a war against terrorism. Echoing Colonel Eli Baron, we believe that recent wars involved convoluted objectives which led to lost support from the public. In America for instance, when the post 9/11 “we will never forget” emotions wore off, appetite for war in Iraq and Afghanistan diminished. Defeating terror groups is a long term sustained effort. Without a populace that is willing to endure that effort, there can be no successful outcome. 

The haphazard manner in which the United States has fought terrorism over the last two decades has been one of everchanging goals, opaque strategy, and wavering commitment. It is important that democracies do not consider the introduction or permeating of democracy to a fragmented nation-state, as victory. But rather the eradication of terror organizations from the safe haven in which they operate. This error in policy is best illustrated by the Iraq war. A conflict undertaken by conflicted reasoning that played out in a manner in which the American-led coalition [IE2] deposed a tyrannical ruler, created a weak government based on Western ideals, then vacillated in the civil and military support as we exited the region. This exit directly enabled an uprising by a destabilized citizenry, cultivating extremism and the eventual birth of ISIS. This faltering resulted in the United States reentering the region to quell terror that it unintentionally enabled. A clear, defined goal agreed upon by the U.S. government, constituents, and allied nations would have done far more in the destruction of terror in the region.        

In Afghanistan the U.S. coalition initially treated the Taliban as a terror organization. However, recently the U.S. has started to recognize the Taliban as a credible entity worth negotiating with, in order to establish a formal government treaty and end the ongoing Afghan conflict. This is not without precedent as there have been previous calls over the past two decades advocating for this kind of compromise. Between 2011 and 2014, one element of the Village Stability Operations and Tribal Engagement strategy, was to promote and facilitate the reintegration of Taliban personnel into the recognized local government forces. Given that the idea of negotiating with the Taliban is a reality of the conflict, the concern becomes if this strategy is being facilitated through fear of the public’s lack of support, rather than it being perceived as a wholly viable solution. Wavering public support was identified by Colonel Richard Kemp as a problem constantly faced by democracies. The moral and political conviction is insufficient to win wars today.

During the debate professor Alan Dershowitz stated that war is only one of the necessary components that must be used to defeat regional and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism must be fought primarily by law enforcement; while regional terrorism must be fought by both law enforcement and the military; and international terrorism fought primarily by the military. In contrast, Professor Michel Paradis was adamant that our counter-terrorism efforts must be through the lens of law enforcement. However, Professor Michel Paradis also agreed that even though these efforts must be led by law enforcement, the cooperation and coordination of the military is key to the success of these operations. One need only look at some of the examples over the past two decades where elite members of law enforcement have embedded with special operations teams and deployed overseas to conduct operations against high value targets such as with the capture of al-Qaeda terrorist Nazih Abdul Hamed al-Ruqai from Libya in 2013. Similarly, law enforcement personnel have deployed to Afghanistan to help combat the illegal narcotic trade, and military personnel that have been trained by law enforcement, have deployed to help conduct counter trafficking operations throughout other regions. We believe that these joint law enforcement-military interoperability exercises need to be both increased in quantity and expanded in scope, to successfully end the war on terror. 

Prior to the debate we believed that democracies had the capability to defeat terrorism but may lack the conviction and shared commitment to do so. Following the debate our opinion has not changed, yet we are now more concerned of the fact that terrorists are viewing this in terms of fighting a 100-year war. Where democracies answer to the people, the public will not have the patience to fund and fight a 100-year war. The key issue for policymakers will be to successfully appeal to the public about why this war is necessary in order for democracy to continue to thrive within and expand outside of their borders. Policymakers must champion this ideal by showcasing historical examples of success, such as those of joint law enforcement-military operations against terrorism and related criminal activities and proposing to improve upon those efforts.

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Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. He deployed multiple times to combat where he led special operations teams combating ISIS, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Read full bio here.

Abdulsalam Kako is a U.S. military officer and current student at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the United States Naval Academy and is working on an additional Master’s degree from the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Read full bio here.

Israel Supports a Good Deal

By Justin Pozmanter

Now that the Biden administration has opened negotiations with Iran, we can expect familiar voices to claim that Israel, and the American pro-Israel community, oppose diplomacy and any agreement related to the Iranian nuclear program. To quote President Biden, that is a bunch of malarkey.

Israel is generally target number one for Iranian aggression. That being the case, who would benefit more from an agreement that actually prevented Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability? It would be foolish, if not downright suicidal, for Israel to oppose such a deal.

This is also not a case of the perfect being the enemy of the good. As a near total capitulation to Iranian ambitions, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is only a good deal if the target audience is Iran, Hezbollah and Bashar Assad.

When the JCPOA was finalized, there were those who claimed opposition was for partisan political reasons or because of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s poor relationship with President Obama. While it is true that Netanyahu and Obama had a famously rocky relationship, it is not the reason Israel opposed the JCPOA.

Israel opposed the JCPOA because it was at odds with Israeli interests and put Israeli lives in mortal peril now and in the future. While another Prime Minister may have handled their opposition differently, anyone who could plausibly be elected Prime Minister of Israel would have actively opposed the JCPOA, no matter who was serving as President of the United States.

A good deal that would justify removing sanctions on Iran would contain, at minimum, the following elements:

1.      It would verifiably remove every pathway to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. It must include anytime, anywhere snap inspections. The Iranian regime has not earned the slightest benefit of the doubt. They have repeatedly lied and hidden nuclear materials, information and even entire uranium enrichment sites. If any place in Iran is off limit to inspectors, the inspections regime is insufficient, and the deal is not verifiable.

2.      It would address Iran’s development of ballistic missiles. Iran has the right to defensive capabilities, and even reasonable offensive capabilities, but if they are not seeking a nuclear weapon, they have no use for large long range missiles and certainly no need for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). These types of weapons are only meant to carry a nuclear (or potentially other nonconventional) warhead.

3.      Iran’s malign behavior in the region must be addressed. It is illogical to again provide sanctions relief when we know it will be used to fund and arm terror proxies and destabilize multiple countries across the region. Iran funds and arms Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, countless militias in Iraq and helped Bashar Assad slaughter half a million people. After the JCPOA, it was promised that being “welcomed back into the family of nations” would moderate Iranian behavior and they would focus on improving the lives of their own citizens. The opposite occurred. Iran, committed as ever to its revolutionary ideology, used the increased revenues to boost payments to regional proxies and has repeatedly and violently crushed attempts by its people to gain greater freedom.

4.      The restrictions must be permanent, or at the very least only eased based on improved Iranian behavior rather than an automatic sunset date. By ending restrictions automatically, the JCPOA allows Iran to reap the financial benefits of the deal permanently, while being patient and continuing nuclear research, before moving forward with their previous nuclear weapons designs from a much stronger and more advanced position. A good deal would not prevent Iran from developing one rudimentary bomb today, only to make it easier for them to build dozens of advanced nuclear weapons in a few years. A good deal would prevent them from ever becoming a nuclear weapons state.

Recent comments by the United States Special Envoy to Iran, Robert Malley, do not provide much room for optimism that the United States plans a tougher stand designed to reach a good deal with Iran.

If the JCPOA is revived, or another weak deal is reached that again enriches Iran while doing nothing to prevent it from using its greater financial strength to continue its most malign behaviors, Israel, as well as most of the rest of the region, will be opposed. If nothing else, when those most endangered by Iran vehemently oppose a deal as a fundamental threat to their national security, the rest of the world should listen.

However, if the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council + Germany) come to a deal that truly and verifiably prevents a nuclear Iran, prohibits Iran from developing the means to deliver nuclear weapons and reigns in Tehran’s support for terror support, they would find Israel, and pro-Israel Americans, the most enthusiastic supporters in the world.

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Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

Mr. Biden, Please Appoint an Antisemitism Ambassador Now

BY David Benger

Today is Yom Hashoah, Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel. On this day, we are taught not only to mourn the millions senselessly slaughtered in Nazi death camps, but also to honor their memory by vowing: “Never again.” Never again will Jewish innocents be targeted for mass extermination with impunity.

For that vow to be fulfilled, we must pair those words with action. For President Biden, on this Holocaust Memorial Day, the clearest signal he can send that he cares for the global Jewish community is to prioritize the nomination of the first ever Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism.

The new Ambassador position was created by Congress early this year to elevate the importance of the position formerly known as Special Envoy to Combat and Monitor Antisemitism, a position created by the Bush administration in 2004.

It is incumbent upon President Biden to appoint a dynamic, energetic, worldly person with charisma and courage to the role. Antisemitism is on the rise across the world, and the new Ambassador’s role will be cut out for them from Day One.

The Ambassador will have to cast away arcane labels of “left wing” and “right wing” antisemitism and address all actions that harm to Jews with equal gusto. Graffiti on a synagogue wall frightens Jewish congregants, whether the words say 'heil hitler' or 'free Palestine. Both acts of vandalism strike fear into Jewish hearts. In that spirit, the Ambassador will have three priorities topping their agenda.

First, the growing power of the BDS movement and its insidious stranglehold on debate regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be made a priority. BDS stands for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, and its goal is to use economic isolation destroy the Jewish and democratic character of the State of Israel. It operates behind the façade of advocating for Palestinian rights. In reality, the movement does nothing for the rights of Palestinians (other than occasionally costing Palestinians their jobs) and instead makes Jews feel unsafe across the globe.

Recognizing BDS for the hateful movement that it is and marshalling resources to combat it will need to be top of the agenda for the new Ambassador.

Second, the Ambassador should pick up right where former Special Envoy Elan Carr left off in advocating for the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism to be adopted as widely as possible. This will mean lobbying foreign governments as well as private companies, and international organizations.

The IHRA definition is a multi-page document with a chapeaux section that explains its goals followed by many examples of antisemitism in action. The full definition (examples included) are a fantastic guideline for helping decisionmakers correctly to label antisemitic acts of hate.

Third, the Ambassador must build relationships with social media platforms to pressure them to protect at risk Jews in online fora. Consistent with the respective free speech and hate speech in a given complainant’s source country, the Ambassador’s office must help individual Jews all over the world pressure tech companies to take down content that makes Jews unsafe.

To be effective in the role, the Ambassador will have to put in extraordinary effort to build relationships from the very beginning of his or her tenure. The Ambassador should ask every State Department outpost across the world (embassies and consulates) to assign an antisemitism portfolio to one of their staffers, so that there is always a point person on the issue.

Next, the Ambassador will have to build deep relationships with the two organizations that are most plugged in to Jewish communities across the globe: Chabad and Moishe House. Though both organizations exist in central Jewish hubs such as Tel Aviv or London, they also service small peripheral Jewish communities, such as Phnom Penh and Almaty. As such, the intel provided by emissaries of Chabad and residents of Moishe Houses will be crucial in guiding the Ambassador to a clearer understanding of the pressing challenges on the ground.

There have already been rumblings about prospective nominees to the position, but nobody has come out as a clear winner yet.

Most recently, news coverage has converged on Nancy Kaufman as an option. Nominating Kaufman would be a grave mistake. Not only has she has garnered support from antisemitic organization “If Not Now” for her refusal to denounce the BDS movement, but her entire professional career has been oriented toward the domestic challenges of American Jewry, the only Jewish community on the planet that does not fall within the Ambassador’s purview.

Other names in the mix include holocaust historian Deborah Lipstadt, lawyer and Civil Rights activist Abe Foxman, philanthropy professional Karen Adler, and former Special Envoy Ira Forman. These four have many years of valuable experience, but it may be worthwhile for the Biden administration to look outside the box for a person with the creativity, energy, and fresh perspective to proudly represent the State Department in every corner of the planet where Jews are at risk.

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David Benger is a research fellow at Harvard University. He is a recent graduate of Harvard Law School, where he served as the chapter president of Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under the Law, and the Events Chair of the HLS Alliance for Israel, as well as an editor on the Journal of Law and Public Policy and the HLS National Security Journal. Read full bio here.

It Ain’t (Totally) Broke, But We Can Still Fix It

By Justin Pozmanter

Before last month’s national elections, I wrote about the nature of the race and how it had been stripped of all ideology and meaning. With all the votes counted and coalition negotiations in full swing, it appears there will either be a shaky coalition of strange bedfellows led by Benjamin Netanyahu, a shaky coalition of strange bedfellows led by a rotation of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid or no coalition at all and yet another election.

Much of the political gridlock can be blamed on the fight over whether Prime Minister Netanyahu remains in power. However, even if he were to leave the political arena, or be acquitted of the charges against him, it is clear the system can use an overhaul.

The first item that must be addressed is the fact that the prime minister is under investigation. While Netanyahu is the first prime minister to serve in office under indictment, both Ehud Olmert and Ariel Sharon faced investigations while in office. The Prime Minister of Israel has one of the most difficult jobs in the world. Adding years-long investigations while serving is not in the interest of the country.

The prime minister should be immune from criminal investigation while in office – with exceptions for truly grave or violent crimes. The Knesset would, of course, maintain the prerogative to remove the prime minister from office. The criminal statute of limitations should be frozen while the prime minister is in office and there should be a term limit to prevent a prime minister using the office as a permanent shield from prosecution.  

The second glaring issue is that members of Knesset have no constituencies of Israeli citizens. In the cases of non-democratic parties (meaning those where the list of candidates is chosen exclusively by the party leader), such as Yesh Atid and Yisrael Beiteinu, the parties are essentially an alter ego of the party leader and the members of their factions owe their loyalty to the party leader alone. But even for the democratic parties such as Likud and Labor, after the primary, no members of the faction other than the party leader truly face voters or must concern themselves with constituent services.

The model suggested maintains the current basic structure. There would still be a unicameral 120 seat Knesset. However, only half the Knesset would be elected exactly as it is today. The parties would submit national lists and be allotted seats in the parliament based on their share of the vote total.

The major change is that the remaining 60 seats would be based on geographic districts. With close to 9.3 million citizens, that would amount to 60 districts of roughly 155,000 citizens.

Under this formula, ministers and deputy ministers would all come from the national lists, but committee chairs would mostly come from the constituent districts. This way, those most concerned with constituent services would be most focused on the granular details of legislating, while the leaders of the national slates would concern themselves with executive ministerial functions.

The candidates for the 60 constituent districts would be aligned with one of the parties submitting a national list and would be part of that party’s faction once elected to the Knesset. The national lists would still need to cross a threshold to make the Knesset, but even if they fall short, any candidate winning a local district-based election would enter the Knesset. While this could present a scenario where a single MK could be the “kingmaker” in a close election, the fact that these MKs would not be eligible for ministerial roles would greatly reduce the type of personal ransom a party of one or two, whose national list failed to clear the threshold, could demand to join a coalition.

The district lines would be drawn by a non-partisan commission of technocrats and approved by the full Knesset once a decade. While some manipulation to favor a party or demographic group is unavoidable, the commission’s mandate, anchored in law, would be to draw lines that are as contiguous as possible and keep municipalities together.

Because of the way the Israeli population is distributed geographically, drawing logical, contiguous districts should naturally create districts that will ensure every major demographic group will have at least some representation in the Knesset. And, unlike today, the main mandate of those representatives will be to provide their local constituency a voice in national politics.

This system would not remove party loyalty from the equation, but it would mean that half the Knesset would be attuned to the needs of their local constituency in addition to their party leadership, and that every periphery community would be guaranteed a voice in every Knesset. It would also allow voters the option to split their ticket. For instance, there could a voter with centrist views who nevertheless believes Benjamin Netanyahu is better suited to be Prime Minister than Yair Lapid. That voter would now have the option to vote for the national Likud list, while also supporting the local Yesh Atid candidate.

This short outline is oversimplified and leaves out a great many details. Revamping the Israeli electoral system will be complex and any attempt at change will surely be met with stiff resistance. However, it is imperative that such an attempt is made.

Israel’s electoral system has served it extraordinarily well. It is still nothing short of a miracle that people from dozens of countries, most with no democratic tradition, returned home after two thousand years to establish a vibrant democracy.

The system does not need to be torn down completely, nor will Israel collapse if we continue to elect the Knesset as we have. But as the country has grown, and with the benefit of seven decades of hindsight, it is clear the system can be improved. Given the current stalemate, the public should be as open as ever to major reforms that will make the system more responsive and representative. Now is the time to try.

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Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

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MirYam's Interview: The U.S. Attempts To Engage Iran Diplomatically. What Are Israel's Interests?

By Chuck Freilich

The United States is engaged in a fresh attempt to engage Iran diplomatically on a return to the 2015 nuclear deal – sparking a debate over what Israel's interests are going forward. The following is a Q & A with Prof. Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli national security adviser.

How do you view the Biden administration’s attempts to diplomatically engage Iran over its nuclear program?

While the debate on how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state is lengthy and complex, it is important to keep in mind that the only supreme objective is to indeed prevent Iran from going nuclear.

The how is less important than the what, and it is vital to keep the bottom line in sight.

Although the U.S. was probably out-negotiated when it, along with other world powers, signed the Joint Plan of Comprehensive Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2015, the deal back then was, and remains, the least worst option in serving the overall objective of keeping Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed state. 

Despite the fact that the Obama administration was more avid to reach an agreement than Iran was - the wrong way to negotiate - the 2015 agreement was ultimately a reasonable arrangement, which gave Israel ten to fifteen years of quiet. Israel has not  gotten that many years of quiet on any major strategic issue.

The primary criticism of the JPOCA was the sunset clauses. The deal also failed to deal with Iran’s missile program or its regional expansionism, but the U.S.’s thinking focused on the goal of managing the nuclear issue –  an existential issue for Israel and a critical one for the region –  and then handling the other issues separately.

This is the right approach; it is one that was held by many, maybe most, Israeli defense and government officials for many years and still is.

Yet after the deal, Prime Minister Netanyahu attacked former President Barack Obama for years over it, in part because the the agreement failed to address the other Iranian issues. The Obama administration claimed that this was the best deal it could achieve, even if it was not the deal that it wanted.

What should Israel do going forward?

Netanyahu is not wrong to say that the Americans were somewhat out-negotiated. But that is no reason for Israel to now come out strongly against a new deal that the Biden administration is seeking with Iran. In fact, it would be a historic error to repeat that posture.

As it is, the American Democratic Left is furious at Israel, casting a shadow over Israel’s most important alliance. An ongoing collapse in support for Israel is occurring in the progressive side of the Democratic camp, and there is also a major decrease of support for Israel in the Jewish community.

Now, even more than in 2015, it would be a historic error to further alienate these camps. Israel should express its stances behind the scenes and engage in serious debate. But it must also present itself as the major ally of the U.S.

It seems likely that Biden has messaged the Israeli government, asking it for its position, and informing it that its views will be taken into account, but also issued a stern warning to not come after it like Netanyahu did to Obama.

The bilateral Israel – U.S. relationship is sufficiently troubled even without tensions over Iran. The Palestinian issue is again gaining attention and the deteriorating quality of Israel’s democracy is also coming under greater scrutiny.

To be sure, once President Trump decided to exit the nuclear agreement, an historic error, his decision to place Iran under a maximum pressure campaign deserved support. The problem is that he did not have a strategy for dealing with Iran beyond sanctions and it did not achieve its objectives in the three years that it was in effect. Perhaps it could have done so if given an extension, but Israel must face up to the new strategic situation that is taking shape.

What is the wider strategic framework for understanding the debate on how to stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions?

Biden is facing significant pressure from his party to conclude a deal with Iran and not to waste too much time and effort on the Islamic Republic, since the U.S. is interested in prioritizing its foreign policies on China and Russia.

For now, however, Iran is the most pressing foreign policy issue, and the Iranians placed themselves at the center of the agenda. The U.S. will have to decide whether to try to go back to the old 2015 deal or aim for an improved version of it.

Going back to the old arrangement means surrendering the good leverage provided to the Biden administration by Trump, in the form of sanctions. On the other hand, the two choices may well be returning to the old deal, or having no deal at all. If that turns out to be the case, it makes little sense to argue that Israel would be better off without any deal.

How would Israel have been able to take on Iranian entrenchment in Syria and its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon if Iran had gone nuclear in the meantime? The answer is that Israel would be facing a new existential threat, and tackling Iranian entrenchment would become severely more complex.

In a reality in which Iran is armed with nuclear weapons, Israel would have to think many times before it struck Iranian assets in Syria , or anywhere else, including in Iran itself. Even if the odds of a full nuclear escalation are very low, the results of such a scenario would be total devastation. Countries behave very differently under such circumstances. 

It is fair to hope that the U.S. will not give up all of its leverage. One option is reaching an interim deal, in which neither side gives up everything. Iran could essentially come back into compliance and back off some of its violations, while the U.S. eases some sanctions. After the Iranian presidential elections occur in June, further negotiations on a more serious deal could resume.

For Israel, progress between the U.S. and Iran on a nuclear deal will allow it to focus on the vital mission of stopping Iran from creating a forward operating presence in Syria, or transferring significant quantities of precision weapons to Hezbollah. Israel must stop these activities at any cost, including going to war if this becomes necessary.

It is important to create the space and time for Israel to deal with the challenge of Iranian entrenchment. To stop Iran’s program of smuggling ballistic missiles and long-range drones to its terrorist proxies, and to further cement emerging relations with its new Sunni friends.

A new nuclear deal will facilitate this objective.  

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Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.